Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671140 s !JEC/1:eT [(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 5() (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOR: 201918Z - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -------- MAR 03 (b)(1) 10909 . -- - - ----- - -- - - - ·(b)(3) NatSecAct---- -- - - - -- - - -- s !!! C(b)( 1 ) T 201914Z MAR 03 STAFF cITE[(b)(3) NatSecAct TO: DIRECTOR. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct FOR: SUBJECT: 20 MARCH- GENERALMEDICALREVIEW REF: [(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE; FYI 2. AS THERE WASNO WATERBOARDAPPLICATION ON 20 MARCH, THE FOLLOWINGIS PROVIDEDAS MEDICALREPORTING FOR THE DAY: 3. ABRASIONS ON KSM'S ANKLES, SHINS, WRISTS AND OCCIPUT. CONTINUE • E STABLE WITHOUTSIGNS OF SECONDARYINFECTION. SUBJECT HAS SOME PEDAL EDEMAAFTER CIRCA 36 HOURSOF STANDINGWHICH IS NOT CAUSING BREAKDOWN OF PREVIOUSLYNOTEDABRADEDAREAS. SUBJECT CONTINUES TO RECEIVE 1500 CALORIES PER DAY AND ADEQUATEHYDRATION. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT MEDICALDECOMPENSATION IS LIKELY TO OCCURIN THE FACE OF CONTINUEDUSE OF ENHANCEDTECHNIQUES. OTHER DETAINEES ALSO REMAIN MEDICALLYSTABLE. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE • ( b) ( 1)"'em: Ref Prinrptf fi·nm Arr.Mve - 07-.lrd-l0ll4 0909 lOMARZOOJ I Page I (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671140 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 Date: TO: ALEC FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - KSM PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ISSA AL-BRITANI; CONFLICT IN KSM REPORTING ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------- (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct C(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ~ I (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOR: 222049Z JUN 03 I 112095 _; -----------------------------------------------(b)(1)------------'1 .: g R .: T 222os1z CITE JUN 03 STAFF · (b )( 1) [(b)(3) NatSecAct TO: IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO IMMEDIATEDIRECTOR. FOR: _---1 ____________ SUBJECT: (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct-______, EYES ONLY - KSM PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONON ISSA AL-BRITANI; CONFLICT IN KSM REPORTING (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct REF TEXT: 1. \. ------------- (b)(3) NatSecAct ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE NOTE SIGNIFICANT CONFLICT IN KSM REPORTING TO INCLUDE ADMITTANCEOF FABRICATION ON HIS PART; PLEASE SEE PARA THREE BELOW. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 2. DURING A CUSTODIAL INTERVIEW CONDUCTEDON 21 AND 22 JUNE 2003, DEBRIEFER~--------~ USED REF A REQUIREMENTS TO QUESTION ( ( KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD) ) AKA MUKHTARFOR FURTHER INFORMATION ~-------------------~ AND !SSA'S (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF SURVEILLING US ECONOMIC AND JEWISH TARGETS IN NEW YORK. 3. BASE NOTES THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION MUKHTARPROVIDED CONFLICTS WITH HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS ON THIS TOPIC AND WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THESE INCONSISTENCIES INFORMATION IN REFS B, C, AND D. TASKING OF ISSA HE ADMITTED THAT HE FABRICATED SPECIFICALLY, MUKHTARSAID THAT HIS (REF B) TO RECRUIT BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS IN MONTANAWAS IN FACT NOT/NOT TRUE. MUKHTARALSO ACKNOWLEDGEDTHAT HE FABRICATED INFORMATION IN REF C, INDICATING THAT BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIMS SERVING AS BODYGUARDSFOR LONDON-BASED SHAYKH ( (ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI)) HAD CONNECTIONS OR FAMILY IN MONTANA. WHEN MUKHTARWAS CONFRONTED WITH REF D INFORMATION LISTING THE NAMES HE PROVIDED AS ABU HAMZA'S BODYGUARDS, HE EXPLAINED THAT THEY WERE JUST TWO AMERICAN JIHADISTS HE HAD HEARD ABOUT DURING THE AFGHAN JIHAD BUT THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT ASSOCIATED WITH LONDON-BASED ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI, AL-BRITANI, ISSA OR MONTANA. MUKHTARNERVOUSLY EXPLAINED TO DEBRIEFER THAT HE WAS UNDER "ENHANCED MEASURES" WHEN HE MADE THESE CLAIMS AND SIMPLY TOLD HIS INTERROGATORS WHAT HE THOUGHT THEY WANTEDTO HEAR. MUKHTARFURTHER CLARIFIED THAT TO HIS KNOWLEDGEISSA MADE ONLY ONE/ONE TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN EARLY 2001 AND NEVER MADE A 1999 TRIP AS SUGGESTED IN REFS E AND F. DEBRIEFER WARNEDMUKHTARTHAT THESE FABRICATIONS WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT HE WOULDBE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ALL HIS RESPONSES TO DATE, REMINDING HIM THAT IT WAS IN HIS BEST INTEREST TO ALWAYS PROVIDE TRUTHFUL ANSWERS. BASE WILL PROVIDE A FOLLOW UP INTEL DETAILING MUKHTAR'S LATEST VERSION OF EVENTS CONCERNING ISSA AND HIS EARLY 2001 TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. 4. PER REF A, PLEASE FIND SUBJECT'S COMMENTSATTACHED BELOW IN QUESTION AND ANSWER FORMAT. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 5. STATES. PER REF A, KSM WAS QUESTIONED ON !SSA'S TRAVEL TO THE UNITED AS STATED ABOVE, KSM DENIED THAT ISSA MADE A TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1999 AND WAS ONLY AWARE OF ONE TRIP THAT TOOK PLACE APPROXIMATELY IN MARCH/APRIL 2001. REF A QUESTIONS. FOLLOWING ARE KSM'S RESPONSES TO (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671161 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 Date: TO: HQSDISSEM FROM: SUBJECT: CT: COMMENTSBY AMMARAL-BALUCHI ON SAYFULLAH PARACHAAND UZHAYR PARACHA ----------------------------------------BODY--------~------------------------------- (b)(3) NatSecAct r(b)(3) NatSecAct=1 (b)(3) NatSecAct SBeRB-T (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOT: 181929Z s 151 e R 151 DIRECTOR (b)(3) NatSecAct · Y INTEL 181929Z TO: JUN 03 DIRECTOR [ I HQSDISSEM. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TOR: (b)(3) NatSecAct CITE L(b)(1) 39238 301600Z MAY 03 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct I I ~--~ (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 TO: I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 8 13 e R E 'f NOPORN CIA Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 8 Be RE 1/NOfORN (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct CENTRALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY WARNING: INFORMATIONREPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATEDINTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS S Ill g R Ill T DIST: HQ~~J 18 JUNE 2003 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct~-------~ I SUBJ: CT: COMMENTS BY AMMAR AL-BALUCHI ON SAYFULLAHPARACHA AND UZHAYRPARACHA Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 DOI: DECEMBER 2002 SOURCE: A DETAINEE. SUMMARY: NONE (b)(3) TEXT: 1. DETAINEE ALI - FEBRUARY 2003 (A DETAINEE) CIAAct ~----~ 1 ABD AL- ((AZIZ)) COMMENT: THE FOLLOWINGCOMMENTSFROM ALI, AKA ( (AMMARAL-BALUCHI)), MAY HAVE BEEN MEANT TO INFLUENCE AS WELL AS INFORM. AMMARALSO MAY HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY WITHHOLDING INFORMATION AND EMPLOYING COUNTERINTERROGATION TECHNIQUES.) 2. DURING CUSTODIAL INTERVIEWS CONDUCTEDIN LATE MAY 2003, AMMARDISCUSSED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SAYFULLAH ((PARACHA)), AKA SAYF AL-RAHMAN ( (PARACHA)) , AND HIS SON UZHAYR ( (PARACHA)) . AMMAR STATED THAT SAYFULLAH CONTINUED TO MEET WITH HIM AS A FRIEND AND POTENTIAL BUSINESS PARTNER EVEN AFTER THE CAPTURE OF KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)), AKA ((MUKHTAR)). AMMARSTATED, HOWEVER, THAT SAYFULLAH DID NOT KNOWOF MUKHTAR'S AL-QA'IDA THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY OF HIS ARREST. AT THAT POINT, AFFILIATION UNTIL AMMARCOMMENTEDTHAT SAYFULLAH PROBABLY KNEW AMMAR'S AL-QA'IDA AFFILIATION AS WELL. AMMARINSISTED DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SAYFULLAH. THAT THERE WERE NO OPERATIONAL AMMARADDED THAT SAYFULLAH WAS UNWITTINGLY BEING USED TO ASSIST IN HIS BROADER PLANS WITH AL-QA' IDA OPERATIVE ( (MAJID KHAN)) , WHICH REQUIRED A BUSINESS BE SET UP IN PAKISTAN TO DO BUSINESS WITH MAJID'S . IN TljE UNITED STATES. COMPANY AMMARCLAIMED HE USED HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH SAYFULLAH TO IDENTIFY THE PAKISTANI RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING ITSELF HIS OWN BUSINESS, OR TO USE SAYFULLAH'S BUSINESS AS THE CONDUIT TO MAJID. AMMARDENIED KNOWING IF MUKHTAR EVER TASKED SAYFULLAH TO CONDUCTANY OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES. 3. AMMARCLAIMED HE MET WITH UZHAYR A TOTAL OF FOUR TIMES, EACH TIME WHILE VISITING SAYFULLAH AT SAYFULLAH'S HOUSE. AMMAR STATED THAT UZHAYR WAS TOTALLY UNWITTING OF AMMAR'S AL-QA'IDA AFFILIATION AND OF AMMAR'S INTENTION TO USE SAYFULLAH FOR BROADER OPERATIONAL PLANS INVOLVING MAJID KHAN. APPROXIMATELY JANUARY 2003, INQUIRE ABOUT MAJID'S TO THE UNITED STATES. AMMARSTATED THAT IN HE REQUESTED SAYFULLAHHAVE UZHAYR IMMIGRATION STATUS WHILE ON AN UPCOMING TRIP THE THIRD TIME AMMARMET UZHAYR AT THE PARACHA RESIDENCE WAS IN ABOUT LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY 2003. MAJID WAS WITH HIM AND WAS INTRODUCED TO UZHAYR. EXPLAINED TO UZHAYR HOW TO INQUIRE INTO MAJID'S THE UNITED STATES. MAJID STATUS WHILE IN AMMARAND MAJID MET WITH UZHAYR ONE ADDITIONAL TIME AT AN ICE CREAM PARLOR IN KARACHI, WHERE MAJID GAVE UZHAYR THE IDENTIFICATION CARDS AND NECESSARY INFORMATION REQUIRED TO LOOK INTO HIS IMMIGRATION STATUS. AMMARSTATED NEITHER HE NOR MAJID INDICATED TO UZHAYR AT ANY TIME THAT THEY WERE MUJAHIDIN OR AL-QA'IDA. AMMARSTATED THAT UZHAYR DID NOT COMPLETE THE TASK. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE .sl!lCitET Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671187 ... Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671189 Date: 20030530 TO: DIRECTOR, ALEC FROM: c(b)(1) SUBJECT: (b)(3) NatSecAct ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------(b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct [(b)(3) NatSecAct=1 -(b)(3) -sBeB'r NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct -- - b)(1) ,--------i-, --- ----- ---------- ------ -- -- -TOR. -30169oz -MAY_ o.(b)(3)_NatSecAct:.-- __-- -- ---- -s 8 ER 8 ~ 301600Z MAY 03 STAFF C( M -, (b )( 1) CITE 39239 (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) To: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ALECINFO~-----(b)(3) CIAAct1 (b)(3) NatSecAct _FO_R_: ~__ (b)(1)______________ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct __, ~---_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_---~~~~~~-(b)(1) SUBJECT: (b)(3) CIAAct (b )( 1)1---------~ (b)(3) NatSecAct REF:c(b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE; FYI. 2. REFINFOWASOBTAINED ON25 AND 26 MAY 2003, DURING INTERROGATIONS OFAL-QA'IDA DETAINEE ALI 'ABO AL-((AZIZ))ALI, AKA AMMAR AL-( (BALUCHI) ), ~----(b)(1)---------~ 3. (b)(3) CIAAct ________ ~ (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671189 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) ,. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671189 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671189 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671203 Date: 20030612 (b )( 1) (b)(3) TO: NatSecAct FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY -REQUIREMENTSFOR KSMABOUTABO AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------(b)(3) c(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) L_ NatSecAct NatSecAct CIAAct NatSecAct T_o_T_, -1-2-1s_s_o_z _JUN __ o_3___ o_I_RE_c_TO_R,------(b )(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) - - - - - - - - - -(b )(3) NatSecAcr-- - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ____________ ~T STAFF --~ TO: PRIORIT~ (b)(3) 121ssoz I oIREcToR=========(b)(3) NatSecAct INFO PRIORITY ALEC. NatSecAct (b )( 1) FROM: ~---------(b)(3) ~-~----------(b)(3) CIAAct1 NatSecAct SUBJECT: EYES ONLY -REQUIREMENTSFOR KSMABOUTABO AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI REF: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE USE THE BELOWREQUIREMENTSWITH KSM AS APPROPRIATE. _2. RECENT DEBRIEFINGS OF KHALID SHAYKH( (MUHAMMAD) ) (KSM) SUGGEST POSSIBLE INCONSISTENCIES IN HIS REPORTINGAS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF ABO AL-AZIZ ((AL-MASRI)), A PRIORITY WMD NU~LEAR AND CBWTARGET. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671203 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671203 ,, (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 3. WE REMAIN HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS THAT KSM IS WITHHOLDING, EXAGGERATING,MISDIRECTING, OR OUTRIGHT FABRICATING INFORMATIONON CBRN ISSUES, PARTICULARLYWITH REGARDSTO INDIVIDUALS WHOARE NOT IN CUSTODYOR DEAD. ACCORDINGTO RECENT REF C REPORTINGFROMKSM, HE DISPLAYS LITTLE KNOWLEDGE ABOUTABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI AND KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT AL-MASRI'S CW EFFORTS BEYONDAN APPARENTLYFAILED EFFORT INVOLVING PHOSGENEGAS OVER FIVE YEARS AGO. (b)(1)--------, (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct WE BELIEVE KSM IS TRYING TO PROTECTHIS CLOSE FRIEND AND ANY OPERATIONSTHAT AL-MASRI MAYHAVEUNDERWAY. PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWINGREQUIREMENTSWITH KSM, USING APPROPRIATE ------~ INTERROGATIONSTRATEGIES FOR A SITUATION LIKE THIS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAc..___________________ _ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671203 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671203 '· (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671203 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671203 (b )( 1) CIAAct---~ (b)(3) NatSecAct ~-------------1(b)(3) 6. THANKS AND REGARDS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF MESSAGE SrleKEI Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671203 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671206 Date: (b )( 1) ToC(b)(3) NatSecAct 1 FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONCERNSOVER RECENT KHALID SHAYKHMUHAMMAD THREATREVEALATIONS ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------- (b)(3) NatSecAct c(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOT: 022012Z MAY03 -:!l~E!F!,li::C. STAFF TO: --- 022012Z IMMEDIATE[(b)(1 (b)(3) NitSecAct ALEcc(b)(3) ~atSecAct ):NFO IMMEDIATEDIRECTOR. b)(3) NatSecAct] (b )( 1) - FROM: -----------(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 1 I SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONCERNSOVER RECENTKHALID SHAYKHMUHAMMAD THREATREVEALATIONS REF: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: --PLEASE SEE PARA FIVE REQUESTFOR INTERROGATIONTEAMFEEDBACKREGARDINGINTERROGATIONSTRATEGYFOR KSM. 2. HQS/ALEC GREATLYAPPRECIATES BASE'S RECENTACQUISITION OF REF THREAT INFORMATIONREGARDINGPLANNEDATTACKSAGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN FROMKHALID SHAYKH((MUHAMMAD))(KSM) AKA ((MUKHTAR)). WE AGREE THAT THE TEAM'S CONFRONTATIONAL SESSION Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671206 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671206 WITH KSM, THAT INCLUDED'SHOWING THE CAPTURE PHOTOS OF AMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND WALID MUHAMMAD( (BIN ATTASH)) ON 29 APRIL WAS A KEY MOTIVATOR IN KSM'S DECISION SAID, TO PROVIDE REF INFORMATION. KSM'S PROVISION OF SUCH INFORMATION -- THAT ONLY AFTER HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE WHICH LED HIM TO ASSUME THE OPERATIONS IN PAKISTAN WERE COMPROMISED -- IS OF SERIOUS CONCERN AND MUST BE ADDRESSED SOONEST. 3. WE WERE DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT KSM ONLY MADE THESE NEW ADMISSIONS OF PLANNED ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN AFTER SEEING THE CAPTURE PHOTOGRAPHS OF 'AMMARAL-BALUCHI AND KHALLAD. WE CONSIDER KSM'S LONG-STANDING OMISSION OF REF INFORMATION_TO BE A SERIOUS CONCERN, ESPECIALLY AS THIS OMISSION MAY WELL HAVE COST AMERICAN LIVES HAD PAKISTANI AUTHORITIES NOT BEEN DILIGENT IN FOLLOWING UP ON UNRELATED CRIMINAL LEADS THAT LED TO THE CAPTURE OF AMMAR, BIN ATTASH, AND OTHER PROBABLE OPERATIVES INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK PLANS. MOREOVER, DEBREIFERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RAISED THE IDEA OF ATTACKS INSIDE c=JALEC THAT OPERATIONS INSIDE PAKISTAN, BUT KSM EXPRESSLY TOLD PAKISTAN WERE NOT ON THE TABLE. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE FACT THAT THIS HANDS OFF APPROACH DID NOT SQUARE WITH HIS STORY ON THE "PERFUME LETTER" PLOT TO ATTACK HOTELS IN PAKISTAN, KSM LAMELY COUNTERED THAT THESE HOTELS WERE AN EXCEPTION AS US "MILITARY" PERSONNEL WERE KNOWNTO RESIDE THERE. SIMPLY PUT, KSM HAS HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO COME CLEAN ON THIS THREAT AND,FROM OUR OPTIC, HE DELIBERATELY WITHHELD THE INFORMATION UNTIL HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE THAT WE ALREADY KNEW ABOUT IT, OR SOON WOULD KNOWABOUT IT FROM AMMARAND KHALLAD. THERE COULD BE OTHER SUCH INFORMATION. 4. SINCE KSM'S CAPTURE, THE SOLE FOCUS OF OUR INTERROGATION EFFORT HAS BEEN THE ACQUISITION OF DETAILED THREAT INFORMATION WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO DISRUPT FUTURE AL-QA'IDA DESPITE ATTACKS. YET, REPEATED AND NUMEROUS OFFERED OPPORTUNITIES TO PROVIDE SUCH THREAT INFORMATION, KSM HAS SHOWNA PERSISTENT PATTERN OF GIVING UP THIS INFORMATION ONLY WHEN HE ASSESSES WE ALREADY KNOW IT AND HE FEELS HE IS BACKED INTO A CORNER. --KSM'S PROVISION OF THE PAKISTAN THREAT REPORTING - ONLY AFTER HE WAS MADE AWARE OF THE CAPTURE OF THE ATTACK PLANNERS - IS VIEWED AS A CLEAR ILLUSTRATION OF CONTINUED AND DELIBERATE WITHHOLDING OF THREAT INFORMATION WHICH HE BELIEVED HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPROMISED. --WE ALSO POINT TO KSM'S REPEATED DISSEMBLING ABOUT JAFFAR ((AL-TAYYAR)) 'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE PADILLA PLOT, WHICH HE ADMITTED WAS A LIE BUT ONLY AFTER WE CONFRONTED HIM WITH BINYAM'S VERSION OF THE STORY. --SIMILARLY, WE NOTE THAT WHEN DISCUSSING AL-QA'IDA'S FOLLOW-ON ATTACKS INSIDE PLANS FOR THE US, KSM CONVENIENTLY "FORGOT" ALL ABOUT HAMABLI OPERATIVE ARSHAD, WHO SAYS THAT HE WAS TASKED TO Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671206 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671206 CRASH A PLANE INTO THE TALLEST BUILDING IN CALIFORNIA. OF NOTE, DEBRIEFERS OBSERVED THAT KSM WAS NOT COMFORTABLEWITH THE LINE OF QUESTIONING AND SEEMED ONLY TO RELAX AND "REMEMBER" THE DETAILS WHEN HE HEARD THAT ARSHAD HAD BEEN ARRESTED. 5. THIS PERSISTENT PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR FURTHER UNDERSCORES OUR ASSESSMENT THAT KSM HAS DIRECT KNOWLEDGEOF OTHER PLANNED ATTACKS WHICH HE HAS YET TO REVEAL. OF CONCERN, ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT PLANS FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE U.S., SAUDI ARABIA, AND EAST AFRICA ARE PROGRESSING AND MAY BE IMMINENT. WE ASSESS KSM IS MORE KNOWLEDGEABLEREGARDING THESE ATTACKS AND THE LIKELY TARGETS THAN HE HAS ADMITTED TO DATE. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE REQUEST BASE'S THOUGHTS ON HOW.BEST TO ADAPT THE.KSM INTERROGATION STRATEGY TO INCREASE OUR CHANCES OF ACQUIRING THIS CRITICAL AND TIME-SENSITIVE INFORMATION. WE LOOK FORWARDTO YOUR COMMENTS. MANY THANKS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671206 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 (b)( 1) Date: TO: c(b)(3~ NatSecAct FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DEBRIEFINGS AND PRODUCTION OF KHALID SHAYKHMUHAMMAD ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------(b)(3) NatSecAct=1 [(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) SBS~ET (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct NatSecAct I_(b)(3) TOT: 302258Z ALEC JUN 03 ------------------------------------------------------------·~----~ 8l3€Rl3'f STAFF TO: (b)(1 )~ IMMEDIATE(b)(3) NatSecActnATE ALEC DIRECTOR. 302258Z L (b)(3) NatSecAct I (b )( 1) FROM: ~I ---------------(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DEBRIEFINGS AND PRODUCTION OF KHALID SHAYKH MUiiAMMAD REF: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: --REQUEST BASE OPINIONS AND INPUT ON POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO REDUCE KSM'S RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS COOPERATION. 2. WE ARE EXTREMELYAPPRECIATIVE OF THE EFFORTS AND THE PROGRESS OF THE INTERROGATORSAND DEBRIEFERS TO DATE WITH KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD))AKA MUHKTAR(KSM), AS THEY WORKON THIS EXTREMELYIMPORTANTALBEIT VERY CHALLENGINGCASE. ON 25 JUNE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 2003, HQS, ALEC, AND CTC/RDG OFFICERS MET TO DISCUSS THE RECENT PRODUCTION AND RECENT REVELATIONS BY KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) AKA MUHKTAR (KSM), PARTICULARLY THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HE HAS PROVIDED ON THE HEATHROWPLOT, THE LOS ANGELES THREAT, AND THE KARACHI OPERATIONS. THE MEETING SERVED TO HIGHLIGHT TRENDS WE HAVE OBSERVED REGARDING KSM'S BEHAVIOR. THESE TRENDS APPEAR TO FORM A PATTERN OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE THAT IS REFLECTIVE OF KSM'S VERY LARGE EGO AND AN ATTEMPT BY KSM TO CONTROL HIS ~NVIRONMENT AND MANIPULATE THOSE WITH WHOMHE IS CONTACT. WE CONCLUDEDTHAT THESE TACTICS ARE HINDERING OUR COLLECTIVE ABILITY TO EXTRACT TIMELY INFORMATION FROM KSM. BELOW, AND WE QUERY BASE'S WE HAVE OUTLINED THESE TACTICS THOUGHTS ON WAYS TO ALTER THIS BEHAVIOR TO A POINT WHERE WE CAN GET TO THE BOTTOM OF HIS STORIES. SINCE THIS MEETING, WE NOTICED THAT BASE IS ALREADY MAKING PROGRESS IN STARTING TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS AND ACQUIRE MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION. WE BELIEVE BASE'S APPROACH TO KSM REGARDING GIVING HIM A "GRACE PERIOD" TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL THREATS SEEMS TO BE PAYING OFF WITH GETTING HIM TO ADMIT ADDITIONAL REVELATIONS, PARTICULARLY HIS RECENT ADMISSION REGARDING ISRAEL. WHILE THIS IS MOST WELCOMEDSHORT-TERM PROGRESS, WANT TO WORKWITH BASE TO ENSURE THAT KSM DEMONSTRATESA CONSISTENT PATTERN AND LONGER TRACK RECORD OF THESE TYPES OF REVELATIONS BEFORE THREAT AND/OR ACTUAL PRESSURE IS REDUCED/REMOVED. 3. OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST TWO MONTHS WE NOTED THE FOLLOWING BEHAVIORAL ISSUES: --COMPLAINTS ABOUT HIS FOOD: THERE WAS AN INCIDENT THAT KSM COMPLAINED THAT HIS "CHEESE" HAD BEEN STOLEN. THIS PREPOSTEROUS ALLEGATION UNDERSCORES HIS ATTEMPT TO CONTROL HIS ENVIRONMENT. ADDITION, IN HE CONTINUALLY COMPLAINS THAT WE ARE PUTTING PORK INTO HIS FOOD, AS AN AFFRONT TO HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. --RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS: IN ADDITION TO THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT PORK AND HOW IT IS AN AFFRONT TO HIS RELIGION, HE HAS ASKED THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO LEAD PRAYERS FOR A GROUP OF DETAINEES. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SOUNDMASKINGMUSIC BEING TURNED UP DURING PRAYER TIME (WHEN IT WAS NOT TURNED UP). THIS SUGGESTS TO US THAT HE BELIEVES TO BE OR WANTS TO BE IN A GTMO-TYPE SITUATION. --GUARDS: ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HE HAS FLATLY REFUSED TO DO WHAT HAS, BEEN ROUTINE, SUCH AS NOT MOVING TO THE BACK OF THE CELL WHEN THE CELL IS TO BE OPENED. HE IS QUITE AWARE THAT THE GUARDS' DEMANDS ARE A NORMAL COURSE OF ACTION. AGAIN, WE SEE THIS AS A MANIPULATION EFFORT TO TEST THE LIMITS OF.MUCH HE CAN GET AWAY WITH. --DEBRIEFERS: HE WILL TELL DEBRIEFERS THAT HE PREFERS· TO TALK TO THEM BUT NOT THE OTHERS OR THAT HE DESERVES MORE "IMPORTANT" DEBRIEFERS. KSM CONTINUALLY CHALLENGES EACH AND EVERY DEBRIEFER/INTERROGATOR THAT HE COMES INTO CONTACT WITH, AND EVEN SINGLES OUT THE GENDER OF THOSE HE PREFERS TO TALK WITH. HE HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY WARNED THAT HE SHOULD TREAT EACH DEBRIEFER THE SAME AND ANSWER THE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 QUESTIONS HE IS ASKED. EVEN WHEN KSM WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH A "SENIOR" WASHINGTON OFFICIAL, HE STILL EXHIBITED BEHAVIOR THAT INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT RECOGNIZE HIS STATUS AS A PRISONER, AND THIS PROCESS DID NOT ELICIT INTELLIGENCE ON THE HEATHROWPLOT. ANY ADDITIONAL AGAIN, WE SEE THIS AS NOTHING MORE THAN A BLATANT ATTEMPT TO CONTROL AND MANIPULATE BY TRYING TO SOW DISSENSION --"GUILT WITHIN OUR OWN RANKS. TRIP" LETTER: PERHAPS HIS MOST OBVIOUS TACT OF TRYING TO MANIPULATE WAS HIS "LETTER" IN RESPONSE TO THE SENIOR WASHINGTON OFFICIAL'S -- OFFER IN WHICH KSM COUNSELS US ABOUT OUR FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO PREVENT 9/11. "GUILT TRIP" GRAINS OF SAND GAME: ADDITIONALLY, KSM CONTINUES TO PLAY GAMES WITH THE LEVEL OF DETAILS HE PROVIDES BASED ON THE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGEHE ASSESSES THE INDIVIDUAL DEBRIEFERS TO HAVE. GAME OF "I'M THIS SMARTER THAN YOU" OVER THE LAST THREE MONTHS IS ANOTHER OF HIS EFFORT TO CONTROL HIS ENVIRONMENT. HE HAS OFTEN BEEN SEEN AS PROVIDING SMALL GRAINS OF TRUTH IN A DEBRIEFING AND LEAVING IT UP TO THE INDIVIDUAL DEBRIEFER TO CATCH THESE SMALL FACTS. 4. THE BEHAVIORS ABOVE ARE IN OUR VIEW A SIGN OF KSM'S TAKING AN OFFENSIVE STANCE AGAINST THE INTERROGATION SITUATION RESULTING IN LESS QUALITY INTELLIGENCE THAN WE BELIEVE KSM IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THESE BEHAVIORS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY LIES OF OMISSION AND IN ONE CASE OUTRIGHT FABRICATIONS BY KSM. OMISSIONS. MAY STILL THE BELOW IS A LIST OF SOME OF THE RECENT IT IS THIS KIND OF DETAIL FROM KSM THAT WE BELIEVE HE BE WITHHOLDING ON OTHER PLOTS. WHEN VIEWED IN COMBINATION, WE BELIEVE KSM'S STRONG ATTITUDE AND WHAT WE ASSESS ARE HIS CALCULATEDACTIONS TO LIE AND WITHHOLD IS A CHALLENGE WE HAVE TO MEET. WE WELCOMECONTINUED TEAM COMMENTON MEASURES WE CAN EMPLOY TO IMPROVE THIS DETAINEE'S PERFORMANCE. WE MAY NEVER GET THERE, BUT WE ENCOURAGETHE INTERROGATION TEAM TO CONTINUE TO PRESS HIM FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON PLOTS HE HAS DISCUSSED AND ANY NEW PLOTS HE HAS YET MENTIONED. A. OMISSIONS: --KARACHI PLOTS: KSM MADE ADDITIONAL COMMENTSON THE OPERATIONAL PLANS (REF A) THAT HIS NEPHEW AMMARAL-BALUCHI AND WALID MUHAMMAD SALIH PLANNING. ( (BIN ATTASH) ) AKA KHALLAD WERE INVOLVED IN THESE REVELATIONS ONLY CAME TO LIGHT WHEN KSM WAS SHOWN WHAT CLEARLY WERE "CAPTURE" PHOTOS OF THESE TWO OPERATIVES. --LOS ANGELES THREAT: ON 20 JUNE 2003, KSM PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS REGARDING A PLOT TO FLY A PLANE INTO THE "TALLEST BUILDING" IN CALIFORNIA. IN SUBSEQUENT DEBRIEFINGS KSM PROVIDES NEW DETAILS PREVIOUSLY UNTOLD REGARDING THIS PLOT. --HEATHROW PLOT: THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION KSM PROVIDED ON THE HEATHROWPLOT WAS ONLY AFTER THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM KHALLAD. ARMED WITH THIS INFORMATION THE DEBRIEFING TEAM WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL DETAILS FROM KSM THAT HE HAD "FORGOTTEN. " Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct B. FABRICATION: --AFRICAN INTERVIEWS AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS: IN LATE MARCH2003, ~---~ DURING INITIAL KSM PROVIDED DEBRIEFERS INFORMATION ON THE RECRUITMENT ON AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS CONVERTS WHO HAD TAKEN TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN, AND MORE SPECIFICALLY THAT ABU ISSA TOLD HIM ABU HAMZA HAD BODYGUARDSTHAT WERE AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSLIM CONVERTS IN THE US, MONTANA. SPECIFICALLY IN A SUBSEQUENT DEBRIEFING IN LATE APRIL, MUKHTARALSO ACKNOWLEDGEDTHAT HE FABRICATED INFORMATION IN REF E, INDICATING THAT BLACK AMERICAN MUSLIMS SERVING AS BODYGUARDSFOR LONDON-BASED SHAYKH ( (ABU HAMZAAL-MASRI)) HAD CONNECTIONS OR FAMILY IN MONTANA. WHEN MUKHTARWAS CONFRONTEDWITH REF E INFORMATION LISTING THE NAMES HE PROVIDED AS ABU HAMZA'S BODYGUARDS, HE EXPLAINED THAT THEY WERE JUST TWO AMERICAN JIHADISTS HE HAD HEARD ABOUT DURING THE AFGHAN JIHAD BUT THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT ASSOCIATED WITH LONDON-BASED ABU HAMZAAL-MASRI, ISSA AL-BRITANI, OR MONTANA. MUKHTARNERVOUSLY EXPLAINED TO DEBRIEFER THAT HE WAS UNDER "ENHANCED MEASURES" WHEN HE MADE THESE CLAIMS AND SIMPLY TOLD HIS INTERROGATORS WHAT HE THOUGHT THEY WANTEDTO HEAR. 5. ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ABOUT THESE PLOTS ONLY CAME ABOUT FROM THE DILIGENCE OF THE DEBRIEFING/INTERROGATION TEAM, WHO, ARMED WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM OTHER DETAI~EES, TO GET KSM TO FINALLY ADMIT TO HIS OMISSION. CLAIMS THAT HE SIMPLY FORGOT THOSE DETAILS. WERE ABLE USUALLY, MUKHTAR IT IS CLEAR FROM KSM'S NOTES, THAT KSM HAS AN EXTREME ATTENTION TO DETAIL AND A CONTROLLING ASPECT TO HIS PERSONALITY THAT MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO BELIEVE THAT HE SIMPLY FORGETS DETAILS OF AN OPERATION AS COMPLEX AS THIS ONE. HIS ATTENTION TO DETAIL COUPLED WITH HIS MICROMANAGING STYLE REGARDING OPERATIONS MAKES THESE OMISSIONS MORE ALERTING. 6. KSM'S PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS, TRYING TO CONTROL HIS ENViRONMENT, LYING' AND THEN ADMITTING THINGS ONLY WHEN PRESSED THAT OTHERS HAVE BEEN CAUGHT AND HAVE LIKELY ADMITTED THE PLOT, IS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN. KSM, MORE THAN ANY OTHER DETAINEE WE HAVE IN CUSTODY, LIKELY HAS ADDITIONAL PLANS THAT HE HAS NOT TOLD US ABOUT AND THAT THESE PLANS MAY VERY WELL BE FOR THE U.S. WE CANNOT DISMISS THAT HIS TACTICS ARE A BID TO STALL FOR TIME TO ALLOW THE OPERATIONS TO BE EXECUTED. WE THINK THAT IT Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) . NatSecAct p Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY NEVER PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ADDITIONAL PLOTS, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT WE WOULDBE REMISS IF WE DID NOT LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY FURTHER COOPERATION. POSSIBLE OF CHANGING HIS ENVIRONMENTTO GAIN TO THAT END, WE REQUEST BASE'S THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS TO GAIN GREATER COOPERATION AND MEASURES THAT CONVINCE HIM THAT ONLY THROUGH A LONG-TERM DEMONSTRATIONOF TRUTHFULNESS CAN HE EXPECT TO KEEP ANY OF THE PRIVILEGES TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN ACCUSTOMED. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF MESSAGE -SECRET Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06671214 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 20040423 Date: TO: ALEC FROM: SUBJECT: · [(b)(3) ~_(b)(1), _________________ (b)(3) NatSecAct _ I (b)(3) NatSecAct NatSecAct=1 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOR: 231744ZAPR 04(b)(1 )1119907 --- - - - -- - - -- -- -- -- -- -- -------- -- ---- - - -- -- - - - - --(b)(3) NatSecAct- --- - - - - - - - - - -Y 6 ! ~ ~ e RE~ 231722ZAPR 04 STAFF (b )( 1) CITE TO: FOR: [(b)(3) ~at~ecAct IMMEDIATE ALEC INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, I (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) SUBJECT: CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 ( b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct ~-----(b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct REF: TEXT: COMBINE: COMPLETE 1. ACTION REQUIRED: (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ISSA AL HINDI THAT ISSA WAS GOOD FRIENDS WITH ABDUL AZIM (SEE BELOW), 46.c=]NOTED WHO HE HAD MET IN THE ISLAMIC CENTRE WITH KSM IN EARLY 2000. HE CAME INTO THE ROOM WITH KSM, WHO SPOKE TO HIM IN ENGLISH, AND CALLED HIM [J ISSA. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct CLAIMED THAT THIS IS HOW HE KNEW IT WAS ISSA THE AUTHOR (COMMENT: THIS IS AT ODDS WITH A PREVIOUS ACCOUNT, WHEN HE CLAIMS ISSA WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM AS THE AUTHOR). ISSA PROBABLY SPOKE NO ARABIC. INDIANS, PEOPLE OFTEN ASKED BN ABOUT ISSA, BUT D AS THEY WERE BOTH BRITISH REPEATED THAT HE DID NOT KNOWHIM. BN RECALLED A CONVERSATION BETWEEN AZIM AND ISSA, IN WHICH AZIM ASKED HOW THINGS (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct WERE IN THE UK AND ISSA RESPONDED THAT EVERYONE HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT HIM ( ISSA) . THE INFERENCE DRAWNBY[J WAS THAT THE PAIR HAD ACQUAINTANCES IN COMMONIN THE UK. c=]ADDED t.nn DED ABDUL AZIM RETURN TO THE UK. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct THAT ISSA MAY HAVE (b)(1) (b )(3) NatSecAct ~--------------------------------, (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 48. AFTER PRESSING, BN WAS REMINDED THAT HE HAD CLAIMED THAT WE DID NOT NEED TO WORRYABOUT ISSA IN A PREVIOUS INTERVIEW. D RESPONDED (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct THAT HE THOUGHT WE MAY.HAVE BEEN INTERESTED IN SOMEONE ELSE NAMED ISSA, .AND THAT WAS WHO WE SHOULDN'T WORRYABOUT (COMMENT: I.E. BECAUSE BN IS ALSO KNOWNAS ISSA). NOT THE AUTHOR OF THE BOOK. DCLAIMED WE CLARIFIED, THOUGH, THATc=]Is THAT HE ONLY LOOKED (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct UNCOMFORTABLE IN HIS DISCUSSION ON ISSA BECAUSE OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A LOOK OF ALARM ON HIS INTERVIEWERS FACE WHEN HE RECALLED THAT HE D HAD SEEN ISSA IN KSMIs COMPANY. THINKS THAT WE HAVE DRAWNTO WRONG CONCLUSIONS - KSM WAS NOT PLANNING ANYTHING WITH ISSA, BUT INNOCENTLY (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 SHOWING HIM ARO~. o.THEN COMMENTED~THE REMAINS CONCERNEDABOUT GETTING OTHERS INTO TROUBLE, BUT PROVIDED A DESCRIPTION OF ISSA (COMMENT: AS AN APPARENT GESTURE TO PROVE THAT HE WILL CO-OPERATE): 49. STRAIGHT, MEDIUM LENGTH HAIR, MEDIUM (TO SHORT) IN HEIGHT, SKINNY BUILD. (b)(1) MINUTE, (b)(3) NatSecAct HE HAD A LONDONACCENT ("NOT POSH"), BUT ONLY SAW HIM FOR ONE WHEN HE GAVE HIM HIS CUP OF TEA. so.[JcLAIMED THAT THE REASON THAT HE INITIALLY DENIED KNOWING ISSA AL HINDI BECAUSE ABDUL AZIM HAD SPENT A LOT OF TIME WITH SOMEONE HE CAN'T TALK ABOUT (I.E. ISSA AL HINDL 51. REID), AND ABDUL AZIM WAS BEING VISITED BY (COMMENT: THIS WAS AN UNCONVINCING EXPLANATION). ABDUL AZIM WOULDKNOW ISSA AL HINDI, AS WOULDANYONE WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN JIHAD IN BRITAIN SINCE THE MID-90S. BABAR WOULDKNOWHIM. ANY OF THE SENIORS IN BABAR'S CIRCLE WOULD KNOWHIM. MOAZZEMBEGG WOULD KNOWHIM, AS WOULDREID, MOUSSAOUI AND MUKHTAR. 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Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct. 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Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 · (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 . Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 . Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 288. CANARY WHARF WAS FIRST MENTIONED TO MUKHTARPOSSIBLY BY ABD UL-JABBAR (REID). MUKHTARWAS ASKING THE BRITONS ABOUT BIG BUILDINGS(b)(1) THIS WAS AT THE TIME WHEN THE MALAYSIANS WERE IN THE HOUSE WITH (b)(3) MUKHTAR.ABDUL-AZIZ LATER REPEATED WHAT MUKHTARHAD SAID DURING THE NatSecAct MEETING IN MCDONALDS. MUKHTARWAS UNCERTAIN.ABOUT WHERE TO STRIKE, AND IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT HE OPENED THE ALMANACAND CROSSED OUT THE WTC TOWERS AS THE WORLD'S TWO TALLEST BUILDINGS. THE THIRD WAS IN CALIFORNIA. BUT[JDOUBTED . DTHOUGHT THAT A BUILDING IN MALAYSIA WAS ON THE LIST (b)(1) THIS WOULDBE A TARGET. MUKHTARLEFT THE DECISION IN (b)(3) NatSecAct THE HANDS OF THE BALUCHI. BUT MUKHTARAPPEARED TO BE FOCUSSED SOLELY ON TALL BUILDINGS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b)(1) . (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE 'l'O!I SECREI Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678508 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678516 /'153-( Date: 20040803 ~------1(b)(1) To: (b)(3) NatSecAct ( I FROM: SUBJECT: (b)(1) ~I (b)(3) NatSecAct I ,--I ----l__ ____ ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------(b)(3) NatSecAct I . L___I --------------' (b)(3) NatSecAct [(b)(3) NatSecAct=1 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ~----------T-o_T _:-03_2_1-4o_z_A_u_G_o_4 ___ D_I_R_Ec_T_oR~---(b )(3) NatSecAct ~--~ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------SECREI (b )(3) NatSecAct STAFF TO: 032140ZDIRECTOR I I (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct FROM: I (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) 1 b)( 3 ) CIAAct ,-----s_UB_J_Ec_T_: ---LL_(b )(3) NatSecAct. ________ REF: ~-~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) TEXT: (b)(3) CIAAct . REQUIRED: NONE, FYI. (b)(3) NatSecAct ACTION INFORMATION ONA HARD DRIVE RECOVERED FROM A " .! • RAID IS A DETAILED STUDY ONTHEMETHODOLOGIES TO (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678516 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678516 EFFECT A TERRORIST ATTACK. AND LOGISTICS ( THE STUDY DESCRIBES THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE UK, NOTING THAT THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE UK IS VERY HIGH AND THAT "ANY PROJECT THAT CAN BE CARRIED OUT IN THE UK" WOULDBE TRANSFERABLE TO ANY OTHER THE DOCUMENTIS DIVIDED INTO TWO MAIN PARTS. COUNTRY. THE FIRST PART INCLUDES SEVEN CHAPTERS ON THE TOPIC ENTITLED "ROUGH PRESENTATION FOR GAS LIMO PROJECT". THE SECOND PART IS ENTITLED "ROUGH PRESENTATION FOR RADIATION (DIRTY BOMB) PROJECT". (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 4. \ THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS NOTABLE ITEMS FROM THE TWO SECTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT: A. NOTABLE FROM THE SECTION ON THE GAS LIMO PROJECT INCLUDES: 1) THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT THE MOST FEASIBLE OPTION WOULD BE TO USE A LIMOUSINE TO DELIVER THE EXPLOSIVES. 2) CRUISER 3) B. OTHER VEHICLES THAT COULD BE USED INCLUDE SPACE (FAMILY) VEHICLES. CHAPTER SEVEN DESCRIBES MANPOWERAND COSTS. NOTABLE FROM THE SECTION ON THE DIRTY BOMB PROJECT INCLUDES: 1) THE USE OF SMOKE DETECTORS TO DELIVER THE RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE AMERICIUM-147. THE AUTHOR PROPOSES TO USE 10,000 SMOKE DETECTORS AS PART OF AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE TO SPREAD THIS RADIOACTIVE ELEMENT. 2) THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES IDEAS AND FACTS REGARDING THE VULNERABILITIES 3) (GASOLINE) OF TRAINS. THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES HIJACKING AND UTILIZING PETROL TANKERS TO RAM INTO A TARGET. (b)(3) CIAAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678516 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678516 END OF MESSAGE / Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06678516 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 Date: TO: HQSDISSEM FROM: SUBJECT: CT: COMMENTS ON INTENTION OF KHALIDSHAYKHMUHAMMAD TO TARGETHEATHROW AIRPORT ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------- (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct [(b)(3) NatSecAct=1 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOT: 172132ZOCT 02 nIREcToR I ~---- s E c R I!: 1' (b)(3) NatSecAct:132z TO: DIRECTOR! (b)(3) NatSecAct I PRIORITY HQSDISSEM. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 fb)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct / __Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct CENTRALINTELLIGENCEAGENCY WARNING: INFORMATIONREPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATEDINTELLIGENCE REPORT cLAss s E e R E DIST: rp 17 OCTOBER2002 COUNTRY: nef(b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct I SUBJ: CT: COMMENTS ON INTENTION OF KHALID SHAYKHMUHAMMAD TO TARGET HEATHROW AIRPORT DOI: DECEMBER2001 - JULY 2002 --------------(b)(3) (b )( 1) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ·. soURcE1 I. . ~-----------------------~ SUMMARY: NONE. 1_. LI_____ ,-----TE_XT_: __ (b)(1 ),_________ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct _ locTOBER 2002, A SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE SAID THAT DURINGA JULY 2002 MEETING IN PAKISTAN, KHALID SHAYKH((MUHAMMAD))(KSM) TOLD RAMZI ( (BIN AL-SHIBH)) ABOUTHIS DESIRE TO TRAVELTO SAUDI ARABIA TO RECRUir SAUDI MUJAHIDIN TO USE IN TERRORIST OPERATIONSIN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM(UK). KSM HAD SELECTED HEATHROW AIRPORT OUTSIDE LONDON,UK, AS A TARGET FOR AN ATTACK INVOLVING ONE OR TWOAIRCRAFT. THE PLANES WOULDBE USED TO ATTACKTHE AIRPORT ITSELF, RATHERTHAN LEAVE HEATHROW IN ORDER TO BE USED IN AN ATTACKAT A SECONDLOCATION. KSM INTENDEDTO RETURNTO SAUDI ARABIA AS SOON AS HIS DUTIES IN PAKISTAN WERECOMPLETEDAND PERMITTEDHIM TO LEAVE. KSM TOLD BIN AL-SHIBH THAT HE WOULD CHOOSEMUJAHIDIN OVER THE AGE OF 30 WHOWERELIVING IN THE UK OR WHOHAD LIVED OR STUDIED THERE AT SOME POINT IN THE PAST TO CONDUCTTHE ATTACK. THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVESAID THAT HEATHROW AIRPORT WASA POWERFULECONOMICSYMBOLWITHIN THE UK. I I I ITHE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE CLAIMEDTHAT HE DID NOT HEAR KSM GIVE SPECIFIC DETAILS ABOUTHIS INTENTIONS TO 2. (b)(1)· (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I ~---------------~ __ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 ATTACK.HEATHROW AIRPORT. THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS ON KSM'S INTENTIONS TO CONDUCTTERRORIST OPERATIONS INSIDE THE UNITED.STATES.) 3. ACCORDINGTO THE SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE, KSM INDICATED THAT ONCE HE HADARRIVED IN SAUDI ARABIA, HE MAYHAVE THE OPPORTUNITYTO COLLUDEWITH 'ABD AL-RAHIM AL- ( (NASHIRI)) AKA ((MULLAH)) BILAL IN PLANNINGTHE ATTACKAGAINST HEATHROW. INDEED, KSM WANTEDTO LEAVE PAKISTAN FOR SAUDI ARABIA BECAUSETHE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN PAKISTANMADEIT VERY DIFFICULT FOR AL-QA'IDA TO CARRYOUT DAY-TO-DAYACTIVITIES. THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE STATED THAT EVEN USING THE INTERNET IN PAKISTANWAS CONSIDEREDA RISKY VENTURE. THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE DID NOT INDICATE WHENKSM'S DUTIES IN PAKISTAN WOULDBE COMPLETED,ALLOWINGHIM TO RETURNTO SAUDI ARABIA. THE OPERATIVE ONLYINDICATED THAT UPON COMPLETIONOF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES IN PAKISTAN, KSM HOPED TO.RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA.) ~--------~ THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVEDID NOT SAY WHETHEROR NOT KSM INTENDEDTO ASSIST MULLAHBILAL WITH MULLAH BILAL'S OWNPLANS TO TARGETU.S. INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION. j 4. WHENDISCUSSING KSM'S INTENTIONS TO RECRUIT MUJAHIDIN IN . SAUDI ARABIA, THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE RECALLEDA DECEMBER2001 CONVERSATIONBETWEENKSMAND BIN AL-SHIBH DURING THE RETREAT FROM QANDAHAR,AFGHANISTAN. AT THE TIME, KSMASKED BIN AL-SHIBH IF HE COULDIDENTIFY CAPABLE/QUALIFIEDOPERATORSTO SEND TO THE UNITED STATES OR UNITED KINGDOM(NFI). BIN AL-SHIBH TOLD KSMTHAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH QUALIFIED MUJAHIDIN. ALSO IN DECEMBER2001, KSM TOLD BIN AL-SHIBH OF HIS DESIRE TO ENROLLBETWEENONE AND THREE INDIVIDUALS IN A FLIGHT TRAINING SCHOOLIN KARACHI, PAKISTAN. ACCORDINGTO THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE, KSM INSISTED THERE WAS ONE SUCH SCHOOLIN KARACHIAND THAT THE INDIVIDUALS ENROLLEDTHERE WERETO BE INVOLVEDIN.KSM'S PLANS TO TARGET HEATHROW AIRPORT. I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 5. SEPARATELY, THE AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVE STATED THAT BIN AL-SHIBH RECEIVED A LETTER FROMKSM IN EARLY SEPTEMBER2002 IN WHICH KSM INSTRUCTEDBIN AL-SHIBH THAT A MESSAGEFROMAYMAN AL-((ZAWAHIRI)) WOULDBE FORTHCOMING. THE OPERATIVE ASSESSED THAT KSM LIKELY TRAVELEDTO IRAN TO MEET WITH ZAWAHIRI SOMETIMEAFTER KSM LEFT KARACHIIN JULY 2002. L-----~---------(b)(3) (b )( 1) I (b)(3) CIAAct ~ NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 (b )( 1) · (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) .CIAAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 . · . (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct l(b)(3) NatSecAd \I 6. (b)(1) I CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ~-~------(b)(3) 7. (b)(3) CIAAct-----------------"------, (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ----------------------------TEAR LINE---------------------------- s 13 e R. 13 'f1'm:lr(b)(3)NatSecAct TEXT: (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct . Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 (b)(3) CIAAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct s ee ----------------------------TEAR POC: CTC/UBL, R 13 'f/nei;ieRN[(b)(3) Nat?ecAct LINE---------------------------- (b)(3) CIAAct I (b)(3) CIAAct ACQ: (MID-OCTOBER2002). (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct END OF MESSAGE SrlSRB'f Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679023 Approv ed for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679027 Date: \ 20040226 (b)(1 )l (b)(3) NatSecAct TO:I l FROM: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAcL SUBJECT: NON-RECOGNITIONOF ABU YUSIF CANDIDATE, --------------------------------- -------BODY---------------------------------------- (b)( 3) NatSecAct l(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ~e:R:El I (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecA ct TOT: 262236Z FEB 04 STAFF TO: PRIORITY I I . (b)(3) NatSecAct -~ - - - - - - - -(b) ( 1)- - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - -''!!lem3'i'(b)(3) NatSecAct ) _ALEC 262236Z ALEC IINFO PRIORIT Y DIRECTOR, (b)(3) NatSecAct ~---~--~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct FROM: I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) SUBJECT: ---------c---------,-(b)(3) CIAAct )(3) NatSecAct NON-RECOGNITIONOF ABU YU_sI_F_CAND __ r_DA_T_E_, ~-~(b I I REF, I (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct l(b)(1) ----~(b)(3) TEXT: ,. 1. .-. CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ACTION REQUIRED: I ) I I 2. AS FOLLOW-UPTO REFS A AND B REQUESTS FOR DETAINEE IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE ((ABU YUSIF AL-JAMAIKI))c=(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approv ed for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679027 - - --- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0667902 7 ~_____ (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b )(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I ~-------------- l~-----~AS 3. DETAINEE COMMENTS POSSIBLE MATCHFOR HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVE ABU YUSIF AL-JAMAIKI: (b )( 1) (b)( 3 ) CIAAct.