104-1043010230 13-00000 1 WW [3 53cm [j .. 4 ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET [Optimal] The CIA and the Cult of Intelli ence by Victor Marchetti a?E Jo D. Mar 5 RECEIVED FM: I Emmi-m no. 0/ 130/ 0 pm ZDUIDQ 1542 3 April 19?? Egidinigmw Ell-Gm numb", and DATE Comma [Numbu Inch common! to show From whom In whom. Draw a line can: column after each comment} I 3 Er. WlIllam Wells DDO Hqs. 4 5" In. IL 12- 13.- 15. :93? ?Miami? [1 35cm CONFIDENTML ?aw, 13-00000 - . DDIO Eli?ig? S'April 197? MEMORANDUM FOR: All Divisions and Certain Staffs? FROM b?fUUfU SUBJECT The CIA and the Cult of Intelli once by Victor'Marchetti?aHd . er 1. Subject book was published in 197d with 168 deleted items demanded by CIA_and involved court trial and decision.' The lawyer for the authors has, in effect, requested that a review be made of the 168 deleted'items to determine which can now be declassified and removed from the court?s injunction, particularly in view of the official disclosures since the publication of the book. The Department of Justice has advised that such a review is in order. 2. Since.the courts decided the 163 deleted items were properly classifiable and classified in accordance with the-appropriate Executive Order in effect-at the time of the initial classification, including Executive Order 11652,.the review at this time must include two points: Is the item still classified under Executive Order 11652, - Has_the item been'placed in the public domain by official disclosure by the United States, such as by an official in the Executive Branch authorized to declassifv the item, or by a report of a Congressional-committee, or by the courts. 3. Each addressee is requested to appoint a focal point officer to review each component's respective items which are held by this office. This office also has the D30 documentation submitted in support of deleting each item in 1973. These can -be reviewed by each focal point official as necessary. .. ..-.-.-- 13-00000 A review Will also be needed-of those items which may have been cleared or released by CIA when reviewing manuscripts submitted by other authors 'since the publication of the Marchetti book. A few items will need to be referred by some of the components to other departments and agencies of government for their review. 4. Please advise this office of the name of ?your focal point officer by cos 113;er 1977. x1542) 'Distribution no {in I DDO - CXFR CXAF C/Dcn info only . ..- . mm? 00000-9 13-00000 mosque -SUBJECT: Review of Deletions ?rom.Marchetti Book for Declassification - Request for Documents. 1 In order to review the deletions from the Marchetti book, The Cult of Intelligence, must determine if any official of? the U38. Government placed any eclassified material in the public domain in open testimony before a congressional Committee. The following material or information is required: . a. Is there any index to public statements by senior government officials on the suhnect of intelligence? Is there any index to the Pike Committee or Church committee testimony like to have copies of the open testimonyr before a Congressional committee by senior_officials of the CIA, NBA, State Dept, Dept of-Defense, FBI, which.deals with intelligence. 0. Any open testimony before Congressional committees by senior .U.S. officials dealing with the cutoff of AID during the cyprus disturbances. d. Any testimony (open) concerning American POWs (MIA) in Vietnam and CIa's method of communication with them. 13-00000 Hussein on trip; the disc. King: No.00. in taken set ref manner.? from tin:- CM 5 Around do It. to lift-Vi. the King. ?It: to suit. was tint. HII new I: my ?rst and 1.0 Ni in0t winds} mi The Itnn Post 0' II. int-inn Irif'the tiII- II on chances for poat'o in tin) toast. excerpts: DE How much truth is there in the 5'qu that appeared in ?the Wash? ington Post? HUSSEJN: [he whole thing is ritiicu- ions anti insuiting. But i am to answer questionx about it (it. ?If?oor government spokesman sate-the stout was a combination of ?fabricationand distortion." What has been fabricated and what has been distorted? What 01.1.1.0 Fai'n' icatt-It in t' he stony 00.0.0 00.1 funds.- h- nnieti nut-Iner? Humility For private bene?t. ?I-?Iihen trim-{nil? l1: Anti) I.- Ies extent] it has linen li'aIiit'iIinal For the checks to he math: but to the Head of State which then are iiepositetl in this stat-5.1. aeunint. "this i0 not an nrat'tiee. All :I00i0tance tot' eivecl in}: In: is I'Iantiimi in the same 00011.1. 1Iii-hat i.0 true is that for a number of 1.01am we in: on -:Itiereti Hecnritv anti no.1 a00i0tant~e which the n! tutu-11t- glatefuih'. AI: {oi tiII' that the lit. ting the i'II'IItL'etion oi nw at honi- in request 00.1.0 math-1 to the State IJL I?IaItInent whiI- 1h kindly; agn- e-It to ensure II mourn}. Ht Ineini art that there have littlt In' any plots again0t In: and Inv family anti this 1.1.000 a purine-Hy noun: II request. it Amy tie-either! to Loans to aehnoi in jotaidn we would needless to 0.11.1 in: .hlo For her aetin'ity and wouitl not he sending -.I hill to the 1.1.8. ann'lnnunt in: El]! elt. 0m: anti security ?Hire. 0. How do you feet about President Cartier ordering the arrangement?code:- manned ?h'o . Beet "?stopped vetinuitti anything ail .lhis heinrt'. It the n. lea'unte is In the assistant-1. we have in't'n tor Humility itiiti gent-e than Ito-01o ?Itt'ti :Ihnnt its suspension. either oiliui aliy IIntiltitrinlhI The tnteitigenoe Oversight Board set up in February tats reported to President Ford?s Few months tater that they regarded the pay}- rnents as improper and he did nothing about Ft. What do you feet was improper about to ash sayments? A. Win ll is .I nr-nnL-I 00' .01. to It II anti :Ili1.' i0 1.".nn .00. ?17? Mat l't'il 7., Money. .a'ritt: Suirit'et ntwt-r taint-3. I11) lItIt-til't1ittitl wa0 tut-ail}: unaware that thi.0 :I's0'i0l1. to Jordan hatl into question l?tthi What i.0' [minor in soon-.1 in A0 laI' .15 '1 Int] can get for Motion anti In01 nopnie is proper. Anti ii0'tr of your Preaitiunti'. [Eisenhnw-f Kennett Johnaon 90100.. thought so, too. . CI. Since you say the assistance-was ptoper and just another form of U3. aid; why; then,: the secreoy?i'and method of payment? A. [it you Int-an the round that 13.11.115- ments were made Iiireuth to the King; 'ancl'iin' his [pel'snnail bene?t and with poiitioal conditions anti obligations, thia Foitli'. . //4?rt 1: . 1 .Igain0l II.0. in 1.10110 unintiilvn- tat that tin-.01: titted-:0 011'rt' inatle as: the 1.01.1.0 111-. Icing up steam on the 0:er (ia- thtit SetIet taty .?I'anue .nrivoti in hmn- '.tl [ti ohvinn0 in nit-1 that those who 0' iah to sabotage the peat-t' nI'ooessm?amE help Isra. 0'l'ay litii in the occupied tetiitor-e .0?are even 00' tiling to engage in chaiaeter assaas'ainarinn ul Iper0nn0 whose denim: wish in For .i3u0t and durable peace. Cl. Who-benefits? Two quarters. (line. in Iiwn that ha0 been trying to tllit.li.'t'- min t1 oi 1.0m key institutions en- gagett in a 0I'oriclwitio. arugula to try to- neutralize the actions ni the KGB in its etforts to promote Communion. The oth- er a0 .1 {1 Iini gmup that Is not interest- ell it hash. sum.- to settie with JordanAlexandra [In l'tI1n tinnve?ntumma-itntum Choice of targets: Jordan's King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range t0 it t'e- The a00i0tantt- was to onhante oin? in- telligI-. 1.0.1.1. and tit-qutitii.? oanahilitii- 1. period. To the CIA is a part of the CLIveI'Innent..Wt1 have. sought tr: nit-quin- ltno'. 111nm: equipment anal new eanahi I i- ties In _in il'tt.? tact-1 i_tlI-. hi: it hIit Intuitl 00hiI- is stiil 00 itII itlunlili ni- interests hetwuen tu'n' {-untinlit' tit IltiVUt?ntI' Irnitlni and mutual L't Inpt? i'atiInI. What do you feel was the prinoipai motivation of those [sources] who ad to the Washington Post story? A. in IInrleInIine' the inl'eitiit'v ul thnai- who '.il'Li 10.00.10.011. lmuw we ?till i L'nIn' . tin-0n :nnl littitit' attagiu are liltile .teI'In0 .II the .lnitlanian at'cnr. Nowawnnk; March .7. 19?7.. . ten] to Jti-I'tiillt. 1. able. :inI' within: in to the. innus n: We. stronger than anything lltiil can in; it Was the Israeli iohl'ry' that the thll'til'ttii?t'i to hlnoh'the i-iawitanti-InteraFt Ini00iie detonate 001.0- F?m?htnateiy, the ?111in ihiletl. Q. How much of a aotbaoir do you test the story has been to the peace-wtth-israet oampaign? A. i hunt- Gonna-1 that it will nut in: it ei'lett' an Inn" {in ?1111}. lint pl: in Hi?ill'ti' turn: of atteII'IntI'. to saiml'age a just and durable 10.000101. 0. What, tor exempte, do you teat the story witi do to your differences with the PLO and attempts to form a faint detegation tor the .Geneva tatiis? is a joint delegation stiti a reattstie possihitity? A. A FLU {intimation is in this tint whole- II thlt?It delegation is stiil very much in The ti I . \?I?itt-i taught can it thing to Hon 0} ill: ready?I coexis Gaza I A. .. But it the. ti?ltt an rec-:15: Qt PLO tween Bank A. to struo' 31..r But I 1'I'Iisn cook it? it then ietIio hack fnre' 0.. a?oat at! an .A. been of'ti'. frien your out resp? your; relat doe; jeuti in. ti?. hum rity: tl'Ltti'l root] 1311?. Was l?tt'ill t't?t't? 0.0m- Dil: - [am I. vet}- Hon: my I iron it: ngai you that not 13 00000 1.: n. His CIA Money 1.111111. l11I.Iii:1.r 1111.11.11 .1r11 111.11 this to into IhIsl . 3111:1111 is propor in soon: Inindsjis in others. As hit 1111'} 11111 anything I 1.1111 1.1111 ihr 11nd my poopio is 11:11pm . Ihnd ii111: oi your Prosid L1nts [Eisenhnw 111', JILL-1111011311. IForLli thought so. too. 0. Since you say the 1115111111111;st proper ano? just another form at U5. aid: why; then.? the seoroofiano method of payment? A. ifs-1111 11:11:11. the I'LL-port that 1111::- 1'11L111ts were. made (Ilit'trt'iljs' to the King '.nnl'tin' his [porsornil] and with politiL'LIl conditions and obligations, this I 111-: It W111: iIIliv II- l1Ii Ii 1. - rL' .ILIL1 11s the 11ii1- -nsi1.'11 1.11.11.- 1111- king 11p hit .1111 t't'FI Lory Lizl'I. iltfti.? 3111111111311 111'1'i1'L'Li in Mon-'11. It is' oin'inns to 1111- th.-It those who 1"isiI to 1::Ihot'11IL:11 tin.- process?1:111} hL'lp Isr1111i'sl111' put in tin: 11111-11 to 11.111111 1:11 in 11ss11ssiII1Iti11n oi persons whose wish is i111'11jnsi '.InLi [111111.11. Who-henotits? - 11111111131111- Uno. in own L-oIInl'rI1 Ih1-Lt has ['11 on twinL: to 1111ri1 r1 mint: Inn-.1 of I'o'nr 1111.111 institutions on- 1111ng in 11 1113-1 In the notions of [111. [(63 in its L-1li-1'1I'ts to promote Tho. oth- or is :1 pow-1 1'i11i1 as not int.1:I 11st- '11 it snow to s11tti11. with jordnn. .. . II .11 I11x1mnra do 1111:1111 ?lming of jordan?s King HIisso-inI taking. aim the shooting ran-go is 11 to ?thriLrstion. The LIssisth'IL'L was designed. only1 our in- toliigL'IIL'L: Innd security periodport .11" tho sought to LIL'qnir. knnw? how. ties to tittlt?lttl ourselves in tho ELCLL oi .I. WtITlLin-idt' hutliL'. in: it hot 1_Il' i1 i1: 111- il'h 11s. And 1.1- liIcI'L" Is :111 'iL'iL-ntitj. 13.111.11.1-111111. iIotwL'L-rn our I will tn 11nd I'ntinn. (ii. What do you feel was the prinoipoi motivation of those [sources] Iri'ho contriboi- ed to the Washington Post stow? .1 . . - .. A1-l11 thL' 1hr. integrity who Llhlu to tn ?1th 1:11:11oL13i1?i111 peoplr know 1111- and I ion-5.1.- th- 111 11nd :11'11 intiiL' i11 - tornls of tho sL'onL'. ?s'VL-I'nro stronger than 1:111] he 11 111.111.11.111.- 197 forgot it 1.1.1111: tho l'srnoii iohhy that litilt'ICl'lI?tl the campaign to, EIiLIci-zl'tiio missile defense sys? tem to Jordan. the. 1111:1in Failed. CI. muoh of a setback foot the has been to the poace-with?israoi Liam nation? A. lIogiLr. oi it will not he :1 solhnL'lc. ALiInitteLli'y, it 1111131 inn-'11 11 on hut i plan It} purscvul't: I'ugm'Ll- Ul- 1It'te11n'pts Kill-tiling? :1 just and What. tors-sample. do you 11.111111111151111? will do to your with tho PLO and attempts to form a ioint delegation tor the .Genera taiks? is. a Joint delegation aI realistic possibility? A. PLO dolor gIItioII is in 1311111111111 this wool-i 11111;] {Ii 11 Iioint dologntion is still very in question. Iour rL1l11tinns on tho. linsis 1? 4: Hill-i! I 1" 1' Tin: [?itur?n' -'Li 1115? '.1'1111'i1'1 lii'i'i'. 11.111111 11111 Fiat} .wns Lla'r-i'LI -n Lint 11l' l1. 1.. wh: 1t tit 111.111 1' IILIiitiL'ni nut-ion 1:111: lit.? 11s 11-? 1111111111 thing wc 111111111? tow months. 1. l'ltlit? AI'LIl-Iposi- iion 1111 this prohiom - 'I'L1tt111'1'1. sinliizo. Cl. is it your impression that the PLO is now ready to amend its basic charter and agree to coexist with israei in a West Bank- Gaza state? A. ?tco. HIii it is tiIL'. isr111'ii position i113. shun-id tho. PLO such 11 sit-1.11 11111.!1 'LIily? Tin-31L must in. 11 oi siInnit1InL'- itym?l?sr: '111 1i roLognizL-s :11 W1 st Ii: (3111111 i?nlostinisn stato- 111'111 iiailnstininn's Israel. 5 O. is it your intention to negotiate PLO prior to Gone-1m a new organic iiniL be- tween .11 possible Paiestinian state on the West Bank and Jordon proper? A. This has been suggostt? i111 111111111 lenders i11_the {111111 11s 11 possihio con- struotive development and 1.1-1- termin- iy plan to explore the' But I_1nnst caution L'on agonist overopti- InisIn. The. rosnniption of tho Geneva conferenL'o by itseif moons nothing and if it LlLILsnt melnL'o rosnits .. then zlhero will In. the of letdown, 1111r the 111' 111111 the exianI'Iisls coming to tin tort.? "Cil. How do you think the tallest CM ottooi relations between Jordan and the Unit- Ed A. Throughout nil ti'IL'sL- s'LInrs 1 how been very proud orthL' growing strength of the roiationship with our Aalioricnn friends. WE identified with principle!- yonr iLn'L'hitlIors .hL'lLi door. Enliit ELL?sped, confidence and faith. and 11131 yond that anything I did Itn reintinns with the US. .1.-11s hast-rd 1111-11 deep L'onviL-tion nlmni our common oh- [11111111, 1111.! progress in. the Middle East My duty is to develop my L'mantrv its 'IilI'tl rity' intelligent-L. tol tho tremendous tlIrL'nts that lie Tin.- is strown with mines to s11i11111115111i11' 0111' 1111:: just 11s111111 11d in will In: tillit'l'S. lint lit?111' in mind that is not in I'LIL'L-iix'ing holp. iniis into thL' L'nlL'gIoI'}1 and is .1 iitr 1'111'1'1111-- 11in? iciI'ILls 1?11: iiII' 11s (11.111 ti11:sL' will 111111 iiI'stnnIi vory insl worth: (111 iIlIni 1111,11"- {1111-111 is 11 111111411111:in 11111111 1111' is in Jordan in freedom. Finally. regarding 1'11111' Hit'tlin attacks ngsinst 1I lII'nnLdI Iiovorun'lont, ii 1.11111 to LionLILh: vitni :11'111 that is thorn In protect you, that is your affair, not 13-00000 attest 11-1p111"1s7? MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DEA FROM M. L. Latta Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group- Central Cover Steffi SUBJECT Fairways Corporation - 1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys for Victor Marchetti have reques.ted release of the 163 iitems previously deleted by court order from the book, . The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora? tion was referred to CCS by the for review in this connection. 2. Fairways Co'rporation is the subject of fo.ur items (107,123,129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, and 463 respec- tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on all four items is that they are still classified, since.they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U. 3., and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order l1652. 3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair? ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In-any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December'lgl?, when - ?irector Bush wrote to-the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair- ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure. E2 IMPDET CL Sienna: sonnets Ah? METHOUS rooms '5 1' Jr in?: *3 1 31-00000 --.- - m, n. secasr 4. 'Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its response to the that DDA would comment further on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may have been placed in the public domain since the court order [i since February 19?5) . 5. Please direct your comments to For your information, I Room 6 0120, red line x9533, is preparing an overall response on the subject for the 5-00000 nig??whmuy) av ?imaging .3 Lou. 5a a 31m gxgis?zs 3% 13-00000 SENDER WILL. CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED I I cowgagimau. SECRET OFFECML ROEFTENG - TD NAME AND . IDATE - INITIALS I ??lb f??c.limama: 2am 11159313; cement . mg? nan m: canwuamci 4 -. Remarks: 7,214.; I :5 .3 Irma-?/ mi? ?izw . .W I Wham 5N A/ngj? -. wd? 521-: 70 5?3; #125: ?oLn TD Ta gang-5;: FROM: NAME. AFJLIRESE AND PHONE NJ. BATE yij'vj??/ ?43fo 1 UNCLASEIFIEH fti?zsanif??rlu ma HD. 237 ?40} 1-6? 13-00000 4 . '29 (La/w) magm- . 913%?! fag-225 Day; I t/a?fxwf - ?re a- 7 Wary/I41? . I49. wJ/wzg' II . 11?. 73313577 oawj??xox?u 'T?g?/rwi I . .. It ICci?r (105964)? wDeb-r/g - 3&3 5mg: "f?fc?ft?lcf Ala-m; guu' li? 21 PEWKG Mgr: y? cw" . . .. .22. @6435? 23 327? I 2 5? 7:5 (muwwm. Maia? 0F $0 13-00000 27 29? :24" 3c? .312 33 3?2? 3'5? :31? 37 335,11,17,53 11.11? 191x512- 155/3 c5: 1c: {4n} Fr: :3 1. mfg-Fora?? Mamw? ?fh=91??W?f mm; I12: was? Saw-771? . .. fat/T29? Jar-?3 may. gr; I CE?/zzsn?mf Damage/w: 5065/41.: Dmacmm?r/ (?b?M/qu . 5.5.- Gamma} (gr Mm) Iii/?E ill? M1114 Midi?.5. 9&3 e15" '4 7 Inf/5 xii-E I: 21:" 191/: t? Wi"-rE? Lift? (5 ?71, Ac: 5? Eli? in} 5/3? Fi?/Mtg; . I?d-Illa/x AFWL J?zE/?r?z Car, 60 Mia 5 If? (Sn-15% Mam)? Mf?' mi 2. H: .crh? 1 31-00000 ?6-?1?1?35 33 I {1459/3 ??ass-?352: .?f?gagaypm 52 EM 513.2377}; mf . 7 1317-3 43:33:23,333 . 57 CM 9:53:43. 3:3 33337::ch 340. Mrm?a?? -4 f. we 337?32336333 . 332 32:35.. . (-3 M2334, :3 err?ft?ch 675?. I B??am/ 6 5K 33,4353.23323 73?" 51 3533M . mare; '79?1E/6nizfi??fm? mwmm?w'?f (mags?cg 13-00000 . .59 7:3" . 7d- {guy-,1 I 53.56 win; '77- . 78? $23: rapm?E/M gm 7-5243?ch Isa? ?3.51. .77 4 g6 Mir/+19 ?w?lrez?Lm?wff F2: mate: I 3/2" :5er 33-6. - 3/3 ?iay'rGIW' .bx?gez, $.35er vzilvg' .. .. . 1.- "mt" .- 13-00000 .--F. .?I?rl 312??"th . El. ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: {Op?onal} FROM: N0. Acting Chief, Latin America I am Division 21 April 19?? 1" dulgm In", rum Numb/M, mid DATE COMMENTS {Number Inch common! to show from whom' In mm. Draw a line mm? column u?ar lunch ?mutant! macswen FORWAEDED _l.l l0.? 11. 12. 13. 14. 35. 59:? 610W some": [3 uncussmso 13-00000 5 22 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM Chier, Latin America Division SUBJECT The CIA and the curt of Intelligence. by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks REFERENCE. Memorandum dated 3 April 1977 The following are the LA Division comments on the' review of the 168 court ordered.deletions of subject book. Item 1; page 11, Chile Classified. Dept. of State/INR "Item 3a, page 11, Chile ?eclassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, CovertVAction - I'tem '3b, page 11, Chile ?eclassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee H.earings, Volume 7, Covert Action "Item 4, page 12, Chile Declassified Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume Covert Action ;Item 5, page 12, Chile Declassified Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action I.tem 11, page 15, Chile . ?eclassified. Pages 170,172.8enate Select Committee Hearings, Volume Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Allegeo Assassination Plots Involving Foreign.LEaders EZ IMPDET CL BY 012180 5 13-00000 SECRET Item 29, page 49, Guyana Executi.ve Order. exemption. 5 (B) 3 Item. 46, page 70, lines 20-w24, Chile DecIassified. Pages of Senate Select Committee Hearings., Volume- 7, Co.vert Action Item 89, page 106, Cuba 3? . Eeclassified. .Se.1ect (:7pj) Commit.tee Interim Report on A1.leged Assassination Plots Involving Fo.reign .Leaders Item 201 page 222, Brazil C1a551?1ed. Executive 0r.der exemption 5 (B) 2 "Item 261, page 338, Panama C13551I1.ed. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI Item 292, page 420, .Ch.i1e Dec1a551f.ied. Page 265 Senate. Se.l.ect Committ.ee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 307, page 15$: Cuba . Ueclass1fied. Senate Select Committ.ee Interim Report on alleged Assassination Plots I.nvolving Fo.reign Leaders 'rtem'31?, p_age 468, Chile - ?ec1a551f.ied Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select' Committee H.earings, Vo1ume Covert Action 'Item 3'18, pages 469, 4-70, .Chile' CIaSsified Executive 0r.der exemption 5 (B) There is no .r.ecord that the intelligence .report on which this item was based has been declassified. - "Ztems 322 323, pages 4?3, 474, Mexico Classliied. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2) There has never b.een offi.cia1 acknow.1e?gement by either the Mexican or 3.8. Governments of this case. 2 1 31-00000 3 page 508, Chile' DecIesslfied. Appendix A {Covert_Aetien in Chile 1963e~1973), pagee 144--209 of Senate Select Committee Hearings; Volume Covert Action 3 1 31-00000 Ian. 5 22 ?lm 19?? MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM Acting Chief, Latin Americe.Divieion SUBJECT The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence 5? Victor Merchetti and John B.?Mnrke REFERENCE Memorandum dated 3 April 19?? The following are the LA Division commente on the review of the 163 court ordered deletions of subject book. Item 1, page 11.Ch11e . Classified. Dept. of Item 3a,- age 11 Chile .. ed. Page 163, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7. Covert Action Item 3b, page 11, Chile . ?ecleseified. Pages 105,190 of Senate Selee.t Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action. Item 4, page 12 Chile . ?ecInseified. Page 168, Sene te Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 5, page 12, Chile Pages 105 l90 of Senate Select Committee Hearings. Volume Covert Action Item 11, page 15, Chile Pages 1?0,172 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders . E2 IMPDET CL BY 012180 SECRET 1 31-00000 Item 29 page 49, Guyana .L. ass Wied. Executive Order. exemption 5 (B) 3 Item 46, {:3e 70,11ne-e 20--24 ..Chile ?eciaseif Pages 148,165,166, 1.?1 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, volume 7, Covert Action Item 89, page 10o, Cuba . . ,Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alle.ged Plots Involving Foreign Leaders . Item 201, page 222,3ra311. ees -ed. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2 Item 261, page 338, Panama.. e59 ed. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI Item 292, page 420, Chile H. Page 205 Senate Sele.ct Committee Hearings, Volume Covert Action Item 507 page 453? Cuba HecIeesified. Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders . Item 317, page 463, Chile Deoiessified. Pages 165 205 of Senate Select Committee Hearinge,Vo1ume.7, Co.vert Action Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chi.1e . Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (I) There is no record that the intelligence report on which this item was booed hae been declassified. Items 322 323, pages 475,. 414., Mexico . Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2) There has never been official acknowledgement by either the Mexican or 0.5; Governments of this case. 1 31-00000 SECRET Item 33a, page 508, Chile. Appendix A {Covert ?ction in Chile pages 144~~20 9 of senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume Covert Aetien SECRET 13-00000 . .. a? mnmu ugcusymn on? El CONFIDENTIAL ig/sscazr ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: [Option-at] FROM: ND. . 9164 cxcus [111-50 Hqs. 5407 31 11139.19??- dwawm? mm ?mm and mus macen's COMMENIS [Number each cornmeal #9 show from whom - . INITIALE In whum. Draw a limp mm? alum u?ar ouch car-menu RECEIVED- FOWAHJED Hue. . . 2? 111:1:11: i . w; HHND CARRY 4 4405 Hqss?s CALL 4_ Att? I o" i 5 c_2919 Hqs. a. Attn: I 6 510? Hqs. a. Attn: I I - . fr) CXCA - 3 0004 Has. . Attn: I 15/" H. 2 0109 . n. 13. H. 15. E3: ?Mam?? L'j 55cm [3 51ml, [3 uncussmin 3 .- . 3593335 3 1 RPR 19?? MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM Chief, Central Cover Staff SUBJECT I: 'The CIR?and'the Colt of'lntelli?ence Victor marchetti and_John . REFERENCE . -Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs, _fr saxnoxo, are 8 Apr Same Subject 1. Pursuant to Reference requeSt, has reviewed its files and effetted coordination with interested components on classification of the 26 items given for review. Results are deSCribed below. 2. It has been dete.rmined that the following items continue to be c1?ass.ified under E.O.11652, and are exempt from the E. 0. General Reclassificati.on Schedule, as indicated by paragraph citations inI brackets: a. Item 24. Page 47 -- RTV. Classified describes intelligence sources-and methods of er- ations based in Jordan. [Section b. Item 48, page 71a BERLINER HEREIN. Classified describes intelligence sources' and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section NOTE: EUR Division con- firms the need for-continued classification and will commentiseparately. No CCS record. c. Item 43, page 71a AFRICAN FORUM. . Classified describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica? tions. [Section NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record. d. Item 43, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORT. Classified describes inte.11igence sources and methods as related to: several magazine pubiica~ tions. [Section advises that. INTELIICENCE nae . I w511 a; . . WERNING NGTICE - EZ IMPDET . CL BYIozsosg SECREH 1 31-00000 Vthe African American Institute; which published africa Re art, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries 1n oo of the Senate Select1Committee Final Report; pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for Ross, pp. 24Tn- 248n. This cit-ation should not be con- sidered official Government disclosure .of. Agency sponsor- ship of the Insti.tute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need? for continued classification and will comment separately e. I.tem 48, page 71a 1- PREUVES. Classified describes inte111gence sources and methods as rel-ated to several magazine publications._ [section NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need. for- continued classification and will comment separate.ly. f. Item 48, page- 71a -- ENCOUNTER Classified I describes intelligence sources and methods as related to. several magazine publ.ications [Section I. NOTE: c1 Staff confirms the need for. con- . tinned classificati.on and will comment separately g. Ite.m 48, page ?la -- FORUM. Classified . describes inte.111gence sources and methods as related to s.evera1 magazine publications [Section NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi- cation and will comment separate11y. h. Item 50, page- 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of- operations based in Germany. [Section NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica* tion and will comment separately. i. Item 51, and FOBOR GUIDES. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(3) 3. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified describes inte111gence sources and methods of opera- tions dire.cted against Egypt.1 [Section k. Item 56, page 31 -- arr. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods_of_opera? tions directed [Section -2- SECRET 1 31-00000 SECREE 1. Items 103,123,129, and 279 on pages 123,132, 133, and 463 respective1 FAIRWAYS CORPORATION. Classified describe. inte.lligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in? the U. S. [Secti.on According to. CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point,. but. there are indicati.ons that the DCI may have responded to the_question in a manner which could have been con- strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. However, CCS- files contain other eviden_ce that .CIA sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The Advisor confirms the need for continued -c1assification and W111. comment_separate1 m. Item 130,. page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET, describes inteiligence' sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria. [Section n. Item 130, page 133?-e SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD. Classified describes -intelligence sources and methods of operati.ons based in East Africa. [Section o. Item 226, page zsr-w- GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified SECRET: describes intelligence sources and methods by describing a cover arrangement With a com- mercia1 company. [Section p. Item 278, page 400 INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Re.ferred to in the manuscript as ?a cover company which sold high school equivalency diploma courses [advertised on the backs of match books.)" -C1assi?ied SECRET, describes inte.lligence sources and methods exposing an operation which provided cover. [Section q. Item 230, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET, describes intelligence sources and methods which expose an operation tar.geted against Egypt. [Section 1 31-00000 4. I 1319351 a- 5; The. following items .were heretofore. classifi.ed SECRET bec1use .th_ey de1cribe.d sources and methods in id_ent_ifying a support :base located in th1 Unite.d. State.s, _bat are new con- sidered to have been plaCed- Iin the publ.ic domain. Items 124, 125, and 12? on pages 129 and 130 -- INTERMDUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation, Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of the Sehate'SeIectLCommittee'Final Report, pp. 208-9, and in the.Report of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218. 