Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 1 of 32 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 KEITH E. EGGLETON, State Bar No. 159842 Email: keggleton@wsgr.com RODNEY G. STRICKLAND, State Bar No. 161934 Email: rstrickland@wsgr.com RYAN S. WOLF, State Bar No. 319353 Email: rwolf@wsgr.com WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI Professional Corporation 650 Page Mill Road Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050 Telephone: (650) 493-9300 Facsimile: (650) 565-5100 LORI W. WILL, Admitted Pro Hac Vice Email: lwill@wsgr.com WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 800 Wilmington, DE 19803-5225 Attorneys for Defendants Reed Hastings, David Wells, Richard Barton, A. George (Skip) Battle, Timothy Haley, Jay Hoag, Leslie Kilgore, Ann Mather, Brad Smith, Anne Sweeney, Neil Hunt, Ted Sarandos, Greg Peters, David Hyman and Nominal Defendant Netflix, Inc. 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 16 SAN JOSE DIVISION 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CITY OF BIRMINGHAM RELIEF AND RETIREMENT SYSTEM, ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) REED HASTINGS, DAVID WELLS, ) RICHARD BARTON, A. GEORGE (SKIP) ) BATTLE, TIMOTHY HALEY, JAY HOAG, ) LESLIE KILGORE, ANN MATHER, BRAD ) SMITH, ANNE SWEENEY, NEIL HUNT, TED ) SARANDOS, GREG PETERS, and DAVID ) HYMAN, ) ) Defendants, ) – and – ) ) NETFLIX INC., ) ) Nominal Defendant. ) ) DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF CASE NO.: 5:18-cv-02107-BLF DERIVATIVE ACTION DEFENDANTS’ AND NOMINAL DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF MOTIONS AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS VERIFIED SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT DATE: TIME: JUDGE: December 13, 2018 9:00 a.m. Hon. Beth Labson Freeman Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 2 of 32 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 NOTICE OF MOTIONS AND MOTIONS .................................................................................... 1 3 ISSUES TO BE DECIDED............................................................................................................. 1 4 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................ 2 5 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 2 6 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 3 7 I. THE PARTIES ........................................................................................................ 3 8 II. SECTION 162(M) AND THE PERFORMANCE BONUS PLAN ........................ 4 9 III. PERFORMANCE BONUSES AWARDED TO OFFICER DEFENDANTS UNDER THE PLAN ............................................................................................... 6 IV. THE PROXY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ............................................................. 7 10 11 12 13 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 8 I. 14 15 16 THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 23.1 BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD THAT DEMAND ON THE BOARD WOULD BE FUTILE. ............................................................................. 8 A. Plaintiff Fails to Create a Reasonable Doubt that a Majority of the Board Lacks Independence or is Interested in the Plan. ........................... 10 B. Plaintiff Fails to Create a Reasonable Doubt as to Whether a Majority of the Board Faces a Substantial Likelihood of Liability. .......... 11 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II. 1. No substantial likelihood of liability for violating federal tax law ................................................................................................. 12 2. No substantial likelihood of liability for knowing dissemination of false information to stockholders ....................... 16 3. Committee membership alone does not establish knowledge ....... 18 4. No substantial likelihood of liability for allegedly violating internal governance policies or failure to implement internal controls .......................................................................................... 19 THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ................................................................ 19 A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. ............................................................................................................ 20 1. No misstatements in the Proxies ................................................... 20 2. No injury-causing transaction ....................................................... 21 3. No culpable conduct ...................................................................... 22 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -i- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 3 of 32 1 B. 2 3 4 5 6 7 C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Under Delaware Law. .......................................................................................... 22 1. No duty of loyalty claim pleaded against the Director Defendants ..................................................................................... 22 2. No gross negligence pleaded against the Officer Defendants or Mr. Wells .................................................................................. 23 Plaintiff Fails to State a Corporate Waste Claim under Delaware Law. ........................................................................................................... 24 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 25 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -ii- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 4 of 32 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 CASES 3 Abrams v. Wainscott, 2012 WL 3614638 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2012) ........................................................................18 4 5 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984),................................................................................................9, 15 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) .............................................................................................................20 7 8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .............................................................................................................20 9 Braddock v. Zimmerman, 906 A.2d 776 (Del. 2006).......................................................................................................9 10 11 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) ....................................................................................9, 10, 11, 25 12 Brown v. Moll, 2010 WL 2898324 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) ......................................................................23 13 14 Bush v. Vaco Tech. Serv., LLC, 2018 WL 2047807 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018) .......................................................................20 15 Conrad v. Blank, 940 A.2d 28 (Del. Ch. 2007) ..................................................................................................9 16 17 Desaigoudar v. Meyercord, 223 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) ........................................................................................20, 22 18 Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007) ..............................................................................................15 19 20 Dreiling v. Am. Express Co., 458 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................................3 21 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) .............................................................................................................20 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Freedman v. Adams, 2012 WL 1345638 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012), aff’d, 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013) .......................................................................................13, 22 Freedman v. Mulva, 2014 WL 975308 (D. Del. Mar. 12, 2014) ...........................................................................15 Freedman v. Redstone, 2013 WL 3753426 (D. Del. 2013), aff’d, 753 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2014) .................................................................................13, 25 Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003) ..................................................................................15, 17, 23 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -iii- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 5 of 32 1 2 Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353 (Del. Ch. 1983) ..............................................................................................25 3 Horman v. Abney, 2017 WL 242571 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017) ..........................................................................19 4 In re 3Com Corp. S’holders Litig., 1999 WL 1009210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) ........................................................................24 5 6 In re Accuray, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 757 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ........................................................15, 17, 19, 23, 24 7 In re Asyst Techs., Inc. Derivative Litig., 2008 WL 2169021 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2008) .....................................................................22 8 9 10 11 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. S’holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268 (Del. Ch. 1995) ............................................................................................11 In re Caterpillar Inc. Derivative Litig., 2014 WL 2587479 (D. Del. June 10, 2014) ...................................................................16, 21 12 In re China Auto. Sys. Inc. Derivative Litig., 2013 WL 4672059 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2013) .......................................................................18 13 In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) ..................................................................................17, 19, 23 14 15 In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., 2010 WL 66769 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) ................................................................15, 17, 25 16 In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., 2015 WL 3958724 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2015) .......................................................................12 17 18 In re Google, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 2012 WL 1611064 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) .............................................................9, 12, 15 19 In re HP Derivative Litig., 2012 WL 4468423 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012).......................................................................9 20 21 In re Linear Tech. Corp. Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 3533024 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2006) .......................................................................18 22 In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640 (Del. Ch. 2008) ..............................................................................................23 23 24 25 26 In re Maxwell Techs., Inc. Derivative Litig., 2014 WL 2212155 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2014) ......................................................................15 In re Sagent Tech., Inc., Derivative Litig., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ...................................................................10, 12, 23 27 In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) ...............................................................................8, 11, 15, 17 28 In re Verisign, Inc. Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ................................................................8, 9, 21, 22 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -iv- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 6 of 32 1 2 3 4 5 6 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) .............................................................................................24 In re Yahoo! Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .................................................................................4 Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund, IBEW v. Dunn, 2008 WL 878424 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), aff’d, 532 F. App’x 157 (9th Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................11 7 Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Bogart, 2012 WL 2160436 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2012) .....................................................................11 8 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) .................................................................................................................8 9 10 Krieger v. Atheros Commc’ns, Inc., 2012 WL 1933559 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) .....................................................................22 11 Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) ..............................................................................................25 12 13 N.J. Bldg. Laborers Pension Fund v. Ball, 2014 WL 1018210 (D. Del. Mar. 13, 2014) .........................................................................18 14 N.Y. City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Jobs, 593 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2010) ........................................................................................20, 22 15 16 17 18 Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2015) ................................................................................................3 Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).....................................................................................................10 19 Potter v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................8 20 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).................................................................................................8, 10 21 22 23 24 Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2014) ..........................................................................................9, 10 Seinfeld v. O’Connor, 774 F. Supp. 2d 660 (D. Del. 2011) ..................................................................13, 14, 16, 21 25 Shaev v. Saper, 320 F.3d 373 (3d Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................14 26 South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2012) ....................................................................................................18 27 28 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).....................................................................................................12 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -v- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 7 of 32 1 2 Towers v. Iger, 2017 WL 6044035 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) ......................................................8, 9, 11, 16 3 Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433 (Del. Ch. 2008) ................................................................................................8 4 Wilkin v. Narachi, 2018 WL 1100372 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2018) ..................................................................12, 19 5 6 STATUTES 7 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) ....................................................................................................................4, 23 8 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) .................................................................................................................... passim 9 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2017) ....................................................................................................... passim 10 RULES AND REGULATIONS 11 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27 ....................................................................................................4, 5, 13, 14, 15 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ............................................................................................................ passim 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 .................................................................................................................. passim 14 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) ...........................................................................................................................4 15 MISCELLANEOUS 16 IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199950021, 1999 WL 1208442 (Dec. 17, 1999) ...............................................14 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -vi- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 8 of 32 1 2 NOTICE OF MOTIONS AND MOTIONS PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on December 13, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable 3 Beth Labson Freeman of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 4 Courtroom 3, 5th Floor, 280 South 1st Street, San Jose, California, Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix” or the 5 “Company”) and defendants Reed Hastings, David Wells, Richard Barton, A. George (Skip) 6 Battle, Timothy Haley, Jay Hoag, Leslie Kilgore, Ann Mather, Brad Smith, Anne Sweeney, Neil 7 Hunt, Ted Sarandos, Greg Peters, and David Hyman (the “Individual Defendants”) will and 8 hereby do move to dismiss the Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint (ECF No. 25; the 9 “Complaint”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks 10 standing to pursue this action because it did not make a pre-filing demand on Netflix’s Board of 11 Directors and has not pleaded particularized facts demonstrating that such a demand would have 12 been futile. 13 PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that at the same date, time and location referenced 14 above the Individual Defendants will and hereby do move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff’s claims under Section 14(a) of the 16 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (the “Exchange Act”), for breach of 17 fiduciary duty, and waste, do not state plausible claims. 18 These Motions are based on this Notice of Motions and Motions; the accompanying 19 Memorandum of Points and Authorities supporting the Motions, the Declaration of Rodney G. 20 Strickland and exhibits thereto; all papers filed herein; oral argument of counsel; and the record 21 in this action. 22 23 ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 1. Should the Complaint be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to make a pre-filing 24 demand on Netflix’s Board of Directors and failed to allege particularized facts demonstrating 25 that a demand would have been futile? 26 27 2. Should the Complaint be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against any of the Individual Defendants? 28 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -1- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 9 of 32 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 2 INTRODUCTION 3 In 2014, Netflix’s stockholders approved an incentive compensation plan for certain 4 executives. Federal tax statutes and regulations, described below, addressed the tax treatment of 5 such plans and provided that certain performance-based bonuses might be tax deductible. This 6 lawsuit, which Plaintiff purports to bring on behalf of Netflix against certain of its directors and 7 officers, does not challenge the validity of that compensation plan. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that 8 disclosures in the Company’s annual proxy statements about the potential deductibility of 9 performance bonuses awarded under the plan were misleading because—according to an 10 interpretation of tax law that Plaintiff concocted—the bonuses were not actually deductible. 11 The compensation plan was created so that Netflix could take advantage of available tax 12 deductions for bonuses paid to three of its senior officers, as permitted by the applicable tax 13 laws. The deductions claimed by Netflix reduced its tax burden, and therefore were beneficial to 14 Netflix and its stockholders. Neither the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) nor any other 15 government entity has challenged Netflix’s tax deductions. 16 challenges something that benefited the Company—the opposite of the type of corporate harm 17 derivative lawsuits typically seek to remedy. Plaintiff’s lawsuit therefore 18 The Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 23.1 because Plaintiff has failed to 19 establish standing to pursue a derivative claim. Netflix’s current 11-member Board of Directors 20 (the “Board”) includes 10 outside and independent directors, two of whom are not defendants. 