No. 17A-______ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _______________ JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPLICANT v. CITY OF CHICAGO _______________ APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY PENDING REHEARING EN BANC IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND PENDING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT _______________ NOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General Counsel of Record Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov (202) 514-2217 ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _______________ No. 17A-______ JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPLICANT v. CITY OF CHICAGO _______________ APPLICATION FOR PARTIAL STAY PENDING REHEARING EN BANC IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND PENDING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT _______________ Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 23 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, the Solicitor General, on behalf of Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III, respectfully applies for a partial stay of the preliminary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, pending rehearing en banc before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of a panel decision affirming the injunction, and, if necessary, pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in this Court. At the request of a single plaintiff, the City of Chicago, the district court entered, and a panel of the court appeals affirmed, a “nationwide” preliminary injunction barring the federal government from imposing two conditions in federal grants to local law 2 enforcement. Addendum (Add.) 2. The two enjoined conditions require local law-enforcement entities that receive federal grants to provide a basic level of cooperation with federal agencies charged with enforcing the Nation’s immigration laws. One condition requires that, upon a request from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concerning a particular alien in custody, state and local law enforcement notify DHS in advance of the individual’s scheduled release. The other requires that state and local law enforcement allow DHS agents access to aliens (or persons believed to be aliens) in custody in order to conduct interviews. The district court concluded that Chicago is likely to succeed on its claim that the two conditions exceed the statutory authority of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and that imposition of them on Chicago will cause the City irreparable harm. Yet instead of enjoining the conditions solely with respect to Chicago -- the only plaintiff -- the court enjoined them as to all grant applicants. A divided court of appeals panel affirmed and declined to stay the injunction’s application beyond Chicago. The full court has granted partial rehearing en banc limited to the scope of the injunction, but it has deferred ruling on a renewed request for a stay. The government respectfully disagrees with the lower courts’ narrow reading of the relevant statutes. But in this application, it does not ask the Court to stay the preliminary injunction in its entirety. Instead, the government respectfully requests a 3 stay only as to the nationwide scope of the injunction -- which bars application of the two conditions not only to Chicago, but also to all other grant applicants that are not parties to this case. Even if the lower courts’ statutory interpretation were correct, that sweeping remedy is unjustifiable and threatens irreparable harm to the government and the public. Enjoining the application of grant conditions to hundreds of grant applicants that are not parties to the litigation contravenes fundamental principles of Article III and equity, and it strays far beyond the traditional, proper role of federal courts. That overbroad remedy is not even arguably necessary to redress any cognizable, irreparable harm to Chicago itself. The City has never shown, and the courts below did not conclude, that imposition of the conditions on other applicants would injure Chicago. An injunction limited to Chicago thus would fully redress the only plaintiff’s claimed injuries. In contrast, the categorical injunction the courts imposed is already causing harm to the United States and other local governments that depend on federal funding. The injunction issued in this case reflects the increasingly prevalent trend of entering categorical, absent-party injunctions that bar any enforcement of federal laws or policies against any person. Such injunctions frustrate development of the law, effectively freezing in place the first ruling adverse to the government unless and until appellate courts intervene. Indeed, 4 the panel majority defended the practice of issuing “nationwide injunctions” in part on the basis that, “because of the[ir] widespread impact,” they are “more likely to get the attention of [this] Court.” scope based Add. 30. in part Moreover, it justified the injunction’s on its misreading of this Court’s precedent -- a recurring error only this Court can correct. This Court has previously stayed a categorical injunction against a federal policy to the extent it swept beyond the parties to the case. See United States Dep’t of Def. v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939 (1993). It should follow the same course here and stay the preliminary injunction to the extent it bars imposition of the two conditions on grant applicants other than Chicago. STATEMENT 1. a. Congress created the Byrne JAG Program in 2006 to provide additional funding to state and local law-enforcement agencies. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (2006 Act), Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006). The 2006 Act provides that, “[f]rom amounts made available to carry out” the program, “the Attorney General may,” in accordance with a statutory formula, “make grants to States and units of local government” for certain criminal-justice purposes. 34 U.S.C. 10152(a)(1). 1 Grant funds are divided among As of September 1, 2017, the provisions at issue here, previously codified in Title 42 of the United States Code, were recodified in Title 34. 1 5 grantees based on a statutory formula, population and crime statistics. largely premised 34 U.S.C. 10156. on States and localities that seek funding must submit an application to the Attorney General require.” “in such form 34 U.S.C. 10153(a). as the Attorney General may Applicants must certify (inter alia) that they “will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws,” that they will “maintain and report such data, records, and information (programmatic and financial) as the Attorney General may reasonably require,” and that “there agencies.” has been appropriate coordination with affected 34 U.S.C. 10153(a)(4), (5)(C) and (D). Congress created the Byrne JAG Program in the Bureau of Justice Assistance in DOJ, which reports to the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). 10141, 10151-10158. 34 U.S.C. 10101, 10102, The same 2006 Act that created the Program also amended the statutory provision that enumerates the powers of the Assistant Attorney General for OJP. That provision had previously authorized the Assistant Attorney General to “exercise such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General.” 42 U.S.C. 3712(a)(6) (2000). The 2006 Act added that those powers “includ[e] placing special conditions on all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants.” § 1152(b), 119 Stat. at 3113; 34 U.S.C. 10102(a)(6). 6 When OJP approves a Byrne JAG grant application, it sends a grant award document to the applicant. The award document enumerates (inter alia) the “special conditions” applicable to the award; the applicant then typically has 45 calendar days to review the special conditions and decide whether to accept the award. 2 b. When OJP solicited applications for the Fiscal Year 2017 grant program, it announced new conditions that were included in OJP’s 2017 award documents. C.A. App. 30, 62-63, 83-84. Two of those conditions, which relate to aliens who have been arrested by state or local authorities for criminal offenses, are at issue here. The first condition -- referred to below as the notice condition -- requires that, with respect to any “program or activity” funded by the grant, the grantee must have a policy designed to ensure that, when DHS provides a formal written request for advance notice of the scheduled release date and time for a particular alien at a particular facility, the facility will provide such notice to DHS “as early as practicable.” Id. at 63 (¶ 56.1.B); see id. at 60 (¶ 53.5.A(3)) (term “program or activity” has the same meaning as that phrase in 42 U.S.C. 2000d-4a). This condition is designed to facilitate cooperation when DHS issues an “immigration detainer,” which includes a request to a local lawenforcement agency that it notify DHS “as early as practicable (at C.A. App. 46-99 (capitalization and emphasis omitted); OJP, DOJ, Grant Process Overview, https://ojp.gov/funding/Apply/ GrantProcess.htm (all Internet sites last visited June 18, 2018). 2 7 least 48 hours, if possible) before the alien is released from [the agency’s] custody.” 3 Although detainers request that local authorities briefly maintain custody of the alien to allow DHS to assume custody, the notice condition expressly disclaims any requirement to “maintain (or detain) any individual in custody beyond the date and time the individual would have been released in the absence of this condition.” C.A. App. 62 (¶ 55.4.B).4 The second condition at issue -- referred to below as the access condition -- concerns federal agents’ ability to meet with aliens in grant recipients’ custody. Federal law authorizes immigration officials, without obtaining a warrant, “to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(1). Although aliens are not compelled to speak with ICE agents, voluntary DHS, Form I-247A: Immigration Detainer -- Notice of Action 1-2 (Mar. 2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ Document/2017/I-247A.pdf. 3 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policy authorizes issuance of a detainer only for an alien who has been arrested for a criminal offense. ICE, Policy Number 10074.2: Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers § 2.5, https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/ 2017/10074-2.pdf. The policy also requires that the ICE officer have probable cause to believe that the alien is removable from the United States based on certain categories of reliable information, and it precludes the issuance of a detainer solely based on evidence that the alien is foreign born and the absence of records in available databases. Id. § 5.1. The policy requires that the detainer request be accompanied by an administrative warrant issued by a supervisory immigration officer. Id. §§ 2.4, 5.2. ICE officers, in turn, are authorized to arrest an alien on the basis of such a warrant. See 8 U.S.C. 1226(a). 4 8 interviews in jails and prisons can assist ICE in assessing an alien’s likely immigration status -- especially when the alien does not appear in the relevant databases. Such interviews can be frustrated, however, if federal agents are prevented from meeting with aliens in custody. The access condition accordingly requires that, with respect to any “program or activity” funded by the grant, the grantee must have a policy designed to ensure that federal agents are “in fact given access” to correctional facilities to “meet with individuals who are (or are believed * * * to be) aliens and to inquire as to such individuals’ right to be or remain in the United States.” 2. the C.A. App. 63 (¶ 56.1.A). On August 7, 2017, the City brought this suit against Attorney General in the Northern District of Illinois challenging (as relevant here) the notice and access conditions. Compl. ¶ 70. sought a It claimed that those conditions were unlawful and preliminary injunction against their imposition nationwide. Id. ¶¶ 55-135; see D. Ct. Doc. 21, ¶ 3 (Aug. 10, 2017); D. Ct. Doc. 23, at 7-9, 21-24 (Aug. 10, 2017). The City alleged that complying with those conditions -- which are aimed solely at cooperation with respect to removal of aliens who have been arrested for criminal offenses -- would undermine the City’s goodwill with the immigrant community. See Compl. ¶ 70. The City did not contend that it is harmed by application of the conditions to other grant applicants. Nevertheless, it sought a nationwide preliminary 9 injunction barring imposition of the conditions with respect to any grant applicants. D. Ct. Doc. 69, at 15 (Aug. 31, 2017). On September 15, 2017, the district court granted the requested injunction in relevant part. Add. 50-90. It determined that the City was likely to succeed on the merits on the ground that the statute does not authorize the notice and access conditions. 60-68. Add. The court credited the City’s contention that it would suffer irreparable harm if it accepted grants containing the notice and access conditions. Add. 85-86. But the court found that the balance of equities and the public interest favored neither party because both parties “have strong public policy arguments.” 89. Add. Considering those factors, the court granted a “preliminary injunction against the Attorney General’s imposition of the notice and access conditions on the Byrne JAG grant.” Add. 89-90. It stated that “[t]h[e] injunction against imposition of the notice and access conditions is nationwide in scope, there being no reason to think that the legal issues present in this case are restricted to Chicago or that the statutory authority given to the Attorney General would differ in another jurisdiction.” Add. 90. 