4. The following items fall into the questionabl.e area as to whether they have .been placed in the public. domain by auth.or-ized Government officials: a. Item 49, page-?la -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes'intelligence sources and metheds as.related to seVeral newspaper publications. -Howerer, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia Jou?rnalism R'eri'ew which state.s, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr. the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street .law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Hoore, now acknowl'edge that the fourth partn.er [in the purchase of the' Home D'aily Amer.ican in 1956] was the CIA [Brass] recently called the arrangement .?atypical' of what th.e Agency was doing, 'a bad example'. It is' questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, _who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shnte., who left the Agency long before that, can be considered as: constituting official Agency disclosure of this' information b. Item 54, page 30 and item 236, page 262 FORUM WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because the? deScribe' intelligence sources and methods and-identification of operations based in England.? Forum Horid?Features was referred to ,1 but not by in Book I of the Senate Select .Commi.ttee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main~ tained in Europe the larger of the two was suiscribed to.by over 30 U.S, newspapers. In an effort .to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two .H?n SECRET 1 31-00000 SECREE press services." It may be argued that .although Forum World Features continues to be prote.cte.d to a deg.ree by deletion of its name in the Senate. Report, CIA dis- closure to newspaper editOrs, if it in fact'took place and depending-on how it was handled, placed the subject in the publ.ic domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff confirm the need for continued classification and w-ill a comment separately. cc: - CONCUR: 2; z- 77 at - nag-.77 ate Fate W111, Dat 15, 1193511 13-00000 'mt SECRET-3 4.- 2 I IIPR MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM :l Ehliof, Central Cover Staff Tho 611 and the Cult of .Into111?enco REFERENCE Homo fer A11 Div and Certain Staffs, fr dud 3 Apr Same Subjsot . 1. Pursuant to Roforsnso soqusst, CCS hos roviowod its files and coordination with intsrostsd components on of tho 26 itoms given to CBS for roviow. R-osuits are described below. 2. It has boon dotorminod that the following items oontinuo to be classified under 0.11652, and sre osonpt from the 0. Sonora: schedule, so indicated by paragraph oitntions'in brsokots: s. Iton 24 page a? SECRET: desorihos intelligence souroos and methods of r? stions based in Jordan. [Sootion (33.(Sgi h. Itom 48, page 71a -- BBRLINER VERBIN Classifisd dossribo-s intoliigonco souroos and methods as related to mogszino publios- tions. [Sootion NOTE: EHR Bivision .don~ firms tho nood for continued Classification and will comment separately. No CCS record. o. Item 48 page 71s AFRICAH . Classified dosoribos intolligoncs seasons and methods as rolstod to soversl magazine publiosv tions. [Ssction NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued olssSIfiosnion and will comment separately. No 863 record. d. Itom 4S, pogo Tin AFRICA REPORT. Classified SECRET ascribes intelligence sources and mothods so roistsd to sovorsl magazine publica- tions. [Section AF?B?gision?sdvisos that coss? CL BY 026089 NOTICE 13-00000 35031513 the Africen_nmer1cnn Institute, which published Africa Re ort is'ineinded in 11st of Agency proprietnries In ?oei VI of the Senete Select Committee Final Report, pg. 263. However, the Re ort gore as its source for the list the book The by Wise and Ross, ppe 2d1n-248n. This citation'shouid not be cone sidered official Government.disc1osnre o? Agency 5 onscr- shin of the Institute. NOTE: CA Stef? confirms need for continued classification and will comment separately. e. Item 43, page 71s Peeuvss. sooner; describes intelligence sourees end methoas as related to eeoerel mngeeine publicetions. [Section RUTH: GE'Steff confirms the seed for continued classification end will comment separately. Item 43. page Ila Classisieg. eescribes intelligence sources and methods'es related to several magazine on Eicntions. [Section CA Staff oon?'tms the need for con- tinued;c1essif1cetion and will cemment separately. 3. Item 48, page Ile.?n FORUM. ?iessified describes intelligence sources end_methods as related tosneversl magazine publications. geection NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need or continued clessifie cation and will comment separately. h. Item 50, page ?2 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Cleseified' describes intelligence sources and methods of o?eretions based in Germany. [Section NOTE: Division confirms the need for continued classifies- tion and will comment separately. 1. Item 51, page 72 -- PGBOR end FODOR GUIDES. Classified describes intelligence sources end_ mggnods'of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(3) 5. Item 55, page 80 RTV. Classified describes intelligence sources end methods of operee tions directed against Egypt. [Section k. Item 56, page 81 RTV. Classified ascent; describes intelligence sources and methods of ere~ tions directed against Egypt. [Section .2. SEQBE 13-00000 Sens 1. Items 10?. 123. 129, and 279-on pages 1253 152, 133, and 403 Classified intelligence sonrses and methods by identifyin.-an operatiensl support facility' located in the U.S. Section According to C63 files, in April 19?5-the was asked by an NBC reporter_abeur CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in oennestien with a planne? TY assumentaf on Agency proprietsries. GEE files are endless on point, but there are indieations that the may have responded to the question in a msnner whish could have been oen- strned as admission of CIA sponsorship as Fairways. However, CGS files contain other evidence that CIA sponsorship ef Fairways was considered still caessifled as recently as December 19?6. NOTE: The snares; Adviser the need fer sentlnued classifi?atlon and will comment separately. m. Item 138, page 133 Pan AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified engage; desoribes_intelligence souroes and methods of operatrons based in Nigeria. {Session n, Iten.1ss. page 153"' AIR ETD. Classified describes intelligenee,eonrces and methane of operations based in Bass Africa. [Section o. Item 226. page 257 GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified desoribes intelli?enoe sources and nethoes by_deser1blng cover arrangement with a some mersial company. [Section 9. Item 278. age 409 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHOQLS WORLD LIMI EB, INcg- Referred to in the manuscript as "a cover-company which sold high sshool equivalenoa diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match boo Classified describes intelligenee sources and methods exposing an operation which provided.cover. [Seotlon q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified deseribes intelligence sources and methods which expose an-operation targeted against Egypt. Ilsection 1 31-00000 some 3. The following.items were heretofore classified SECRET because they described sources and methods in identifying a support base located in the united States, but are now cons -siderod to have boonpplacod in the public domain. Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129,and 150 -- INTERMOHNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermonntsin Aviation, Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Fina1_Report, pp. 203-9, and inathe Report of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States,-pg. 218. 4. The foilewing items fall into the questionable area as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by authorised Government officials: a. _Item 49, page 71a ROME AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as'relatod to several newspaper- publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and ?ctober 19?4 edition of the ~Columbia Journalism Review which states, ?Landon K. Thorno, Jr.] the Ellis Erica, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shuts, then a partner-in the prestigious Wall Street lam firm_of Crarath, Swaine,-and Moore, non acknowledge that the.fourth partner {in the purchase of the ?gme Bail; American in 1956] was the {Brass} recently as led the arrangement 'atypical? of what the agency was doing, 'a bad examplo'." It is queStionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Brass, who retired from the Agency in l?ll, and Mr. Shuts, who left the Agency long before that. can be considered as =asnconstituting official Agency disclosure of this information. b. Item 54, page 30 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe intelligence Sources and methods and identification of operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to but not by name Jr'in book I of tEe Senate Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of [propaganda}??fallont' involved two proprietary news Services that the CIA main? tained in Europe the larger of the two was autocribod to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the_CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two so 13-00000 SECREE press services." It may be argued that although Pusan World Featurss continues to be protected to a dag. by deletisn.of its name in the Senate Report. Cl?"iss closurs.tE ns??papsr editors, if it in ?sst tack plugs and how it was handled, P?icsd the subject in the puh11?_aama1n. soTss EUR.D1vision ans cs Staff c?nfirm tbs.nssd for sontinusd classificatisn and will comment separately. as: . 'c/Ls CINE CONCUR: Chief, AF ?lvi?ion ate Chief, EUR Division' ate Chief, LA Division - Chis}; NE ?ivlsinn .- ?sfs ta . ?ute 13-00000 s'E memoRRNnUM FOR: saxooxo' FROM Act1ng Chlet, Latin America Division, SUBJECT The CIR and the Cult of Intelli once by Victor Marchetti anleohn D1 .arks REFERENCE saxonozo Memorandam dated a'Rpril_197? The following are the LA Division comments on the' review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book,. Item 1, page 11, Chile Classified, Dept. of State/INR Item 3a, page 11, Chile Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action . Item 3b, page 11, Chile ?eclassified Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee_ Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 4, page 12, Chile Declassified Page 163, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 5, page.12, Chile' Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume covert Action Item 11, page'lS, Chile Declassified. Pages 170, 1?2 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders E2 IMPDET CL BY 012180 3 13-00000 3 Eh? Item 29, page 49, Guyana Classified. Executi.ve Order exemption 5 (B) 3' page 70, lines Ch-ile Declassified, Pages 148,165,166,1?1 of Senate Selec_t Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action - Item 39, page 106, Cuba . Declassified. Footnote 1, page 17?, Senate Select -Committee Interim Report on Alleged. Aesassination ?1ots. "Involving Foreign Leaders 'Item 201, page 222, Brazil Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2 Item 261, page 333, Panama Class1iied. - Director of In telligence operations, ACSI ,Item 292, page. 420, Chile Declas51fied. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume Covert Action Item 30?, page 468, Cuba Decla551fied. Footnote 1, page 17?, Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination? Plots Involving Foreign Leaders 'Item 311, page 468, Chile Declasslfied. Pages 163, 139, 205 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 313, pages 469, 4-70,Ch11e w1a551f1ed Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There 1.5 no record that the intelli.gence report on which this item was based has been declassified. Items'322,'323, pages 413, 474, MexiCo Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) There has never been official acknowledgement by either the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case. 2 T- 13-00000 35.0115? Item 338, page 508, Chile Uec13551fied. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee 'Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action 3 . . R-E 13-00000 ?21 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM Chief, Central Cover Staff . SUBJECT The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence Victor Marchetti and John B. ?Marks REFERENCE Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs, fr 3 Apr 77, Same Subject. 1. Pursuant to Reference request, 665 has reviewed its files and effected coordination with interested components on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review. Results are described below. . 2. It has been determined that the following items continue to be classified under and are exempt from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated by paragraph citations in brackets: a. Item 24, page RTV. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of er-- ations based in Jordan. [Section b. Item 48, page ?1a -- BERLINER VEREIN. *Classified describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section NOTE: BUR Division con- firms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record c. Item 43, page ?la -- AFRICAN FORUM. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica~ tions. [Section NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record. d. Item ea, page ila AFRICA REPORT. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section AF Division advises that :TTrentt . zz muscles (31. in 035039 1 vii} -.. . .: . Warn?I- 1- 13-000?) - the African American Institute, which.published Africa Re ort, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries in ook VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pg. 263. However,.the Report_gave as its source for the list the book The Invisible'Government, by Wise and- Ross, pp. This citation should not be con- sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor- ship of the Institute.' NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. e. Item 48, page 71a PREUVES. Classified describes intelligence sources and'methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and_will comment separately. Item 43, page 71a -- sucounrsa. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section . NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con- tinued classification and will comment separately. g. Item 43, page ?1a u~ FORUM. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi? cation and will comment separately. h. Item 50, page ?2 AXEL SPRINGER. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Germany. [Section NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica- tion and will-comment separately. 1. Item 51, page 72 FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.- Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(3) 5. Item 55, page 30 -- RTV. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of opera- tions directed against Egypt. [Section k. Item 56, page 31 -- RTV. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of opera" tions directed against Egypt. [Section 1 31-00000 31011131 1. Items 10?, 128, 129, and 219 on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively FAIRWAYS-CDRPORATIDN. .Classified describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. [Section According to CCS files, in April 19?5 the DCI was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA. sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agenc} proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that the D01 may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been con? strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classifie as recently as December 19?6. NOTE: The Adviser confirms the need for continued classification-. and will comment separately. m. Item 130, page 133 PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria. [Section n. Item 130, page 133 SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section o. Item 226, page 25? -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified SECRET, describes intelligence sources and methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com- mercial company. {Section p. Item 2?8, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)". Classified SECRET, describes intelligence sources and methods exposing an operation which'provided cover. [Section - q. Item 230, page 40? -- RTV. Classified describes intelligence sources and methods which expose an operation targeted against Egypt." [Section 13-00000 SECR o: 3; The following-items were heretofore classified SECRET because they described sources and methods in identifying-a support base located in the United States, but are new con~ sidered _to have been placed in_ the?public domain Items 124,126, and 12? on pages 129 and 130 INTERMOUNTAIN INC. lntermountain Aviation, Inc. is as an Agency proprietary in Book I of _the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp; 203-9, - and in the Report.of the Rockefeller Commission on- CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 213. 4. The following items fall into the questionable area as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by authorized Government officials: a. .Item.49, page 71a -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several newspaper publications However, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the - Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. iThorne, Jr. the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Brass] recently called the arrangement 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'. It is questionable whether the remarks made by we. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered .as constituting official Agency disclosure of this information. b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 FORUM WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe intelligence sources and methods and identification of operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to -- but not by name -- in BooE I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: -- "Another example of the damages cf [propaganda] 'fallout' involved two. proprietary news services that the CIA.main? tained in Europe the larger of the two was suincribed to by over 30 U. S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two Sana pre'ss services It may he argued that although Fo?rum World Features continues to be protected to a degree by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis~ closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place and depending on has it was handled, placed the subject' in .the public domain NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff confirm the need for continued classification and will -comment separately icc: CIEUR CINIE Chief, AF Division - - Date Chief, EUR Division ate Chlef, LA DiV151on ate Chief,'NE Division ?ate Chief, ca Staff V?w??ate 13-00000 [3 CONFIDENTIAL El 52cm ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: [Optional] . The CIA and the Cult 9i Intelligence by Marehetti and Marks FROM: NO. 6343 W, 1602 22 April 19?? :31}:ng d?iim'i?ni mam ?um. and COMMENTS much tel-amen! to show from whom In whom. Draw a I'm. across column after and: cummant] RECIWEIJ 1. 2' 3' 2. 3. 3,9, APR 19?? 4. SAX 2-130109 Hqs. h. T. 3. it 10. II. I?ll 13. u. 15. 51"? 61 "same El sum [3 UNCLASSIFIED 13-00000 SECREB 22 April 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for . External Oversight VIA Chief, Staff for International Activities FROM Chief, SUBJECT The CIA and the Cult of'Intelli ence by Victor Marchetti and . er REFERENCE Memorandum dated 3 April 197? from Mr. Fendig, same subject 1.. This offiCe has reviewed the five items concerning Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has determined that all items are still not releasable for the following reasons:. . a, Item 182, page 196: According to-Mr. Vernon Weimar, the liaison contact in'the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified under Executive Order 11652, Section; sources and methods). - - b. Item 197E Rage 213; This item is still classifie en es E.O. 11652, Section 5 liaison) and (2). c. Item 198 a 219: This item is still classified under E.0. 11652, Section 5 (B) (2.). d."Item 224 a 252: This item is still classified under E.D. 11652, Section 5 (B) (2) s2 IMPDET CL SECRET 1 31-00000 e. Item 256 a 329: _This item is still classifiea unHer E.U. 11652, Section 5 an& (2). 2. An? questions regar?ing this memorandum should he directed to extension 1602. . . 13-00000 SECRET 22' l?fil nsnons?num son: spacial Assistant 1. one for External Oversight VIA Chiof, Staff for Intornstionol Activities soon Chief I SUBJECT Tho CIA and tho Cult of Intolli anon 51! VIC tin?Hanoi?! an? 3 Hi 5 Mr?'s REFERENCE Memorandum datod 3 April 19?? from Mr. Fondig, some suhjoot 1. This offioo has roviowod the five items concerning Isrsol whioh worn dolotod from snbjo.ot book sn? has dotorminod that all items are still not releasable for the following reasons: 1_ . a. Item 132! 196: Mr; Vernon Whimsr. son in the Federal Bureau of Invostigstion, this itom is still slossifiod undor Executive Undo-r (E. 0. 11652, Sootion sonroos and not ads). b. Item 197 _s 218: This 1tom.1s st11_1 o1assif1o one .D 11652,3oot1on_5 (B J(1J{foroign lisison} ind (ZJ. c. Iton 193 9.219: This.1ton_is still classifio . under 3.0. 11652,.Sootion 5 Itom_224u -s;s 252: This itsm.is 31111 .11? 111111 E2 IMPDET CL BY 059743 13-00000 (3) (1) 2. An directnd to SECRET and questions regarding this mamorandum should ha SIRII, qxtansion 1602 SECRET 13-00000 1 Sam -. 1:1 SUBJECT: [Optional] ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET Addendu? to LA Division Memorandum 22 April 1977 FROM: Acting Chlef 0/5 Latin America Division 1039 MD. DANE To: -[O?cer dou'gna?am roam numb?, and building} DATE FORWARIIED OFFICE . INITIALS- COMMENTS lHumbw each column! In Show from when in whom. Draw a ?ne Wu? atrium after null {mutant} H1. H. 12. l3. 15. 5.33:? 610 "55mm? El 55cm counnixmL $2936? uncussmm 13-00000 SECRET 26APR1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: SAKDOXO FROM i Acting Chief, Latin America Division SUBJECT Addendum to LA Division Memorandum Dated 22 April 19?? 1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State, who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and item 33? page 509 are still classified. 2. Item 19'page 14, Chile According to Mr. David Carpenter, lines 14 through line 1? ?So at Kissinger's urging? and line 24 beginning ?Ambassador Kerry'through line 29 continue to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee? through line 24 ending "the covert action programs.? has been declassified. The substance can be_found on pages 166-170, 190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action. 3. Item 10 page 15 Chile Line 1 through "his nominal superior? and line 2 beginning ?Meyer was? through line 4 continue to be classified according to Mr. Carpenter, Lines 5 through 11 are declassified and can be found on pages 16?-169 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume Covert Action. 4. _Item 261 page 333 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour Young, Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified. - - 1.. .--. cu. migrate?; - 1 31-00000 .. "null-minus; hull-:mmt?QmeJm-wm ?ies?4.: 36 RPR 1973' MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM Acting Chief, Latin America Division SUBJECT Addendum to LA Division Memorandum Dated 22 April 197?-- . 1. It was Mr. William c. Jones at Department of State,- stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and item 33? page 509 are still classified. Item 9 page 14, Chile According to Mr. David Carpenter, lines 14 through line 1? "So at Kissinger? urging" and line 24 beginning "Ambassador line 29 continue to-be classified. Line 1? beginning ?the 40 Committee? . through line 24-ending ?the covert action programs." has been declassified. The substance can be found on pages ld?elFD, 190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume Covert Action. 3. Item 10-page 15 Chile Line 1 through "his nominal superior? and line 2 beginning "Meyer was? through line 4 continue to be clasSified according to Mr. Carpenter, Lines 5 through 11 are declassified and can be found on pages 16?*169 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action. 4. Item 261 page 333 was discussed with Mr. Herrill T. Kellv. Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI bv Sevmour Young, Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified. C.R 13-00000 ?g?f?g?u?h courwmm 1] 55cm ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: {091mm} Marchetti-Marks-Manuscript Hume-an ND. CA . on: 25 April 1977 TD: rid building] ongnn Ion mum num a {Humbert ouch common! In show from whom IMHHS in whom. Draw a ?ne was; column u?cr each common? RECEIVED ?rm? SECRET CI .UNCLASSIFIEB 13-00000 Li?-Hue?iliri? . as APR 19?? MEMORANDUM FOR: . FROM: UhlEf, covert action Staff SUBJECT: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor.Marchetti and John D. Marks REFERENCE: Memo for All Divisions and Certain Staffs, from 8 April 1977, same subject Following are Covert Action Staff comments on items 24, 43, 54,'55, 56, 236, and 280, which are among the passages containing classified information that were de- leted before publication of the Marchetti?Marks manuscript: a) Items 24 47), 55 80), 56 31), and 230 464) are classified secret, and are exempt from publication under Section 5 (2) of E0 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods of operation. Specifically, these items name RTV, Inc. and describe it as a CIA proprietary- that was used for clandestine operations in a variety of countries. In addition, items 55 and 56 are especially sensitive because they describe an opera? . tion in Jordan, exposure of which could be harmful to united States relations in the Middle East Section 5 3). b) Items 262) are classified secret, and are exempt from publication- under Sectionigi (2) of E0 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods of operation. These items name Forum World Features, describe it as a CIA proprietary that was used for clandestine propaganda operations, specify that the clandestine operations were directed especially at the Third World, and further specify that the man who ran FWF was an experienced CIA operator._ It may be worth noting that the Senate Select Committee declined to publish the name of this clandestine proprietary when the Agency advised the Committee that publication would damage the former director of Forum World Features, who had entered into a clandestine relationship with the U.S. Government in good faith. I .?iiti"u' 13-00000 t1 .5, ,qu' t- at 0) Item 48 ?1a) is-classified secret, and is exempt from publication under Section 5 2b} (2) of ?0 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods_of operation, This item names African Forum, Africa Report, Preuves, Encounter, and Forum as magazines that received CIA subsidies, In the case of Preuves, Encounter, and Forum, these magazines were published by the former Congress for Cultural Freedom, The Government has not acknowledged covertey subsidizing CCF or its magazines, although Encounter magazine' ties to CIA have been the subject of press speculation. Prenvesmagazine has been the subject of little or no press speculation, as far as we know, and it is our understanding that French laws prohibit covert foreign subsidies to French publications, which makes it especially important to protect the former CIA tie to that magazine. Exposure of the two Africa magazines would he damaging to a number of prominent people and organizations in this country and in Africa that have worked for improved social conditions in Africa and for good relations between this country and Africa, which would be harmful to this country's relations with Africa. (Section 5 3) .1 r. %r 13-00000 512%, El 55cm ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET i SUBJECT: [Dp?on?ll paw: N0. Chief, European Division DATE 2 5 APR 19?? TD: [Of?cer designation, mm mm", and [mfg buiiding} COMMENTS {Number such common! 1o Ihow {ram whom INITIMS In whom. Draw a tin. nu?o? column a?u Iud'l commut} IECEWED WARDED 1. SA D00 . W7 1- 123244;) IO. 1L 12. 13. 14. 15. ?Miami?? 52cm [3 [j 519% uncussmao 13-00000 - - SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight Chief, European Division SUBJECT: Marks-Marchetti Manuscript: Review of Deletions i 1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the original manuscript because of the Agency position they were classified information. We can find only one instance in which an authorized official of the U. S. Government has placed any of these references in the pUblic domain since first publication of the book. The specific references are listed below,'together with the grounds for classification and the components who have been consulted. 2. References which European Division believes are still classified. and should remain so are: . s.o.11651 -Name/Cite #fPaggh Exemption'?atego ry 'Coerdination Alex Springer T2) . 5 2 Rome Daily American - I ?1a} . 5 2 cos, EURxItaly Magazines: Preuves, Forum I lla] 5 2 . CA Encounter ?1a) 1 See note Forum World Features #255, 30, 262) 5 2 CA, EURKBC E2 IMPDET CL BY 003283 I 1 31-00000 SECRET E.O. 11652 Name/Cite #lPage Exemption category Coordination LCPIPIT {#334, 335, 336, 483-4) 5 3 CA Bases in Germany (#234, 262) 5 3 EURKG, CCS Release of.Sate11ite photos to British 36) 5 2 LiaiSon relations CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7, 215, 6, 8) (#303, 437) 5 2 Liaison, others [#196, 225, 333; 21?, 253, 483) 5 2 AF MAKARIOS, Base rental deal [#296, 293, 300 425, 426) . 1 Political subsidies: spn, CDU, Italy 273, 45, 380} 5 {b3 3 EUR/Italy Willy Brandt 28, 52, - - 5 2 42-45, 48, were pro?ided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural 1? . 