___ , -- oN 11 FEBRUARY2004, KHALID sHAYKH ((MOHAMMED)> (b)( 3 ) NatSecAct' AMMARAL-! !BALucHil > AND KHALLAD( (BIN ATTASH)> wERE sHoWN ------~IP_H~OTO OF ABU YUSIF AL-JAMAIKI_______ ~ c---1 I I NONERECOGNIZEDTHE PHOTO OR HAD ANY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS TO ADD. -- OF INTEREST, HOWEVER,HASSANGHUL BELIEVED THAT HE HAD SEEN THIS MANBEFORE, BUT CLAIMEDTHAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHERE. ON A SEPARATE, BUT RELATEDNOTE, GHUL ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE (GHUL) THINKS HE MAYHAVE FACILITATED THE TRAVEL OF AN ABU YUSIF FROMTHE UK BEFORE 9/11 TO KARACHIFOR ONWARD TRAVELT_O ___ _ AFGHANISTANFOR TRAINING. GHUL WASNOT SURE HOWEVER, WAS INDEED THE MANHE FACILITATED, BUT SAID.HE COULDNOT·RULE IT OUT. GHULALSO SAID THE MAN (ABU~YUSIF) HE IS THINKING OF WASA BLACK MANSENT TO HIM FROMTHE uKI ~---~ FINALLY, GHUL SAID HE WASNOT SURE IF THE MANHE FACILITATED TRAVEL FOR WAS NAMEDYUSIF, BUT HE THOUGHTIT WASA GOOD POSSIBILITY. I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679027 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct - Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679027 ) (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct -- AS MENTIONEDABOVE, HASSANGHUL BELIEVED HE HAD SEEN THIS MANBEFORE, BUT CLAIMEDTHAT HE WAS NOT SURE FROMWHERE. ON A SEPARATE, BUT RELATEDNOTE, GHUL COMMENTED THAT HE (GHUL) THINKS HE MAYHAVE FACILITATED THE TRAVELOF AN ABU YUSIF FROMTHE UK BEFORE 9/11 TO KARACHIFOR ONWC ARD TRAVELTO AFGHANISTANFOR TRAINING. GHULWAS NOT SURE ~fAS INDEED THE MANHE FACILITATED, BUT SAID HE COULDNOT RULE IT OUT. GHUL ALSO SAID THE MAN (ABU YUSIF) HE IS THINKING OF WASA BLACKMANSENT TO HIM FROMTHE UKI FINALLY, GHUL SAID HE WAS NOT SURE IF THE.MANHE FACILITATED TRAVELFOR WASNAMEDYUSIF, BUT HE THOUGHTIT WAS A GOODPOSSIBILITY. I \ ~-----------(b)(3) (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ___ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAc._____ ~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679027 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679027 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct ___ ~----------(b)(3) ~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF MESSAGE SECREi _______ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679027 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 Date: TO: ALEC FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: KHALIDSHAYKHMUHAMMAD. PROVIDESADDITIONALDETAILS ON HEATHROW OPERATIONAND OPERATIVES ------------------------ ---------------BODY----------·----------------------------- (b )( 1) (b)(3) l(b)(3) NatSecAct NatSecAct (b)(3) SECREI NatSecAct CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(3) (b)(3) TOR: 201722Z MAY03·. (b)(1 )~1717 __________________________________________________ (b )(3) NatSecAcL ___________ _ MAY03 STAFF 201719Z SECRET (b)(1) cIT{b)(3) . NatSecAct · TO: IMMEDIATEALEC INFO IMMEDIATEDIRECTOR.(b)( ) 1 (b)(3) CIAAct ~F_oR_:_L_ ___________ ----1(b)(3) NatSecAct--• I - ~----~ ·sUBJECT: ·EYES ONLY - DRAFT INTEL: KHALIDSHAYKHMUHAMMAD PROVIDES ADDITIONALDETAILS ON HEATHROW OPERATIONAND OPERATIVES REF:~---(-b-)(_3_) -N-at_S_e-cA_c_t ___ ~ TEXT: . (b)(3) 1. ACTION REQUIRED: CIAAct I (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) ACQUISITION DETAILS: ALEC OFFICER SERVEDAS THE ON-SITE DEBRIEFERDURINGA 20 MAY2003 DEBRIEFING SESSION OF KHALIDSHAYKH . ((MUHAMMAD)) , AKA ((MUKHTAR)) . NatSecAct 2. ~-------- (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 CIAAct CIAAct NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 3. MUKHTARCLARIFIED THAT ( (SALMAN)l KHUBAYB)l 'S U.K.-BASED ( (SULIMAN)), (LNUl FROM ( (ABu GROUP~------~ WHOMALI IS IDENTIFIABLE ((ABD AL-AZIZ ALI)), A~ WITH (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct . (b)(3) NatSecAct ( (AMMAR AL-BALUCHI)), CLAIMED TO HAVE DISPATCHED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM IN LATE FEBRUARY 2003, ~-----~ MUKHTARDENIED THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS IDENTICAL TO SALMAN ( (KHAN) ) , THE NEPHEW OF MAQSUD ( (KHAN) ) . AND THE COUSIN OF MANSUR ( (KHAN) ) , AKA 4. ( (HASSAN) ) . MUKHTARDENIED THAT ((ISSA INVOLVED IN THE HEATHROWPLOT. AL-TRINIDAD!)) (b)(3) CIAAct AL-BRITANI)) IS IN ANY WAY HE ALSO DENIED THAT ((YUSIF IS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED IN THE PLOT. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 6. BASE PLANS TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE BELOW ISSUES WITH RAMZI ((BIN AL-SHIBH)). WE NOTE THAT MUKHTARPREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT SALMAN WORKED ON THE MEDIA COMMITTEE IN EARLY 2002, THIS SESSION THAT HE MEANT 2001. BUT CLARIFIED DURING REQUEST CORRECTION TO INTEL BASED ON C(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct -- -- - (b)(3) NatSecAct-- - -- -TEAR LINE- -- -------- - --- --- ----"'-- (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) _Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 --- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 'i' ii' g R 13 ~---------------------------TEAR qi· LINE---------------------------- (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE. Sl38IUJ!f __ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679113 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 20030617 Date: TO: (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct I L__ __ FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONING MAJID KHAN ABOUTABU KHUBAYBGROUPMEMBERS, SULIMAN AKA TALHA AND ADNAN AKA KHURRAM ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------- ----c==-------~-- ~-----------(-b)-(3_)_N_a_ts_e-cA_c_t (b)(3) NatSecAct ~C_(_b)_(3_) _Na_t_Se_c_Ac_t __ f (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOT: 172242Z JUN 03 ALEC l (b)(3) NatSecAct --~ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------sssn.:T (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 112242z ~-=-====--= ______ _[__ ____ c----'T.,_..._O_._: _L___(b)(1) _____________ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 1 _____L ____ ~FR=OM==-~_(b)(1 _ ) ______________ _ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONING MAJID KHAN ABOUT ABU KHUBAYB GROUP MEMBERS, _9ULIMAN AKA TALHA AND ADNAN AKA KHURRAM (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct REF: TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: (b )( 1) I --(b)(3) ~-------- _ CIAAd (b)(3) NatSecAct _j ______ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 .Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TIRELESS.EFFORTS ~------;::====:::;-------------__J INTERROGATIONTEAMSHAVE RECENTLYSURFACED BY SIGNIFICANT NEW INFORMATIONFROMKSM, 'AMMAR,AND KHALLAD((BIN ATTASH)) RELATING TO THE HEATHROW PLOT AND PLAYERS INVOLVED. CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT THE REPORTS FROMTHE TRIO ARE REFERENCESTO A PAIR OF COMPUTERSAVVYPAKISTANI-ORIGIN UK PASSPORT HOLDERS, SULIMANAKA ABU TALHA/TALHAAND ADNANAKA KHURRAM,WHOSERVEDAS HELPERS TO 'AMMARIN KARACHIAND REPRESENTEDTHE UK-BASED ((ABU KHUBAYB)) GROUP IN PAKISTAN (SEE REFS C-D FOR ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND ON ABU KHUBAYB,AKA BABARAHMED, AND HIS ASSOCIATES). 3. OF GREATEST CONCERNIS SULIMAN/TALHA,WHOREPORTEDLY ACCEPTED RECRUITMENTINTO KSM'S HEATHROW OPERATIONCIRCA MARCH/APRIL 2002 AND SUBSEQUENTLY MADEAT LEAST THREE TRIPS TO THE UK TO RECRUIT OPERATIVES, OBTAIN FLIGHT SCHEDULESINTO HEATHROW, CASE CANARYWHARF, AND PRODUCEOR OUTSOURCECASING REPORTS OF AIRPORTS IN THE UK AND EASTERNEUROPE. WE ASSESS THAT THE TALHA AND KURRANNOTED BY MAJID KHANARE IDEN WITH SULIMAN/TALHAAND \ ADNAN/KHURRAM, AND WE ARE EAGERTO HAVE MAJID KHANQUEST_IONED ASAP ABOUT THE PAIR AND HOWTO FIND THEMIN PAKISTAN (NOTE: THE NAME . . . KHURRAM HAS BEEN SPELLED ((KHORAM)) IN SOME REPORTS, AND WE SUSPECT KURRANIS SIMPLY ONE OTHERREPORTER'S ATTEMPTAT SPELLING A DIFFICULT NAMEHEARDORALLY). 4. KSM, 'AMMAR,AND KHALLADREMAIN LOATHETO REVEALDETAILS OF THE HEATHROW PLOT, AND THEY ARE NO LESS CIRCUMSPECTABOUT INFORMATIONTHAT MIGHT HELP LEAD US TO SULIMAN/TALHAAND ADNAN/KHURRAM.THE SUM OF THEIR REPORTING SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE. PAIR REMAIN IN KARACHI, THOUGHKHALLADINDICATED.SULIMAN/TALHA WAS PLANNINGYET ANOTHERUK TRIP IN LATE APRIL. WHILE WE BELIEVE ALL THREE DETAINEES LIKELY HAVE INFORMATIONABOUTRESIDENCES, FAVORITE HAUNTS, FRIENDS AND FAMILY1ASSOCIATEDWITH THE.PAIR THAT COULDHELP LEAD TO THEIR CAPTUREIN PAKISTAN, THEY HAVE SO FAR ·CLUNGTO SUCH INFORMATION. THEY HAVE DEFLECTEDQUESTIO~S ABOUT SUCH ISSUES BY DESCRIBING STRICTLY BUSINESS-LIKE, HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED RELATIONS WITH THE PAIR, UTTERLYDEVOID OF A SOCIAL ELEMENT (THIS RINGS HOLLOWIN HQS/ALEC ESTIMATION). THE GRINDING, PIECEMEAL SUCCESS FROMINTERROGATORS SO FAR IN OBTAINING GRANULARITYABOUT SULIMAN/TALHAAND ADNAN/KHURRAM HAS ONLY RESULTED FROMDEFT PLAYING OF REPORTS FROMONE DETAINEE OFF ANOTHER, SUCH AS HIGHLIGHTEDBELOW: Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 5. WITH THE ABOVEAS BACKGROUND, WE HAVE PREPAREDADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR USE WITH MAJID KHANABOUTSULIMAN/TALHAAND ADNAN/KHURRAM·, BEYONDTHOSE IN REF A. OUR HOPE IS THAT MAJID HIMSELF WILL PROVIDE US WirH INFORMATIONPOTENTIALLYLEADING TO THEIR LOCATIONAND CAPTURE, AND/OR AT LEAST WiLL GIVE US MORE FODDER FOR CONFRONTINGKSM/AMMAR/KHALLAD ABOUTTHEIR PITHY OUTPUT ON THE PAIR TO DATE. REGARDSAND GOODLUCK. - - -- ------------------ ----TEARLINE-- -----. --------. - SECft:B'¼' SUBJECT: MAJID KHAN - QUESTIONS ABOUTTALHAAND KURRAN/KHURRAM (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct - - - - - - - - - - -.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --TEARLINE- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - .. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 '. . (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679118 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 Date: To: (b )( 1) [(b)(3) NatSecAct FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - QUESTIONINGAMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND MUSTAFAAL-HAWSAWION HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------- (b)(3) NatSecAct c(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I TOT: 161821Z [(b)(3) NatSecAct=1 z JUL 03 [[(b)(3) ALEC _ I (b)(3) NatSecAct __J NatSec~ct 161821 TO: (b)(1) ____________ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I _FR_OM_:~l __ SUBJECT: -------a (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct EYES _ONLY- QUESTIONINGAMMAR AL-BALUCHI AND MUSTAFA AL-HAWSAWION HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES REF: c(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: --PLEASE USE PARA 5 TEARLINE SUGGESTED REQUIREMENTSFOR AMMARAND PARA 6 TEARLINE SUGGESTEDREQUIREMENTS FOR HAWSAWI . 2. HQS/ALEC WOULDLIKE TO DRAWADDEESATTENTION TO THAT MAYNOT HAVE INFORMATIO BEEN ADDRESSEDWITH' AMMARAL-((BALUCHI)) OR MUSTAFAAHMAD ~-------- ---- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ~--------------------------- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 AL- ( (HAWSAWI)) REGARDINGONE ( (ADIL AHMED)) VARIANT ( (ADIL AHMAD)), AN EMPLOYEEAT HEATHROW INTERNATIONALAIRPORT, WHOSENAME IS SIMILAR TO ((ABU ADIL)), ONE OF THE OPERATIVES IN THIS PLOT. AS STATION IS FULLY AWARE, HQS/ALEC REMAINSCONCERNED WITH WHATWE BELIEVE TO BE PALTRY INFORMATIONCOMINGFROMDETAINEES ABOUT OPERATIONS IN THE U.K., THE EVER CHANGINGIMPORTANCEOF THE KHUBAYBGROUP, AND THE ORIGINAL HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES (ABU ADIL, ( (ABU YUSEF)), ( (AYYUB)), AND ( (AZMARAI))). (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct -~ I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b )(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ALTHOUGHTHE ADIL AHMEDWORKING AT HEATHROW MAYOR MAYNOT BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH ABU ADIL OF THE HEATHROWPLOT, HQS/ALEC BELIEVES THIS IS ONE LEAD WORTHFOLLOWING UP ON WITH DETAINEES. GIVEN THE ACCESS OF AMMAR AND HAWSAWITO U.K. BASED OPERATIVES, WE BELIEVE DETAINEES COULDSHED LIGHT ON THIS AND OTHER U.K. BASED OPERATIVES. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct IL AHMEDWORKSAT HEATHROW AIRPORT AT AN UNSPECIFIED BAGGAGEHANDLINGCOMPANY. FURTHER, ADIL RECENTLYVISITED PAKISTAN,~-------ADIL AHMEDIS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN PERIPHERALLYINVOLVEDIN THE TOOTINGGROUP (FORMER NAMEOF THE ABU KHUBAYB GROUP). (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I ~----------------~ 3. IN ADDITION, SINCE AMMARTOOK OVER OPERATIONALPLANNINGFOR KSM AFTER HIS ARREST, WE BELIEVE THAT HE MAYVERY LIKELY HAVE MORE TO TELL. FOR EXAMPLE, DID ABU ADIL AND ABU YUSIF OBTAIN THEIR PILOTS LICENSES OR WEREAYUBAND AZMARAISENT IN THEIR STEAD, PER KHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) 'S RECOMMENDATION.. FOR MUSTAFA AL-HAWSAWI, WE WONDER WHATHIS CONNECTIONSARE TO HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES ABU ADIL AND ABU YUSIF, AYUBAND AZMARAIAND POSSIBLY ABU KHUBAYBGROUP MEMBERS. DESPITE HIS CLAIMS DURING HIS 24 MARCH DEBRIEFING THAT HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF UK PLOTS OR INDIVIDUALS IN THE UK NAMEDABU ADIL OR ABU YOUSEF, WE ARE HARDPRESSED TO (b )( ) BELIEVE THAT GIV_ENHAWSAWI 'S FINANCIAL ROLE_IN AL-QAI IDA AND 1 (b)(3) NatSecActHER KSM'S TRUST, HE WOULDBE flLEFT OUT" OF THIS OPERATION. I AS SUCH, WE WONDERIF HAWSAWIIS PRESSED ON ~HIS POINT WHATPOSSIBLE NEWLEADS ON ABU ADIL OR THE OTHER OPERATIVES IN THIS PLOT COULDBE DERIVED FROMHAWSAWI,ESPECIALLY SINCE KSM MENTIONEDTHAT HE (HAWSAWI)WOULDAT LEAST KNOWABU ADIL'S EMAIL ADDRESS. FURTHER, AS OTHER DETAINEES HAVEPOINTED OUT, HAWSAWIPROVIDEDLOGISTICAL SUPPORT (AIR, HOTEL, AND CAR RENTALS) TO SOME OF THE 11 SEPTEMBERHIJACKERS, WE WONDERIF HE ALSO PROVIDED THIS TYPE OF SUPPORT FOR THE HEATHROW PLOT OPERATIVES. I 4. DETAINEE INFORMATIONON HAWSAWIFOR BASE BACKGROUND: - -ACCORDINGTO ( (ABU ZUBAYDAH) ) , HAWSAWIIS A WELLRESPECTED MANAND A MEMBEROF AL-QA'IDA'S MEDIA COMMITTEEALONGWITH KSM. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 j Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 ABU ZUBAYDAHFIRST SAWHIM SOME TIME AFTER THE ATTACKON THE USS COLE (AFTER 12 OCTOBER2000) WORKINGON A COMPUTERIN AL-QA'IDA'S MEDIA COMMITTEE. FURTHERABU ZUBAYDAH POINTS OUT THAT HAWSAWIIS VERY GOOD FRIENDS WITH KSM. HAWSAWIIS ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT COMPUTERS. ABU ZUBAYDAH SAW HIM AGAIN RECENTLYAFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKSAND BELIEVES THAT HE WAS EVACUATING AFGHANISTANFOR IRAN. (b)(3) CIAAr.t'===c---~ I --PRIOR TO THE 11 SEPTEMBERATTACKS, HAWSAWIASSISTED RAMZI ((BIN AL-SHIBH)) BY PROVIDING HIM U.S. $1,500 TO TRAVELTO DUBAI. ONCE IN DUBAI, ON 9 SEPTEMBER, AT KSM'S URGING, BIN AL-SHIBH ADVISED HAWSAWI,WHOHAD NOT YET BEEN TOLD THE MISSION WAS IMMINENT, TO LEAVE DUBAI IMMEDIATELY. KSM TOLD BOTH BIN AL-SHIBH AND HAWSAWITO GO TO QANDAHAR,AFGHANISTAN,AND BIN AL-SHIBH ARRIVED IN QANDAHAR THE MORNINGOF 11 SEPTEMBER. KSMWASWAITING FOR BIN AL-SHIBH AT THE AIRPORT. HAWSAWISOON ARRIVED AT THE SAME APARTMEN'.fIN KARACHIAND INFORMEDBIN AL-SHIBH THAT ON TELEVISION HE SAW A PLANE HIT A LARGEBUILDING. KSM SOON RETURNEDTO THE APARTMENTAND TOGETHERBIN AL-SHIBH, HAWSAWI,AND KSM CELEBRATED THE succEss oF THE MISSION. I (b)( 3 ) CIAAct~ --BIN AL-SHIBH FURTHERNOTES THAT AS OF LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY 2002, KSM WAS ASSISTING HAWSAWIBY PROVIDING A SAFEHOUSEAND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PERSONNELTO KEEP.HAWSAWISECURE. --~ I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct DURING THE MEETING, HAWSAWIAND BIN AL-SHIBH RECEIVED GREETINGS AND WORDSOF PRAISE FROMTHE FOUR ) SENIOR AL-QA'IDA LEADERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF THE 19 AL-QA'IDA TERRORIST HIJACKERS. ~-----~COMMENT: ABU HAFS AL-MASRI WAS KILLED IN COALITION AIRSTRIKES IN AFGHANISTANIN NOVEMBER 2001.) PRIOR TO THE 11 SEPTEMBERATTACKS, HAWSAWIFACILITATED COMMUNICATIONS AND THE TRANSFEROF FUNDS VIA HIS LOCATIONIN DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, ON BEHALF OF MUHAMMAD 'ATTA AND THE OTHER 18 AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES INVOLVEDIN THE 11 SEPTEMBER OPERATION. HAWSAWI,DID NOT KNOWTHE DETAILS OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER PLOT BUT HE DID FACILITATE THE AIR, HOTEL, AND RENTALCAR RESERVATIONSFOR 15 OF THE 19. OPERATIVES OVER A SIX MONTHPERIOD PRIOR TO 11 SEPTEMBER. --ACCORDING TO KSM, HAWSAWI"DOES THINGS FOR THE BROTHERS." HE FURTHER COMMENTED THAT HAWSAWIIS "BLACK" AND CANNOTMOVEABOUT EASILY IN PAKISTAN. IN ADDITION, KSM CLAIMEDTHAT HE VISITED HAWSAWITHE NIGHT OF THE ARREST ONLYBECAUSEOF ·A MEETINGWITH ABU MUS'AB REGARDINGA MONEYMAN "WHOCAMEFROMYOURSIDE." THIS IS ALMOSTCERTAINLYA REFERENCETO (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 5. PLEASE USE SUGGESTEDTEARLINES BELOWWITH AMMAR AND HAWSAWI. THANKS ----------------------------TEARLINE---------------------------- Sl!l€JRl!l:f/l SUBJECT: I (b)(3) CIAAct QUESTIONS FOR AMMAR (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -TEARLINE-- - - - - - - - -·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6. BASE, PLEASE USE SUGGESTEDTEARLINE BELOWFOR HAWSAWI. ----------------------------TEARLINE---------------------------- 31!.e~l!l'l';'i(b)(~) SUBJECT: CIAAct QUESTIONS FOR HAWSAWI HAWSAWIHAS THUS FAR PROVIDEDUS WITH LITTLE INTEL ON THE HEATHROW PLOT OR ITS OPERATIVES. IN FACT, IN LATE MARCH2003 HAWSAWIWAS QUESTIONEDABOUT FUNDS TRANSFERSAND/OR PAYMENTSMADETO KSM'S OPERATIVES IN THE UK. HE CLAIMEDTO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF FINANCIAL TRANSFERSAND/OR PAYMENTSTO INDIVIDUALS IN THE UK AND ALSO CLAIMEDNOT TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF AL-QA'IDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UK INVOLVING INDIVIDUALS WITH THE NAMESABU ADIL,, ABU YOUSEF, OR OTHER INDIVIDUALS. HOWEVER,KSM MENTIONEDTHAT HAWSAWI WOULDKNOW ABU ADIL, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT BELOWWILL PROVIDE SOMENEWLEADS. ADDITIONALLY, HAWSAWIHAS PROVIDEDSOME INFORMATIONABOUTHIS ROLE IN AL-QA'IDA AS A FINANCE OFFICER AND LIMITED INFORMATIONABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH KSM. --------------------- (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b) (3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 -~. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct _ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679119 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679122 FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONFRONTING KHALID SHAYKHMUHAMMAD ON SOLIMAN AND UK OPERATIONS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BODY - - - - - _- - - - - - - - -·- - - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - _~----------(-b)-(3_)_N_a_tS-e-cA_c_t C(b)(3) __________ (b)(3) NatSecAct-- NatSecAct ------------===========~~ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOT: 192314Z MAY 03 '(b)(3) NatSecAct S,iQfHJ'i' STAFF TO: C FROM: --(b ,(b)(3) NatSecAct 192314z (b)(1 )DIATE =INFO (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct DIRECTOR. . I [(b)(3) CIAAct )(3) C IAActSec-A-ct ______ - ______, (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - CONFRONTING KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ON SOLIMAN AND UK OPERATIONS REF, l(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE CONTINUE TO CONFRONT KSM ON BELOW REQUIREMENTS. 2. HQS/ALEC REQUEST$ BASE CONFRONTKHALID SHAYKH ((MUHAMMAD)) (KSM) FURTHER ON THE TOPIC OF AL-QA'IDA DISPATCHED TO THE UK FOR TERRORIST OPERATIONS. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN KSM'S PAST STATEMENTS AND COMMENTSMADE BY RECENTLY DETAINED ALI AL- ( (BALUCHI)). OPERATIVES WE NOTE ( (ABD'AL-AZIZ ALI)) AKA AMMAR PER REF A; AMMARDESCRIBED AN OPERATIVE NAMED Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679122 ~ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679122 ·t· ( (SULIMAN)) WHOMAMMARCLAIMEDTO HAVE DISPATCHEDTO THE UK IN LATE FEBRUARY2003. ACCORDINGTO AMMAR,SULIMAN'S ORDERSWERETO GO TO THE UK AND ESTABLISH HIMSELF (HOUSING, JOB, ETC) AND TO IDENTIFY OTHERS IN THE UK SUITABLE FOR HIJACKING OR SUICIDE OPERATIONS. HQS/ALEC IS CONCERNEDTHAT KSM HAS NOT MENTIONEDTHIS OPERATIVE SULIMANBEING DISPATCHED TO THE UK IN HIS DEBRIEFINGS. AS SULIMAN WAS SENT TO THE UK IN LATE FEBRUARY2003, IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO KSM'S CAPTURE, IT SHOULD.HAVEBEEN AN OPERATIONFRESH IN KSM'S MIND. 3. HQS/ALEC NOTES THAT KSM MENTIONEDAN INDIVIDUAL NAMED· ((SALMAN KHAN)) IN 15 MAY2003 DEBRIEFINGS, WHOMAYBE IDENTIFIABLE WITH AMMAR'SSULIMAN. PER REF B, KSM IDENTIFIED SALMAN ((KHAN)) AS THE NEPHEWOF MAQSUDAND THE COUSIN OF MANSUR ((KHAN)), AKA ((HASSAN)). HASSANWAS THE AL-QA'IDA MEDIA OFFICIAL WHOSERVED AS THE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELTO MAJID KHANAND IYMAN FARIS. PER KSM, DURINGA MEETING WITH SALMANIN MAQSUD'SKARACHI HOUSE IN APPROXIMATELYMID-2000, SALMANTOLD KSM THAT HE PLANNED TO GO TO CANADA,AND OFFERED TO DO SOMETHINGOPERATIONALWHILE HE WAS THERE. KSM CLAIMEDTHAT AS SALMANWAS YOUNGAND HADNO TRAINING, HE WAS SUSPICIOUS OF HIS OFFER TO HELP OPERATIONALLY AND THOUGHTSALMANWAS LOOKINGFOR A WAYTO GET HIS TRIP FINANCED. KSM SAID HE REFUSED SALMAN'S OFFER AT THAT TIME. IN ( APPROXIMATELYFEBRUARY'2003, KSM SAID HE BEGANTO RETHINK SALMAN'S OFFER, AND WAS PLANNINGTO PROPOSE SENDING SALMANFOR OPERATIONAL TRAINING WITH "(('ABD .AL-HAD!)) AL-IRAQI, WHOWASLOCATEDIN WAZIRISTAN, PRIOR TO SALMAN'S DEPLOYMENTON AN OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT, POSSIBLY IN CANADA. KSM SAID HE THOUGHTTHAT SALMAN WAS COLLOCATEDWITH HASSANIN THE AREA KNOWN AS TANDOLEYAR, IN HYDERABAD,AS OF MID-FEBRUARY2003. KSM CLAIMEDHE WASUNABLETO CONTACTSALMANBY EARLYMARCH,AND HAD THEREFORENEVER PROPOSED THE TRAINING. 4. PER REF A, AMMARPROVIDEDTHE FOLLOWINGADDITIONAL INFORMATIONON SULIMAN. ACCORDINGTO AMMAR,SULIMAN·WASA PAKISTANI WITH A UK PASSPORT (AMMARSAID HE NEVER SAWTHE PASSPORT AND DID NOT KNOWSULIMAN'S TRUE NAME). SULIMANIS REPORTEDLY 24/25 YEARS OLD, TALL WITH A FIT BUILD, FAIR COMPLEXION,WITH A SHORT BEARD. SULIMANHAD FOUGHTIN AFGHANISTANAND AMMARSAID HE BELIEVED THAT SULIMANHAD STUDIED TN THE ·UK. AMMAR SAID HE DID NOT RECALL SULIMAN'S EMAIL ACCOUNTBUT SAID HE DID EMAIL HIM AND DIRECTED HIM TO STANDDOWNUPON KSM'S ARREST. DESPITE SULIMAN'S SERVICE AS A FIGHTER IN AFGHANISTAN, AMMARASSESSED HE WASNOT WILLING TO TAKE RISKS ASSOCIATEDWITH SUICIDE MISSIONS OR OTHER OPERATIONALWORK. SULIMANWAS DIRECTED TO SPOT, ASSESS, AND RECRUIT OPERATIVES FOR SUCH OPERATIONS. AMMARSO FAR HAS NOT IDENTIFIED WHERESULIMANHAD BEEN DEPLOYEDNOR WHEREHE HAD PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN THE UK. HOWEVER,AMMARSAID HE BELIEVED SULIMAN'S PARENTS AND A BROTHERLIVED IN THE UK. SULIMAN REPORTEDLYWAS INTRODUCEDTO AMMARBY IMRAN,.A PAKISTANI WHOHAD LEFT KARACHI FOR AFGHANISTANIN JUNE 2002. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679122 Approved for Release: ~017/12/01 C06679122 5. REQUESTBASE QUERYKSM IF HIS SALMANAND AMMAR'SSOLIMAN ARE ONE AND THE SAMEAND PRESS FOR MOREDETAILS OF HIS ACTIVITIES. HQS/ALEC BELIEVES THIS IS A "NO WIN" AREA OF QUESTIONING FOR KSM; EITHER WAYBASE WILL HAVE CAUGHTDETAINEE ONCE AGAIN WITHHOLDING VALUABLEINFORMATION. IF THE TWOARE SEPARATE INDIVIDUALS, HQS/ALEC FINDS IT IMPLAUSIBLE THAT KSMWOULDNOT HAVE KNOWN ABOUT AMMAR'S SOLIMANBEING SENT TO THE UK. IF SOLIMANAND SALMANARE ONE AND THE SAME, HQS/ALEC SUSPECTS THAT KSM WAITED T,O DISCLOSE REF B INFORMATIONUNTIL AFTER LEARNINGOF AMMAR'SDETENTION, PROBABLYBECAUSEKSM MAYHAVE FELT HE HAD NOTHINGTO LOSE BY DISCLOSING SOME INFORMATIONAT THAT POINT. HOWEVER,EVEN THEN, HE DID NOT GIVE THE FULL STORY OF SOLIMAN/SALMAN AND HIS MOST RECENT OPERATIONALACTIVITY. 6. AS AN ASIDE, HQS/ALEC ALSO NOTES A SIMILARITY BETWEENTHE TASK~NGAMMAR GAVE TO SOLIMANAND KSM'S REPORTEDPLANS FOR ((ISSA AL-BRITANI)). APPRECIATE BASE'S THOUGHTSON THE RESEMBLANCE. 7. HQS/ALEC APPLAUDSBASE'S ONGOINGWORKIN OBTAINING CRITICAL THREAT INFORMATIONFROMKSM, DESPITE DETAINEE'S PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATEAND DECEIVE. MANYTHANKSAND GOODLUCK IN YOUR CONTINUINGEFFORTS. REGARDS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679122 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679127 20040214 (b)(3) NatSecAct Date: TO:C I (b)(1) . FROM: (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT:L________________ POSSIBLE THREATS TO THE U.K. _JPROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMMENTSON ----------------------------------------BODY--·------------------------------------- (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 0525 141713ZFEB 04 - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -----:- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - ~ - --- - - - - - - - -- --(b )(3) NatSecAct- - - - - - . · s p c n i: T 1411oazFEB o~(b)(3) NatSecAc(J · · (b)(3) NatSecAct . C]TE 20525 TOR: ~--- ~-- TO: (b)(3) NatSecAct I ,----------___:_ ____ (b )( 1) (b )(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct. __,____ FOR: ~---~- SUBJECT: L_________________ COMMENTSON POSSIBLE THREATS TO THE U.K. (b)(1) PROVIDE ADDITIONAL (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct REF, ""'· L______________________ : (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. (b)(1) . __J ACTION REQUIRED: BASE IS SUBMITTING BELOW INFORMATION IN OPS CHANNELS AS THIS INFORMATION REPRESENTS ONLY ~------ SPECULATION OR !