District of Columbia
Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department

Incident Review Committee

Report

A


 

Structure Fire 809 Street NE.
Washington, DC
Incident Date August 2, 2017

March 31, 2018

Incident Review Committee
809 Street NE.
Incident Date ?August 2, 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 
. 
Acknowledgements .. 
Executive Summary 
The Intersection 
Investigation 
Incident Timelines 
Company Speci?c Actions . . . .. . 

Training and Experience 

Causeoflnjury . 
PersonalProtectiveEquiprnent 
Self? Contained Breathing Apparatus .. . . . . .. . 
Weather Conditions .. . . . . . . . . 
Contributing Factors 
Findings and Recommendations. .. . .. 
NFPA Compliance Table . . 
Exhibit A 
Exhibit 

.I. - I . DOI

Fire and EMS Department

The District of Columbia Fire and EMS Department protects the lives and property of over
600,000 residents of the District of Columbia as well as the thousands of visitors and workers
who are in the city each business day. The area served by the DC. Fire and EMS Department
covers 68.3 square miles and is bordered by the states of Maryland and Virginia.

The Department had responded tol66,520 incidents as of August 1, 2017 which can be
categorized as follows:

0 Fire related responses
0 29,461

up EMS related responses
0 137,059

During that same period, Engine Company 3 responded to 2,821 calls for service and Truck
Company 7 responded to 2,254 calls for assistance.

The DC. Fire and EMS Department is comprised of dual role and single role professional
?re?ghters and EMS personnel. The District of Columbia maintains 33 ?re stations with 33
engine companies (of which, 21 are staffed with a paramedic), 16 aerial ladder truck companies,
3 heavy-duty rescue squads, 1 hazardous materials company, 4 ?re boats, and 44 EMS transport
units.' Engine companies are staffed with an of?cer and 3 ?re?ghters. Aerial ladder truck
companies and rescue squads are each staffed with an of?cer and 4 ?re?ghters.

There are four shifts (platoons) providing coverage, with each platoon working a 24-hour day
that begins at 7:00 am. On each platoon there are seven (7) Battalion Fire Chiefs and a Deputy
Fire Chief assigned to the Operations Division and Special Operations Division. A Lieutenant or
a Captain is assigned to each engine, truck, and rescue squad on each shift. A Sergeant is
assigned to each of the ladder trucks and is used to replace regularly assigned of?cers in the
Operations/ Special Operations Division that may be absent annual leave, training, etc.).

The standard initial assignment for a reported structure ?re is referred to as a ?box alarm? and
includes the following:

5 Engines
0 The 1st and 3rd due Engines report to the front of the structure
0 The 2nd and 4th due Engines report to the rear of the structure
0 The 5th due Engine is assigned as the Rapid Intervention Crew
0 2 Trucks
0 The 1st due Truck reports to the front of the structure
0 The 2nd due Truck reports to the rear of the structure
a 2 Battalion Fire Chiefs
0 The 1st due Chief is assigned as the Incident Commander
C) The 2nd due Chief is assigned as needed, at the discretion of the Incident
Commander
1 Rescue Squad
1 Ambulance

Incident Review Committee

The following individuals were appointed to the DC. Fire and EMS Departrnent?s Incident
Review Committee by Fire EMS Chief Gregory M. Dean:

Chairperson:
0 Charles Battle, Battalion Fire Chief - Washington, DC. Fire EMS Department
Members:

ChristOpher Sefton, Battalion Fire Chief - Washington, DC. Fire EMS Department
Michael Knight, Battalion Fire Chief Washington, DC. Fire EMS Department

Daniel Mccoy, Battalion Fire Chief - Washington, DC. Fire EMS Department

Mitchell Kannry, Battalion Fire Chief - Washington, DC. Fire EMS Department

Gary Steen, Battalion Fire Chief -Washington, DC. Fire EMS Department

Shawn Downs, Captain - Washington, DC. Fire EMS Department

Brian Gray, Captain- Representative for International Association of Fire?ghters, Local 36
Jeffrey Folts, - Detective, Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)

Goals and Objectives

The ?ndings provided herein outline a summary of the events that led to the injury of a member
of the DC. Fire and EMS Department.

The Incident Review Committee followed the International Association of Fire?ghters (Division
of Occupational Health, Safety and Medicine) Investigation Manual for Fire?ghter Line of Duty
Death or Injury as a resource for the proper way to memorialize their ?ndings.

This document is designed to be easily understood by audiences of varying backgrounds and will
provide a descriptive analysis of the contributing factors and recommendations required to
correct all concerns.

The primary purpose of the investigation is to identify any actions that can be initiated to Drevent
future occurrences of iniurv or death. The report does not determine fault or assign blame.

Acknowledgements

The Incident Review Cormnittee acknowledges the following individuals and organizations that
assisted the committee in completing this report:

Detective Jeffrey olts- Metropolitan Police Department

I: Safety Engineer Timothy R. Merinar? National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH)

- Safety and Occupational Health Specialist Karis M. Kline- National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)

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Executive Summary

In the late evening hours of August 2, 2017, a house ?re was reported in the area of 8th St. and 
St. NE Washington, DC. A box alarm assignment was dispatched and units subsequently found
a house on ?re at 809 St. NE. While units were reSponding into the scene, the 1St due Truck
Company (Truck Company 7), unwittingly struck the ?re?ghter (Lineman) from Engine
Company 3, temporarily pinning him between the rear of the engine and the side of the ladder
truck.

As soon as members became aware that a ?re?ghter was injured, Truck Company 7 immediately
backed-up and observed Engine Company 3?s Lineman fall to the ground with critical injuries.
Members from Engine Company 3, Truck Company 7, and Engine Company 6 began immediate
life saving measures. The Lineman from Engine Company 3 was transported to Medstar Hospital
by Medic 3 with life threatening injuries.

Fireground operations continued without interruption concurrent with the medical interventions
provided to the injured member. The ?re was held to the original ?re building and was
eventually extinguished by units on the scene. It was not until after the ?re was extinguished
that the gravity of the situation became apparent to members on the incident.

At the request of the Fire and EMS Chief, a review committee was formed to investigate the
incident. The goal of the committee was to determine the facts of. how this incident occurred,
identify any contributing factors, and offer recommendations for how to prevent future incidents.

What is contained herein is the culmination of the committee?s work, including interviews with
over forty members, examination of physical evidence, and our best efforts (in concert with the
Metropolitan Police Department Crash Investigation Team) to establish a recreation of the
incident scene.

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Investigation Summary

On August 2, 2017, a ?re?ghter (Lineman) assigned to Engine Company 3 was critically injured
when he was pinned between a moving ladder truck and a stationary engine while performing
?re?ghting duties in response to an indent at 809 St. NE.

At 11:33 pm, a box alarm assignment for the report of a house ?re near the intersection of 8th St.
and St. NE. was dispatched on radio channel 01. The order of dispatch was: Engine Company
3, Engine Company 18, Engine Company 8, Engine Company 2, Engine Company 6, Truck
COmpany 7, Truck Company 4, Battalion Fire Chief 6, Battalion Fire Chief 3, Rescue Squad 3
and Ambulance 13.

While responding into the scene, Engine Company 6 and Engine Company 18 arrived out of
sequence and requested that the order of dispatch be changed since no other units had committed
to any assigned tasks at that time.1

The Of?cers in Charge (01C) of Engine Company 6 and Engine Company 18 requested on radio
channel 07 that they be placed due on the box alarm assignment. Engine Company 6?s
request was not acknowledged. Engine Company 18 was granted permission to take due
position, and the response assignment was adjusted.

The new order of dispatch was: Engine Company 18, Engine Company 8, Engine Company 3,
Engine Company 2, Engine Company 6, Truck Company 7, Truck Company 4, Battalion Fire
Chief 6, Battalion Fire Chief 3, Rescue Squad 3 and Ambulance 13. 2

Dispatched units continued to the scene to take their assigned positions. Engine Company 3 took
a position at a hydrant in the 800 block St. NE. and its members prepared to deploy a backup
attack line. Once Truck Company 7 entered the block to turn east onto the 800 block of St.
NE, the Wagon Driver from Engine Company 3, motioned for Truck Company 7 to stop so that
he could remove the humat valve from the middle of the intersection.

Truck Company 7 stopped as requested and then continued to proceed into the block. As the
apparatus was moving past Engine Company 3, it stopped abruptly as it appeared that Truck
Company 7 had made contact with Engine Company 3.

As soon as members became aware that there had been an impact, Truck Company 7
immediately backed-up. At that time, it became apparent that the Lineman (Engine Company 3)
had been struck and temporarily pinned between the rear of Engine Company 3 and Truck
Company 7. Members immediately exited Truck Company 7 and collectively worked with
members from Engine Company 6 and Engine Company 3 to render aide.

 

1 DC. Fire and EMS Department allows for companies to request a change in assignment if they are closer to
the incident than other units responding to the scene.

2 DC. Fire and EMS Department require that 2 Engine Companies and a Truck Company report to side A of
the building and 2 Engines and a Truck report to side of the building. Per the new dispatch assignment, Engine
Companies 18, 3, and Truck 7 were to report to side A of the structure. Engine Companies 8, 2, and Truck 4 were to
report to side of the structure.

8

An initial radio transmission was made to Battalion Fire Chief 6 which stated a person was
injured and needed immediate medical attention. Ambulance 18 and Medic 3 assisted along with
EMS 6. The Lineman was subsequently treated and transported to MedStar Washington Hospital
Center for immediate medical care.

Detailed description of the investigation and the information foun_d:

The Safety Of?cer was dispatched per Standard Operating Guidelines on the Working Fire
Dispatch as the Incident Safety Of?cer. After performing his normal ?reground activities, he
was noti?ed that there was a signi?cant Fire?ghter injury and began his accident investigation.