124:1 NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act. -2- SECRET 13-00000 bi. 2 5 APR 19?? MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight FROM: Chief, European Division SUBJECT: Manuscript: Review of Deletions 1. As requested', the European Division has reviewed the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the original manuscript because of the Agency position they were classified information. We can find only one instance in which an authorised official of the U.S. Government has placed any of these references in the public domain since first publication of the book The snecific references are listed below, together with the grounds for classification and the components who have been consulted. 2. References which European Division believes are -still classified and should remain so are: . 5.0. 11652 NameICite #/Pag? Exemption Category ?Coordination Alex Springer 72) 2 Rome Daily American 71a) 5 2? CCS, EURfltaly' Magazines: Preuves, Forum ?la] 5 2 CA Encounter 71a) See note I Forum World Features #256, 30, 252) _5 2 c1, E2 IMPDET CL BY 003235 SECREI 13-00000 LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 333, 433-4) Bases in Germany (#234, 262) Release of Satellite photos to British 36) Liaison relations CANUKUS {#194, E-04- 215, 6, a) (#303, 432). . 5 Liaison, others (#196,5225, 333, 21?, 253, 433) MAKARIUS, Base rental deal [#296, 298, 300 425, 426) Political subsidiesi SPD, CDU, Italy 223, 45, 330) 5 Willy Brandt (#13 ?20, 23, 42-45, 48, he?? 52, . 5 11552 Essansiratiazeaaorr ?119; di assign CA Ennis, cos AF EUR/Italy NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds were provided to Encounter through'the Congress for Cultural (25 April Y7) [x13?2} has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act. - Distribution: Orig 1 Addressee 1 - - -2- SECRET .. I . u. .- .. . 13-00000 . counomm seam ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET sum?m {Omiunqll Fm: . EXTENSON no. . SE was . we 534306 1705 26 Aprll 1977 designation, room number. and DATE COMMENTS [Number and! comment to main from whum - INITIAUB to whom. Draw a lino can? mlunm aha: each minimum} EECEWED FORWAIDED . 4 gm ivy-age. s. I - 6 ID. 12. 13. I4. 15. 5?9? mommam? sun? com-10mm H'ste??'?v uncussmso 13-00000 . I SECRET 3 5 RPR 19?? MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Resistant'to DDO for External Oversight FROM Chief, Sovietf?ast European Division SUBJECT anthhE'Cult' InteIIi'ence: By Victor Earc?etti a?d 3oEn H. ?arEs REFERENCE Your Memorandum, Same subject, dated 3 April 19?? i. We have reviewed the seven items relating to SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 19?4 . from the Marchetti and Marks' book,'The CIA and the cult of Intelli ence, againt official disclosures and have dEtermined tEat with one exception, the items are still properly classified under Executive Order 11652: A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains classified SECRET. It describes intelligence' sources and methods of operations directed against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of . Executive Order 11652, exemption category B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating to the Penkovskiv Pagers remains classified SECRET. They descri?e inte igence sources and methods of an operation directed against the Soviet Union. They are exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 53(3). C. Item Nos. 143 and 1&9 relating to the AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation based in Tokyo directed against the Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under cover. EARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - SECRET E2 IMPDET CL 13-00000 .. SECRET 2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57. This item relates to the Penkovekiy Papers. Marchetti and Marks wrote in their manuscript: "One of the CIA's most famous venture [sic] in.book publishing waS'The'Penkovsky Papers (sic). This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky." The'Penkovskiy Pa ers are mentioned in the'Final ReEort of the'SeTect'Committee to tudy Governmental D'erations witV KEtivities, Book I, page TQI, dated 26 Iprii 1?76, as follows: ?Another'CIA book, the Penkovskiy-Papers, was published in the United States in 1965 'for operational reasons', but actually became commer- cially viable. The book was prepared and written by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials. Publication rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher through a.trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware of any U.S. Government interest." 3. In View of this published statement by the Senate Select Committee, Item.No. has been placed in the public domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can no longer be considered classif'ed under Executive Order 11 52. SECRET 13-00000 SECRET . . 26 roe: Special assistant to DDO.forIExterna1 Oversight FROM - . . . Chief, Soviet/East European Division The'CIA'and the Gult'of'lntelligence - I 'by VictIor'Marchetti a?d john E. Ear?s - Your Memorandum, Same Subject dated 8 a 1. We have reviewed the seven items relating-to SE Division interests of the 163 items deleted in 1914 . from the Marchetti and Marks? book, The CIA and the Enlt of Intelligence, againt official'discloSures and'have HEtermlned that with one exception, the items are still_ properly classified under Executive Order 11652: A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains classified SECRET. It describes intelligence sources and methods of-operations directed against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive-Order 11652, exemption category 53(3). B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating.to the Penkovskiv Papers remains classified SECRET. They?describe intelligence sources and methods . of an operation directed against the Soviet Union. -. - They are exempt-from the General Declassificaeion - Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category C. Item Nos. 143 and 149 relating to the AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They - describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation based in Tokyo directed againSt the i I Soviets and also identify'Agency personnel under cover. WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED SECRET EZ IMPDET. ct av aides? 1 31-00000 .- "5 . . Z. I'he. one item excepted is Item No. 5? This item-' . relates. to the_ -Penkovskiy Papers. Marchetti and Marks wrote in their manuscr1p.t: '?One of the most famous venture sic) i.n book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic). his chronicle of spying for West 1ns1de the Kremlin 'appeared in 1965 and it was allegedly taken from the journal of the actual spy, Colonel Uleg.PenkoVsky.? The Penkovskiz? - Papers are mentioned in the Final Report pg the'Se ect Committee to tudy. Governmental Operations w_ith aspect to Intelli ence .KEtivities, Book- page 194, dated 26 April 1?76, sfollows: ?Another SIR book the Penkovskiy Papers, was- /published. .-in the United States in I963 ?for - operational reaso?ns' but acltually. betame commerw cially Viable The book was prepared and written 1' by witting'ngency assets who drew on actual case I materials Publication rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher throu_gh a trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware of any 5. Government interest. 3. In View of this published statement by the Senate Select Committee, Item No 5? has been placed in the public domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652. 26 April Distribution: Orig 1 - Addressee - ss/CI - . SECRET 13-00000 uncLAssmEn [j Ij courinEumL Romans AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Omit-null} . Memorandum - FROM: EXTENSION no. NEXCOPS - 3-1138 am 5177 . 3 April 1977 lam-:13? #1033sz mm ond DATE COMMENTS {Mummy ouch Show from what-'- mm? FORWAIDED- INITIALS In whom. Draw a Im- amusxolumn nil-Eu ouch comment! I. 531/ D0 :0 Arm: I _Room1 15. 29:? mow-mew 55an E3 {W?b - 13-00000 I sea; - 2 19?? MEMORANDUM FOR: Shine/o ATTENTION Chief of Operations, NE_Division SUBJECT The CIA and the Cult g; Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John . Mar 5 l. The following deleted items in subject book have been placed in the public domain as cited below: . a. Item 72, page This item, which was placed in he public domain in.Harry Rositzke?s Secret erations, on pages 173 and l?4, is a problem area. -The author is ook is a former senior CIA officer who allowed the Agency to review his manuscript prior to publication. However, CIA did not approve the manuscript for publication and, there" fore, in our view Item ?2 remains classified under Executive- Order 11652 under Exemption SB b. Item 152, page 165 and Item 23, page 48: These two items also fall in a problem area. The following references to Cln's Special-re1ationship with the Shah of Iran imply, but do not.specifically state, that such a relationship exists. _See Book 1 of the Select Committee to Study Governmental'OPerations with Res ect to Intelligence activities, page 552, and Ray-S. C11ne?s entitled, agg'Soholars; Blueprint -of the Bssential'CIA, pages 151 and 132. Additionally, though Cline, a former senior CIA officer, allowed the Agency to we review his manuscript prior to publication, CIA did not approve he manuscript for publication. Therefore, in-our view Items - 52 and 28 remain classified under Executive Order 11652 under Exemption SB (2). oce" . .3 :5 2. The following items remain claSsified under Executive Order 11652: Item Manuscript Page Exemption 152' 165 5B (2) ?f?lt13?u:? e2 IMPDET sneer: gnu:_: teem . arose CL BY 056332 1 31-00000 Manuscript Paga 46 46 97 139- 93 482 482 132 252 181 182 183 184 Exemption 513 (3) uL?? El' I \ak {Ax . . 6%?sz a? . a; . gage.? iwq?i ig 33? 0 898-9 13-00000 . ENTEIHAL . as; mm CONFIBEHTIAL ROUTING AND RECORD SUBJECT: {Optimal} . Marchetti/Marks Book ROM: Chief; Africaxplan?_ EITEN5IDN 1326 DATE 37 APR 19?? bmwm} TO: {Wm duigm?an. room mm, Iu? OFFICERS RECEIVED FORWAMD CDHMEHFS {Numhnr ouch cunt-null to show from mm In whim. Drumr 1: Hire mm oulum of!? tech comment) Attn: 72M ID. i2. 13. 14.- 15. El I: 13-00000 near 2:7 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: ATTENTION Chief, Africa/Plans SUBJECT Marchetti/Marks Book 1. has questioned our request that Item 359, page 509 remain classified on the ground that references to CIa.activities in the Congo in an official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the reference to the Congo. 2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification . of the reference to the Congo would have the.effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged . target of CIA operations._ This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the gavernment of Zaire. We believe the item'should remain classified and that exemption would apply in the case of the Congo. SEHSHE: alrLuFf?SE SGURCES :?aur? ?323 CL 1 31-00000 .2: 5d? gee era 2'2 loam?? MEMORANDUM FDR: arrest; on FROM Chief, Africa/Plans SUBJECT MarchettiIMarks Book . A .p . . 1. Ihas questioned our request that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an official report of the U. 3. Senate declassified the reference to the Congo. 2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo - is reported in an interim report of-the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree. to declassification of the reference to the Congo would hEVe the. _effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA_operations. This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption would apply in the case of the Congo. . SELEHCES rinbuilt,- CL 1 31-00000 ugc'ussmm Lil??'?ly [j CONFIBEHTIAL - El ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET sunset: [Op?mil FROM: '1326 NO. DATE 21 Abril 19?? building] TO: l??m designation. room number. ?nd DATE IECENED INNS COMM: [Burnt-u! ouch gamma: lo Iliw iron whom to whom. Draw a i'mo mun cdumn u?pr mh comment} 1. 0 Attn: IO. -12. F3. 14. l5. . af' azowamw "El SECRET [j CONFIDENTIAI. 39:33:51 El 1 31-00000 I - - new: 21m 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to for External Oversight ATTENTION FROM Chief, Africa Plans .SUBJECT The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence REFERENCE memo dated 3 April 1977i Same Subject 1. The information which pertains to Africa and which' was deleted by court order from subject book remains classifiable and classified. The information is national security information, bears directly on the conduct of our foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized disclosure. None of the items of information ordered deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified by.any United States Government official authorized to -declassify national security information. 2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items are as follows:. . Item 29, Page 49 Exemptions Item 79, Page 100 ExEmptions Items 233 and 234, Exemption Page 413 Items 236 and 23?, Exemptions Page 414 Item, 28Ta, Page 415 Exemption Item 288, Page 416 Exemption Items 290 and 291, Exemption Page'417 B2 IMPDET CL BY 009904 WARNING mm . souncss - AND METHODS 1 31-00000 ir? SEEM 3. The following items, all of which relate to matters Africa Division, also remain classified: of concern to Item Item Item Item Item Item Item Item Item Item Item 4. 41, 42, 47, 43, 55, 130, 1?0, 197, 193, 301, 339, Items 283, pertain to National Page Page 65a Page T1 Page Ila Page 80 Page 153' Page 189 Page 218 'Page 219 Page 427- Page 509 Exemption Exemption Exemption '-Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption 284, 286, 28?, 287a, 288, 290 and 291 Security Council proceedings. Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Hence, National Security Council-staff, have been informed by telephone this date that reque the requeSt of the attorney of Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items. 2 1 APR 19?? MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to for External Oversight ATTENTION FROM Chief, Africa Plans The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence REFERENCE salve/o Memo dated 8 April 1971, Same Subject 1. The information which pertains to Africa and which was deleted by court order from subject book remains - classifiable and classified The information is national security information, bears directly on the conduct of our foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized disclosure. None of the items of information ordered I deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified by any united States Government official authorized to -dec1assify national security information . 2, The exemptions which apply to the deleted itIems Iare as follows. Item 29, Page 49 Inxemptiens -Item 79, Page 109 Exemptions Items 283 and 284, Exemption I Page 413.. Items 286 and 23?, - Exemptions Page 414 - . Item, 28?a, Page 415 IExemption Item 233, eaIge 416 Exemption Items 290 and 29l, Exemption Page 41wows 7 . I SENSITIVE ENTELUEENCE SOURCES - A 1-: - . . MES MEIHQDS mvowen1 31-00000 .. -t I l" 3Q The following items, all of which relate to matters saw of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified: Item 41, Item 42, Item Item 48, a Item 55, Item 130, Item 170, Item 197, Item 193, 1 Item 361, Item 339, 4. Items for African Affairs, Page Page 65a Page ?1 Page 71a Page 80 Page 133 Page 189 Page 213 Page 219 Page-427 Page 509 233, 234, and Exemption Ememption Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption 'Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption 236, 237, 287a, 5(3) (2) (3) H3) (2) (3) so) (2) (3) 5(3) (23(3) 5&0 5(3) (2) 5(3) (2) (3) 5(3) (1) (2) (3) 288, 290 and 291 pertain to National Security Council proceedings. Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State that CIA will refuse the request-of the attorney of 'Mr. Marchetti and Mr.'Marks to dedlassify-these items. 1 mm . Paul Henze, National Security- Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date 13-00000 . 1 31-00000 THE VIETNAM- CAMBODIA EMERGENCY, 1975 Pan Iii?Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of Amhassader John Gunther Dean HEARING 1 SPECIAL 0N INVESTIGATIONS I 03' THE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONGRESS I SEGUND SESSION ELLE II. 1916 Printed for the use of the on. lam-national Relations . :t I I LI . IA. 1.1.5. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1?54?? WASHINGTON I 1111!! 1 31-00000 672 made on behalf of Carnot-alto. To insure that the program wan tailorcti to tea} requirements, to insure that. equipment was ice-cited in. tiaraonnei trained in their use and to insure. that: material provided untior 111.111 had rant-111mm? 1. of maintenance support, itetur one]: 1111 force structure, milita r;r orga- nization. technical assistance anti logistic-a became matters that came under 11.x.- put-view ot the MEUTC. To have cloned our eyes to time aopeeta in my vie-12'. would hare ignored congressional eonoorna regarding eiticieat- management. 1 111a noreonaitier these functions a 111"iolation of the mitigrearionai intent in banning attrisore and. these functions continued during 1115' tenure. In 1111' lit-lint the ban would have been riolateti had personnel been arraigned to military units or activities on an around-tlic-ciwlt boats and inrolreti tittiuifioii?b?i in most of the matters attracting their units or activity. In proactihing the limits of our arson-In auce, the views of the GAO report were useful in guiding.- our 31111111111111 Question Iii. During your tenure 113 Ambassador, did an: [7.55. JIilitarJ' AttaehE-i nerve with Khmer military units in the ?eld? 1rthat; regulations {lid the U.I. Haitian-53 hate to gorern the aetiritiea of US. Military Attaeliea 11111] the Military Equipment Deliver]: Team:- any changes in the regulations made after the incident at Hamper inrolring Major Iatwrence'Ontlecker in M11 lilii? Answer. No 1.1.1.1. military avert-er] with Khmer military units in the ?eid. personnel from hath the Defense Attache Of?ce and the ?that: of the Chief Military Equipment; Delivery Team, Gambotiia routinely riairen and rel-1mm! the military status of linmhodian military units as part of their :?luties hott'erer. S. personnel did not. remain with units in the manner nhiclt S. aorieore ril-?i in South U. peraottnel are ex renal-11:11 blinLd 1111011 arri'ral re. rat-Ii in: the Conan-anion. 1t restrictions against ailrieira to the t'amhot'fian militant. The K111111101: incident me-nrretl prior to 1115' arrival in t?anihr-tiia. Shorrlr after to: arrival in l'hnotu I?ouh. I received the inetrut-tiona in effort and tierertniner] that they were adequate. I did. hont- t'cr. perenna?lr 11111111 my military 311111.111: several noi'aainna. the 111'111 to ahhie Hernnulr 1141' hr these it: irtrui'; riona 11111! to at oiti situations nhieh might: in: 515-7 infringements of their tire-urtihetl duties. aeration II. in Noreinlier 1974. the ii-?atrhington Post reported and the He- fenre Department aekuowirtieeti that data on notential inonthina tar-rota in was gathered hi' Antoriran ?ights from Thailand and retest-1 on to {'amhotlian military authorities. 11%! this praetim- heriu -?Iiiti you know about it. and did ,ron hare 11 role in it? a?Ii?o you consider it ?otation of the Congressional hair on ameriean not-isms with Khmer Republic forces? Answer. it-n'oohi he inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed in Camhodia that militant information which we had would he deliberately withheitl or denied to a country to whieh we were proritling enormona militari' anri' emnomic assistance. The information we hart concerning enemy actiritiea in (13111111111111 was a Err-product. of our own intelligence roller-ting e?orr on com- munist forces throughout Indochina. This information was provided to Catn- hodian militantr authorities but the decision on what. notion. if 1111;. would he taken was one which the (iamhnriiana made for theme-elves. The proririona of information prescient-1 my arrival and I am not on are erar-tlr ?hen the practice may- hare begun. I nae aware of the praetlee although I tliil not play. a pit-oral - in the powers and did not coneitler this procedure at violating congressional 'etlnna on America 11 adrisore. ?irtation 12.1311! GIA personnel in Patnhodin oror not as aoriaera to Khmer forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos {area it on a smaller scale}. you tell no what role China Airlines plai'etl in Cambodia and it it was in any war associated with 1.11.1. activities? wii?hat'waa the [Li-3. role in organizing and applying the Khmer "liitirlle Range Patio Answer. Haring net-ted both in Enos and Latnhoilia. and lamenting the {31.1 operations in tooth eenntriea, I can lioneotlr ear that the CIA did not art 111: miriaera to the Khmer Republic tort-ea in a fashion aimiiar to their in. Lane. China Airlines, under contract to Air America. transported 111-1 int-hitting weapons and ammunition. for agenciea in Cambodia. The 111111111- Range Reconnaiarance Patrols rereh'eti 15.3. military ?1115111111111 3-: 11111"! of the Kinner Armed Fort-ea anti also received some intelligence collection training- 13-00000 El El conn'mnm 55cm ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Vi?eyi?archetti and John D. Marks FROM: No. "q5 1333 15 April 1977 L?hiu?mm diligr??un. and DATE COHHENTS [Number ouch comm-m to how from whom INITIALS In whom. ?rm a line across column after each communh] RECEIVED FDWAMD I. GA 1. 3. DCEA 383} Pom 3-62 610 "52mm"! El SECRET CONFIDENTIAL mm}, uncussmui 13-00000 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM SUBJECT REFERENCE 5 16 Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight? Chief, East Asia Division The CIA and the Cult of Intelli ence, by Victor Marchetti and John E. Memorandum, dated 8 April 19?7, Same Subject . East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted subject book items per'Reference request and conclude they are:. 1) still classified under Executive Order 11652, 2) still not in the public domain through official disclosure; and 3) still not.contained in material cleared by the Publications Review Board. Attachment - Detail Listing enemas aorta . swam}: saunas i E: i??3??433 AND masons anvourta :j 13-00000 Item 11652 Exemptions for Items in The CIA and The Cult g? Intelligence 5 Attachment Manuscript Page No-ExemEtien (13-00000 1 6 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to BBC for External Oversight' FROM - Chief, East Asia Div1sion SUBJECT The CIA and the Cult of Intelli ence, by Victor Marchetti and Jo D. er REFERENCE Memorandum, dated 8 April 19?7, Same Subject . - East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted subject book items per Reference request and conclude they are: 1) still classified under Executive_0rder l1652, 2) still not in the public domain through - official disclosure; and 3) still not contained in material cleare by the Publications Revieu Board. Attachment 4 Detail Listing E2 IMPDET SENSITWE SOURCES. CL BY 022433 mamas HOTICE nan MEIHDDSENVOLFEQ 13-00000 47-? ,Item 152 19? 319 320 -321 'Attaehment E. 0. 11652 Exemptions for Items in The CIA and The Cult 2; Intelligence Manuscript Page NoExemgtien (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (1) (1) (2) (Z) (3) (2) (.3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 13-00000 -l .31? 33 13" Office.of General Counsel FROM .William W. Wells . Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT . :5 Review of the 168 Deleted Items in and the Cult of Intelligence? _by V-ictor Marchetti and John Marks In reply to your oral request, attached is' the report of the review of the deleted items which are the responsibility of the BBQ. Appropriate components of the DEC reviewed their respective items for classification and their findings are contained in the attached report. Specific classi? fication and exemption authority for each item which is still classified is available, if needed, in each component?s response filed with ?illiam W. hells William W. Wells 'Distribution: Orig - OGC - 2 - BBQ 2 - E2 IMPDET CL BY 013630 s- - - c-mI-u- .. . 13-00000 . . . - emanated 27 April 19?? 1. MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations Special Assistant to the DUO for External Oversight FROM. SUBJECT I - Review of 168 Deleted Items in and the cult of Intelligence? . . by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks (U) 1. This is the report of the review done by the appropriate DUO components of those deleted items which are the basic responsibility of the BBQ. The remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi- bility of and DDA were reviewed by those Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC. Responsible components did the-necessary_inter- and intraagency coordinations. (U) 2; Several points need to be highlighted concerning the completeness of the review, especially -as regards'those items declassified by "official public disclosure? as defined-by the courts. While I am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done by the D90 components, a thorough and absolutely complete search is impossible for the following reasons: (U) a. 1There is no index of any kind, let alone having the material in machine form such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published hearings and reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities [Church Committee), the six published hearings and proceedings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee] or the one volume Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission];' s2 rapper ?htf? CL BY 018630 . 1 31-00000 1.: .5 b. There is no comprehensive readily. available record of precisely what information has been declassified-and released in accordance with the'Freedom of Information Act and the _Privacy Act; there are separate collections with a limited capability to retrieve some such information; - (U) c. There is no available record of the information-that officials of the Executive Branch of government, with authority to declassify information, have said or written in public either before Congressional committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows, college symposiums, the general?lecture circuit, other public forums, etc. In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee that those items which are still classified by the BBQ components have not been deliberately or 'inadverten'tly declassified in whole or in part as "official public disclosure.?. (U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A lists those items of the DDG'deleted items which have been declassified by "offic_ial public -disc1osure These thirteen complete and parts of four other items can therefore be released from the court injuncti.on. (S) Attachment (seven parts} contains eleven (1313128?1 items [seven subjects) which are still classified but about which there may be some possible question; These are highlighted here so that cognizance can be taken and final decisions made With due regard for all legal and policy aspects. (U) 5. Attachment lists all DUO-remaining items which the BBQ components advise are still classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and cannot be released from the court injunction. - 13-00000 Item No. -3 9 {line 1? thru_?inth word on line 24] 10 (last four words of line 1 and first 11 words of-line 2; and lines 5?11] 11 46 (line'ZO thru first three words of line110106Official Public Disclosure Church Committee 'Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190,.? -Church-Committee Vol. 7, p. 163 Church Committee- Vol. 1, p. 190 Church Committee' Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190 Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190 Church Committee Vo1._7, pp. 160, 170, 172 Church Committee . Vol. T, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171 Church Committee Book I, p. 194 Church Committee,_ Alleged Assassination.?1ots pp. 139 ff. Rockefeller Commission Report Church Committee Book I, pp. 208?209 -Rockefe11er Commission Report p. 213 - _Book I, pp. 208r209 Rockefelier Commission Report . 213 Church-Committee Book I, pp. '208-209 - . . .. .- 13-00000 ATTACHMENT A cont'd - 4 M55 .. Item No. - 2. no. (Official Public Disclosure 292 3 420' Church Committee Vol; p. 205 30? . 435: 'Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots 5 pp 139 ff - 317 453 Church Committee - Vol, 7, pp. 168, 139,-205 533 . . 503' Church Committee I . Vol.'7, pp. 144-209' 339 (line 1, third, 509 - CIA presence has been fourth, eighth, - officially disclosed in ninth words; and the following only: line 2, first three words) a. Congo - Church Committee report on Alleged Assassina- tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, pp 13 TD b. Cambodia - Amb. John . Gunther Dean testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representa- tives, May p; 672' ?mm' Laos - Director Colby, 13 September 1974, in an . address to the Fund for_Peace Conference on CIA and Covert Actions and in Church Committee Book I, pp. 120 and 155; Book IV, p.'68; d. Vietnam - Church Committee. report on Alleged Assassination pp 217- 224; Book I, pp 23 and 120. e. Philippines Church Committee, Book I, p. 23. 