21 None of Netflix’s directors benefitted from the compensation plan. Nevertheless, Plaintiff chose 22 not to make a demand on the Board before filing this lawsuit. To have standing in the absence of 23 a demand, Plaintiff must make particularized allegations demonstrating that a majority of the 24 Board members—that is, at least six—could not have impartially considered a demand because 25 they face a substantial likelihood of liability. Plaintiff’s burden is even higher because Netflix 26 has an exculpatory charter provision, and so Plaintiff must show at least six directors breached 27 their duty of loyalty or acted in bad faith. It has not done so. Putting aside that Plaintiff’s views 28 on deductibility are entirely novel, the Complaint contains no particularized allegations DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -2- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 10 of 32 1 suggesting that at least six directors knowingly violated the law or even had a role in the 2 challenged disclosures about the potential deductibility of the bonuses. 3 The Individual Defendants further contend that the Complaint should be dismissed under 4 Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has failed to establish the elements of a Section 14(a) claim under the 5 Exchange Act. The Complaint also lacks a well-pleaded, non-exculpated claim for breach of the 6 duty of loyalty against the director defendants, and fails to allege any facts supporting a claim of 7 gross negligence against the officer defendants under Delaware law. 8 allegations quibbling with the performance bonuses come nowhere close to satisfying the high 9 standard for pleading a waste claim. For these reasons, the Complaint must be dismissed. 10 11 Finally, Plaintiff’s FACTUAL BACKGROUND I. THE PARTIES 12 Plaintiff brings this stockholder derivative action on behalf of Netflix, a Delaware 13 corporation with its principal executive offices in Los Gatos, California. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16. Nine 14 of Netflix’s directors—Messrs. Hastings, Barton, Battle, Haley, Hoag, and Smith, and Mss. 15 Kilgore, Mather and Sweeney (collectively, the “Director Defendants”) are named as defendants. 16 Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19-26. Only one of the Director Defendants—Mr. Hastings, the Chief Executive 17 Officer of Netflix—is alleged not to be an outside, independent director. Compl. ¶ 17. At the 18 time the Complaint was filed, Netflix’s Board consisted of 11 directors—the nine Director 19 Defendants, plus non-defendants Rodolphe Belmer (the Chief Executive Officer of Eutelsat, one 20 of the world’s leading satellite operators) and Amb. Susan Rice (former Ambassador to the 21 United Nations and National Security Advisor to President Obama). See Decl. of Rodney G. 22 Strickland in Supp. of Netflix, Inc.’s and the Individual Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss Verified 23 S’holder Derivative Compl. (“Strickland Decl.”) Exs. B & C.1 Plaintiff also names as defendants 24 25 26 27 28 1 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following documents, which are attached to the Strickland Declaration: (A) Netflix’s Restated Certificate of Incorporation, filed with the SEC as an exhibit to Netflix’s Form 10-Q on July 17, 2015; (B) Netflix’s Form 8K, filed with the SEC on January 24, 2018; (C) Netflix’s Form 8-K, filed with the SEC on March 28, 2018; and (D) Netflix’s Form 8-K, filed with the SEC on December 28, 2017. These documents are appropriate for judicial notice because they were publicly filed with the SEC. See Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining “[i]t is appropriate to take judicial notice of this information, as it was made publicly available by [the SEC]” (citation omitted)); Dreiling v. Am. Express Co., 458 F.3d 942, 946 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that a court “may consider documents referred to in the complaint or any matter DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS -3CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 11 of 32 1 five current and former non-director officers of Netflix. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 30-33. Mr. Wells is the 2 Company’s Chief Financial Officer. Compl. ¶ 18. The other four officers—Messrs. Hunt, 3 Sarandos, Peters, and Hyman (the “Officer Defendants”)—are or were covered employees whose 4 compensation is subject to the deductibility limits of Section 162(m)(3) of the Internal Revenue 5 Code. Compl. ¶¶ 30-33. 6 II. SECTION 162(M) AND THE PERFORMANCE BONUS PLAN 7 According to the Complaint, this action was initiated because Netflix took a tax 8 deduction on performance-based bonuses awarded to the Officer Defendants, which Plaintiff 9 believes were not deductible under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code and the 10 relevant Treasury regulations. E.g., Compl. ¶ 6. Section 162(m) placed a $1 million limit on the 11 deductibility for income tax purposes of annual compensation paid to a “covered employee”—a 12 company’s CEO and its other three highest-paid officers (other than the CFO). 26 U.S.C. 13 § 162(m)(1), (3); Compl. ¶ 50. Until it was amended (as explained below), Section 162(m) also 14 contained an exception to that limitation for qualified performance-based compensation, defined 15 as compensation “payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance 16 goals.” 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2017) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)); see also 26 17 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(b), (e); Compl. ¶¶ 52-53. 18 Therefore, Section 162(m) provided a mechanism by which a company could claim a tax 19 deduction for bonuses awarded to senior executives. Because of the potential tax benefit, many 20 companies implemented Section 162(m) compensation plans. 21 addressed only the tax deductibility of performance-based compensation paid to covered 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Importantly, Section 162(m) subject to judicial notice, such as SEC filings”). “[C]ourts routinely take judicial notice of certificates of incorporation when ruling on motions to dismiss in derivative actions.” In re Yahoo! Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1117-18 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Defendants do not seek judicial notice of the truth of all matters in these documents. Exhibit A is offered for the fact that Netflix’s Restated Certificate of Incorporation includes an exculpatory provision, which mirrors the language of Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Exhibits B and C are offered solely to show the composition of Netflix’s Board at the time the lawsuit was filed. Exhibit D is offered to demonstrate that bonuses are no longer being awarded under the Plan. The existence of the exculpatory charter provision, composition of Netflix’s Board, and discontinuation of the Plan are not subject to reasonable dispute and can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -4- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 12 of 32 1 employees—not the amount of compensation that could be awarded. Neither Section 162(m) nor 2 any other statute or regulation prohibited granting compensation that was not tax-deductible. 3 This provision of Section 162(m) on deductibility is no longer in place. Pursuant to the 4 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, dated December 22, 2017 and effective January 1, 2018, the Section was 5 amended to expand the scope of the $1 million deduction limitation and to eliminate the 6 exception for performance-based compensation. 26 U.S.C. § 162(m). Because that amendment 7 went into effect and eliminated any tax benefit from performance-based bonuses, Netflix began 8 paying all cash compensation to senior executives as salary in 2018. See Strickland Decl. Ex. D. 9 The Treasury regulations that implemented Section 162(m)’s former exception for 10 performance-based compensation describe what constitutes a “performance goal” under the 11 statute. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27. Treasury Regulation Section 1.162-27(e)(2)(i) explains that a 12 performance goal must be established “not later than 90 days after the commencement of the 13 period of service to which the performance goal relates,” and “in no event will a performance 14 goal be considered to be preestablished if it is established after 25 percent of the period of 15 service . . . has elapsed.” Id. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i). That Treasury Regulation also requires that the 16 “outcome” of the performance goal must be “substantially uncertain at the time the 17 compensation committee actually establishes the goal.” 18 regulations do not define the meaning of “substantially uncertain.” Id.; Compl. ¶ 54. The Treasury 19 On April 28, 2014, Netflix filed a definitive proxy statement (the “2014 Proxy”), seeking 20 stockholder approval of the Performance Bonus Plan (the “Plan”), which Plaintiff accurately 21 alleges was “developed to enable the Company to claim a tax deduction under Section 162(m) 22 for certain performance-based compensation.” Compl. ¶ 56. Before the 2014 Proxy was filed, 23 the Compensation Committee approved the Plan on March 26, 2014 following a review of 24 Section 162(m). Compl. ¶ 56 (citing minutes). In the 2014 Proxy, stockholders were informed 25 that, pursuant to the Plan, eligible officers might receive compensation “based upon the 26 Company achieving certain performance goals.” Compl. ¶ 57. The 2014 Proxy also explained 27 that the Plan “could permit [Netflix] to receive a full federal income tax deduction for 28 compensation (if any) paid under the Plan.” DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF Id. The 2014 Proxy described the potential -5- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 13 of 32 1 performance goals that the Compensation Committee could set in connection with the Plan, 2 which included revenue, among other metrics. Compl. ¶ 58. The 2014 Proxy also disclosed that 3 a participant’s target award would be based on achievement of “one or more performance 4 goal(s).” Compl. ¶ 58. On June 10, 2014, Netflix announced that stockholders approved the 5 adoption of the Plan, and provided a summary of the “principal features of the Plan and its 6 operation.” Compl. ¶ 59. Plaintiff does not challenge the 2014 Proxy or the validity of the Plan. 7 III. 8 PERFORMANCE BONUSES AWARDED TO OFFICER DEFENDANTS UNDER THE PLAN 9 In the first quarter of 2015, the Compensation Committee acknowledged it had 10 determined that the Plan should be implemented so that the Company could “take advantage of 11 available tax deductions.” Compl. ¶ 60 (quoting minutes). Before each quarter in 2015, 2016, 12 and 2017, the Compensation Committee set a performance period and a goal of global streaming 13 revenue. Compl. ¶¶ 80, 82, 85, 87, 90, 93, 96, 98, 101, 104, 106-107. “The [Compensation 14 Committee] chose this goal because global streaming revenue is an important metric 15 demonstrating the growth of the Company.” Compl. ¶¶ 69, 75. Although the Compensation 16 Committee members received forward-looking projections during quarterly Board meetings 17 (e.g., Compl. ¶ 83), they set the global streaming revenue performance targets as “reflected in 18 [Netflix’s] publicly-available financial statements.” Compl. ¶¶ 69, 75 (emphasis added). Put 19 differently, the internal performance goals mirrored Netflix’s public guidance. At the conclusion 20 of each quarter, the Compensation Committee compared the Company’s actual global streaming 21 revenue to the performance target, and determined whether the relevant Officer Defendants were 22 eligible for a bonus payout under the Plan. 23 The Complaint demonstrates that the global streaming revenue goals increased each 24 quarter, such that significant growth was required for the bonuses to be awarded. The 25 performance target for the final quarter the Plan was in use was more than double (or increased 26 by over $1.4 billion) that of the first performance period in 2015. Compare Compl. ¶ 81, with id. 27 ¶ 106. 