The Safety Of?cer reported to the intersection of 8th and St. NE. and began to take pictures of
the apparatus. Pictures were taken of Engine Company 3, Truck Company 7, and the
intersection. -

Initial investigative measures were conducted by the on-duty Safety Of?cer Captain Shawn
Downs, who was later joined by Deputy Fire Chief Kenneth Crosswhite and Assistant Fire Chief
David Foust. Additionally, the Metropolitan Police Department Major Crash Investigation Team
was dispatched and worked with the members of DC. Fire and EMS to investigate the incident.
The members of MPD included Detective Michael Peppennan, Detective Phuson Nguyen and
Lieutenant Ronald Wilkins. MPD later reassigned the case to Detective Jeffrey Folts (who
maintained the investigation lead throughout the remainder of the investigation).

The investigation revealed that Engine Company 3 was positioned near the hydrant located at the
southeast comer of the intersection on St. NE (800 block). Engine Company 3 had positioned
the rear of their apparatus so that it was protruding into the intersection and was so angled that
the driver?s side was further into the intersection than the of?cer?s side.

Truck Company 7 turned into the 800 block of St. NE. from Northbound 8th St. NE. and had
to st0p in a semi jack-knifed position while Engine Company 3?s Wagon Driver was clearing a
humat valv4e from Engine Company 18 (which was in the middle of the road obstructing the
roadway).

The position of Truck Company 7 was such that the tractor portion of the apparatus was in the
800 block of St. NE. (alongside the driver?s side of Engine Company 3) while the trailer
portion of the apparatus remained on '8?h St. NE. This spatial dynamic left the Truck Driver with
no line-of-sight to the rear of Engine Company 3 or the majority of the trailer. This position put
the trailer directly behind Engine Company 3 and left an approximate two-foot gap between the
back step of Engine Company 3 and the of?cer?s side of Truck Company 7?s trailer.

While the truck was stopped, the Lineman and Layout man from Engine Company 3 moved into
the gap between Truck Company 7 and Engine Company 3 and were attempting to pull their
400? attack line. This action diminished the ability of the Truck Driver and Tilleiman to observe

 

3 The initial pictures are after Truck Company 7 had already repositioned.

4 A humat valve is a water appliance connected to a supply line that is used to receive and relay water.

them and to safely proceed further in to the block. It is estimated that Truck Company 7 was
stopped for 10?15 seconds.

Once this obstacle was cleared, the Wagon Driver from Engine Company 3 motioned for Truck
Company 7 to proceed into the block. It is unclear if there was any communication between the
Truck Driver and Tillerman before they began moving into the block.5

During the time that Truck Company 7 began to pull fonvard, Truck Company 4 (2nd due) came
through the intersection of 8th St. and St. NE. traveling southbound on 8'h St NE. The
position of Truck Company 4 occupied the southbound lane of 8th St NE, opposite ofF St. NB.
This prohibited the Tillerman of Truck Company 7 from steering the trailer further into 8'h St.
NE. to assist in making the turn onto St. NE. (generally done to increase turning radius), due
to the potential to strike Truck Company 4.

While Truck Company 7 was in the turning position, the area on the trailer (immediately behind
the ?fth wheel and around the outrigger controls) was not visible to the Tillerman. When Truck
Company 7 moved forward at a very slow speed to complete their turn onto St. NE, the trailer
made contact with the Lineman (who was grabbing a hose load and had stepped behind the
driver?s side rear compartments of Engine Company 3).

Just as Truck Company 7 moved forward, the Tillerman and Barman (in the cab of Truck
Company 7) observed that it appeared that the side of the truck had struck the rear of Engine
Company 3. Members immediately shouted for the Truck Driver to stop concurrent with the
Tillerman?s reaction to depress the stop buzzer. The Tillerman communicated with the Truck
Driver to backup, and when they did, the Tillerman saw the injured ?re?ghter fall from between
the two pieces of apparatus. Members from Engine Company 3 (Of?cer in Charge and Layout
man), Engine Company 6 (entire crew) and Truck Company 7 (Barman and Hookman)
immediately began to render aide.

This Space is Intentionallv Left Blank

 

5 During the interview process, neither the Truck Driver nor the Tillerman ?'om Truck Company 7 could recall with
great detail if communication was initiated prior to or after the signi?cant incident.

lO

Incident Timelines Data Summary)?

0 initial 911 caller advised that a house was on ?re at the intersection
of 8th St NE.
0 2nd call advised that he can see a house on ?re from the building

across the the caller was located in the 500 block of 9th St NE. the caller also
gave 8th St southeast corner 2 houses in ..facing street

0 the 2?d call was entered into CAD (the second call was entered and sent
before the ?rst call)
I Engine 3 (3.1mm); Engine 18 (3.2 min); Engine 8 (4.2 min); EngineZ (4.8

min); Engine6 (5.0 min); Truck 7 (3.1 min); Truck 4 (5.7 min). rescue 3 and
Ambulance 13 were dispatched

- Engine 18 arrived

0 Engine 6 arrived

I Engine 3 arrived

0 Truck 4 arrived

0 Truck 7 arrived

0 Engine 18 advises the address is 809 St. 2 Story smoke showing.

6 Truck 7- Man down behind the engine 3 hit by the ?re truck

23:37:07 .. BC6 (could not have heard the transmission) advised he copied the corrected
address

I 23:37:20 . Engine 3 advises ?Scene priority; member was hit by a truck; unconscious,

need a medic; 8th also need someone to take the line.?

23:37:31..
23:37:48..

.. Medic 3 is dispatched (3.1 min)
. Engine 6 to BC advises to take truck 7 3 engine out on this one need

a medic 8th St NE. . .. Priority I struck by vehicle.

I 23:41 :21 .. Medic 3 in on the scene (avl)

- Working Fire Dispatch

- 23:42:51 . .. Medic 3 is transporting (AVL)

0 2nd alarm Dispatched

- Medic 3 noti?es Med star 3-5 min ETA trauma to the chest and head
- BC6 advises cave in support not needed

0 23:50:51 . .. Medic 3 arrives at Med-star (AVL)

0 All visible ?re has been knocked down checking for hot spots

0 BC4 responding to med-star to checking on staging units can
return to service, with the exception of Engine 7, Engine 4 and truck 10

0 BC6 requested animal control for cat in the building

BC6 advices any unit needing debrie?ng/PISD respond to the command post

I BC6 advises truck 7 to remain out of service. they are not to return to service

 

6 These times are approximate and are not considered to be absolute with regard to arrival of units on scene.

11

I BC6 advises remaining units to return to the ?rehouse out of service for
rehab. and a quick visit to med-star (if you want)

Company-Speci?c Actions
Engine Company 18

Initially dispatched 2nd due Engine (in quarters), but arrived after Engine Company 6 and just
prior to Engine Company 3. The following radio traf?c occurred:

- E-18 ?Engine 18 is on the scene, request permission. . .(inaudible)?

Battalion Fire Chief 6 ?last unit you were broken up, I need the corrected address,
what?s the corrected address??

- E-18 ?Engine 18 is on the scene, we are able to take 1St due. We have a hydrant at 8th
and F, I?ll call you back with a corrected address Chief.?

- Battalion Fire Chief 6 ?0k, Engine 18 is going to take due on the assignment?

Engine Company 18 laid a supply line from the northeast corner of the intersection, and left the
humat valve in the middle of the street. The hydrant at the intersection was actually located on
the southeast comer of the intersection. They were assigned to the Attack Group and followed

all Department once inside the structure.

Engine Company 3

Dispatched as due Engine (in quarters) and arrived right behind Engine Company 18.
Battalion Fire Chief 6 asked them to take the due position, but the Of?cer in Charge stated
they were in position to pick up Engine Company 18?s supply line, and were reassigned as 3rd
due. The following are the actions of the members of Engine Company 3:

Wagon Driver

The Wagon Driver placed the wagon in the 800 Block of St. NE. in a position to hook-up to
the hydrant utilizing his front soft sleeve. The Wagon Driver exited the apparatus and cleared
Engine Company 18? humat valve from the middle of the street and then waved Truck
Company 7 into the block.7

Lineman (injured ?re?ghter)
The Lineman exited on the of?cer?s side of the apparatus (right side) and went to the rear of the

vehicle via the right side of the apparatus and prepared to deploy the 400? inch and one-half
attack line.8

 

7 The Wagon Driver ?Inernher that has the responsibility of operating the apparatus (Engine) on all assigned
responses. This member is usually a Technician but any member quali?ed to drive can be assigned to that position
for that tour of duty. Note: The Wagon Driver on duty was not a regularly assigned Technician, and was a ?ll?in
driver

8 Lineman? member that has the responsibility of operating the hose line and extinguishing all visible ?re. This
member is usually anyone assigned to that position for that tour of duty.

12

Layout man

The Layout man exited on the driver?s side (left side) and went towards the rear of the vehicle
via the left side of the apparatus to assist in deploying the hose line. Once at the rear of the
apparatus, the Layout man stated he had to tum sideways and squeeze between a stopped Truck
Company 7 and the rear of Engine Company 3. He then had to move past the Lineman at the
rear pf the apparatus, to take a position to assist in deploying the 400? inch and one-half attack
line.

Of?cer in Charge

The Of?cer in Charge (OIC) ordered the Lineman and Layout man to deploy the 400? inch and
one?half attack line (located on the driver?s side rear of the apparatus). The OIC initially took a
few steps to move towards the ?re building. He then stopped and went back to the rear of the
apparatus to assist with deploying the attack line. Once he saw the position of Truck Company 7
in relation to Engine Company 3, he told his crew members to ?hold-up? but at that point, Truck
Company 7 had already begun to m0ve forward. 

The OIC stated that as the apparatus converged at an extremely slow speed, the Lineman?s body
was lifted off of the ground. The OIC grabbed the Lineman?s SCBA straps and held onto him in
an attempt to support him while shouting for Truck Company 7 to back-up. Once Truck
Company 7 backed-up, the OIC stated that he along with the Layout man (Engine Company 3)
and other companies began to render aide to the injured ?re?ghter.