1 31-00000 ATTACHMENT (1) Item Ne; 22,,23,'152, 172 M33 pp 'no. 46, 43, 165; 139 (U) NE Division has highlighted these items; (S) Item 22 states in.part notable example of such' a 'special relationship'_is Iran,_where a CIA organised coup d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah.was _understandab1y grateful..;? ,ltem 23 lists the Shah_among 'other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special relationships? as does Item'152 and a similar statement is made in Item l?9. . (U) Ray S. Cline in his book ?Secrets, Spies and I Scholars,9 pp 131-132, states: . a covert operation so successfu1_that it became widelv known all over the world was carried out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been driven.out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier, Mohammad MosSadegh; whose support came from the local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful clandestine services officer who flew to Iran, hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian- military men loyal to the Shah how to take over the local radio station, and paved the.way for'the Shah's triumphal return.? (Uj _The Church Committee, Book I, es 111, briefly mentioned ?the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran" as one of.CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert operations." There is a vast difference between the classified dawned items speaking about an active-?special relationship? with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a statement about .CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh The former is still properly classifiable and classified. 14353535: Viewed!? 1 31-00000 ATTACHMENT Item No. 49 - - MSS pt no. Tla.' I Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Bail American is still classified SECRET because it describes 1nte111gence sources-and-methods as related to newspaper publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 19?4 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states; ?Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street laW'firm of Cravath, Swaine; and Moore,_now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the'Rome'Daily American in 1956} was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange? ment 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, *a bad example'.? It_is questionable whether the remarks made by 'Mr. Bross,who retired'from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, 'who left the Agency long before that, can be considered -as constitutingl- official Agency disclosure of- this information. 13-00000 ATTACHMENT {11 Item No. . MSS p. no. 80, 262 Reference to CIA sponsorship of'Forum'World Features is still classified SECRET because both items -aescri5e intelligence sources and methods and identifies operations based in England.? Forum-world'Features was referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church Committee Final Report, page 199,-as follows: "Another example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in - Europe1.. The larger of the two was subscribed to by over thirty 0.5. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services." While'Forum world'Featares was not named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be *protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper editors may be considered as ?official public disclosure." 1 31-00000 ATTACHMENT (4) .4 Item_No. 67 [lines 25) no. 92 . (5) Under injunction as classified information is "For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the Agency constructed extensive support facilities in Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special trainingLV -Underlining Qine 25, ninth t?ru twenty-third word) indicates the questionable part of the item_since MSS page 97, lines 24 26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly brought to the United States for special paramilitary 'training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado This sen_tence was originally deleted then reinstated and 'appears in _bo1dface type on page 115 in' the published book. 13-00000 ATTACHMENT (5) Item'No. 12 MSS pr 97 NE Division has highlighted -this. item. (3) The deleted item is ?The CIA quickly made contact with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.l Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret' Operations" pp. 1?3?1?4, states ?As the Korean-war was winding down, the_CIA began sending intelligence agents into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could be done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving him a channel of communication with the West.? ?When the Dalai Lama chose' to flee from- Lhasa to I- avoid capture by- the Chinese forces in 1959, he was accompanied on his fl-ight by a CIA trained radio operator who was able to keep Washington posted on his often hazardous progress.?_ (3) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA ?close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being "financed and advised? by CIA which is quite different from Rositzke' statement about CIA trained radio operators being with the Dalai Lama These are two different comments with_ the first being properly classi-fiable and classified. SE 1 1-, 1. bolus: 1 31-00000 I can: or?; a a (65 Item No. 10?; 123, 129, 2?9 M35 pp. 125, 132,'133, 403 (S) CCS states that all four items which refer-to .Fairways Corporation as a CIA-owned proprietary company are still Classified since they describe intelligence sources.and methods by identifying an operational support _facility located in the U.S.'and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section.5 (2).of the_General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652c (S) According.to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission_of sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, GUS-files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 19?6, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that.the. subject be withheld from public disclosure. 13-00000 ATTACHMENT [11 Item No. 339? I . no. 509 David 9hi11ips. in his book ?The Night Watch, chap.ter 8, pp. 212 235, entitled ?Brazil, Venezuela 19?0- 1972? describes his presence as Chief of Stat ion of CIA in BrazilI Iand on Ipage 209 he d_iscusses CIA in Bolivia. In regard to the declassification of CIA pres.ence in the Congo [Attachment A, .Item 339, M38 p. no. 509}, Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA pres?nce in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated'ZD November IQTS. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification of the reference to the? Congo would .have the effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA.operations. This would have an adverse -effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption would apply in the case the Congo.? . It is not a question of whether to agree or not to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church I Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made "officialmpublic disclosure? of the matter, rendering the subject moot. In addition, as Item Attachment A shows, four other countries of the Third World are also mentioned, thereby not singling out'the Congo alone. What adverse effect could be expected noW-by another public* ?reference to CIA presence in?the Congo as of the original 19?4 publication date.of the Marchetti/Marks book, is difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has not changed since-the 1975 release of the information by' the Church Committee, it- -would seem that whatever adverse effects there might be have alrIeady occurred. SEE-E 1 31-00000 ATTACHMENT ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT It?m N0. M38 2* no. Item No[lines 14-16; 14 92' - line 24, last . - 72 1- 97 . . two wurds 23 97 1 thru line.29] . 74 . 98 79 -160 10 (ling first 7? words; . 128 132 line 2, last 2 . -. 129 133 wUHE-?uu 130 . '133 line 152' - 165196 317.198 219- 31 54 201 222'65a 236 . '262 46 [line 24.fburth.word - - 261 334 1 thru line 31} . 273' 380 4? . 71 '228- 400 9 48 . -2?9 403 49 - 713 - 288' 464284 .413 287a 415 298 426 13-00000 Item No. . MES no. 333 423321_ 471 322 . 473. 323 . -474 331 432 332434 337 507 33981116 1, first 509 '1:er words and fifth, sixth and seventh words) 13-00000 {t ie?WQJ.e77" MEMGRANBUM FOR: . Office of General Counsel FROM William W. Wells . 'Deputy Director for Operations 'Review of the 168 Deleted Items in and the Cult of Intelligence? by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks In reply to Your oral request, attached is the report of the review of the deleted items which are the responsibility of the EDD. Appropriate components of the BBQ reviewed their respective items for classification and their findings are contained in the attached report. Specific classi~ fication and exemption authority for each item which is still classified is available, if needed, in each component's response filed with William N. Wells Distributioni Orig 8'sz IMPDET CL SEEM - -- q"n-4 . - -- 1 31-00000 ZT'April MEMORANDUM FOR: _Deputy Director for Operations VIA Special Assistant to the DDO for External Oversight FROM SUBJECT Review of 168 Deleted Items in and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks 1. This is the report of the review done by the appropriate 390 components of those deleted items which are the basic responsibility of the BBQ. The remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi- bility of the DDSET and DDA were reviewed by those Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC. Responsible components did the necessary inter- and, - intraagency coordinations. . (U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted concerning the completeness of the review, especially as regards those items declassified by ?official public disclosure" as defined by- the courts. While I am sure that as diligent a search as. possible was. done by the components, a thorough and absolutely complete search is impossible for the following reasons: (U) a. There is no index of any kind, let alone having the material in machine form such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published hearings and reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations. With Respect to Intelligence Activities [Church Committee), the six published hearings and - proceedings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission}; ~33 E2 IMPDET CL Br 018.630 13-00000 . {quThere is no comprehensive readily available record of precisely what information has been.deciassified and released in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act; there are separate collections with a limited capability to retrieve some such information; . (U) There is no available record of the information that officials of the Executive Branch of government, with authority to declassify information, have said or written in public-either before Congressional committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows, college symposiums, the general lecture circuit, other public forums, etc. In view-of the above, it is impossible to guarantee that those items which are still classified by'ther .DDO components have not been deliberately or inadvertently. declassified in whole or in part as ?official public disclosure.?. (U) . Bearing in mind the -above, attachment A lists those items of the BBC deleted items which have been declassified by ?official public disclosure." - These thirteen complete and parts of'four other items can therefore be released from the court injunction. (S) 4. Attachment-B (seven parts) contains eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still classified but about which there may be some possible question. These are highlighted here so that cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with due regard for all legal and policy aspects. - (U) 5. Attachment lists all DDO remaining . items which the DDO components advise are still . classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and' cannot_be released from the court injunction. 4- 35:63:? . Mr?: - a? . n- "raw-1.- . 1 31-00000 Item 5- 4 5. 9 (line 1? thru ninth 10' word on 1ine.24)_ (last four words of line I and first 11 - words of line '11- 4e '89 124 126 12? and lines 5-11) {line 20 thru first three words of line 24106 129 130_ 130 Church Committee Vol. 7. pp. 166-1?0, 190 ATTACHMENT-A Official Public Disclosure 'Church Committee Vol. pp. 168, 190 ~Church Committee V01- 7, p. 168 -Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 190 Church Committee Vol. ?..pp..166-170, 190 Church Committee Vol..7, pp. 160, 1?0, 172 'Church Committee V01. 7, pp. 143, 165, 166, 171 Church Committee Book I, p. 194. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 139 ff. Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church'Committee Book I, pp. 303-209 -Rockefe11er Commission Report p. 213 _Book I, pp. 203?209 I Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 - Church-Committee Book I, pp. 203'209 1 31-00000 Item 292 30? '31? 338 339 Ne. (line 1, third,- fourth, eighth, ninth words; and line 2,efirst three words] 110. 420 435 -463 503 509 5L3 ATTACHMENT A cont'd Official Public Disclosure Church Committee Vol; 7, p, 205 I'Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots 'pp 139 ff Church Committee- Vol, 7,'pp. 163, 189, 205 Church Committee - Vol. CIA presence has been officially disclosed in .the following only: a. Congo - Church Committee report on Alleged Assassina- tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, pp. 13??0. h. Cambodia Amb. John Gunther Dean testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representa- tives, May 5, 19?6, p. 672 c. Laos Director Colby, 13 September 19?4, in an address to the Fund for'Peace _Conference on CIA and Covert Actions and in Church Committee Book I, pp._120 and 155; Book IV, p. 68. d. Vietnam - Church Committee. report on Alleged Assassination pp; 21?-224; Book I, pp. 23 and 120. e; Philippines_- Church Committee,-Book I, p. 23. 13-00000 ATTACHMENT (1) -Item No.'22, MSS pp. no. 46, 43, 165, 139_ (U) NE Division has highlighted these items. (8) Item 22 states in part notable example of such a 'special relat_1onship .15 Iran, where a CIA organized coup d'etat restored the Shah to power. in 1953. The Shah was understandably gratefu1.. I-tem 2'3 lists the Shah among other ?world leaders with whom CIA has developed special relationships? as _does Item 152 .and a similar statement is made in Item 179. (U) Ray S. Cline in his book ?Secrets, Spies and Scholars," pp. 131-132, states: a covert operation so successful that it 'became widely known all ever the world was carried out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had-been driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful- .clandestine.services officer who flew to Iran, hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian military men loyal to the-Shah how to take over the local radio station, and paved the way for the Shah's triumphal return." (U) The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly mentioned ?the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran? as one of CIA's ?boldest, most spectacular covert operations.? (S) There is a vast difference between the classified deleuxiitems speaking about an active ?special relationship" with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh The '-former is still properly classifiable and classified. tee -a 13-00000 hw?n?g Lgiltsu;t=u ATTACHMENT (2) Item No. 49-_ . . MSS at no. 71a Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily American is still classified SECRET because it descrl?es 1ntelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper publications. CBS-files contain a newsclip from the September and'Dctober 197A edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states, ?Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, .then a part-nor in the .prestigious Wall Street law -firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Mo-ore, now acknowledge that the in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange- ment 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example' It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr; Bross,who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left'the Agency long before that, can be considered as constituting official Agency disclosure of this information. 13-00000 .ATTACHMENT (6) Item No. 54,"236 . M55 p. no. su,_262 Reference to CIA sponsorship of'Forum world- Features is still classified SECRET because Bot? items HescrlEe intelligence sources and methods and identifies operations based in England. Fornm-World Features was referred to - but not by name -_in Book I of the Church Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: ?Another example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in The larger of the two_was subscribed to by over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major ULS. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services." while'Ferum'world'reateres was not named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be- protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper editors may be_conSidered as ?official public disclosure.? 1 31-00000 ATTACHMENT (4) Item No. 6? (lines 24, 25}. - M33 p. no; 92 (8) Under injunction as classified-information is "For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the Agency constructed extensive support facilities in Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas to_a deserted Army base in Colorado for special-trainingL?. Underlining ?ine 25, ninth thru indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly brought to the United States for special paramilitary 'training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado!? ?his sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and appears in boldface type on page_115 in the published book. Q?i- 05?. Fruit. ?q - I -- 1 31-00000 ATTACHMENT (5) Item NoDivision has highlighted this item. (SJ The deleted item is ?The CIA quickly made contact with the Dalai Lama and a close relat_ionship was established. Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he (U) Harry Rositzke, in his book ?The'CIA's.Secret.f Operations" pp. "As the Korean war was' winding down, the CIA began sending intelligente agents into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could be. done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving him a channel-of communication with the West. ?When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to avoid capture by the Chinese forces-in?lQSQ, he was 'accompanied on his flight by a CIA- trained radio operator who was able to ke.ep Washington posted on his often hazardous progress . (S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA ?close relationship" with.the Dalai Lama and his being ?financed and advised? by CIA which is quite different .from Rositzke?s statement about CIA trained radio operators being with the Dalai Lama. These are two different comments with the firs_t being properly classifiable and classified. . . . 1 31-00000 rirwmt'? i. 3?(sj Item No. 107; 12s,'129, 279 123, 132, 133,.403 CBS states that all four items which refer to Fairways Corporation company are still classified since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U. S. and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5 (B) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652. (5) According to CCS files, in April 19?5 Director Colb-y was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have- -responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as reCently as December 1916, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclos?re. 1 31-00000 I ATTACHMENT (7) Item No. . mes 9. no. 509 David Phillips in his book .The Night Watch,_ chapter 3, pp. 212? 235, entitled ?Brazi1,. Venezuela 19?0-' '1912" describes his presence as Chief of Station of CIA in Brazil and.on page 209 he discusses CIA in. Bolivia. In regard to the declassification of CIA-presence in the Congo (Attachment A, item 339, M33 p. no. 509), Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on'Intelligence dated 20 November IQYS. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of singling oht the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of operations. This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5 (3) would apply in the case of the Congo.? It is not a question of whether to agree or not to declassification-of reference to the Congo. The Church Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made ?officialwpublic disclosure"'of the matter, rendering the subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment shows,-four other countries of the Third World are a150' mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What adverse effect'could be expected now by another public reference to CIA presence in.the Congo as of the original 1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has not changed since the 1975 release of the information by the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse effects there might be have already occurred 13-00000 14'6?: ITEMS STILL QLASSIFEED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT- Item No. MSS no. Item No. -M58 2. n6(lines 14?16; 14_ . -67 92 line 24, last 72 97- two wnr?s 73 97 thru line 29(line 132' line 2, last 2 129- 133 words thru - 130 . 133 line 4) . . 143 155 . '149 156 13 . 42- 152.152 . 134 217-201 222" 34 59 224. 252 33 63 _225 253 41. 65 226 257' _42 '65a 234 .262 43 656 236 '262 46 [line 24, 7D 256 329 .fbuf?uhmrd . 261 334 thru line 31) 273 38071a -230234' 413 52 77 - 236_ - 414 53 78 237 - _414 54 - 80 2376 415 -291 417 298 426' 13-00000 .- . Item No. MES 12?- n?o. 300 426 303. 437 '513 469 319 '470' 320 4?1 321 471 322 4?3 323 '4?4 331 432 332 432 333 483 3341-. 433 335 433 336 . 484 337 507V 339 (line 1, first 509 two words and fifth, sixth and seventh words) ., I {hi-m 1 31-00000 ., up. E.T Associate General Counsel FROM - 1' Deputy Director for'Operations SUBJECT DUO Coordination on Review of Deletions from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti_and Marks REFERENCE May 19?? 1. Appropriate Components of the D30 have reviewed the following items (deletions) listed at Tab of referent for Coordination with the HBO and concur with the DDSET that they_are all properly classified in accordance with 5.0; 11652 and should so remain:- Itemj - 'Manuscript Page . 25 4? 159 - .131 150 132 161 I 183 152 134 153 . 184 .164 . - - 135 295' . 234 203 235 209 '235 295 424 297 . ?referent, the deferred to BBC or US the decision on the classification of Item 190 manu? script page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow. The appropriate DDO Component finds that this item must remain classified SECRET since it relates to and is 'exempt from the General Declas?sification Schedule of ?Eiffdli:??:fi::? E2 IMPDET CL BY 013530 1 31-00000 5 C-R I E.0. 11?52; exemption_category 3. Specific classification an& exemption authority-for- each item, if-needed, is available from - . amilliam'w. walls 1 . I a Diatribution Ofigina1.?- Addrasse? DDO ADDU . 1 31-00000 _ments was attempted. C: E: :si-nnw or?? of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks MEMORANDUM Poe; 'General Counsel- 1 ATTENTION Review of'Deletions from The CIA and the I. The responsible-and knowledgeable components of this. directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from_subject book per your. .request The review was made to determine whether each deletion was still classified under E0 11652 or whether the information. in each deletion has been officially released by the 11_, 8 Government. .2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items rewiewed by this directorate.' Tab is-a list of those items of primary interest_of this directorate.? All of these items remain classiw fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released; Tab is a list of those items which we determined are still classified under ED 11652; howeVer, some portions of three items can be -re1eased, _but we recommend that all of the items in Tab be coordinated with other indicated e1ements.- Tab is a list of items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and should be re_ferred to other indicated _e1ements. Tab is a list of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can now be reieased. The portions in red brackets remain classified and should not be released. -3. Since many of the deleted items-involved the-National Security Agency (NBA), we attempted to coord.inate our determina- tions throngh our contacts at NSA he were told that any coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA -Genera1 Counsel As a result, no further coordination with other ele- 4. This memorandum completes the .DDSET 'action on the 'court Iorde red -review of the deletions from subject book. ?if/Izaak ZELLMER . - .. Associate Deputy Director . -- for_ Science and Technology Attachments21:1 .rt110051snl As.Stated SECRET . 5 1 31-00000 DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT REVIEWED 33 THE DnsaT Page 47 104 104 133' 107 _134 135_ 119 130 131 132 133 134 135 135 135 135 139 139 139 190 191' 191 "192 193 194 200- 201 .202 I Item .190 191 -192 204 205 203 209 245 248 254 258 259 260 267 263 269 f2?5' 1'295- 29? '299 301 333 30? 306 312 313 324 325 328' 329 1423 42? 427 430 4427 450 -.474 '4?41 425 426 480 1 31-00000 Item' 91 '92 6135 136 155 158 163 .165- 166 162 .133' - Manuscrigt Pagg 106 10? 134 135. 122.- '130 '136 135 135 135 '201 Tab INTEREST TO THE .AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED SECRET, 53(2) SECRET, 53(2) SECRET, 53(2) SECRET, 53(2) SECRET, 53(2) 53(3) CONFIDENTIAL, and (3) ahd_(3) an? (3) a?d (3) and and 53(2) 53(2) TOP SECRET, 53(2) *Can be sanitized and portions released. 1 31-00000 1 HID La ITEMS OF INTEREST T0 DDSET AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE WITH OTHER ELEMENTS 'Item Manuscript FagDOD (BIAHBO, 0c; ERDA. 5 I 160 I -132 I I 030I-Innq, 0c, 152 Dno, 0c, ERDA 163 I -134 - 164 135 930' 122 . I139 - NBA I 18? 200 I - I- [Navy)' 139 ._'2h2 .. DOD (Navy) 20? . 233. . and DDO ?05 . _234 . I DDO 203f I 235-DDO 2&5? - -268 I a?I DODEISAF38321 I243 I .269 . ?_-Don 254 I NSC Staff ?258' . 1 331. IIDOD (SAFSSJ *Can be 13-00000 -Item? 259' 260 267 . 368- 239 *235. 295 1 29? . 299 ?301 302 306_ I312 3-3i3 '3297 Manuscript Page 331 331 _337 337 394 424: '425 '426 427_ 427 431 I443 450' 333 Tab'C Continued DOD BOD BUD (Navy) DOB [Navy)_ DOD (Navy) DDO DDU NSA BDO, dc, NSA NSA DOD'tNavy) NSA NSC Staff *Can be sanitiZed and portions relea?ed. -.72-- 13-00000 Tab ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS Item' mm 3.5 170. 191 4 193. 1?4 195' 1?6 .17? 178 190 "191. 192 324 325' 321 323 Manus?ript Pag? '104 139 139 1999 191' 191 192 193 194 2.14 214 1 215-' 479. 414 495 476_03'_ St?te Departments'- State_Departme?t DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff Inon DDI and DOD DDI, DOD and NSC Staff: Ir-u I:-u 1 31-00000 .L?itl - .Tab E- ITEMS SANITIZEDIFOR POSSIBLE RELEASE {Item 135, ManuIscript page 134 somewhat similar sale of a proprietar) occurred i.?1195i! when CIQ decided. to get rid of a technical researchilaborator .in the area." Item 25, Manuscript page 17 ?Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the to run guerrilla attackg?against.ma1n1and hiqa}and then in more recent Years to use ?piwanf _as a b-ase "for U- 2 flights [flown over China by Nationalist ?pilots trained in the United States), e-1ectronic surveillance of ~the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda .and disinformation aimed at China duIring the Cultural Revo1? utior?' - Item Manuscript page 107 "The Agency also _had- a project to determine where AmIericanI risoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to ommun-icate with them} Scale models of the prisons wele constructed from aer1ali?nd satellite photograpthand from other intelligence, and studies were made- to learn which . prisoners had tried or Imight be willing to try to communicate.. Sbme of -the prisoners, on their own, had e_arlier used their infrequent letters to their- -families as a means of sending 3coded messages relating where they'were_ being held. Thus, the Agency worked .out schemeijto use return mail from the families to send answers bac Meanwhile, _the Technical. Services Division of the? . Item 275, Manuscript page 394 'gpew optics for sat_ellite cameras and improvements in 'orer the horizonf Iradars? These technical contr?acts were almost always drawn Up under the cover of being between the scholar (or the- universityj'and some government agenc} other than the ICIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were the most? .SECEET . . 13-00000 4% 9- I L19- ..- - we; '253' .Manuscript Page I 47 194 '105 179 181' 182 183- 184 18; 185 .189 200 282. 233 234 235 .236 263' 269_ 32? 331 Tab 3 OF INTEREST TU DDSET AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDIEATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS one. 05 DUO, 00, ERDA one, 00; ERDA I DUO, 0c, ERDA Dn0,'0c, ERDA Duo DDO NSA DOD (Navy) DOD (Navy) NSA ?nd DDO DDO DDO non (SAPSS), NSC Staff DOD *Can bE'$ahitized and portidns releaSed. mum" 1 31-00000 304 '-313 329- 396' 312 - Manageri?? Page 331_ 331 33?? 33? 337 394: -424 425' 426 112?. .427 430 431 442' 450 43H Tab .Continued DOD DOD DOD (NavyJ' DOD (Na?y) 0L pno Dno DDO, 0c, NSA NSA.I NSA .IDOD (Navy; NSA NSC Staff -*Cah-be sanitized'gnd b0rtion? rgleasgd. .. 13-00000 i i i .. Tab ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS Item 36 170? 171 11?3 175 1?6 12? 123 -190 . 191 ?:192 324 325.. -32? 323 - Manuscript Page I-1D4 139' 190 191 _191 - 192. 193' _194 '214 214 215 474 m. 4?5' 476 o/DcI- NSA- NSA NSAI NSA NSA State Department State Bepartment EDI and Don'* DDI, DOD and NSC Staff_ 'Don use Staff - u. . I . 1 31-00000 Eussein and the 11.3. Government became increasingly concerned about the strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a I desire to counter its anti-Aunerican. anti-Hussein line (which was notfnew). . so the CIA funded the building of 'a Jordanian television station. I A CIA - i owned. New York based proprietary company.