~FORMATION ON TOPICS L____________ ON WHICH THESE DETAINEES HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. __J PLEASE ADVISE IF HEADQUARTERSWISHES ALL OR PART OF BELOW INFORMA~~ON TO BE SUBMITTED (b)(1). (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679127 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679127 (b )( 1) IN INTEL CHANNELS. oN u 2. (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct FEBRUARY2004. I IQUESTIONED (b )( 1) ~------------------~ION INFORMATIONRELATED TO POSSIBLE THREATS.IN THE UNITED KINGDOM(U.K.) REGARDINGREF A REQUIREMENTS (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct 3. ~ DAS EMPHATICTHAT HE NEVER USED HASSAN ( (GHUL)) FOR ANY TYPE.OF DIRECT OPERATIONALWORK. c=:)TATED THAT HE NEVER USED GHUL AS A LINK WITH SAUDI AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES. c=JsAID THAT (b )( 1) ~c=JWERE HIS OPERATIONALCOMMUNICATIONS LINK WITH OPERATIVES, (b)(3) CIAAct NOT HASSANGHUL. (b)(3) NatSecAct 4. I l(b)(1) RECALLEDHIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTSIN REF B VIVIDLY AND HE SAID THAT AT(b)(3) THE TIME HE WAS ASKED ro GIVE HIS SPECULATIONAND THAT ALL THAT HE (b)(3) PROVIDEDWAS MERELYHisl~ SPECULATIONAND GUESSES BUT THAT HE I ~ (b )( 1) WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE FAC_T_S_. ---[__ _____________ ~ 1 (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct I (b )( 1) CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(3) (b)(3) (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679127 CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(1) ~____ /h\/1 \ (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679127 '-' 11"'\1"'\vl . l u A 0 J v 1/-\1-\1.,L (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct____ (b)(3) (b)(3) NatSecAct CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(3) D 7. WAS VERY CLEAR THAT WHILE GHUL WOULDLIKELY KNOW.SOME PEOPLE IN QATAR HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT GHUL HAD ANY OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PEOPLE IN QATAR. c=JsAID THAT GHUL WAS INVOLVEI(b)(1) IN THE MOVEMENTOF MUJAHIDIN FAMILIES OUT OF_PAKISTAN ANDc=] CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(3) BELIEVES THAT GHUL'S CONTACTS IN .QATAR WOULDONLY BE EITHER MUJAHII(b)(3) AND THEIR FAMILIES WHOMGHUL SENT TO.QATAR OR PEOPLE IN QATAR WHO HELPED GHUL FACILITATE THE MOVEMENTOF PEOPLE THERE. ALSO,DCLARIFIED 8. THAT HE BELIEVES THAT IN THE VERY EARLY (b)(1) STAGES OF HIS DETENTION HE MAY HAVE MADE SOME SIMILAR STATEMENTS CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(3) ABOUT HASSAN GHUL HAVING OPERATIONAL CONTACTS IN QATAR, BUTc::JSAID(b)(3) THAT THESE EARLY STATEMENTS WERE NOTACCURATE. BASE BELIEVES THAT LIKELY ~EFERRING TO R~F C DRAFT INTEL REPORT WHICH IS DATED 11 (b)(1) c=JIS DALSO 9. CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(3) MARCH 2003. (b)(3) COMMENTEDON HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT FROM REF B THAT READS, c=JSAID THAT EITHER ( (ABU MU' SAB) ) AL-BALUCHI OR GHUL TOLD HIM ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEF'.ORE HIS ~--CAPTURE, GHUL AND DISCUSSED THE MANYU.S. THAT A QATARI CALLED (b )( 1) PLANES AT HIS LOCATION AND THE USE OF WEAPONS SUCH AS SAM-7'.S AGAINST THESE PLANES. c=JsAID TOLD THE QATAR! TO TALK TO ABU HAZIM." LJoES CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(3) THAT GHUL (b)(3) NOT RECALL EXACTLY WHO TOLD HIM ABOUT THE CALL FROM QATAR TWO WEEKS BEFORE HIS DETENTION OR WHO EXACTLY RECEIVED THE CALL FROM QATAR. c=JsAID TIME, THAT AT THE HE SPECULATED TO DEBRIEFERS THAT MAYBEHASSAN GHUL HAD RECEIVEr b THE CALL, AGAIN FOR THE sAME REAsoNs HE STATED PREvrousLY, rn THAT GHUL KNEW PEOPLE IN QATAR, BUT AGAIN GHUL WAS ONLY ONE POSSIBILITY. HOWEVERc=:)u,so ADDED THAT IT WOULDNOT HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY UNEXPECTED THAT GHUL WOULDRECEIVE SUCH A CALL. D 1 ~b~b~ CIAAct (b)( SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH GHUL WAS NOT INVOLVED DIRECTLY IN ANY OPERATIONS THAT D 3 N S A at ec ct - KNEW OF,c=JSAID THAT GHUL WAS INVOLVED WITH MANY AL-QA'IDA FACILITATING THE MOVEMENTOF FAMILIES AND MUJAHIDIN OUT OF PAKISTAN. (b)(3) THEREFORE,D ) PEOPLE (b)(1) SAID THAT ANYONE DOING THIS woRK MAY ocCASIONALLY HEAR(b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct ABOUT OPERATIONAL INFORMATION BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN HE WAS INVOLVED IN IT. SPECULATINq~--~AID THAT IF SOMEONECONTACTEDGHUL~WITH AN OPERATIONAL IDEA, GHUL WOULDKNOWENOUGH PEOPLE IN AL-QA'IDA TO 10. PUT THAT PERSON IN CONTACT WITH SOMEONE WHO WAS AN AL-QA'IDA OPERATIONAL PLANNER. ALSO, =SAID (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW_IF GHUL AND ( (ABU HAZIM) ) AL-SHA' IR HAVE ANY CONNECTION OR IF THEY EVEN KNOW EACH OTHER. HOWEVER, D BELIEVES IT WOULDBE LIKELY THAT GHUL WOULD(b )( 1) KNOW SOMEONE IN SAUDI ARABIA WHO HELPED GHUL WITH THE MOVEMENTOF FAMILIES WHO ALSO KNEWABU HAZIM. IF GHUL WERE TO CONTACT A SAUDI (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct CONTACT THAT SAUDI CONTACT MAY BE ABLE TO HELP GHUL GET IN TOUCH WITH ABU HAZIM OR ANOTHER PLANNER. ALSO, GHUL COULD CONTACT ABU MUS'AB TO HELP SOMEONE GET IN CONTACT WITH AN OPERATIONAL PLANNER IN AL-QA' IDA. (b)(1). 11. DwAS ASKED TO SPECULATE AS TO WHOMAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO (b)(3) (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679127 CIAAct NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679127 TAKE OVER FOR I IAs THE HEATHROW PLOT. A LINK TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE REST oF THAT HIS c=_]STATED FIJ_EAL ouE To HIS APPEARANCE,LANGUAGEsKILLs, AND uK STATUS; sUBJ NEVER MET ABU ISSA. ~SKED SUBJ IF HE CONSIDEREDUSING JAF.AR AL ((TAYYAR)) TO RECEIVE THE EXPLOSIVES, BUT SUBJ.SAID HE DID ~I NOT. _____ I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 7. SUBJ CLAIMEDHE DISCUSSED BLOWINGUP BRIDGES WITH MAJID BUT THIS IDEA WAS NO LONGERBEING CONSIDERED. HE DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE DISCUSSING ANY PLOT WITH MAJID INVOLVINGPOISONS; ANTHRAX,ETC. SUBJ CLAIMEDHE DID NOT KNOWTHE CURRENTLOCATIONOF MAQSOOD HE MET MANSOUR A MONTHAGO IN PESHAWAR AND MANSOURSAID HE WASENROUTETO AFGHANISTAN. SUBJ BELIEVED SALMAN ((KHAN)) MAYBE LIVING WITH HIS.FATHER IN TANDOALLAHYAR. 8. ( (KHAN)) OR MANSOUR( (KHAN)) . 9. SUBJ'S ONLY ASSOCIATE IN.IRAN IS HIS BROTHERHASHIM ABD'AL- ((AZIZ)) WHOIS 32-YEARS OLD AND MARRIEDWITH THREE CHILDREN. HE CLAIMS ALL HIS ASSOCIATES WHOWERE IN IRAN HAVERELOCATEDTO SAUDI ARABIA. 10. SUBJ WOULDNOT IDENTIFY ANY OF HIS RESIDENCES OR SAFEHOUSES BESIDES USMAN'S AND SHAKIR'S WHICHWE~E IDENTIFIED BY MAJID. SUBJ CLAIMEDHE LIVED WITH USMANOFF AND ON UNTIL MAJID'S ARREST. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679133 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679133 11. SUBJ SAID HE LIVED' AT AAFIA ((SIDDIQUI))' S· HOMEWITH HIS TWOUNMARRIEDSISTERS AND BROTHERSALEH UNTIL SALEH CAMEUNDER SURVEILLANCE. HE SAID HE L~FT A COMPUTERAT AAFIA'S, BUT REMOVEDTHE HARD DRIVE AND GAVE IT TO ( (KHAJA)) AKA ( (TALHA)) WHOWAS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED.BY MAJID AS A DRIVER FOR SUBJ. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679133 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679150 Date: 20020808 TO: ALEC, DIRECTOR 1. FROM: [(b)(1) CURRENT LOCATION AND (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: INFORMATIONON ABU ISSA ·AL-PAKISTANI ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------- (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOR: 081717Z AUG 02 - - -- - - -- -- - - - - -------- -- -- - - ------ -- -- ---------(b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 8 E C R E I 001114z CITE ~-~ 80508 (b )( 1) 1180508 ·(b)(3) NatSecAct- - ---- - -- ---- "'- AUG 02 STAFF (b)(3) NatSecAct ~-----~ IMMEDIATEALEC, DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE~-----~(b TO: ~----~(b)(3) _FO_R_:~ l __ (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: CURRENTLOCATIONAND INFORMATIONON ABU ISSA AL-PAKISTANI [(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct REF· · (b)( ) 1 (b)(3) NatSecAct _ TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST ALEC/HQS INFORMATIONON POSSIBLE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679150 )( 1) NatSecAct Approved for Release:_2017/12/01 C06679150 CURR~ WHEREABOUTS OF ABU ISSA l(b)(1) ~I (b)(3) CIAAct -(b)(3) NatSecAct . I · ~---------~ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 4. WE HAVENO CURRENTINTELLIGENCE AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF ABU ISSA. NATURALLY WE AR~ KEENTO IDENTIFY HIM AND WOULD APPRECIATEANY FURTHERDETAILS 5. MANYTHANKS. KIND REGARDS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679150 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679150 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ·...·.END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679150 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 Date: 20030331 TO: HQSDISSEM FROM: SUBJECT: CT: KHALID SHAYKHMUHAMMAD'S COMMENTS ON HIS PLANS TO TARGET U.S. INFRASTRUCTURETARGETS ----------------------------------------BODY--------------------------------------- • (b)(3) NatSecAct [(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct SB8RB'f (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOT: 312243Z s B e R s TO: DIRECTOR (b)(3) NatSecAct If INTEL 312243Z MAR 03 DIRECTOR[ I IMMEDIATEHQSDISSEM. (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct CENTRALINTELLIGENCEAGENCY WARNING:INFORMATION ~PORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS S H e R B 'f DIST: ll'Qli!QAN 31 MARCH2003 COUNTRY: UNITED STATES SUBJ: CT: KHALIDSHAYKHMUHAMMAD'S COMMENTS ON HIS PLANS TO TARGETU.S. INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETS DOI: 1996 - MARCH2003 SOURCE: A DETAINEE. (A DETAINEE) SUMMARY:NONE. (b)(3) CIAAct TEXT: 1. ~----~ COMMENT:THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIONALPLANNERKHALIDSHAYKH((MUHAMMAD)) AKA ((MUKHTAR))MAYHAVEBEEN MEANTTO INFLUENCEAS WELLAS INFORM. MUKHTAR HAS ALSO BEEN KNOWN TO INTENTIONALLY WITHHOLD INFORMATION AND EMPLOYCOUNTERINTERROGATION TECHNIQUES.) 2. DURINGA CUSTODIALINTERVIEWON 30 MARCH2003, MUKHTAR COMMENTED ON HIS PLANSTO TARGETTHE INFRASTRUCTURE .OF THE UNITED STATES ANDHIS OPERATIONAL MODUSOPERANDI. FROM1996 UNTIL THE TIME OF HIS CAPTURE, MUKHTAR IDENTIFIED INFRASTRUCTURE TARGETSFOR ATTACKIN THE UNITED STATES BASEDALMOSTSOLELYON THE WORLDTIMES ALMANAC(SIC). IN ADDITIONTO USING THE ALMANAC TO TARGETNUCLEAR POWERREACTORSIN THE UNITED STATES, MUKHTAR USED IT TO DEVELOP POTENTIALOPERATIONSAGAINSTLARGE-SCALEWATERTREATMENT FACILITIES, AND EXPANSESOF U.S. FORESTLANDSPANNINGFOURWESTERN STATES. 3. MUKHTAR EXPLAINEDTHAT HIS CONCEPTSFOR OPERATIONS TARGETINGWATERRESERVOIRSAND WATERTREATMENT FACILITIES WERENOT AS DEVELOPEDAS HIS PLAN FOR ATTACKINGNUCLEARPOWERPLANTS. MUKHTAR COULDNOT RECALLTHE RESERVOIRSHE SELECTEDFROMTHE ALMANAC,BUT NOTEDTHE BIGGER THEY WERE, THE BETTER, AND SAID THAT HE HAD SET HIS EYES ON TARGETINGTHE LARGESTRESERVOIRLISTED IN THE ALMANAC. MUKHTAR COULDNOT RECALLTHE SPECIFIC RESERVOIR, BUT WASEMPHATICTHAT IT IS THE LARGESTONE LISTED IN THE ALMANAC AND SHOULDBE EASY TO FIND. ) MUKHTAR HADAT ONE TIME WORKED IN LAHORE, PAKISTANAS A WATERPLANNINGENGINEER FOR A YEAR. BASEDON THIS EXPERIENCE, HE KNEWTHEREWEREAT LEAST Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 (b)(3) CIAAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 TWOWAYSTO TAMPERWITH THE WATERSUPPLY. THE FIRST METHOD WOULD BE TO PERMANENTLY DAMAGE THE HYDRAULICPUMPSAND BACK~UPPUMPSOF A MAJORRESERVOIR. EVEN IF THE PUMPSCOULDBE REPLACEDWITHIN A WEEK, CRIPPLING A LARGE-SCALERESERVOIRWOULDLEAVEHUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF CITIZENS WITHOUTWATER,AND WOULDLEAVETHEMFEELING VULNERABLE TO FURTHERTERRORISTATTACK. '--------~ IT WAS MUKHTAR'SAND AL-QA'IDA'S GOALTO MOUNTTERRORISTATTACKSDIRECTLY AFFECTING THE U.S. ECONOMY ANDU.S. CITIZENS, SINCE ONLYTHEN WOULDCITIZENS PRESSURETHE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CHANGEITS POLICIES IN THE MIDDLEEAST.) 4. MUKHTAR'SSECONDAPPROACHFOR ATTACKINGWATERSUPPLIES INVOLVEDINTRODUCINGPOISON INTO THE WATER. MUKHTAR REALIZEDTHAT CONTAMINATING A MAJORWATERSUPPLY PRIOR TO CHLORINATION WOULD PROBABLYBE INEFFECTIVE. HOWEVER,INSERTJ;NGA CONTAMINATE INTO THE SYSTEMAFTER THE CHLORINATIONPROCESS, OR EVEN HYPERCHLORINATING THE WATERBY RAISING TWOTO THREE-FOLDTHE AMOUNTOF CHLORINENORMALLY PUT INTO WATER,COULDCAUSE CONSIDERABLEHAVOC, EVEN IF ONLYTEN PERCENTOF THE POPULATIONWAS MADEILL. MUKHTAR HADNOT WORKED OUT THE DETAILS OF THIS PLANAND ADMITTEDTHAT DETERMININGTHE APPROPRIATECONTAMINANT WOULD REQUIRE FURTHERRESEARCH. MUKHTAR WASINTERESTEDIN HAVINGMAJID ((KHAN)) WORKON THE WATERSUPPLY PROJECT, AS WELLAS A PROJECT TARGETINGNUCLEARREACTORS. HE DID NOT SHAREWITH KHANANY DETAILS ABOUTTHESE OPERATIONS,AND TALKEDTO KHANIN ONLYGENERAL TERMSABOUTKEEPING HIS MIND OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TARGETING REACTORSAND WATERSUPPLIES. COMMENT:·SEE '-------------------~ F9R INFORMATION ON MAJID KHANAND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN PLANS TO TARGETTHE U.S. WATER SUPPLY.) S. MUKHTAR ALSO DEVELOPED A PLAN FOR SETTING FIRE TO FORESTS "IN MONTANA,COLORADO,WYOMING,AND UTAH, HOPING TO CREATE DEVASTATIONSIMILAR TO THE FIRES THAT RAVAGED AUSTRALIAIN 2002. HE HAD SPOKENABOUTTHIS PLAN IN DETAIL WITH ( (ABU ISSA AL-BRITANI)). MUKHTAR'SORIGINAL PLAN CALLEDFOR ABU ISSA TO TRAVELTO THE UNITED STATES WITH THREETO FOUR OTHEROPERATIVES. THE GROUPWOULDTIME THE FIRES TO OCCURDURINGMID-SUMMER,AND WOULDSET TIMED EXPLOSIVEDEVICES THROUGHOUT THE FORESTSAND GRASSLANDOF THESE FOUR U.S. STATES WITH THE INTENT TO CREATE MASSIVE FIRES THAT WOULDDEVASTATELARGETRACTS OF WOODLAND, FARMLAND,AND CIVILIAN HOUSINGAREAS. THE TIMED CHARGESWOULDNOT DETONATEUNTIL THE GROUPHADSAFELYDEPARTEDTHE UNITED STATES. MUKHTAR BELIEVED THAT SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE U.S. ECONOMY WOULD RESULT, AND ONCE IT WASREALIZEDTHAT THE FIRES WERETERRORIST TO ACTS, U.S. CIVILIANS WOULDPUT PRESSUREON THE u.s·. GOVERNMENT CHANGEITS POLICIES. ALTHOUGH MUKHTAR WANTED ABU ISSA TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE SPECIFIC INTENT OF CARRYINGOUT THIS OPERATION, OSAMABIN LADIN INSTEAD INSTRUCTEDABU ISSA TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES, REGISTER AS A STUDENT,AND CASE JEWISH TARGETSIN NEWYORKFOR AL-QA'IDA. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) (CJ~ct CIAAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE 'SECkiri. (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE ~T Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679185 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679188 Date: TO: (b)(1 )------, c(b)(3) NatSecAct FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - FOLLOW-UP ON DETAILS REGARDING U.K.-BASED ABU ISSA AL-BRITANID (b)(1) I (b)(3) NatSecAct----~ I ----------------------------------------BODY---------------------------------------. (b)(3) NatSecAct I · [(b)(3) NatSecAct . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOT: 260043Z (b )( 1) - --- - ---- (b )(3) NatSecAcf- - --- -- -------- c=(b)(3) NatSecAct ALEC ------ - - - - ----- ------- - - -- -- --- - - --- - - JUN 03 I SH8REllf STAFF TO: 260043z IMMEDIATE =INFO DIRECTOR. (b)(3) NatSecAct ALEc(b)(3)NatSecAct] . (b )( 1) -----------1(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct FROM: I SUBJECT: EYES ONLY- FOLLOW-UP ON DETAILS REGARDING U.K.-BASED ABU ISSA AL-BRITANI REF: (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTIONREQUIRED: 1) PLEASEPOSE BELOWFOLLOW-ON QUESTIONSTO KSMREGARDING ABU !SSA'S TRAVEL (b)( 1) 2. ALEC/HQSAPPRECIATESREF A FOLLOW-UP REGARDING KSM'S KNOWLEDGE OF ( (ABU ISSA AL-BRITANI)) AKA ( (ISSA AL-HINDI)) AND (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679188 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679188 OTHERPOTENTIALUS/UK OPERATIVES. I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 5. WE BELIEVE KSM KNOWSMOREREGARDINGTHIS U.S. CONNECTION THAT HE IS PRESENTLYDIVULGING. IN RUNNINGTO GROUND U.S . . NEXUSES, WE FIND !SSA'S TRIP IN MARCH/APRIL2001 MOSTINTERESTING. IF ISSA WASONLYTO STAY IN THE U.S. FOR A FEWMONTHS,AS KSMHAS PROPOSEDIN HIS RECENTDEBRIEFINGSON THIS TOPIC, WHYWASISSA TASKEDTO ENROLLIN A UNIVERSITY IN NEWYORKDURINGTHIS TIMEFRAME? DID KSMADVISE THAT HE DO THIS AND IF SO, AT WHATNEW YORKUNIVERSITY MIGHT ISSA HAVEENROLLED? WHYWOULDISSA BE ADVISED TO ENROLLIF HE ARRIVEDIN MARCH/APRILANDWASPLANNINGON RETURNINGTO THE U.K. IN MAY/JUNE2001? 6 • FABRICATION: ALEC/HQSALSO WOULDLIKE KSMTO ADDRESSTHE ISSUE OF HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTSIN WHICHHE SAID HE HADTASKED ISSA TO RECRUIT BLACKAMERICANMUSLIMCONVERTSIN MONTANA.REF INDICATEDTHAT KSM SAID HE FABRICATEDTHIS INFORMATION,BUT WE NEED HIM TO CLARIFY EXACTLYWHICHPARTS OF THE STORYARE TRUEAND WHICHARE ~OT. ~ WE CONSIDERTHESE ADMISSIONSOF FABRICATIONS TO BE ANOTHERRESISTANCE/MANIPULATION PLOY THAT WE WILL ADDRESSIN GREATERDETAIL OVERALLIN SEPARATECABLE, BUT AS ALWAYSWELCOME BASE'S COMMENTS ON KSM'S CONVENIENTEXCUSESTHAT HE FELT "FORCED" TO MAKETHESE ADMISSIONS.) OF COURSE, AL-QA'IDA HAS LONGBEEN · TARGETINGBLACKAMERICANMUSLIMCOVERTSFOR RECRUITMENT.IN THE WORDSOF ABU ZUBAYDAH,AL-QA'IDA CONSIDERSAFRICANAMERICANSTO BE LIKE "TIME BOMBS"READYTO EXPLODEBECAUSEOF RACIAL DIVISIONS IN US SOCIETY. IF ISSA WASNOT TASKEDWITH THIS RECRUITMENT,WAS ANOTHERINDIVIDUAL TASKEDTO RECRUIT BLACKAMERICANMUSLIM CONVERTSINTO AL-QAI IDA'S RANKS? DID ISSA IN FACT TRAVELTO Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679188 (b)(3) CIAAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679188 MONTANA? IF SO, WITH WHOM DID HE TRAVELAND BY WHATMEANSDID HE GET THERE? WHYMONTANA?DO THEY CONSIDERTHERE ARE PRO-AL-QA'IDA ENCLAVESIN THAT.STATETHAT SUPPORT ITS U.S.-BASED OPERATIONS? WHOIS THE KEY CONTACT.PERSON IN MONTANA?WHYDID KSMFABRICATE THE INFORMATIONON !SSA'S TASKING TO RECRUIT THESE CONVERTSIN MONTANA? DO BLACKAMERICANMUSLIMSSERVE AS BODYGUARDS FOR LONDON-BASEDSHAYKH( (ABU HAMZAAL-MASRI))? IF SO, DO THESE BLACK AMERICANMUSLIMSHAVERELATIVES/FAMILYMEMBERS/ASSOCIATES IN MONTANA? OR ELSEWHEREIN THE U.S.? KSM LATER EXPLAINEDTHAT THESE MEN WEREJUST TWOAMERICANJIHADISTS HE HADHEARDABOUT DURING THE AFGHANJIHAD AND THAT THES~ AMERICANJIHADISTS WERE NOT/NOT ASSOCIATEDWITH LONDON-BASED ABU HAMZA,ISSA AL-BRITANI, OR MONTANA. IF THIS IS SO, THEN WHATELSE DOES HE KNOW ABOUT THESE "AMERICANJIHADISTS"? 7. FROMREF D, WHENKSMCLAIMEDTHAT IN 1999 HE SENT ABU ISSA TO THE UNITED STATES ON A LONG-TERMPROGRAM TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCEON TARGETSIN NEWYORKAND TO RECRUIT AFRICAN-AMERICANISLAM CONVERTS,WHYDID KSMWEAVETHIS TAIL? DID KSM SEND SOMEONEELSE ON SUCH A TRIP OR DID THIS TRIP NEVEROCCUR? BEFORE TRAVELINGTO THE UNITED STATES, KSM CLAIMEDABU ISSA TRAVELEDTO THE UNITED KINGDOM,WHEREHE WASSAID '1'.0HAVEMET WITH SHAYKH( (ABU HAMZAAL-MASRI)) AKA MUSTAPHA((KAMEL)), IMAMOF FINSBURY PARK MOSQUE,TO SEEK ABU HAMZA'SADVICE ON RECRUITING AFRICAN-AMERICAN MUSLIMS. ACCORDINGTO KSM, ABU HAMZAWASTHE IMAMOF A LARGEWELL-KNOWN MOSQUEIN LONDON,WITH A COTERIE OF BLACKMUSLIMBODYGUARDS.PLEASE HAVEKSMREVISIT THIS ISSUE AND EXTRACTWHATPARTS HE CAN RECOUNTWITH ANY ACCURACY TO HELP DIFFERENTIATE FACT FROMFICTION. 8. REGARDINGKSM'S REF A ASSERTION THAT ISSA PRESUMABLY FLEW INTO NEWYORKIN MARCH/APRIL2001, BUT THEN WASPLANNINGTO STAY WITH HIS SISTER IN VIRGINIA, WE QUERYWHETHER AND HOWISSA TRAVELLEDTO VIRGINIA, AND WHETHERHE MET UP WITH ANYASSOCIATES DURING HIS TIME IN THE U.S. BEFORE TRAVELINGTO VIRGINIA, DID ISSA STAY IN NEWYORK? IF SO, WHEREDID HE STAY ANDWHODID ME MEET THERE? TO THE U.S.? IF STATION ~------------------CAN PRESS KSM ON THE ISSUE OF WHATTYPES OF PASSPORTSEITHER ISSA OR HIS SISTER USED, AND HOWTHEY MIGHT HAVEOBTAINEDTHESE PASSPORTS, THIS WOULDBE GREATLYAPPRECIATED. 9. WE APPRECIATEBASE'S EFFORTS IN ATTEMPTINGTO OBTAINTHIS INFORMATION. WE ALSO APPRECIATEBASE'S EFFORTS OF IMPRESSINGUPON KSM THE NEED TO PROVIDETRUTHFULAND.COMPREHENSIVE ANSWERSTO ALL -QUESTIONS TO ENSUREHIS BEST OUTCOME. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679188 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679188 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF.MESSAGE SB8RB4' Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06679188 Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 Date: (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 20020423 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TO: FROM: cTc[(b)(~) CIAAct SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - UPDATE ON "KENYAN"AND "AMERICAN"IDENTIFIED BY ABU ZUBAYDAHAS PARTICIPANTS IN URANIUMDEVICE PLOT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - BODY - - - - - - - - - - .- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct [ c(b )(3) NatSecAct====---S-130-RE!_'f' ____ (b )(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ~ 231837Z I F a r = B ! TO: 231838Z I I ~I ---(b)(3) FROM: l(b --~-(b)(3) SUBJECT: ALEcl (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSec~ct I APR 02 NatSecAct )( 1) (b)(1)------~ (b)(3) CIAAct (br3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) CIAAct·-----(b)(3) (b)(3) NatSecAct EYES ONLY - UPDATEI CIAAct--------< (b)(3) NatSecAct ION "KENYAN"AND "AMERICAN" IDENTIFIED BY ABU ZUBAYDAHAS PARTICIPANTS IN URANIUMDEVICE PLOT (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 1 Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b )(3) NatSecAct 2. SUMMARY:IN REFS C THROUGHF INTERROGATIONSUMMARIES, SENIOR AL-QA'IDA OPERATIONSOFFICER AND KEY UBL LIEUTENANT ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)) (AZ) HAS PROVIDEDINFORMATIONON A POTENTIALTERRORIST PLAN INVOLVINGTHE USE OF AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE CONTAININGURANIUM (b )( 1) I : (b)(3) CIAA ct (b)(3) NatS ecAct ! I I I THE TWOSUPPOSEDLYDOWNLOADED THE BOMBPLANS OFF THE INTERNETI (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 3. AZ IDENTIFIED THE "KENYAN"AS TALHAAL-((KINI)), AND THE "AMERICAN"AS ABDALLAH AL- ( (MUJAHIR)) (VARIAT - MUHAJIR) AKA ABU ABDALLAH AL- ( (AMRIKI)) · I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I PER REF G, DURINGAN ~-----------~ Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 INTERROGATIONSESSION THAT COVEREDTHE EVENING OF APRIL 22 AND EARLY MORNINGOF APRIL 23, AZ POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE "KENYAN" AS ZOUAOUIAND THE "AMERICAN"AS PADILLA. L(b)(1 ),~---,~--------- "=============(b)(3) CIAAct.___ (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 _ . Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681950 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) TOT: 2516092 (b JUL 02 DrnEcToR C(b 3 )(3 ) NatSecAct 1 ~ _)_J_N_a_ts_e_c_A_c_t ___ 2_s_1_60_9_z _D_rR_E_cT_o_R_L__(_b_)(_ )(3) NatSecAct _______ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: THIS CABLE PROVIDES FORMAL AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED WITH -PORTIONS OF THE NEXT PHASE OF THE INTERROGATION OF ABU ZUBAYDAH. FORMAL APPROVAL FOR THE REMAINDER WILL FOLLOW ONCE WE HAVE ·RECEIVED APPROVAL FROM THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. HQS DEFERS TO ~-- AS TO WHETHER TO PROCEED WITH THE PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEXT PHASE AT THIS T,IME OR TO AWAIT FINAL JUSTICE DEPARTMENT APPROVAL FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TECHNIQUES. 