FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
RAY and RICKMAN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules

June 5, 2018

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A18A0749. MAYNARD et al. v. SNAPCHAT, INC.
RAY, Judge.
Wentworth and Karen Maynard sued Snapchat, Inc. for negligence and loss of
consortium to recover for injuries sustained in a car accident that allegedly resulted
from the use of Snapchat’s Speed Filter. The Maynards filed this interlocutory appeal
from the trial court’s grant of Snapchat’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that
Snapchat is immune to liability under the federal Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”), 47 USC §230. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order
and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
“In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must accept as true all
well-pled material allegations in the complaint and must resolve any doubts in favor

 of the plaintiff. We review the trial court’s ruling de novo.” (Citations omitted.)
Cunningham v. Gage, 301 Ga. App. 306, 307 (686 SE2d 800) (2009).
The Maynards’ complaint alleges that on the evening of September 10, 2015,
a car accident occurred between the Maynards and Christal McGee. Heather McCarty
was a passenger in the backseat of McGee’s vehicle at the time of the accident.
McCarty’s affidavit recounts the events preceding the accident as follows:
I looked up and noticed that we seemed to be accelerating. I looked in
the front, and saw Christal McGee holding her phone. The screen had a
speed on it, which was about 80 m.p.h. and climbing. I asked Christal if
her phone was keeping up with the speed of the car. Christal said it was.
I told her I was pregnant and asked her to slow down. Christal
responded and said she was just trying to get the car to 100 m.p.h. to
post it on Snapchat. She said “I’m about to post it.” I began pleading
with Christal to slow down. I saw the speed on the phone hit 113 m.p.h.
before she let off the gas. Just after I saw the speed of 113 m.p.h., a car
pulled out of an apartment complex, and I screamed.
As a result of the accident, Wentworth Maynard sustained permanent brain damage.
Snapchat is an application made for mobile devices that allows users to take
temporary photos and videos, also known as “Snaps,” and share them with friends.
Snapchat creates “filters” that allow users to include captions, drawings, and graphic
overlays on a user’s photos or videos. One of these filters is a speedometer that shows
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 the speed at which a user is moving and allows for that speed to be superimposed to
a Snap before sending it out over the application (the “Speed Filter”).
The Maynards allege that McGee was using Snapchat and driving in excess of
100 m.p.h. at the time of the crash. The Maynards do not allege that McGee uploaded
or posted a Snap using the Speed Filter before the accident occurred.
The Maynards brought suit against both McGee and Snapchat. The Maynards
allege that Snapchat knew that its users could “use its service in a manner that might
distract them from obeying traffic or safety laws.” Further, the Maynards allege that
Snapchat’s Speed Filter “encourages” dangerous speeding and that the Speed Filter
“facilitated McGee’s excessive speeding[,]” which resulted in the crash. In granting
Snapchat’s Motion to Dismiss, the trial court concluded that Snapchat is immune to
suit under the CDA because Snapchat was merely the publisher of third-party content,
not the creator of content.
1. The Maynards argue that the trial court erred by granting Snapchat’s motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the CDA provided it with immunity for its Speed
Filter. We agree.

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 Section 230 of the CDA immunizes providers of interactive computer services1
against liability arising from content created by third parties: “No provider . . . of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” 47 USC § 230 (c) (1).
See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F3d 327, 330 (II) (A) (4th Cir. 1997) (The
CDA was enacted by Congress to provide “federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a thirdparty user of the service”).2 This grant of immunity applies only if the interactive
computer service provider is not also an “information content provider,” which is
defined as someone who is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of” the offending content. (Emphasis supplied.) 47 USC §230 (f) (3).