-named RT-li. provided the technical 6 expertise and managementskills to put the station in operationg . Still another example of a country-where the CIA enjoys a special - 3? relationship is Nationalist China. {in Taiwan. however. the link is 5 not with President Chiang Kai-shelf. but with his son and heir apparent. Premier Chiang {things-Koo. One former CIA chief of station?lay Cline. now the I Jr 'State Departmentis Birettor of Intelligence and Research. became something I. of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all-? f. night drinking bouts+dith the younger Chiang. I I- Ever the years. the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first @f to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent I years to use Taiwan as a base for U- 2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist 1" pilots trained in the United States). electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at i China during the Cultural RevolutionJ I In South Vietnam. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally 2- conducting all important meetings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was 2 station accompanied by the CIA chief?when there was Agency business to be discussed. ,2 But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for 2 many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. 2 According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker. this CIA officer has I. 3, served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal a. meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea. 2 fcrsanaii wit}. Ear the years. the CIA has provided Thieu Wmillioos of z. (lawnd?rm??mend .2 dollars in untraceablei?black bag" madam 13-00000 . - . i i 1 the information straight forwardly, thereby. handicapping the in making Hit- a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report' 5 content. Some intelligence both inside and outside the CIA, receive='_ large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from a actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillancell {which is. by definition. an accurate account of what was said) with agent reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false. the Clandestine Services confuses and often.misleads those people within the U.S. government whose function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly_those leaders who make decisions based on that intelligence analysis. El!? the mid-woes. the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and the experts of the Scientific and technical Directorate to I carry-out one of the Agency's most imaginative {if ultimately unsuccessful) intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time. top-level v.5. government officials were_distaibed by reports that Communist China was_on the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. They knew that the threat posed by Chinese would play an important part- in the decision. then under consideration. to go ahead with an emerican antia ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest i priority. the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtza. the Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia. :The Agency?s technical Specialists responded by designing a nuclear- ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from the missile site. well over a thousand miles away. and then rely the information to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain peak called the ?anda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the . KIA-.2 . Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed ?line-of-sight" to the secret test facility. as the device was being perfected in the CIA the Clandestine Services took on the resoonsihilitv for the most 13-00000 5 7C xx 'The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the Clh's close relations with the Indian inteiligence service. The Indians not 'only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project. Next. the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry the device, complete with'its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it into operation. well-known-American mountaineer who had previously conquered Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop. was contacted and convinced to lead the climb. Overall control of the operation, however. was placed in the hands of an experienced CIA case officer. Jihat summer. the Agency operator-along with the American and Indian climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters. were brought together at a secret training_base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and_to learn how to assemble the-monitoring device once they got it to the top of handa Devi. Cover for the Operation was carefully built by leaking information in international I mountaineering circles that a joint American- Indian expedition was planning an ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the technicians completed'work on the sensor device, and a few months later the CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and.cover arrangements with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport plane from one of the Agency?s proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from' where they and the Sherpas would begin their long. difficult ascent of the Nanda' Devi. Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line. the Indians began to tire and became irascible. claiming that they were backpacking too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the ?Eifficult phase of the operation'ee installing the machine on the mountain top.., 2. shim i is! 13-00000 Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base I. camp from where the final ascent to the mduntain's summit would be made by- - a small party of climbers accompanied by a few porters.' Soon after the group had started for the-peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the staging area. that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes.' The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in_' 'an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was new mail off - schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire_expedition because of the onset of bad weather. Hith some difficulty,'the hgency operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its target near the top of the Nenda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into gag, operation. with Spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news of the successful installation was radioed back.to the staging.area. But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been sending from the Manda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the Idevice had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headnaters of the sacred Banghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about religious pollution, not ecological.' The CIA reacted by planning another climb+of the mountain for the following year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring system -- this one powered by a nonwnuclear generator. The climbing team. led by Bishdp, was gathered together again and this time it reached the top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the 13-00000 i I i Eei?ore was not found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor devic@ stopped wor?ing. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical- 1l malfunction. At this point. the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new. improved-. satellites for acquiring the information it was?se king. The-Indians were I thanked and compensated for their American climbers were . presented with secret medals by a grateful. but disappointed. CIATZ - #4 Elie fertile imaginations of the ?ssiexperts during the following years produced many more unique coolrction schemes aimed at solving the mysteries of China's strategic missile'program. Most eventually proved to be unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high?risk potential. The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In" Iconcept. an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated_into the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would assemblethe aircraft and fly to safetyrover the nearest friendly border. I Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing hoardssecond system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket. that could. [65 be dropped by a or another aircraft near the missile test site. its fall' slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, andaerial rising from its too. would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still later. the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a foreign and hdstile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine raiser! cerium: as in the cvstem'c utility: and Mirth. The ESET i 13-00000 dispecialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project. seemed, however?g;3 EC oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile I I '2 In installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear attack. Development of the ?oatly system was. therefore, pushed ahead. The . technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device .. i in the southwestern 9.5. desert usuaily resulted in the system burying itself several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation - that the device failed to selfmactirate and function prooerlya:z I I . FA third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird. such as a condor, which was powered by'a miniature nuclear engine and which could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well over a thousand miles away. all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble lit on the air defense radar scopes the flight.patterns of a large eagle. Once over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras would be-turned on to record activities below and relay the infonnation either . to its launch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated _?hinese airspace far this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the CIA in research on this "baby that called fer numeroushbreakthroughs in Jursrev the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was? of course, that if i and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an Agency?sponsored spying missioni:} The technical difficulties involved in theiair-dro?isystem and thelmddelz fag; Firpdade?evice were too great and time consuming for either to be fully ,157 developedgby their inventors before improvements in intellieence satellite surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement (9 for these questionable and potentially provocative collection systems before they could be put into Operation. Other clandestine collection devices a few more sensibly contrived. most. however, of dubious value were also being 13-00000 _naga:acn--. E?by allowing the Agenc .- use Iran as a base for electrv? and radar surveillance of the-soviet Union. The CIA L'on 'e in Iran usually maintained closer contact with the Sha I the Amer - mbassador. {with the 19?3 . appointment of -.- er CIA Director Helms to'the past of an ambassador in? i. I .smllil .. .- .. - . 7317 o) 73%, ?t??ad developed a of over-theuhorizen radar which it wished to install in Iran? As was Z- - the case, CIA representatives carried out most of the negotiations with the _l 3 (Iranisq However, when ?mbassador Annie Beyer was informed of the details oi" I 4' the proposed agreement, he raised some questions with. the CIA station chief that . blossomed into an spate. At this point Meyer cabled the'State I Department for instructions and advice. 7 In the wayr of background, it should be understood that CIA conmunications - clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies overseas and hashington -- for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a. separate f6 code room for each agency' in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a? . If senior CIA couvnunications espert is regularly assigned to the administrative - part of the State Department in order to oversee Clh's conmunicators who work {2 under State cover. In theory, CIA code clerks are not supposed to read the ?111 messages they send for State. but any code-clerk who wants to have a successful career quickly realized that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he is JG. well advised to show the CIA station chief copies of all important State I {7 messages. The State Department long ago implicitly recognized that-its most secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special I - cornaunications channels which cannot be deciphered by the CIA. 2? . ?heijin l963? Ambassador Move}; ran into troubles with )the CIA station chief in Teheran. Hover switched his?coanaunications?with St to _n Hashington, 2 . He needed to be able to discuss thy 13-00000 togeea$9 -l:?ituation in private with his superiors. :But Bob and his cohorts at FIID were -one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. 1They had_figured.out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Hashington. So shortly after each _State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy of the message for the personal inspection of the top of each mntercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be kept especially confident because State-was unaware that the CIA had a copy. Desoite Agency knowledge of allot heyer's instructions and information.] - Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in hashington refused to yield to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even-after these.two men met at - CIA headquarters with the deputy Direttor of CIA, Vice Admiral Ruins Taylor, Ithev still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were-- unacceptable to the 5. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so aggravated by this continued resistance than he personally telephoned Secretary to the CIA position. of State Rush to settle the matter. RuSk ended the dispute by agreeing [hole was also involved in another series of events which started when FUD worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of~a certain South hmerican government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose-of allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent by third countries. However, FIID tood advantage of the liaison to intercept were normallprocedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which the Secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements cooperated in good faith. liaison with the South American country continued for a long period of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over unrelated issues, and as-a result was forced to break off the relationship. However. did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could l?zm7 .l 2 2 1 31-00000 .. ?;?ometime later, suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite 42252) - that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive. operator. Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other CIA man replied that CIA, aftera'll. was not the American foreign aid oregano; and hether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seen to. be a matter concerning CIA. Only later did the executive suite_officer learn from other sources that FIID had worked out a deal with the South American - country in which liaison would be reatored in rEturn for aRComsat channel(which - CIA.would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme mien -. th a fellow Agency employee in the Director?s office.- a1 Eventually. the South American country received the Comsat channel; the' country restored liaison with and CIA again had access to all of that country' 3 secret messages::? Bob's job with is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the -- Clandestine Services.- There are operators in the-paramilitary fields who . probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But_Bob is in _a position where. on a regular basis. he misrepresents himself and even lies within the 3.5. government not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into liaison agreements with Bob is one of these ordinary looking people who mow their lawn, love their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA. 7:41? low other devoted family man who lived in suburban Hashington homes similar to Bob X's are named James i-icCord and E. Howard Hunt. Both had long. relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper- middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob has. HcCord was a CIA security officer. specializing in protecting the Agency?s physical facilities. Hunt was an who nlaued a leadino role in the Bav of Pins and who took part 4?3 - It; 2-3 1 31-00000 1 - . . Agency had become invoivod in a chain of evenfa which forced it to intemne militarily in'ai sweat! Gauntrar Warmest its operation againat Cuba. may foe original ~?olicyt but there waa no way he coald haveIknoan that aimply. by appnoving an attack on.Cuha. he aould act in train Agency paramilitary activities against Guatemala. I CIA operations can have another unforaeen effect on Amara ican foreign can Subject the country to blackmail if something goes wrong.I For instance, afterIth_!ULAlJi10u was shot down and.oeptured by Indonesia Iin.1953 within five daya - the US government approved the sale for local currency of 3?,000 tone of American rice and lifted an embargo on $3 million-in small arme aas other militaay equipment; Conai?ering at that J(f; moment; thajola waa acaively'backimgaan armed revolution.againet I the Sukarno regime .would have been strange actions indeed for the US governmant to take if it were not extremely concerned. about saving the captured pilot. I I a somewhat eimilar incicent occunneo in SingapoIre in'1966' after a CIA lie detector-expert was flown Specially intoI the city. to make euro that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy._ 14 When the agency technician plugged in his polygraph machineI in a .hotel roan. he blew out all the fuses in the bail dirwI The [Eahia was not in; only time that the CIA blew masor ?Haas caer- {Qg?a aeaa. During the mid-339605. the Agents? added to its: much)! m? 3" . faci3itiea on Taiwan by building a hirga electronic *u?gf 1 31-00000 . 4- . - 1ie_deteotor men. ease of?ieere and the local agent wane soon-all ?nder arrest. The'Singap-ore govemsent and the Britism who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence; "were both Quite disturbed bythe inoident. Negotiations then, I onened to Secure the men'e release. According to Singapore Prime minister Lee Kean Yew, the U3 sever-meant offered$3 3 mil- -- lion to get them out. Loo claimed that he wanted teff?tiaee as. I much and coneequently took nothing. In any case, the tee CIIL officials were moseque ntly freed. the newly installed. Secretary of State, Dean Rush. wrote a secret letter of apology :to the Singapore leader. In l965. Lee mentioned the affair in a speech as an enamels: of the type of so tivities engaged in rue-the CIA. The State Department then issued a routine denial hart-demo by the Cine-?Ea tate? press office not realizing the truth of Lee' charges. Lee reacted ?by publicly producing Bush?s letter of: e- Ipology. and State wastes-coo tor-street itso Mr sine}. statement. although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered. As well as embarrassing the U3 goverrment and Ins-him headlines around the meld. the incident caused the State to ramp its internal syetem for making announcements about in?- telligenoe matters. I: Blackmail was again the theme in: the mi?~19603 with the - President of Cyprus. Archbishop ?aharios, quietly infomed the: . .I'rf . Linetallation for weillsnoe of the Chinese ehen the - gevioe eaei?nmed on for the first time. 11: imoekee out a large- part of the '1e-Lene's power. In this case. the local goeement 4; {reacted in a 11inch store friendly marmer than did 'SingajreIe?s. 13-00000 5 govemeoint that he might cost certain intelligence inetale Gigi: from his island. Elke CIA had a major interest in the . matter. si?au it operated a Foreign Broadcaet Information;3eru . lis??ning there. and the Pentagon wae?alec ccnh' i cerned about the possible lees of its large electronic eurveilu lance facilities. The View in the intelligence community was that Hakarice had to be eollified at practically all coats. ?Finally. governnent negotiators reached a eecret deal witn the 11y old archbiehop, and,he received a special payment of about. . $10 million.an return for letting the remain. The CIA put up half of the money. ueing the Director'e Contingency Fund for thie expense.? ea In general, the presence of.American intelligence facili- inJ ties in a foreign country can have-an.important effect on Amer? icon policy towara than country. especially in the Tgird #orld._ Closely aligned coontriee. nganr - Ih and Australiat'have_uenally allowed the UnlceQIStatee to set- up electronic eyeing ae part of the general-framework of i cooperation beeween ellieererue to the less developed conntriee. lthe presence of an American installation ie both a threat and The threat comee_frcn domestic cppoeiticn fore cee who look on the base as an example cf??nec?cclonialienweapon in powerr- The unpertunity out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly for the right-to inetall ite equipment-?and to keep it in place, nail-rchhiehcp maker-ice discovered. jag 13 13-00000 [[?The only American military 133533 in ?fti- on are in fact pain I eerily intelligence These are Kagnew in IEIthiopiaI . i I and Keni era in morocco I.7Both host governments have been severely criticised oy internal forces and neighboring countries for giving the United States a foothold in their nations, but both have been handsomely- rewarded in testis of receiiring American I . 'i Imilitary and economic assistance which had added up over the I I years into the hundreds of millions of doll are; . mill comparamI tively modest amounts of aid would have probably been? supplied. even if there had been no cases. the large size ofI the programs 1 represented. in effect. a direct payment for the intelligence I. 1 facilities. I - - I Similar-13?, from 1956 anti]. thend of 15359. the US Air cox-co I 'operateds hose has near Peshawar in Pakistan, which was prin? I - eerily an intelligence facility. For several years before Francis I Saw Power? abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1969. CIA 11-2 planes us ed Peshawar as a 1o.1.ne?I pal ?seeoff men fen - reconnaissance ?i??lte ofer and along the eaves of to :e Soviet - Uniion. In sedition. Butane intelligence set up a vast array ofjlectronic Iii-stoning rievi cos thereto monitor actiijritiea '1 within the Soviet Union.ZFma the days of "the Eisenhower administration. the United. States had allied it elf more closely-I with Pakistan than with India in those two coactries? eraditional struggle. Yet, at least some experts on the re gion believe that an important factor in the American ?tilt" toward Pakistan, at least untilithe late 19603. was the desire to hold on to the 13-00000 penetration, whiie cieariy fortuitous. are not unique in clandestine Operations. In 1964. it was 1oarned that the American embassy in hoscow had been thoroughly 1e - - Ln?aII-lq?h-I-l?ul?-I-I- hugged by the KGB. Scores of Soviet audio devices were found throughout the 3 I building. Counterespionage and security Speciaiists determined that the equipment had been insta11ed in 1952 when the embassy had been renovated. and 5? that the bugs had been operationai for roughiy tweive years. The damage report asserted that during-this entire period -- at the height of the acid war -- 7 int: Soviet had probabiy intercepted every dip1omatic cabie between Hashington and the embassy. {ibis assessment was based on the discovery of i audio devices in the code room which a1iowed the Soviets to hear 1 distinctiy the sounds being maded by the typewriters and equipment. It was a reasonabdy easy technoiogica] feat we11 within Soviet capabi1ities to transiate such sounds into their true a1phabetica1 meaninggz American suspicions about the Soviet eavesdropping were apparently aroused 1% eariy in 1964 when Soviet 1eader Khrushchev made a remark to Ambassador-Fay-Fe?a, Kohier about Kbhier?s roie in_beocking the shipment to the Soviet Union of steei for an important pdpeiine. Taken in context. Khrushchev?s remark indicated to Kohier that there was a Teak somewhere in hmerican security. Koh1er started a massive investigation, and within a month or two. forty?odd bugs were found embedded in wa11s throughout the embassy. Although Koh1er wouid 1ater claim I there was no connection between the discovery of the bugs and the investigation . he ordered after his conversation with Khrushchev. the timing wouid seem to i indicate otherwise. - - 3 Up any casetthe officia1 damage report cont-Jaded that for those twelve i cruciai years at the height of the Co1d War, the Soviets aimost certainiy know 1 every diplomatic secret which was communicated between the American embassy in. 3 Moscow and hashington. The damage report noted, however. that this Soviet know1edge may we11 have worked to the advantage of the United States at least in one instance in 1953 when the Korean war armistice was being negotiated. At the time. bargaining position with the North Koreans was that if a oarticu'lam 1 31-00000 7. 1} F31 m1! DEA 77-2412 2 8 EP3 19?? mm FDR: Mr. Halpern H. G. Bean Acting Executive Officer/DEA SUBJECT Faimays Corporation REFERENCE: Attached memorandmn from Central Cover Staff 1. With reference to paragraph 4 in the attached Hemorandtan from Mr. Latta, to the very best of our knowledge the CIA sponsorship of the Fairways Corporation has not been officially placed in the public domain._ There has been at least one newspaper article relating to Fainvavs and, in addition, at least one short television news item on the same subject. However, official confirmation of the allegations of a relationship which was made in these media presentations has been carefully avoided. 2. There has been official aclmowledgement of the fact that CIA's Office ofoaining runs a proprietary to provide executive tran5portation. Such a statement appeared in the report of the Senate Select Comittee on Intelligence Activities. However, here again there has been no that such an entity was identical with or related to the Fairways Corporation. 3. The DDA concurs with the position of CCS as eacpressed in paragraph 2 of Mr. Latta's remorandmn. Attachment cc: CCS mica?m 3mm - cm? 13-00000 SECRET ?may? 21 April 13%? MEMORANDUM son: Executive Officer to the DDA - FROM L. Latta Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group -Centra1.Cover Staff -SUBJECT Fairways Corporation 1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys" for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168 items previously deleted by court order.from the book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelli once. Fairways-Corpora?j tion.was referred.to CCS by the A 0/0 for review in this connection. 2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items (107, 128, 129, 2?9, on pages 123, 132, 133,-and 405 respec- tively,] in the original manuscript. The position of SOS on' all four items is that they are still classified, since they -3 describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying-an operational support facility located in the U.S., and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652. 3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair- ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency - proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair- ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure. e2 CL ar_ozsoss ENTELUGENCE SUURCES may METHODS lovotvto 5 55 -. w?'mc?iwrlee 3 no "4 1 31-00000 .- - .. . 4. For our conversation, CCS has stated in its' 'response to the EDA would comment further on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may have been placed in the public domain since the- court order e. since February 19?5) 5. Please direct your comments to For your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 0120, red line x9588, is proparing an overall response on the Subject for the - . SECRET 1 31-00000 . "momma son: MW 2; A 13-00000 I I ier14?June'1arz MEMORANDUM Distribution - FROM 5 I - . . . Req-uest for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - MarEs 1.- In conjunction with the current-review of the deles Itions in subject book for possible declassification, the has.indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the de-letions pertinent to your component are attached _(see page SJ. - 2. Please review .the deletions using the same cri.teria applied during the review of_ deletions within the exclusive purview of the BBQ. If you find that any of the items have been legally placed_ in the public domain, please provide the details. The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June Item Manuscript Page Review ReSponsibility 25 47 Division '159 181' EA Division and NE Div._ 160 1.82 I'162 '134 163 184 - - ll . ?1211_234 - - NE Divisioh '208 235 - LA-Division' 209 236 LA Division 295 . -424' . . .Ea Division 297 425 . EA Division and EUR Div. 299 #26 - EA Division and BUR Div. 301 "42? AF Division - 190 .214 - -SE Division (Office of' Security may be appropriate_ 'action office for this item) sz IMPDET c1 BY 018630 3 a - - . 13-00000 . 3 4. Where more than one Division is involved, single coordinated reply may be provided.