5 Chicago also challenged a third condition, not at issue here, that requires certification that the applicant complies with 8 U.S.C. 1373, which prohibits state and local government and lawenforcement officials from restricting the sharing of information with DHS, ibid.; C.A. App. 59 (¶ 52). The district court denied the City’s request to enjoin that condition, finding that the City had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Add. 69-84. 5 10 3. The government promptly appealed and filed a motion in the district court seeking a partial stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal to the extent that the injunction applied to grant applicants other than Chicago. (Sept. 26, 2017). the motion. D. Ct. Docs. 79, 80, 81 On October 13, 2017, the district court denied Add. 91-107. The court stated that it had broad remedial authority to address the alleged violation of law and that the legal issues would not differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Add. 94-96. The court reasoned that “judicial economy counsels against” requiring other jurisdictions that might want to challenge the conditions “to file their own lawsuits,” particularly because some had participated as amici curiae. Add. 101. The government immediately sought the same partial stay in the court of appeals. C.A. Doc. 8-1 (Oct. 13, 2017). After suspending proceedings to allow the district court to address a motion the City had filed seeking reconsideration of the denial of an injunction with respect to a third condition, Add. 109-110, which the district court denied, Add. 111-141, the court of appeals denied the stay and directed briefing on the merits. 4. On April 19, 2018, a panel of the court of appeals affirmed the preliminary injunction. a. Add. 142-143. Add. 1-35. The court of appeals concluded that the City was likely to succeed on its claim that the statute governing the Byrne JAG Program does not authorize the notice and access conditions. Add. 11 15-24. The court stated that the statutory text authorizing the Assistant Attorney General to “‘exercise such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General, including placing determining special priority conditions purposes for on formula all grants, grants,’” does and not constitute a “stand-alone grant of authority” to impose conditions on grants. omitted). Add. 17, 19 (quoting 34 U.S.C. 10102(a)(6)) (emphasis And the court concluded that no other statutory provision vests authority to impose the conditions at issue in either the Assistant Attorney General or the Attorney General, and therefore Section 10102(a)(6) does not permit Attorney General to exercise that authority. the Assistant Add. 18-19. In a divided portion of its ruling, the panel majority also affirmed the nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction. 24-35. Add. The majority acknowledged “the possible hazards of the use of nationwide injunctions,” including that they “can stymie the development of the legal issues through the court system” and invite “forum shopping.” Add. 24-25. The majority nevertheless determined that, “for issues of widespread national impact, a nationwide injunction can be beneficial” by providing “efficiency” and “certainty,” avoiding irreparable harm, and advancing the public interest. Add. 26. The majority construed this Court’s decision in Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam) -- 12 which granted a partial stay of nationwide preliminary injunctions entered against an Executive Order suspending entry of aliens from abroad -- as endorsing nationwide injunctions. Add. 26-28. The panel majority disagreed with the government’s argument that Chicago lacks standing to seek to enjoin federal policies as to nonparties, reasoning that “[t]he City had standing to seek injunctive relief” and that the scope of the injunction was merely a matter of balancing the equities left to the district court. Add. 28. that The majority also rejected the government’s arguments nationwide “requir[ing] necessary to relief that the provide here violated injunction complete be relief no to the equitable rule more burdensome than the City”; that the district court’s remedial analysis conflated the breadth of the City’s legal argument with the scope of relief; and that the injunction eviscerated requirements for and protections of class actions. Add. 29. The majority reasoned that “[t]hose arguments would seek a bright-line rule” against nationwide injunctions, which the majority held would be inconsistent with IRAP and various lower-court rulings imposing nationwide injunctions. The panel majority concluded that nationwide Ibid. relief is appropriate here because Chicago’s legal challenge “presents purely a narrow issue of law” that is “not fact-dependent” and would not “benefit from consideration in multiple courts.” Add. 30-31. It also concluded that “the balance of equities” supports such relief. 13 Add. 32. The majority reasoned that the challenged conditions would harm nonparty applicants’ relationships with their communities and that grant applicants are “interconnected” because of the Byrne JAG Program’s funding formula. Add. 34; see Add. 31-34. And it believed that requiring individual applicants to bring separate suits would not serve the public interest. b. Add. 32-33. Judge Manion concurred in the judgment in part but dissented with respect to the injunction’s scope. Add. 36-49. He observed that “[t]he Notice and Access conditions, viewed in isolation, are perfectly reasonable,” and that “[n]o one should find it surprising that the federal government would require cooperation with its law enforcement efforts in exchange for the receipt of federal law enforcement funds.” Add. 39. He nevertheless agreed with the majority’s statutory interpretation and would have affirmed “a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Attorney General from imposing [the notice and access] conditions on Chicago,” which is “the only plaintiff in this suit.” Add. 41. Judge Manion disagreed, however, with the majority’s approval of an injunction that sweeps far beyond Chicago to reach numerous nonparties. Add. 41-49. That injunction, he explained, is “a gratuitous application of an extreme remedy,” and the majority’s ruling upholding it “bypasses Supreme Court precedent, disregards what the district court actually concluded concerning the equities in this case, and misreads the effect of providing relief to 14 Chicago.” Add. 42. A “nationwide injunction,” Judge Manion observed, “is similar in effect to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel,” which this Court has held is inapplicable to the federal government because it would “‘substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue.’” Add. 42-43 (quoting United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984)). The majority’s position that allowing development of the law is unnecessary for “‘purely legal’ issue[s],” Judge conflict[s]” with these principles. Manion explained, “directly Add. 44 (citations omitted). In his view, a court of appeals “should not presume to decide legal issues for the whole country” once and for all. Ibid. Judge Manion further explained that the majority improperly “second-guess[ed]” the district court’s “express[] determin[ation] that the balance of the equities and the public interest ‘favor neither party.’” Add. 45 (citation omitted). The majority’s concern about “‘widespread, duplicative litigation,’” he opined, was unfounded because “Chicago could have filed a class action,” and “[r]equiring a class action has the benefit of dealing with the one-way-ratchet nature of the nationwide injunction.” 45-46. Add. He also explained that, unlike cases where the plaintiff’s injuries can be redressed only in ways that unavoidably benefit nonparties, the “need to protect third parties to provide complete relief is not present here”: Chicago “ha[d] certainly not shown 15 how an injunction preventing the Attorney General from enforcing the conditions at all is necessary to protect its own interest in collecting its allotment.” Add. 48-49. And even “[i]f money were withheld and redistributed from other jurisdictions,” Judge Manion noted, “Chicago would benefit by getting more money.” 5. Add. 49. On April 23, the government filed a motion in the court of appeals for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending a forthcoming petition for proceedings in this Court. rehearing en C.A. Doc. 115. banc and any further On April 24, the panel denied the motion “without prejudice to renewal” upon the filing of a petition for rehearing en banc. Add. 144. On April 27, the government filed a petition for rehearing en banc and a renewed stay motion. C.A. Docs. 118, 120. The panel directed Chicago to respond to the petition but denied the stay motion, over Judge Manion’s dissent. Add. 145-146 & n.1. The government moved that its renewed stay motion be placed before the en banc court; on May 2, the panel ordered that the stay motion would be “taken under advisement for consideration by the full court should rehearing en banc be granted.” Add. 147. On June 4, the court of appeals granted the government’s request for partial rehearing en banc to address “the geographic scope of the preliminary injunction,” Add. 149, but it did not rule on the government’s stay motion. On June 14, the government informed the court by letter that it would seek relief from this 16 Court if the court of appeals did not act on the pending stay motion by June 18. Add. 148. In an order the same day, the court of appeals stated that it would not rule immediately on the stay motion and instead had “decided to await [this] Court’s resolution of Trump v. Hawaii (2018) (No. 17-965),” which the court “expect[ed] may facilitate [its] disposition of the pending motions.” * * * Ibid. ARGUMENT Under this Court’s Rule 23 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651, a single Justice or the Court has the authority to stay a district-court order pending appeal to a court of appeals. 6 considering the application, the Court or Circuit In Justice considers (1) whether four Justices are likely to vote to grant certiorari if the court of appeals ultimately rules against the applicant; (2) whether five Justices would then likely conclude that the case was erroneously decided below; and (3) whether, on balancing the equities, the injury asserted by the applicant outweighs the harm to the other parties or the public. San Diegans for the Mt. Soledad Nat’l War Mem’l v. Paulson, 548 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2006) (Kennedy, J., in chambers); see Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers). All of those factors strongly support a partial stay to the extent the injunction grants relief beyond Chicago. See United States Dep’t See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017); West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016); Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice § 17.6, at 881-884 (10th ed. 2013). 6 17 of Def. v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 939 (1993) (granting stay pending appeal of “so much of” injunction “as grant[ed] relief to persons other than” only plaintiff); Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1331 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) (granting partial stay pending appeal of injunction that went “far beyond the application of [circuit precedent] to [the] concrete cases before [the district court]”), motion to vacate stay denied, 464 U.S. 879 (1983). If the en banc court affirms, this Court is likely to grant certiorari. The Court’s review is warranted because the injunction effectively nullifies nationwide two conditions on federal grants made to state and local governments across the country, all at the behest of a single plaintiff. Review is especially appropriate because the injunction extends a concerning trend among lower courts of issuing categorical, absent-party relief. There is also a fair prospect that this Court would hold the injunction’s scope invalid to the extent it applies beyond Chicago. The injunction goes far beyond redressing any plausible injury to the City by enjoining the two challenged conditions everywhere. That sweeping remedy contravenes Article III and longstanding principles of equity, both of which prohibit a district court in a suit such as this from imposing injunctive relief that goes beyond what is necessary to redress cognizable, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs before it. 18 The balance of equities also strongly supports a partial stay. The injunction is causing irreparable injury to the government and the public interest by disrupting the operation of a nationwide grant program at a crucial point in the grant cycle and eviscerating a federal policy. By contrast, the City will suffer no injury, let alone irreparable harm, if the injunction is stayed to the extent it applies outside Chicago pending proceedings in this Court. I. THIS COURT IS LIKELY TO GRANT CERTIORARI If the en banc court of appeals affirms the injunction’s scope, this Court is likely to grant review. banc reflects, cf. Fed. R. App. As the grant of rehearing en P. 35(a), the propriety of categorical, absent-party injunctions against federal policies is an issue of great importance. issue. This case squarely presents that Based on claimed injuries to a single city, the injunction effectively nullifies two conditions on federal grants nationwide. Review is warranted because the decision below extends a disturbing but accelerating trend among lower courts of issuing categorical injunctions designed to benefit nonparties. courts, including the Seventh Circuit, once recognized Lower that injunctions should be limited to redressing irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. See McKenzie v. City of Chicago, 118 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (reversing injunction against entire city demolition program and holding that “plaintiffs lack[ed] standing to seek -- and the district court therefore 19 lack[ed] authority to grant -- relief that benefits third parties”); see