1

Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server[.]” 47 USC § 230 (f) (2). See Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 FSupp2d 1055, 1065-1066 (II) (B) (1) (a) (C.D. Cal.
2002) (an online dating website is an “interactive computer service” under the CDA).
2

Because there are few Georgia cases applying the CDA, United States District
and Circuit Court cases construing the Federal law are instructive. However, “[w]e
note that while we are at liberty to consider foreign authority, the appellate courts of
this [S]tate are not bound by decisions of other states or federal courts except the
United States Supreme Court.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Internet Brands,
Inc. v. Jape, 328 Ga. App. 272, 276 (1) (760 SE2d 1) (2014).
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 Ultimately, the use of the CDA is to “protect internet service providers for the display
of content created by someone else.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied). Jones v.
Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F3d 398, 406 (II) (B) (6th Cir.
2014).
The CDA states that it was enacted to further certain policy objectives,
including:
to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media[,] . . . to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation[, and] . . . to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is
received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services[.]
47 USC § 230 (b) (1) - (3).
This Court has held that “three elements are required for § 230 (c) (1)
immunity. First, the defendant must be a provider or user of an interactive computer
service. Second, the asserted claims must treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker
of [that] information. Third, the challenged communication must be information
provided by another information content provider.” (Citation and punctuation
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 omitted.) Jape, supra at 276 (1). Accord Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817
F3d 12, 19 (II) (A) (1st Cir. 2016); Federal Trade Commn. v. LeadClick Media, LLC,
838 F3d 158, 173 (I) (B) (1) (2d Cir. 2016). “[C]ourts have consistently held that §
230 provides a robust immunity, and that all doubts must be resolved in favor of
immunity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jape, supra. Because the parties do
not address the issue of whether Snapchat is a provider of interacive computer
services, and appear to agree that it is, we will not address that element.
(a) Publisher or Speaker. Under the second element of the Section 230
immunity test, we must determine whether the Maynards’ “theory of liability would
treat [Snapchat] as a publisher or speaker of third-party content.” Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 570 F3d 1096, 1101 (II) (B) (9th Cir. 2009).
The Maynards argue that the trial court erred in concluding that immunity
under Section 230 of the CDA applies to their claims against Snapchat because their
complaint does not seek to hold Snapchat liable as a speaker or publisher of a third
party user’s content. Rather, they argue that their complaint seeks to hold Snapchat
liable for the negligent creation, design and maintenance of the Speed Filter that
encourages excessive speeding, not for the posts themselves. The Maynards reiterate
that McGee had made no actual post to Snapchat prior to the car accident.
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 Snapchat cites to Backpage.com, supra, Fields v. Twitter, 217 FSupp3d 1116
(N.D. Cal. 2016), and Barnes, supra, for the assertion that the CDA provides
immunity when the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from
the defendant’s status as a publisher or speaker, and that it does not matter whether
an actual online post was made. However, those cases are distinguishable because
they do not involve an incident where a plaintiff attempted to hold an interactive
computer service provider liable when no posts were made. Rather, the plaintiffs in
those cases sought to hold the interactive computer service provider liable for
publishing decisions made regarding online content posted by others. See Barnes,
supra at 1102 (II) (B) (“publication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether
to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content”) (citation omitted;
emphasis supplied); Backpage, supra at 22 (II) (A) (“claims that a website facilitates
illegal conduct through its posting necessarily treat the website as a publisher or
speaker of content provided by third parties and, thus, are precluded by section 230
(c) (1)”) (emphasis supplied).
In Backpage, supra, victims of sex trafficking sued to hold Backpage, an online
classified advertisement forum, liable for participating in the sex trafficking of minors
based on Backpage’s standards for posting advertisements on its website. Id. at 16 (I).
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 In particular, the plaintiffs objected to the rules “about which terms are permitted or
not permitted in a posting, the lack of controls on the display of phone numbers, the
option to anonymize e-mail addresses, the stripping of metadata from photographs .
. . and Backpage’s acceptance of anonymous payments.” Id. at 20 (II) (A). The First
Circuit, in shielding the website from liability under Section 230 of the CDA, noted
that
the contents of all of the relevant advertisements were provided either
by traffickers or by the [victims] themselves (under orders from their
traffickers). Since appellants were trafficked by means of [specific]
advertisements, there would be no harm to them but for the content of
their postings.
Id. at 19-20 (II) (A).
Similarly, Barnes, supra, and Fields, supra, are distinguishable from the instant
case because those cases sought to find the interactive computer service providers
liable for harm caused by publishing decisions related to a third parties’ content. In
Barnes, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that Yahoo! was immune from liability under
the CDA for failing to remove offensive content that the victim’s ex-boyfriend posted
under her name in fake online profiles. Id. at 1098 (I), 1106 (III) (C). In doing so, the
Court held that the fake profiles were solely created by a third-party information
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 content provider and that the Section 230 (c) (1) of the CDA “by itself, shields from
liability all publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove, or to post, with respect
to content generated entirely by third parties.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 1105 (III)
(C). In Fields, supra, family members of a government contractor killed by a terrorist
organization sued Twitter, alleging that it violated the Anti-Terrorism Act by
permitting members of terrorist organizations to sign up for accounts. Id. at 1118. The
court in Fields, supra, noted that “the decision to furnish an account, or prohibit a
particular user from obtaining an account, is itself publishing activity.” Id at 1124 (I)
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the complaint.3
In Barnes, supra, Fields, supra, and Backpage, supra, the publication of a thirdparty user’s posts caused the harm, and the claims depended on the content of the
posts themselves. In the instant case, on the other hand, there was no third-party
3