__If there are any questions, please contact the writer on x1542, Attachments As Noteo_Above kaw (1542) Distribotion - Original 1 1 1 C/AF/Plans '1 LAZFUIA 2 SA/Doxo l' 5 13-00000 - am an MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel' .8UBJECT Review of Deletions from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks. 1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from.subject book per your request. The review was made to determine whether each deletion was st-ill classified under E0 11652 or whether the information in each deletion has been officially released by the U. Government 2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the-deleted items reviewed- by this directorate. Tab is a list of those items of primary interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi- I'fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab is a-list of those items which we determined are still classified under B0 11652; however, some portions of three items can be released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab be.? coordinated with other indicated e1ements.- Tab is a list of items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and . should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab is a list of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified and should not be releaSed. - 3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National Security Agency (NBA), we attempted to coordinate our determina- tions'through our contacts at NSA. .We were told that any coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with_other elet. ments was attempted - . 4. This memorandum completes the DDSS action on the court ordered review of the deletions -from subject book. ERNEST J. Associate Deputy Director- for Science and Technology Attachments: Ii I A5 Stated - EL BKQQEIJQEJ SECRET -. 13-00000 -.- --. .- u- 165 166 188 139 -TAB A DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT BY THE DDSET Page 134 135 122 -1?9 180 181 182 -183 184 185 185 185 185 189 189 139 190 191 191 192 193 194 200 201 202- Item 190. 191 192 204 205 203 209 245 '248- 254 253 259 250 267 263 269 225 295 29? 299 301 302 304 306 312 313 324 325 32? 328 329 236 263 269 327 331_ 331' 331 337 33? 337 394 424 425 426 427 427 430 431 442 450 424 424 425 4?6 460 1 31-00000 'Item 91 92 3135 153 155 153 I-163 135 133 137 _133 Tab Br ITEMS OF INTEREST T0 THE AND REMRIN CLASSIFIED Manuscrigt Page - 135 137 154 '135 130- 134 135 135 135 231 SECRET, 53(2j SECRET, 53(2) SECRET, 53(2) SECRET, 53(2) SECEET, 53(2) SECRET, 53(3) CONFIDENTIAL, CONFIDENTIAL, and-[3] 3nd_{3) and (35' and 53(2) 53(2)5 TOP SECRET, 53(2) *Can be sanitized and portions released. 1 31-00000 -Tab ITEMS OF INTEREST T0 DDSET AND SHOULD REMAIN SHOULD BE WITH OTHER 254 '253" ;-Manuscript ?gg? 4? I 104' 105 179 181 182 133- 134' 134 185 189 200 202 233 234 235 236 268 _269 327 331 nno" non (BIA) DOD . OS DDO, 0c, DDO, 0C, ERDA 000; 0c, DUO Dne' DOD (Navy)- and DDG- DDO DOD (SAFSS) DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff DOD (SAFSS) *Can be sanitized and portions raleased. 13-00000 . . I . . '--Tab - - Continued I-tem II Manuscript Page 332 non [Navy] 263 - 4 332 - DOD (Navy)_ 269 I 33? DOB I (Navy) 5 .4225 394 '425990, 454 - '301 427 . DDO, 0c, NS4 302 . 42? 'Ns4 I 1- 304 I430 I N54 345- 431 non-(Navyj 312 442 - N34 313' 450- 434 329 . 430. NSC Staff *Can be sanitizedIand portions released. 1 31-00000 Tab REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS Item 36 120 121' 123 _174 1?5 136 177' 123_323 Manuseript Page 194 139 139 190 191 191 '192' 193' 194 214 214 219 474 424 475 476 N83 NSE .msa, NSA or 05' .State Department State Department and NSC Staff .DOD- and non and NSC Staff_ 1 31-00000 - - Tab ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE -ltem 135, Manuscript page 134- somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred ini?g?i} when CI decided to get rid of'a technical research ?ab?orator? in the Bosto? area." - - . -. - Item 25, Manuscript page 47 "Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the ationalist first to run guerrilla attacks againstg?ainland hi and en in more recent years to use aiwa?f?s a base .for U-Z flights.(f1own over China by Nationalist pilots trained in the United States}, electronic surveillance of' the mainland and such covert action programs_as-propaganda 1 . .and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revol- . utiong' Item Manuscript page 107 "The Agency also had a project to determine where American risoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to ommnnicate with them Scale models of the prisons were constructed from aer1a1 End satellite photograph?and from other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which risoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate. one of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their infrequent letters to their families'as a means of sending coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus, 'the Agency worked out scheme to use return mail from the families to send answers bac Meanwhile, the Technical 'Services Division of the" Item 275, Manuscript page 394 ?%ew optics for satellite cameras and improvements in ?over horizon? rada?g? These technical contracts were almost always drawn up under the cover of being between the.scho1ar (or the university) and some government agency other than the CIA [the Defense Department or some component thereof were the most" . I 13-00000 Tab ITEMS OF INTEREST To AND SHOULD CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE CDORDIEATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS . . _M3nuscript Pag? 23 4? BDO . .-- _104 DOD (BIA) 33' 105'? pon?(n131' 153. 3' 179 I. 05 159_' ?131 BBQ, 00, I 160' 132- - dc; 3333' 151_ - 3' I 133 1: DUO, 0c, 3333 133 . 'fl'134 I 163 134_ -.I 1 BBQ 1164 - 13s Dno' 139- NSA _13? -. - _2oo - DOD {Nauy) 189 202 (Navy) 204: - 233. NSA and_DDO 235 BBC 2391'.'_ 233 -2457.1:. .DOD (33333) 143 - . 1?233 i .254 13~. _32? .f non Staff ?253: .3 531 . hon *Can be sanitized and.portions released. 13-00000 Tab i Continued 1? Item IManuscript Page I 259 . I 331 - :Don (SAFssj zpo- I.I.331 I Inon 36? - 337 . DOE (Navy) I 268. I. 333TI 5 ?Don (Navy). 269_ . 337 I [Na?y)I I *2?5 . I 394 I -'295 I424 . .DDU 299 I I426 I "Dpo,-NsA 301 - I-I #27 . 7 .- ?ne31-33 #50 I NBA 329 . _439 . I NSC Staff '*Can be sahitized_and portions released. -2- 13-00000 'Tab ITEMS REFERRED TO Manus?xipt Page I I ..36 1- .2 104 130- - - . -NSAI ii 1T1. .- 139' I . -NSAE '173 ~_193 - mun-um? n-w?wn mw-vn?r-m-n?nI?v?u?q-nl-u? .-- . - --. - -.: -.1-.-. - -. .- . . 1&5 . I . '19192-. I msa 17? . I 193' .- . NSA 13303' ?191 -. I214 - state Depart?ent- 192. . I - 215 Statg Dapart?ent A 324 474'- I DOD and use Staff 325' - 4v4. . non I I 4?5 7DDI and 328 I '4?6 I DOD and NSC Staff _f 13-00000 1 I -us: out? [j 51355357 . RIQUTING AND RECORD - -- - wax/Dom -- .: we . - _2p0109- '1542 14 Jun?.197? "map-ff I. - Of?cers (Numb; ?all. gamma: to ?th ?Sm in whom. Draw a limp mm column after each comm? Iu?mn FOIFMIDE sM-?nom50? @3219Skunk - . . . an 8W 5. -- - . un?t? - ?gtA gunk . 6StAer - 5* I Lb610 woman El SECRET I CONFIDE HIIAL El ?gum! 1 31-00000 1 ape 14 June 19?? MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution FRGM o/SA/Doxo SUBJECT Request for BBQ Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of .Intelligence by Marchetti - ?arFs 1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele- tions in subject book for possible declassification, the DDSET has indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached (see page 3). 2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive purview of the BBQ. If you find that any of the items have been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the details 3. The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June 1927: Item Manuscript Page Review Responsibility 25 4? EA Division 159 1811 EA Division and NE DivDivision 208 235 LA Division 209 236 LA Division 295 424 EA Division 297 425 EA Division and EUR Div. 299 426 EA Division and EUR Div. 301 42? AF Division 190 214 SE Division {Office of Security may be appropriate action office for this item) E2 CL BY 013630 5 1 31-00000 i .- 4. Where more than one Division is involved,_a single coordinated reply may be provided. please contact the writer on x1542. Attachments If there are any questions, As Noted Above U/SA/DD/O:NAShepanek:kaw Distribution Original Ill-ill [1542) C/AF/Plans E-C 13-00000 men 'E-iussein and the 11.3. Government became-increasingly concerned about the desire to counter its antinMerican. antinussein line (which was notlnew}. . a strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo.s Both parties shared funded the building as a Jordanian television'station. A cm - .J- 11?: owned. New York based proprietary company. named Rl'li, provided the technical espertise and management skills to put the station in operation; (I, 'Still another example of a the CIA enjoys a special - relationship is Nationalist China.? (in Taiwan. however, the CIA's link' is i 3 not-with President Chiang? Kai-shalt but with his son and heir apparent, Premier Chiang Ching-iiuo. One former Clio chief of station) Ray Cline. now the 1 State ?epartment?s Director of Intelligence and Research. became somethinglegend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all- I 1 night drinking boutsi?ith the younger Chiang. . - Ever the years. the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent I years to use Taiwan as a base for U-Z flights. (flown over China by Nationalist - pilots trained in the United States). electronic-surveillance of the mainland 1 - and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation, aimed at i fhina during the Cultural Revolution; - . i In South Vietnam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally conducting all important President This-u; sometimes Bunker was ,a accompanied by the CIA ohiei;1 when there was Agency business to be discussed. 2 But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for I 23 many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. 2 According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker. this CIA officer has served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a fennel 1?1 z, I meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea. 2 i rezone?, WIN: a ?Ear the years. the CIA has provided Thieu Wmillions of a (faunaereai money dollars in untraceablei?black bag" funds; - - :7 ?23 ?llets. a 1 31-00000 . a confident.3udgment of the accuracy of the report? 5 content. We? .. . 16?) SEEN- the information straight forwardlIy, thereby. handica-pning the in making Some intelligence inside and'outside the receiweFI -_large numbers of this tyne of report every day. many of which do come from - 4 actual agents. But by mixingI together information supplied by auIdio surveillance - (which is, by definition, an accuaate account of what was ed1d) with agent reports which are- sometimes,exaggeratedIor false.-the Elandestine Services confuses and often.misleads those people within the 3.3. government whose function it is to analyse.foreign events and indirectly.those leaders_who make decisionsIbaSed on that intelligence enalysis;II' En__the mid?19605; the Far East Division of' the Clandestine Services and the experts of the'scientitic and Eachnical Directorate to l'carry'out one of the agency?s'mostrimaginatire (if.ultimately intelligence collection operations'ener undertaken. At that time, top?level' I HI. 5 IgovernmentInfficials'were distotbed by reports that Communist China was on Ithe verge of devel_oping an 'intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.. They knew'that. the_ threat posed by Chinese would play an important part in the decision. then under consideration. to go-ahead with an American anti- ballistic missile deployment -program. As_a matter of the highest . priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at the I'Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia. technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-_ powered certain Reerlectronic:emissions coming from the missile site. well over a thousand miles-away. and then rely the information- to a CIA list?ninngost;I The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain peak calledatha Honda Devii,at an altitude of more than-ESgDUO feet, in the Indian IHimalayas from where it_ would have an nnobstructed ?line-of-sight"I to-I the secret test facility; As the device was being perfected in theI CIA the Clandestine Services Look on the resoonsibilitv for the 13-00000 I I me one. i C1fficult phase of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top. ., i The first thing that had to be done was to gain the.permission of the 2- Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the 3 Clh?s close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not I "1 only agreed but. surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project. 5 next. the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry -.Ehe device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp'the mountain and put it. 3 into operation. A.well-known American mountaineer who had previdusly conquered i -ht. Everest, Barry Bishop. was contacted and convinced to lead the climb. - . . i Overall control of the operation._however. was placed in the hands of an experienced CIA case officer. .;lhat summer. the Agency operator along with the-emerican and Indian climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret' (e.h CIA training base in the Rocky Hountains to practice as a team and to learn how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Hands Devi. Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian espedition was planning an ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the technicians completed work on the sensor device. and a few months later the CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and.cover arrangements with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport plane from one of_the Agency's proprietary airlines. Heat. the climbers were brought together and taken to the caap in the foothills of the Himalayas from where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Hands Devi. 'wm- tip? I Things went well at first. but after the expedition passed the snow line. the Indians began to tire and became irascible. claiming that they were backpacking '52? Q?s. too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the eggs}? -4 Ir a .- ..-I #5 1- i? - 13-00000 'Cwouldq do. ?Progr?ess slowed and. hehind schedule. the team reached the base f. camp'from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by a small party of'climhers accompanied by a few porters. 'Soon after the i . group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to tell the CIA man. who had remained behind to handle communications with the vstaging area. that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes.- i The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in . . an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now'weel off schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition - becahse of the onset of bad weather. with some difficulty, the Agency - operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached'its target near the top of the Handa_Devi; Amidst howling winds and at temperatures - well below zero. the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into . operation. with spirits high. the group returned to base camp and the news of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging area. But within a few short months. the signals that the sensor had been sending from the Handa Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It.was learned that the I device had been knocked over hy a snow slide. when the Indian government was informed of the development. it complained to the CIA station in Delhi that the nuclear generator-might be polluting the headeaters of the sacred Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about religious pollution, not ecological. The CIA reacted by planning another climb?of the mountain for the following year. both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring system this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team. ;Cgi led by Bishop. was gathered together again and this time it reached the top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was set up. but after an extensive search; the atomic generator from the year;:rr at?? age? .- 1 31-00000 ease-aw: 1W SEEM I [:hefore was not-found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor be it stepped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical 2 i malfunction. 3 At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the ?ommunist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved_ satellites for acquiring the information it was soaking. The Indians were i thanked and compensated for their cooperation.?.7he American climbers were presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed . Ellie fertile imaginations of the 553? experts during the following years produced many more unique schemes aided at solving the 1' mysteries of Chinais strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to he 1 unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly'highfrisk potential. The silliest of them all. however, called for the creation of a small one?man 'i;33 airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases.' In concept, an agent along with the suitcases would sonehow be infiltrated into the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to?have anything to do with this scheme,-and the projectydied on the drawing boards. A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could ?gf he dropped by a or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three feet into the ground on_impact. Afterwards, the system, aniaerial rising from its top, would activate itself and perfonn its electronic sensing tasks. Still later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a foreign and h?stile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional {a dh?r: similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine raiser-i courier?: miner-Inns: at: in than IIi'i'lii'v and unri?h. The: Ell? 13-00000 teem 1 7 and Cecialists. fascinated by the technical aspects of the project seemed, however. oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear. attack. Development of the costly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of'the device 'in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself several feet below the ground.surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation- that the device failed to selfeactivate and function 2 II - ?1 .I [?_third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird. . such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well over a thousand miles away. all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble, on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras would be turned'on to record activities below and relay the infonnation either to its launch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated' Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the CIA in research on this "baby that called for numerous breakthroughs in - the state of the technical arts. Its. chief advantage vii; of course, that if and when it.was shot down there would he no pilot to confess it had been on an Agency?sponsored spying mi ssionJ The technical difficulties involved in and thelmodelz xdg; gairplanejdevice were too great and time consuming for either to be fully Adj? developed?hy their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite surveillance programs were achieved. thus negating the justifying requirement for these questionableland potentially provocative collection systems before they could be put into Operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few more sensibly contrived. most. however. of dubious value -- were also being . 1 31-00000 . I . I - . em. coo. 1( I Agency Ihad become involved in a chain of even-be which forced it to interwne militarily in In eecgcd to protect its operation age Wainet Cuba. one Preei lent may have eat the orig: inal policyg but there was no way he could have Iknoen that aim-ply Ihy- approving an attack on Cuba. he Inould set in train Iebenoy . I paramilitary activitiee against Guatemala. CIA operatione can have another effect on Amer- ican foreign policy/- ?ay one subject the comtry to blaclanail if something goes wrong; For inetence, after wee ehot down and captured by Iindoneeia in 1958, within rive Idaye the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000- tone of American rice and limited an embargo on million in small erme anti other military equipment?. Considering at that moment. the: JIA wee: actively backing an armed revolution againat I the Sukarno regime would have I?oeen strange actione inx-ieed for the US government to take if it were not extremely concerned about saving the captured pilot. I I I I I 1'1 cometeiat aimilar inoicent occu?ed in- Sihigapore in 1960 after a CIA lie detector expert was flown epecielly into the cits:r to make euro that a locally recruited agent wee Itruetwox'thg. IWhen the Agency technician plugged in hie polygraph machine in a hotel mee. he blew me all the faces in the EThie wee not the only time that the CIA. blew major It?s-ace oter? eeaa. During! the mic?latices, the Agencv added to its: nuarer-or cm? facilities on Taiwan by building a huge electronic ??yee?r .. . - $355sz . 1 31-00000 LIZ 5 lie detector nan, a 01a officer; and the local agent were eoon.a11 under arreate- The Singapofe government'and ?he'hnitiehe who neEe in the of granting Singapore its inde?endenoe, 'wez?o' disturbed byIthe iheident. Negotiatione then eneued fhe menia.releaee.' heeoIrding to SIingapore Prime: Inloter Lee Kuan few. the government ofIfered$3 3 mile lion ?to get there- out. Lee elaimed that he wanted teni?tiaee as I much and ooneequently took nothing.l -any oae- e. the two CIA officiala were?auhaeqne ntly free e. the newly inataIlee eoretary of State,I Dean.Ruak. wrote a eeoret letter of apology :to the Singapore leader. In 1965. Lee mentioned the affair in as an example of the ty?e of activiItIee engaged in hthhe CIA. The State Department a routine denial furnished by- the CIA?waeate'e not realizing the truth of Lee'aI ehargea. Lee reacted by publicly erodueing IRueic'e IetIter or pology; and State wee foreoaIto.retract ita.original statement, although it etiIIl nainItainee that .no ranIeoa had ever been offered. he well ae embarrassing the US government and melting hIeadlinee. around the werld. the incident caused the State Uepartment to revamp-ite internal system for nahing announcemente abouh in- telligence mattera . I Blaokmail was agin the theme in the midwly??a when the Pr'eaident of Cyprus. Archbishop Hedger-lea, quietly informed the, 1314'" E:inetalIation forIeunmeillance of the Chinese mainland. When the deviee wae?i?axfned on for- ;the first time. 11; knoeked out a large- part of the island's-power. In this case. the Iocal government 'c -reaeted 1n7a moon more friendly manner than did Singanore?ao::? - a 13-00000 13 SEGRET. ELEM new: their: I1e mi'ghft'cust' certain?intelligence ital-stalle- fer_this I lstiene frem'his islend._ The CIA had a major interest in.the matter. s? it eperated a Fereign Broadcast Information Sern 1.viee FB.E lietening-.-pest there. sndI the Pentagon weeI el-se eenn seerned ebeut the possible less of its large eleetrenie surveil- "lance The v-lew in tIhe intelligence communitg wee .thet {eekaries- hed tn be. mellified at preet-ieell all meets. 'Finellingevernment negetisters reached a secret deal with the e'ily-eld archbishop, end;?e receives a speciel payment of about $10 millie? in-peturn for 1e?ting_theIheses remain; put up half ef'the money; using the Director?s Contingeney_Fundl 11:: In general. the presence of American intelligence facilin- ties in farsign Ieeuntry can have an innertant effect on Anerh ieen policy tewerd thee country, especielly in the Tgird World. Closely al1gnee Jepen, . and Australia. have eilewed the Unieeq'?tetesIte set- up electronieIsyying bases as pare of the generei frenewerk_ef be?ween ellies.' But te_the lees develeped eeunteies, the presence of an American installation is both three? end 'en.epportunity.r The threat eO?es free domestic ep?esitien form ees who leek en the base as an example of "neeI?eeleniel1se" and use it as e-weepon against these in pewer: The opportunity arises tent of the feet that the United States will pay dearly for the right to inetell its eavesdropping equiymentw-end ta keep it in plseIe, as erehhiehep hekeries discovered.I Ijba SEGEETF 13-00000 Des: coannEmIAL SECRET gnoun??e'mn RECORD - 'su?lIch: {Optima FROM: I. - mum-QR NIOJI 'O/SAxnozo I 2130109. I 9564" 14 June 1977 - I ?ui??mw duignulion, mm and [Number lurch common? #0 About Hum whom - - - IHIIALS in whom. Draw a line- dam: comma. afar ouch column-II!) - . gimp Fonwupm - I . .LI . I . same/13? . 2.. .7 ib'im sr?A'an' 'Su?the best of -our. knowledge,? .items 2.03 and - '209 have nOtI been made public'13. II M. 1m 29:? El SECRET .IZI courInI-zuriIAL Ip??i??'pftv El uncussmgu; fl- 13-00000 1 .3 C-R 14 JuneI197?' See Distribution FROM - 3 SUBJECT I Reouest for DDOICoordination_on Certain Deletions in the_Cu1t of Intelligence'by-Marchetti ~1MarEs In conjunction with the current review of the dole-- ti_ons in subject book for possible doc lassification, the has indicated certain items which they believe shouid remain classified but has reQuested DDO coerdination.- Copies of the deletions pertinent- to your c_omponent are- attached (see page 3). 2. Please review the-deletions using the same criteria applied during the review of deletions within-the exclusive purview of the If you find that any of the items have been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the details. . I3. The following items should be reviewed by the .components indicated and response forwarded to the eriter by 23 June 1977: Item.' Manuscript Page - Review Responsibility 25 47 EA Division 159' 1811 on _Division and NE Div. 160. . 132 161 183 II 162Division 208 235 LA Division 209 235 _La Division 295I 42? I EA Division 29? 425 EA Division and EUR Div. 299 426 EA.Division and EUR Div. 301I d2? nF-Division 190 214I SE Division (Office of Security may_be appropriate action office for this item) . . s2 IMPDET-CL BY 018630 5 13-00000 =3 Exc more than ono Division is involved, a single Coordinated reply may be-proyided._ If.there are any q?estions; planse contact the'writer on x1542; I . Attachments - As Noted Abono :kaw (1542)] Distribution Original CIAFfPlans .1 --c/SE/oso 2 ?-sA/D0/o 13-00000 A a?e- -- - 233- . I unn- .t::itdatioa in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FIID were one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. _Thev had figured out a way to intercept i I his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each State message was sent. Bob wodld appear in the tin executive suite with a copy of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. hritten on top of each rtntercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should he kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy. Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in hashington refused to yield to-Agency pressure fer a quick settlement. 'Even after these two men met at CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice hdmiral Rufus Taylor, they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were unacceptable to the v.5. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so aggravated hv'this continued resistance than he personally telephoned Secretary completely to the CIA position. 1 Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and infonnation,j' of State Rush to settle the matter. Rusk ended the dispute by agreeing I Eon was also involved in another series of events which started when .1 wprhed out a liaison arrangement with the codehreaking service of a certain South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent hr third countries. However. tood advantage of the liaison to intercept the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements were nonnal procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw N. .nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which cooperated in good faith. liaison with the South American country continued for a long period of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over unrelated issues. and as a result was forced to break _off the relationship. However. did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could ?xmw..7 at? i i 2 2 13-00000 5? I would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme uien we 236 on. i Sometime later, suggested to an officer in the ICIA's executive suite that the Agency should help. the South Anerican country obtain a channel in the international satellite comnunications network. 