also, e.g., Virginia Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 392-394 (4th Cir. 2001) (narrowing injunctive relief against federal policy to apply only to plaintiff), overruled on other grounds, The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1114 (2013); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Def., 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (same). Increasingly, however, these same courts and others have disregarded this bedrock rule and approved categorical, absentparty injunctions against federal policies nationwide. See, e.g., Add. 1-35; IRAP v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 272-274 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. pending, No. 17-1194 (filed Feb. 23, 2018); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 701-702 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, No. 17-965 (argued Apr. 25, 2018); see also Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 457-460 (2017) (cataloguing recent cases). Amplifying the need for this Court’s intervention, lower courts have upheld such absent-party injunctions based in part on their misreading of this Court’s precedent. For example, the panel majority here relied heavily on this Court’s decision partially staying a nationwide injunction in Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (per curiam), as evincing affirmative approval of nationwide injunctions in general. Add. 26-28. The district court likewise mistakenly relied on IRAP and other decisions of this Court to 20 support the sweeping remedy it adopted, see Add. 96-99, as have other courts in issuing or affirming similarly overbroad injunctions, see IRAP, 883 F.3d at 272-274; Hawaii, 878 F.3d at 701-702. The lower courts’ reading of IRAP is incorrect, pp. 32-33, infra, but without this Court’s intervention that recurring error will persist. The extension of that trend here to invalidate grant conditions nationwide at the request of a single city warrants this Court’s review. Review is especially warranted because the courts below have thwarted the implementation of modest steps to facilitate federal law-enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect the Nation by enforcing the immigration laws against aliens arrested for criminal offenses. This Court has granted certiorari to address “important questions” of interference with “federal power” over “the law of immigration and alien status.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012); see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam). It should do so here to address the propriety of enjoining a federal immigration policy everywhere at the behest of one litigant. II. THERE IS AT LEAST A FAIR PROSPECT THAT THIS COURT WILL REVERSE IF THE EN BANC COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMS THE INJUNCTION’S SCOPE There is also at least a “fair prospect,” Lucas, 486 U.S. at 1304 (Kennedy, J., in chambers), that, if the en banc court affirms the injunction’s scope, this Court will reverse. The injunction transgresses both Article III and longstanding equitable principles 21 by affording relief that is not even arguably necessary to redress any cognizable, irreparable injury to the only plaintiff, Chicago. And it frustrates the development of the law, while obviating the requirements for and protections of class-action litigation. A. The Injunction Violates Article III And Principles Of Equity By Granting Relief Beyond What Is Necessary To Redress Any Cognizable, Irreparable Injury To Chicago 1. a. Chicago lacks Article III standing to seek injunctive relief beyond what is needed to redress an actual or imminent injury-in-fact to Chicago itself. “[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross,” and “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing * * * for each form of relief that is sought.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (citations omitted). “The remedy” sought thus “must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established. ” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353 (2006) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)). “The actual-injury requirement would hardly serve [its] purpose . . . of preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches, if once a plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration, the court were authorized to remedy all inadequacies in that administration.” Ibid. (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357) (brackets omitted). Applying injunctions that that principle, afforded this relief that Court was has not invalidated shown to be 22 necessary to prevent cognizable injury to the plaintiff himself. For example, in Lewis, the Court held that an injunction directed at certain prison practices was overbroad, in violation of Article III, because it enjoined practices that had not been shown to injure any plaintiff. 518 U.S. at 358. The injunction “mandated sweeping changes” in various aspects of prison administration designed to improve prisoners’ access to legal services, including library hours, lockdown procedures, access to research facilities and training, and “‘direct assistance’” from lawyers and legal support staff for “illiterate and non-English-speaking inmates.” Id. at 347-348 (citation omitted). This Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek, and the district court thus lacked authority to grant, such broad relief. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358-360. The district court had “found actual injury on the part of only one named plaintiff,” who claimed that a legal action he had filed was dismissed with prejudice as a result of his illiteracy and who sought assistance in filing legal claims. Id. at 358. “At the outset, therefore,” this Court held that “[it] c[ould] eliminate from the proper scope of the injunction provisions directed at” the other claimed inadequacies that allegedly harmed “the inmate population at large.” Ibid. “If inadequacies of th[at] character exist[ed],” the Court explained, “they ha[d] not been found to have harmed 23 any plaintiff in this lawsuit, and hence were not the proper object of this District Court’s remediation.” Ibid. Here, likewise, Chicago lacks standing to seek an injunction against the imposition of grant conditions on other applicants. The alleged “inadequacy,” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357, that purportedly would cause Chicago’s injury is the inclusion of the notice and access conditions in a federal grant to Chicago itself. The City has not shown, or even alleged, that it has suffered any concrete injury from the imposition of any conditions on any other applicant. Even assuming that application of the conditions to other applicants would be unlawful, Chicago thus has no concrete stake in seeking to enjoin the conditions as to them. Indeed, a geographically bounded local government like Chicago has no cognizable interest in enjoining restrictions on federal grants to other governments. The fact that nonparties might suffer harms similar to Chicago’s does not entitle Chicago to seek categorical, absent-party relief. b. This Court also has recognized and applied the corollary principle that, where a plaintiff faces actual or imminent injury at the outset of a suit but that injury is subsequently redressed or otherwise becomes moot, the plaintiff no longer can seek injunctive relief to redress alleged harms to anyone else -- unless the plaintiff is the representative of a certified class. For example, in Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009), the Court held that the plaintiffs’ challenge to a state-law procedure for 24 disputing the seizure of vehicles or money had become moot because their “underlying property disputes” with the State “ha[d] all ended”: the cars that had been seized from the plaintiffs had been returned, and the plaintiffs had either forfeited the money seized or had “accepted as final the State’s return of some of it.” Id. at 89; see id. at 92. The Court accordingly held that the plaintiffs could no longer seek declaratory or injunctive relief against the State’s policy. Id. at 92. Although the plaintiffs had “sought certification of a class,” class certification had been denied, and that denial was not appealed. Ibid. “Hence the only disputes relevant” in this Court were “those between th[ose] six plaintiffs” and the State concerning specific seized property, “and those disputes [were] * * * over.” Ibid. And although the plaintiffs “continue[d] to dispute the lawfulness of the State’s hearing procedures,” their “dispute [was] no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights.” Ibid. Similarly, in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009), the Court held that a plaintiff lacked standing to seek to enjoin certain Forest Service regulations after the parties had resolved the controversy regarding the application of those regulations to the specific project that had caused that plaintiff’s own claimed injury. Id. at 494-497. The plaintiff’s “injury in fact with regard to that project,” the Court held, “ha[d] been remedied,” and so he lacked standing to maintain his 25 challenge to the regulations. Id. at 494. The Court expressly rejected a contrary rule that, “when a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness of certain action or threatened action but has settled that suit, he retains standing to challenge the basis for that action” -- in Earth Island, “the regulation in the abstract” -- “apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent harm to his interests.” Ibid. Such a rule would “fly in the face of Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.” Ibid. The same conclusion logically follows where, as here, a plaintiff’s only injury has been eliminated by an injunction barring application plaintiff. of the challenged law or policy to the If a plaintiff himself is no longer in any imminent danger of suffering injury from the law or policy -- whether because his injury has become moot through happenstance or settlement, as in Alvarez and Earth Island, or because a plaintiffspecific injunction prevents any future injury to that plaintiff from the law or policy -- he lacks standing to press for additional injunctive relief. The fact that the challenged law or policy would still cause concrete injury to nonparties is irrelevant. As Alvarez and Earth Island both demonstrate, the plaintiff must show the relief he seeks is necessary to redress his own actual or imminent injury-in-fact; potential injuries to others who are not parties to the case do not entitle the plaintiff to seek relief on their behalf. 26 c. In the since-vacated portion of its decision, the panel majority did not identify any imminent, concrete injury Chicago would suffer from the application of the conditions to other applicants. It stated that “the recipients of the grant are interconnected” because funds may be “withheld” from one recipient “as a penalty compliant for * * * non-compliance” recipients.” and “reallocated Add. 34. to other, But as Judge Manion observed in dissent, “the statute is completely silent on what happens if a potential grantee is denied or if it simply fails to submit an application” based on its refusal to comply with certain conditions. Add. 48. Moreover, even “[i]f money were withheld and redistributed from other jurisdictions” that refuse to comply with the notice and access conditions, if anything “Chicago would benefit by getting more money.” Add. 49. The majority also stated that “the City is obligated to apply for Byrne JAG funds not only for itself but for eleven neighboring counties.” Add. 34. But it did not explain why exempting even those nonparty municipalities from the challenged conditions is necessary to prevent harm to Chicago, let alone why exempting all other applicants nationwide is necessary. The panel majority nevertheless dismissed Chicago’s lack of standing to seek to enjoin application of the conditions to other applicants. Add. 28. It reasoned that “[t]he City had standing to seek injunctive relief” of some kind, and the proper scope of relief was then left to the district court’s discretion. Ibid. 27 That reasoning contradicts this Court’s teaching that “standing is not dispensed in gross” and that “the remedy” a district court may impose “must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.” DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 353 (citation omitted). appeals’ reasoning is also irreconcilable with The court of this Court’s decisions holding that a plaintiff whose own injury has become moot can no longer seek judicial relief. See Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 92-93; Earth Island, 555 U.S. 494-497. If an injunction were entered against application of the conditions to Chicago, the City would be in the same position as a plaintiff whose injuries have disappeared through settlement or happenstance. Chicago’s only injury any would be redressed, and it would lack continuing concrete stake in enjoining the conditions as to other applicants. 2. a. Independent of Article III, the injunction here violates fundamental rules of equity by granting relief broader than necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Chicago. This Court has long recognized that injunctive relief must “be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation omitted). Where no class has been certified, a plaintiff must show that the requested relief is necessary to redress his own irreparable harm; he cannot seek injunctive relief in order to prevent harm to others. See Monsanto 28 Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 163 (2010) (plaintiffs “d[id] not represent a class, so they could not seek to enjoin [an agency order] on the ground that it might cause harm to other parties”). Even where a class has been certified, relief is limited to what is necessary to redress irreparable injury to members of that class. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 359-360 (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)). “[T]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established” that injured class members, “not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.” Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702. Applying that principle, this Court held in Lewis that a “systemwide” injunction was improper as a matter of equity even as to the particular claimed inadequacy that had been found to cause Article III injury: inadequate services for illiterate inmates that allegedly deprived them of access to the courts. 359-360 & n.7. 518 U.S. at The district court’s “only findings” supporting systematic relief as to that inadequacy -- one inmate’s dismissed complaint, and one instance in which another inmate “had once been ‘unable to file a legal action’” -- “were a patently inadequate basis for a conclusion of systemwide violation and imposition of systemwide relief.” citation omitted). “illiterate prisoners There c[ould was Id. at 359 (brackets and no not] finding obtain that the any minimal other help necessary to file particular claims that they wish[ed] to bring 29 before the courts.” Id. at 360. The Court accordingly held that, even though a class had been certified, “[t]he constitutional violation” that had injured those two inmates “ha[d] not been shown to be systemwide, and granting a remedy beyond what was necessary to provide relief to [those two inmates] was therefore improper.” Ibid. The panel majority’s ruling is inconsistent with Lewis and similar cases. The only plaintiff is Chicago, and its only asserted irreparable harms stem from application of the two conditions to the City itself. Those claimed harms would be fully redressed by an injunction limited to Chicago. The City has never demonstrated, and neither lower court found, that if it were freed from complying with the two challenged conditions, an injunction barring application of the conditions to other grant applicants would be necessary to redress any imminent, irreparable harm to Chicago. b. History confirms that the relief the lower courts imposed violates “traditional principles of equity jurisdiction.” Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999) (citation omitted). This Court “ha[s] long held that the jurisdiction ” conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 “over ‘all suits . . . in equity’ * * * is an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of 30 the two countries. ” internal Id. at 318 (brackets, citation, and other quotation marks omitted). “Substantially, then, the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act, 1789.” Ibid. (citation omitted). Absent-party injunctions were not “traditionally accorded by courts of equity.” Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319. did not exist at equity at all. Indeed, they They are a modern aberration, with no direct antecedent in English practice, or apparently even in the United States until the mid-20th century. Bray 425 (“There is an easy, uncomplicated answer to the question whether the national injunction is traceable to traditional equity: no.”); see Bray 424-445 (detailing historical English practice and U.S. practice from Founding to present). century, this Court rejected injunctive enforcement of a law to nonparties. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897)). the 1930s courts issued Thus, in the late 19th The panel barred As a consequence, for example, in more majority that Bray 429 (discussing Scott v. than 1600 enforcement of a single federal statute. c. relief did not injunctions against Bray 434. dispute that equitable principles limit injunctive relief to redressing the plaintiff’s own irreparable harm, and it did not identify any irreparable harm Chicago would suffer from application of the conditions to other 31 grant applicants. The majority also did not dispute that global, absent-party injunctions did not exist at the Founding or for long thereafter. Add. 29. The majority nevertheless refused to adhere to those equitable principles because it believed they would yield “a bright-line rule” against nationwide injunctions “that is both inconsistent with precedent and inadvisable.” Ibid. Each step in that reasoning is mistaken. The majority’s premise that adherence to equitable principles would categorically bar all injunctions affording relief that benefits nonparties outside the class-action context is unfounded. As Judge Manion explained, “broad relief, even relief that benefits non-parties, is sometimes necessary to provide complete relief to the actual plaintiffs.” Add. 47. A “classic example[]” is a desegregation case, where “‘the very nature of the right[]’” the plaintiffs assert would “‘require[] that the decree run to the benefit not only of the plaintiffs but similarly situated.’” also for all persons Ibid. (brackets and citation omitted). To be sure, even in such cases, injunctions are not boundless; the scope of relief still must be limited to redressing harm to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 74, 89-91 (1995) (holding injunction in school-desegregation case overbroad because court found an “intradistrict violation” of constitutional requirements, but injunction imposed “interdistrict relief”). But 32 in certain cases, a plaintiff’s injury cannot be redressed without also benefitting nonparties. This, however, is not such a case. The panel majority also erred in construing this Court’s precedent misread as endorsing this Court’s injunction in IRAP, nationwide decision 137 S. Ct. injunctions. partially 2080, as The staying approving majority a global nationwide injunctions as a general matter because this Court did not stay the injunction in that case in its entirety. Add. 26-29, 31-32. But as this Court explained in IRAP, it was “not asked to grant a preliminary injunction, but to stay one,” and accordingly the Court did not determine the proper limits of the preliminary injunction in the first instance. 137 S. Ct. at 2087. Instead, the Court “br[ought] to bear an equitable judgment of [its] own” and balanced the equities to permit enforcing the temporary suspension as to all aliens who lacked a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a U.S. person or entity. Ibid.; see id. at 2088-2089. Moreover, although the government disagrees with the global injunctions issued in IRAP, the circumstances significantly from those at issue here. in IRAP differ At the very least, the temporary entry suspension in IRAP restricted the entry of aliens from abroad through any U.S. port of entry, and the Fourth Circuit had stated that the “[p]laintiffs [were] dispersed throughout the United States.” IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir.) (en banc), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (citing United States 33 v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950)). Here, in contrast, the notice and access conditions have no effect on aliens abroad, and the only plaintiff, Chicago, is located in one State. The City has not attempted to show how application of those conditions to other grant applicants will have any spillover effect on Chicago. IRAP lends no support to the panel majority’s conclusion. 7 B. Nationwide, Absent-Party Injunctions Frustrate The Development Of The Law And Eviscerate Requirements For And Protections Provided By Class-Action Litigation 1. The injunction here also impedes the orderly, evenhanded development of the law. As Judge Manion explained, an order by one lower court enjoining any application of a federal policy, including as to nonparties, effectively imposes a rule of “nonmutual offensive The district court also cited Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam), see Add. 95, but it is also inapposite. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that a nationwide injunction against implementation of the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (DAPA) was warranted due to what it perceived as the importance of uniformity in federal immigration law and the prospect that a “geographicallylimited injunction would be ineffective because DAPA beneficiaries would be free to move among states.” 809 F.3d at 187-188. None of those factors warranted nationwide relief in Texas, see, e.g., Gov’t C.A. Br. at 54-56, Texas, supra (No. 15-40238), and in any event they are inapplicable here. The notice and access conditions apply only to state-federal cooperation regarding aliens who have been arrested by law enforcement. See pp. 6-8, supra. Enjoining the conditions nationwide is not even arguably necessary to maintain uniform enforcement of the Nation’s immigration laws. Jurisdictions already can decline to accept Byrne JAG grants and avoid committing to the notice and access conditions; conversely, even jurisdictions that do not receive grants can provide the same forms of cooperation. Enjoining the conditions nationwide would increase the potential for disuniformity by enabling state and local governments to establish divergent policies even while accepting grant funds. 7 34 collateral estoppel.” Add. 42 (citing United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984)). In holding that such estoppel “does not apply against the Government,” this Court explained that a rule requiring the government to adhere to lower courts’ legal determinations in litigation involving different adverse parties “would substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue.” Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160, 162; see id. at 163-164. “Allowing only one final adjudication” in turn “would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants certiorari.” Id. at 160. As Judge Manion observed, the injunction the court of appeals affirmed invites precisely those problems. Add. 42-44. The panel majority “implicitly attempt[ed] to distinguish” Mendoza, but its purported distinction is illusory. (Manion, J., dissenting in part). Add. 43 The majority reasoned that there is no need to leave room for other courts to opine on the merits because this case “presents purely a narrow issue of law” that is “not fact-dependent and will not vary from one locality to another,” and therefore will not “benefit from consideration in multiple courts.” Add. 30-31. But that is true of every case that turns on interpreting a statute. As Judge Manion observed, “if a lack of factual differentiation is all that is needed to distinguish Mendoza, then a nationwide injunction is appropriate in every 35 statutory-interpretation case,” and “[t]hat cannot be the law.” Add. 43. “Courts faced with difficult statutory questions,” including this Court, “are the ones who benefit the most from the existence of multiple well-reasoned decisions from which to draw.” Ibid. Lower-court judges “should not discount the fact that [their] honorable colleagues in other districts and other circuits may view things differently.” 2. Add. 44 (Manion, J., dissenting in part). Absent-party injunctions also undermine the primary tool that federal law prescribes for adjudicating in a single proceeding legal issues that affect many persons: class actions. As Judge Manion noted, “Chicago could have filed a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all jurisdictions that do not want to comply with the conditions,” provided that it met Rule 23’s requirements. Add. 46. “Requiring a class action has the benefit of dealing with the one-way-ratchet nature of the nationwide injunction.” Ibid. As Judge Manion observed, “[a] nationwide injunction ties the Attorney General’s hands when he loses, but if Chicago had lost here, then some other municipality could have filed suit against the Attorney General in some other jurisdiction, and that process could in theory continue until a plaintiff finally prevailed.” Ibid. In contrast, “[w]ith a class action, a decision would bind those other municipalities just as it would bind the Attorney General, and they could not run off to the 93 other districts for more bites at the apple.” Ibid. 36 The panel majority offered no persuasive reason to excuse the City from seeking and securing class certification before obtaining class-like relief. It noted that in IRAP this Court declined to stay an injunction that benefited nonparties despite the absence of a certified class. Add. 27, 29. that inapposite stay ruling is As explained above, however, here. See pp. 32-33, supra. Moreover, the majority’s own characterization of this case suggests that it likely would have deemed class treatment appropriate: it emphasized that “a significant number of award recipients oppose the conditions” and that the facts of this (or presumably any) particular case are immaterial to the statutory analysis. Add. 33. If class treatment would have been proper (a doubtful proposition), imposing class-like relief without requiring class certification is perplexing. And if instead the City could not satisfy one or more of Rule 23’s elements, then leaving adjudication of other challenges to the conditions to separate suits is all the more necessary, and the lower courts’ imposition of a categorical remedy is all the more inappropriate. III. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES SUPPORTS A STAY A. The injunction causes direct, irreparable injury to the interests of the government and the public, which merge here, see Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). enjoined by a court from effectuating “[A]ny time a State is statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable 37 injury.