28 Sarandos, Hunt, and Peters, until the third quarter of 2017 when Mr. Hyman replaced Mr. Hunt. The Officer Defendants who were awarded bonuses under the Plan were Messrs. DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -6- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 14 of 32 1 Compl. ¶ 106. Netflix’s CEO, Mr. Hastings, was not awarded bonuses under the Plan. Mr. 2 Wells was also not awarded bonuses under the Plan because, as CFO, his compensation was not 3 subject to the limitations of Section 162(m) and therefore fully deductible. See supra at 4. 4 IV. THE PROXY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE 5 While the performance-based bonuses were being awarded under the Plan, Netflix issued 6 three proxy statements before each of three annual stockholder meetings that included a 7 description of the bonuses, in connection with Netflix’s “say-on-pay” stockholder vote. Compl. 8 ¶ 120. The first was issued on April 27, 2015 (the “2015 Proxy”), the second on April 27, 2016 9 (the “2016 Proxy”) and the third on April 24, 2017 (the “2017 Proxy” and, with the 2015 Proxy 10 and 2016 Proxy, the “Proxies”). Compl. ¶¶ 62, 67, 73. 11 The 2015 Proxy explained that the Plan had been created “[i]n order to comply with 12 Section 162(m),” and described that the Compensation Committee had “chos[en] to implement 13 the [Plan] that was approved by stockholders in 2014,” such that “certain [of the Officer 14 Defendants] w[ould] be eligible to receive bonuses based on targets set by the Compensation 15 Committee.” Compl. ¶¶ 64-65. 16 The 2016 Proxy and 2017 Proxy both explained that the “Plan [wa]s intended to permit 17 the Company to seek a full federal tax deduction for compensation paid under the Plan” and that 18 “bonuses earned and paid under the [Plan] [we]re intended to qualify as performance-based.” 19 Compl. ¶¶ 69, 71, 75, 77. The 2016 Proxy and 2017 Proxy also described the Compensation 20 Committee’s approval of four performance periods, each one “comprised of one of [the 21 Company’s] fiscal quarters,” and described its selection of global streaming revenue targets 22 based on Netflix’s “publicly-available financial statements.” Compl. ¶¶ 69, 75. Each quarterly 23 global streaming revenue performance target and each corresponding global streaming revenue 24 result was also disclosed. Compl. ¶¶ 70, 76. 25 26 27 28 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -7- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 15 of 32 1 2 ARGUMENT I. 3 THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 23.1 BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PLEAD THAT DEMAND ON THE BOARD WOULD BE FUTILE. 4 Federal law determines the procedural rules that apply to stockholder derivative 5 complaints filed in federal court. See In re Verisign, Inc. Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 6 1173, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2007). A stockholder seeking to pursue derivative claims on behalf of a 7 corporation must make a demand on the corporation’s directors to act, or must “state with 8 particularity” the reasons why such demand would have been futile. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(3); 9 see In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1999). This “demand 10 requirement implements ‘the basic principle of corporate governance that the decisions of a 11 corporation—including the decision to initiate litigation—should be made by the board of 12 directors.’” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 101 (1991) (citation omitted). As 13 the Ninth Circuit has held, “strict compliance with Rule 23.1 and the applicable substantive law 14 is necessary before a derivative suit can wrest control of an issue from the board of directors.” 15 Potter v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). Derivative plaintiffs must overcome the 16 presumption that directors fulfilled their fiduciary duties with particularized factual allegations, 17 meaning that the “plaintiff’s pleading burden in the demand [futility] context is more onerous 18 than that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Towers v. Iger, 2017 WL 6044035, at 19 *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) (quoting Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 441 (Del. Ch. 2008)). 20 Because Netflix is a Delaware corporation, Delaware law supplies the substantive 21 standard for determining whether demand is excused. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 108-09; Silicon 22 Graphics, 183 F.3d at 990. Under Delaware law, demand will be excused only if a complaint 23 contains “particularized factual allegations . . . creat[ing] a reasonable doubt that . . . the board of 24 directors could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in 25 responding to a demand.” Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993). Delaware law 26 provides two tests for assessing demand futility—the Aronson test and the Rales test. The 27 Aronson test is applied if the lawsuit challenges a specific decision or transaction of the 28 corporation’s board, requiring the plaintiff to plead particularized facts creating a reasonable DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -8- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 16 of 32 1 doubt either that (1) the directors were disinterested and independent, or (2) the challenged 2 transaction was the product of a valid business judgment. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 3 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). The 4 Rales test is applied if the subject of the lawsuit is not a particular business decision of the board, 5 or is a decision made by less than a majority of a board. See Braddock v. Zimmerman, 906 A.2d 6 776, 784-85 (Del. 2006). 7 “The Ninth Circuit has held that the difference between the Aronson and Rales tests is 8 blurred in cases where a derivative claim alleges wrongdoing by a majority of the board but does 9 not challenge a specific board decision.” Towers, 2017 WL 6044035, at *5. Here, the decision 10 to set performance targets and award bonuses under the Plan was an act of the Compensation 11 Committee (Messrs. Battle, Haley, and Hoag) who constitute just three of the 11 Board 12 members. See Conrad v. Blank, 940 A.2d 28, 36 (Del. Ch. 2007) (applying Rales test where 13 challenged option grants were authorized by compensation committee constituting less than half 14 of the board); see also In re HP Derivative Litig., 2012 WL 4468423, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 15 2012) (explaining that “when the challenged act does not constitute a business decision by the 16 board, a court should employ the Rales test”). Nor is a “board decision” implicated by the 17 Proxies—there are no facts alleged regarding a majority of the Board’s involvement with the 18 alleged misstatements. See In re Google, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 2012 WL 1611064, at 19 *5 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) (applying Rales where directors allegedly “caused” the company to 20 accept and promote illegal advertisements; concluding “plaintiffs’ allegations of defendants’ 21 ‘conscious’ knowledge and inaction vis-a-vis the purportedly unlawful advertising scheme 22 should be analyzed under the Rales test”); see also Verisign, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (dismissing 23 claims; applying Rales to allegations of filing misleading proxies about option grants where 24 “facts as pled show[ed]” a board majority was “not involved in any decision to backdate the 25 option grants”). In such cases, “courts excuse demand if ‘Plaintiffs’ particularized allegations 26 create a reasonable doubt as to whether a majority of the board . . . faces a substantial likelihood 27 of personal liability.’” Towers, 2017 WL 6044035, at *5 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 28 F.3d 1137, 1150 (9th Cir. 2014)). Because Plaintiff cannot establish that any of the directors— DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -9- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 17 of 32 1 much less at least six of the 11 Board members—is not disinterested and independent or faces a 2 substantial likelihood of liability, demand is not excused. 3 4 A. Plaintiff Fails to Create a Reasonable Doubt that a Majority of the Board Lacks Independence or is Interested in the Plan. 5 To show that a director is interested, Plaintiff must plead with particularity allegations 6 demonstrating that “divided loyalties are present, or [that] a director either has received, or is 7 entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit from the challenged transaction which is not 8 equally shared by the stockholders.” Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984), overruled 9 on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253-54. Rather than showing that a majority of the 10 Board—or at least six directors—is interested, Plaintiff effectively concedes that no member of 11 the Board received a personal benefit from the Plan. Compl. ¶¶ 108-116. Plaintiff attempts to 12 single out the Compensation Committee members as lacking “the requisite level of disinterested 13 and independence required” to consider a demand, but focuses on their purported misconduct 14 (addressed below) rather than allege any personal interest in the Plan. Compl. ¶ 113. Absent 15 from the Complaint is an allegation that any of the Director Defendants—including the 16 Compensation Committee members—would have been compensated differently with or without 17 the Plan. Even if the Compensation Committee members’ interests were somehow separate, they 18 constitute just three of the 11 Board members. 