2. BACKGROUND. CIA PLANS TO IMPLEMENT MORE AGGRESSIVE TECHNIQUES IN OUR INTERROGATION OF ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)), OBTAIN ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE ABOUT AL-QA'IDA IN ORDER TO OPERATIVES IN THE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 UNITED STATES AND PLANNED AL-QA'IDA CITIZENS AND U.S. INTERESTS.. LETHAL ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. THE INTERROGATION TEAM HAS CONCLUDED THAT ABU ZUBAYDAH CONTINUES TO WITHHOLD CRITICAL INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE IDENTITIES·OF THE UNITED STATES; IDENTITIES, THREAT AL-QA'IDA OPERATIVES IN THAT IN ORDER. TO PERSUADE HIM TO PROVIDE THOSE THE USE OF MORE AGGRESSIVE TECHNIQUES rs REQUIRED; AND THAT THE USE OF THOSE TECHNIQUES WILL NOT ·ENGENDER LASTING AND SEVERE MENTAL OR PHYSICAL HARM. SOME OF THESE TECHNIQUES INCORPORATE MILD PHYSICAL PRESSURE, LIFE. WHILE OTHERS MAY PLACE ABU ZUBAYDAH IN FEAR FOR HIS IT IS NOT INTENDED, HOWEVER, THAT ABU ZUBAYDAH.ACTUALLY SUFFER SEVERE PHYSICAL OR MENTAL ·PAIN; TRAINED MEDICAL PERSONNELWILL IN ADDITION, APPROPRIATELY BE PRESENT THROUGHOUTTHE PROCESS. THE USG STAFF EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN THE INTERROGATION OF ABU ZUBAYDAH ARE COMPLEMENTEDBY EXPERT PERSONNEL RETAINED ON CONTRACT WHO POSSESS EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, GAINED WITHIN THE ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYS·ICAL METHODS OF INTERROGATION AND THE RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED AS COUNTERMEASURES TO S.UCH INTERROGATION. ALTHOUGH THE INTERROGATION PROCESS HAS PRODUCED.A LIMITED AMOUNT OF SUCCESS TO DATE, ABU ZUBAYDAH:REMA·INS.ADROIT AT APPLYING A HOST OF RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES. HE IS THE.AUTHOR OF A SEMINAL AL-QA' IDA MANUAL ON RES_I•STANCE TO INTERROGATION-' METHOD~, AND. THE AGENCY ASSESSES HE CONTINUES.TO WITHHOLD CRITICAL, INFORMATION ·ABOUT THE IDENTITIES OF AL-QA'IDA TO THE UNITED STATES AND ABOUT PLANNED AL-QA'Il)A ATTACKS. ACTibNABLE PER(,ONNEL .DISPATCHED TERRORIST SIMPLY STATED, COUNTLESS MORE AMERICANS MAY.DIE UNLESS WE CAN PERSUADE AZ TO TELL US WHAT HE KNQWS, OUR.ATTORNEYS HAVE PRESENTED THESE DETERMINATIONS. AND OUR LEGAL ANALYSIS TO THE LEGAL ADVISER TO THE NSC, LEGAL COUNSEL AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DIVISION AT JUSTICE. THE CHIEF ALSO HAS PARTICIPATED 0F STAFF TO FBI IN THESE DISCUSSIONS., TO THE OFFICE OF AND TO THE CRIMINAL DIRECTOR MUELLER AND .THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT HAS. BEEN BRIEFED AS WELL. 3. DISCUSSION. WE HAVE SECURED FORMAL APPROVAL FROM THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL TO EMPLOY THE CONFINEMENT -BOX, AS DESCRIBED IN REF, IN THE COURSE OF THE INTERROGATION OF ABU ZUBAYDAH. WE ALSO HAVE SECURED FORMAL APPROVAL FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO EMPLOY THE FOLLOWING TECHNIQUES, WHICH ARE MORE FULLY DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW: THE ATTENTION GRASP; WALLING.; FACIAL HOLD; FACIAL SLAP (INSULT SLA:P); STRESS POSITIONS; HARMLESS INSECTS. CRAMPED CONFINEMENT; WALL STANDING; SLEEP DEPRIVATION; USE OF DIAPERS; AND USE OF WE NOTE THAT THESE TECHNIQUES- ARE USED ON U.S .. MILITARY PERSONNEL DURING ,SERE TRAINING DIAPERS AND REAL INSECTS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF - - ALTHOUGH SERE TRAIN,ING DOES: MAKE USE OF SIMULATED SNAKES, INSECTS, ET.-CETERA, AS WELL AS FORCED Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 CROSS-DRESSING). A MEDICAL EXPERT WITH SERE EXPERIENCE WILL BE PRESENT THROUGHOUTTHE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROCEDURES. THE SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS, THE ANTICIPATION PER OF THESE TECHNIQUES IS OFTEN WORSE THEN THE ACTIONS THEMSELVES. 4. PLEASE NOTE THAT WE STILL ARE AWAITING FTNAL JUSTICE DEPARTMENT APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF THE WATER BOARD AND/OR THE USE OF MOCK BURIAL AS PART OF A THREAT AND RESCUE SCENARIO.. TO~--~ WE DEFER AS TO WHETHERTO AWAIT THAT APPROVAL BEFORE COMMENCING THE NEXT PHASE OF THE INTERROGATION. 5. IN ADDITION. TO THE CONFINEMENT BOX DESCRIBED IN REF, THE INTERROGATION TEAM IS AUTHORIZED TO EMPLOY ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING TECHNIQUES: -- ATTENTION GRASP: IN A CONTROLLED AND QUICK MOTION, GRASP· THE INDIVIDUAL WITH BOTH HANDS, ONE ON EACH S'rDE OF THE COLLAR OPENING. -- IN THE SAME MOTION, DRAW THE INDIVIDUAL TOWARDYOU. WALLING: THE INDIVIDUAL IS STOOD IN FRONT OF A SPECIALLY CONSTRUCTED FLEXIBLE WALL. THE INDIVIDUAL.'S HEELS TOUCH THE WALL. THE INDIVIDUAL IS PULLED FORWARDAND THEN QUICKLY AND FIRMLY· PUSHED INTO THE WALL. THE HEAD AND NECK ARE SUPPORTED WITH A ROLLED HOOD OR TOWEL THAT· PROVIDES AC-COLLAR EFFECT TO HELP PREVENT WHIPLASH. CONTACT WITH THE WALL IS MADE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S INJURY, -- SHOULDER BLADES. FACIAL HOLD: THE INDIVIDUAL'S EYES. TO REDUCE THE PROBABILITY. OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS ALLOWED TO REBOBND .FROM TH.E WALil. ONE OPEN PALM IS PLACED ON EITHER SIDE OF FACE, FINGERTIPS FACIAL SLAP (INSULT SLAP): FINGERS SLIGHTLY SPREAD. DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE TIP CORRESPONDING EARLOBE. SHOCK AND SURPRISE; -- WELL AWAY F,ROMTHE INDIVIDUAL'S THE GOAL IS TO HOLD THE HEAD IMMOBILE. THE SLAP IS DELIVERED WITH CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE WITH THE AREA OF THE CHIN AND. THE BOTTOM OF THE THE GOAL OF THE FAC~AL SLAP IS TO INDUCE NOT SEVER.E OR LASTING PAIN. CRAMPED CONFINEMENT: INDIVIDUALS ARE .PLACED IN A CONFINED SPACE THE. DIMENSION OF WHICH RESTRICTS MOVEMENT. THE CONTAINER IS USUALLY DARK. INDIVIDUALS MAY BE KEPT IN LARGER CONFINEMENT SPACES FOR UP TO 18 HOURS, AND SMALLER CONFINEMENT BOXES FOR ONE HOUR. -- WALL STANDING: THIS TECHNIQUE IS USED TO INDUCE FATIGUE. THE INDIVIDUAL STANDS APPROXI.MATELY 4 OR 5 FEET FROM A WALL, WITH HIS FEET SPREAD APPROXIMATELY SHOULDER WIDTH. WITH.ARMS OUT STRETCHED IN FRONT, FINGERS RESTING ON THE WALL SUPPORTING BODY WEIGHT. INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT ALLOWED.TO MOVE OR REPOSITION THEIR FEET OR HANDS. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 -- STRESS POSITIONS: POS.SIBLE. A VARIETY OF STRESS POSITIONS ARE THEY FOCUS ON PRObUCIN.G MILD PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT FROM PROLONGED MUSCLE USE, RATHER THAN PAIN ASSOCIATE.D WITH CONTORTIONS OR TWISTING OF THE BODY. THE TWO DISCUSSED WERE (1). ABU ZUBAYDAH SITTING ON THE FLOOR WITH LEGS .EXTENDED STRAIGHT OUT IN FRONT OF HIM WITH HIS ARMS RAISED ABOVE HIS HEAD; AND (2) HAVING ABU ZUBAYDAHKNEEL ON THE FLOOR AND LEAN BACK AT A 45 DEGREE ANGLE. -- SLEEP DEPRIVATION: PREVENTING SLEEP IS THE EFFECT OF REDUCING ABU ZUBAYDAH'S ABILITY INTENDED TO HAVE TO THINK ON HIS FEET AND TO MOTIVATE HIM TO COOPERATE BECAUSE OF THE DISCOMFORT ASSOCIATED WITH THE LACK OF SLEEP. FOR MOST PEOPLE, THE EFFECTS OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION REMIT AFTER ONE OR TWO NIGHTS OF UNINTERRUPTED SLEEP. IN RARE CIRCUMSTANCES, .INDIVIDUALS PREDISPOSED TO PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS MAY DISPLAY ABREACTIONS, BUT THESE TOO GENERALLY REMIT AFTER THE INDIVIDUAL SLEEPS. THE RECORD (GUINNESS BOOK OF WORLD RECORDS) FOR VOLUNTARYSLEEP DEPRIVATION IS 205 HOURS WITH THE SUBJECT SHOWING NO SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOL(JGICAL PROBLEMS AND QUICK RECOVERY' AFTER ONE OR TWO DAYS OF SLEEP. -- USE OF DIAPERS: FASTIDIOUS. ABU ZUBAYDAHAPPEARS 'TO BE VERY . HE SPENDS MUCH TIME CLEANING HIMSELF AND SEEMS TO GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO AVOID CIRCUMSTANCES LIKELY TO BRING HIM IN CONTACT WITH POTENTIALLY UNCLEAN OBJECTS OR MATERIAL. SENSITIVE HE IS VERY TO SI'I'.UATIONS THAT REFLECT A LOSS OF STATUS OR ARE POTENTIALLY HUMILIATING. ONE WAY TO LEVERAGE HIS CONCERNS, WHILE HELPING ENSURE HIS WOUNDDOES NOT BECOME INFECTED WITH HUMANWASTE WHEN IN CRAMPED CONFINEMENT IS,TO IF SOILED, PLACE HIM IN AN 'ADULT DIAPER. CARE WOULDHAVE TO BE TAKEN TO KEEP HUMANWASTE OUT OF HIS LEG WOUND. -- INSECTS: ONE POSSIBILITY ABU ZUBAYDAHAPPEARS TO HAVE A FEAR-OF INSECTS. IS. TO THREATEN TO PLACE STINGING INSECTS INTO .THE CRAMPED CONFINEMENT BOX WITH HIM, BUT INSTEAD PLACE HARMLESS. INSECTS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE',TO PLAY OFF HIS' FEARS AND INCREASE HIS SENSE OF DREAD AND MOTIVATE HIM TO AVOID THE BOX IN THE FUTURE BY COOPERATING WITH THE INTERROGATOR'SREQUESTS. 6. WE WILL ADVISE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE ONCE WE HAVE A FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE WATER BOARD AND/OR THE MOCK.BURIAL SCENARIO. BEST REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06606423 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - l~ __ loN ABU ZUBAYDAHAS OF 2300 HOURS I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOR: 181656Z JUN 02 (b)(1 )I -----------------__._______,(b)(3) 110487 NatSecAct--~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - I TIME) 18 JUNE 2002 ION ABU ZUBAYDAH. AS OF 2300 HOURS I ~---~ ~-~ REF: A-~-~ 10484 (b)(3) NatSecAct B.Ll0482I C. 104831 D. 103001 TEXT: 1. (b)(1) ~--- (b)(3) NatSecAct ACTION REQUIRED: -- 1l~b~b~ PLEASE ENSURE THAT SUBSTANTIVE POFb- 0F INFORMATION BELow ARE sHARED WITH FBI HQs MARKEDATTENTION CIAAct--~ (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 2. OVERALL STATE OF PLAY: AFTERNOON OF 18 JUNE 02, INTERROGATION TEAM MEMBERS ~ AND . !DELIVERED A CAREFULLY SCRIPTED MESSAGE TO ABU FBI. SA C(b)(6) L__ ZUBAYDAH (SUBJECT) _____________ AS.OUTLINED DELIBERATE LASTING FROM 1335 IN REF B. - 1350 HOURS. THE SESSION WAS SHORT AND I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) '-------------Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct THE TONE OF THE COMMENTSBY THE INTERROGATORS WAS PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESSLIKE. SUBJECT'S THE TONE OF THE RESPONSES WERE FRUSTRATED AND AT TIMES MILDLY ANXIOUS. SUBJECT SAT ON HIS MAT, PRAYED, AND DRANK WATER DURING THE HOUR OR TWO THAT PRECEDED THE "CRISIS "CRISIS PRECIPITATION" SUBJECT'S PRECIPITATION" EVENT. AT 15:15, THE EVENT BEGAN AS SIX SECURITY STAFF ENTERED THE CELL, HANDCUFFED HIM HIGH ON THE BARS, AND THEN HOODED HIM. THE TEAM IC PSYCHOLOGIST THEN ENTERED THE CELL AND PROCEEDED TO CUT THE SUBJECT'S 19 MAY. CLOTHES FROM HIM FOLLOWING THE SAME PROCEDURE USED ON THE SUBJECT WAS THEN RELEASED FROM THE BARS AND HAD HIS HANDS CUFFED BEHIND HIS BACK. THE IC TEAM PSYCHOLOGIST THEN PULLED THE SUBJECT TOWARDHIM USING A CONTROLLED ATTENTION GRAB (AS ROUTINELY USED IN SERE PROGRAM) AND SIMULTANEOUSLY DELIVERED A MESSAGE CONTAINING THE AGREED UPON THEMES, ESSENTIALLY TELLING THE SUBJECT THAT NO ONE WOULDTOLERATE BEING JERKED AROUND BY HIM ANYMORE WHEN THEY ASK FOR INFORMATION. SUBJECT WAS THEN TURNED BACK AROUND TOWARDTHE BARS AND HANDCUFFED IN THE ROUTINE FASHION. THE IC TEAM PSYCHOLOGIST AND ALL BUT TWO OF THE SECURITY STAFF DEPARTED THE CELL. SUBJECT WAS RELEASED FROM HIS HANDCUFFS, UNHOODED, AND LEFT ALONE IN HIS CELL. 16:01. THE "CRISIS PRECIPITATION" EVENT SCENARIO CONCLUDEDAT AFTER BEING LEFT ALONE, SUBJECT SLOWLY TURNED FROM THE CELL BARS AND APPEARED SOMEWHATBEFUDDLED AND UNSETTLED. AFTER STANDING MOTIONLESS FOR SEVERAL SECONDS, HE SLOWLY STEPPED BACKWARDSAND EFFORTLESSLY LOWERED HIMSELF TO A SITTING POSITION. HE PULLED HIS LEGS UP CLOSE TO HIS BODY AND LEANED HIS BACK AGAINST THE WALL. SAT THERE LOOKING DEJECTED AND DISTRESSED. HE OUR ASSESSMENT OF HIS EMOTIONAL RESPONSES IS THAT HE WAS INITIALLY ANXIOUS, BUT THEN BECAME ANGRY WHEN HE REALIZED THAT HE HAD NOT ACTUALLY BEEN HARMED. HIS ATTITUDE AND DEMEANOR'SUGGESTS THAT, AFTER HE REALIZED HE WASN'T GOING TO BE HURT, HE WAS INSULTED THAT WE WOULD TREAT HIM THAT WAY AND STARTED TO SULK. ASSESSING SUBJECT'S RESISTANCE POSTURE: BASED ON AN ONGOING ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBJECT'S PATTERNS TEAM WAS MADE TO ASSESS THE SUBJECT'S BEHAVIOR A DECISION BY THE RESISTANCE POSTURE AND GIVE HIM A FACE SAVING OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE THE REQUESTED THREAT INFORMATION. I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) I L__ ____ THIS SESSION ENDED WITH THE SUBJECT SAYING, "WHAT I HAVE, _ I GIVE IT ALL ... I HAVE NO MORE." IT IS OUR OPINION THAT THE SUBJECT IS IN PART ATTEMPTING TO DEMONSTRATETO HIS CAPTORS THAT USING PHYSICAL THREATS AGAINST HIM IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE ISOLATION PHASE WAS STARTED. NEEDLESS TO SAY WE WILL CAREFULLY MONITOR SUBJECT'S NEXT 24 HOURS. 4. THREAT UPDATE: THIS WRITING. 5. MEDICAL UPDATE: BEHAVIOR AND REACTIONS OVER THE NO NEW THREAT INFORMATION TO REPORT AS OF SUBJECT'S DRESSING WAS CHANGEDX,. 1. WOUNDIS HEALING WELL AND VITAL SIGNS ARE STABLE. THE SUBJECT'S CONDITION REMAINS UNCHANGED .. 6. MINIMIZE CONDITIONS CONSIDERED. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 · END OF MESSAGE ( Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06630764 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0663077 4 3EORET • (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ------------------------------~~~~-===~~~:-~~-~: ____ (b)(1)-1~==~~------------SB ERB CITE ~--~ T 231045Z JUL 02 ( b)(1 )-------i (b)(3) NatSecAct. I (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 73208 TO: FOR· r(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT:. EYES ONLY - COMMENTS ON PROPOSEDENHANCEDINTERROGATION PROCESS • REF: DIRECTOR 375769(b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUESTHQS GUIDANCE. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct THERE IS ,~-------------------~I INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS TO INDICATE THAT SUBJECT HAS INFORMATION ON TERRORIST THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES, I (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct WE ARE A NATION OF LAWSAND WE DO NOT WISH L_T_O_P-AR_S_E-WO~RD-S-. -A-B-OT_T_JOM LINE IN CONSIDERINGTHE NEWMEASURES PROPOSEDFOR USE AT~_~IS THAT SUBJECT IS BEING HELD IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT,AGAINST HIS WILL, WITHOUTLEGAL REPRESENTATION,AS AN ENEMYOF OUR COUNTRY,OUR SOCIETY AND OUR PEOPLE. THEREFORE,WHILE THE TECHNIQUESDESCRIBED IN HQS MEETINGSAND BELOWARE ADMINISTERED TO STUDENTVOLUNTEERSIN THE U.S. IN A HARMLESSWAY, WITH NO MEASURABLE IMPACT ON THE PSYCHE OF THE VOLUNTEER,WE DO NOT BELIEVE I • Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0663077 4 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0663077 4 SEeRET WE CAN ASSURE THE SAME HERE FOR A MANFORCEDTHROUGHTHESE PROCESSES AND WHOWILL BE MADETO BELIEVE THIS IS THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE REMAINDEROF HIS LIFE. STATION,~--~ COB AND~--~ PERSONNEL WILL MAKEEVERYEFFORT POSSIBLE TO INSURE THAT SUBJECT IS NOT PERMANENTLY PHYSICALLYOR MENTALLYHARMEDBUT WE SHOULDNOT SAY AT THE OUTSET OF THIS PROCESS THAT THERE IS NORIS ~--------------~ HE IS AN INCREDIBLY STRONGWILLED INDIVIDUAL WHICH IS WHYHE HAS RESISTED THIS LONGI (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 3. THE ABOVESAID, WE DEFER TO EXPERTS AND AS REQUESTEDREF, BELOW-- IN PARAS FOUR AND FIVE -- PLS FIND COMMENTS DRAFTEDBY INTERROGATIONTEAMMEMBERS, IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS~----~OF REF B, CONCERNINGPOINTS RAISED REF A. WE HOPE HQS FINDS THIS CLARIFICATION HELPFUL. - • 4. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTSFEEDBACK: OUR ASSUMPTIONIS THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS OPERATION IS TO ACHIEVE A HIGH DEGREEOF CONFIDENCE THAT SUBJECT IS NOT HOLDINGBACKACTIONABLEINFORMATIONCONCERNING THREATSTO THE UNITED STATES BEYONDTHAT WHICH SUBJECT HAS.ALREADY PROVIDED. GIVEN HIS DEMONSTRATED ABILITIES, HIS CURRENTLEVEL OF CONFIDENCE, AND HIS RELUCTANCETO PROVIDE THREAT INFORMATION-- AGAIN BEYONDTHAT WHICHHE HAS ALREADYPROVIDED-- IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS RECOMMEND USING AN ESCALATINGINTERROGATIONSTRATEGYTHAT HAS A HIGH PROBABILITY OF OVERWHELMING SUBJECT'S ABILITY.TO RESIST. TO ACCOMPLISHTHIS, THE ESCALATIONMUST CULMINATEWITH PRESSURE WHICH IS ABSOLUTELYCONVINCING. WE PROPOSE TO EMPLOYTHE PRESSURES/TECHNIQUES IDENTIFIED AT HQS (MINUS THE MOCKBURIAL--SEE PARA SIX BELOW) IN CONCERTEDFASHION TO OVERWHELM SUBJECT'S ABILITY TO RESIST BY LEADING HIM TO BELIEVE THAT HE CANNOTPREDICT OR CONTROLWHATHAPPENS TO HIM. THE PLAN IS TO RAPIDLY OVERWHELM SUBJECT, WHILE STILL ALLOWINGHIM THE OPTION TO CHOOSETO COOPERATEAT ANY STAGE AS THE PRESSURE IS BEING RATCHETEDUP. THE PLAN 'HINGES ON THE USE OF AN ABSOLUTELY CONVINCINGTECHNIQUE. THE WATERBOARD MEETS THIS NEED. WITHOUTTHE WATERBOARD, THE REMAININGPRESSURES WOULDCONSTITUTEA 50 PERCENT SOLUTIONAND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS WOULDDISSIPATE PROGRESSIVELYOVER TIME AS SUBJECT FIGURES OUT THAT HE WILL NOT BE PHYSICALLYBEATENAND AS HE ADAPTS TO CRAMPEDCONFINEMENT. 5. EFFECTIVE USE OF THE WATERBOARD OVERWHELMS THE INDIVIDUAL'S ABILITY TO RESIST. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTSCONCURWITH THE JPRA REPRESENTATIVE'S ASSERTION THAT IF USED TO PUSH STUDENTSTOO FAR IN TRAINING PROGRAMS,THE WATERBOARD CAN HAVE THE UNWANTED SIDE EFFECT OF REDUCINGTHE STUDENT'S CONFIDENCEIN HIS OR HER ABILITY TO RESIST IN ACTUALCAPTIVITY AND INTERFERE WITH LEARNING. THE FACT THAT THE WATERBOARD OVERWHELMS MOST PEOPLE'S ABILITY TO RESIST IS PRECISELY WHYIC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTSTHINK THIS PROCEDUREWOULDBE EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE RESISTANCE STRATEGIES SUCCESSFULLYEMPLOYEDBY SUBJECT TO DATE. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTSARE NOT AWAREOF ANY SPECIFIC STATISTICS REGARDINGLONG TERMMENTALHEALTHOUTCOMESOR CONSEQUENCES FROMUSE OF WATERBOARD IN TRAINING. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTSDO KNOWTHAT THE NAVYHAS NOT REPORTEDANY SIGNIFICANT LONGTERMMENTALHEALTH CONSEQUENCES FROMUSE OF THE WATERBOARD IN TRAINING. IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTSARE ALSO AWARETHAT JPRA -- WHICH IS THE OPR FOR EXECUTIVEOVERSIGHT OF ALL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) SERE SCHOOLS AND CHARGEDWITH INSURING SAFETY OF THE TECHNIQUESUSED IN TRAINING -- HAS NOT REPORTEDANY SIGNIFICANT LONG TERMMENTALHEALTH CONSEQUENCES ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF THE WATERBOARD.ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONCONCERNINGTHE USE OF THE WATERBOARD IN NAVYSERE SCHOOLS SEiGREF Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0663077 4 (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0663077 4 OEGRl:T . (b)(3) NatSecAct ___ ~~ CAN BE OBTAINED FROM [ THE JPRA SERE PSYCHOLOGIST; AND I I, THE WEST COAST NAVY SERE SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGIST. SPEAKING DIRECTLY TO THE ISSUE OF INDUCING SEVERE MENTAL PAIN OR SUFFERING, ANY PHYSICAL PRESSURE APPLIED TO EXTREMES CAN CAUSE SEVERE MENTAL PAIN OR SUFFERING. HOODING, THE USE OF LOUD MUSIC, SLEEP DEPRIVATION, CONTROLLING DARKNESS AND LIGHT, SLAPPING, WALLING, OR THE USE OF STRESS POSITIONS TAKEN TO EXTREME CAN HAVE THE SAME OUTCOME. THE SAFETY OF ANY TECHNIQUE LIES PRIMARILY IN HOW IT IS APPLIED AND MONITORED. 6. STATION~--~DEFER TO HQS ON USE OF THE MOCK BURIAL WHICH IS LESS CRUCIAL TO THE PROCESS. THIS APPROACH WAS SUGGESTED AT HQS AS ONE/ONE METHOD FOR TRANSITIONING SUBJECT FROM HIGH PRESSURE INTERROGATIONS TO A MORE DEBRIEFING-LIKE SETTING IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT SUBJECT COULD SUCCESSFULLY RESIST THE WATERBOARDDURING THE HIGH PRESSURE PHASE. THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO TRANSITION SUBJECT AND WE DO NOT NEED TO PURSUE THIS OPTION IF IT HOLDS UP THE APPROVAL PROCESS INORDINATELY. I, ;(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE saeRE'P • • · SECRl!T Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0663077 4 (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct I, pproved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631188 (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) TOfl SEeR:ET • £ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct L----------------,-------,------o--c:-61c---:s=-=s:---:-a-z-A-u-=--::G,-------02---,--------------,-1-os_9_4 ____ (b )( 1) (b )(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct • ~I~~ ONLY DETAILS RE 06 AUGUST 02 CYCLE OF INTERROGATIONS OF ABU ZUBAYDAH (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: (b)(1) OF INFlO.RMAACTTIOINONBREELOQUWIARERED: PLEASE ENSURE THAT SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS SHARED WITH FBI HQS MARKEDATTENTION: (b)(3) NatSecAct • 2. DAY THREE OF THE ENHANCEDINTERROGATIONPHASE COMMENCED AT 1042 HOURS. ABU ZUBAYDAH(SUBJECT) SPENT THE PREVIOUS EVENING IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENTBOX. PER THE CURRENT INTERROGATIONSTRATEGY SUBJECT'S SLEEP CONTINUES TO BE DISRUPTED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT, AT 1042 HOURS THE GUARDSAND IC SERE PSYCHOLOGISTS (INTERROGATORS) ENTERED THE CELL AND SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE BOX. AS DISCUSSED DURING THE 0900 HOURS STAFF MEETING, ~--~TEAM MEMBERS IN CONSULTATIONWITH THE MEDICAL STAFF CRAFTED A SCENARIO IN WHICH SUBJECT COULD CLEAN HIS EXPOSED WOUNDWITHOUTDISRUPTING THE INTERROGATIONPROCESS. FYI: AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, SUBJECT'S BANDAGECAME COMPLETELYOFF WITHIN THE FIRST 4 HOURS OF THE ENHANCED PHASE OF INTERROGATION. THE GUARDS SWAPPEDOUT SUBJECT'S WRIST SHACKLES, FOR A CLEAN PAIR, SINCE THEY OCCASIONALLYCOME INTO CONTACT WITH THE EXPOSED WOUND. SUBJECT WAS BROUGHTTO THE "WALLING" WALL. 1:0P SEGRET Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631188 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct pproved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631188 \. t T9P SECRET • A ROLLED TOWEL WAS PLACED BEHIND SUBJECT'S NECK. WHEN ASKED WHAT WAS THE ONE THING SUBJECT DID NOT WANT US TO KNOW, SUBJECT DENIED HE WAS WITHHOLDING ANY INFORMATION. SUBJECT RECEIVED AN INSULT SLAP. SUBJECT WAS "WALLED" WHEN HE DENIED HAVING ANY INFORMATION TO STOP OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S. 3. THE INTERROGATORS DEMANDEDTHAT SUBJECT CLEAN HIS WOUNDAS THEY HAD NO INTEREST IN GETTING ANY EXUDATE FROM HIS WOUNDOR ANY OTHER OF HIS BODILY FUNCTIONS ON OR NEAR THEM. SUBJECT WAS PROVIDED 6 GAUZE PADS SOAKED IN BETADINE SOLUTION AND WAS TOLD IN A FIRM AND PERFUNCTORY MANNER THAT HE ONLY HAD A FEW MINUTES TO TAKE CARE OF HIMSELF. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THE PEOPLE WHO WERE FORMERLY TAKING CARE OF HIM HAD LEFT THE PREMISES AND THAT SUBJECT WAS TO GET THE JOB DONE AND NOT WASTE THE INTERROGATORS TIME. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THIS BRIEF INTERLUDE, SUBJECT WAS WALLED WITH THE QUESTION, "WHAT IS IT THAT YOU DO NOT WANT US TO KNOW?" SUBJECT CONTINUED TO DENY THAT HE HAD ANY INFORMATION. AT 1110 HOURS THE INTERROGATOR WALKED SUBJECT INTO THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX AND PERFORMED AN ATTENTION GRAB. SUBJECT WAS BRIDGED INTO "!'HE BOX WITH THE FOLLOWING PHRASE: WHAT INFORMATION DID SUBJECT HAVE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST WHICH WOULD STOP OPERATIONS. • (b)(1) 4. AT 1130 HOURS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX AND HOODED. HE WAS BROUGHT TO THE "WALLING" WALL AND IN AN EFFORT TO CONTINUE TO DISLOCATE HIS EXPECTATIONS SUBJECT WAS LEFT STANDING HOODED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE GUARDS UNTIL 1209 HOURS. AT THAT TIME THE SECURITY TEAM MOVED SUBJECT BACK TO THE LARGE BOX, REMOVED THE HOOD, POINTED TO HIS WASTE BUCKET AND PLACED HIM BACK IN THE BOX. THE SECURITY TEAM HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED WITH THIS MOTION IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET SUBJECT TO RELIEVE HIS BLADDER. 