'Comsat. Always the secretive CIA man replied that CIA, after-all. was not the American foreign aid program; and leather or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to I2. ,3 operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other I I Il-f 6' 7 he amatter concerning CIA. Only later did the executive-suite officer learn from other sources that FIJI) had worked out a'Ideal with the South American - I 3 country in which liaison would be restored in rIIe-turn 'for IaII'Comsat' channelfwhich I "if I I with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's off-ice. I I II - - Eventually. the ISouth American the Comsat channel. - theI ?3 country restored liaison with and CIA again had access to all of that I - 3?5. country's secret messages: I - I I i Bob's job with F111) is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the I i5 Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations; But Bob is in a position where. on a regular basis. he misrepresents himself and even lies . lie within the UI.S. government not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues {f perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into 2t?: liaison agreements with FUD. I Bob is one of those dodinary looking people who mowItheir lawn, love I 1? their wives. and do some very nasty things 'for the CIA. 73?3 low other devoted family man who lived in suburban Hashington homes 1" similar to Bob X's are named James l-icCord and E. Howard Hunt. Both had long. 1: relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper? middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob has. licCord was a CIA security officer. specializing in protecting the Agency?s physical facilities. Hunt I . gar-r was an a leadinn role in the. Bav of Pics and who took part @3492.- 13-00000 [1 bazaar" 55cm ROUTING ANa-wn?if?it?Eh-IEH swan: Iowan.? mam/M, - 4 4406 ?j - 18:72 um m: mud-w, and z: Jill-1E! L9H building mm mm mm COMMENTS {Number each comment to show from when in whnm. ?lm! 4: HM across cdum u?or ?ch cont-ant} RECEIVED- mm oksaxnozo HI. i2. 13. 14. 15. 5:0 seem - :3 El a uncussmen. 1 31-00000 MEMORANDUM FROM SUBJECT REFERENCE S-E-C-R-E-T 23 June 19?? Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti Book SAKDOIO Memorandum of 14 June 19?? European Division concurs that the two items involving EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should femain classified. 2 IMPDET CL BY 003233 S-B-C-R-E-T 1 31-00000 L-C-R-E 23 June 19?? 5 i MEMORANDUM FOR: SUBJECT Coordination of Deletions in Marks?Marchetti . 5 Book . i REFERENCE Memorandum of 14 June 19?? - European Division concurs that the two items involving EUR (Item 297, page 425 and_Item.299, page 426) should remain classified. 2 IMPDET CL BY 003283 13-00000 [3 CONFIMHTIAL 1 I: SECRET El Egami ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET {Omimol} FROM: 'NE/cops $33: 9155 NO. DATE 25 June 19?? TD: dosigmtia huil?adingi a, room mm, and [3?15 INITIMS Pam-rm COHMEHIS [Numbar cad-u comment fa sham from whom to whom. ?rm a line mm: column ?Her and: imminent} I. Atm: I TUBE: DX-G \xd E0. ll. l2. 13. l4. IS. FORM 3-62 61 0 "Emma?: 55cm gm, :3 UNCLASSIFIED 13-00000 MEMORANDUM FOR: ATTENTION FROM SUBJECT ~81? 23 1g;HJmeI1977 Mr. Chief of Operations, NE Division DDSET Request for BBQ Coordination on 'Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - HarEs NE Division has researched the seven DDSET items cited in reference and to our knowledge none of the items cited have been legally placed in the public domain. Thereforey the items remain classified under Executive Order 11652 as listed below: Item 159 168 161 162 '163 164 . 205 45544:." Jinn?; swam-w -- - :th' - I Manuscript Page Exemgtion I81 182 IMPBET 353357 CL BY 0549?9 13-00000 ulgpugsqm?sn E1 CONFIDENTJAL ROUTING AND SUBJET: {Op?mull FROM: 534303 9045 (Olin: dosignoiion, mom nun'lbln owl buiEdingi . DATE IECHVID HJHHARDED OFFICERS INITIM In whom. DATE I 23 June 19?? COHMENTS (Number ouch common! to :how from whom Draw lino column o?or each comment! ZDUIOQ 5mm H. i2. 13. IL I5. 3+6! 6113 ?mum? mm CONFIBENTML El ENTEIHAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIEB 13-00000 ?an. SECRET 23 JUN 197? MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO for External Oversight ATTENTION FROM Katharine C. Hart Acting.Chief, Soviet/East European Division SUBJECT Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence - by Marchetti - Marks REFERENCE Your Memorandum, Subject: DDSET Request for BBC Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks, dated 14 June 1977 1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division interests referred to the ?30 for coordination by the DDSET. This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book, The Cult of Intelligence Checkingagainst official disclosures we have determined the item is still properly classified under Executive Order 11652. 2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet capabilitiesto make intelligible the by.audio devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to and is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652 exemption category . SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 014652 13- 00000 Win. uJ i: 1L4 no?. - - . I): 7, I.. 30:1. sscaer-' avv MEMORANDUM Special Resistant-to the DUO for - External-Oversight 3PROM. I Katharine Hart 1 3 - Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division. SUBJECT -- Deletions in ehe Th'e Cult of Inte11igence . 'by Marchetti e:Marks REFERENCE I 'Your Memorandum; subject: EDBSET Request .- . . for BBQ Coordination on Certain Del_etions 1 in the Cult of Intelligen ce by Marchetti - Marks, dated 14 June. 197I7 1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division interests referred to the BBC for coordination by the 'This concerns an item :from ehe Marchetti- and marks book _The Cult of Intelligence. Che?w against official disclosures we have determined the item. is still prope-rly classified. under- ZExecutive Order 11652. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, .relating to Soviet capabilitiesto. make intelligible the sounds '.pioked_ up by .audio {devices discovered. in the code .room of the American Embassy in sMoscow, .remains. classified errant This item relates to and is exempt:?agn- the General DeclassificationI . Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 7 7 ?2 IMPDET 1:914552 13-00000 ?acms?nhn INTERNAL "Si ONLY El CONFIDENTIAL SECRET I. ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT.- (Optional! DDSET Request for BBQ Coordinatin Deletions in the Cult- of Chief, Africa Plans 11326 Certaan by Marchettinarks DATE 1'0: ['me designation, mm nuqur, anti building] DATE Fonwma his in vii-mm. 6 1m CDMMERTE [Numhir each cornmeal to Ihuw from Whom {Jruw a line across coiumn one! and! comment] I. 0/ D010 Attn: I I ED. I2. 13. I4. 15. FORM 610 ?mama" SECRET El CONFIDENTIAL a 13-00000 some MEMORANDUM FOR: Attn: FROM I Chief, Africa Plans SUBJECT for BBQ Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cuit ?g "Interligence by Marchetti-MarEs We concur in the conclusion that Item 301, page 24? remain classified. E2 IMPDET CL wannms some . SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES mu mosses women SEERET 13-00000 ,j . sagas . MEMORANDUM FOR: Attn: FROM Chief, Africa Plans SUBJECT DDSET.Request for BBQ Coordination on Certain Relations in the Colt "Intelligonce by Marchetti?MarEs We concur in the conclusion that Item 301, page 24? remain classified. '3 E2 IMPDET CL moms Roma . INTEIUGENCE SOURCES AND MUHUDS - 1 i. I i?l/ li?d "i Following is a transcript of Press :ilcnt Carter's news' conference in 1; Washington yesterday afternoon, as i" :3 recorded by The Yorh Times be!) 1thrciugh this of ABC News: a - -. lit opening Statement Good afternoon everybody. I'd like "to make a very brief statement as a ?progress report to tild?im ericaupeople of some items that are important to ins. -- We have submitted and the Congress ills now considering legislation to give one the authority to reorganize {the :executii'e-branch of Government. The denote Committee under Senator Ribic. . all has now completed their hearings .bnd they'll be marking up the bill beginning tomorrow. 173:. :5 i The House Committee on Govern-' ?rnent operations under Congressman. Jack Brooks has ?scheduled hearings to . begin on March 1. So because of the interest of the .lntnerican people and the Congress and myself in completing this very crucial project I think the Congress is moving with great expedition to give me'that' . authority. - We?ve also initiated with directions. If!) the _members of "the Cabinet and other agency heads a. new program to cut down on the extremely great over- load of paper work with a requirement that dress; who prepare Government regulations he resptinsible 'for the? preparation assigned them. I've asked any Cabinet'ofticers to read the reguia~ tions that are forthcoming from their departmeats each week until they see the volume and the complexity of. them, and We hope to eliminate unnecessary regulations, abbreviate those that are necessary and express them in a lan? guage so that we can all understand them. i I?ve also asked major elements of our own society, the university profes- ours and the state officials in this last week to give me their suggestions on .how the regulations might be improved. We have done the same thing with reports required by the Federal Governd meet. I hope-to reduce drastically the number oi--reports and the frequency of those reports and the. cornplexitg of them. We will complete the proposed {legisv lotion on creating a. new Department of Energy this week. The proposed legislation is now on my desk. It will be submitted to the Congress for action- the first of next week-And we've con- sulted very closely with the key- leaders ?in_t-be congress and I believe there's going to be rapid creation of this new department-and a heavyr emphasis on the importance of energy questions, to our people. We will also present to the American people. probably at a joint session of the Congress a speech about April 2G. a comprehensive-energy pol-i- which would involve an the com? _p enities of the energy question. It?s seiner-lung that's long overdue and it?s going to be quite pro ound in its-impact on the American consciousness and our society, and I hope it will he com-pre-. i?m not going toqleai'v'e of not comment- ing directly on any specific (Lin. ac- tivity. But I can tell you that I have begun o'complete analysis which will be completed within. the next week of all activities by the CIA. I?ve received substantial reports already. I've reviewed the more controversial revelations that have been publicized in the last few days. some quite errone- ous, some with some degree of accura- cy. These same operations have been reviewed by the Intelligence Oversight Board. on independent board. and also by my predecessory, President Ford. _1 have not found anything illegal or unproper. if in future assessments. which will. come quite early.-I discover such an . impropriety or an_illegality I will not only take immediate action to correct it but also will let the Anierican people know about it. I might say this. This-is a veryserious problem of how in a democracy to have adequate intelligence gathered. as- _-ses_sed and used to guarantee the-se- curity of our country. it?s not part of- the American nature to do things in secret. va1ously, historically and still at this modern time there is a necessity __to protect. sources of information from other nations. Sometimes other ernments cooperate with us folly; sometimes they don?t. But l'll, try to he sure, and so will Stan. Turner, who will be the next director of_ the intelligence community. He will try to be sure that every thing we do is not only proper and legal. but also compatible with the attitudes of the American people. One other point I?d like to make is this. it can be extremely damaging to our relationship with other nations, to the potential security of our country President Carter walking past reporters after news conference at the E: with labor and management Bu whether be successful. I don?t know l?m just going to have to do my nest ii. Human High ts Abroad Q. In your letter to Mr. Sakh?il'mi you said that the United States Would use its good offices to seek the release of prisoners of consciencexnnd you said that you wanted to continue ti: shape a world responsible to human aspirations. As you know there are human rights problems in many other countries. And some of them like Iran or the Philippines we support with arms. or we support with ninericon aid. These are countries where many people believe we have more leverage than we might have in the. Soviet Union. What if anything do you plan iotry to do to help victims of political mares sion in these ei-iunt-ries? A. 1 think without my trying to take credit for it there has been a substan- tial move toward concern about bi. man rights throughout the world. I think this has Edi-Lott place in probahlv'a dozen or more different coo. --ies. There?s an arousing interest in the posi- tion that our own Government here in our free country does take. Obviously there are deprivations of human righls even more brutal than the ones on which we've commented up to now. the actions there have dis- gusted the entire civilized world and. as you know, we have no diplomatic relationships with Uganda. But in. is an instance where both Ambassador Andrew Houng and I have expressed great concern about what is there. The British are now considering asking the United Nations to go into Uganda to assess the horrible murders that :13-parr entiy are taking place in that country'? 13-00000 i lines. Le is gnu a ?lane's?1's. IpllUll-I'u going to be a- rapid creation of this new department and a heavy emphasis on the importance of energy questions to our people. - We will also present to the American people. probably at a joint session of the_Con'gress a speech by .me about April a comprehensive energy poli- cy which would involve all the cores peinties of the energy question. It's something that?s long overdue and it's gnu-lg to be quite profound in its impact on the American consciousness and our society, and i hope it will he compre- henswe enough so that it can be well- balanced and fair to all. . We are quite concerned about the pressures of location. The advisers to me on economies are trying to assess all _Government programsand private actions that contribute to inflationary Pressures. When this analysis is done will use every means that I-havo available to me to express-these con- cerns and possibly corrective actions; tether American people as wdt. . - .And the last- point is that 'we will. Imus: pm?n?il?onmloeio nuclei-ma? .iow ?cin eg on. And" the ?rst 11ml! is hm? der'egiilatitogol the air on is n. a near. We Congress to Congress arlIgi?sl?i?5tion hojcaus?e the Congress has a move so slantiall forward in dealing With this ?nd now I'd like to answer questions. . Mr. Iranlt Cormier. 34-: Questions and linswers f1? 1-. Defense Budget . Mr. President, you told the Demo- I 'cratic Platform. thought present defense expenditures Committee that you cool be reduced 'by .five to seven bil- lion dollars. Now I think you may have ?In?dlfl?d your position somewhat since then.- Obviously in your short time in office you. didn't find the opportunity to make cuts like that in your precedes- sors budget. But isn't it also likely that next year?s budget for the defense will exceed this year?s. A. Welt because of inilationaw'pres- sures and because of an impossibility of assessmg the potential threat to our country. from other nations, it's hard _to predict exactly what the level of defense spending will be. In the short tune that we bed available to work on the previous-Administration's budg- et?about three weeks or hard work? we were able to reduce the suggested expenditures by almost $3 billion. I tliiulcabout $235 billion. - This was done?and lthink Senator Stennis in his recent public' statements hos continued that it has been done without weakening-our own deietise capability. And the substantial savings in defense spending that wilt-still leave on muscle will be in such things as the standardization of weapons long? range planning. a more busines he at?- location of defense contracting.- an as? sessmentlof the defense contracts for construction or repair already out- standing. . - A reassessment of priorities of the evolution of new weapons which in the future _eau become enormously expeni owe; a longer assignment of military personnel to a base before they are transfer-reds some emphasis on the cor- gection or inequities and unfairnesses in the retirement system. -. These things obviously can't be done in three weeks, but theylwill- he an ongoing effort on my part. And I think the 19% budget. which will be my Ad? ministratinn'e Hm stun": . mom-submitting 'a "manage . . very shortly on that sub? get. -We will not submit administration othei' natioris. ernntents cooperate with as fully: sometimes they don't. But I'll try to be sure. and so will Stan. Turner. who will be the next director oi the intelligence ooninuinity. He will try to be sure that. every thing we do is not only proper and legal, but also compatible with the attitudes of the American people. time other point I?d like to make is this. It can be extremal damaging to our relationship with at or nations, to the potential security of our country even in peacetime, for these kinds of operations which are legitimate and proper to be revealed. It makes it hard for or: to lay a all until. we might predicate a successful meet- ing of a threat to us in time or war if we don't have some degree of scorer Cir. . I?m quite concerned about the. num-. ber of epic now who have access to this been workin ve ,ciosely with the. Congression tea are, yesterday and today in twin reduceitheoverail num- - her oi people who have access to the sources of intervention. that within+the boupdg that, Inimdesccibod?prcipnety -- 'a?nd toga it}, and American attitudes to- ward the best I can not ever ti_ malts a mistake. And I'm also assuming on a continuing basis a direct personal reponsibitity for the operation of all the ingelligence agen? cies Government to make sure that they are meeting these standards. .- 3.5 ICorrecting?f Errors on Clad. If there has. been erroneous inter- motion, wouldn?tit behoove you to cor- - rectthelrecord? it. In'some ways we are correcting the record, but it I began to either dis- pute or confirm every-individual story that's written whether correct or er- roneous on every matter relarin xii; 'Wthe C.I.A., then these matters wiic are necessarily secret would no longer be seepet, so i?mmot going to comment on individual items that relate to intel- ligence. - i. sidelines was Manny Q. Mr. President; George Meany says he won?t go along with your idea for pro-notification on wage and price in- . creases. stud my question really is, how hard, are you going to press Mr. Manny to go along and do you have anything else .in mind that you could use in the way of Government involving itself to try to control inflation? A. I announced earlier in firm come :mitment not to have man atory- wage and price laws or authority, not to have standby wage and price authority. I?ve not made any proposal to'Mr. Meany many other labor leader nor to any - representative of.industry or manufac- turing. But? twill retain the option in the future of assessing what we need to do to control inflation. l?ve emphasized always the word "voluntary." And to the extent that I can arrive at a common understand- ing with industiy and labor leaders that a. certain amountlol? cooperation and information cah? be exchan ed before a major proposal is made. I 1 int: that's legitimate pursuit of mine. I can?t force it. It's got.to be voluntary. And thatwith my au- . s. Wage-slice Guidelines 0. You mean lust directlv about-we ee "ad-oi -inforn'iation.- And I've 1 there are even more brutal than the ones on which we?ve commented up to now. In-Uganda the actions there have dis- gusted the entire civilized world and. as you know' we have no diplomatic relationships with Uganda. But to a is an instance where both Ambassador Andrew Young and have expressed great concern about what is there. The ?ritisli are now considering astrin the United Nations to go into Ugan a. to assess the horrible murders that appar- entiy are taking place in that country? ttie persecution of thoso- who have aroused the m. :if Mr. Amin. We more: my concern ah.. prisoned ll in Korea, in Cuba. in litany countrir- --in several countries, rather.--in -i;th America. and I?ll continue to do so. I have never had an inclination to single out the Soviet Union as the only place where human rights are being abridged. Wis-have, I thirds, a'resportsibitity and lI-,lt I legal right disapproval of violations of human rights. The Hot sin?ni hp: at. Fe?s?mh= Three Provision, insures, that some of these-human rights shall"- be preserved. We are a signatory of the Helsinki agreement. We are ourselves culpable ways -for not giving people adequate rights to move around our country- or [Patriotism unneceesar?i-ly, in my opinion, visitation in this country by those who disagree with us politicalv ll? . So I think that we all ought to take a. position in our own country and among our friends and allies. among our potential adversariem that human rights is something on which we should bear a major responsibility for leader- ship. And I have made it clear to the Soviet Union and' to others in the East- ern European community that I'_m not tr ing to launch a unilateral criticism lltEl'l?l?, that I'm trying to set a stand ard in our own country and matte my concerns expressed throughout the world, not singled out against any par- ticular country. Q. Mr. President, the other: day. so ting back to' this CIA. thing, or on that story broke your Press Secretary. when he issued what amounted to a ?no comment" by the White House, someone asked him if this story had broken back during the campaign when. .you were running for President, would you have given a similar response? And he said "well I tin can I ask you, what would have hear.- your? response? Would it have been the same? A. i don't know. Review of (3.1.11. Activities Q. Mr. President. on that same sub- ject. you said earlier that you- review of CIA. activities had found nothing illegal or improner and you later said that those activities are legitimate and proper. Isn't. that a. Value judgment that the American public might like to share? But liow can they if you refuse to' give them any idea of what you have discovered dur?og this review about payments, including ones made in secret? A. 'i?ha-t is a va?ue judgment. it's made 'by the independent Intelligence Over- sight Board, which was established and appointed by President Ford. This board ha?s made itself available to the Inspector General and to any employee within the Clot. or within the defense - intelligence agencies or any other to_ receive-even rumors of 13'00q9gsures of ll?iirillcm. 'l'he advisers to me on economics are trying to assess Iall'IGovernment programsund private actions that contribute to inflationary grossures. When this is done . iegislation is in ,_tbe. congress. . to Congress very shortly on that so .. - location of defense contracting. an ace. Questions and Answers Ed? i 1.. Defense Budget - 1 Mr. President, you told the Demo- 'crn Platform. Committee that you. thought present defense expenditures will use every means that I have available to me to expressthese con- cerns and possibly corrective ?nd the glass point 'is mature will. lithium or new on deregulation. And' the first question is the deregulation of- the-air ject. We will not submit administration legislation because the Congress has already moved substantially forward in "dealing with this important issue._ "And now I'd like to answer questions. Mr: frank Cormier. could be reduced 'by- five to seven hil- hon dollars. Now I think you may have modified your position somewhat since then.- L?ibviously in, your. short time in office you. didn?t find the opportunity to make cuts like that in your precedes? sor?s budget. But isn?t it also likely that next year's budget for the defense will exceed this year's. A. Wei! because of inflationanr'pres- . sores and because of an impossibility of assessmg the putenlial threat to our countryifrom other nations, it?s hard to predict exactly what the level of defense spending will be. In the short tune that we had available to work on the previous Administration?s budg? etn-ahout three weeks of-Ihard- work? we were able to reduce the su gested expenditures by almost think_ about $2.75 billion. - This was done?and lthink Senator Stenms in his recent public statements has confin'ned that it has been done without weakening-our own defense capability. And the substantial savings in defense spending that wilt-still leave us muscle will be in such things as the standardization of'weapuns long- range planning, a more business 'ke al- sessment: of the defense contracts for construction or repair already outs standing. . A reassessment of priorities of the evolution of new weapons which in the. - future can become enomiou?y expen- sive: a- longer assignment of military personnel to a base before theyare transferred: seine emphasis on the cor- rection of inequities and unfairnesses rn the retirement system. These things obvious] can't be done In three weeks. but ey_will- be an ongoing effort on my part. And I think the _19'i'9 budget. which will be my Ada ministration's first budget, will show these improvements to a substantial dc- . . Q. Willnext year's defense budget actuallybe lower then than the one that you just revised. can't say "It. . . i . is? 2.C.I.A'.'Accountabilit3' i the GM. to pay off King Hussein and other foreign leaders? And what steps are your taking to make yourself more knowledgeable and more uncountable for wh at the can. does? t? A. Well, I?ve adopted a-pollcy which as aha. . .- . actions- . 'tothe-dmencsn'peodlepsuweli. . $3 .5 lion. 1 Q. Do you think it?was proper for- 11?. 11.5 'ldl'y' at 4,5; ?use? we might - radicate a successful meet- ing of a reat to ash time of war if we don?t have some degree of score: cy. . - I'm. quite concerned about the num-. ber of ?gople now who have access to this- 'nd-of-infonnationr and I?ve been workin Congressiona leaders, yesterday and toda to try to reduce-the overall num- ber in one have seems to the sources of-giofornsat'ion. th at? within ?the' hounl-' "arid?leg lil'} "and American attitudes to- ward secrecy-d?l-Ldo the best I can not ever to make a mistake. And I?m also assuming on a. continuing .basis a'direct personal reponsihilily for the operation of all the ingelligence agen- cies in?our Government to make sure that they are meeting these standards. I oil-0.1.4. - Q. If there has been" erroneous infor? mation, wouldn't. it behoove you to cor?- - rect.the__record? A. In "some ways we are'correcting the record. but if I began toeither dis-n pure or confirm enerydindividual story- that?s written whether correct or er- rone'ous on every. matter relatingt-to the C.I.A., then these matters which are necessarily sepret would no longer be secret. so I?m not going to comment on individual items that relate to intel- ligence. . 4. Difference With Manny - Q. Mr. President, George l?deariy says he won't go along with your idea for pro-notification on wage and price in- creases. Aud my question really is, how hard, are you going to press Mr. Money to go along and do you have anything else in mind that you could use in the way of Government involving itself to try to control inflation? - a. I announced earlier firm cone.- mltment not to have man atory wage and price laws or authority. not to have standby wage and price authority. I?ve not made any proposal to'Mr. Meany many other labor leader nor to any representative of. industry or manufac- turing. But ].will retain the option in the future of what we need todo to control in lotion. I?ve emphasized always the word ?voluntary." And to the extent that I can arrive at a common understand? ing with industry and labor leaders that a certain amount of cooperataon and information can be exchan ed before a major proposal is made. I Ink that's .a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can?t force it. It?s gotito be voluntary. And thatwith my an- awer. 5. Wage-Frict- Guidelines Q. You mean just directly about wage and price ?guidelines" which might be voluntary. How is that for an idea? A. Well I think rigid guidelines are a mistake. if we said, for instance. that no price increase or no wage Increase could exceed ?6 percent this would he too restrictive. It would be contrary to my own philosophy of Government and I think that because of the diversi- ty of our society and the fact that it is a free enterprise system. you've got to have some flexibility. But I'd prefer to deal with. these ?problems that arise on' increasing prices on an individual bases and I also prefer, of course, to work harmoniously very. closely with tho' Jrl'iSUl?lcd pic-1.3 ll in Korea, in (Lube. in many countrir several countries. radian?in 5 edit America and I?ll continue to do so. I have never had an inclination to single out the Soviet Union as the only place where human rights are?beta g. abridged. Vite-have. I'thinlt, irresponsibility and .. d- legal right to express op-r' discus royal": - of violations-of human rights. The He} oil'hd. Encheth? Three Provision, of ,mmMman- rights-shalhbe preserved. sin'k?r hug! ctr. 'erd, We are a signatory of' the Helsinki i l. agreement. We arecurselves culpable-- in some ways for not giving people adequate rights to move around our country or restricting unnecessarily. in my opinion. visitation in this country by those who disagree with us political- in . So I tbii-ik that we all ought to take a position in our own country and among our friends and allies. among our potential adversaries! that human rights is something we should boar a major responsibility for leader. ship. And 1 have made it clear to the Soviet Union and to others In the East: ern European community that Pm not trying to launch a unilateral criticism of them. that Fm trying to set a stand? ard in our own country and make my concerns expressed throughout the world. not singled out against. any par? ticular country. Q. Mr. Presidept, the other day. et- ting back to' this CIA. thing. on that story broke your Press Secretary, when 'he issued what amounted to a ?no comment" by the White House. someone asked him it this story had broken back during the campaign when you were running for Presideni, 1a-cmld you have given a similar response? And 'he said ?well i don?t? know.? So can I ask you, what would have been you.