(V0 Claudia A. Reis (Bar SUPERIOR ecurzr semen couw?rv FILED .LENZO REIS, LLC JUN 1 2 2017 360 Mount Kemble Avenue, Suite 1004 Morristown, NJ 07960 a 6 ?4 . (973) 845-9922 DEPUTY CLERK Attorneys for Plainti? SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: BERGEN COUNTY HERMAN SAVAGE, Plaintiff DOCKET NO.: BER-L-445 1-15 V- Civil Action CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND Defendant Plaintiff Herman Savage says the following by way of the First Amended Complaint against defendant: THE PARTIES 1. Plaintiff Herman Savage (?Plaintiff? or ?Lt. Savage?) currently resides in the Borough of Fort Lee, County of Bergen, State of New Jersey. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiff was employed by defendant City of Englewood as a Lieutenant by the City of Englewood Police Department (?Department?). 2. Defendant City of Englewood (?Englewood?) is municipality within the County of Bergen, State of New Jersey. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 1. Plaintiff, a black of?cer who has been employed by the Township for the past twenty-two years, has always received satisfactory performance evaluations. 2. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was employed by defendant Englewood as a Lieutenant. 3. On or about August 15, 2013, the Department issued an Order (?Order?) announcing that a promotional examinations would be administered on January 4, 2014, including for a promotion to the rank of Captain. 4. The Department had two available promotions to the rank of Captain. 5. Pursuant to the Order, all individuals interested in participating in the promotional examination were required to indicate their interest on or before 5:00 pm. on Wednesday, September 4, 2013. 6. On or about October 7, 2014, the Department issue a Reading List for the promotional examination. 7. Five Lieutenants expressed interest in being considered for the promotion to Captain. 8. Three of the lieutenants who expressed interest in the promotion to Captain are black, one is white, and one is Latina. 9. Prior to the January 4, 2014, written examination, Chief Suffem made clear that the promotional decision had already been made, at least in part, when he told then?Lt. Halstead and Lt. Hayes, both of whom are black, that he would not be able to promote both of them to Captain even though there were two available promotions to Captain. . 10. On the day of the written examination, Chief Suffern publicly advised the examinees that a score of 75 was necessary to move on to the oral interview phase of the promotional exam. At the conclusion of the written examination, the President of the Supervisor?s Union advised Plaintiff and others that despite Chief Suffem?s statement to the contrary, the Department wanted all of the lieutenants to move on to the interview phase of the promotional process regardless of their score on the written examination. 12. Chief Suffern subsequently advised that City Manager Timothy J. Dacey, who is white, insisted that all of the lieutenants be interviewed regardless of their score on the written examination. 13. The written examination and scoring was entirely objective in nature given that the questions asked sought responses to policing questions and, as such, the scoring for the written examination was unbiased given that it did not require the individuals making the promotional decisions to interj ect their udgrnents about the responses or candidates. 14. Plaintiff received the second highest score and then-Lt. (now Captain) Halstead received the highest score on the objective written examination for the promotion to Captain. 15. Then-Lt. (now Captain) Torell, who is white, received one of the lowest scores (if not the lowest score) of all those participating in the written phase of the examination process and, indeed, scored below the passing score of 75. 16. Chief Suffem, Deputy Chief Loschiavo, City Manager Dacey, and Arielle Greenbaum Saposh, an HR employee, administered the verbal interview phase of the promotional examination. 17. Almost all (if not all) of the questions asked of the interviewees during the verbal [interview for the promotion to Captain solicited subjective responses thereby permitting, and indeed requiring, those administering the interview to interject their personal feelings and biases into the assessment. 18. On or about March 6, 2014, Chief Suffern advised Plaintiff that he was not selected for the promotion. 19. On or about March 18, 2014, the Department issued a Personnel Order announcing that Torell, who is white and achieved the lowest score on the written examination, and Halstead were promoted to Captain. 