While care was being provided to the Lineman, the OIC made a ?Priority? radio transmission to
Battalion Fire Chief 6 advising of an unconscious member that was struck by a truck and that
additional resources were needed.10

Truck Company 7

Truck Company 7 was dispatched as the l"l due Truck and approached the scene by responding
Northbound on 8th St. NE. As Truck Company 7 attempted to navigate the right turn onto St.
N.E., they had to come to a complete stop in order for the Wagon Driver from Engine Company
3 to remove Engine Company 18?s humat valve from the middle of the street on St. NE. The
Tillerman states that after stopping, Truck Company 4 came through the intersection which
limited his ability to maneuver the trailer into the intersection and around Engine Company 3.

Once the humat valve was cleared from St. NE, Truck Company 7 began to move forward to
complete their turn into the block. Due to the position of the tractor, the Truck Driver had a
limited view of the trailer and the side of Engine Company 3. When the truck started to move,

 

9 The Layout Man - member that has the shared responsibility of ensuring that a water supply has been established.
Member works in concert with the Wagon Driver and when not assisting in that capacity is responsible for working
with the Lineman to ensure all visible ?re has been extinguished. 

19 Of?cer in Charge member of the rank of Sergeant, Lieutenant, or Captain that is responsible for the day to day

activities of his company in and out of quarters. This member is a supervisor and directs his crew towards the
completion of an assigned task. Note: The OIC was a Sergeant and not the regularly assigned Of?cer on duty.

13

the Tillermap believed that the trailer had struck Engine Company 3 and immediately said ?Stop,
stop, stop!? 1

As Truck Company 7 backed-up, the Tillerman stated he saw a ?re?ghter fall from in between
Truck Company 7 and Engine Company 3. Headvised the rest of the crew and they all exited
the apparatus. The members of Truck Company 7 along with the members of Engine Company
3 began to assist the Lineman from Engine Company 3.

The of?cer from Truck Company 7 made a ?Priority? radio transmission to Battalion Fire Chief
6 informing him of a man down that was struck by the ?re truck.

Note: The Truck Driver was the regularly assigned Technician (Tillerman). The Tillerman was
not a technician and was a ?ll-in driver. Both drivers were wearing the voice-communication
headset system.12

Engine Company 6

Engine Company 6 was dispatched as the 5th due Engine but was the ?rst unit to arrive at the
intersection of 8th and St. NE. and relayed the same to BFC 6 (in an attempt to request 1St due).
This radio transmission was never acknowledged and they maintained a position at the southwest
corner of 8th and St. NE. The crew witnessed the incident from the opposite side (driver?s
side) of Truck 7 and immediately reported to the rear of Engine Company 3 and began rendering
aid to the Lineman from Engine Company 3.

The of?cer from Engine Company 6 transmitted a ?Priority? radio message to Battalion Fire
Chief 6 advising of someone being struck by a vehicle and the need for additional resources.
After they rendered care and Engine Company 3?s Lineman had been transported, they were
reassigned to ?re?ghting duties by the Incident Commander.

Battalion Fire Chief 6

Battalion Fire Chief 6 (BFC 6) was dispatched as the due Battalion Chief (Incident
Commander). BFC 6 acknowledged the radio transmission from Engine Company 18 which
stated that they were on the scene and reassigned them to due Engine. BFC 6 then reassigned
companies as previously noted above.

BFC 6 initially received radio reports of an injured person and directed EMS units on the scene
to assist with patient care. At no time was Battalion Fire Chief 6 fully aware that the intent of
the ?Priority? radio transmissions he was receiving, (from multiple companies) speci?cally
advised of the injury to the Lineman from Engine Company 3.

 

11 Truck Driver- member that has the responsibility of operating the apparatus (Truck) on all assigned responses.
This member is usually a Technician but can be anyone assigned to that position for that tour of duty.

12Tillerman? this member has the responsibility of operating the rear tiller portion of the apparatus (Truck) on all
assigned responses. This member is usually a Technician but can be anyone assigned to that position for that tour of
duty.

14

Once BFC 6 recognized that the injured person was a ?re?ghter, BF 6 tasked the Safety
Of?cer with investigating the circumstances of the injury.?

Truck Company 4

Truck Company 4 was dispatched as the 2mt due Truck and approached the incident ?'om 
southbound on 8th'St. NE. As they approached the intersection of 8?[1 St. and St. NE, they
saw Truck Company 7 attempting to navigate the turn onto St. N.E., however they (Truck
Company 7) were stopped. Truck Company 4 then went through the intersection and took a
position on 8th St NE. to cover the rear of the affected structure, and perform their assigned
responsibilities.

Response Routes gilt! Positioning

The response routes for units are the result of a review of the interviews and what information
was provided.

Engine C0. 6

Arrival Order l5t Arriving Unit to the Intersection of 8th and Street NE.

Dispatched Assignment - Due Engine

Location upon Dispatch and Route Traveled New Jersey and St NW. at Dispatch. Traveled
New Jersey Ave to Massachusetts Avenue, traveled around Union Station on Massachusetts
Avenue to Street N.E., Left on 6th Street, Right on Street to Intersection of 8th and Street
NE.

Engine Co. 18

Arrival Order 2'id Arriving Unit

Dispatched Assignment 2mI Due Engine

Location upon Dispatch and Route Traveled In quarters at Dispatch. Traveled North on 8th
Street S.B.. Right on Street to 809 Street NE. (Laid out 8th and Street).

Engine C0. 3

Arrival Order Arriving Unit

Dispatched Assignment 1St Due Engine

Location upon Dispatch and Route Traveled In quarters at Dispatch. Traveled South on New
Jersey Ave NW. to St heading East, Left on 6m Street N.E., Right on Street into intersection
at Street and Street NE. (picked up 18?s line)

 

13 A member of the rank of Battalion Fire Chief who is responsible for establishing the action plan required to
mitigate the incident. This member orders, directs and manages all resources on the scene.

15

Truck Co. 7

Arrival Order - 4th Unit (Truck 7 and Truck 4 arrived at approximately the same time)
Dispatched Assignment Due Truck

Location upon Dispatch and Route Traveled In quarters at Dispatch. Traveled North on 8th
Street S.E. Right on Street N.E.

Truck Co. 4

Arrival Order 4th Unit (Truck 7 and Truck 4 arrived at approximately the same time)
Dispatched Assignment 2nd Due Truck

Location upon Dispatch and Route Traveled New Jersey Ave .W. and Street at Dispatch.

Traveled New Jersey Ave NW. to Left on Street, East on Street to on 8th Street N.E.
Stopped at allc)r entrance at 519 Street N.E.

This Space is Intentionally Left Blank

16

Engine Company 3 Line-man?s Training and Exgerienee

Engine Company 3?s Linemanbegan his career as a member of Recruit Class 378 on September
19, 2016. He was instructed in the following deliverables and graduated from the District of
Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Training Academy on April 26, 2017:

Fire Fighter 1

Fire Fighter 2

Nationally Registered Emergency Medical Technician
CPR

Hazardous Materials Operations

Hazardous Materials Awareness

Upon graduation, he was assigned to Paramedic Engine Company 3 located at 439 New Jersey
Avenue NW. As a recently graduated Recruit, he was still in his probationary period and was
required to take tests to attest to his pro?ciency and job knowledge.

The Lineman from Engine Company 3 had previously responded to many calls for reported
structure ?res that subsequently were mitigated by other units on scene; however, he had limited
to no experience with responses where the structure was actually on ?re.

Engine Comgany 3 Of?cer?s Training and Experience

Engine Company 3?s Of?cer began his career on December 15, 2003. He was promoted to the
rank of Sergeant in June of 20 14. He was instructed in the following deliverables and graduated
from the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Training Academy:

Fire Fighter 1

Fire Fighter 2

Nationally Registered Emergency Medical Technician
CPR

Hazardous Materials Operations

Hazardous Materials Awareness

Fire Of?cer 1

Fire Instructor 1

17

mick Company 7 Truck Driver?s Training and Experience

Truck Company 7?s Truck Driver began his career on October 10, 2000. He was instructed in
the following deliverables and graduated from the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency
Medical Services Training Academy:

Fire Fighter 1

Fire Fighter 2

Nationally Registered Emergency Medical Technician
CPR

Hazardous Materials Operations

Hazardous Materials Awareness

Upon graduation, he was assigned to Truck Company 7 located at 414 8th Street SE.
This member is quali?ed to operate the apparatus in the assigned position for his tour of duty and
holds the rank ofFire?ghter Technician. 4

Truck Cumnamr 7 Tilierman?s Training and Experience

Truck Company 7?s Tillerman began his career on March 4, 2004. He was instructed in the
following deliverables and graduated from the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical
Services Training Academy:

Fire Fighter 1

Fire Fighter 2

Nationally Registered Emergency Medical Technician
CPR

Hazardous Materials Operations

Hazardous Materials Awareness

Upon graduation, he was assigned to Truck Company 7 located at 414 8th Street SE.
This member is quali?ed to operate the apparatus in the assigned position for his tour of duty
however, he is not a Technician.I5

 

'4 Technicians are members who have participated in a promotional process and qualify to be designated as the
driver for a speci?c apparatus for their shift. This is a monetarily compensated position.

This member was initially quali?ed to operate an apparatus on January 16, 2003.

They successfully passed the written and practical examination for Fire?ghter Technician given by the DC. Fire and
EMS Training Academy on May 12, 2009.

15 This member was an alternate Tillerman and was quali?ed to operate the apparatus per D.C. Fire and EMS Order
Book. The initial quali?cation to operate an apparatus was received by this member on November 27, 2004

18

Truck Comganv Officer?s Training and Experience

Truck Company 7?s Of?cer began his career on September 1, 1991. He was promoted to the rank
of Captain in November of 2008. He was instructed in the following deliverables and graduated
from the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Training Academy:

Fire Fighter 1

Fire Fighter 2 .
Nationally Registered Emergency Medical Technician
CPR

Hazardous Materials Operations

Hazardous Materials Awareness

Fire Of?cer 1

Fire Of?cer 2

Fire Of?cer 3

Fire Instructor 1

Fire Instructor 2

Incident Safety Officer

Health and Safety Of?cer

T_his Space is lntentionallv Left Blank

19

Cause of lniurvMedicgl History

The ?re?ghter (Lineman) from Engine Company 3 sustained injuries as a result of contact made with
Truck Company 7 simultaneous with being pinned between Truck Company 7 and Engine Company 3.
The Lineman was facing Truck Company 7 at the time of impact, and side of the truck. The injuries were
further exacerbated by his SCBA cylinder, which caused the Lineman to pivot as he was struck. The
Lineman was brie?y pinned between the truck and rear compartment of the engine for approximately 10-
15 seconds until Truck Company 7 became aware of the incident and backed up enough to free him.
Once he was free, members began immediate life-saving measures.