5. AT 1246 HOURS THE INTERROGATORS BROUGHT THE WATER BOARD INTO THE CELL. THE LARGE BOX WAS OPENED AND SUBJECT WAS HOODED. SUBJECT'S HOOD WAS REMOVEDAND SUBJECT MOVED ONTO THE WATER BOARD WITH NO RESISTANCE. SUBJECT BEGAN CRYING AS HE WAS TOLD THAT WE WANTED INFORMATION TO STOP OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S. SUBJECT WAS TOLD THAT HE COULD STOP THE PROCESS AT ANY TIME. SUBJECT CONTINUED II i-l!TH HIS APPEAL THAT HE HAS T p (b)(3) NatSecAct· BETWEEN 1250 AND 1315 THE WATER BOARD TECHNIQUE WAS APPLIED NUMEROUS TIMES. SUBJECT WAS PUT INTO THE LARGE BOX AT 1317 AND TAKEN BACK OUT AT 1321 HOURS AND PLACED ON THE WATER BOARD IN A SITTING POSITION. SUBJECT APPEARED DESPONDENT AND SAT (b)(1) HUNCHED OVER AT THE END OF THE BOARD AND CRIED IN AN APPARENTLY FASHION. SUBJECT CONTINUED TO SAY THAT AFTER HE HAD PRAYED (b)(3) NatSecActJINE HE WAS TELLING THE TRUTH IN '=-AN~E=F=F=o=R=T~T=o~s=Acc-V=E~H=I=M=s=E=L=F-AND=:::---;HcccI;c--:S;;:--;;Bc--;;R;:--:;0:--:;TcccH::::::ERS . AT 13 2 6 HOURS SUBJECT WAS PUT BACK IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX. 6. AT 1629 HOURS, THE TEAM ENTERED THE CELL AND OPENED THE BOX. THE INTERROGATOR GAVE THE SAME BRIDGE WHICH SUBJECT WAS LEFT WITH WHEN HE WAS PUT IN THE BOX REGARDING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT INFORMATION HE HELD BACK FROM THE PREVIOUS INTERROGATORS. SUBJECT HAD NO RESPONSE, AND WAS LED FROM THE BOX TO THE WATER BOARD AND AGAIN ASKED THE BRIDGE. SUBJECT STARTED CRYING AND CLAIMED HE HAD GIVEN US EVERYTHING. SUBJECT WAS INFORMED HE NEEDED TO START GIVING NEW INFORMATION IN ORDER TO STOP THE WATER TREATMENT; HE WAS WARNEDNOT TO MANUFACTUREINFORMATION. (b)(1 )~ (b )@) NatSecAct TOP SEORET Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631188 ,' pproved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631188 \, I TOP SECRET • (b)(1 )J_--------------------------, l(b)(3) NatSecAct 7. I (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT WAS LARGE BOX AT 1754 HOURS I D .... \....I\. • TU TH~ I I (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 8. CURRENT STATUS: AFTER THREE DAYS OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE, SUBJECT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ANY NEW INFORMATION REGARDING IMMINENT THREATS OR ATTACKS AGAINST THE US. AT THE RISK OF STATING THE OBVIOUS, THERE ARE POTENTIALLY TWO REASONS FOR HIS FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUCH INFORMATION: (A) SUBJECT KNOWINGLY POSSESSES ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND CONTINUES TO CONCEAL THIS INFORMATION DESPITE THE SIGNIFICANT ESCALATION OF THE INTERROGATION PROCESS OR (B) SUBJECT HAS NO SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DIRECTLY RELATED TO THREATS/ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, BEYOND THAT WHICH HE HAS ALREADY PROVIDED, BUT MAY BE WITHHOLDING INFORMATION RELATED TO PAST OPERATIONS AND/OR ACTIVITIES NFI. WISH TO UNDERSCORE THAT IN THE OPINION OF~--~TEAM MEMBERS IT IS PREMATURE IN THE NEW INTERROGATION PHASE TO ADEQUATELYDISCERN WHICH RATIONALE (ITEM A ORB) IS THE CORRECT REASON FOR THE LACK OF NEW INFORMATION. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT'S MEDICAL CONDITION IS STILL STABLE GIVEN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. • 9. PLANS: SUBJECT WILL REMAIN IN THE LARGE CONFINEMENT BOX WITH HIS SLEEP DISRUPTED THROUGHOUTTHE NIGHT UNTIL INTERROGATIONS RESUME MORNING OF 0AUGUST 02. THIS IS TO ALLOW SUBJECT A CHANCE TO CONSUMEENSURE AND FLUIDS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS. TQP SleCRli:r Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631188 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct n cO .. I I I ' 1"8P SESRE+ • (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE TOI' 5!3E!REltf • -· TOP 9E8RE'f ,,.., ,.,,- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631188 II It Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631199 (b)(3) s CIAAct (P)(6) I (b)(3) NatSecAct 'POF SBGRS'f (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(1) ~S_UB_J_E-CT-: -E-Y-ES_O_N_L_Y_-I-NT-ER_R_O_G_A_T_IO_N_P_LAN-=[(b )(3) NatSecAct1 (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b )( 1) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE REVIEW AND WILL ASSUME CONCURRENCE ADVISED~~~~THAT THERE (b)(1) UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY. ALSO, c=]CTC HAD BEEN A MESSAGE PREPARED BY CTC OFFERING GUIDANCE ON LEGAL ISSUES (b)(3) WHICH WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE RECEIVED. REQUEST CTC RE-TRANSMIT~ (b )( 1) THANKS. . NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)( 3 ) NatSecAcfl'HE THREE MEMBER BEHAVIORAL INTERROGATION TEAM ALONG WITH I 1 (b)(6)AS WELL AS THE TWO NVTAG SPECIAL AGENTS SPENT THE EVENING FINE TUNING(b)(1) I THE ANTICIPATED MOVE(b)(3) NatSecAct THE IMPENDING INTERROGATION OF I OFc=]FROM THE HOSPITAL TO I I COULD OCCUR AS EARLY AS !APRIL 2002. REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL DATE OF TRANSPORT, ALL CONCURRED THAT CwouLD BE TRANSPORTED IN A STATE OF PHARMACEUTICAL UNCONSCIOUSNESS TO DECREASE POTENTIAL SECURITY CONCERNS AS WELL AS TO (b )( 1) MAXIMIZE THE INTENDED EFFECT OF DISORIENTINGc=]WHEN HE AWAKENS IN A (b)(3) NatSecAct NEW ENVIRONMENT. THE CONTINUED AND DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO DENY ORIENTING INFORMATION FOR THE DURATION OF THE INTERROGATION PHASE WILL PERSIST. I 3. PRESENT ELICITATION AND INTERVIEW OF ~ APPEARS TO BE GATHERING CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION OF HISTORICAL EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO THE OVERALL COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FROM~ YET APPEARS TO BE INFORMATION THAT IS LIKELY BELIEVED TO BE DISPOSABLE AND FROM~-~ POINT OF VIEW ALREADY KNOWN BY~~ THE PRESENT STYLE OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION HAS BEEN INT~ALLY PURSUED TO ALLOW~-------c~-_TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP HLJ THAT CONVEYS RESPECT AND TOLERANCE TO HEAR SPECIFIC AND ~ALING INFORMATION THAT COULD BE SHAMEFUL AND DIFFICULT FOR ~ TO • ..,CLOSE. THE DEVELOPED RELATIONSHIP WHERE"-----=-=== TS VIEWED AS '1'HE PRINCIPAL INTERLOCUTOR IS AN INTENTIONAL DYNAMI(b)(1 ),T IS PART OF (b)(1 )rnE STRATEGIC INTERROGATION PROCESS. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct. _______________ ------( b)(3) NatSecAct·---~-~-~~~~- (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) __________ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631199 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct /!, (/9-- 4 _ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631199 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct '•· (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 4. THE MEDICAL COMPLICATIONS THAT TO DATE HAVE BEEN EBBING AND FLOWING PRESENT SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTY TO THE ENTIRE PROCESS AND HAVE EREFORE BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN THE INTERROGATION PLAN TO 'TIMIZE POTENTIAL DISRUPTION TO THE NECESSARY FLOW OF THE STRATEGIC • J.'1. FOR EXAMPLE, ONCE c=::J IS MOVED TO~------~ AND THE INTERROGATION STRATEGY IS BEING PROSECUTED, THE RE-TRANSPORT OFc=] TO THE HOSPITAL HAS TO BE WITHHELD UNLESS GRAVE MEDICAL CONDITIONS DEVELOP. INSTEAD, THE CURRENT STRATEGY IS TO INCORPORATE THE MED~CAL DAILY CARE INTO THE PLAN SO THAT WE CAN ATTEMPT TO STAVE OFF A GRAVE CONDITION. CLEARLY, THE DAILY INTRODUCTION OF MEDICAL STAFF TO CARE FOR ~ IS NOT IDEAL TO THE INTERROGATION PROCESS, BUT GIVEN HIS MEDICAL CONDITIONS WE ARE BETTER OFF INTERWEAVING THE MEDICAL EXAMS THAN ATTEMPTING TO FORGO THEM. THEREFORE,.WE WILL HAVE MEDICAL STAFF DRESSED IN UNIFORMS THAT ARE A SOLID COLOR, CONCEAL FACIAL FEATURES AND SKIN, AS WELL AS COVER THE EYES YET ALLOW FOR REASONABL!(b)(1) VISUAL PERCEPTION, I.E. TINTED GOGGLES. WHEN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, (b)(3) THE PHYSICIAN CAN REMOVE HIS/HER GOGGLES TO EXAMINE c=]TO ENSURE ACCURACY OF THEIR EVALUATION. FURTHER, IN AN ATTEMPT TO DIMINISH AFFIRMATION OF11AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND TO RESTRICT PSYCHOLOGICAL THE ME,ICAt STAFF WILl(b )( 1) AFFILIATION, B~YONE OTHER THAN'--==~=== BE INSTRUCTED TO USE HAND SIGNALS TO COMMUNICATEWITH AND WHEN (b)(3) NECESSARY TO COMMUNICATEWITH c=]THROUGH ACCORDING TO WILL REQUIRE FOUR EVALUATIONS DAILY, THEREFORE WE HAVE (b)(3) ~D~ES~I~G~N~E=D-T=HA~T c=JWILL BE SEEN ~IMUM OF 6 TIMES A DAY ON A (b)(6) VARIABLE SCHEDULE TO DISCOURAGEL_JFROM ORIENTING TO THE EVALUATION TIMES AS WELL AS ATTEMPT TO HEAD OFF ~-~POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF THE PROCESS BY REQUESTING MEDICAL CARE BECAUSE OF PAIN OR SOME OTHER SYMPTOMOLOGY. WE WILL CAREFULLY EVALUATE EVERY REQUEST THAT c=J MAKES FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION, YET OUR BASIC POSTURE WILL BE TO PROVIDE(b)(1) MEDICAL ATTENTION ON THIS VARIABLE AND INTERMITTENT SCHEDULE AND NOT WHEN HE REQUESTS MEDICAL CARE, UNLESS OF COURSE WE BECOME CONCERNED (b)(3) T HIS REQUEST HAS MERIT. THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THIS APPROACH IS Tc=:JWILL LIKELY ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE THE INTERROGATION PROCESS . TRY TO GAIN A LEVEL OF CONTROL OVER HIS ENVIRONMENT. TO FURTHER DISCOURAGE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS, WHILE c=JCONTINUES TO PHYSICALLY RECOVER FROM HIS GAPPING LEG WOUNDWE WILL USE STANDARDMEDICAL BINDING OF HIS WRISTS TO KEEP c=J FROM ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE FECAL MATTER OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN SUBSTANCE TO HIS OPEN WOUNDSTO CAUSE A MEDICAL CRISIS. AS HIS WOUNDSHEAL AND THIS TYPE OF CONCERN DIMINISHES ~L BE ALLOWED TO HAVE ADDED MOBILITY. THE 24 HOUR MONITORINGOFL_jBY AUDIO/VISUAL MEANS FURTHER ENHANCES OUR EFFORTS TO AFFORD HIS MEDICAL SAFETY WHILE STILL ACCOMPLISHING OUR INTELLIGENCE GOALS. 41 5. THE SECURITY TEAM AND THE BEHAVIORAL TEAM HAVE WORKED COOPERATIVELY TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY IN THE STRATEGIC PROCESS WHILE RETAINING ALL NECESSARY SECURITY CONCERNS. THE SECURITY TEAM WILL BE DRESSED IN SOLID BLACK UNIFORMS, HEAD AND FACE COVERING AND THE (b)(1) USE OF HAND SIGNALS. THE SECURITY TEAM WILL FULFILL A VITAL FUNCTIOl(b)(3) IN THE OVERALL PROCESS AND WILL HAVE ONE OFFICER IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CELL TO HELP KEEP c=J AWAKEDURING THE DISORIENTATION PHASE OF THE PROCESS. 6. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT, ~-~PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE AND THE ACTUAL INTERROGATION PROCESS ARE INTENTIONALLY DESIGNED TO DEVELOP THREE BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS TO ENHANCE COOPERATION AND WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS VITAL INTELLIGENCE. THE DEVELOPMENTOF PSYCHOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE, LEARNED HELPLESSNESS AND SHORT TERM THINKING ARE KEY FACTORS IN REDUCING ~~=SENSE OF HOPE THAT HIS WELL HONED COUNTER-MEASURE INTERROGATION SKILLS WILL HELP HIM FROM CLOSING IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE. BY USING BRIGHT (PHYSICALLY NOT ~FUL) LIGHTS IN AN ALL WHITE ENVIRONMENT, WHITE NOISE PRODUCED BY • ND "MASKING" EQUIPMENT (PHYSICALLY NOT HARMFUL), DISORIENTATION BY (b)(1) NOT ALLOWING IN NATURAL LIGHT NOR ROUTINE OF SCHEDULE, KEEPING c=J (b)(3) CIAAct, MAKING HIM DEPENDENT BY NOT RESPONDING TO HIS REQUESTS OR T (b)( ) NatSe;Act REMOVING As MUCH coNTRoL As POSSIBLE FROM HIS ABILI 3 I Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631199 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct NatSecAct CIAAct NatSecAct NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) ~atSecAct pproved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631199 (b )( 1) . 1, (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) 1M .ft!EMJ'I' AFFECT HIS ENVIRONMENT DURING THE EARLY PHASES OF THE PROCESS WILL ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NECESSARY MINDSET WHERE c=]WILL ~E.DIFFICULTY CONCENTRATING, PLANNING, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY • ISTING THE PROCESS. 7. PHYSICAL ~-~WILL THE INTERROGATION PROCESS HAS TO BE AN EXTENSION OF THE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MANIPULATION THAT HAS BEEN DESIGNED. BE GIVEN SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION IN USING INTERROGATION (b)(3) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct (b)(6) =-1 (b)(1) ;!~~I~~o~~~ ~~~~:s~EHi~E cg~:g:~u:g~ i~E R~~~c:~YA:I~:LiH!s (b)(3) NatSecAct PREPARE HIM FOR THE INTERACTION DURING THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE INTERROGATION PROCESS. ONCE COOPERATION AND VITAL INTELLIGENCE IS OBTAINED AND c=JAPPEARS TO HAVE RESIGNED HIMSELF TO THE PROCESS (b)(1) ~-~ WILL MOVE MORE AND MORE TOWARD A TRADITIONAL DEBRIEFING STYLE. (b)(3) CIAAct IF NECESSARY, ~ CAN BE RETURNED TO A MORE RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT (b)(3) NatSecAct IF c=:JsECOMES RESISTIVE AFTER A PERIOD OF COOPERATION. (b)( ) 6 8. THE INTERROGATION PROCESS WILL ESTABLISH SHORT-TERM THINKING, DECREASED INTERNAL PROBLEM SOLVING AND DIMINISH EVASIVE TECHNIQUES THAT =::JHAS LEARNED OR HAS NATURALLY IN HIS ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL AND NOT DISCLOSE VITAL INTELLIGENCE. ~---~WILL BE (b )( 1) ENCOURAGED TO TAKE A POLITE, RESPECTFUL AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL (b)(3) NatSecAct INTERACTIVE STYLE WITH c=]WHILE ALSO NOT BE APOLOGETIC NOR UNDETERRED FROM GETTINGc=] TO ANSWER ~-~DIRECT QUESTIONS WITH SPECIFIC AND DETAILED RESPONSES. BY NOT ALLOWING c=J TO MANIPULATE (b)(1) THE PROCESS BY EITHER MAKING COMPLAINTS OR ATTEMPTING TO DERAIL (b)(3) CIAAct ~--~ THE SHORT TERM THINKING APPROACH WILL AGREE WITH COMPLAINT FOLLOWED BY RESTATING THE QUESTION. THEME DEVE~L-OP_M_ENT~ AND(b)(3) NatSecAct MONOLOGUES BY ~---~WILL FURTHER ENHANCE THE PROCESS. THE (b)(6) THEMES AND MONOLOGUES WILL BE CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED BY ALONG WITH CONSULTATION WITH THE BEHAVIORAL TEAM. THE '=p=R~O~CE~S_S_I~S~A ~HLY EFFECTIVE WAY TO MOVE PAST THE "THROW AWAY" INTELLIGENCE THAT WILL LIKELY ATTEMPT TO STALL THE PROCESS. THE USE OF • ~NTER-MEASURES BY A DETAINEE IS NOT INTENDED TO KEEP THE (b)(1) INTERROGATOR FROM BECOMING AWARE THAT THE DETAINEE IS USING THEM, (b)(3) CIAAct BUT RATHER ARE DESIGNED TO FRUSTRATE AND DETER THE INTERROGATOR FROM (b)(3) NatSecAct GETTING VITAL INFORMATION. (b)(6) 9. THE CURRENT ANTICIPATED TIME LINE AND PROCESS IS AS FOLLOWS: TRANSPORT FROM THE HOSPITAL, DURING WHICH11WILL BE MEDICALLY PLACED INTO AN UNCONSCIOUS STATE, c_____,--~FA'--cTIIT.HAIR, SCALP AND BEARD,(b)(1) WILL BE SHAVED TO DENYc=] THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE HOW LONG AND FAR HE WAS TRANSPORTED. THE FIRST 24-48 HOURS WILL BE KEPT AWAKE(b)(3) NatSecAct BY HAVING A GUARD IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM, OUT OF SIGHT OF CJ BUT CLOSE ENOUGH TO FIRMLY ROUST=:J AFTER THE INITIAL ISOLATION (b)(1) PROCESS, THE FIRST SESSION WILL OCCUR WHERE ~---~WILL TELL THAT THINGS HAVE CHANGED, THAT WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT - MANY THINGS (b)(3) CIAAct AND THAT YOU NEED TO TELL ME ABOUT MANY THINGS, BUT WE ARE GOING TO START WITH "THE ONE THING YOU DON'T WANT ME TO KNOW." c=]WILL (b)(3) NatSecAct ~ILL AGREE (b)(6) LIKELY PROTEST OR ATTEMPT TO DIVERT THE QUESTION. WITH A PROTEST, I.E. THE ROOM IS VERY BRIGHT, BY SAYING "YES THE ROOM IS VERY BRIGHT, NOWc=]WHAT IS THE ONE THil'fID THAT YciDO NOT WANT TO TELL ME." IF ~DOES NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY,~ l~~~=c--r_,WILL INFORM THAT HE NEEDS TO TELL ~-~ THE ONE THING THAT DOES NOT WAN'l(b)( 1) TO TELL ~-~AND THAT HE WANTS TO THINK ABOUT HIS ANSWER AND (b)(3) NatSecAct THEN TURN AND WALK OUT OF THE ROOM. THIS SAME PROCESS WILL OCCUR OVER THE NEXT MULTIPLE HOURS UNTILc=JPROVIDES A "MENU" OF THINGS HE ~ANTS INFORMATION ABOUT. AS HE PROVIDES THE (b )( 1) THINGS AFOREMENTIONED "MENU, 11 WITHOUT REALIZING IT, IS ACTUALLY (b )(3) NatSecAct PROVIDING/CONFIRMING TOPICS HE HAS INFORMATION ABOUT. AT THIS POINT, CJWILL BE ENCOURAGED TO PICK ONE OF THE TOPICS THAT HE LISTED IN "MENU" AND ATTEMPT TO GET ~ TO PROVIDE SPECIFICS ABOUT THE (b)(1) 1 INF~~ D~:s w~~s Pc=]~~ ~:~~(b )( ··rnA WHEN HEw~i~URNs, (b )( 3 ) NatSecAct c=J CJ I c=J I ;· CJ ··l I D C ~ )~~:I~· 'I(b)(1 )IND WALK AWAY. MOST IMPORTANTLY, (b)(3) _c(b)( 3 ) CIAAr.fING AND NOT APPEAR FRUSTRA(b)(3) (b)(3) NatSecAct CIAActn,n APPEAR RELAXED, NatSecActNTED BY (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631199 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct pproved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631199 ,(b)(1) • (b)(3) (b )( 1) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct 'FBP!H3CRE'I' J ( b) ( 1) RELUCTANCE. ~ WILL CONTINUE TO BE KEPT FROM SLEEPING DURING THESE (b)( 3 ) ENCOUNTERS. ONCE c=]PROVIDES SPECIFICS ABOUT THIS TOPIC AREA FROM (b)(3) ==rwILL TELL HIM THAT THIS WAS NOT THE "ONE THING (b)(6) s "MENU" • DID NOT WANT TO TELL HIM. II I I WILL TELLc=]THAT HE • rs~ TO TELL HIM ABOUT THE ONE THING HE DOES NOT WANT TO TELL ~------~REACTION TO THIS REBUFF SHOULD PROVIDE VALUABLE BEHAVIORAL CLUES AS TO HOW CLOSE WE ARE TO MORE VITAL INFORMATION AND THE DEPTH OF~-~ RESOLVE TO RESIST. THIS PROCESS WILL BE CAREFULL"l(b)(1) MONITORED AND WHEN APPROPRIATE ~---~ WILL PROGRESS TO (b)(3) UTILIZATION OF MONOLOGUES AND THEME DEVELOPMENT. CIAAct NatSecAct I 10. TO AID THE AFOREMENTIONED APPROACH, THE INTERROGATION TEAM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ~=~~==-"OFFICERS, IDENTIFIED A PRIORITIZED LIST OF KEY ISSUES/TOPICS TO BE COVERED WITHc=] DURING THE INTERROGATION. THIS LIST WILL HELP KEEP THE INTERROGATION FOCUSED (b)(1) ON INFORMATION OF HIGHEST PRIORITY AND SERVE AS A USEFUL TOOL TO (b)(3) GAUGE WHEN c=J EMPLOYS RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES TO DIVERT OUR ATTENTION TO LOWER PRIORITY ITEMS. THIS LIST WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY FOR HQS ASSESSMENT AND ADJUSTMENT AS NECESSARY. (b)(1) (b)(3) 11. THE WHITE NOISE GENERATORS WILL BE USED IN VARIABLE LENGTHS OF TIME TO HELP DISRUPT~_~PROBLEM SOLVING THINKING AND TO INCREASE HIS SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS BY HIGHLIGHTING HIS INABILITY TO ALTER THE ENVIRONMENT AROUND HIM. WE WANT TO INSTILL IN ~ THAT WE ARE NOT GOING AWAY AND THAT THE ONLY MECHANISM HE HAS AT HIS DISPOSAL TO CONTROL THE ENVIRONMENT WILL BE IN PROVIDING VITAL INTELLIGENCE TO OVER TIME~ WILL EARN BASIC PRIVILEGES WHEN~ AND THE BEHAVIORAL TEAM FEEL THAT IT IS CONDUCIVE TO THE (b)(1) INTERROGATION. QUITE CLEARLY, c=]WILL NEVER BE GRANTED A PRIVILEGE (b)(3) WHEN ~ REQUESTS ONE BUT RATHER APPEAR T~HAT CONTROLS HIS ENVIRONMENT AND THAT HE HAS TO PLEASE L___J TO MAKE HIS (b)(3) ~ITIONS BETTER. (b)(6) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) NatSecAct NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct I I • I CIAAct NatSecAct 12. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THERE ARE A VAST NUMBER OF OTHER NUANCES AND MINOR BUT IMPORTANT DETAILS THAT WOULD MAKE THIS CABLE SEVERAL VOLUMES LONG. WE THOUGHT THIS THUMBNAIL GIST WOULD HELP HQS GET AN (b)(1) APPRECIATION OF THE LONG AND CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT PROCESS THAT HAS (b)(3) CIAAct ,...B=E=EN.,._____.D=E=S._...I=G=NE=D~T._..O._____.._P_....ER"-"S..,_,E.._..CUT=__..,E_T_.._.H._.__,I.,__.,S,_____._,M~SS~I~O~N~----l ________ __l----(b )(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (b )( 1) (b)(3) (b)(3) END OF MESSAGE • ~-----------(b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct ':FSF SB€R:B'l? (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct~----------~/!,~J'.~k~" 7 -----------i 1 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631199 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 SECRET (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ~======~ I (b)(3) NatSecAct __ ___________ (b)(3) NatSecAct ~~ I I PAGB 001 - -- -- - -- - -- - ----- -- --(b )(3) NatSecA~:.~~~~~-~ - ~~ -- -- _J , (b )( 1) S B e R B T ' (b)(3) NatSect~k TO: 151003Z 10536 IMMEDIATE SLUGS: L_ [~~~~~ ------------ JUL 02 STAFF 1)-------~----(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ALEC INFO DIRB~b)( FOR: _____________ _ SUBJECT: BYES ONLY - ADDITIONALOPERATIONAL AM> SECURITY CONSIDERATIONSFOR THE NEXT PHASE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH INTERROGATION REF: A. Cll0530I B. c. TEXT: 105298 12161 (b)(3) NatSecAct I D.(b)(1) 105341 (b)(3) NatSecAct ----~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) GEeRE:r Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 I ___J Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 Sl!CRE'f (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 Sl!CPll!T (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 Sl!CfH:'T (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) IP SUBJECT DEVELOPSA SERIOUS MEDICALCOlmITION WHICHMAYINVOLVEA HOST OP COlmITIONS INCLUDINGA HEARTATTACKOR ANOTHERCATASTROPHIC TYPB OP COlmITION, ALL BPPORTSWILL BB MADBTO BNStJRBTHAT PROPBR MEDICALCARBWILL BE PROVIDEDTO SUBJBCT. IN THB EVENTSUBJBCTDIBS WE NEBDTO BE PRBPARBDTO ACT ACCORDINGLY KBBPINGIN MDm THE LIAISON ~mI:TI8S_____DIIVOlLlq, NG OUR HOSTS. IP SUBJECT DIBS, WE PLAN ON SBBKIHG ASSISTANCEFOR THE CREMATION OF SUBJECT. I I I (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) REGARDLESS WHICHOPTION WE FOLLOW, ~:>Wl!WB:If;, -.JAL'U..IOOIBBSS:PPlBRC:lIALL:ALl'.iYnI~NIL'LirolGHT OF THE PLANNEDPSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURETECHNIQUESTO BB IMPLEMBN'l'ED, WE NEED TO GET REASONABLE ASSURANCESTHAT SUBJBCTWILL REMAININ ISOLATIONAND INCOMMUNICADO I seenc:r Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 FOR (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) BND OF MBSSAGB SBC'ltBT SECAE+ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631226 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOR: ------------------s e c R s 'ti 1214442 fl, CITL(b)(1 ~__ ---------------AUG 02 [(b)(3) 1214482 AUG 02 --------- (b)(1) - ------- I 1061 R .(b)(3) NatSecAct ___________ NafSecAct f1C:1 Q ~ (b)(3) NatSecAct _______________ (b )( 1) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) EYES ONLY - DETAILS OF 12 AUGUST 2002 INTERROGATIONS OF ABU ZUBAYDAH BJECT: CYCLE OF (b )( 1) NatSecAct (b)(3) TEXT: .1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI ONLY. 2. SUMMARY: DURING DAY NINE OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE, SUBJECT PROVIDED NO NEW THREAT INFORMATION REGARDING PLANNED OR FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S. SUBJECT WAS • BOARD. (b)(1)INTERROGATED TWICE ON 12 AUGUST, BOTH TIMES ON THE (b)(3) NatSecAct 3. r 1101 • DAY NINE OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION HOURS LOCAL TIME, 12 AUGUST 2002. I I LARGE b)(3) HOURS 11 AUGUST ( (ABU @11;, ....,4:j))(SUBJECT) MOVED FROM THE LARGE BOX BY THE SECURITY CLEANED (b)(1 AT 1922 AND BB/ENSURE BOX BY THE SECURITY )11.UGUST, SUBJECT WAS REPLACED. PHASF. COMMRNC"'.Rn AT (b)(3) NatSecAct==1 TEAM. SUBJECT TEAM AT 1.930 HOURS. HIS WAS WOUND WAS WAS RETURNED AT 0500 . . HOURS 12 WAS REMOVED FROM THE LARGE BOX BY THE SECURITY NatSecAct TO THE TEAM (b)(1) S./i,CRCT (b)(3) \ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 --~!Pagel NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 3"ECRE'1' -AM AND SEATED ON THE FLOOR. SUBJECT WAS HOODED AT 0630 HOURS, SECURITY STOOD SUBJECT UP SO THAT HIS WOUNDCOULD BE INSPECTED. SUBJECT 9'S THEN RE-SEATED ON THE FLOOR, STILL HOODED. AT 0700 HOURS, SECURITY TEAM RETURNED SUBJECT TO THE LARGE BOX, WHERE HE REMAINED UNTIL 1101 HOURS. AT THIS TIME, SECURITY TEAM MEMBERS EN.TERED THE ROOM, UNLOCKED THE LARGE BOX AND WHEELED IN THE BOARD. SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE BOX BY SECURITY TEAM MEMBERS AND INTERROGATOR PLACED THE BOARD COLLAR AROUND HI.S NECK. THE ROLLED TOWEL/NECK SUPPORT WAS PLACED AROUND SUBJECT'S NECK BY THE IN.TERROGATOR, AND HE WAS MOVED TO STAND NEXT TO THE liil 11B (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct INTERROGATORS STOOD SILENTLY BY SUBJECT FOR A MOMENT. SUBJECT AT ONE POINT SWAYED AND LOST HIS BALANCE BUT RIGHTED HIMSELF WT'!'