In contrast, in Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016), Jane
Doe sued Internet Brands for negligent failure to warn of a danger relating to the
operation of Model Mayhem, a networking website for models, alleging that Internet
Brands knew about, but did not warn its users, of a scheme to use the website to lure
models to a fake audition to be drugged and raped. Id. at 848. The Ninth Circuit held
that the CDA did not bar Jane Doe’s negligence claim because she did “not seek to
hold Internet Brands liable as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of content someone posted on
the Model Mayhem website, or for Internet Brands’ failure to remove content posted
on the website.” Id. at 851 (II). Instead, Jane Doe sought to hold Internet Brands
liable “based on its knowledge of the rape scheme[,]” and “for failing to generate its
own warning.” Id. at 852 (II).
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 content uploaded to Snapchat at the time of the accident and the Maynards do not
seek to hold Snapchat liable for publishing a Snap by a third-party that utilized the
Speed Filter. Rather, the Maynards seek to hold Snapchat liable for its own conduct,
principally for the creation of the Speed Filter and its failure to warn users that the
Speed Filter could encourage speeding and unsafe driving practices. Accordingly,
we hold that CDA immunity does not apply because there was no third-party user
content published.
(b) Communications provided by another information content provider.
As we have concluded in division 1(a) above that the Maynards’ claim does not
allege that Snapchat was the publisher or speaker of any third-party content, we need
not, and herein decline, to address whether the complaint seeks to hold Snapchat
liable for the communications of another content provider.
2. Although Snapchat contends that this Court should affirm the trial court’s
grant of its motion to dismiss under the right for any reason rationale, because the
Maynards allegedly did not properly state negligence claims against Snapchat and
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Snapchat, these issues were not
decided by the trial court below.

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 Under the “right for any reason” doctrine, an “appellate court will affirm a
judgment if it is correct for any reason, even if that reason is different than the reason
upon which the trial court relied.” (Citation omitted.) City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275
Ga. 834, 835 (573 SE2d 369) (2002). However, the right-for-any-reason doctrine is
just one of several principles this Court must consider under “the circumstances of
individual appeals[.]” Id. at 838. Our Supreme Court has stated that “the tenant that
the appellate courts do not rule on issues not ruled on by the trial courts preserves the
appellate courts’ jurisdiction and delineates the proper roles of the courts[.]” Id.
We find that the remaining arguments raised by Snapchat are hotly contested
below and require a review of issues within the trial court’s discretion. Thus, we
conclude that judicial economy will be “maximized by returning the case to the trial
court” in the instant case. Id. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court to
decide the remaining arguments.
Judgment reversed and case remanded. McFadden, P.J., and Rickman, J.,
concur.

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