Members from Engine Company 3, Engine Company 6, and Truck Company 7 all immediately began
emergency care that involved: airway management, assessment and rapid transport to the hospital.
Members immediately removed all of his Personal Protective Equipment and work uniform and
performed a rapid trauma assessment.

While this was being done, Ambulance 18 retrieved their equipment and began to transfer him onto their
back-board and stretcher. While moving the injured ?re?ghter from Engine Company 3 to Ambulance
18, Medic 3 arrived on the scene and he was placed in their unit.

The Lineman was ultimately transported by Medic 3, with members of Engine Company 3 and EMS 6
assisting. Due to the location of the incident, and the extent of the injuries to the Lineman, the decision
was made to transport him to Medstar Hospital, and they were subsequently noti?ed of the same via the
hospital radio channel. The total time of transport (from injury occurrence until arrival at the hospital)
was 14 minutes.

Once he arrived at Medstar, multiple physicians took over life-saving measures and were ultimately able
to stabilize him.

The injuries the Lineman received were consistent with these types of accidents. All injuries were
directly related to the initial and only impact between Truck Company 7, Engine Company 3 and Engine
Company 3 Lineman.

The ?re?ghter from Engine Company 3 underwent many surgeries and spent several weeks in the
intensive care unit. He was moved to the National Rehabilitation facility where he underwent further
rehab work. On October 25, 2017, the ?re?ghter from Engine Company 3 was of?cially discharged from
the hospital.

20

Personal Protective Eguipment (PPE) Findings

The injured ?re?ghter?s Personal Protective Equipment (?re?ghting ensemble) was sent out to
an independent 3 party service provider for inspection after the incident. The gear sustained no
damage and was not a contributing factor in the injuries sustained.

21

SELF CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS (SCBA) FINDINGS

The injured ?re?ghter Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) that he was wearing at the
time of the incident was inspected on the scene and was sent out to an independent 31a party
service provider for inspection after the incident.

The SCBA sustained level 111 damage (signi?cant) to the exterior of the cylinder. The mask
mounted regulator was separated due to the impact, and the metal back frame was distorted.

Although the member was wearing his SCBA at the time of his injury, the SCBA was not in use
at the time of the incident and a malfunction of the SCBA was not a contributing factor in the 

injuries sustained.

The District of Columbia Fire and EMS Department currently operates using the (Scott Safety)
Scott 4.5 Air?Pak 50 w/ Standard Harness/ Standard Belt/Pak-Tracker.

The Fire?ghter was issued the Scott Safety AV-3 000 HT face piece and was mated to his SCBA
regulator.

This Self Contained Breathing Apparatus has been upgraded to the 2007 edition and is certi?ed
to meet NFPA 1981 -2007 (Standard on Open- -Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
(SCBA) for Emergency Services).

See Exhibit for digital images.

22

Weather Conditions
At the approximate time of the incident, the weather was clear and the temperature was 76
degrees Fahrenheit. Visibility was clear and unobstructed in the area. Weather conditions were

not a contributing factor in this incident.

See Exhibit for digital images.

23

Incident Reconstruction

011 September 10"1 2017 at 0500 hours the membets of the committee met with Detective Felts
(MPD) at the scene of Ei?h and St. N. The committee used pictures from the incident scene to
recreate apparatus positioning and location of members at the scene. The following factors were
observed:

a No member of Truck Company 7 was able to observe anyone operating along the
of?cer?s side of the truck.

a The area around the ?fth wheel and outrigger controls has limited visibility for the
Tillerman.

- Engine Company 3 was positioned away ?om the curb and 1n the intersection, impeding
the ability of other apparatus to turn into the block.

I A collision between Truck Company 7 and Engine Company 3 was likely to have
occurred regardless of members operating in this area if the trailer continued along its
projected trajectory without the necessary adjustment being made to avoid contact

I The intersection was well-lit and provided no visual impairments.

The Truck Driver from Truck Company 7 had limited visibility of the trailer and side of
Engine Company 3.

24

Contributing Factors Speci?c to the lniured Fire?ghter

Based on the information gathered during the incident review process of 809 St. NE, the
members of the Incident Review Committee were able to identify two contributing factors that
resulted in the signi?cant injury to the ?re?ghter from Engine Company 3:

1. Situational Awareness during apparatus placement
2. Lack of. ?reground experience

Contributing Factor #1

Truck Company 7 struck the injured ?re?ghter (Lineman) as they maneuvered the apparatus past
a stationary Engine Company 3. The injured ?re?ghter was standing at the rear of Engine
Company 3 and was located in an area of reduced or limited visibility and was not observed by
the Truck Driver and Tillerman.

The recreation of the scene of the incident highlighted the fact that apparatus placement proved
to be a mitigating factor. Blind spots were identi?ed that would require the need for spotters to
ensure that the apparatus was operating in a safe manner.

The inability of the operators of the apparatus to forecast pinch points during maneuvers that
offered diminished clearances as well as the less than productive placement of the apparatus on
scene, created a scenario that offered very little margin for human error during ?re ground
activities. This lapse in situational awareness for the overall incident created an environment that
fostered tunnel vision with regard to the immediate completion of the assigned task(s) at hand.

Contributing Factor #2

The lack of ?reground experience for the injured ?re?ghter (Lineman) was also determined to be
a contributing factor as it relates to the member?s ability to discern the appropriate ?reground
tactics and on scene safety. The lack of real time experiences and decision-making processes on
an active ?reground limited the ?re?ghter?s efforts to ensure personal safety concurrent with
identi?cation and mitigation of potential hazards on an incident.

25

Findings and Recommendations

The Incident Review Committee identi?ed operational activities, performed by units responding
to and on the ?reground, which did not directly contribute to the signi?cant injury but could
possibly jeopardize our member?s safety in the future if not abated.

These recommendations should be reviewed with corrections made to the Departments 
?re ground tactics and objectives in hopes of improving the safety, survival and performance for
all members of the Department.

Finding #1

The initial box alarm being dispatched to an intersection without an exact address contributed to
the likelihood that all units responding would arrive in the same vicinity simultaneously. This
action is also a catalyst for the reorganization of unit assignments and positions which is
problematic not only for the units concerned but also the Incident Commander who now has to
re-direct company movements and assign tasks. Once a unit's position has been altered, the task
that was originally designated has been reassigned and a new apparatus placement must be
obtained. The change of one unit's positioning can recon?gure the entire response assignment.

Recommendation #1

Amend the current SOG for a response to a structure ?re with an unknown address. The current
procedure for dispatch should be changed and a new guideline created which will limit the
number of units committed to the scene. This can be accomplished by providing that all units
with the exception of the due Engine Company and due Truck Company stage 2 blocks
away in line of approach. Additionally, based on the information obtained from the 911 caller,
the response assignment with an unknown address can be reduced to a Local Alarm or less for an
investigation. The response assignment can be upgraded once the exact address has been
con?rmed or additional information is received indicating a working incident.

Finding #2

Per D.C. Fire and EMS Standard Operating Guidelines, all responding engine companies
assigned to a box alarm are either to establish or supplement a water supply.

As previously identi?ed in Finding on this incident, the initial response assignment was
altered. Engine Company 18 was now responsible for establishing a water supply. Engine
Company 18 did initiate this process by removing the humat valve and the attached hose but left
the assembly in the middle of the street.

As a result of this action, Truck Company 7 was unable to enter the block to assume their
assigned position. As they were entering the block, they were told to stop by the Wagon Driver
from Engine Company 3. He subsequently removed the obstruction and motioned for Truck
Company 7 to proceed into the block.

The inability of Truck Company 7 to turn into the block unimpeded due to the placement of the
humat valve, the apparatus placement of Engine Company 3 and the direction of travel of Truck

26

Company 4 required that the current direction of travel be reassessed and an alternate means to
enter the block located.

The obstruction in the road way prevented Truck Company 7 from moving into their assigned
position without delay. This also impacted the decision-making process of the Wagon Driver
from Engine Company 3 as he altered his apparatus position to ensure that Engine Company 18
had an adequate water supply.

Per the incident recreation, there was a hydrant located on the southeast comer of the 600 blk. of
8th St NE. (also referenced as the 800 block of Street NE.) just a few feet from where the
supply line was initially le? in the intersection.

Recommendation #2

Develop, initiate and implement In Service Training deliverables which emphasize and reinforce
the importance of apparatus positioning, situational awareness, and adherence to Department
and training manuals. The training modules will provide additional clarity as to how to
establish or supplement a water supply and the best practices for safe and ef?cient use of
apparatus placement on incidents.

Finding #3

As previously identi?ed in Findings #1 and the initial dispatch for the response had been
changed and a water supply needed to be established per Department Engine Company
18 was now 1St due and had placed their supply line in the 800 block of St NE.

Engine Company 3 needed to secure a water supply and placed their apparatus on the southeast
corner of the 800 blk. of St. in order to accomplish this task. However, by doing so, their
apparatus (along with the supply line and humat valve from Engine Company18) impeded the
ability of other responding units to enter the block.

Pictures taken from the scene show that the apparatus placement Engine Company 3 selected for
establishing water supply, reduced the clearance of that road way and impeded Truck Company
7 from entering the block without restriction (see attached photos).

Per the incident recreation, the identical hydrant which Engine Company 3 secured a water
supply from (located on the southeast corner of the 800 blk. of St. NE.) could also have been
used if the apparatus pulled further into the block and utilized their rear intake. The use of the
rear intake from this position would have eliminated or reduced the impact of a diminished
clearance for other units responding into the block. Additionally, the apparatus could have been
placed closer to the curb and further up the street to prevent its rear from protruding into the
intersection.