19 Nor does Plaintiff allege that the Director Defendants are dominated by or “beholden to” 20 the executives who received bonuses under the Plan such that the directors’ “discretion [has 21 been] sterilized.” Rales, 634 A.2d at 936; accord In re Sagent Tech., Inc., Derivative Litig., 278 22 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing independence standard). In addition, of the 23 11 Board members serving at the time the Complaint was filed, only Mr. Hastings is also an 24 officer—and he received no bonus under the Plan. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19-26; see also Rosenbloom, 25 765 F.3d at 1148 (explaining demand “‘[f]utility is gauged by the circumstances existing at the 26 commencement of a derivative suit’ and concerns the board of directors ‘sitting at the time the 27 complaint is filed’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, a majority of the Board is independent and 28 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -10- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 18 of 32 1 disinterested with regard to the Plan, and would have been qualified to consider a demand, had 2 Plaintiff made one. 3 4 B. Plaintiff Fails to Create a Reasonable Doubt as to Whether a Majority of the Board Faces a Substantial Likelihood of Liability. 5 Plaintiff’s attempt to argue demand futility consists of conclusory allegations that the 6 Director Defendants (9 of the 11 Board members) face “a substantial likelihood of liability for 7 violating federal securities and tax laws,” as well as their “fiduciary duty of candor.” Compl. 8 ¶¶ 111-112. Courts routinely find allegations that directors could be personally liable legally 9 insufficient to excuse demand. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 990 (explaining that “[t]he 10 mere threat of personal liability . . . standing alone, is insufficient to challenge either the 11 independence or disinterestedness of directors” (citation omitted)); Iron Workers Local No. 25 12 Pension Fund v. Bogart, 2012 WL 2160436, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2012) (accord); Ind. Elec. 13 Workers Pension Trust Fund, IBEW v. Dunn, 2008 WL 878424, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) 14 (“[I]t is no answer to say that demand is necessarily futile because (a) the directors would have to 15 sue themselves, thereby placing the conduct of litigation in hostile hands, or (b) that they 16 approved the underlying transaction.” (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 257 n.34)), aff’d, 532 F. 17 App’x 157 (9th Cir. 2009). Rather, “[d]emand will be excused only if the plaintiff’s allegations 18 show the defendants’ actions ‘were so egregious that a substantial likelihood of director liability 19 exists.’” Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 990 (citation omitted); In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. S’holders 20 Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1271 (Del. Ch. 1995) (stating it is “a rare case where the circumstances 21 are so egregious that there is a substantial likelihood of liability”). 22 Here, Plaintiff’s burden is even more difficult because Netflix has an exculpatory charter 23 provision that shields its directors from personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty, absent a 24 showing of intentional misconduct, self-dealing, or bad faith. See Strickland Decl. Ex. A, art. 25 VIII. As a result, Plaintiff “can establish the substantial likelihood of liability necessary to 26 excuse demand only by pleading ‘bad faith by alleging with particularity that a director 27 knowingly violated a fiduciary duty or failed to act in violation of a known duty to act, 28 demonstrating a conscious disregard for her duties.’” Towers, 2017 WL 6044035, at *5 (quoting DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -11- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 19 of 32 1 In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., 2015 WL 3958724, at *12 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2015)); 2 Sagent, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 n.9 (finding exculpatory charter provision precluded claim for 3 negligent breach of fiduciary duty). Plaintiff does not meet this burden, and demand is not 4 excused. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (explaining that actual knowledge 5 of unlawful conduct is required to show substantial likelihood of liability: “imposition of liability 6 requires a showing that the directors knew they were not discharging their fiduciary 7 obligations”). 8 1. No substantial likelihood of liability for violating federal tax law 9 Plaintiff primarily attempts to establish demand futility by arguing that the Board faces a 10 substantial likelihood of liability for violating federal tax law. Compl. ¶¶ 111-115. However, 11 the Complaint lacks particularized allegations demonstrating that a majority of the Board, despite 12 having no motive to do so, breached its fiduciary duties by intentionally causing the corporation 13 to violate the tax laws. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70 (explaining that bad faith requires a 14 fiduciary to have acted (1) intentionally with a purpose other than that of advancing the best 15 interests of the company, (2) with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or (3) with a 16 conscious disregard for his or her duties). Plaintiff asks the Court to infer—without making a 17 single particularized allegation on a director-by-director basis—that the Director Defendants 18 somehow knew that the bonuses were not tax deductible under Section 162(m). See Google, 19 2012 WL 1611064, at *7 (finding plaintiff did not demonstrate demand futility where allegations 20 “stated against all defendants in a collective and general fashion” without any “particularized 21 allegations stating which particular director or directors had knowledge of” unlawful practices). 22 That is not a reasonable inference to draw for several reasons. 23 First, Plaintiff does not demonstrate a violation of Section 162(m) or the relevant 24 Treasury regulations that could support a finding of substantial likelihood of liability against a 25 majority of the Board. This is not a case where the government has taken action to investigate or 26 prosecute a corporate trauma, and a stockholder derivative action is filed concerning the same 27 conduct. Here, there has been no enforcement action or investigation against Netflix that could 28 bolster Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations. See Wilkin v. Narachi, 2018 WL 1100372, at *10-11 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -12- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 20 of 32 1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2018) (finding no substantial likelihood of liability for knowing violation of 2 positive law where plaintiff alleged board violated FDA regulations but it was “unclear . . . 3 exactly what law” was violated and plaintiff did not allege “with particularity any facts to 4 suggest that the FDA ever determined that [the company] violated anything or issued any fines 5 whatsoever”); see also Freedman v. Redstone, 2013 WL 3753426, at *9 (D. Del. 2013) (finding 6 “no clear and undisputed violation, let alone a violation that, standing alone, would create a 7 reasonable doubt that the [b]oard acted without knowledge or intent” in exceeding limit of a 8 stockholder-approved Section 162(m) plan), aff’d, 753 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2014). 9 The Complaint rests entirely on Plaintiff’s theory that if a company (allegedly) has reason 10 to believe it may reach a certain performance target, bonuses awarded based on the achievement 11 of that target are not performance-based and, thus, not deductible for purposes of Section 12 162(m). Cf. Freedman v. Adams, 2012 WL 1345638, *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012) (rejecting 13 plaintiff’s attempt to have a “disclosure claim . . . turn on an interpretation of tax law” where 14 plaintiff contended she had “concocted a superior tax strategy” to that employed by the board), 15 aff’d, 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013). However, to satisfy IRS requirements, targets need only be 16 “substantially uncertain.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i). In Seinfeld v. O’Connor, the United 17 States District Court for the District of Delaware recognized that where a company “confidently 18 and consistently predict[s]” that it will meet its goals—even where the company has a history of 19 repeatedly meeting those goals—it does not follow that the company is “not substantially 20 uncertain” to meet those goals. 774 F. Supp. 2d 660, 672 (D. Del. 2011). Here, the Officer 21 Defendants would still be required to “work diligently throughout the performance period” to 22 accomplish the global streaming revenue targets. Id. In fact, Treasury regulations provide that 23 “a bonus contingent on profits is substantially uncertain even if a company has a long history of 24 profitability,” id. (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vii)), and that a performance goal may be 25 substantially uncertain where it amounts to “maintaining the status quo.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.162- 26 27(e)(2)(i). Thus, Netflix’s history of accurately predicting growth in quarterly global streaming 27 revenue—which more than doubled while the Plan was in use—does not render its performance 28 targets “substantially certain.” DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -13- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 21 of 32 1 To the extent Plaintiff challenges the quarterly performance period set by the 2 Compensation Committee, Plaintiff also does not demonstrate that the Plan contravenes Treasury 3 regulations. Treasury Regulation Section 1.162-27(e)(2)(i) provides that a performance goal will 4 not be deemed “preestablished” if it is set “after 25 percent of the period of service . . . has 5 elapsed” (emphasis added). There is no allegation that the Compensation Committee set the goal 6 after 25% of the performance period had elapsed; rather, the Complaint and documents 7 incorporated into it show otherwise. Moreover, a private letter ruling from the IRS confirms that 8 the regulation cited by Plaintiff was not violated. See IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199950021, 1999 WL 9 1208442 (Dec. 17, 1999) (“The performance period and related service period established by the 10 Y Compensation Committee for performance awards under the Plans may be as short as a single 11 calendar quarter, or the period between the IPO and the spinoff, so long as the performance goals 12 are established prior to or during the first 25 percent of the period of service to which the 13 performance goal relates.”); cf. Seinfeld, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 668 (recognizing private letter 14 rulings are not precedential, but may be “informative” where they “shed[ ] light on whether the 15 IRS would view the [Plan] to be tax deductible”). Nor is this case akin to the Third Circuit Court 16 of Appeals’ decision in Shaev v. Saper, where the court found that a performance bonus paid to 17 the company’s CEO and majority stockholder, who allegedly dominated the board, ran afoul of 18 Section 162(m). 