20. Even though the two most quali?ed and highest scoring individuals were black, the Defendant re?ised to promote them both to Captain and, instead, promoted a less quali?ed white male who failed to even pass the written examination and, in fact, achieved one of the lowest scores on the written test. 21. Since January 2014 when Chief Suffern became the Chief of Police, defendant has a. not hired any black of?cers even though it has hired approximately eight non-black officers; b. denied a black (non-of?cer) employee a promotion to a supervisory position and hired two white individuals for the position at issue; c. disproportionately granted promotions to White of?cers; and d. has reserved plumb assignments for non-black of?cers such as assignments to the Criminal Investigation Bureau or Police Evidence Unit. 22. Chief Suffern has expressed the opinion that defendant?s black of?cers are lazy, do not work hard, and fail to take actions to better their situations but has not expressed similar broad- sweeping sentiments about White employees. . 23. After being put on notice of Plaintiff?s discrimination claim, the Department undertook a campaign to retaliate against Plaintiff for disclosing and objecting to the race discrimination to which he was subjected, which campaign included but is not limited to: a. Unfairly targeting Plaintiff by instituting and pursuing various unwarranted Internal Affairs investigations against Plaintiff; b. Seeking and imposing signi?cantly harsher discipline upon Plaintiff than white police of?cers who engaged in similarly minor conduct or signi?cantly more egregious conduct, and (ii) of?cers who had not complained about unlawful discrimination; c. Pursuing Internal Affairs investigations against Plaintiff at the behest of Sergeant Sean Carnahan, a subordinate of?cer who is closely aligned to and doing the bidding of defendant, Chief Suffern, Captain Halstead, Captain Torell, and Lieutenant Delarosa, who is a member of the Professional Standards Unit for the Defendant and, therefore, responsible for Internal Affairs Investigations; d. Failing to pursue internal affairs investigations against white of?cers and/or of?cers who have not complained about discrimination even though they engage in conduct similar to or worse than that alleged to have been engaged in Plaintiff; e. Pursuing criminal charges for simple assault and terroristic threats against Plaintiff as a result of Sgt. Carnahan?s allegations even though it took no action against Sgt. Carnahan who ?rst challenged plaintiff to a physical altercation; f. Instituting an Internal Affairs Complaint and seeking to impose major discipline upon Plaintiff for allegedly stating in the presence of Sgt. Carnahan that he ?sees a bite while failing to pursue similar charges or seek any discipline against Police Of?cer Timothy Barrett who re?ised to talk to the African-American female administrative assistant and, instead, threatened her that ?bitches end up in ditches? or Lieutenant Fred Pulice who immediately asked her if she?d rather be a bitch or a snitch; g. Seeking diSproportionately severe discipline against plaintiff such as greater than a thirty-day suspension and ultimately consenting to such a suspension arising from Plaintiff?s ?bitch? comment to Sgt. Camahan but imposing less discipline upon a white male police of?cer who had not complained of discrimination but who had been videotaped masturbating in his uniform while at work on duty; h. Maliciously subjecting Plaintiff to unjusti?ed Internal Affairs investigations and charging him with insubordination for not answering Of?cer Delarosa?s request for information relating to an incident involving another of?cer?s treatment of a prisoner even though Plaintiff had already provided all requested information to his superior of?cer and confirmed that no further information was necessary; and i. Harassing Plaintiff by subjecting him to an Internal Affairs investigation because a White police of?cer fallaciously claimed to have felt offended by Plaintiff?s alleged use of the term ?mother fucker? during a private conversation with another police of?cer. 24. It is clear that Sgt. Camahan is targeting Plaintiff on behalf of or to garner favor with defendant given that Plaintiff and Sgt. Camahan always worked together cordially prior to Plaintiff opposing the racial discrimination to which he was subjected and Sgt. Camahan?s recent harassing complaints against Plaintiff were either made to and/or reviewed by Captain Torell whom Plaintiff alleged was not quali?ed for the promotion to Captain. 