Recommendation #3

All BC. Fire and EMS engines are designed with multiple intakes that aid in the establishment
of a continuous water supply. Engine companies are tasked with ensuring that they can
accomplish this assignment as ef?ciently as possible by selecting the proper hydrant and intake
required for the task.

27

Develop, initiate and implement In Service Training deliverables which emphasize and reinforce
the importance of apparatus positioning, situational awareness, and adherence to Department?s
and training manuals. The training modules will provide additional clarity as to how to
establish or supplement a water supply and the best practices for safe and ef?cient use of
apparatus placement on incidents.

Finding #4

Engine Company 3 and Truck Company 7 share several commonalities with regard to this
incident. One of which is that the operators of these vehicles were not the regularly assigned
drivers. Although all members are responsible for having the ability to operate an apparatus,
there are members (Technicians) whose sole task is to operate their assigned apparatus on a daily
basis.

Being a Technician carries with it a performance expectation as members who are assigned as
such have been rigorously tested to a Department standard to achieve that promotion. They are
considered to be experts at operating, responding, and placing their apparatus in the correct
position at an incident.

It is impossible to ensure daily that there is a designated Technician operating on all Department
apparatus as budget constraints, leave and training all in?uence that ability. However, it has been
determined that the Tillerrnan of Truck Company 7, although on duty and assigned to the
apparatus, was not assuming their normal responsibilities for that tour.

Conclusions from the investigation determine that it was the trailer portion of the apparatus
which pinned the Lineman from Engine Company 3. The Tillerman ?om Truck Company 7 was
the duties of the Truck Driver. Another ?re?ghter from Truck Company 7
subsequently assumed the responsibilities of the Tillerman.

The ability to change assignments is within the discretion of the Of?cer in Charge and his/her
comfort level with the members and their experience. There is no Department policy established
which gives direction or instructions as to how this is to be handled.

Recommendation #4

Develop a written policy that identi?es how to select ?ll in Technicians when the regular
assigned Technician is not on duty. Regularly assigned Technicians Should not be allowed to
move away from de?ned positions on an apparatus in the absence of another member, unless
extenuating circumstances exist. They should remain in their current position and another
quali?ed driver be designated to ?ll the vacancy.

Develop, initiate and implement In Service training deliverables which emphasize and reinforce
the importance of apparatus positioning situational awareness, and Emergency Vehicle
Operation Course (EVOC). The training modules will provide additional clarity for safe and
ef?cient use of apparatus placement on incidents.

28

Finding #5

Part of the Incident Review Committee?s responsibility was to review all relevant data to include
audio and video recordings that may have captured critical information needed to clarify the
circumstances surrounding this signi?cant event. Based on the results of the review, it was
determined that the dash cameras that were installed on Truck Company 7 were not functional
and/ or operational and could not be reviewed for content. A more in?depth analysis revealed that
the problem of inactive or unresponsive dash cameras is systemic within the Department and that
the operational capability of the cameras is haphazard at best.

Recommendation #5

Ensure that all units in the Department are equipped with a functional dash camera that can be
used to capture audio and video and extract data needed to complete a determination of the
vehicle?s speed, travel and occupant?s activities during any investigative process.

These cameras should be properly maintained and the Department should ensure it has the
necessary software to review and store this footage.

Finding #6

While conducting interviews from all members who may have responded or were on scene, it
was determined that the use of the David Clark headsets was not consistent amongst members
assigned to the apparatus and responding to this incident. Communication between not only the
operators of the apparatus but between all riding positions enhances the unit?s situational
awareness while responding. All members are able to work in concert to ensure that critical
information is relayed ef?ciently and 

Recommendation #6

Develop a policy that includes the use of a vehicle headset system for all riding position on an
apparatus for which a David Clark headset has been provided. The headset system should be
considered a critical safety item on all apparatus. On Tiller-Trucks, the buzzer system shall
remain the primary method of communication between the Truck Driver and Tillerman, and all
movement should be at the direction and acknowledgement of the buzzer system.

Finding #7

The location for initial assignment for the report of a ?re was at 8th and Street NE. The
updated size-up reported the corrected address to be simply 809. This was problematic in
multiple ways.

First, it did not clarify the exact location of the structure on ?re. Although the ?re was at 809 
Street NE, it was not unrealistic for the Incident Commander to think that the corrected address
was 809 8th Street NE. due to the initial dispatch to this intersection. Compounding matters, this
hypothetical address (809 SW Street NE.) was only blocks away from the intersection of Em and
Street NE.

29

Second, unit of?cers were giving an incomplete message when communicating critical incident
information. These radio transmissions can leave some parts of the message open to
interpretation or assumption, which is not appropriate for ?reground activities.

Due to the complexity of the incident and the lack of clear radio transmissions, the Incident
Command Post was not positioned in a manner that would allow them the ability to view at least
2 sides of the structure that was involved in ?re?ghting activities.

Recommendation #7
This recommendation is twofold:

1. Ensure all members use clear communication (plain talk) in all aspects of an incident, and
give complete and speci?c radio transmissions.

a. This will minimize and or eliminate ?reground miscommunication and improve
overall radio traf?c.
b. The lack of clarity in radio transmissions was a determinant in
i. Change of initial response assignment
ii. Identi?cation of the injured ?re?ghter
c. When the Of?ce of Uni?ed Communications (OUC) receives updated
information on a response, they should immediately (verbally) relay that
information to the responding Battalion Fire Chief.

2. Ensure the Incident Command Post (ICP) is located within a clear view of the incident.

a. Based on the radio reports received, the ICP was located on 8th Street NE.
b. Although the Incident Commander had some View from this vantage point, it was
not the optimal position for monitdring tasks on the ?reground.

Finding #8

The Incident Review Committee was formed days after the signi?cant event had occurred.
Although no formal policy had previously been developed to investigate incidents within this
scope, on duty members did their best to gather as much critical information as they could in an
effort to preserve the scene for a future investigation. Without having a documented plan of
action, inevitably somethings were delayed and others dismissed. Apparatus involved in the
incident were moved prior to the completion of the investigation, preventing a complete and
thorough assessment of the scene.

30

Recommendation #8

This recommendation is as follows:

1.

2.

Create a standing Incident Review Committee that can be quickly activated to assist with
the investigation of signi?cant injuries, Line of Duty Deaths and serious accidents.
Develop a policy for a post major accident investigation.

Ensure that any units involved in a collision are not moved without the expressed
permission of the Incident Commander and Safety Of?cer. Any unit involved in an
accident en-route or on the scene of an emergency should immediately be considered
?Out of Service? and have their assignment reallocated, unless otherwise directed by the
Incident Commander.

a. Create a major incident support unit Of?cer/Liaison an individual who can
assist the crew of an injured member who could assist with logistical needs and
transporting members that were directly involved in a critical incident.

Finding #9

Members interviewed regarding the signi?cant event expressed that a revision of the Critical
Incident Personnel Management (CIPM) Bulletin is warranted. Currently, D.C. Fire and EMS
Bulletin 42 is outdated and member?s contact information needs to be corrected and updated.
Additionally, the process for the activation and the content of the information delivered should
be standardized.

Recommendation #9

The following are recommendations that should be included in the revised Bulletin:

1.

Members determined to be directly involved in an incident shall be immediately removed
from duty and placed on Administrative Leave for the remainder of the tour. Members
shall be required to meet with a mental health professional at the PFC prior to being
placed back to full duty.

Add additional counselors and training to keep the content of information dispersed
relevant to the subject audience.

Solicit applications for new counselors to increase the capability of the program.

When the need for CIPM has been identi?ed, counselors are called in off-duty so they
can focus solely on the needs of the incident. Members who are on-duty and are
counselors should be used as a last resort.

Work in conjunction with IAFF Local 36, who has partnerships and resources with local

area mental health professionals. Some members may be more comfortable dealing with
counselors who are not associated with the agency.

31

Finding #10

It was not until late in the incident that the Incident Commander was aware that the injured
person (that was reported on the ?reground channel) was a ?re?ghter. Multiple radio
transmissions were made to alert the Incident Commander of this fact however, every radio
report identi?ed the injured person via a different nomenclature. This did not affect the treatment
that was rendered to the injured ?re?ghter but it did have an impact on the continuity of
?reground operations and how the Incident Commander assigned tasks on the ?reground.

Recommendation #10

Amend Communications Operations Bulletin No. 1 and the Standard Operating Guidelines to
ensure that when members transmit a Priority, Mayday or ?103 3? message, that they transmit the
message and wait to be acknowledged by the Incident Commander or OUC. For example, when
members transmit a Priority message, they will transmit the following: ?Engine 34 to Battalion 8
Priority?. Stop and wait to be acknowledged, and then transmit their message, ?Engine 34
Priority, we have an injured member Members transmitting this type of message shall
depress their Emergency Identi?er button to give their radio priority in transmitting.

1. Additionally, all responding units shall monitor ongoing radio traf?c. This includes
responding Battalion Fire Chiefs and Aides as well as the Fire Liaison Of?cer (FLO) at
the OUC when possible. Should any member hear an emergency radio transmission that
is not readily acknowledged by the Incident Commander, they shall immediately ensure
that this message is received.

2. Currently, the Department staffs one FLO on the OUC dispatch ?oor on any given shift.
In order the ensure redundancy and that critical information is not missed, an additional
FLO is needed to assist with:

a. the monitoring of. ?reground channels

b. relaying of critical incident related information
c. providing updates and corrections

(1. support of the Incident Commander as needed

Finding #11

The individual interview precess that was used to gather information regarding the signi?cant
event identi?ed the following gap analysis. Members were not readily able to identify apparatus
that had arrived on scene. The Incident Commander at this event reports signi?cant dif?culty
identifying what units were positioned where, since many units were operating with reserve
apparatus.