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., chambers) in (citation omitted). The injunction here similarly inflicts severe, concrete harm on the federal government by barring imposition nationwide of conditions in federal grants that implement important federal policies. A stay is necessary to avoid interference with the operation of a nationwide grant program at a crucial point in the grant cycle. OJP has received nearly 1000 applications from state and local jurisdictions for more than $250 million in available Fiscal Year 2017 Byrne JAG Program funds. Add. 151-152 (¶¶ 4, 6). Before the entry of the nationwide preliminary injunction, OJP had aimed to issue Fiscal Year 2017 Byrne JAG Program awards by September 30, 2017. Add. 152 (¶¶ 7-8). But because of the injunction, DOJ cannot issue grants with two conditions that are designed to promote a basic level of cooperation between governments in fulfilling their respective law-enforcement responsibilities -cooperation very much in the public interest. DOJ thus has not distributed Fiscal Year 2017 grants to any jurisdiction since. If the government were to issue grants subject to the terms of the injunction, it may well lose the practical ability to include the conditions this year even if this Court later holds the injunction to be improper. States and localities can spend the funds as soon as they are distributed, and attempts to include the conditions at a later date would face many difficulties. 38 Although DOJ has been delaying issuance of grants, further delay “would hinder the reasonably timely and reliable flow of funding” to support law-enforcement activity around the country, impose particular burdens for localities with relatively small budgets, and disrupt state grant-making processes under which states issue sub-awards of Byrne JAG Program funds. Add. 153 (¶ 10); see ibid. (¶¶ 11-12). In contrast, the City will suffer no injury whatsoever if the injunction is stayed to the extent it extends beyond Chicago. As discussed above, the City has never identified any way in which application of those conditions in grants to other applicants will harm Chicago. Its claim of harm is premised on application of the notice and access conditions to the City itself. supra. See pp. 8, 23, The City certainly cannot show it would suffer irreparable harm from a partial stay of the injunction as to other applicants pending rehearing en banc and any proceedings in this Court. B. In the now-vacated portion of its decision, the panel majority concluded that “the balance of equities supports the district court’s determination to impose the injunction nationwide,” Add. 31, but its reasoning is deeply flawed and provides no sound basis for denying a stay. The majority purported to agree with the district court’s “assess[ment]” of the “balance of harms.” Ibid. But as Judge Manion observed, “the district court specifically concluded the balance of equities and the public interest did not 39 favor Chicago.” Add. 38 n.2 (emphasis added). The court entered an injunction because it mistakenly believed Chicago did not have to meet all four factors set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) -- including “that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor,” id. at 20 -- to obtain an injunction. Add. 38 n.2 (Manion, J., dissenting in part); Add. 89. The majority also stated that the burden of a nationwide injunction on the federal government is “minimized” because it “can distribute the funds without mandating the conditions.” 32. Add. But that would defeat the federal government’s interest in securing a basic level of cooperation from grant recipients. Under the injunction, the government must either forgo distributing grant money or distribute it even to local governments that refuse to provide minimal law-enforcement assistance. The majority posited that some local governments might voluntarily comply with the conditions and that the burden on the federal government “is limited to those jurisdictions who oppose the conditions.” Ibid. Yet the majority itself observed that “a significant number of award recipients oppose the conditions.” Add. 33. In any event, the panel majority identified no irreparable harm to Chicago absent a nationwide remedy that could outweigh the harm to the government. It cited the conditions’ purported “impact” on other grant applicants, Add. 32, but identified no irreparable harm Chicago would suffer if the injunction were confined to the 40 City, see Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (plaintiff must show “that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm” (emphasis added)); see also pp. 26-27, 30-31, supra. interest” in avoiding nationwide relief. The majority also stated that the “public “simultaneous Add. 32-33. litigation” supported But the majority identified no legal basis substantiating that asserted “public interest.” 32. Add. And to the contrary, as this Court in Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160, 163-164, and Judge Manion in his dissent, Add. 42-44, each recognized, litigation in multiple fora is in fact a valuable feature of the judicial system that fosters the development of the law. Moreover, that asserted “public interest” cannot outweigh the government’s interest because those interests “merge” where the government is a party, Nken, 556 U.S. at 435, and in any event any interest in avoiding parallel litigation is dwarfed by the public’s interest in preventing overbroad court orders from improperly nullifying policies adopted by Congress or the Executive. CONCLUSION The preliminary injunction should be stayed to the extent it applies beyond the City of Chicago pending rehearing en banc and, if necessary, pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and further proceedings in this Court. Respectfully submitted. NOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General JUNE 2018 ADDENDUM Court of Appeals Opinion (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 2018) (C.A. Doc. 111)............................................1 District Court Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) (D. Ct. Doc. 78)..........................................50 District Court Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) (D. Ct. Doc. 98)................91 Court of Appeals Order on Motion to Suspend Briefing (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2017) (C.A. Doc. 27)..................108 District Court Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Motion to Intervene (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2017) (D. Ct. Doc. 125)..............111 Court of Appeals Order on Motion for Partial Stay of Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 2017) (C.A. Doc. 33)..................142 Court of Appeals Order on Motion for Partial Stay Pending Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Writ of Certiorari (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018) (C.A. Doc. 116)......144 Court of Appeals Order Requesting Response to Petition for Rehearing (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2018) (C.A. Doc. 121).......145 Court of Appeals (Panel) Order on Renewed Motion for Partial Stay Pending Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Writ of Certiorari (7th Cir. Apr. 30, 2018) (C.A. Doc. 122).................146 Court of Appeals Order on Motion for En Banc Consideration of Motion for Partial Stay Pending En Banc Review (7th Cir. May 2, 2018) (C.A. Doc. 124-1).................147 Court of Appeals Order Regarding Government’s June 14, 2018, Letter (7th Cir. June 14, 2018) (C.A. Doc. 131)....148 Court of Appeals Order on Petition for Rehearing En Banc (7th Cir. June 4, 2018) (C.A. Doc. 128)..................149 Second Declaration of Alan R. Hanson (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) (D. Ct. Doc. 82)..............151 Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________  No. 17‐2991  CITY OF CHICAGO,  Plaintiff‐Appellee,  v.  JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney  General of the United States,  Defendant‐Appellant.  ____________________  Appeal from the United States District Court for the  Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.  No. 1:17‐cv‐05720 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.  ____________________  ARGUED JANUARY 19, 2018 — DECIDED APRIL 19, 2018  ____________________  Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.  ROVNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from the grant of a  preliminary  injunction  in  favor  of  the  City  of  Chicago  (the  “City”) and against Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, the At‐ torney  General  of  the  United  States,  enjoining  the  enforce‐ ment  of  two  conditions  imposed  upon  recipients  of  the  Ed‐ ward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (the  “Byrne  JAG  program”).  See  34  U.S.C.  §  10151  (formerly  42  (Add. 1) Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 2 2  No. 17‐2991  U.S.C.  §  3750).  The  Byrne  JAG  grant,  named  after  a  fallen  New York City police officer, allocates substantial funds an‐ nually  to  provide  for  the  needs  of  state  and  local  law  en‐ forcement,  including  personnel,  equipment,  training,  and  other uses identified by those entities. The Attorney General  tied  receipt  of  the  funds  to  the  grant  recipient’s  compliance  with three conditions which the City argued were unlawful  and unconstitutional. The district court agreed with the City  as  to  two  of  the  three  conditions—the  “notice”  condition  mandating  advance  notice  to  federal  authorities  of  the  re‐ lease  date  of  persons  in  state  or  local  custody  who  are  be‐ lieved  to  be  aliens,  and  the  “access”  condition  which  re‐ quired  the  local  correctional  facility  to  ensure  agents  access  to  such  facilities  and  meet  with  those  persons.  Compliance  with those conditions in order to receive the funding award‐ ed  under  the  Byrne  JAG  grant  would  require  the  allocation  of state and local resources, including personnel. The district  court  granted  the  preliminary  injunction  as  to  those  two  conditions,  applying  it  nationwide.  The  court  subsequently  denied the Attorney General’s motion to stay the nationwide  scope of the injunction, and this court denied the stay on ap‐ peal.  The  Attorney  General  now  appeals  that  preliminary  injunction.  Our role in this case is not to assess the optimal immigra‐ tion policies for our country; that is not before us today. Ra‐ ther, the issue before us strikes at one of the bedrock princi‐ ples of our nation, the protection of which transcends politi‐ cal  party  affiliation  and  rests  at  the  heart  of  our  system  of  government—the separation of powers.  The  founders  of  our  country  well  understood  that  the  concentration  of  power  threatens  individual  liberty  and  es‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 3 No. 17‐2991  3 tablished a bulwark against such tyranny by creating a sepa‐ ration  of  powers  among  the  branches  of  government.  If  the  Executive  Branch  can  determine  policy,  and  then  use  the  power of the purse to mandate compliance with that policy  by the state and local governments, all without the authori‐ zation or even acquiescence of elected legislators, that check  against  tyranny  is  forsaken.  The  Attorney  General  in  this  case used the sword of federal funding to conscript state and  local  authorities  to  aid  in  federal  civil  immigration  enforce‐ ment. But the power of the purse rests with Congress, which  authorized the federal funds at issue and did not impose any  immigration  enforcement  conditions  on  the  receipt  of  such  funds.  In  fact,  Congress  repeatedly  refused  to  approve  of  measures that would tie funding to state and local immigra‐ tion policies. Nor, as we will discuss, did Congress authorize  the  Attorney  General  to  impose  such  conditions.  It  falls  to  us, the judiciary, as the remaining branch of the government,  to  act  as  a  check  on  such  usurpation  of  power.  We  are  a  country that jealously guards the separation of powers, and  we must be ever‐vigilant in that endeavor.  I.  The path to this case began in 2006, which was both the  year that the City enacted its Welcoming City ordinance, and  the  year  that  the  federal  government  first  established  the  Byrne  JAG  program.  For  many  years,  the  two  coexisted  without  conflict.  In  the  past  few  years,  numerous  pieces  of  legislation were introduced in the House and Senate seeking  to  condition  federal  funding  on  compliance  with  8  U.S.C.  § 1373—which  was  intended  to  address  “sanctuary  cities”  and  prohibit  federal,  state  or  local  government  officials  or  entities from restricting the exchange of information with the  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 4 4  No. 17‐2991  immigration  authorities  regarding  citizenship  or  immigra‐ tion  status.  None  of  those  efforts  were  passed  by  Congress.  See,  e.g.,  Stop  Dangerous  Sanctuary  Cities  Act,  H.R.  5654,  114th Cong. § 4 (2016); Stop Dangerous Sanctuary Cities Act,  S. 3100, 114th Cong. § 4 (2016); Enforce the Law for Sanctu‐ ary Cities Act, H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); Mobilizing  Against  Sanctuary  Cities  Act,  H.R.  3002,  114th  Cong.  §  2  (2015); Stop Sanctuary Policies and Protect Americans Act, S.  2146, 114th Cong. § 3(a) (2015); Stop Sanctuary Cities Act, S.  1814,  114th  Cong.  §  2  (2015)  (all  available  at  https://www.congress.gov).  see  also  Annie  Lai  &  Christo‐ pher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanc‐ tuary  City  Defunding,  57  Santa  Clara  L.  Rev.  539,  553  n.  87  (2017)  (listing  eight  pieces  of  legislation  introduced  during  that time, all of which were unsuccessful).   Determined  to  forge  a  different  path  in  immigration  en‐ forcement, the President on January 25, 2017 issued an Exec‐ utive Order directing the Attorney General and the Depart‐ ment of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary, in their discre‐ tion  and  to  the  extent  consistent  with  law,  to  ensure  that  sanctuary  jurisdictions  are  not  eligible  to  receive  Federal  grants  except  as  deemed  necessary  for  law  enforcement  purposes  by  the  Attorney  General  or  the  Secretary.  