25. It is also clear that defendant is retaliating against Plaintiff and imposing disproportionately harsh discipline upon him while covering up the unlawful conduct of white police o?icers, and speci?cally Sgt, Camahan. who have not complained of discrimination. For example, a. On April 21, 2017, one of defendant?s police of?cers attempted to stop a motor vehicle that was speeding through the streets of Englewood. b. Once the police of?cer?s emergency lights and sirens were activated, the vehicle began to ?ee at a high rate of speed, ran two red lights, and eventually entered Route 4 West as it was pursued by several police cars. 0. After ?nally stopping the vehicle, it was discovered that the driver was Sgt. Camahan, who had called out of work for his shift that evening. d. At the time that his vehicle was stopped, Sgt. Carnahan was intoxicated, belligerent, and directing profanity at the of?cers at the scene. e. Not only was Sgt. Camahan not arrested, his vehicle was not towed, he was not issued any summonses, and he was allowed to drive home in an impaired condition. f. The Defendant took no action whatsoever against Sgt. Camahan or any of the of?cers who failed to arrest him and allowed him to drive home while under the in?uence. 26. Chief Suffem, Captain Halstead, Captain Torell, and the Professional Standards Unit, Led by Lieutenant Delarosa are closely aligned with Sergeant Carnahan. Their personal relationships with each other appear to guide and interfere with their ability to properly address matters relating to both plaintiff and Sgt. Camahan?s misconduct. 27. It is clear that the defendant is protecting Sgt. Camahan for doing its bidding and retaliating against Plaintiff and imposing disproportionately harsh discipline upon him while covering up the unlawful conduct of white police officers speci?cally and especially Sgt. Camahan who have not complained of discrimination. 28. Defendant?s conduct makes clear that it is intent on a pursuing a never?ending campaign of retaliatory Internal Affairs investigations and disproportionately harsh disciple upon Plaintiff in retribution for his ?ling of a Complaint in this matter. FIRST COUNT IN VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION) 29. Plaintiff repeats all of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. . 30. Defendant violated the (New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, 1025~1 et_sch, by discriminating against plaintiff on the basis of his race. 3 . As a result of defendant?s unlawful conduct, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer economic losses, statutorily recognized emotional distress, harm to career, harm to reputation, and other such damages compensable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against defendant for the following: a. Compensatory damages; b. Consequential damages; c. Punitive damages; d. Attorneys? fees with enhancement; e. Costs of suit; f. Pre-j udgment and post-judgment interest; and g. Such other relief as the Court may deem equitable and just. SECOND COUNT (RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRINIINATIOM 32. Plaintiff repeats all of the foregoing allegations as if ?illy set forth herein. 33. Defendant violated the (New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, 10:5-1 gig? by retaliating against Plaintiff for opposing the discrimination to which he was subjected by unfairly instituting and pursuing baseless IA charges against Plaintiff and targeting Plaintiff while not similarly subjecting Sgt. Carnahan to an IA investigation even though, by his own admission, he threatened Plaintiff with physical violence. . 34. As a result of defendant?s unlawful conduct, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer economic losses, statutorily recognized emotional distress, harm to career, harm to reputation, and other such damages compensable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against defendant for the following: a. Compensatory damages; b. Consequential damages; 0. Punitive damages; d. Attorneys? fees with enhancement; e. Costs of suit; f. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and g. Such other relief as the Court may deem equitable and just. LENZO REIS, LLC Claudia A. Reis Dated: June 9, 2017 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff hereby demands a jury tn'al on all issues subject to trial by jury. LENZO REIS, LLC Attorneys for .Plaim?i?r By: Claudia A. Reis Dated: June 9, 2017 DESIGNATION OF TRIAL COUNSEL Plaintiff hereby designates Claudia A. Reis as his trial counsel. LENZO REIS, LLC Attorneys for Plaintz? A By: Claudia A. Reis Dated: June 9, 2017 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge, this matter is not the subject of any other action pending in any court or of a pending arbitration proceeding, and that no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated at this time. I further certify that to the best of my knowledge, there are no non-parties who should be joined in this action at this time. LENZO REIS, LLC Attorneys for Plaintiff Claudia A. Reis Dated: June 9, 2017