The needs of the Department dictate that as front?line apparatus is sent out for repairs,
maintenance or service, a reserve piece of apparatus is used in its place. All apparatus have a
unique identi?er and serial number assigned to it and no two units are identical in that regard.

Several apparatuses assigned to the response at 809 Street NE. were temporarily assigned

reserve apparatus. Being able to recognize responding units is paramount to the completion of
assigned task as units normally work in tandem for ef?ciency and on scene safety.

32

Recommendation #1 1

Create a_ standardized placard system that allows companies using reserve apparatus the ability to
designate that apparatus with their company identi?ers. Any member or citizen should be able to
recognize the correct unit operating the vehicle regardless of the apparatus? status in the ?eet
(front line or reserve).

Finding #12

A review of the ?re ground channels as well as interviews with members who actively responded
revealed that this incident was very active and dynamic. There were many moving parts early in
the response which seemed to cascade and eventually culminated with the injury to the
?re?ghter.

As previously stated, none of the ?ndings contained herein are directly related to the signi?cant
iniurv but traininar for low frequency. high acuity responses will result in a uronerlv prepared

workforce. One that is canahle of recogmizinn and mitigating all hazards.
Recommendation #12

All members of the Department will bene?t from additional training that will enhance ?re ground
performance. The Department is implementing training at the company level but currently there
is no active training for members serving as the Incident Commander.

Since the Incident Commander creates the objectives, strategies and tactics required to stabilize
the incident, additional and continuing education and training to enhance their performance
should be initiated.

Develop, initiate and implement In Service Training deliverables which emphasize and reinforce

situational awareness, adherence to Department and training manuals and various aspects
of incident management for operational chiefs.

33

DC Fire and EMS Department NFPA 1500 Compliance Table?i

 

Chapter '1 Administration - .,

 

1.4 Equivalency

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.4.1 Equivalency levels of quali?cations established Yes
1.4.2 Training, education, competency, safety Yes
Chapter 2 Referred Publications

Redacted

Chapter 3 De?nitions

Redacted

Chapter 4 Organization

4.1 Fire Dept. Organization Statement

4.1.1 Written statement or policy Yes
4.1.2 Operational response criteria/prepare maintain Yes
4.1.3 Statement available for inspection Yes
4.1.4 Pre?incident plan development Yes
4.2. Risk Management Plan

4.2.1 Written risk management plan Yes
4.2.2 Risk management plan coverage Yes
4.2.3 Risk Management plan components Yes

 

4.3 Safety and Health Policy

 

4.3 .1 Written ?re department occupational safety and health policy Yes

 

4.3.2 Program complies with NFPA 1500 Yes

 

4.3.3 Plan effectiveness evaluated Yes

 

4.4 Roles and Responsibilities

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.4.1 Fire department responsibility Yes
4.4.2 Comply with laws Yes
4.4.3 Fire department rules, regulations, SOPs and SOGS Yes
4.4.4 Accident investigation procedure Yes
4.4.5 Accidents and illness investigated Yes
4.4.6 Individuals cooperate, participate, and comply Yes
4.4.7 Member has right to be protected and participate Yes
4.4.8 Member organization role Yes
4.5 Occupational Safety and Health Committee

4.5.1 Establish committee Yes
4.5.2 Committee purpose Yes

 

 

 

 

 

16 The Compliance Table is based on the 2018 NFPA 1500 Standard. Any Index and sub-indices that were not
deemed relevant to incident have been redacted or omitted.

34

 

4.5.3 Regular meetings

Yes

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

level per NFPA 472

 

4.5.4 Orientation process for best practices for safety committee Yes
processes
4.6 Records
4.6.1 Accidents, injury, illness, exposures, death records Yes
4.6.1.1 Data collection system established according to National Yes
Fire Service database
4.6.2 Occupational exposures Yes
4.6.3 Con?dential health records Yes
4.6.4 Training records Yes
4.6.5 Vehicles and equipment records Yes
4.7 Appointment of the Health and Safety Of?cer
4.7.1 Appointed by Fire Chief Yes
4.7.2 Meets quali?cations Yes
4.7.3 Given authority to administer program Yes
4.7.4 Performing functions in NFPA 1521 Yes
4.7.5 Managing occupational safety and health program Yes
4.7.6 Additional safety of?cers and resources available Yes
Chapter 5 Training, Education, and Professional Development

. 5.1 General Requirements
5.1.1. Establish and maintain safety and health training Yes
5.1.2 Training commensurate with duties and functions Yes
5.1.3 Training and education programs for new members Yes
5.1.4 Restrict the activities of new members Yes
5.1.5 Training on the risk management plan Yes
5.1.6 Training on department?s written procedures Yes
5.1.7 Training for emergency medical services Yes
5.1.8 Training on operation, limitation, maintenance, and Yes
retirement criteria for personal protective equipment
5.1.9 Maintaining pro?ciency in skills and knowledge Yes
5.1.10 Training includes safe exiting and accountability Yes
5.1.11 Training includes incident management and accountability Yes
system used by the ?re dept. 
5.2 Member Quali?cations
5.2.1 Fire ?ghters meet NFPA 1001 Yes
5.2.2 Drivers/operators meet NF PA 1002 Yes
5.2.3 Airport ?re ?ghters meet NFPA 1003 Yes
5.2.4 Fire of?cers meet NFPA 1021 Yes
5.2.5 Wildland ?re ?ghters meet NFPA 1051 
5.2.6 Hazardous materials responders trained to at least operations Yes

 

35

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.2.7 Fire investigation training meeting NFPA 1033 Yes
5.2.8 Fire investigation training meeting NFPA 1031 Yes
5.3 Training Requirements

5.3.1 Adopt or develop training and education curriculum Yes
5.3.2 Training supports minimum quali?cations and certi?cations Yes
of members

5.3.2 Training supports minimum quali?cations and certi?cations Yes
of members

5.3.3 Members practice assigned skills sets on a regular basis but Yes
not less than annually.

5.3.4 Training for members when written policies, practices, Yes
procedures, or guidelines are changed.

5.3.5 SCBA training program per NFPA 1404 Yes
5.3.6 Wildland ?re ?ghters trained at least annually in the proper 
deployment of ?re shelter

5.3.7 Live ?re training in accordance with NFPA 1403 Yes
5.3.8 Supervised training Yes
5.3.9 Emergency medical services training Yes
5.3.10 Training on use, care, maintenance and limitation of PPE Yes
5.3.11 Training includes incident management and accountability Yes
system used by the ?re department

5.3.12 Infectious disease control training to NFPA 1581 Yes
53?13 All members trained in the risk associated with the exposure Yes
to products on ?reground and incident related health hazards

5.4 Special Operations Training

5.4.1 Advanced training for special operations Yes
5.4.2 Train members for support to special operations Yes
5.4.3 Technician level for hazardous materials mitigation Yes
54.4 Rescue technician training to NFPA 1006 when required Yes
5.5. Member Pro?ciency

5.5.1 Pro?ciency of members Yes
5.5.2 Monitor training progress Yes
5.5.3 Annual skills check Yes
5.6 Training Activities

5.6.1 All training done under supervision of quali?ed instructor Yes
5.6.2 All live training shall follow NFPA 1403 Yes
5.6.2.1 EMS shall be on scene for live ?re training as per NFPA Yes
1403

5.6.3 Non-?re training shall conduct a needs assessment to Yes
determine proper EMS presence

Chapter 6 ?re Apparatusmquipgnent and D?versIOperators

6.1 Fire Department Apparatus

6.1.1 Safety and health concerns related to ?re apparatus Yes

 

 

36

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6.1.2 New ?re apparatus meets NFPA 1901, Yes
6.1.3 New Wildland ?re apparatus meets NFPA 1906 
6.1.4 New automotive ambulances meet NF PA 1917 Yes
6.1.5 New marine ?re?ghting vessels meet NFPA 1925 Yes
6.1.6 Tools, equipment, and SCBA properly secured Yes
6.1.7 Apparatus refurbished per NFPA 1912 Yes
6.1.8 Restraints and harnesses for aircraft operations 
6.1.9 Apparatus has storage area with positive means to present Yes
unintentional hose deployment

6.2 Drivers/Operators of Fire Department Apparatus

6.2.1 Successful completion of approved driver training Yes
6.2.2 Complies with traf?c laws including having valid driver?s Yes
licenses

6.2.3 Rules and regulations for operating ?re department vehicles Yes
6.2.4 Drivers are responsible Yes
6.2.5 All persons secured Yes
6.2.6 Drivers obey all traf?c laws Yes
6.2.7 for nonemergency and emergency response Yes
6.2.8 Emergency response, drivers bring vehicle to a complete stop: Yes
6.2.9 Proceed only when safe Yes
6.2.10 Stop at unguarded railroad grade crossing Yes
6.2.11 Use caution at guarded railroad grade crossings Yes
6.2.12 engine, transmission and driveline retarders Yes
6.2.13 manual brake limiting valves Yes
6.2.14 Rules and regulations for private vehicles for emergency Yes
response

6.3 Riding in Fire Apparatus .
6.3.1 Seated and belted securely while riding ?re apparatus Yes
6.3.2 Tail steps and standing prohibited Yes
6.3.3 Seat belts not released while the vehicle is in motion Yes
6.3.4 Secured to vehicle while performing emergency medical care Yes
6.3.5 Hose loading operations Yes
6.3.6 Tiller training (if applicable) Yes
6.3.7 Helmets for riding in unclosed areas Yes
6.3.8 protection for riding in unenclosed areas Yes
6.3.9 Alternative transportation Yes
6.4 Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Fire Apparatus

6.4.1 Fire apparatus inspection, and repair per NFPA 1911 Yes
6.4.2 Pumpers service tested per NFPA 1911 Yes
6.4.3 Aerial ladders and elevating platforms tested per NFPA 1911 Yes

 

 

37

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6.4.4 Apparatus and equipment disinfected per NFPA 1581 Yes
6.5 Tools and Equipment