Exec.  Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 at § 9(a) (Jan. 25, 2017).  That  Executive  Order  was  challenged  in  court  and  prelimi‐ narily  enjoined  by  a  district  court  on  April  25,  2017—and  subsequently permanently enjoined. County of Santa Clara v.  Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017); County of Santa  Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Shortly  thereafter—in the face of the failure of Congress to pass such  restrictions and the issues with the legality of the Executive  Order—on  July  25,  2017,  the  Attorney  General  pursued  yet  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 5 No. 17‐2991  5 another path to that goal and issued the conditions for recip‐ ients of the Byrne JAG funds that are challenged here.   The  Byrne  JAG  program  is  the  primary  provider  of  fed‐ eral criminal justice funding to state and local governments.  The funds have been used to meet a wide range of needs for  those law enforcement entities, including funding the acqui‐ sition  of  body  cameras  and  police  cruisers,  and  support  for  community programs aimed at reducing violence. The City,  which challenges the new conditions imposed, had targeted  the fiscal year 2017 funds for several purposes including ex‐ pansion of the use of  ShotSpotter technology to allow  offic‐ ers to quickly identify the location of shooting incidents and  deploy  a  more  precise  response.  Under  the  new  provisions  imposed by the Attorney General, state and local governing  authorities  who  were  awarded  grants  under  the  Byrne  JAG  program  could  not  receive  any  of  the  funds  unless  they  complied with the new conditions.   Specifically, the Attorney General imposed “notice,” “ac‐ cess,” and “compliance” conditions, on Byrne JAG grant re‐ cipients,  only  the  first  two  of  which  are  at  issue  in  this  ap‐ peal.  The  “notice”  and  “access”  conditions  require  that  for  local governments, throughout the period for the award:  A.  A  local  ordinance,  ‐rule,  ‐regulation,  ‐policy,  or  ‐practice  (or  an  applicable  State  stat‐ ute,  ‐rule,  ‐regulation,  ‐policy,  or  ‐practice)  must  be  in  place that is designed to ensure that agents of the United  States acting under color of federal law in fact are given  access  [to]  a  local‐government  (or  local‐government‐ contracted)  correctional  facility  for  the  purpose  of  per‐ mitting such agents to meet with individuals who are (or  are believed by such agents to be) aliens and to inquire as  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 6 6  No. 17‐2991  to  such  individuals’  right  to  be  or  remain  in  the  United  States.   B.  A  local  ordinance,  ‐rule,  ‐regulation,  ‐policy,  or  ‐practice  (or  an  applicable  State  stat‐ ute,  ‐rule,  ‐regulation,  ‐policy,  or  ‐practice)  must  be  in  place  that  is  designed  to  ensure  that,  when  a  local‐ government (or local‐government‐contracted) correction‐ al facility receives from DHS a formal written request au‐ thorized  by  the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act  that  seeks  advance  notice  of  the  scheduled  release  date  and  time for a particular alien in such facility, then such facili‐ ty  will  honor  such  request  and—as  early  as  practicable  (see ʺRules of Constructionʺ incorporated by para. 4.B. of  this condition)—provide the requested notice to DHS.   OJP Form 4000/2 (Rev. 4‐88);  https://www.bja.gov/Jag/pdfs/SampleAwardDocument‐ FY2017JAG‐Local.pdf at 19 (last visited 03‐20‐18).   It further provides that “[n]othing in this condition shall  be understood to authorize or require … any entity or indi‐ vidual to maintain (or detain) any individual in custody be‐ yond the date and time the individual would have been re‐ leased  in  the  absence  of  this  condition.”  Id.  at  18.  Identical  provisions apply when the states are the grant recipients ra‐ ther than local governments. Id. Under the notice condition,  grant recipients were initially required to provide 48 hours’  advance  notice  to  the  DHS  as  to  the  scheduled  release  date  and  time  of  any  individuals  in  the  jurisdiction’s  custody  suspected  of  immigration  violations.  When  the  City  sued  and  sought  a  preliminary  injunction,  it  argued  in  part  that  the  requirement  was  impossible  to  implement  in  Chicago  which  operated  only  temporary  lock‐up  facilities  and  held  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 7 No. 17‐2991  7 the vast majority of persons for less than 24 hours, and that  holding them for a longer period in order to comply would  violate  the  Fourth  Amendment  of  the  United  States  Consti‐ tution. The Attorney General subsequently modified the no‐ tice condition, requiring that advance notice be provided as  early  as  practicable.  The  access  condition  required  the  local  authorities to provide immigration agents with access to the  local  detention  facilities  and  to  the  individuals  detained  there to question such individuals.   Those conditions were inconsistent with the provisions in  the Welcoming City Ordinance, and the City challenged the  imposition of those conditions by the Attorney General. The  Welcoming City Ordinance reflects the City’s determination  that, as a City in which one out of five of its residents is an  immigrant, “the cooperation of  all persons, both document‐ ed citizens and those without documentation status, is essen‐ tial to achieve the City’s goals of protecting life and proper‐ ty, preventing crime and resolving problems.” Chicago Mu‐ nicipal Code, Welcoming City Ordinance, § 2‐173‐005 “Pur‐ pose and Intent.” The City recognized that the maintenance  of  public  order  and  safety  required  the  cooperation  of  wit‐ nesses and victims, whether documented or not, and the co‐ operation  of  Chicago’s  immigrant  communities.  Id.  Finally,  the  City  concluded  that  immigrant  community  members,  whether or not documented, should be treated with respect  and dignity by all City employees. Id. Toward that end, the  City  set  forth  some  standards  for  the  treatment  of  persons  within  its  jurisdiction,  which  included  prohibitions  on  re‐ questing or disclosing information as to immigration status,  and on detaining persons based on a belief as to that status  or  based  on  immigration  detainers  when  such  immigration  detainer  is  based  solely  on  a  violation  of  civil  immigration  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 8 8  No. 17‐2991  law. Id. at § 2‐173‐020, ‐030, ‐042. It also provides in § 2‐173‐ 042 that unless acting pursuant to law enforcement purposes  unrelated  to  the  enforcement  of  civil  immigration  law,  no  agency or agent shall permit Immigrations and Customs En‐ forcement (ICE) agents access to a person being detained or  permit  the  use  of  agency  facilities  for  investigative  inter‐ views,  nor  can  an  agency  or  agent  while  on  duty  expend  time  responding  to  ICE  inquiries  or  communicating  with  ICE  as  to  a  person’s custody status  or release  date.  The  Or‐ dinance  explicitly  clarifies  that  those  provisions  in  §  2‐173‐ 042 do not apply when the subject of the investigation “has  an outstanding criminal warrant, … has been convicted of a  felony,  …  is  a  defendant  …  where  …  a  felony  charge  is  pending, … or has been identified as a known gang member  either  in  a  law  enforcement  agency’s  database  or  by  his  or  her own admission.” Id. at § 2‐173‐042(c).  The  City  therefore  could  not  comply,  consistent  with  its  Ordinance,  with  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  Attorney  General  on  those  seeking  funds  under  the  Byrne  JAG  pro‐ gram,  and  filed  this  suit  alleging  that  the  conditions  were  unlawful  under  the  statute  and  unconstitutional  as  a  viola‐ tion  of  separation  of  powers  principles.  In  a  thorough  and  well‐reasoned  opinion,  Judge  Leinenweber  in  the  district  court granted the City’s motion for a preliminary injunction  as to the notice and access conditions, but denied it as to the  compliance condition which is not challenged in this appeal  and of which we express no opinion. The district court noted  that  nothing  in  the  Byrne  JAG  statute  granted  express  au‐ thority to the Attorney General to impose the notice and ac‐ cess  conditions,  and  rejected  the  Attorney  General’s  claim  that a provision in a different subsection, 34 U.S.C. § 10102,  could be interpreted to allow such authority. The court fur‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 9 No. 17‐2991  9 ther concluded that a nationwide preliminary injunction was  required to provide full relief in this case.   II.  Underlying this case are the sometimes‐clashing interests  between  those  of  the  federal  government  in  enforcing  its  laws  and  those  of  the  state  or  local  government  in  policing  and  protecting  its  communities.  Here,  the  federal  executive  branch, in the person of the Attorney General, has concluded  that  its  interests  will  be  best  served  by  harnessing  the  local  authorities  to  identify  and  to  make  accessible  persons  in  their custody who are potentially in the country unlawfully,  so  as  to  facilitate  efficient  civil  immigration  enforcement.  State  and  local  law  enforcement  authorities,  however,  are  concerned  with  maximizing  the  safety  and  security  of  their  own communities. For some communities, those goals might  be  maximized  by  cooperating  with  the  federal  immigration  authorities and assisting them in identifying and seizing un‐ documented individuals in their communities.   Other communities, such as the City in this case, howev‐ er, have determined that their local law enforcement efforts  are handcuffed by such unbounded cooperation with immi‐ gration enforcement. They have concluded that persons who  are  here  unlawfully—or  who  have  friends  or  family  mem‐ bers here unlawfully—might avoid contacting local police to  report crimes as a witness or a victim if they fear that report‐ ing will bring the scrutiny of the federal immigration author‐ ities  to  their  home.1  In  the  case  of  domestic  violence  or                                                    1 That fear of the reach of immigration authorities would not be un‐ founded.  According  to  the  Fiscal  Year  2017  ICE  Enforcement  and  Re‐ moval Operations Report, approximately 11% of the arrested alien popu‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 10 10  No. 17‐2991  crimes of that nature, the reluctance to report that is endemic  to  such  offenses  could  be  magnified  in  communities  where  reporting could turn a misdemeanor into a deportation. And  the  failure  to  obtain  that  victim  and  witness  cooperation  could both hinder law enforcement efforts and allow crimi‐ nals to freely target communities with a large undocument‐ ed  population,  knowing  that  their  crimes  will  be  less  likely  to  be  reported.  Those  competing  interests,  between  the  At‐ torney  General  in  pursuing  civil  immigration  compliance  and the state and local law enforcement authorities in ensur‐ ing the safety and security of their communities, are placed  into direct conflict because the Attorney General in requiring  these conditions forces the states and localities to devote re‐ sources to achieving the federal immigration goals or forfeit  the  funds.  State  and  local  law  enforcement  authorities  are  thus  placed  in  the  unwinnable  position  of  either  losing  needed  funding  for  law  enforcement,  or  forgoing  the  rela‐ tionships  with  the  immigrant  communities  that  they  deem  necessary for efficient law enforcement  Although  the  City  uses  the  term  Welcoming  City  in  its  ordinance, localities which have concluded that cooperation  in  federal  civil  immigration  efforts  is  counterproductive  or  simply  offensive  are  often  labeled  “sanctuary”  cities  or  states, but that term is  commonly misunderstood.  The term                                                                                                                lation  had  no  known  criminal  convictions  or  charges,  reflecting  ICE’s  avowed goal of expanding its efforts “to address all illegal aliens encoun‐ tered  in  the  course  of  its  operations.”  https://www.ice.gov/sites/de‐ fault/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf  at  3‐4  (last  visited 03‐20‐2018). Of those with criminal convictions, 25% were convic‐ tions for immigration violations or non‐DUI traffic offenses. Id. at 4 Table  2.   Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 11 No. 17‐2991  11 signifies  a  place  of  refuge  or  protection,  see  e.g  Merriam‐ Webster  Dictionary,  https://www.merriam‐webster.com/  dictionary/sanctuary,  and  is  used  for  example  to  describe  a  house of worship, into which, if a person flees, law enforce‐ ment authorities commonly will not enter to forcibly remove  the person. That definition has no correlation to the so‐called  sanctuary cities at issue here. The City,  like other “welcom‐ ing” or “sanctuary” cities or states, does not interfere in any  way with the federal government’s lawful pursuit of its civil  immigration  activities,  and  presence  in  such  localities  will  not  immunize  anyone  to  the  reach  of  the  federal  govern‐ ment. Accord City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d  579,  591,  602  (E.D.  Pa.  2017).  The  federal  government  can  and does freely operate in “sanctuary” localities.   And  the  level  of  refuge  provided  by  sanctuary  cities  is  not  unbounded.  For  instance,  the  City  cooperates  with  im‐ migration  enforcement  authorities  for  persons  who  pose  a  threat to public safety, exempting from the Ordinance inves‐ tigations  involving  persons  for  whom  there  is  an  outstand‐ ing criminal (as opposed to civil) warrant, persons convicted  of or charged with a felony, or persons who are known gang  members.  