320 F.3d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir. 2003). Although the nine-month performance 19 period was described as “too short to meet the Treasury Regulations requirements,” the court in 20 Shaev was concerned that the board “manipulated” an amendment of the plan to increase the 21 CEO’s compensation more than a million dollars beyond the maximum with just six weeks 22 remaining in the performance period. 23 intentional manipulation to benefit a controlling stockholder are present here. Id. at 380. No such particularized allegations of 24 Second, even if Plaintiff’s theory that the bonuses were not deductible is correct, the 25 Complaint does not contain even a single particularized allegation demonstrating that any of the 26 nine Director Defendants knew the bonuses were not deductible under federal tax law, but 27 decided to characterize them as performance-based anyway. There are no facts pled “detailing 28 the precise roles that the[ ] directors played at the company, the information that would have DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -14- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 22 of 32 1 come to their attention in these roles, and any indication as to why they would have perceived the 2 [wrongdoing].” Google, 2012 WL 1611064, at *6 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 3 503 (Del. Ch. 2003)); see also Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 990 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 4 814); In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig., 2010 WL 66769, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) 5 (dismissing claims; finding no bad faith or knowledge where the complaint did not make 6 “specific factual allegations” to enable “an analysis of the state of mind of the individual 7 defendants” (citation omitted)). Instead, the Complaint simply argues that (1) the Board received 8 quarterly financial updates predicting global streaming revenue, and (2) that the Compensation 9 Committee set quarterly global streaming revenue performance targets under the Plan that were 10 similar to the Board projections. Nothing in the Complaint, or the documents referenced therein, 11 shows that any director at any point knew or was advised that the bonuses might not be 12 deductible under Section 162(m).2 13 Third, even if the Court infers from the Complaint that the Director Defendants were 14 aware of Treasury Regulation Section 1.162-27(e)(2) regarding “substantial uncertainty” of 15 performance targets from the allegation that the Compensation Committee “review[ed] Section 16 162(m),” that is not equivalent to knowingly violating the regulation. 17 Freedman v. Mulva, 2014 WL 975308, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 12, 2014) (finding plaintiff failed to 18 allege a “knowing and intentional decision to violate the terms” of an executive compensation 19 plan); see also In re Maxwell Techs., Inc. Derivative Litig., 2014 WL 2212155, at *12 (S.D. Cal. 20 May 27, 2014) (holding demand not excused; allegations “that the director defendants reviewed 21 [financial] statements pursuant to their responsibilities” not sufficient to show liability given “no 22 specific allegations demonstrating how the directors knew that the financial statements were 23 incorrect”). 24 162(m) cannot be imputed to the other seven Director Defendants who were not a part of that 25 Committee—not to mention the two new Board members who are not defendants. See Desimone 26 27 28 Compl. ¶ 56; see In any event, the three-member Compensation Committee’s review of Section 2 Nor is demand excused for Plaintiff’s waste claim. As discussed below, infra at 24-25, boards have broad discretion in awarding executive compensation, and Plaintiff fails to plead any facts showing the bonuses—and the Director Defendants’ attempt to gain a tax deduction for the Company—were devoid of a legitimate corporate purpose. See In re Accuray, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 757 F. Supp. 2d 919, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2010). DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -15- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 23 of 32 1 v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 943 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Delaware law does not permit the wholesale 2 imputation of one director’s knowledge to every other for demand excusal purposes. Rather, a 3 derivative complaint must plead facts specific to each director . . . .”); see also Towers, 2017 WL 4 6044035, at *7. As a result, Plaintiff fails to establish that at least six of Netflix’s 11 directors 5 face a substantial likelihood of liability for violating federal tax laws such that demand is futile. 6 7 2. No substantial likelihood of liability for knowing dissemination of false information to stockholders 8 The Complaint also pleads no facts demonstrating that a majority of the Board faces a 9 substantial likelihood of liability for violating securities laws or its state law fiduciary duty of 10 disclosure. Plaintiff repeatedly makes the conclusory allegation that the Proxies were false and 11 misleading because they stated that the bonuses paid pursuant to the Plan were “performance- 12 based” under Section 162(m) while “the Individual Defendants . . . knew the Company was 13 substantially certain to achieve” the performance goals. E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 66, 78. However, the 14 Proxies at issue do not state that the Plan was guaranteed to comply with Section 162(m). 15 Rather, the Proxies explain that the Plan was created “[i]n order to comply with [Section] 16 162(m)” (Compl. ¶ 64 (quoting 2015 Proxy)), “[wa]s intended to permit the Company to seek a 17 full federal tax deduction for compensation paid under the Plan” (Compl. ¶¶ 69 (quoting 2016 18 Proxy); id. ¶ 75 (quoting 2017 Proxy)), and that the bonuses paid under the Plan “[we]re 19 intended to qualify as performance-based” under Section 162(m) (Compl. ¶¶ 71 (quoting 2016 20 Proxy); id. ¶ 77 (quoting 2017 Proxy)) (emphases added). 21 language of a compensation plan’s objectives is not a representation that a plan complies with 22 the applicable tax laws. See In re Caterpillar Inc. Derivative Litig., 2014 WL 2587479, at *14 23 (D. Del. June 10, 2014) (finding no demand futility where plaintiff alleged a proxy statement 24 represented that a plan complied with Section 162(m) when the proxy statement merely stated 25 awards “were intended to comply with Section 162(m), or that it was the Company’s objective 26 that such awards would be tax deductible, or that substantially all such compensation was 27 expected to be tax-deductible”); Seinfeld, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 666-67 (holding that a proxy 28 statement did not “say what [plaintiff] allege[d]” and did not contain false or misleading DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -16- Courts have held that similar Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 24 of 32 1 statements where the proxy statement explained the plan was “intended” to be deductible under 2 Section 162(m) but “did not represent that the [plan] was guaranteed to be tax deductible”). 3 The Complaint also lacks particularized allegations showing that any individual director 4 had knowledge that disclosures about the performance bonuses were (allegedly) false. E.g., Dow 5 Chem. Co., 2010 WL 66769, at *10 (explaining that determining whether directors had 6 knowledge of statement’s falsity or acted in bad faith “requires an analysis of the state of mind of 7 the individual director defendants” (citation omitted)). Even if the Complaint adequately alleged 8 a misstatement or omission, demand is not excused because Plaintiffs have not pled any 9 disclosure violations were made knowingly or in bad faith. E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder 10 Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 132-34 (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that to excuse demand on a 11 disclosure violation, plaintiff must show directors “deliberately misinform[ed] shareholders 12 about the business of the corporation” by alleging particularized facts that “the violation was 13 made knowingly or in bad faith” (some emphasis added) (citation omitted). As explained above, 14 the Complaint contains no particularized allegations showing that the Director Defendants knew 15 the bonuses awarded under the Plan were not tax deductible under Section 162(m). Thus, there 16 can be no reasonable inference drawn from the Complaint that the Director Defendants knew the 17 Proxies contained false or misleading statements regarding the tax deductibility of those bonuses 18 at the time the Proxies were filed, or that they deliberately misinformed stockholders. 19 The bare allegation that the Director Defendants “caused” or “ordered” the challenged 20 disclosures to be made is also insufficient. E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 42, 57, 62, 67, 73. Instead, Plaintiff 21 must allege each director’s involvement in making the challenged disclosures—which it fails to 22 do for any director, much less a six-member majority of the Board. See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 23 133 n.88, 134 (finding allegation that directors “‘caused or allowed’ the Company to issue 24 certain statements” fails to show the directors prepared statements or were directly responsible 25 for the misstatements); Guttman, 823 A.2d at 498 (accord); see also Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 26 at 990 (holding demand not excused where there were no particularized facts alleged that board 27 approved fraudulent statements; a “general allegation that the Board participated” is insufficient 28 to allege “substantial risk of personal liability”); Accuray, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 927-28 (accord). DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -17- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 25 of 32 1 Plaintiff therefore comes nowhere close to meeting its burden under Rule 23.1 with regard to the 2 Proxies. See N.J. Bldg. Laborers Pension Fund v. Ball, 2014 WL 1018210, at *6 (D. Del. Mar. 3 13, 2014) (holding disclosure claims failed to satisfy demand requirement where “[n]othing in 4 [the] complaint suggest[ed] that the Director Defendants were aware of the alleged 5 misstatements or omissions, intended to cause harm to [the company] by incurring unnecessary 6 tax liabilities, or acted in bad faith by not adequately informing themselves”). 7 3. Committee membership alone does not establish knowledge 8 In lieu of particularized facts showing that any of the Director Defendants acted in bad 9 faith, Plaintiff cites to Messrs. Battle, Haley and Hoag’s membership on the Compensation 10 Committee as evidence of having “caused Netflix to misrepresent the[ ] bonuses as ‘performance 11 based’ under Section 162(m).” Compl. ¶ 113. If that allegation was sufficient to excuse demand 12 for the Compensation Committee members, it would implicate just three out of 11 Board 13 members, leaving eight other directors who could consider a demand. But it is not sufficient. 14 The fact that the Compensation Committee was charged with setting performance goals 15 and awarding bonuses under the Plan does not create a substantial likelihood of liability for those 16 directors “without supporting allegations of particularized facts showing bad faith.” In re China 17 Auto. Sys. Inc. Derivative Litig., 2013 WL 4672059, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2013) (finding that 18 conclusory allegations based on committee membership “d[id] not give rise to a substantial 19 threat of personal liability”); see South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 17 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“[T]hat the 20 underlying cause of a corporate trauma falls within the delegated authority of a board committee 21 does not support an inference that the directors on that committee knew of and consciously 22 disregarded the problem for purposes of Rule 23.1.”). Once again, there are no facts alleged 23 from which one can reasonably infer that the individual Compensation Committee members 24 knew the bonuses were not tax deductible (as Plaintiff alone alleges) such that they acted in bad 25 faith by awarding them. See Abrams v. Wainscott, 2012 WL 3614638, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 26 2012) (rejecting argument that compensation committee members faced a substantial likelihood 27 of liability for allegedly misleading disclosures that compensation was deductible under Section 28 162(m) because no facts pled that violation was knowing and intentional); In re Linear Tech. DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -18- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 26 of 32 1 Corp. Derivative Litig., 2006 WL 3533024, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2006) (holding demand 2 not excused on allegations of backdating, and rejecting argument that compensation committee 3 members “face a substantial likelihood of liability for their having approved the stock options” in 4 the absence of particularized facts about each individual director’s role and knowledge). 5 4. 6 No substantial likelihood of liability for allegedly violating internal governance policies or failure to implement internal controls 7 Finally, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that the Director Defendants somehow violated 8 “the Company’s own internal governance controls” by seeking a tax deduction does not excuse 9 demand under Rule 23.1. Delaware law provides that allegations of violations of a company’s 10 internal Code of Ethics or other internal governance policy do not expose directors to a 11 substantial likelihood of personal liability. 12 important to note that ‘liability is not measured by the aspirational standards established by . . . 13 internal documents . . . .’” (quoting Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 135)); see also Wilkin, 2018 WL 14 1100372, at *10-11 (stating that “failure to follow best practices does not create a substantial 15 likelihood of liability” and does not suffice to establish a breach of fiduciary duty). Plaintiff’s 16 acknowledgement that Netflix has internal governance policies in place also belies Plaintiff’s 17 conclusory allegation that the “Director Defendants face a substantial likelihood of liability to 18 Netflix for failing to correct and/or implement the necessary internal controls.” Compl. ¶ 9; see, 19 e.g., Horman v. Abney, 2017 WL 242571, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017). 20 * See Accuray, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 929 (“[I]t is * * 21 Thus, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts that at least six of the 11 Board members— 22 ten of whom are independent, eight of whom were not on the Compensation Committee that 23 awarded the performance bonuses, and two of whom are not defendants—could not impartially 24 consider a demand. The Complaint should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 23.1. 25 II. 26 THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(6) FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 27 Even if demand was excused, the Individual Defendants contend that the Complaint 28 should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -19- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 27 of 32 1 To state a claim, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 2 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Bush v. Vaco Tech. Serv., LLC, 2018 WL 2047807, 3 at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Where a 4 complaint pleads facts . . . ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the 5 line between possibility and plausibility,’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 6 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)), and dismissal is appropriate. 7 Each of Plaintiff’s claims fail. First, Plaintiff’s Section 14(a) claim fails to sufficiently 8 allege any misstatement, injury, causation, or negligence. Second, Plaintiff has failed to allege 9 facts to support its breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Individual Defendants. Third, 10 Plaintiff makes no allegations that satisfy the high standard for a waste claim. 11 A. 12 To state a claim under Section 14(a), a plaintiff must establish that “(1) a proxy statement 13 contained a material misrepresentation or omission which (2) caused . . . injury and (3) that the 14 proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an 15 essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction.” N.Y. City Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Jobs, 593 16 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 17 693 F.3d 896, 925 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Desaigoudar v. Meyercord, 223 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th 18 Cir. 2000) (stating a plaintiff must also “demonstrate that the misstatement or omission was 19 made with the requisite level of culpability”). The Complaint must set forth a causal connection 20 between the material misrepresentation and an economic loss. See generally Dura Pharms., Inc. 21 v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (“[A]llowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indication of 22 the economic loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has in mind would bring about the harm 23 of the very sort the statutes seek to avoid.”). Plaintiff’s Section 14(a) claim fails because it does 24 not allege a misrepresentation or omission resulting from negligent conduct that caused an injury 25 to Netflix. 26 Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. 1. No misstatements in the Proxies 27 Plaintiff alleges that the Director Defendants and Mr. Wells made material misstatements 28 in the Proxies regarding the tax deductibility under Section 162(m) of bonuses awarded to the DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -20- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 28 of 32 1 Officer Defendants under the Plan. Compl. ¶¶ 62-78. This allegation rests on Plaintiff’s own 2 interpretation of Section 162(m) that bonuses awarded based on a performance goal a company 3 allegedly had reason to believe it could attain are not deductible. If Plaintiff’s interpretation is 4 wrong, the bonuses paid under the Plan are deductible under Section 162(m) and Netflix made 5 no misstatement regarding their deductibility in the Proxies. As discussed above, the plain 6 language of the relevant Treasury regulations shows that is incorrect—compensation can qualify 7 as performance-based where the company believes the goal is within reach. See supra at 13. 8 Even if there was validity to Plaintiff’s reading of Section 162(m) and the relevant 9 Treasury regulations, none of the challenged disclosures is false—Netflix never represented that 10 the bonuses paid under the Plan were guaranteed to be deductible. The allegedly misleading 11 disclosures are: (1) that the Plan was created “[i]n order to comply with 162(m)” and that the 12 Officer Defendants “may receive compensation” under the Plan (Compl. ¶¶ 64-65 (quoting 2015 13 Proxy)); and (2) that the “Plan [wa]s intended to permit the Company to seek a full federal tax 14 deduction for compensation paid under the Plan” and that the Company’s global streaming 15 revenue as “reflected in [its] publicly-available financial statements” was the goal selected for 16 bonuses which were “intended to qualify as performance-based.” Compl. ¶¶ 69-70 (quoting 17 2016 Proxy); id. ¶¶ 75-77 (quoting 2017 Proxy) (emphases added). Plaintiff therefore cannot 18 identify a misstatement—the Proxies do not “assert that the [Plan] w[ould] be tax-deductible, 19 only that it [wa]s intended to be deductible under IRC § 162(m).” Seinfeld, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 20 668 (dismissing Section 14(a) claim regarding deductibility of performance-based bonuses); see 21 also Caterpillar, 2014 WL 2587479, at *14 (finding no demand futility where plaintiff alleged a 22 proxy statement represented that the plan complied with Section 162(m) when it merely stated 23 the company’s intention that awards would be deductible); supra at 16. 24 2. No injury-causing transaction 25 “Damages are recoverable under [Section] 14(a) ‘only when the votes for a specific 26 corporate transaction requiring shareholder authorization . . . are obtained by a false proxy 27 statement, and that transaction was the direct cause of pecuniary injury for which recovery is 28 sought.’” Verisign, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1213 (citation omitted). DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -21- That is, for the alleged Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 29 of 32 1 misstatements in the Proxies to form the basis for a Section 14(a) violation, the Complaint must 2 “connect any proxy misstatements or omissions with an actual economic harm.” Krieger v. 3 Atheros Commc’ns, Inc., 2012 WL 1933559, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) (citing Jobs, 593 4 F.3d at 1023). However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the alleged misstatements in the 5 Proxies about the tax deductibility of bonuses caused Netflix to suffer an injury—monetary or 6 otherwise. See In re Asyst Techs., Inc. Derivative Litig., 2008 WL 2169021, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 7 May 23, 2008) (stating that a derivative Section 14(a) claim requires pleading of facts “that a 8 defendant made a material misstatement in a proxy statement which caused the Company injury” 9 and that the proxy solicitation was the “transactional cause of harm of which plaintiff 10 complains”). Even if Plaintiff was correct that the bonuses were improperly deducted under 11 Section 162(m), the Complaint does not allege that Netflix was harmed—nor could it. The 12 Director Defendants were permitted to grant compensation that is not tax-deductible and “there 13 is no general fiduciary duty to minimize taxes.” 14 (dismissing disclosure claims; explaining “deference to directors’ business judgment is 15 particularly broad in matters of executive compensation” (citation omitted)). 16 3. Freedman, 2012 WL 1345638, at *12 No culpable conduct 17 Finally, the Complaint lacks allegations giving rise to a strong inference that any Director 18 Defendant or Mr. Wells acted with negligence—“[t]he required state of mind for a § 14(a) 19 claim.” Verisign, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1213; see Asyst, 2008 WL 2169021, at *8. A Section 14(a) 20 plaintiff “must demonstrate that the misstatement” was “made with the requisite level of 21 culpability.” Desaigoudar, 223 F.3d at 1022. Plaintiff’s failure to “plead the required state of 22 mind with particularity as to each defendant” requires dismissal of its Section 14(a) claim. 23 Verisign, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-07 (dismissing Section 14(a) claim where plaintiffs pleaded no 24 “particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference that [each] defendant acted with the 25 required state of mind” (citation omitted)). 26 27 28 B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Under Delaware Law. 1. No duty of loyalty claim pleaded against the Director Defendants The exculpatory provision in Netflix’s certificate of incorporation bars Plaintiff from DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -22- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 30 of 32 1 pursuing any claims against the Director Defendants for non-intentional breaches of fiduciary 2 duty, pursuant to Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. See Strickland 3 Decl. Ex. A, art. VIII. “[T]o the extent that the complaint alleges any negligent breach of 4 fiduciary duty, such a claim is precluded by the exculpatory clause”; allegations that the Director 5 Defendants engaged in intentional misconduct or bad faith are therefore required. Sagent, 278 F. 6 Supp. 2d at 1095 n.9; see also Brown v. Moll, 2010 WL 2898324, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) 7 (finding no well-pleaded allegations sufficient to defeat protection under exculpatory provision); 8 Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 (stating that Section 102(b)(7) “place[s] an extremely high burden on 9 a plaintiff to state a claim for personal director liability”). As shown above, there is not a single 10 fact alleged that any of the Director Defendants knew that the bonuses awarded pursuant to the 11 Plan were not deductible under Section 162(m) but nonetheless intentionally issued misleading 12 disclosures about those bonuses. See supra at 16-18. Plaintiff therefore has failed to plausibly 13 plead that the alleged disclosure violations were “made with knowledge of alleged inaccuracies 14 or in bad faith,” as Plaintiff was required to do to plead a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary 15 duty claim. Accuray, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 934 (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty claim where 16 plaintiff failed to allege disclosures made with knowledge of falsity or in bad faith). 17 18 2. No gross negligence pleaded against the Officer Defendants or Mr. Wells 19 Regarding the Officer Defendants and Mr. Wells, the Complaint makes no allegations 20 whatsoever that could support a breach of fiduciary duty claim against them. To state a claim, 21 Plaintiff must plead gross negligence, which “requires the articulation of facts [of] a wide 22 disparity between the process . . . used . . . and that which would have been rational.” Guttman, 23 823 A.2d at 507 n.39. This is a “stringent” standard “not readily satisfied,” Accuray, 757 F. 24 Supp. 2d at 934, and “imports the concept of recklessness,” In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 25 A.2d 640, 652 & n.45 (Del. Ch. 2008). Plaintiffs do not meet this “stringent” standard. 26 The only allegation regarding Messrs. Hunt, Sarandos, Peters, and Hyman is that they 27 received bonuses under the Plan from the Compensation Committee. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 30-32. This 28 allegation does not plausibly suggest that the Officer Defendants acted with reckless indifference DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -23- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 31 of 32 1 to Netflix’s stockholders or acted “without the bounds of reason.” Accuray, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 2 934 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 3 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)) (dismissing claims against officers where gross negligence not pled). 4 It is unclear why Messrs. Hunt, Sarandos, Peters and Hyman are named as defendants in the first 5 place, as Plaintiff does not seek any relief from them. See Compl. at 32-33. 6 As to Mr. Wells, the Company’s Chief Financial Officer, Plaintiff makes a bare 7 allegation that Mr. Wells “knew, or should have known, that the Company’s public statements 8 concerning its executive compensation concealed the fact that the Company’s performance-based 9 bonus plan did not comply with Section 162(m),” and that Mr. Wells “caused Netflix to 10 disseminate false and misleading Proxy Statements.” Compl. ¶ 18. The Complaint does not 11 suggest why Mr. Wells would have been motivated to “conceal” information from stockholders, 12 how he “knew” that the bonuses were not deductible, or what involvement he had in awarding 13 the bonuses or preparing the challenged disclosures in the Proxies that would suggest deliberate 14 or reckless conduct. See Accuray, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 934-35 (dismissing breach of fiduciary 15 duty claim against CEO and CFO where plaintiffs did not allege they “deliberately disregarded 16 or were recklessly indifferent”). Plaintiffs therefore also do not state a breach of fiduciary duty 17 claim against Mr. Wells. 18 C. 19 Finally, Plaintiff’s waste claim is without merit. Under Delaware law, [t]he standard for 20 a waste claim is high and the test is ‘extreme [and] very rarely satisfied by a shareholder 21 plaintiff.’” In re 3Com Corp. S’holders Litig., 1999 WL 1009210, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 1999) 22 (citation omitted). Plaintiff claims that the Director Defendants and Mr. Wells “caused Netflix to 23 waste valuable corporate assets” by awarding bonuses to the Officer Defendants based on 24 “achievement of performance goals that were substantially certain to be reached, disqualifying 25 them as ‘performance-based’ bonuses under Section 162(m).” Compl. ¶ 129. But the Complaint 26 contains no allegations indicating that the Director Defendants’ awarding of bonuses under the 27 Plan, with the goal of achieving a tax deduction for the Company, was irrational, or “an 28 exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionally small as to lie beyond the Plaintiff Fails to State a Corporate Waste Claim under Delaware Law. DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -24- Case 5:18-cv-02107-BLF Document 30 Filed 06/08/18 Page 32 of 32 1 range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.” Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 2 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997). Nor does Plaintiff make any allegations against Mr. Wells that would 3 suggest his involvement in the award of bonuses under the Plan. 4 Plaintiff also appears, at times, to quibble with the size of the performance bonuses that 5 were awarded or the form of that compensation. See Compl. ¶ 40 (discussing payment of “more 6 than $27 million in unnecessary cash payments”); id. ¶ 127 (stating Director Defendants “pa[id] 7 excessive fees to certain executive officers”). To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing the size of 8 the bonuses constitutes waste, Delaware law provides that directors’ determination of how to 9 compensate employees “is protected by the presumption of the business judgment rule in the 10 absence of a showing that the business judgment rule does not apply because of a disabling 11 factor.” Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 359 (Del. Ch. 1983); see also Freedman, 753 F.3d at 428 12 (declining to second-guess compensation committee’s exercise of business judgment in awarding 13 compensation because “a board’s decision on executive compensation is entitled to great 14 deference” and “the size and structure of executive compensation are inherently matters of 15 judgment” (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263)). Plaintiff does not allege that any of the bonuses 16 paid under the Plan was awarded made in bad faith, as is required. See Dow Chem. Co., 2010 17 WL 66769, at *6 (rejecting allegation that board caused excessive and wasteful compensation to 18 be made where there were “no particularized allegations in the complaint”). 19 CONCLUSION 20 The Individual Defendants and Netflix respectfully submit that the Complaint should be 21 dismissed pursuant to Rule 23.1, and the Individual Defendants respectfully submit that the 22 Complaint should also be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 23 24 Dated: June 8, 2018 25 26 WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI Professional Corporation By: s/ Keith E. Eggleton Keith E. Eggleton 27 Attorneys for Defendants and Nominal Defendant 28 DEFS.’ AND NOMINAL DEF.’S MOTS. TO DISMISS CASE NO.: 5:18-CV-02107-BLF -25-