6.5.1 Safety and health are primary concerns Yes
6.5.2 Hearing conservation Yes
6.5.3 New ?re department ground ladders meet NFPA 1931 Yes
6.5.4 New ?re hose meets NFPA 1961 Yes
6.5.5 New spray nozzles meet NFPA 1964 Yes
6.5.6 Equipment inspected at least weekly and within 24 hours after Yes
any use

6.5.7 Records maintained for the equipment Yes
6.5.8 Tested at least annually Yes
6.5.9 Defective or unserviceable equipment removed from service Yes
6.5.10 Tools and equipment cleaned per NFPA 1581, Yes
6.5.11 Fire Department ground ladders tested per NFPA 1932 Yes
6.5.12 Fire hose inspected and tested per NFPA 1962 Yes
6.5.13 Portable ?re extinguishers, tested and inspected per NFPA Yes
1 0

6.5.14 Powered rescue tools meet NFPA 1936 Yes
Chapter 7 Pratective Clothing and Protective Equipment

7.1 General Yes
7.1.1 Fire department provides PPE Yes
7.1.2 Use Yes
7.1.3 Use of PPE speci?c to operation Yes
7.1.4 PPE cleaned every 6months per NFPA 1851 Yes
7.1.5 Where worn, station work uniforms meet NFPA 1975 Yes
7.1.7 Compliance training for a cleaning program for PPE Yes
7.2 Protective Clothing for Structural Fire Fighting

7.2.1 Protective clothing meets NFPA 1971 Yes
7.2.2 Minimum 2 in. (50 mm) overlap of all protective clothing Yes
layers

7.2.3 Overlap not required on single piece protection coveralls Yes
7.2.4.2 Gloves have proper interface Yes
7.2.5.1 Program in place for selection, care, maintenance, and use Yes
of protective clothing

7.2.6 Require all members to wear all appropriate protective Yes
ensemble

7.3 Protective Clothing for Proximity Fire Fighting Operations

7.3.1 Risk assessment performed as required by Chapter 5 of NFPA Yes
15 81 to determine need for proximity assembly

7.3 .2 Proximity ?re?ghting protective equipment meeting NF PA Yes
1971 provided and used

7.3.3 Overlap not required on single piece protection coveralls Yes

 

 

38

 

 

 

7.3.4 SCBA protected

Yes

 

7.4 Protective Clothing for Emergency Medical Operations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7.4.1.1 Emergency medical protective clothing meeting NFPA Yes
1999 provided and used,

7.4.2 Members use emergency medical gloves Yes
7.4.3 Members use emergency medical body and face protection Yes
7.4.4 Infection control program for EMS protective clothing meets Yes
NFPA 581

7.5 Chemical Protective Clothing for Hazardous Material

Emergency Operations

7.5.1.1 Members have and use vapor protective garments that meet Yes
NFPA 1991 when appropriate

7.5.2.1 Members have and use liquid splash protective garments Yes
that meet NFPA 1992 when appropriate

7.5.3.1 Members have and use appropriate protective ensemble for Yes
CBRN terrorism incidents

7.6 Inspection, Maintenance, and Disposal of Chemical Protective
Clothing

7.6.1 Inspected and maintained per manufacturer?s Yes
recommendation

7.6.2 Dispose of contaminated garments Yes
7.7 Protective Clothing and Equipment for Wildland Fire Fighting

7.7.1 for use ofprotective clothing 
7.7.2 Protective clothing that meets NFPA 1977 provided and used 
7.7.3 Fire shelter provided and worn properly 
7.8 Protective Ensemble for Technical Rescue Operations

7.8.1 Selection care and maintenance as provided in NFPA 1855 Yes
7.8.2 Technical rescue protective clothing meeting NFPA 1951 Yes
provided and used

7.8.3 Minimum 2 in (50 mm) overlap of all protective clothing Yes
layers

7.8.4 Respiratory protection certi?ed by NIOSH provided and used Yes
7.8.5 Primary protection that meets NFPA 1951 provided and Yes
used

7.8 .6 Protective clothing used and maintained per manufacturer?s Yes
instructions

7.9 Protective Clothing and Equipment for Surface Water

Operations

7.9.1 Members who engage in surface water operations use a Yes
protective ensemble meeting NFPA 1951

7.9.2 Surface water protective ensembles used and maintained in Yes
accordance to manufacturer?s instructions

7.9.3 Fire department established maintenance and inspection Yes
program for surface water operation protective ensembles

7.9.4 Proper decontamination procedures for surface water Yes

 

39

 

 

 

protective ensembles

 

7.10 Respiratory Protection Program

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7.10.1 Respiratory protection program addresses the selection, care, Yes
maintenance, and use

7.10.2 SOPs addresses respiratory protection Yes
7.10.3 Members quali?ed at least annually in use Yes
7.10.4 Reserve SCBA provided and maintained Yes
7.10.5 Adequate reserve air supply Yes
7.10.6 Equipment stored ready for use and properly protected Yes
7.10.7 SCBA provided that meets NFPA 1981 and required to be Yes
used

7.10.8 Members understand keeping face piece in place Yes
7.10.9 Respiratory protection in the post ?re environment Yes
7.11 Breathing Air

7.11.1 Breathing air meets NFPA 1989 Yes
7.12 Respiratory Protection Equipment

7.12.1 SCBA meet appropriate standards Yes
7.12.2 Supplied air re3pirators appropriate for intended application Yes
7.12.3 Air purifying respirators NIOSH certi?ed with policy for use Yes
7.13 Fit Testing

7.13.1 Quantitative ?t test annually Yes
7.13.2 New members ?t tested before permitted in hazardous Yes
atmospheres

7.13.3 Respirators quantitative ?t testing in negative pressure mode Yes
7.13.4 Records of face piece ?tting test Yes
7.13.5 Protection factor at least 500 for negative pressure face Yes
pieces

7.14 Using Respiratory Protection

7.14.1 Face piece to face seal required Yes
7.14.2 Nothing passes through area of seal Yes
7.14.3 No beard and facial hair in area of seal Yes
7.14.4 Spectacles ?tted to inside of face piece Yes
7.14.5 Spectacle strap or temple bars prohibited Yes
7.14.6 Contact lenses permitted Yes
7.14.7 Head covering breaking seal prohibited Yes
7.14.8 SCBA face piece/head harness worn under protective hood Yes
7.14.9 SCBA face piece/head harness worn under hazardous Yes
materials chemical protective hood

7.14.10 Helmet does not interfere with the face piece to face seal Yes
7.15- SCBA Cylinders

7.15.1 Inspected annually Yes

 

 

40

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[715.2 Hydrostatic test cylinders Yes
7.15.3 SCBA cylinder minimum gas capacity Yes
7.15.4 In service SCBA cylinders stored charged Yes
7.15.5 In service SCBA cylinders inspected weekly, and Yes

ricr to ?lling

7.15.6 Personnel protected during SCBA cylinder ?lling Yes

7.15.7 Unique situations for rapid ?lling identi?ed Yes

7.15.8 Risk assessment process used to identify rapid ?lling Yes

situations

7.15.9 Rapid re?lling of SCBA on person limited Yes

7.15.10 Emergency situation for air transfer permitted Yes

7.15.11 Trans ?lling per manufacturer?s instructions Yes

7.15.12 Emergency strategy practiced when SCBA cylinder reaches Yes
335 than 600 

7.16 Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS)

7.16.1 PASS meet NFPA 1982 Yes
Members provided with and use PASS device Yes
716.3 Tested at least weekly and prior to use Yes

7.17 Life Safety ROpe and System Components

7.17.1 Life safety rope and system components meet NFPA 1983 Yes

7.17.2 Life safety rope used for other purposes removed from Yes

serwce

7.17.3 Reuse of life safety rope only after evaluation Yes

7.17.4 Rope inspection by quali?ed person Yes

7.17.5 Records document each life safety rope use Yes

7.18 Face and Protection

7.18.1 protection appropriate for hazard provided and used Yes

7.18.2 SCBA face piece used as primary face and protection Yes

7.18.3 Primary protection used when full face piece not used Yes

7.19 Hearing Protection
719.1 Provided and used when apparatus noise in excess of 90 Yes



7.19.2 Provided and used when tool and equipment noise in excess Yes

of 90 

7.19.3 Hearing conservation program Yes

7.20 New and Existing Protective Clothing and Protective

Equipment

7.20.1 New PPE meets current standards Yes

7.20.2 Existing PPE shall have met standards when manufactured Yes
720.3 PPE retired in accordance with NFPA 1851 Yes

7.20.4 Open Circuit SCBA retired in accordance with NF PA 1852 Yes

7.20.5 Program for retirement and disposal of PPE Yes

 

4l

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7.20.6 Manufacturer criteria to be used Yes
Chapter 8 Emergency Operations

8.1 Incident Management

8.1.1 Prevent accidents and injuries Yes
8.1.2 Incident management system in writing and meets NF PA Yes
1561

8.1.3 IMS used at all emergency incidents Yes
8.1.4 IMS applied to drills, exercises, and training Yes
8.1.5 Incident commander responsible for safety Yes
8.1.6 Incident safety of?cer assigned when needed Yes
8.1.7 Span of Control Yes
8.1.8 Incident commander?s responsibility Yes
8.2 Communications

8.2.1 Dispatch and incident communication systems meet NFPA Yes
1561 and NFPA 1221 8.2.2 SOPs

8.2.2 Portable radios in warm or hot zones Yes
8.2.3 for use of clear text radio message Yes
8.2.4 Procedures for emergency traf?c Yes
8.2.5 Incident clock used Yes
8.3 Risk Management During Emergency Operations

8.3.1CRM function of Incident Commander Yes
8.4 Risk Management During Emergency Operations

8.4.1 Risk management integrated in incident command Yes
8.4.2 Risk management principles used Yes
8.4.3 IC evaluates the risk to all members Yes
8.4.4 Risk management principle routinely used by supervisors Yes
8.4.5 Quali?ed Incident Safety Of?cer assigned Yes
8.4.6 Protective equipment appropriate for CBRN exposure Yes
8.5 Personnel Accountability During Emergency Operations