Thus,  for  the  persons  most  likely  to  present  a  threat  to  the  community,  City  law  enforcement  authorities  will  cooperate  with  ICE  officials  even  in  “sanctuary”  cities.  The decision to coordinate in such circumstances, and to re‐ fuse  such  coordination  where  the  threat  posed  by  the  indi‐ vidual  is  lesser,  reflects  the  decision  by  the  state  and  local  authorities as how best to further the law enforcement objec‐ tives of their communities with the resources at their dispos‐ al.   Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 12 12  No. 17‐2991  Moreover,  as  to  the  persons  who  have  proven  to  be  a  threat  to  society  such  as  those  in  longer‐term  incarceration,  other programs already in place would alert ICE to potential  immigration issues. For instance, the “Secure Communities”  program was first instituted in 2008 and reactivated in 2017  in order  to carry out ICE’s enforcement priorities regarding  persons  in  the  custody  of  another  law  enforcement  agency.  See  Official  Website  of  DHS,  https://www.ice.gov/secure‐ communities at 1. Local law enforcement agencies as a mat‐ ter of routine submit fingerprints of individuals in their cus‐ tody  to  the  FBI  for  criminal  background  checks  and,  under  Secure  Communities,  the  FBI  automatically  forwards  that  information to the DHS to check the prints against its immi‐ gration databases. Id.; City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at  633. According to the DHS, “ICE  completed full  implemen‐ tation of Secure Communities to all 3,181 jurisdictions within  50  states,  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  five  U.S.  territories  on  January  23,  2013.”  See  Official  Website  of  DHS,  https://www.ice.gov/secure‐communities at 1. With that abil‐ ity to identify undocumented individuals, at least as to those  serving prison sentences for whom the pressure of time and  the  possibility  of  a  quick  release  are  not  issues,  ICE  could  procure a judicial warrant and obtain a transfer of custody.   III.  To establish its entitlement to preliminary relief, the City  must demonstrate that “(1) without such relief, [it] will suf‐ fer irreparable harm before [its] claim is finally resolved; (2)  [it]  has  no  adequate  remedy  at  law;  and  (3)  [it]  has  some  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits.”  Harlan  v.  Scholz,  866  F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2017). If that burden is met, the court  must weigh the harm that the plaintiff will suffer absent an  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 13 No. 17‐2991  13 injunction against the harm to the defendant from an injunc‐ tion, and consider whether an injunction is in the public in‐ terest.  Id.;  Higher  Soc’y  of  Indiana  v.  Tippecanoe  Cty.,  Indiana,  858  F.3d  1113,  1116  (7th  Cir.  2017).  The  district  court  weighed all of those factors and granted the preliminary in‐ junction as to the notice and access conditions, denying it as  to  the  compliance  condition.  On  this  appeal  from  the  grant  of the preliminary injunction as to those two conditions, we  ask only whether the district court abused its discretion. Har‐ lan, 866 F.3d at 758. In the absence of any clear error of fact  or  law,  we  accord  great  deference  to  the  district  court’s  weighing  of  the  relevant  factors.  Ty,  Inc.  v.  Jones  Grp.,  Inc.,  237 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2001).  With respect to the preliminary injunction factors, the At‐ torney General challenges only the district court’s conclusion  as to the likelihood of success on the merits, and the scope of  the  preliminary  injunction.  The  district  court  held  that  the  Attorney  General  lacked  the  statutory  authority  to  impose  the  notice  and  access  conditions,  and  consequently  the  ef‐ forts to impose them violated the separation of powers doc‐ trine and were ultra vires. Dist. Ct. at 19.   In considering on appeal the likelihood of success on the  merits,  it  is  necessary  to  focus  narrowly  on  the  dispositive  question  and  to  avoid  the  invitation  of  the  parties  to  weigh  in on broader policy considerations. For instance, the Attor‐ ney  General  repeatedly  characterizes  the  issue  as  whether  localities can be allowed to thwart federal law enforcement.  That is a red herring. First, nothing in this case involves any  affirmative  interference  with  federal  law  enforcement  at  all,  nor is there any interference whatsoever with federal immi‐ gration authorities. The only conduct at issue here is the re‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 14 14  No. 17‐2991  fusal of the local law enforcement to aid in civil immigration  enforcement through informing the federal authorities when  persons  are  in  their  custody  and  providing  access  to  those  persons at the local law enforcement facility. Some localities  might choose to cooperate with federal immigration  efforts,  and others may see such cooperation as impeding the com‐ munity relationships necessary to identify and solve crimes.  The choice as to how to devote law enforcement resources— including whether or not to use such resources to aid in fed‐ eral  immigration  efforts—would  traditionally  be  one  left  to  state and local authorities. Whether the conscription of local  and  state  law  enforcement  for  federal  immigration  enforce‐ ment  through  the  sword  of  withholding  federal  funds  pre‐ sents other Constitutional concerns is not before us. See gen‐ erally  Nat.  Federation  of  Indep.  Bus.  v.  Sebelius,  567  U.S.  519,  580 (2012) (noting, for example, that the Constitution may be  implicated  where  “’the  financial  inducement  offered  by  Congress’  was  ‘so  coercive  as  to  pass  the  point  at  which  pressure turns into compulsion’”); Printz v. United States, 521  U.S. 898 (1997); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). This  appeal  turns  on  the  more  fundamental  question  of  whether  the Attorney General possessed the authority to impose the  conditions at all.   The  Attorney  General  also  complains  that  “[n]othing  in  the statute supports the counterintuitive conclusion that ap‐ plicants  can  insist  on  their  entitlement  to  federal  law  en‐ forcement  grants  even  as  they  refuse  to  provide  the  most  basic  cooperation  in  immigration  enforcement,  which  the  Attorney  General  has  identified  as  a  federal  priority.”  Ap‐ pellant’s Brief at 17. In fact, throughout the briefs in this case,  the Attorney General  is incredulous that localities receiving  federal funds can complain about conditions attached to the  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 15 No. 17‐2991  15 distribution of those funds. But that repeated mantra evinces  a  disturbing  disregard  for  the  separation  of  powers.  The  power of the purse does not belong to the Executive Branch.  It  rests  in  the  Legislative  Branch.  Congress  may,  of  course,  delegate such authority to the Executive Branch, and indeed  the case today turns on whether it did so here, but the Exec‐ utive Branch does not otherwise have the inherent authority  as to the grant at issue here to condition the payment of such  federal funds on adherence to its political priorities.   In  fact,  the  Attorney  General  otherwise  acknowledges  that  limitation  when  addressing  the  legal  issues  here.  The  Attorney  General  does  not  claim  to  possess  inherent  execu‐ tive  authority  to  impose  the  grant  conditions,  and  instead  recognizes that the authority must originate from Congress.   We turn, then, to that core issue in the Attorney General’s  challenge  to  the  preliminary  injunction—whether  Congress  granted  to  the  Assistant  Attorney  General  the  unbounded  authority to impose his or her own conditions on the release  of the Byrne JAG funds. The Byrne JAG statute itself grants  the  Attorney  General  explicit  authority  to  carry  out  specific  actions under the Act in 34 U.S.C. §§ 10152–10158, including:  to make grants “in accordance with the formula established  under  section  10156,”  §  10152(a)(1);  to  develop  a  program  assessment  component  in  coordination  with  the  National  Institute of Justice, and to waive that requirement if the pro‐ gram is not of sufficient size to justify it, § 10152(c); to certify  that  extraordinary  and  exigent  circumstances  exist  that  would allow the use of the funds for purposes that fall with‐ in  the  prohibited  use  categories,  §  10152(d)(2);  to  grant  re‐ newals  and  extensions  beyond  the  four  year  period,  § 10152(f);  to  determine  the  form  of  the  application  and  the  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 16 16  No. 17‐2991  certification,  §  10153(a);  to  provide  technical  assistance  to  states and local governments, § 10153(b); to approve or dis‐ approve  applications  after  affording  the  applicant  reasona‐ ble notice  of deficiencies and the  opportunity  for  correction  and reconsideration, § 10154; to issue rules to carry out this  part,  §  10155;  to  allocate  funds  pursuant  to  the  statutory  formula,  §  10156;  to  certify  that  a  unit  of  local  government  bears  disparate  costs  as  defined  in  the  statute  to  allow  for  disparate  allocations  under  that  formula,  §  10156(d)(4);  to  reallocate  funds not  used by the state, §  10156(f); to  reserve  not more than $20,000,000 for use by the National Institute of  Justice and for antiterrorism programs, § 10157(a); to reserve  not more than 5 percent, to be granted to 1 or more states or  local  governmental  units,  to  address  precipitous  or  extraor‐ dinary increases in crime or in types of crimes, or to mitigate  significant programmatic harm resulting from the operation  of the formula for allocating funds, § 10157(b); and to reduce  the amounts paid if a state or local unit of government fails  to expend the funds within the grant period and fails to re‐ pay it, § 10158. None of those provisions grant the Attorney  General  the  authority  to  impose  conditions  that  require  states  or  local  governments  to  assist  in  immigration  en‐ forcement, nor to deny funds to states or local governments  for the failure to comply with those conditions. The Attorney  General  does  not  argue  otherwise;  he  does  not  argue  that  any provision in the Byrne JAG statute authorizes the impo‐ sition of the conditions.  Instead, in his appeal, the Attorney General places all his  purported authorization in one statutory basket, pointing to  34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) as authorizing the Assistant Attorney  General  to  impose  these—and  indeed  any—conditions  on  grant recipients. Section 10102 sets forth the duties and func‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 17 No. 17‐2991  17 tions of the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Jus‐ tice Programs and provides:  § 10102. Duties and functions of Assistant Attorney Gen‐ eral  (a) Specific, general and delegated powers  The Assistant Attorney General shall—  (1) publish  and  disseminate  information  on  the  condi‐ tions and progress of the criminal justice systems;  (2) maintain  liaison  with  the  executive  and  judicial  branches of the Federal and State governments in matters  relating to criminal justice;  (3) provide  information  to  the  President,  the  Congress,  the  judiciary,  State  and  local  governments,  and  the  gen‐ eral public relating to criminal justice;  (4) maintain  liaison  with  public  and  private  educational  and  research  institutions,  State  and  local  governments,  and  governments  of  other  nations  relating  to  criminal  justice;  (5) coordinate and provide staff support to coordinate the  activities  of  the  Office  and  the  Bureau  of  Justice  Assis‐ tance, the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Jus‐ tice Statistics, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the Of‐ fice of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; and  (6) exercise  such  other  powers  and  functions  as  may  be  vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this  chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General, includ‐ ing  placing special conditions  on  all grants,  and deter‐ mining priority purposes for formula grants.  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 18 18  No. 17‐2991  34 U.S.C.A. § 10102 [emphasis added]. The Attorney General  contends that the bolded language constitutes a grant of au‐ thority  to  the  Assistant  Attorney  General  to  impose  any  conditions  he  or  she  sees  fit,  and  applies  to  the  Byrne  JAG  grants as well even though the grants are in a different sub‐ chapter.  It is well‐established that the plain language of a statute  is  “the  best  indicator  of  Congress’s  intent,”  and  that  “’[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the con‐ trary,  that language must  ordinarily  be  regarded  as  conclu‐ sive.’” Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n. v. City of Chicago, 874 F.3d 959,  962 (7th Cir. 2017), quoting Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d  1147,  1152  (7th  Cir.  2016);  Puerto  Rico  v.  Franklin  California  Tax‐Free  Trust,  136  S.  Ct.  1938,  1946  (2016).  The  Attorney  General’s  interpretation  is  contrary  to  the  plain  meaning  of  the  statutory  language.  The  word  “including”  by  definition  is used to designate that a person or thing is part of a partic‐ ular  group.  See  e.g.  