- response? Would it have been the same? A. i don?t know. Review of (LIA. Activities Q. Mr. President. on that same sub- ject. you said earlier that you- review- of CIA. activities had found nothing illegal or improper and you later said that these activities are legitimate and proper. Isn't that a value judgment that the American public mi in like to share? But. how can they i you refuse to? give them any idea of what you have discovered dur? .1g this review about payments, including ones made in secret? A. That is a value judgment. We made by the independent Intelligence Over-- - sight Board, which was established and appointed by President ?Ford. This board has made itself available to the Inspector General and to any employee within the OLA. or within the defense intelligence agencies or any other to receive even rumors of impropriety. -They-have assessed these operations. They made their inquiries in the past, which is in accordance with an execu? . tive order issued by President Ford to the Attorney General of' the United States and also to the President. I have read that correspondence. it?s quite voluminous and I think that it's accurate to say that-Senator lnouye?s committee in the Senate and the appro? priate committees in the House have also received this information in the past. I have talked to Senator Inouye and he confirms what he just told you. And Ithink he would also that . 1 31-00000 . 14113 (/1119 .I, lIIHUsscar . FEBRUARY :14. 1911' may? 57 .4417:ch lerence 011 Foreign and Domesac Matters The New York TlmesITerese Ia bola tiffl'ce Balding in Washington {the impropriety or the illegality does "'no't exist on Iany ongoing CIA opera- . 8. Problems With Congress Q. Mr. President Charles Kirbo, your ifriend Charles Kirbo seems to feel that re going to be having a Iot'intlru'uing '?'problent with. the Congress and that you?ll have to go over Congress?s head - to the people in order to get results. Is this true? "in: .- A. I thinlt if you read the whole iistatement that Mr. Kirbo made, which is just a private, citizen?s opinion, he would say that every President has had arguments and debates and disagree- ments. with the Congress. And I think that?s inevitable in our system of Gov- summit. That's part of the che?ks and balances that 5 very .precious to us Iali. - I have folind up to now a growing. sense of coope1atio11 with the Congress think last week when I was asked roughly the same question that the troubles were perhaps underestimated by the news med-la. I think now per- ?.-haps the troubles with the congress i, are overestimated. =n?1eetings with the Congressional lead- . "avg . 11:1; 1 have frequent :ers buth Democratic and Republican. and I think that the progress of the legislation '111111 we consider to be cru- .13 cral which seemed to be moving vn1y slowlyI in the past is now 11111111111ng ave Sol donr believe that we?ll nearly the problems with the Congress that has been the case in recent'yea-rs. I am very pleased with my relationship . 'a-nd I have to say in summary that with the Congress now. 1'l'I?lie Election Process Q. Mr. i?resident, in view of your assignment to Vice P1 esidcut Mondale r-?Iegarding- the election laws, could you {give Ius your view, in1 on the direct But I will work with Congress on the deregulation of natural- gas as a part .of an overall energy policy. By. Apr-ii 21'} I think we?ll be prepared to present to' you, the news media, and the people and the Congress more specific proposals involvin direct iegisla-tion proposals that wi' answer your oucstion? more fully. 13. Energy Program Sdtrifices. . Q. Mr. President. we? ve been told that the. central thrust of your new energy program- will involve sacrifice and voluntary conservation, yet the public' a. ahvays reading stories in-the paper of how the major oil-companies are with- holding natural gas. So I?d like to ask how are you going to expect the public to make sacrifices when there's such wiI_despread public suspicion. about the role of the oil companies in the energy crisis 111.1 think the comprehensive nature of the proposal that takes in all these very disparate and sometimes'conflict- ing elements at: one time and a long? .1?ange projection ofIOur needs and a tangible demonstration .to._the dimers;-I 'can people, to the extent that I'm able to put it forWard, that there will be direct ultimate benefits to them will .he the elements that will "cause them. to make those sacrifices At the same time ?1 .wa?nt to increase the surety that we have that the 1eserve supply data given to us by the oil companies and others are accurate. We are now conducting some admit- tedly'_superficial studies in _5ecretacy Cecil Andros in Interior an also they'll be followed up by more detailed studies under Dr. Schlesinger, to see whether or not the reserve supplies are ade innate and? whether or not the oil com- panies are giving us accti'rate data. I think it?s obvious to all of us that there are. some instances where natural gas is withheld from the market. That's understandable: If I was running an? oil. company I would reserve the right to release or to reserve some supplies of natural gas. "With the emergency [legislation that the Congress did polls I thinl's' 1111 about a week of assessment during the frigid part of the wintermit 5 still very cold-? we Were given some authority to buy. extra gas at a. very high price. This is obviously a ?transcient circumstance. But I believe the American people will be willing to make the sacrifices requ1 red if they are convinced that fu- ture re orts will be accurate. that sup- plies not] not be withheld from the mar- ket and if we can let the oil companies know in a predictable way what our 'policy will be 1WD months or two years or- 20 vears in the future?within the bounds 'of human reason?then I think theyll be much 1ch likely to withhold . supplies of oil and natural. gas from the .market just hoping that they?ll get some bonanza. increased. price in the future if the policies do change. 11.11111.- 1'11 Gasoline Tax . Q. Another question sir, on the Sacri- fices that you say Iyour upcoming ener- gy program is going to. demand Is it likely that one of those sacrifices is going to come in the form of a largely I increased Federal gasoline tax? 15. I don't know how to' answer your was a w?aste. You also promised td do? i the waste out of the defense budgct.,: When would you expect to stop production of the 8-1 as opposed to research and'devel'opment on the a. I think I cut out about more than 52% million from the B- 1 program do. the budget just submitted to the Corn-1. gross. I ?have serious questions about'i 1 whether or not the. 1 ought to be 1 in the future the center of our aiihoIrInIaig defense capability. i' ?I-vae several more months before? I have to make a decision on that mac-:1 ter and the National Security Council?; - which combines as you know 5tate.:- Treasury, Defense and other elements. '1 of the Government. working very closes, 1y with me, is now making a complete - reassessment of the need for the; .113 1r,I' bomber. -. 1 I don't know whether We will decide: to go on with it or not. And I donlli know whether we?ll expedite produc- tion of it or not, at this time. -- 1. I?art of the factor to be assessed -ls. the attitude of the Soviet Union. If we" can have a general lessening of tensions. a demonstrated commitment on their- part toward dis-armament, it would eat-.- tainly make it less likely that we wriuldII' go ahead with the B- I . But I can?t answer that question untih I complete my own study and I think'i that would have to be terminated by" the end of May. . 1. 18. Campaign Financing Lawn, Q. Mr. President, I was a little unclear; about what you? re going to propose" in the campaign finance law. Are sa ing that you will propose to' '?aIvti al Congressional elections 1.111111111111111 Danced? A. That's my preference. yes 1Q. Is that what you will propose to Congress? A. The Vice President' is In?ll, doing a study on a complete election law package. And I?d like to reserde? my own judgment until I see what his report is? to me. But that's my town, inclination. Its a position that i too - during the campaign and so no reason to change my mind. 19. Foreign Polity Tumtable Q. You gave us a kin-:1 of a timetahlri" for your domestic program in your pre- liminary statement. I wonder if you -have a simiiar timetable of what ydu hope to achieve in foreign policy be- tween now and the end of the. year. such as Middle East peace, Cyprus, 111111111 treaty with Panama. . 11 Of course- I can't answer that question specifically because I. d'lont know what cooperation we will. get from other nations and I dont. know. what the inclination of those nations in disputed regions of the world want to do toward one another I Secretary Cyrus' Vance has just. .re} turned from what I consider to be Is. very successful trip to the Middle: East, He not only probed with the heads-of: those Governments and their Cabinet. members their own positions, both pub? lie and private on- the controversial, issues that have so far prevented-1a: peace in the Middle East. He also had a chance to compare their positions on issues?which, ones they found to, be in harmony, whichfones there was 13-00000 . And I have to 'say 'in s?ummary'that - [am very pleased with my relationship . with the Congress now. 9. The Election Process . Q. Mr. President, in view of your assignment to Vice President Mondale - regarding the election laws. could you Ir- give us your view. sir. on the direct -, olection?of a President versus the Elite- 'I.tora.l Colle a. And also do' you think smut. the [115) tended to congress as writ as the Presi- - decoy? I .. - I a. There are three basic questions 3. that come up. in the first place. i do 5 favor at least an automaticivote by E?:Presidentiat electors once the general election is completed. I think the Elec- l~tural for instance, should-Ilse . ?r'eliminated'. Whether'the ratio among leates of votes ought to be changed tl'm notorepared to comment on now. i int- or sional elections by public fil??d?T-If. has i proved to be successful. I behave. in ithe Presidential election.. i strongly favor? that. yes. And the other element ?of the overall package would be a sim- ple way-for American people. who are citizens and 13 years old Ito register to vote. And I am committed to that proposition and the vice President has - .graciously consented to take on this 'Ioveralt election process responsibility. :Those three wilLbe basic elements of Fthe proposals. it; 3? ?10. Relations With cabs i5 0.. Mr- Prettiest. are you._prepareo to lift the trade embargo 'agatnst Cuba gas one step toward normalizing reia- . 1' think- any substantial-move in 'four relationship with Cuba would have :an await further discussions with thorn-s -"_indirectly. andalso some tangible evia hence on our port that they are willing -,to restore basic hum-an rights inICuba, 5 involving the number of prisoners who {are being held. their attitude toward overseas adventures such as theone Iin Angola. and other matters. So can't Etay what might come in the future. I?m willing. though. to discuss these matters with the Cuban leader-Is. At this ime we have no direct relationships I ith thorn. political. But through inter- nediarics comments are' being ex- ?lhanged back and forth. Most of my. tomments are in public statements like 1 this. but we do have messages coming pack from people who visit Clubs. 3 . II. Befense Savings Goal" Q. In answer to an earlier question. President. you said that: you could- .n?t say whether nest yearI's'Idefcnso :iittdget will be' lower or higher than {this year?s. But as I understood your i tat-tier 'postion. you did want to achieve a five to seven oillion dollar savings- Eregarrlless of the overall level of spend- lag. Do you still hold with that figure? it that still your goal and a commit? . bent? ii A. Yes. The analyses that I?ve made the defense budget so far?which month's study just part-timemmdi- .ate' that that's a goal that will be leached. I . 1.12. Natural Gas Deregulation . Q. Mr. President, in letters to the :governors of Oklahoma. Texas and i iou-isiana last October. you said uncon~ iitionaily that you would'work with congress to' deregulate new natural gas. And i wondered ?if you' planned to keep that promise:e't . -.EII yn'n ru- lic financing should .be as- . is you know has been limited to about; - sa-tssm-?nua?b 14. Rise in Gasoline Tax - . Q. Another question. sir. on the sacria trees that you say your upcomin ener- gy program is going to deman is it hirely that one of those sacrifices is going to come in the form of a largely increased Federal gasoline tax? I- A. It don't know how to answer your questions about specifics of the ropes- at. I want to make this'clear. pur- pose of the energy policy evolution is not to cause sacri?ite or hardship among the American pe le.Unless i can demonstrate that in lance the temporary sacrifices in 'a certain area are far overcome by immediate and ul- Igunate bene?ts then nobody?s going to uy it. such a horrible on golf selfi- fusion in the energy field that houses knows- toilette going 'tn-hsppemrngext. 50 Home that the sacrifices "wit-I?fbe. by: the. benefits that the- far overcome Anterioanpeopleww-ill be easily?able to discern tor manual. . 1.5. US. Hot; on Canada Q. You said that in spite of the fact that the. Canadian licople would have to determine their future for them- selves. particularly in regard to the separatism issue in Quebec that you had-confidence that the issue would . be straightened out relatively peaceful- ly. Do you really think' that there is little concern in this country about the 'future of a unified Canada and is there Iapythin'g reallyi- that we can do about . it. There's a great deal of concern in 'this- country about the future of Canada 'and I have complete confi- dence. as I said in an interview with the Canadian news media in the sound of the Canadian people. I'm familiar?end even more familiar r'today than I was two days ago after Prime Minister Trudeau's visit?with the problems in Quebec and the inclina- tion of some of the French Canadians to have an independent status from. the resrof Canadian Provinces. I don?t. know what?s going to be the ultimate outcome. Butt believe that? we are so closely tied together with Canada on a mutually beneficial basis. sharing -. problems. sharing opportuni- ing companies that have joint owner ship. our exchange of energy sources. 'our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-. war. the Great: Lakes as far as water pol ution is concerned. the bringing of . Alaskan oil and natural gas down to us that we have got to have a continu- ing relationship with Canada, My own personal preference would be that. the commonwealth stay as it is and that Iare not be a separate Quebec province. But that's a decision for the Canadians to malted-11d I would certainly make no private or public move to try to determine the outcome of that great debate. 16. Keeping Campaign Promises Q. Mr. President. you've had a' month - now to enjoy-the view: fromthe Oval foice. Do you think you?ll be able to . . keeplfully alt-tho campaign promises you made? . I tau-As you know. we have issued'what I_believe is the complete book of my campaign promises. which is. I pre?. some. being made available to all of -. you. My determination is to keep all promises. I I obviously if circumstances should change i would have to reserve the I. end believe that we'v ..itpw goIt__ tics. sharing trade. sharing manufacturn - rut; t?dtne He not only probed with the heads-on those Governments and their Cabinet members their own positions. both pubi- lic and private on the controversial. issues that have so far prevented-[at 'peace in the Middle East. He also had a chance to compare their positions on? issuesmwhich oncs they found to. he in harmony. which,ones there was still a dispute. J. We also invited the leaders strolls those nations to meet with me. Iii-leg,r have all accepted I will be arc-ting with the heads of the nations in dispute. in the Middle East. all of them. before the end of'May. The first visit of :orl'e of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin-qt. believe. March 12. And he will be {Ole lowed by the leaders from Egypt. from Jordan and from Syria. from Saudis: Arablamnd I look forward to meeting with them. . at that point I hand i. will haven-r veryisitiear picture-of; what ?no the American Government ought rte-splay. Thesame thing appliesto the situa; tion that exists between curselvessnd Turkey. ourselves and selves and Cyprus We can't impose our will on other people. But it they honestly want to seek a solution. we are perfectly will- ing to offer Our good offices as a coon-1 try with influence and interest to help them resolve their own differences. nut; it's got to be done primarily by those countries involved. We have began again. and within the last thank. our discussions on .tha - Panama Canal Treaty. We have two' extremely good negotiators and I-hopo that we will have success there?. There?s. ?no .way that I can say at this noun: what degree of progress we have made. beginning. . I. So throu hour the areas of high dis- - pute. including South Africa and others thatl don't have time to- mention we're. probing as best we can to discern sump, possibility of resolution of those ten- sion areas. .. We are meeting todhlf. in factual]. this week with the British. to try to get a renewed proposal to make con- cerning the question surrounding Rpm. desia. And then of course. we?ll still have left Namb a andlulltirnately ons- jority rule 'ouestion in South But We only been in office a month. - I don?t claim to know all the easy as swers. And these questionstha-t have are not going to be easy to solve-?But well-e going to do the best we can open- ly and forcefully offering. our. good services. not trying to impose our-will on other people. ..-. Q. Thank you. Mr. President. Carter Errs And Ties Feb. 2-3 {Alli?Fresh- dent Carter made two errors inhis news conference today. uddch _.the. White House staff later corrected. Mr! Carter used a wrong date?fof the forthcoming visit to the Uni-ted States of Prime Mbtister Yitzhak Harbin of Israel. The President said that he thought the visit would. take place Marsh 12. The White ltotlse later corrected dint to say ?the proposed visit is tentatively planned for March and The White House also corrected the President?s statement that the United states does not have diplomatic rela'v tions with Uganda. I "This is not strictly accuraeeftthe as Writ as liar: ricot- :ncy? .. A. 'There are threa basic questions rat come up. In the first place, I do war at least an automatic'votc by residential electors once the general action is completed. I think the Elec- iral for instance. should-be inunated. Whethef'the ratio among area of votes ought to be changed In notpreaaredto comment on new. -. interlacing or (congres- onal elections by puhlic funds?4t has raved to he successful, I believe, in ie Presiddnti?al election; I strongly ivor' that, yes. And the other element the overall package would be a sim- le way-for American peoples-rho are linens and 18 years old to register i vote. And I am committed to that ?oposition and the Vice President has raciously consented to take on this icrall election process responsibility. hose three will be basic elements of proposals. -1o. Relations was coca Q. Mr. President, are youlpreparegl . lift the trade embargo against Cuba i one step toward normalizing rela- ans? ALI think any substantial ?_move in it relationship with Cuba w0uld'have' i await further discussions with them-- directly, and also some tangible evi- moe on our port that they are willing . restore basic human rights in_t3oba. volving the number of prisoners who a being held, their attitude toward terseas adventures such as theone Angola, and other matte-rs. So 1 can't. iy what might come in the future. I?m willing, though. to discuss these alters with the Cuban leaders. At this me we have no direct relationships ith than, political. But through inter- ediarics comments are being ex- tangcd back and lerlh. Most of my imments are in public statements like -is, but we do have messages coming icit from people who visit (lobe. I 1. Defense Savings Goal Q. In answer to an earlier ?questlon, President, you said that you could? t- say whether nest year's'defense idget will be lower or higher than is year's. But as I understand your irlier?postion, you did want to achieve five to seven billion dollar savings- :gardless of the overall level of spend- g. Do you still 'hold with that figure? that still your goal and a commit? ent. A. Yes. The analyses that I've made the defense budget so far?which is not to cause sacrifice or hardship among the American pe le.l.lnless I can demonstrate that in al-ance the temporary sacrifices in 'a certain area are far overcome by immediate and ul- tima?te benefits then nobody's going to buy it. "-J'rl'ld believe-that. We?v' fora: .gotj fusion in lens-yrs vrl-rat-Fs- ?oi-g tin-he a rose. So -I think- that. the far overcome hyg-lhu- benefits dist-me 15. Us. Rel on Canada Q. You said that in spite of the fact that the. Canadian veople would have to determine their future for them- selves. particularly in regard to the separatism issue in Quebec that you had: confidence that the is'sue would . be straightened out relatively peacefula ly. Do you- really think" 'that there is little concern in this country about the 'future of a unified Canada and is there ?gytbin'g really? that we can do about it. There's a great deal of concern in 'this- country about the future of Canada and I have complete confi- dence, as I said in an interview with- the Canadian news media in the sound judgmental? the Canadian people. I?m familiar?and even more familiar today than -I was two days ago after Prime Minister Trudeau's visit?with the problems in Quebec andrtiie inclina? tion of some of the French Canadians to have an independent status from the rest of Canadian Provinces. I don?t, know what?s going to be the ultimate outcome. Burl believe that" we are so closely tied together with Canada on a mutually beneficial basis, . sharing :prohlerns, sharing, opportuni- .ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur- i you know has been limited to about: month's study just part-time?n-indh rte that that?s a goal that will he ached. - - 12. Natural Gas Deregulation Q. Mr. President, in letters to the avernors of Oklahoma, Texas and misiama last October, you said uncon- tienafly that you would work with angress to' deregulate new natural is. end I wondered?if you' planned keep that promise, andif so how in will go about it? A. I don't ltnow how I'll coconut . I do try to keep my promises. The tuition that I have taken. and the :isition.lhat the governors of Oklaho- a and Texas tool: at governors con- :rences to which I was referring, was ie deregulation of natural gas for a nited period. of time. four to five tars, to see how it works out, leaving Listing contracts in effect. 't ing companies that have joint owner- ship, our exchange of "energy sources, 'our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea- way, the Great Lakes as far as water pol ution is concerned, the bringing of .Alasltan oil and natural gas down to us that we have got to have a continua - ing relationship with Canada. My own personal preference would he that the commonwealth stay as it is and that there not be a. separate Quebec province. but that?s a decision for the Canadians to make and I would certainly make no private or public move to try to detennina the cadence of that great debate. Ill. Keeping Campaign Promises Q. Mr. President, you?ve had a month - now to enjoy-the view fromthe Oval Office. Do you thinlt you'll be able to . keepfully all- the campaign pronuses you made? Ares you know, we have Issued what I [believe is the complete book of my campaign promises, which is. 1 pre- surneI being made available to all of you. My determination is to keep all those promises. Obviously if circumstances should change I would have to reserve the right to go back to the American peeple . and say "now that circumstances have changed. this a better approach to that particular problem." But I will do-rny utmost to keep all the campaign prom- ises that I made to the American peo~ ple.? 17. Production of 33-1 Q. Mr. President. you said-at various times during the campaign that the 3-1 Washington." have all accepted and I will be exacting with the'heads-of the nations in dispute. in the Middle East, all of them. before the end of May. The first visit abode of these leaders will he Mr. Rabin-Lil. believe, March 12. And he, will be fol: lowed by the leaderg {rem Egypt, from Jill-mi? 'Sr?a. from Saudis-"- such" a horrible conglomera ?mhl?rand 1.1901! the energy field that humid? forward to meeting with them-? -. .5. 4-1: goliat point I hood" I. will mists-i..- .- wnai iult?. the-.- ?m'erioa-n- Government, ought couples..- T-lieoatne 'tlti'rrg applicants lh?s?ilM?? .. . tion that'exists between ourselvesand Turkey.- ourselves and selves and Cyprus. .. ?We can?t impose our will on other people. But if they honestly want to seek-a solution, we are perfectly-will:- ing to offer our good offices as rice i try with influence and interest to help i them resolve their own differences. Jill-t it's got to be done primarily by those countries involved. We have begun again, and within- the last week, our-discussions on ,the. - Panama Canal Treaty. We have two: extremely good negotiators and I hope that we will have success there: There?s. no .?way that I can say at this ?ght? what degree of progress we have made. . 'ltisjust beginning. . -, .i do throughout the areas of high dis-i - pute, including South Africa and others i that don?t have time to- mention weird probing as best; we can todiscern some. possibility of resolution of these ten- 5101'! areas. .. We are meeting today. in factiall- this weal: with the'British, to tryto, get a renewed proposal to malts co - .- cerning the question surroundin Rho?J desta. And then, of course, we?ll still' have lei-t Ramble and ultimately jority rulelquestion in 'South But I've only been in office a month. i I don'tcla?im to know all the easy 53:11:: swers. And these questionsthat have are not going to be easy to solvelliut wells oing to do the best we can open- ly an forcefully otferingourgood services, not; trying to impose our-will another people. - Q. Thank you, lvlr. President. Carter Errs on Rabin: And U.S.-Uga-nda Ties wasnevorou. Fee. 23 (nape-ass" dent Carter made two errors inhis. news conference today. Wlme Hence staff later corrected . .- Carter used a wrong darte'fdr'? the forthcoming visit to the United. .- States of Prime l?vltinister Yitzhalr Robins of Israel. The President said that he. thought the visit would take 1313113131.! norm-12. . . The White House later corrected that; to say "the proposed visit is tentatively plaunerl for March 1' and . The White House also corrected President's statement that the United States does not have diplomatic tiona with Uganda. "This is not strictly correction said. explaining: "wrote mediated States has willie" dravm. its mission from Uganda aml., has no direct diplomatic representation there. "United States affairs in the Republic of Uganda are carried out? tlrrou-gh the West'German embassy and? the-Republic of Uganda has an querat? .. mg embassy. and charge d?affaires-ln -. ML. 13-00000 POST i 6 CIA Admits I: WW9 Working to Wm Raise Sub I By Times; 3. Robinson Wuhlmon Post ?tn? Writer The Central Intelligence heency term exempge. forced hlic sues score on men the case last y? w?ed?g p? October that even the- attorneys in- it was invoiced in tho Giorner solved still have not been sh! to Explorer 5 attempts to raise sunken: 1.9% The opinion was issued in that Russian snhnIini-ine frorn- the fi?scific secret fashion upon direct orders of Ocean ?aun- - . - - til; gout-It; {IzI-f Appeals whitebafifif; see accept secre - .r The tar? anknu??menih?m?gl devits from high level government oi" - a ?Lu? 1? iicisls concerning the case. Court of Appeals '33? the ?mi-9 Public thrown: filed at the ninety; partmcut two weeks ago. The docu- i'ioriner President Fordfs top national rnent asked that a suit against the 1 security Lt.. Gen. Brent Seow? CIAI by 2, private group concerning. croft sa disclosures of the CIA to- Ii the Glamor's ?nancing he sent back 9:12:33: . t0 3 10?? ?all": in? further hearings: offended by the project toI IreItIaliIsteI: The ?ling merits an nbruptchonge against the United States..- from the previous position taken by gag-d that hetsiistion? the Justice Betterment in the 13' i 'inight take the. forrn- lot j?strong meas- '2 month-old case that the mere dcknowl- Ir urea" that might ?endanger UIQ mili-' edgement of the CIA's inrolrement in tar}; and diplomatic personnel and: 31%! himJE? ?rail: 11!: businessmen overseas. .. . one securi r. on: operation of the project has been re' 5 - ported in numerous publications, the . port- of .3 classified U5. 30V: 121;?! ernnient project ?to accomplish oer? ?53 533? p? 3" WI er ose secret theirs .in furtherance Iof na- ports Were true. -- tionoIl securityc objectives" The case hronght by the nonproiit I . Military Audit Project which rnonia tors spending by the defense me his telligence has in- solved an unprecedented amount-o1: I secret court proceedings as the attempted to prove'the need for see- rem.t to US. District ConrtJudge Ger- hard A. Gesell. The suit seeks the fi- nancisi details of the Glamor project. - m- -.- ?Jinn?.1? .u