8.5.1 Written SOPs for personnel accountability Yes
8.5.2 Local conditions and characteristics considered Yes
8.5.3 Members actively participate Yes
8.5.4 IC maintains awareness Yes
8.5.5 TLMC of?cers supervise assigned companies/crews Yes
8.5.6 Company of?cers responsible for members Yes
8.5.7 Members remain with company Yes
8.5.8 Member responsible for following personnel accountability Yes
system

8.5.9 Personnel accountability system used at all incidents Yes
8.5.10 Accountability system effective Yes

 

42

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8.5.11 Additional accountability of?cers Yes
8.5.12 1C and supervisors responsible for tracking and Yes
accountability of assigned companies

8.6 Members Operating at Emergency Incidents

8.6.1 Adequate number of personnel provided to safety conduct Yes
emergency operations

8.6.2 No evolutions outside of established safety criteria Yes
8.6.3 Inexperienced members directly supervised Yes
8.6.4 Members operate in teams of two or more Yes
8.6.5 Crew members in communication with each other Yes
8.6.6 Crew members operate in proximity to each other Yes
8.6.7 Two in, two out in initial stages Yes
8.6.8 At aircraft rescue and ?re?ghting IDLH area within 75 Ft (23 Yes
In) of aircraft

8.6.9 Highest available level of EMS available for special Yes
operations

8.6.10 EMS personnel at hazmat operations meet NFPA 473 Yes
8.6.11 IC requests EMS to be available Yes
8.6.12 Members secured to aerial device Yes
8.6.13 PPE and SCBA used by ?re investigators and others in Yes
IDLH atmosphere

8.6.14 Water rescue members wear personal ?otation devices Yes
8.6.15 SOP for hazardous energy source operation YES
8.7 Hazard Control Zones

8.7.1 Hazard control zones established with members wearing Yes
appropriate level of PPE

8.7.2 Hazard control zone perimeters established Yes
8.7.3 Changes in perimeters communicated to all members Yes
8.7.4 Hazard control zones identi?ed Yes
8.7.5 The IC ensures that the designation of the appropriate Yes
protective clothing and equipment

8.7.6 All of?cers and members using appropriate PPE Yes
8.7.7 The use of hazard control zones continued until the hazard Yes
have been mitigated

8.8 Rapid Intervention for Rescue of Members

8.8.1 Personnel provided for rescue of members Yes
8.8.2.2 Standby members maintain awareness Yes
8.8.2.3 Standby members remain in communication Yes
8.8.2.4 Standby member permitted to perform other duties outside Yes
of the hazard area

8.8.2.5 Standby member restricted activities Yes
8.8.2.6 Standby members have full PPE and SCBA Yes
8.8.2.7 Standby members don full PPE and SCBA before entering Yes

 

 

43

 

 

 

hazardous area

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8.8.2. 8 Standby member limitations Yes
8.8.2 Rapid intervention crew deployed when incident in no longer Yes
in initial stage

8.8.2.10 In immediate life?threatening situations, action to prevent Yes
loss of life' permitted with less than four personnel

8.8.4 Rapid invention crew equipped and available Yes
8.8.6 Composure and structure or RIC ?exible Yes
8.8.7 IC provides appropriate for incident size Yes
8.8.8 RIC status in early stages Yes
8.8.11 for special operations Yes
8.10 Violence, Civil Unrest, or Terrorism

8.10.1 Fire department not involved in activity without law Yes
enforcement present

8.10.2 Fire department personnel not involved in crowd control Yes
8.10.3 SOPs for member safety at civil disturbance Yes
8.10.4 Interagency agreement for protection of members Yes
8.10.5 Communication to indicate life and death situations Yes
8.10.6 Fire department to coordinate with law enforcement Yes
8.10.7 Fire department IC identi?es and reacts to violent situations Yes
8.10.8 Fire department IC communicates with law enforcement IC Yes
8.10.9 Stage resources in a safe area until scene secure Yes
8.10.10 Secure law enforcement or withdraw when violence occurs Yes
8.10.11 Body armor used only by members trained and quali?ed Yes
8.10.12 Members supporting SWAT operations trained and Yes
operating under SOPs

8.11 Post Incident Analysis

8.11.1 SOPs for standardized post incident critique Yes
8.11.2 Incident safety of?cer involved in critique Yes
8.11.3 Review of conditions and actions on the safety and health of Yes
members.

8.11.4 Identify needed action to improve welfare of members Yes
8.11.5 Analysis includes standard action plan Yes
8.11.5 Analysis includes standard action plan Yes
Chapter 9 Tra?ic Incident Management

9.1 Reserved 
9.2 Emergency Operations at Traf?c Incidents

9.2.1 Training on Roadway Hazard and Safety for all members Yes
9.2.2 Develop in partnership with other agencies Yes
9.3 Placement of Apparatus and Warning Devices

9.3.1 Safe zones established early Yes

 

 

44

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9.4 Use of Apparatus as Blocking Device

9.4.1 Proper placement of blocking apparatus Yes

9.4.2 Reduce warning lights when temporary TIMA established Yes

9.4.3 Additional units positioned from blocking Yes

apparatus and warning lights reduced

9.4.4 Ambulance placed in safe loading zone Yes

9.4.5 Traf?c cones and warning signs compliant with MUTCD Yes

9.4.6 Proper utilization of warning lights Yes

9.4.7 Position units and victims in safe area Yes

9.4.8 Stage unneeded units and off-road way Yes

9.4.9 Member shall wear high visibility safety equipment (ANSI Yes

107) when potential for contact with motor vehicle traf?c exist

9. 4. 10 Train members to 1091 standard if assigned to traf?c control Yes
7-5 . - f3: E9713 3. .7 3584?; 
Redacted 

Chapter 11 Medical and Physical Requirements

Chapter 11.1 Medical Requirements

11.1.1 Medical quali?ed before becoming a member Yes

11.1.2 Medical evaluation considers risks and functions Yes

11.1.3 Candidates and members meet NFPA 1582 Yes

11.1.4 Aircraft pilots comply with FAA regulations 

11.1.5 Members under in?uence of drugs or alcohol excluded fr0m Yes

participation

11.2 Physical Performance Requirements

11.2.1 Fire department develops requirements Yes

11.2.2 Candidates quali?ed prior to training NO In progress
11.2.3 Members annually quali?ed NO In progress
11.2.4 Members not quali?ed not involved in emergency Yes

operations

11.2.5 Physical performance rehabilitation program available Yes

11.3 Health and Fitness

11.3.1 Health and ?tness program meets NFPA 1583 NO In progress 
11.3.2 Fitness levels determined by individual?s assigned functions NO In progress
11.3.3 Health and ?tness coordinator administers the program NO In progress
11.3 .4 Health and fitness coordinator acts as liaison Yes

1 1.4 Con?dential Health Database

11.4.1 Individual health ?le for each member Yes

11.4.2 Health ?le complete Yes

11.4.3 Composite data base for analysis Yes

11.4.4 Autopsy results in health data base Yes

11.5 Infection Control

 

 

 

 

 

45

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11.5.1 Fire department limits or prevents member?s exposure Yes
11.5.2 Infection control program meets NFPA 1581 Yes
11.6 Fire Department Physician

11.6.1 Fire department licensed physician of?cially designated Yes
11.6.2 Provides medical guidance in management of safety and Yes
health program

1 1.6.3 Physician licensed

1 1.6.4 Available on urgent basis Yes
11.6.5 Health and Safety Of?cer and Health Fitness Coordinator NO "In progress
liaison with physician

1 1.7 Fitness for Duty Evaluations

11.7.1 Process for evaluating essential job functions Yes
11.7.2 Evaluation by competent person and con?rmed by ?re Yes
department physician

11.7.3 Treatment provided to allow member to perform essential Yes
job functions

11.7.4 Fire department physician to determine member?s return to Yes
work

Chapter 12 Behavioral Health and Wellness Programs

12.1 Behavioral Health Program

12.1.1. Provide member assistance program Yes
12.1.2 Program refers members to appropriate health care services Yes
12.1.3 Program to assist members with coping with stressful events Yes
12.1.4 Program that supports behavioral health Yes
Chapter 13 Occupational Exposure to Atypically Stressful

Events

13.1 General

13.1.1 Physician to provide guidance Yes
13.1.2 Written policy that establishes program to relieve stress Yes
13.1.3 Clearly outlined assistance and intervention to affected Yes
member

Chapter 14 Exposure to Fireground Toxic Contaminants

14.1 Training

14.1 Training on hazards associated with ?reground exposure Yes
14.2 Prevention and Mitigation Yes
14.3 Cleaning and Maintenance Yes
14.3.1 AHJ will provide for the cleaning and maintenance of PPE Yes
14.3.2 AHJ will remove all soiled and contaminated PPE from Yes
service until it is compliant with NFPA 1851

14.4 Mitigation of Fireground Toxic Contamination Exposure Yes
14.4.1 Appropriate PPE shall be worn on ?reground operations Yes
14.4.2 Respiratory protection during overhaul shall be a supplied Yes

air respirator

 

 

 

46

 

 

14.4.2.1 APR Use in the Post Fire Environment Yes 

 

 

14.4.2.1.1 APR with cartridge can be used in predetermined Yes
conditions and atmospheric levels
14.4.2.1.2 The chemical cartridge must be NIOSH Approved Yes

 

14.4.2.1.3 The chemical cartridge should be replaced at regular Yes
intervals

 

 

 

14.5 Post Incident Fireground Toxic Contamination Exposure Yes
14.5.1 Members trained in the proper dof?ng of contaminated PPE Yes
14.5.2 Create SOG for proper ?reground decontamination Yes

 

14.5.3 AHJ shall provide decontamination facilities and equipment Yes
for exposed ?re?ghters

 

 

 

 

 

 

14.5.3 .1 Proper post ?reground hygiene for members Yes
14.6 Exposure Reporting Requirements Yes
14.6.1 Establish exposure reporting system Yes
14.6.1.1Exposure report records shall be maintained for 15 years Yes
14.6.1.2 Members shall access to their exposure report record Yes

 

 

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