!-!l\m ASSISTANCE; HE SAID NOTHING. I (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct iilili \SUBJECT WAS LED TO THE ,__T_O_S_I_T-ON_I_T_S_E_D_G_E_. -S-U~BJECT WAS TOLD TO LIE ON THE DID SO SLOWLY. 4. INTERROGATORS STRAPPED SUBJECT TO THE TABLE AND MADE BOARD AND illB iEliB BOARD (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAc+-~--===-==~======tb)(3) NatSecAct SF,Gff£T Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 I~-----~· fage]- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct THE FIRST • TREAT 125. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) SUBJECT WAS LEFT (b)(3) NatSecAct '---...--.--.-.~~~~~-=----=----,--(b)(1) ~HE_R_o_o_M_A_T_1_1_5 6_H_o_uR_s~---(b INTERROGATORS RETURNED TO )( 3 ) NatSecAct-------------1 • TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1157 HOURS. SUBJECT CONTINUED WITH HIS DENIALS, AND ANOTHER TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1158 HOURS. SUBJECT'S DENIALS PERSISTED AS INTERROGATORS INSISTED SUBJECT KNEW MORE THAN HE WAS TELLING THEM. ANOTHER TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1159 HOURS. 111D (b)(1) 111D (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT WAS RELEASED FROM THE • BOARD AND TOLD TO GET UP. SUBJECT WAS TOLD NOT TO WASTE HIS TIME WHILE THINKING. SUBJECT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PUT IN TO THE LARGE BOX AT 1203 HOURS. SECURITY TEAM MEMBERS CLEANED HIS WOUNDAREA, I ADJUSTED HIS HANDCUFFS AND LOCKED THE DOOR. 5. AT 1230 HOURS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OUT OF THE LARGE BOX, AND HIS WOUNDCLEANED. AT 1345 HOURS SUBJECT WAS SEATED ON THE FLOOR, HOODED. AT 1545 HOURS SECURITY TEAM MEMBERS HAD SUBJECT STAND AGAINST THE WALL. AT 1615 HOURS, SUBJECT WAS AGAIN SEATED ON THE FLOOR. AT 1632 HOURS, THE SECURITY TEAM ENTERED, AND BROUGHT IN THE BOARD SUBJECT WAS RAISED FROM THE FLOOR, AND HIS HOOD REMOVED. BOARD SUBJECT LOOKED AT INTERROGATORS, SLOWLY UPON SEEING THE WALKED FORWARDOF HIS OWN ACCORD TO-THE SIDE OF THE liim BOARD AND WAITED FOR INTERROGATOR TO PLACE THE COLLAR AROUND HIS NECK. SUBJECT LAID HIMSELF DOWNON THE liim BOARD SHAKING. 1111B BIB (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) c=(b)(3) NatSecA9 (b)(1) &ECRCT Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 _JPageJ (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 S£CRET (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct I ,nn • TREATMENT WAS APPLIED AT 1707 HOURS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ~ (b )( 1) I INTERROGATORS COVERED SUBJECT'S EYES WITH THE CLOTH. (b)(3) NatSecAct c--------~ ~)(1)---~ (b)(3) NatSecAct L__ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 ______ (b)(1) . (b)(3) NatSecAct L__f~;:;- ---------------Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 (b)( 1 (b)(3) NatSecAct INTERROGATORS I DEPARTED THE ROOM AT 1709. SEVERAL SECONDS LATER SUBJECT BEGAN TO VOMIT. INTERROGATORS IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE ROOM, PARTIALLY UNSTRAPPED SUBJECT AND RAISED HIM TO A SITTING POSITION SO THAT HE COULD CLEAR HIS AIRWAY. [____________________ (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct AT 1714 SUBJECT WAS TAKEN OFF THE BOARD AND HOODED.. AT 1715 SECURITY TEAM MOVED SUBJECT TO SIT ON THE FLOOR AND INITIATED THE WHITE NOISE. SUBJECT WAS MOVED IN TO THE LARGE BOX BY THE SECURITY TEAM AT 1738 HOURS. '---===-------------~ I &ml (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE • Sli:Cl-:iT /" • (b)(1) (b)(1) [(b )(3) NatSecAct~-------,------------(b )(3) NIL_ a_t_s_e_cA_c_t~~~~\ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06644 727 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 t• (b)(3) CIAAct (b)~6) . 0:>~2~7A{,4~ I 'f6F SIJCRB'f Ve}. NQl!!QEUJ - ;).I'' ~s.. PowerPointPresentation I a .. lnr · -• Ah11 7, - - (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Slide 2: I I (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) - ·- _ Con: Not a USG-controlled facility Requiresdiplomatic/policy decisions (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct HOf'O~H 'fOfi 3:EC~E'f Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 '½'OPSB6RB!F l~Of'ORH - SUBJECT: Guatanamo Bay (Brig) Slide 4: Pro: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Con: Viabili (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) resencean issue of maintainin Possiblelossof controlto US militaryand/orFBI Possibleimpacton prisonersif AZ's presencebecomesknown • (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Slide 6: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct 5 US MilitaryCustl8}~ ) I Pro: US Military-controlled facil(b)( ) 1 · (b)(3) NatSecAct ~~=~~--(b )(5) • oorareasecu tiJOFOllt~ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct._~ (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 . 'f0P SECRE'f nererm - SUBJECT: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) • • HOFOR-H ~l:CREI 'fep Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah TS/INF Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 ----------.....-.pproved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 . . -.- :, ·_:.; ; . . . ,i-J- This presentation is classified T()P SEeRET NOF0RN TSfltff Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0665600 . _____ ___..._ _______ .Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Options for IncarceratingAbu Zubaydah (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) TSflP~F Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0665600 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah Guantanamo Bay (Brig) Pro: US Military-controlled facility High degree of physical security ----------------- (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) ~----~--------(b)(S) (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Con: Viability of maintaining secrecy of Abu Zubaydah's presence an issue (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Possible loss of control to US military and/or FBI Possible impact on prisoners if AZ's presence becomes known TS11 ~1F Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 O ptions for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah 1 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) c_l ---------------~ Pro: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) No issues of possible US court jurisdiction ------------------ (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Con: Not a USG-controlled facility Requires diplomatic/policy decisions TS/fNF Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Options for IncarceratingAbu Zubaydah (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) TS//NF Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 ----·---,--------~A~pproved for Release: 2_917/12/01 C06656009 Options for IncarceratingAbu Zubaydah (b )( 1) ~--(b)(3) NatSecAct . US Military Custod Y~-(-b)_(s) Pro: Con: ___ ~I US Military-controlled facility Maintaining secrecy ~------------(b)(3) (b )( 1) (b)(5) NatSecAct- Poor area security Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 1 ------------- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 •• Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 1, .... Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Optionsfor IncarceratingAbu Zubaydah (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) -4'.SNNF Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C0665600 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 O ptionsfor Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah 1 (b )( 1) 3 ) NatSecAct ~l_-~(b~)(~5)____ us Miilitary Custody~(b)( : Pro: US Military-controlled facility Con: Maintaining secrecy I ~. (b)(1 )1--------(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Poor area security TSmJF -------------Mpproved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656009 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656588 .. .... , Date: 20020810 TO: ALEC (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - TEAM ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATUS OF THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION STRATEGY OF ABU 2UBAYDAH (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I I TOR: 1003352 AUG 02 110607 I _________________________________________________ (b)(1) _________________________ _ s 13 e 1t e 1 1003312 AUG 02 STAFF · (b)(3) NatSecAct · (b)(1 )--, CITE [(b)(3) ~atSecAct (b)( 1) (b)(1) TO: "'~Ee INFO DIRECTOR~b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct cTcc=JrnFol cTc/LGL, TMMDnn,n,::, ~_(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct I ~I---------~I OMS~ OTt:=j (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) SUBJECT: EYES ONLY TEAM ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATUS OF (b)(3) NatSecAct THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION STRATEGY OF ABU 2UBAYDAH ~-~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct REF: (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: HOLDING A VTC WITH HQS AT PLEASE SEE PARA 7 ON DESIRABILITY L__ ___ AUGUST {HQS TIME), OF AND PARA 8 (b)(1) REQUEST FOR INDICATIONS OF STEPS TO BE TAKEN POST-INTERROGATION. )~ (b)(3) NatSecAct~RESPECTFULLY REQuEsTs REsPoNsE sY oos 11 AuGusT L(b)( 1 (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656588 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAcf-Pproved forRelease:2017/12/01 C06656588 2. SUMMARY: TEAM'S COLLECTIVE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT ~--~ IS THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)) (SUBJECT) HAS ACTIONABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. TEAM THINKS, HOWEVER, SUBJECT IS STILL HOLDING BACK INFORMATION ABOUT HIS INVOLVEMENT IN PAST OPERATIONS. THE CURRENT LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES WILL BE MAINTAINED FOR THE TIME BEING TO REFINE THIS PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT. PROCESS HAS BEEN FASTER THAN ANTICIPATED, (b)(3) NatSecAct THE CONDITIONING PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE WATERBOARDQUICKLY OVERWHELMEDSUBJECT'S ABILITY THE RISK OF GOING BEYOND LEGAL AUTHORITIES, ESCALATING THE PRESSURE. (b )( 1) TO RESIST. TO AVOID WE DO NOT RECOMMEND IF A HQS TEAM CANNOT VISIT SITE EARLY THE WEEK OF 12 AUGUST, RECOMMENDA VTC WITH~--~STATION~--~AT 0900 ON 13 AUGUST (HQS TIME) TO DISCUSS TEAM'S PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AND POST-INTERROGATION STEPS WITH SUBJECT. END SUMMARY. )__j __ T_H_I_s_c_A_B_L_E_HA_S_B_E_E_N_c_o_o_R_D_IN_A_T_E_D_W_I_T_H_C_O_i(b )( 1 _J ~--3_. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) ~(b)(3) NatSecAct I I WHAT FOLLOWS IS 1coLLECTIVE TEAM ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE ~---~ AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION STRATEGY VIS-A-VIS THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER SUBJECT HAS ANY ACTIONABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. SESSIONS THIS ASSESSMENT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONDUCTED FROM 4 AUGUST TO DATE. THESE SESSIONS INVOLVED USE OF MOST OF THE APPROVED PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED PER REF C, 4. INCLUDING THE WATER BOARD. AT THIS JUNCTURE IN THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PROCESS, IT IS THE TEAM'S COLLECTIVE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY SUBJECT HAS ACTIONABLE NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS SAID, THE TEAM PLANS TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES FOR THE TIME BEING TO DEVELOP AND REFINE THIS PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT. 5. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE INTERROGATION STRATEGY COMMENCEDON 4 AUGUST AND WE HAVE IMPLEMENTED MOST OF THE APPROVED PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES, INCLUDING THE WATER BOARD. LARGELY BECAUSE OF USE OF THE WATER BOARD, THE CONDITIONING PROCESS HAS BEEN FASTER THAN ANTICIPATED. IN OUR COLLECTIVE OPINION, OVERWHELMEDSUBJECT'S ABILITY TO RESIST. THE WATERBOARDHAS FURTHERMORE, IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE INTENSITY OF THE PRESSURE APPLIED TO HIM THUS FAR APPROACHES THE LEGAL LIMIT. FOR THE TIME BEING, BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW. CURRENT LEVELS CAN FOR THIS REASON, WE DO NOT RECOMMENDESCALATING THE INTENSITY OF THE PRESSURE, BUT RECOMMEND HOLDING IT AT PRESENT LEVELS TO ALLOW FOR MORE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT. ACCORDING TO THE MEDICAL OFFICER ON THE SCENE, UNDER CURRENT MEDICAL INTERVENTION SUBJECT'S MEDICAL STATUS IS LIKELY TO DETERIORATE TO AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, AND THUS WILL CONTINUE TO BE CLOSELY MONITORED. Approved forRelease:2017/12/01 C06656588 (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656588 .... . - (b )( 1) - (b)(3) NatSecAct 6. ABOVE NOTWITHSTANDING, HOLDING BACK INFORMATION. TEAM THINKS SUBJECT IS STILL IT IS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS INFORMATION IS RELATED TO SUBJECT'S INVOLVEMENT IN PAST OPERATIONS. IT IS ALSO OUR OPINION THAT: SUBJECT CAN STILL BE A PRODUCTIVE SOURCE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PAST OPERATIONS; SUBJECT CAN IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE BACKGROUNDINFORMATION ON OTHER OPERATIVES; AND SUBJECT CAN (b )( 1) (b )(3) NatSecAct PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO THE WAY THE AL QA'IDA NETWORKFUNCTIONS. 7. AS NOTED REF B, SUGGESTED THAT AN OBSERVER TEAM INCLUDING A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF CTC TRAVEL~---~TO ONGOING INTERROGATIONS DURING THE WEEK OF 12 AUGUST 02. OBSERVE THE PURPOSE (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct OF THIS REQUEST WAS TO GIVE A HQS TEAM AN ON-THE-GROUND APPRECIATION FOR THE TACTICS/TECHNIQUES BEING USED AS A WAY OF ASSURING HQS THAT TECHNIQUES ARE BEING APPLIED TO THE LETTER/INTENT OF THE LAW, ALLOW A HQS TEAM THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS TEAM CONCERNS REGARDING POSITIVE/NEGATIVE IMPACT OF INCREASED PYSCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS RE ACTIONABLE THREAT INFORMATION, AND REINFORCE TEAM REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE END GAME STRATEGY RE SUBJECT. GIVEN THE SPEED WITH WHICH SUBJECT HAS REACTED TO THE WATERBOARD PROCEDURE, OVERALL CONCERNS THAT CURRENT PRESSURES NOT BE EXCEEDED, THE FACT THAT THIS PHASE IS POSSIBLY BEST BROUGHT TO CLOSURE WITHIN THE NEXT TEN DAYS, AND ON-THE-GROUND DISCUSSIONS WITH COS WHICH (b)(1) ~ FORMED THE BASIS FOR THIS CABLE, TEAM PROPOSES A VTC (WITH~T_A_P_E ___ (b)(3) NatSecActFoR HQs To OBSERVE) AT 0900 oN u AuGusT HQs TIME WHILE TEAM CONTINUES TO BELIEVE A FIRST-HAND, ON-THE-GROUND LOOK IS BEST, IF A HQS TEAM CANNOT MAKE IT BY EARLY THE WEEK OF 12 AUG, THE VTC WILL ACCOMPLISH THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT AS (b)(1) WE SEE IT. (b)(3) NatSecAct 8. TEAM STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT THE LOOKING AHEAD: ABOVE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT, AND REFINEMENTS OF IT TO FOLLOW, MAKE EVEN MORE URGENT THE NEED TO ADDRESS STEPS TO BE TAKEN WITH SUBJECT AFTER THE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION PHASE ENDS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ALL CONCERNED -- HQS/ALEC, DEVELOP A COMMONUNDERSTANDING OF AT LEAST THE NEXT STEP, NEXT SEVERAL STEPS. - MUST STATION, IF NOT THE ALEC/HQS COMMENTSWELCOMEAND SOLICITED. REGARDS. 9 - (b)(3) CIAAct C(b)(3) NatSecAct _____________ CABLETYPE: [(b)(3) NatSecAct] END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06656588 ~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct --- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06666321 Date: -- ;; :) 3 20021010 (b)(1) TO: c(b)(3) ~atSecAct FROM: CTC/UBL SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - fDB ASSESSMENTOF ABU ZUBAYDAH'SPROVISION OF INFORMATION ----------------------------------------BODY-------------------- -- ---- --- -- - - - - (b)(3) NatSecAct -1Sl38R£1'f (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ., ! TOT: 181439Z OCT 02 ALEC --------(b)(1)--------------------------------------------------(b)( sl3eRfl'i" ~~~FF (b)(1) 3) NatSecAct_ (b)(3) NatSecAct 181439Z ALEC 189716 (b )(3) NatSec~~t=1,-------------,1 INFO I IDIRECTOR ~-- (b)(3) NatSecAct I -------1 l b)(1t------___,b)(3) CIAAct---(b)(3) NatSecAct ,--"'F_._._RO=M----=_J___ __________ SUBJECT: EYES ONLY-' PDB ASSESSMENTOF ABU ZUBAYDAH'SPROVISION OF INFORMATION REF: NONE TEXT: l_ ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI FOR.INTERROGATIONTEAM. 2. FYI FOR THE INTERROGATION TEAM, THE FOLLOWINGASSESSMENT 'S INFORMATION AND HIS CONTINUEDWILLINGNESSTO OF ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)) PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCEWAS PREPAREDFOR THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEFING. THIS ASSESSMENTWAS PRODUCEDIN EARLYOCTOBERBY ~ AND COORDINATEDWITH CTC/UBL. THE PRIMARYDRAFTERWASAN~ ANALYSTWHOHAD SERV~D AT ~IDEN). WE PROVIDE THIS DOCUMENT FOR THE RECORDAND FOR THE BACKGROUND OF THE INTERROGATIONTEAM, AS IT ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE CO~LECTIVEHQS VIEW OF THE INFORMAT~ON PROVIDEDTO DATE. (b)(3) CIAAct I (b)(3) CIAAct Ji Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06666321 - (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct --- -- Approved for Rel ease: 2017/12/01 C06666321 . . --------------""""nLINE-sl!lsRscr,I I 'ueFoRM;(b)(3) NatSecAct ii 1. -- (b)(5) IHE CONTINUES TO WITHHOLD SIGNIFICANT THREAT INFORMATION. ! (b)(5) (b )( 1) (b)(3) Nat SecAct ,, I (b)(5) IABu ZUBAYDAHRESISTED PROVIDINGUSEFUL INFORMATIONUNTIL.BECOMINGMORECOOPERATIVE IN EARLY AUGUST, PROBABLYIN THE HOPE:ioF IMPROVINGHIS LIVING CONDITIONS. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) I, !I Approved for Rel ease: 2017/12/01 C06666321 -------- Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06666321 . (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06666321 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06666321 ·------------------~-----~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) END OF MESSAGE - SElCREl'f Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06666321 Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 Date: 20020602 TO: ALEC FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - SUMMARYOF DAILY OBSERVATIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF ABU ZUBAYDAHSINCE 16 APRIL; ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE PROCESS HAS EVOLVED (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct------------------------------------(b)(3) NatSecAct-----------------------~ , I (b)(3) NatSecAct BODY---------------------------------------- I (b)(3) NatSecAct 'l"OP Sl39Ri:T I I (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct L I S (b)( 3 ) Nat ecAct PAGE 001 C::J02os43z· Jm(b)(1) I -I -J~1-03_9_3~ (b)(1) --- --- -- - -- - -- - - - ----- ---- --- ----- - - - --- -- ---(b)(3) CIAAct--- -- -- - - ---- - - -- -- - -- (b)( 3 ) CIAActl' e P s ! e ff. ! T 02os4oz JUN 02 · STAFF (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct----~ I TO: IMMEDIATEALEC INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOF(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(1) _________ (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct--------------->---------i (b)(3) NatSecAct FOR: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - SUMMARYOF DAILY OBSERVATIONSAND ASSESSMENT OF ABU ZUBAYDAHSINCE 16 APRIL; ASSESSMENT OF HOWTHE PROCESS HAS EVOLVED REF: A. a.I ALEC I ~-----(b)(3) (b)(1 )1 (b)(3) CIAAct NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TEXT: COMBINE: COMPLETE 1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE. FYI . Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 .... · Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 2. PER REF A AND PURSUANT TO REF B, BELOW IS AN OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT INTENDED TO CHRONICLE ((ABU ZUBAYDAH)) (SUBJECT) 'S STRATEGY FOR RESISTING INTERROGATION EFFORTS AND AVOIDING DISCLOSURE D OF CRITICAL THREAT INFORMATION DURING THE FIRST SESSIONS. IN ADDITION, INTERROGATION BELOW OUTLINE ALSO OFFERS THE TEAM'S OPERATIONAL PSYCHOLOGISTS' PERSPECTIVE ON SOME OF THE CRITICAJ;, FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUBJECT'S DECISION TO BEGIN PROVIDING NEW THREAT-RELATED INFORMATION IN SESSIOND SIGNIFICANTLY (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct THESE NEW DISCLOSURES EXCEEDED WHAT SUBJECT HAD PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED AND (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT ADMITTED THAT HE HAD INTENTIONALLY HELD BACK THE INFORMATION. IN OUR OPINION, THE ASSESSMENT BELOW DOES AN EXCELLENT JOB OF ADDRESSING HIS GENERAL APPROACH TO CAPTIVITY AND RESISTANCE, IDENTIFYING SUBJECT'S OVERALL RESISTANCE STRATEGIES, IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIES WITH INTERROGATORS. AND APPROACH TO THIS ASSESSMENT IS CRITICAL FOR OUR ONGOING INTERROGATION PROCESS WITH SUBJECT. THE ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE READ, HOWEVER, AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN ENTIRE 11 PRocEss 11 sEssION. AS OPPOSED To AN "EVENT" WHICH LEAD To THE RESULTS oF ADDITIONALLY, IN THE coLLECTIVE D INTERROGATION TEAM,s . (b)( 1) (b)( 3 ) CIAAct (b )(3) NatSecAct ASSESSMENT, WHILE ON SOME LEVELS IT CAN BE_ARGUED THAT SUBJECT WAS WINNING SOME OF THE BATTLES, THE INTEL DERIVED FROM LONG, SUSTAINED AND CAREFULLY SCRIPTED INTERROGATION SESSIONS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME .. LED TO CRITICAL FI WHICH WE SUBMIT WAS IN A CATEGORY OTHER THAN "THROW AWAY" TYPE INFO. AS WE CONTINUE WITH OUR INTEGRATED INTERROGATION PROCESS WE CERTAINLY NEED TO KEEP REFLECTING ON WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED TO DATE. ONGOING CONSIDERATION OF THE THEMES NOTED BELOW CAN IMPROVE OUR STRATEGIC APPROACH AND HELP MAXIMIZE OUR EFFORTS TO GAIN CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT .TRACK OF THE TANGIBLE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED OVER AN EVOLVING PROCESS. FOR THE RECORD, THE DETAILS BELOW HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BY~I--------~-----------~I ~---------(b)(3) WITH THE HELP OF SERE PSYCHOLOGIST 3. SITE, = :(b)( 1 ) (b)( 3 ) CIAAct (b)( 3 ) NatSecAct NatSecAct---~I SUMMARY: BEGINNING WITH THE DAY HE ARRIVED AT SUBJECT APPEARED TO BE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING A STRONG RESISTANCE POSTURE. BUILDING, TESTING, THIS POSTURE INCLUDED AND REVISING A-MENTAL MODEL THAT HELPED HIM UNDERSTANDAND, TO SOME DEGREE, PREDICT AND MANAGEHIS CAPTORS AND SURROUNDINGS. THIS DEVELOPING AD HOC MENTAL MODEL ALSO PROVIDED STRUCTURE THAT HELPED HIM ORGANIZE, SELECT, DEPLOY, AND ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIFIC RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. EARLY ON, SUBJECT. STRUGGLED WITH FATIGUE RESULTING FROM MILD TO MODERATE SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND SHOWED RESILIENCE AS HE REGROUPED AFTER TWO OF HIS RESISTANCE STRATEGIES WERE UNDERMINED IN MID-TO LATE-APRIL. THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY 2002, DURING THE TEAM DECIDED TO POSTPONE THE STRATEGY OF APPLYING STEADILY INCREASING PRESSURES ON THE SUBJECT DUE TO A NUMBER OF CONSTRAINING FACTORS. THE TEAM THEN SHIFTED TO A STRATEGY I THAT EMPHASIZED THE COMBINATION OF A FRIENDLIER RAPPORT-BUILDING) (POSITIVE STYLE OF INTERACTION, ATTENTION TO HEALTH/WELFARE NEEDS, AND THE PERSISTENTLY REPEATED PRESENTATION OF PROOF THAT SUBJECT WAS CAUGHT IN LIES AND INCONSISTENCIES. IN PART, THIS SHIFT WAS MADE TO ACCOMMODATE AND TEST AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE THAT A Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 FRIENDLIER APPROACH AND BETTER TREATMENT WOULDLEAD THE SUBJECT TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE. THE SUBJECT'S RESPONSE TO THIS SHIFT WAS TO CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO PREVIOUSLY SEEN RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. THE SUBJECT APPEARED UNMOVEDBY THE ONGOING ACCUSATIONS OF "LYING" AND "INCONSISTENCY". OVER TIME, HE MAY HAVE INTERPRETED THIS SHIFT IN THE TONE AND NATURE OF HIS TREATMENT/CONDITIONS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE INTERROGATION WAS RUNNING ITS COURSE. FURTHERMORE, THE SUBJECT MAY HAVE CONCLUDEDTHAT HE HAD LESS AND LESS REASON TO FEEL PRESSURED BY THE INTERROGATORS DESPITE THEIR EMPHATIC STATEMENTS THAT THINGS WOULD GET WORSE IF HE WAS NOT MORE TRUTHFUL AND FORTHCOMINGWITH INFORMATION. THE SUBJECT'S COMPLACENCYMAY HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY HIS RECOGNITION THAT HIS DAY-TO-DAY CAPTIVITY CONDITIONS REMAINED THE SAME, AND EVEN IMPROVED SOMEWHATSINCE THE SHIFT IN INTERROGATION STRATEGY. MOREOVER, THE SUBJECT LIKELY FACTORED IN THE CONSTANT AND METICULOUS MEDICAL ATTENTION AND THE CARING THAT IT CONVEYED TO HIM IN TERMS OF HIS IMPORTANCE TO THE USG. IT IS UNLIKELY THA~ THE SUBJECT MISSED THE FACT THAT HIS ONGOING RESISTANCE AND INTRANSIGENCE DID NOT NEGATIVELY IMPACT HIS CONDITIONS OR STATUS. HIS BEHAVIOR AND DEMEANORSUGGESTED THAT HIS CONFIDENCE AND MORALE WERE GENERALLY STRONG AND GROWING STRONGER AS THE INTERROGATIONS EXTENDED INTO MID-MAY. BY THIS TIME, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE SUBJECT BELIEVED HIS AD HOC MODEL INCLUDED A FAIRLY ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING AND REPRESENTATION OF HIS SITUATION. SUBJECT APPEARED QUITE CONFIDENT IN HIS ABILITY TO CONTROL THE INFORMATION FLOW AND OUTCOMEOF THE SESSIONS. HE MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATING A FAIRLY BENIGN COURSE OF EVENTS. SOME OF HIS STATEMENTS INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED HE WAS (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct HE MAY HAVE EXPECTED THAT THE INTERROGATORS WOULD EVENTUALLY GROWTIRED, TERMINATE THE SESSIONS, AND ESCORT HIM OUTDOORS AND INTO ~-------------~ FURTHERMORE, HE MAY HAVE EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD BE PLACED WITH OTHER JIHADIST GUANTANAMOBAY. DETAINEES AND, IN DUE COURSE, FLOWN TO THE PROCESS AND SEQUENCE OF MANIPULATIONS, AND OVERALL EFFECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY TEAM MEMBERS, APPEAR TO HAVE LED THE SUBJECT TO A POINT WHERE HE FELT SECURE AND CONFIDENT. THE SUBJECT MAY HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY REACHED A POINT OF CONSIDERABLE OVER-CONFIDENCE. SUCH OVER-CONFIDENCE MAY ACCOUNT FOR HOW DRAMATIC THE EFFECTS WERE WHEN THE SUBJECT'S BELIEFS AND ASSUMPTIONS WERE SEVERELY DISLOCATED BY THE MYSTERIOUS AND ANGRY MAN WHO STRIPPED HIM OF HIS CLOTHES AND EXPECTATIONS ON 19 MAY. THE SUBJECT DISPLAYED THREE NEW BEHAVIORS AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ANGRY MAN INTO HIS CELL ON 19 MAY: REQUESTS TO SEE AN INTERROGATOR; (2) OF DETAILS RELATED TO TOPICS OF INTEREST; INFORMATION VIA HANDWRITTENNOTES. (1) URGENT PROFUSE AND RAPID VERBALIZATION AND (3) AT THIS TIME, DISCLOSURE OF SUBJECT CONTINUES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION THROUGH DAILY NOTES AND SOMETIMES VOLUNTEERS DETAILS ON TOPICS NOT BROACHED BY INTERROGATORS. TEAM MEMBERSHAVE ALSO NOTED SUBJECT NOW SINGS HIS PRAYERS ALOUD, APPEARS MORE NATURAL AND SPONTANEOUS IN CONVERSATION, SEEMS MORE BORED WHEN ALONE IN HIS CELL, AND APPEARS LESS INCLINED TO DISENGAGE FROM CONVERSATION AT THE Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 END OF INTERROGATION SESSIONS. SOMEWHATSTAGED, ARTIFICIAL, PREVIOUSLY (E.G., THERE IS A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF THE AND EXAGGERATEDBEHAVIOR WE SAW INTENTLY STARING AT PHOTOGRAPHS FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME AS THOUGH TRYING TO RECALL WHO THE PERSON IS). [J SINCE SESSION WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY CLEAR OR CONSISTENT EVIDENCE OF HIS PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO JUDGE THE DEGREE TO WHICH SUBJECT IS OMITTING IMPORTANT DETAILS, HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE USING RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES TO STALL, DISRUPT, OR DERAIL THE FOCUS OF THE INTERVIEW, NOR DOES HE SEEM TO BE INTENTIONALLY LIMITING HIS ANSWERS. IN GENERAL, SUBJECT APPEARS MORE RELAXED AND WILLING TO PROVIDE SOLICITED AND UNSOLICITED INFORMATION. DESPITE RECENT ENCOURAGING CHANGES, INTERROGATION TEAM MEMBERS WILL REMAIN ALERT FOR A RESURGENCE IN SUBJECT'S RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. USE OF THESE AND OTHER END OF SUMMARY. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 . .,I L___ Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) VI. REPEATSTEPS 1-V. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) (b )( 1) ~~~~~~~~~(b)(3) CIAAct.~~~~~~~~~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) - Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 i Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(5) 11. SHATTERING ABU'S MODEL BY DISLOCATING HIS EXPECTATIONS: THE CONCLUSION OF SESSIOND (19 APRIL), AT TEAM MEMBERS CONFERRED AND DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMMEDIATELY RATCHETING UP THE PRESSURE IN A WAY THAT WOULD SEVERELY UNSETTLE AND SHATTER SUBJECT'S AND CERTAINTY. IN THE TEAM'S OPINION, (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b )(3) NatSecAct CONFIDENCE SUBJECT HAD REACHED A POINT OF BEING QUITE CONFIDENT IN HIS EVALUATION AND WORKING MODEL OF THE TEAM'S INTENT, CONSTRAINTS, AND LIMITATIONS. AT THIS POINT, HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE HIS RESISTANCE TECHNIQUES WERE WORKING WELL AND HE COULD OUTLAST THE INTERROGATORS WITHOUT CONCERN FOR DIRE CONSEQUENCES. HE WAS NOW READY TO PUSH THE LIMITS AND TEST THE TEAM'S RESOLVE. THE TEAM RESPONDED BY HAVING SUBJECT HOODED AND HIS HANDS CUFFED HIGH ON THE BARS OF HIS CELL. TEAM (ONE OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS) -HEARD BEFORE -- A MEMBEROF THE INTERROGATION WHOSE VOICE SUBJECT HAD NEVER ENTERED THE CELL IN A BRUSQUE MANNER, VIOLENTLY TOSSED THE PLASTIC PATIO CHAIR AGAINST THE CELL WALL, AND ABRUPTLY RIPPED OFF SUBJECT'S ASKED THE SUBJECT, CLOTHES. AFTER DOING THIS, THE TEAM MEMBER "ARE YOU SURE THAT YOU WANT TO GO DOWNTHIS PATH ... LATER ON, REMEMBERIT WAS YOU WHO CHOSE IT?" CLEARLY TAKEN ABACK AND VISIBLY DISCONCERTING ACTION. SUBJECT WAS SHAKEN BY THIS WHOLLYUNEXPECTED AND LOUD ABRASIVE MUSIC WAS STARTED AGAIN (AFTER NOT BEING HEARD FOR SEVERAL WEEKS). TO A LOWER PORTION OF THE BARS. SUBJECT WAS UNHOODEDAND CUFFED HE WAS LEFT SITTING ON THE FLOOR NAKED FOR AN HOUR TO PONDER AND RECONSIDER HIS SITUATION. OUTSET OF SESSION= AT THE THE INTERROGATOR IMMEDIATELY ENTERED INTO A SHORT MONOLOGUEWHILE THE SUBJECT REMAINED IN HIS PREVIOUS POSITION -- SHACKLED TO THE BARS AND SITTING ON THE FLOOR. THE SUBJECT'S EYES WERE GENERALLY DOWNCAST. HIS DEMEANORAND ATTITUDE APPEARED TO HAVE CHANGEDTO DEJECTION. , SUBJECT APPEARED TO ACCEPT A FACE-SAVING WAY Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 TO PROVIDE THREAT INFORMATION AND THEN IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TALKING ABOUT POSSIBLE THREATS THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED IN SUCH DETAIL BEFORE. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION, THE INTERROGATOR ASKED SUBJECT IF HE COULD DO ANYTHING FOR HIM AND THE SUBJECT RESPONDED, "SOMETHING TO COVER MY BUTTS." 12. MAINTAINING PRESSURE: AS SESSION D (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct CONCLUDED, THE PROBLEM FOR THE INTERROGATION TEAM WAS HOW TO SUSTAIN THE SUBJECT'S APPARENT SENSE OF DISLOCATION AND PRESSURE WITHOUT IMPEDING HIS NEW WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, THE INTERROGATION TEAM MEMBERWHO HAD STRIPPED AND WHISPERED TO THE SUBJECT EARLIER RETURNED TO THE CELL. WHILE THE SUBJECT WAS HOODED AND CUFFED TO THE BARS, THE TEAM MEMBERWHISPERED, i,you MAY HAVE FOOLED THOSE OTHER GUYS, BUT YOU DON'T FOOL ME... AFTER THEY GET TIRED OF YOU JERKING THEM AROUND AND LEAVE, IT WILL BE JUST YOU AND ME." TO CONSIDER HIS NEW SITUATION. FOR DINNER. ONCE AGAIN, SUBJECT WAS LEFT THE INTERROGATION TEAM LEFT THE SITE WHILE EATING, THE TEAM RECEIVED TWO TELEPHONE CALLS FROM SECURITY STAFF STATING SUBJECT WAS ASKING TO TALK TO·AN INTERROGATOR. IT IS NOTABLE THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SINCE INTERROGATIONS BEGAN SUBJECT REQUESTED TO SPEAK TO AN INTERROGATOR. SPECI~ICALLY SPOKEN. IN THIS CASE, HE WAS REQUESTING TO SEE THE INTERROGATOR TO WHOMHE HAD LAST WHEN THE INTERROGATOR REENTERED THE SUBJECT'S CELL, SUBJECT GAVE HIM A COLLECTION OF NOTES WRITTEN USING CRAYONAND PAPER. NOTES INCLUDED THREAT AND OPERATIONAL INFORMATION. THE PRIOR TO THIS DAY, SUBJECT HAD ESSENTIALLY IGNORED THE PAPER AND CRAYON THAT HAD BEEN LEFT IN HIS CELL. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THE NOTES, SUBJECT BEGAN TO SPEAK RAPIDLY AND DELIVER AN OUTPOURING OF INFORMATION. SUBJECT DID NOT REQUIRE PROMPTING AND STAYED ON TOPIC. EVIDENCE OF ANY OF SUBJECT'S (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct THERE WAS NO PREVIOUSLY USED RESISTANCE STRATEGIES. AFTER BEING JOINED BY AN SPEAKING INTERROGATOR SUBJECT EXPLAINED THE REASON HE DECIDED TO COOPERATE WAS HE PRAYED HIS ISTIKHARAH (SEEKING GOD'S GUIDANCE) AND WAS NOW READY AND WILLING TO TELL WHAT HE REALLY KNEW. AFTER SESSION[JHAD SAT ALONE IN HIS CELL AND SANG HIS PRAYERS. CONCLUDED, SUBJECT THIS WAS THEFIRST TIME (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct SINCE HE ARRIVED AT THE INTERROGATION FACILITY THAT HE SANG HIS PRAYERS ALOUD. 13. IN TEAM PSYCHOLOGISTS WILL FORWARDADDITIONAL COMMENTS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND DIAGRAMS ILLUSTRATING OUR DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF SUBJECT'S DATE. ~-------(b)(1) RESISTANCE POSTURE AND INTERROGATION BEHAVIOR TO ________ (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE Approved for Release: 2018/03/05 C06681742 ~ (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 Date: 20030320 TO: DIRECTOR FROM: SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - 19 MARCH2003 INTERROGATIONOF KHALIDSHAYKHMUHAMMAD (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct TOR: 201037Z MAR03(b)(1 )I 1090~ - - -- - - - - -- ---- --- --- ---- - - -- -- - - ------- -- -- - ----(b)(3) NatSecAct--- -- -- - - ---- -~ 8 F SE e RE~ 201021Z MAR03 STAFF (b)(1 cITE[(b)(3) TO: t NatSecAct IMMEDIATEDIRECTOR. ~(b)(1) FOR:I (b)(3) CIAAct.-----------------1 (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - 19 MARCH2003 MUHAMMAD REF: LI _____ INTERROGATIONOF KHALIDSHAYKH (_b-)(_3_) -N-at_s_e_cA-ct ______ _ (b )( 1) TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI. 2. ATMOSPHERICS: (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) (KSM) WAS A. ON 19 MARCH2003 ( (KHALID SHAYKHMUHAMMAD)) INTERROGATED BY HVT INTERROGATORS IN THREE WATERBOARDSESSIONS (ONE ABBREVIATED), ONE LONGINTERROGATIONSESSION, AND ONE THREE-HOUR L__ ____________ ~ Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 ENHANCED MEASURES INTERROGATION SESSION. KSM MAINTAINED HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THREATS TO THE US, BUT ASKED FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO WRITE INFORMATION IN ARABIC. B. KSM SPENT THE NIGHT IN THE STANDING POSITION, INITIATED SLEEP DEPRIVATION AT 0900 SESSION, ON 18 MARCH 2003. HAVING AT THE FIRST KSM WAS CONFRONTED WITH HIS EARLIER INCONSISTENCIES ABOUT JAFFAR AL-TAYYAR AND THE ISSUE OF HIS PASSPORT. (LIES) KSM USED HIS USUAL STRATEGY OF TRYING TO OBFUSCATE WITH IRRELEVANT DETAILS, MISDIRECTION, AND ENTICING LEADS. HE WAS TAKEN TO THE WATER BOARD ROOM WHERE HE WAS SUBJECTED TO THE WATER BOARD ENHANCEDMEASURE BY INTERROGATORS SESSION, AT THIS WATER BOARD KSM SEEMED TO LOSE CONTROL AND ADMITTED THAT HE HAD LIED ABOUT JAFFAR AL-TAYYAR. AFTER 9/11, KSM SAID THAT AL-TAYYAR HAD BEEN COMPROMISED AND AS A RESULT KSM COULD NOT USE HIM FOR A MISSION. SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN FORCED TO LIE, . JAFFAR AL-TAYYAR. AND HAD MADE UP STORIES ABOUT HE BEGGED TO WRITE A STATEMENT IN ARABIC, HE COULD WRITE 50 PAGES IN ARABIC, KSM SAYING (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) BUT DENIED HAVING ANY NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THREATS TO THE US. HE WAS RETURNED TO HIS CELL, WHERE HE WAS PLACED IN THE STANDING POSITION. C. KSM WAS RETURNED TO THE WATER BOARD AT APPROXIMATELY 1450, WHERE HE WAS SUBJECTED TO ANOTHER WATER BOARD SESSION BY INTERROGATORS AT THIS SESSION, KSM WAS OFFERED THE OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE DETAILS ABOUT THE NEXT ATTACK ON THE US. AGAIN, KSM DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGEOF ATTACKS OTHER THAN THE ONES HE HAD PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED. KSM WAS EXTREMELY FOCUSED, SEEMING TO BE CONCENTRATING HIS STRENGTH ON GETTING THROUGH THE WATER BOARDING. AT THE END OF THE SESSION, HE WAS RETURNED TO HIS CELL. D. AT 1530, THE INTERROGATION TEAM INITIATED ENHANCED INTERROGATION SESSION WITH KSM. SHIFTS, A THREE-HOUR ROTATING IN 30-MINUTE THE INTERROGATORS CONCENTRATEDON CONDITIONING KSM BY UTILIZING A MIX OF ATTENTION GRAB, WALLING, WETTING DOWN, INSULT SLAP, ABDOMINAL SLAP, AND FACIAL GRASP. AT THE END OF THE SESSION, KSM WAS ASKED IF HE HAD ANYTHING NEW TO PROVIDE ON THREATS TO THE US. HE CLAIMED HE DID NOT, AND WAS RETURNED TO THE WATER BOARD. ABBREVIATED SESSION IN AN (ONE WATERING), KSM AGAIN OFFERED TO WRITE INFORMATION IN ARABIC, CLAIMING THAT HE DID NOT WRITE WELL IN ENGLISH. HE WAS TOLD HE WOULDBE GIVEN THE CHANCE, BUT THAT IF H~ WASTED THE INTERROGATORS' TIME HE WOULDSPEND AN EQUIVALENT AMOUNTOF TIME ON THE WATER BOARD. INSISTED EVEN BEFORE COMING OFF THE WATER BOARD, KSM HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO PROVIDE, BUT MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE ADDITIONAL DETAILS. HE WAS RETURNED TO HIS CELL, WHERE HE WAS ALLOWED TO SIT AND WRITE FOR ONE HOUR. AT THEE~ OF THE PERIOD, WAS RETURNED TO THE STANDING POSITION. 3. ENHANCEDMEASURES: PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF REF B, APPROPRIATE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT. ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES FOR KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD WERE Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 HE (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 (b)( 1) AUTHORIZED BY REF 8, AUTHORIZEDTO BE EMPLOYEDBY CERTIFIED (b)( 3 ) CIAActn.."'-sRRoGAToRs (b )(3) NatSecAct==1 THE LFO_L_L_O_W_I_N_G_E_NHAN--CE_D_M_EA-SUR_E_S_W_ER_E_E_M_P-LO_Y_E_D_B_Y_HVT __ I_TEAM~ (b)( 6 ) WITH COB, RMO, AND HVT PSYCHOLOGISTOBSERVING: FACIAL GRASP, 1 I ATTENTION GRASP, WALLING, WATERDOUSING, ABDOMINALSLAP, INSULT SLAP. SUBJECT'S SLEEP DEPRIVATION BEGANAT 0900 ON 18 MARCH2003. (b)(1) 4. WATERBOARD: THREE SESSIONS (ONE ABBREVIATED, WITH ONE (b)(3) CIAAct WATERING) CONDUCTEDBY HVT INTERROGATORS (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(6) 1 '----------~ 5. ASSESSMENT: WITH THE RE-INITIATION OF PRESSURE ON KSM, HE REVERTED TO HIS PATTERN OF TRYING TO PROVIDE ENOUGHINFORMATIONTO INTEREST THE INTERROGATORSAND RELIEVE THE PRESSURE, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MISDIRECT THE LINE OF QUESTIONINGAWAYFROMTHREATENINGTHEMES. AT THE FIRST WATERBOARDSESSION, KSM APPEAREDTO LOSE SOME STRENGTH AND DEMONSTRATED A SMALL DEGREEOF SURRENDER. PRESSURE WAS MAINTAINED, WITH THE SINGLE-MINDED FOCUS OF GAINING IMMINENTTHREATS AGAINST THE US, AND THE EFFECT APPEARED CUMULATIVE. KSM HAS A STRONG RESISTANCE LEVEL, BUT HIS STRATEGYIS DEVELOPINGCRACKS. NOWTHAT KSM HAS ADMITTEDLYING ABOUT SOME PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED INFORMATION, WE ARE CONCERNEDTHAT HE MAYBE USING DELAYINGTACTICS TO GAIN TIME FOR A.PENDING OPERATION. 6. PLANS: THE PRESSURE WILL BE MAINTAINED. THE FOCUS IS ON PENDING THREATS TO THE US, AND KSM WILL GAIN NO RELIEF UNTIL HE PROVIDES THE INFORMATION. KSM'S WRITTEN WORKWILL BE REVIEWED, AND ITS INITIAL VALUE ASSESSED. DEPENDINGON THE VALUE OF THE INFORMATION, KSM WILL EITHER BE DEBRIEFED IN DETAIL, OR HE WILL CONTINUE WITH THE ENHANCEDMEASURESINTERROGATION. 7. MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS: SEE FOR DETAILS OF KSM REVIEW. 8. HVT PSYCHOLOGISTCOMMENTS AND UPDATEDSUMMARY: A. DURING THE DAY'S INITIAL INTERROGATIONSESSION, SUBJECT APPEARED MORE FATIGUED AND LETHARGICTHAN HE HAS PREVIOUSLY. THAT SAID, SUBJECT WASALERT AND HIS SPEECH WASORGANIZED, PURPOSEFUL, AND APPROPRIATE TO CONTEXT. HOWEVER,HIS VOICE SOUNDEDTIRED AND HIS SPEECH RATE WAS DIMINISHED AND MORE FALTERING AT TIMES WITH LONGER PAUSES. THE CHANGEIN THE FLUIDITY OF HIS SPEECH WAS PARTICULARLY APPARENT WHENINTERROGATORSCONFRONTEDHIM ABOUT HIS INCONSISTENT STORIES AND DISCLOSURES.· ijIS CLEAR ATTEMPTSTO LIE AND MISDIRECT, AND FAILURE TO VOLUNTARILYCORRECTHIS LIES, THE WATERBOARD ROOM. PROMPTEDHIS TRANSFERTO 8. SUBJECT BEGANTO WHIMPER, WHINE, AND MOANAS SOON AS SECURITY STAFF TOOK CONTROLOF HIM AND BEGANLEADING HIM TO THE WATERBOARD ROOM. FOR A FEW·MOMENTS AFTER ASSUMINGHIS POSITION ON THE WATERBOARD,SUBJECT APPEAREDSOMEWHAT FRANTIC AND BEGANTO SPEAK Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 RAPIDLY AND ACKNOWLEDGETHAT HE HAD LIED ABOUT A NUMBER OF DETAILS RELATED TO JAFFAR ( (AL-TAYYAR) ) . HE ASSERTED THAT HE COULD BE MORE CLEAR AND COULD "WRITE 50 PAGES" IF ALLOWED TO USE ARABIC. INTERROGATORS THEN TOLD HIM THEY WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN WORDS, WHETHER ENGLISH OR ARABIC, THAT DISCLOSED DETAILS ABOUT THE NEXT ATTACK ON AMERICA. SUBJECT REPLIED THAT HE HAD "ALREADY TOLD EVERYTHING" AND HAD "NOTHING MORE TO ADD" ABOUT SUCH ATTACKS. INTERROGATORS TOLD SUBJECT THAT FROM THIS POINT ON THEY ONLY WANTED TO HEAR HIM SPEAK IF HE WAS REVEALING THE NEXT ATTACK ON AMERICA AND/OR USAMA ((BIN-LADEN'S)) INTENDED ATTACK. SUBJECT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND DID NOT MAKE FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE WITH INTERROGATORS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE WATERBOARDSESSION. DESPITE BEING MORE ANXIOUS AND LESS EFFECTIVE THWARTING THE WATERBOARDPROCEDURE, SUBJECT APPEARED TO RESIGN HIMSELF TO BEING STOIC AND DOING HIS BEST TO COPE WITH THE WATERBOARD PROCEDURE. TODAY WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT HE GRABBEDAND HELD ON TO THE CLOTHING OF INTERROGATORS DURING THE MORE INTENSE MOMENTSOF THE PROCEDURE. THROUGHOUTTHE DAY AND EARLY EVENING, THE HVT INTERROGATION TEAM FOLLOWEDTHE TDY DEBRIEFER RECOMMENDATIONTO DEVOTE ALL MEASURES TO PRESSURING THE SUBJECT ON THE SINGLE ISSUE OF THE "NEXT ATTACK ON AMERICA". GRABS, INSULT SLAPS, IN ADDITION, THE USE OF ATTENTION WALLING, WATER DOUSING, AND WATERBO~ INTENDED TO FURTHER WEAR DOWNTHE SUBJECT'S WERE RESOURCES, MOTIVATION, AND WILLINGNESS TO EFFECTIVELY RESIST. C. THE LATTER PORTION OF THE AFTERNOON AND EARLY EVENING WERE DEVOTED TO WALLING·AND WATER-DOUSING AS A.MEANS TO FURTHER UNDERMINE THE SUBJECT'S WATERBOARDSESSIONS, AND TOLERANCE. RESOURCES FOR RESISTANCE. AS IN THE SUBJECT GENERALLY SHOWEDREMARKABLECOMPOSURE AGAIN, HE APPEARED TO RESIGN HIMSELF TO BEING STOIC AND TOLERATING THE ENHANCEDMEASURES AS BEST HE COULD. INDICATIONS DESPITE THERE WERE NO THAT SUBJECT WAS BEING PROVOCATIVE OR ACTIVELY DEFIANT. INCREASED FATIGUE, HE RESPONDED TO INTERROGATORS AS DIRECTED AND, ON OCCASION, QUIETLY STATED THAT HE HAD "TOLD EVERYTHING". OVERALL, _SUBJECT CONTINUES TO EVIDENCE GOOD RESILIENCE AND A RESISTANCE POSTURE THAT INCLUDES AVOIDING OVERT PROVOCATION, PRESENTING A GENERALLY STEADY AND COMPOSED DEMEANORAND MIXING TRUTH WITH MISDIRECTION AND LIES. FURTHERMORE, SUBJECT'S RESISTANCE POSTURE INCLUDES TENACIOUSLY ADHERING TO THE STORY THAT HE AND . AL-QA'IDA WERE TOO HARASSED AND DISRUPTED AFTER 11 SEPT TO ORGANIZE AND MOUNT BIG OR SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. HIS STORY ALSO INCLUDES THE ASSERTION THAT ARRESTS AND OTHER DISRUPTIONS HAVE FORCED AL QA'IDA TO DECENTRALIZE AND LOOSEN SOME OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL ON DISPERSED FIELD LEADERSHIP. THE GENERAL EFFECT IS AN IMAGE OF A BELEAGUERED AND HOUNDEDLEADER WHO HAS BEEN RENDERED IMPOTENT DUE TO AMERICA'S HEIGHTENED SECURITY, THE LOSS OF AFGHANISTAN, AND WORLD-WIDE TARGETING OF AL QA'IDA OPERATIVES AND RESOURCES. BECAUSE IT INCLUDES ELEMENTS OF REALITY, THIS IS AN ELEGANT AND SOMEWHATCOMPELLING RESISTANCE POSTURE. LIKELY THAT SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THIS IT IS HIGHLY "PROJECTED IMAGE" ARE INTENDED FOR EFFECT AND TO MISLEAD. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 D. (b )( 1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct BASED ON THE CURRENTASSESSMENT, THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT SUBJECT IS AT RISK TO SUFFER PROFOUNDOR PERMANENTEMOTIONALAND PSYCHOLOGICALHARM. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct END OF MESSAGE TO! :!!l'!leRl3T Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06669364 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631246 (b)(1) 1. How much has the CIA paid Mitchell and Jessen since 2002? (b)(3) NatSecAct ~) Dr. James Mitchellwas paid a total of $1,459,601.43 as an independentcontractor (IC) to the CIA from FY 2001 to FY 2005. This included services to the Directorateof Science and Technology and to the CTC Renditions,Detentions and InterrogationsProgram (ROI). Costs from FY 2001 through FY 2005 include (b )( 1) payment for research and developmentas well as operational services. (b)(3) NatSecAct (~ Dr. J. Bruce Jessen was paid a total of $1,204,550.42 as an IC to the CIA from FY 2002 to FY 2005. This included services to the Directorateof Science and Technology and to the CTC/RDI. Costs from FY 2002 thru FY 2005 include (b)(1) payment for research and developmentas well as operationalservices. (b)(3) NatSecAct ~ During FY 2005, Ors. Mitchell and Jessen formed Mitchell, Jessen, and Associates (MJA)ending their role as independentcontractors. In addition to continuingthe provision of professional services by Ors. Mitchell and Jessen, MJA provided qualified interrogators,detainee security officers for CIA detention sites, and curriculumdevelopmentand training services for the RDI program. MJA also provided training services for other CTC/SMD elements unrelatedto the RDI program. From FY 2005 through 23 January 2009, MJA was paid a total of $71,968,923.90. (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) (b)(3) NatSecAct During the periods Ors. Mitchell and Jessen, and later MJA, were associated with the CTC/RDI program,the program provided intelligenceto disrupt terrorist plots, remove terrorist leaders from the battlefield and den AQ a safe haven in (b )( 1) (b)( 3 ) NatSecAct which to plan and train. IA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligenceacquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means. Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631246 Approved for Release: 2017/12/01 C06631246 ____ _ (b )( 1) • (b)(3) NatSecAct (b )( 1) 'fOP SECRE'f (b )(3) NatSE: