Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 1 of 17 Page ID #:126 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NICOLA T. HANNA United States Attorney LAWRENCE S. MIDDLETON Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division PUNEET V. KAKKAR (Cal. Bar No. 259816) Assistant United States Attorney OCDETF Section 1400 United States Courthouse 312 North Spring Street Los Angeles, California 90012 Telephone: (213) 894-5728 Facsimile: (213) 894-0142 E-mail: puneet.kakkar@usdoj.gov 8 9 Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 13 Plaintiff, 14 15 v. THERESA TETLEY, aka “Bitcoin Maven,” 2:17-CR-00738-R SENTENCING POSITION Hearing Date: June 11, 2018 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. Location: Courtroom of the Hon. Manuel L. Real 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel 20 of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of 21 California and Assistant United States Attorney Puneet V. Kakkar, 22 hereby files its sentencing position. 23 This sentencing position is based upon the attached memorandum 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 28 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 2 of 17 Page ID #:127 1 of points and authorities, the files and records in this case, and 2 such further evidence and argument as the Court may permit. 3 4 Dated: June 4, 2018 Respectfully submitted, NICOLA T. HANNA United States Attorney 5 6 LAWRENCE S. MIDDLETON Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division 7 8 9 10 /s/ PUNEET V. KAKKAR Assistant United States Attorney Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 3 of 17 Page ID #:128 1 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS DESCRIPTION PAGE 3 4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...............................................ii 5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES................................1 6 I. INTRODUCTION...................................................1 7 II. BACKGROUND ON UNLICENSED MONEY TRANSMITTING BUSINESS AND BITCOIN........................................................2 8 A. Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses..................2 B. Background on Digital Currency and the Dark Web...........4 C. Digital Currency and Money Transmitting...................6 9 10 11 III. OFFENSE CONDUCT................................................7 12 A. Unregistered Money Transmitting Business..................7 B. Facilitation of Money Laundering..........................7 13 14 1. Transactions with Undercover Agents..................7 2. Exchanges for William James Farber...................9 15 16 IV. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE SENTENCED TO 30 MONTHS’ INCARCERATION......9 17 A. Nature and Circumstances of Offense.......................9 B. Need to Promote Respect for the Law and to Afford Adequate Deterrence......................................11 C. History and Characteristics of Defendant.................12 18 19 20 21 V. CONCLUSION....................................................13 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 i Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 4 of 17 Page ID #:129 1 2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES DESCRIPTION PAGE 3 4 Cases 5 United States v. Faiella, 6 7 8 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ....................... 6, 7, 8, 9 United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ............................... 2 9 Statutes 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)................................................. 9 18 U.S.C. § 1960........................................... 1, 2, 3, 6 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1).............................................. 3 31 U.S.C. § 5330.................................................... 2 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(a)(2)............................................. 3 16 Regulations 17 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)......................................... 6 18 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(t)............................................. 6 19 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311................................................ 3 20 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(a)............................................. 3 21 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380(b)(2).......................................... 2 22 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320(a)(2).......................................... 3 23 24 25 26 27 28 ii Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 5 of 17 Page ID #:130 1 2 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION 3 Over the course of more than three years, defendant Theresa 4 Tetley, also known as “Bitcoin Maven” (“defendant”), operated an 5 illegal, unlicensed money transmitting business, namely, an 6 unregistered Bitcoin-for-cash exchange service, which fueled a black- 7 market financial system in the Central District of California that 8 purposely and deliberately existed outside of the regulated bank 9 industry. Defendant’s decision to not register with the federal 10 government signaled to her clients that she was unconcerned with the 11 government’s regulations concerning money laundering, and thereby 12 would not conduct customer due diligence or report to the government 13 suspicious transactions or certain transactions over $10,000. 14 Customers, regardless of the source of their funds, could then 15 utilize her services, exchange Bitcoin for cash or vice versa, 16 without fear of being the subject of reports filed with the federal 17 government for certain transactions that otherwise would be reported. 18 Defendant charged a premium to these customers seeking to avoid the 19 regulated financial system, and collected higher fees for her 20 services than those charged by regulated exchangers. 21 conduct, defendant has pleaded guilty to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1960 and 22 1956(a)(3). 23 For this The government recommends the Court to sentence defendant to 30 24 months’ incarceration, to be followed by three years of supervised 25 release. 26 27 28 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 6 of 17 Page ID #:131 1 II. BACKGROUND ON UNLICENSED MONEY TRANSMITTING BUSINESS AND BITCOIN 2 A. 3 18 U.S.C. § 1960 criminalizes, in relevant part, money Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses 4 transmitting businesses that fail to comply with federal registration 5 requirements, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5330 and the regulations 6 prescribed thereunder. 7 the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, which was one of a 8 series of provisions aimed at combating money laundering and 9 enhancing reporting requirements relating to cash transactions. Section 1960 was enacted in 1992 as part of A 10 more complete explanation of the purpose of the legislation is in the 11 report of the Senate Banking Committee on the bill in the prior 12 session of Congress. 13 (1990). 14 money laundering legislation has improved, “[i]ncreasingly, money 15 launderers are using money transmitters, check cashers, money 16 exchanges and other nonbank financial companies” to “convert street 17 currency into monetary instruments and even to transmit abroad the 18 proceeds of drug sales.” 19 Section 1960 “sought to prevent innovative ways of transmitting money 20 illicitly.” 21 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). See S. Rep. No. 101-460, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. That Senate Report noted that, as banks’ compliance with Id. at 13-14. “From its inception,” United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 708 22 A money transmitting business must usually register with the 23 federal government as a “money services business,” specifically, with 24 the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), which is part of 25 the Department of Treasury. 26 Registration as a “money services business” (“MSB”) then triggers 27 obligations for that financial institution. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380(b)(2). 28 2 For example, under the Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 7 of 17 Page ID #:132 1 Bank Secrecy Act, an MSB is required, among other things, generally 2 to: 3 • Develop, implement, and maintain an effective written anti- 4 money laundering program that is reasonably designed to 5 prevent the MSB from being used to facilitate money 6 laundering and the financing of terrorist activities (31 7 U.S.C. §§ 5318(a)(2), (h); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(a)); 8 • 9 Report transactions that the MSB knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect are suspicious (which includes funds 10 derived from illegal activity or involves the use of the 11 transmitter to facilitate criminal activity), if the 12 transactions are conducted or attempted by, at, or through 13 the MSB, and the transactions involve or aggregate to at 14 least $2,000 in funds or other assets (31 U.S.C. 15 § 5318(g)(1); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1022.320(a)(2)); and 16 • File a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of 17 currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to 18 such MSB which involves a transaction in currency of more 19 than $10,000 (31 C.F.R. § 1010.311). 20 In practice, the obligations outlined above require an MSB to 21 verify customer identity, conduct due diligence on its customers, 22 file reports with the federal government, and create and maintain 23 records pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act. 24 registered with the federal government, they are not routinely 25 subject to examinations (i.e., audits) conducted by FinCEN to ensure 26 that these obligations are being followed, and have no incentive to 27 comply with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. 28 MSBs thus operate in, and fuel, a black market financial system, and 3 When MSBs are not Unregistered Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 8 of 17 Page ID #:133 1 pose the very threats that the Senate outlined in legislating 18 2 U.S.C. § 1960. 3 B. 4 Digital currency (also known as crypto-currency or virtual Background on Digital Currency and the Dark Web 5 currency) 1 is generally defined as an electronic-sourced unit of 6 value that can be used as a substitute for fiat currency (i.e., 7 currency created and regulated by a government). 8 exists entirely on the Internet and is not stored in any physical 9 form. Digital currency Digital currency is not issued by any government, bank, or 10 company and is instead generated and controlled through computer 11 software operating on a decentralized peer-to-peer network. 12 currency is not illegal in the United States and may be used for 13 legitimate financial transactions. 14 “pseudonymous” nature of digital currency (described below), it is 15 used for conducting illegal transactions, such as the sale of 16 controlled substances. 17 Digital However, because of the “Bitcoin” (or “BTC”) is a type of online digital currency that 18 allows users to transfer funds more anonymously than would be 19 possible through traditional banking and credit systems. 20 are a decentralized form of digital currency having no association 21 with banks or governments. 22 “wallets,” which are identified by unique electronic “addresses.” 23 digital wallet essentially stores the access code that allows an 24 individual to conduct Bitcoin transactions on the public ledger. 25 access Bitcoins on the public ledger, an individual must use a public 26 address (or “public key”) and a private address (or “private key”). Bitcoins Users store their Bitcoins in digital A To 27 28 1 For purposes of this filing, “digital currency,” “crypto-currency,” and “virtual currency” address the same concept. 4 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 9 of 17 Page ID #:134 1 The public address can be analogized to an account number while the 2 private key is like the password to access that account. 3 the public addresses of those engaging in Bitcoin transactions are 4 recorded on the public ledger, the “Blockchain,” the true identities 5 of the individuals or entities behind the public addresses are not 6 recorded. 7 public address, it would be possible to determine what transactions 8 were conducted by that individual or entity. 9 are, therefore, described as “pseudonymous,” meaning they are 10 Even though If, however, a real individual or entity is linked to a Bitcoin transactions partially anonymous. 11 Although they are legal and have known legitimate uses, Bitcoins 12 are also known to be used by criminals for money-laundering purposes, 13 and are believed to be the most oft-used means of payment for illegal 14 goods and services on “dark web” websites. 15 colloquial term for sophisticated, encrypted websites that allow 16 participants to buy and sell illegal items, such as drugs, firearms, 17 and other hazardous materials (sold by “vendors”) with greater 18 anonymity than the traditional Internet. 19 websites use a variety of technologies, and other encryption 20 technologies, to ensure that communications and transactions are 21 shielded from interception and monitoring, and usually only accept 22 digital currencies such as Bitcoin as a form of payment for 23 contraband. 24 enforcement shut down in 2013), operated similar to legitimate 25 commercial websites such as Amazon and eBay, but offered illicit 26 goods and services. 27 28 “Dark web” websites is a These online black market A famous dark web marketplace, Silk Road (which law Generally, individuals can purchase or sell Bitcoin in a peerto-peer context (i.e., another individual willing to exchange Bitcoin 5 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 10 of 17 Page ID #:135 1 for cash) or from exchange companies. Those offering to exchange 2 Bitcoin for cash in a peer-to-peer setting often advertise their 3 services on the Internet, on websites such as localbitcoins.com or 4 Craigslist. 5 register with FinCEN (like traditional banks), or choose not to 6 register with the federal government, thereby seeking to avoid the 7 requirements imposed by the Bank Secrecy Act. Bitcoin exchangers either comply with the law, and 8 In the government’s experience with criminal investigations, 9 those who obtain and use digital currency via and through illicit 10 means seek to exchange this currency for fiat currency via 11 unregistered financial exchangers to remain outside government 12 scrutiny. 13 Bitcoin for fiat currency (or vice versa) through institutions that 14 do not require a form of identification or report certain 15 transactions to the federal government. 16 allows illicit actors to remain as anonymous as possible. That is to say, illicit actors prefer exchanging their This method of exchanging 17 C. 18 Exchangers of convertible virtual currency -- those who offer Digital Currency and Money Transmitting 19 the purchase and sale of U.S. dollars as well as digital currency 20 such as Bitcoin -- are “money transmitters” as defined at 31 C.F.R. 21 § 1010.100(ff)(5), “financial institutions” as defined at 31 C.F.R. 22 § 1010.100(t), and generally “money transmitting business[es]” for 23 purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. 24 FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging or Using 25 Virtual Currencies,” March 18, 2013; United States v. Faiella, 39 F. 26 Supp. 3d 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 27 to the Bank Secrecy Act, including the requirement to implement an See FIN-2013-G001, “Application of These exchangers are thus subject 28 6 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 11 of 17 Page ID #:136 1 anti-money laundering program, and its various reporting requirements 2 described above. 3 III. OFFENSE CONDUCT 4 A. 5 Between 2014 and 2017, defendant operated an unlicensed money 6 transmitting business –- the exchange of Bitcoin for cash and vice 7 versa. 8 by all means, a professional business and not a hobby: 9 advertised under a trade name, “Bitcoin Maven,” on localbitcoins.com. Unregistered Money Transmitting Business (Presentence Investigation Report [“PSR”] ¶ 12.) This was, She 10 (PSR ¶ 13.) 11 customers across the country. 12 to ensure that she was always accurate. 13 of this illicit business, defendant exchanged a significant amount of 14 money, between $6 and $9.5 million. 15 B. 16 (Id.) She possessed a money counter (Id. ¶ 31.) In the course (Id. ¶¶ 12, 15.) Facilitation of Money Laundering 1. 17 Defendant also maintained ledgers of her activity for Transactions with Undercover Agents Defendant operated her unregistered exchange business to afford 18 privacy and secrecy for her clients. 19 undercover law enforcement provides a snapshot into the means by 20 which she conducted her business. 21 Defendant’s interactions with In or around April 2016, an undercover with the Drug Enforcement 22 Administration (“UCA-1”) met with defendant. 23 she had been “kicked out” of four major financial institutions, and 24 therefore had enlisted her sister to conduct cash transactions for 25 her. 26 maintain anonymity with her Bitcoin transactions with defendant; and 27 defendant, honoring this request, stated that she did not want to 28 know the source of UCA-1’s Bitcoin. (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant stated that UCA-1 informed defendant that she wanted to 7 (Id.) Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 12 of 17 Page ID #:137 1 In July 2016, UCA-1 then introduced defendant to UCA-1’s 2 “boyfriend,” who was, in fact, another undercover agent (“UCA-2”). 3 UCA-2 began to insinuate the unlawful nature of his funds (which were 4 in Bitcoin), informing defendant that he was engaged in a business 5 selling products that were not “socially acceptable on the open 6 market.” 7 want to know,” but continued to discuss doing business with UCA-2. 8 (Id.) 9 the identity of her customers, to reassure UCA-2 the secrecy by which (Id. ¶ 21.) In response to this, defendant stated “I don’t Defendant informed UCA-2 that she did not disclose to the IRS 10 defendant conducted her business. 11 advised UCA-2 that she does not generally track whether a transaction 12 exceeds $10,000. 13 cash transaction that day (approximately $45,000), at a restaurant; 14 defendant provided UCA-2 with cash (in exchange for his Bitcoin) in 15 seven white envelopes. 16 (Id.) (Id. ¶ 22.) Defendant also UCA-2 and defendant conducted a Bitcoin-for- (Id. ¶ 26.) Defendant and UCA-2 met again in January 2017 to conduct another 17 exchange of cash for Bitcoin that UCA-2 possessed. 18 UCA-2 was more explicit with his representation that the source of 19 his Bitcoin was unlawful, informing defendant that an intruder broke 20 into one his apartments, stealing only the supply of “coke, meth, and 21 weed” but not the money because it was in “Bitcoin.” 22 Defendant believed that the transaction involved the proceeds of 23 unlawful activity, and in a wink-and-nod, stated “you’re joking,” and 24 continued to proceed with the transaction, commenting that “Bitcoin 25 is the way to go.” 26 $70,000 in seven white envelopes to UCA-2. 27 continued to assure UCA-2 that she was trustworthy and reputable, and 28 UCA-2 emphasized that he was in the business of selling narcotics. (Id. at ¶ 29.) This time, the (Id. ¶ 29.) Defendant provided approximately 8 (Id. at ¶ 30.) Defendant Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 13 of 17 Page ID #:138 1 (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 32.) 2 do business with UCA-2. 3 Notwithstanding this, defendant still decided to (Id. at ¶ 33.) Defendant and UCA-2 arranged to meet in March 2017 for a 4 $300,000 exchange transaction. (Id. at ¶ 33.) Defendant brought to 5 the transaction two Trader Joe’s paper grocery bags. 6 Plea Agreement Factual Basis.) 7 transaction. 8 2. (Id. at ¶ 33; Defendant was arrested at this (Id.) Exchanges for William James Farber 9 The privacy and anonymity that defendant offered to the public 10 attracted at least one other actor who is alleged to launder money. 11 In the course of her business, prior to defendant’s arrest, defendant 12 exchanged over $6 million in Bitcoin for cash for one of her 13 customers, whom she knew as “David.” 14 communicated with “David” via Wickr, an encrypted communications 15 application. 16 Farber, who was charged by the government in United States v. Farber, 17 et al., 17-CR-188-LJO (E.D. Cal.), for being a large darknet vendor 18 of narcotics on the marketplace AlphaBay, which was subsequently shut 19 down by law enforcement. 20 IV. 21 (Id.) (PSR ¶ 15.) Defendant It turns out that “David” was William James (Id.) DEFENDANT SHOULD BE SENTENCED TO 30 MONTHS’ INCARCERATION Based on the relevant factors that this Court can consider for 22 sentencing, including 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the government recommends 23 a custodial term of 30 months’ imprisonment. 24 A. 25 Defendant profited from her illicit business. Nature and Circumstances of Offense Defendant 26 operated a multi-million dollar unlicensed money transmitting 27 business in the Central District of California, flouting regulations 28 requiring financial institutions (such as her) to prevent money 9 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 14 of 17 Page ID #:139 1 laundering in this country. Indeed, defendant marketed, and 2 capitalized on, providing anonymity and secrecy for her clients, 3 exchanging Bitcoin for individuals such as Farber and the DEA 4 undercover agents who are alleged to have obtained (or claimed to 5 have obtained) those funds from illegal activities. 6 offered a financial platform beyond the scope of federally regulated 7 financial institutions to convert digital currency into fiat currency 8 and launder transactions. 9 profit; she charged above-market rates 2, which presumably was Defendant And defendant did so with an intent to 10 profitable for her. 11 defendant’s adjusted gross income earnings approximated, and 12 exceeded, $300,000 per year. 13 During the time of the offense conduct, While the law does not require that defendant know that her 14 conduct was illegal, that was the case here, which constitutes an 15 aggravating factor for sentencing. 16 DEA undercover agent that she had been “shut out” of financial 17 institutions, but continued to proceed with the illicit business 18 anyway; this should have alerted her to the inherently suspect nature 19 of her business. 20 with the law, she enrolled her sister to assist her with banking 21 transactions. 22 Defendant flatly admitted to the Instead of ceasing these operations or complying Further, defendant’s conduct with the undercover agents 23 demonstrate her way of business: Defendant continued to proceed 24 conducting transactions, even when alerted that the transactions were 25 26 2 27 28 For example, the fees that defendant charged were greater than those charged by Coinbase, a registered digital currency exchange institution. See, e.g., https://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/2109597-buysell-bank-transfer-fees. 10 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 15 of 17 Page ID #:140 1 suspicious, thereby consciously disregarding the anti-money 2 laundering regulations that the federal government has imposed for 3 financial institutions such as herself. 4 Defendant also facilitated the laundering of suspected narcotics 5 proceeds, namely, those of an alleged large darknet vendor, Farber. 6 Though the government has no direct proof that defendant was 7 specifically aware of Farber’s alleged activity, the circumstances 8 certainly reflect that defendant knew, or should have known, of some 9 malfeasance connected to Farber. Defendant communicated Farber via 10 encrypted communications. 11 conducted numerous, high-level cash transactions with him (ultimately 12 amounting to $6 million), knowing him only to be “David” or “Pirate 13 Shit.” 14 awry, as “David” coveted that she operated entirely outside of the 15 regulated financial market, that she offered privacy and anonymity, 16 and that she could sustain a high level of business for him. 17 For a significant period of time, she These circumstances show that defendant knew something was Providing cash in envelopes (and in the significant amounts she 18 did), in coffee shops and restaurants, is no way to conduct 19 legitimate business, certainly when that volume exceeds the millions, 20 and someone such as defendant –- a former stockbroker and real estate 21 investor –- was certainly aware of that. 22 proceed in this manner highlights the seriousness of the offense that 23 warrants a custodial sentence of 30 months. 24 25 26 B. Her decision to continue to Need to Promote Respect for the Law and to Afford Adequate Deterrence A significant sentence of 30 months is also warranted to deter 27 individuals from operating unlicensed money transmitting businesses. 28 In light of the growth of the dark web and the use of digital 11 Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 16 of 17 Page ID #:141 1 currency, unlicensed exchangers provide an avenue of laundering for 2 those who use digital currency for illicit purposes. 3 who obtain Bitcoin from unlawful means (e.g., the sale of contraband) 4 seek an outlet to exchange those funds for fiat cash (to reap the 5 profits of their crime or to further layer transactions to avoid 6 detection); unlicensed exchangers provide the perfect conduit. 7 Unlicensed exchangers such as defendant generally do not conduct 8 customer due diligence, file transaction reports for cash 9 transactions in excess of $10,000, or file suspicious reports with Illicit actors 10 the government. 11 profit--the price that a customer is willing to pay for this 12 anonymity; for an illicit actor, that price is simply a cost of doing 13 criminal business. 14 All that matters for an unlicensed exchanger is the In targeting unlicensed exchangers, the government is able to 15 prevent, or at least curb, the opportunities for actors utilizing 16 digital currency illicitly to convert those proceeds into fiat 17 currency. 18 that failure to register as a money transmitting business is a 19 serious offense, and not a simple administrative oversight of failing 20 to file a form with the federal government. 21 case here, where defendant facilitated laundering for a suspected 22 large darknet narcotics vendor and agreed to launder funds 23 represented to be narcotics proceeds with an undercover agent. A custodial sentence of 30 months in this case will signal That is particularly the 24 C. 25 The defendant’s history and characteristics are mitigating History and Characteristics of Defendant 26 factors for the Court to consider. 27 criminal history and no encounter with the criminal justice system. 28 Further, defendant appears to have a caretaking, leading role in her 12 Specifically, defendant has no Case 2:17-cr-00738-R Document 31 Filed 06/04/18 Page 17 of 17 Page ID #:142 1 family, looking after siblings who have been affected with serious 2 health issues. 3 concerns are properly reflected in the recommended sentence. 4 these mitigating concerns do not outweigh the significant nature of 5 her crime (which allowed the crimes of others to continue) and the 6 need for general deterrence, and thus, a custodial sentence of 30 7 months is warranted. 8 V. 9 The government believes that these mitigating In sum, CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests 10 that this Court sentence defendant to 30 months’ incarceration, to be 11 followed by three years of supervised release. 12 requests an order of forfeiture reflecting (1) 40 Bitcoin that she 13 possessed as of March 30, 2017, and transferred to law enforcement on 14 January 8, 2018; and (2) $292,264.00 and 25 assorted gold bars seized 15 by law enforcement officials on March 30, 2017. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 The government also