Oxford  English  Dictionary,  Third  Ed.,  Sept.  2016,  www.oed.com  (defining  “including”  as  “[u]sed  to  indicate  that  the  specified  person  or  thing  is  part  of  the  whole  group  or  category  being  considered:  with  the  inclu‐ sion  of”)  (last  visited  03‐12‐18.)  In  this  section,  its  plain  meaning is to set forth a subcategory of the types of powers  and functions that the Assistant Attorney General may exer‐ cise when vested in the Assistant Attorney General either by  the  terms  of  this  chapter  or  by  delegation  of  the  Attorney  General.   The  inescapable  problem  here  is  that  the  Attorney  Gen‐ eral does not even claim that the power exercised here is au‐ thorized  anywhere  in  the  chapter,  nor  that  the  Attorney  General  possesses  that  authority  and  therefore  can  delegate  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 19 No. 17‐2991  19 it  to  the  Assistant  Attorney  General.  In  fact,  as  set  forth  above,  the  Byrne  JAG  provisions  set  forth  the  duties  of  the  Attorney  General  and  do  not  provide  any  open‐ended  au‐ thority  to  impose  additional  conditions.  See  34  U.S.C.  §§ 10152–10157. Therefore, the Attorney General’s argument  is that the “including” clause itself is a stand‐alone grant of  authority  to  the  Assistant  Attorney  General  to  attach  any  conditions  to  any  grants  in  that  subchapter  or  other  sub‐ chapters even though that authority is not otherwise provid‐ ed in the chapter and is not possessed by the Attorney Gen‐ eral. Because that interpretation is so obviously belied by the  plain  meaning  of  the  word  ”including,”  the  Attorney  Gen‐ eral’s position is untenable.2   That alone is sufficient to end  the  inquiry and affirm the  determination  of  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits.  But  we  note  that  our  plain  reading  of  the  statute  is  also  con‐ sistent  with  the  structure  of  §  10102  and  of  the  Byrne  JAG  statute.  First,  §  10102(a)(6)  would  be  an  unlikely  place  for  Con‐ gress to place a power as broad as the one the Attorney Gen‐ eral  asserts.  The  preceding  “powers”  in  the  list,  §§ 10102(a)(1)–(5), address the communication and coordina‐ tion duties of the Assistant Attorney General. The sixth pro‐ vision,  §  10102(a)(6),  is  a  catch‐all  provision,  simply  recog‐                                                   2 The Attorney General’s argument might fail for an additional rea‐ son, that the term “special conditions” is a term of art referring to condi‐ tions  for  high‐risk  grantees  with  difficulty  adhering  to  grant  require‐ ments, and cannot be read as an unbounded authority to impose “any”  conditions  generally.  See  City  of  Philadelphia,  280  F.  Supp.  3d  at  617.  In  light of our analysis of the clause as a whole, we need not address that  argument.  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 20 20  No. 17‐2991  nizing that the Assistant Attorney General can also exercise  such  other powers and  functions as  may be vested  through  other sources—either in that Chapter or by delegation from  the Attorney General. The “including” phrase is tacked on to  that.  A  clause  in  a  catch‐all  provision  at  the  end  of  a  list  of  explicit  powers  would  be  an  odd  place  indeed  to  put  a  sweeping power to impose any conditions on any grants—a  power  much  more  significant  than  all  of  the  duties  and  powers that precede it in the listing, and a power granted to  the  Assistant  Attorney  General  that  was  not  granted  to  the  Attorney General. The structure of § 10102 therefore is con‐ sistent with the plain language  interpretation—that  the “in‐ cluding” clause merely exemplified the type of other powers  that the Assistant Attorney General may possess by delega‐ tion elsewhere.   Moreover, an interpretation such as is argued by the At‐ torney  General,  that  would  allow  the  Assistant  Attorney  General to impose any conditions on the grants at will, is in‐ consistent with the goal of the statute to support the needs of  law enforcement while providing flexibility to state and local  governments. And the notion of the broad grant of authority  to impose any conditions on grant recipients is at odds with  the nature of the Byrne JAG grant, which is a formula grant  rather  than  a  discretionary  grant.  As  a  formula  grant,  it  is  structured so that the funds are allocated based on a careful‐ ly  defined  calculation  which  determines  a  minimum  base  allocation which can be enhanced based on the state’s share  of the national population and the state’s share of the coun‐ try’s  violent  crime  statistics.  Once  calculated,  60  percent  of  the  state’s  allocation  is  awarded  to  the  state  and  40  percent  to the eligible local government units. See 34 U.S.C. § 10156;  Edward  Byrne  Memorial  Justice  Assistance  Grant  (JAG)  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 21 No. 17‐2991  21 Program  Fact  Sheet,  https://www.bja.gov/programs/JAG‐ Fact‐Sheet.pdf  (last  visited  03‐07‐18).  The  Attorney  General  is  authorized  under  the  statute  to  make  grants  “in  accord‐ ance  with  the  formula  established  under  section  10156.”  34  U.S.C.  §  10152(a).  If  Congress  sought  to  provide  an  agency  the  ability  to  exercise  its  judgment  in  the  selection  of  the  grantees,  it  would  have  made  sense  for  it  to  do  so  by  em‐ ploying the discretionary grant model rather than the formu‐ la grant structure used here. Located in a different subpart of  the  same  statute,  the  provision  for  discretionary  grants  im‐ bues  the  Director  (who  reports  to  the  Assistant  Attorney  General)  with  the  authority  to  award  funds  on  terms  and  conditions that the Director determines to be consistent with  that subpart. See 34 U.S.C. § 10142.  The  ability  of  the  Attorney  General  to  depart  from  the  distribution  mandated  by  the  formula  is  strictly  circum‐ scribed. For instance, of the total amount available in a given  fiscal  year,  the  Attorney  General  is  authorized  to  reserve  “not more than 5 percent, to be  granted to 1 or more States  or units of local government” for one or more of the allowed  statutory  purposes,  “pursuant  to  his  determination  that  the  same  is  necessary  (1)  to  combat,  address,  or  otherwise  re‐ spond to precipitous or extraordinary increases in crime, or  in a type or types of crime; or (2) to prevent, compensate for,  or  mitigate  significant  programmatic  harm  resulting  from  operation  of  the  formula  …  .”  34  U.S.C.  §  10157(b).  Moreo‐ ver,  the  Attorney  General  is  authorized  by  other  statutes  to  reduce  the  funding  in  certain  circumstances,  but  even  then  the  amount  of  the  reduction  is  set  by  statute.  For  example,  the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act mandates  a 10 percent reduction in JAG funding if a state fails to sub‐ stantially  implement  its  provisions.  34  U.S.C.  §  20927(a).  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 22 22  No. 17‐2991  And the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 stipulates that  a state that does not certify full compliance with its national  standards  can  forfeit  5  percent  of  JAG  funds  unless  it  certi‐ fies  that  no  less  than  5  percent  of  such  funds  will  be  used  solely to achieve compliance. 34 U.S.C. § 30307(e)(2)(A).  Therefore,  the  statute  precisely  describes  the  formula  through which funds should be distributed to states and lo‐ cal governments, and imposes precise limits on the extent to  which  the  Attorney  General  can  deviate  from  that  distribu‐ tion. Against that backdrop, it is inconceivable that Congress  would have anticipated that the Assistant Attorney General  could  abrogate  the  entire  distribution  scheme  and  deny  all  funds  to  states  and  localities  that  would  qualify  under  the  Byrne  JAG  statutory  provisions,  based  on  the  Assistant  At‐ torney  General’s  decision  to  impose  his  or  her  own  condi‐ tions—the putative authority for which is provided in a dif‐ ferent  statute.  Indeed,  the  statute  which  purportedly  grants  that power to the Assistant Attorney General was passed in  the same Omnibus Act as the Byrne JAG statute, yet nothing  in  the  Byrne  JAG  statute  cross‐references  that  alleged  au‐ thority or even hints that the tightly‐circumscribed structure  of the Byrne JAG grants can be upended by some unbound‐ ed authority in § 10102 of the Assistant Attorney General to  impose new conditions.  Finally, Congress knew how to grant such authority, and  explicitly did so in another statute within the same Act that  added  the  “including”  language.  See  generally  Violence  Against Women  and  Department of Justice Reauthorization  Act  of  2005,  H.R.  3402,  Pub.  L.  No.  109‐162,  119  Stat.  2960  (2006). The Violence Against Women Act provided that “[i]n  disbursing  grants  under  this  subchapter,  the  Attorney  Gen‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 23 No. 17‐2991  23 eral  may  impose  reasonable  conditions  on  grant  awards  to  ensure  that  the  States  meet  statutory,  regulatory,  and  other  program  requirements.”  34 U.S.C.  § 10446(e)(3).  In contrast,  as set forth above, the Byrne JAG statute provides the Attor‐ ney  General  authority  over  a  carefully  delineated  list  of  ac‐ tions,  with  no  such  broad  authority  to  impose  reasonable  conditions. If Congress had wanted to vest such authority in  the  Attorney  General  regarding  the  Byrne  JAG  grant,  one  would  expect  it  to  include  explicit  language  in  the  grant  statute  itself,  as  it  did  in  the  Violence  Against  Women  Act.  The  Attorney  General’s  argument  that  such  sweeping  au‐ thority over the major source of funding for law enforcement  agencies nationwide was provided to the Assistant Attorney  General by  merely adding a clause to a  sentence in  a list  of  otherwise‐ministerial powers defies reason. The authority to  impose any conditions desired to the Byrne JAG grant—and  by  the  Attorney  General’s  reasoning  to  all  other  grants  un‐ der  the  Assistant  Attorney  General’s  domain—is  a  tremen‐ dous power of widespread impact, and is not the type of au‐ thority that would be hidden in a clause without any expla‐ nation,  and  without  any  reference  or  acknowledgment  of  that  authority  in  the  statute  that  actually  contains  the  grant  itself. See e.g. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006) (re‐ jecting  the  Attorney  General’s  argument  that  the  power  to  deregister  a  physician  in  the  public  interest  included  the  power  to  criminalize  the  actions  of  registered  physicians  when  they  engage  in  conduct  he  deems  illegitimate,  and  holding that “[i]t would be anomalous for Congress to have  so  painstakingly  described  the  Attorney  General’s  limited  authority  to  deregister  a  single  physician  or  schedule  a  sin‐ gle drug, but to have given him, just by implication, authori‐ ty to declare an entire class of activity outside ‘the course of  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 24 24  No. 17‐2991  professional  practice,’  and  therefore  a  criminal  violation”);  Utility  Air  Regulatory  Group  v.  E.P.A.,  134  S.  Ct.  2427,  2444  (2014)  (noting  that  the  Court  would  expect  Congress  to  speak clearly if it wished “to assign to an agency decisions of  vast ‘economic and political significance.’”), quoting Food &  Drug  Admin.  v.  Brown  &  Williamson  Tobacco  Corp.,  529  U.S.  120, 160 (2000); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451  U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“if Congress intends to impose a condition  on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguous‐ ly.”) As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “’Congress  …  does  not  alter  the  fundamental  details  of  a  regulatory  scheme in vague  terms or ancillary  provisions—it does not,  one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’” Gonzales, 546  U.S.  at  267,  quoting  Whitman  v.  American  Trucking  Assns.,  Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).  Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining  that the City established a likelihood of success on the merits  of  its  contention  that  the  Attorney  General  lacked  the  au‐ thority to impose the notice and access conditions on receipt  of  the  Byrne  JAG  grants.  The  Attorney  General  raises  no  challenge to the district court’s application of other prelimi‐ nary  injunction  factors,  and  therefore,  the  district  court  properly determined that preliminary relief was warranted.   IV.  The  Attorney  General  additionally  challenges  the  scope  of the preliminary injunction, arguing that the district court  erred  in  granting  nationwide  relief,  rather  than  more  nar‐ rowly limiting the geographic scope of the injunction to the  City of Chicago. We are cognizant of the possible hazards of  the use of nationwide injunctions, as was the district court in  this  case.  Commentators  have  cautioned  that  the  use  of  na‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 25 No. 17‐2991  25 tionwide injunctions can stymie the development of the legal  issues  through  the  court  system  as  a  whole.  See  e.g.  Samuel  L.  Bray,  Multiple  Chancellors:  Reforming  the  National  Injunc‐ tion, 131 Harvard L. Rev. 417 (2017); Zayn Siddique, Nation‐ wide Injunctions, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (2017); but see Spen‐ cer  E.  Amdur  and  David  Hausman,  Nationwide  Injunctions  and Nationwide Harm, 131 Harvard L. Rev. F. 49 (2017) When  relief  is  limited  in  geographic  scope,  multiple  cases  may  be  filed  in  numerous  jurisdictions,  and  the  reviewing  courts  may  therefore  gain  a  wider  range  of  perspectives  and  the  opportunity  to  explore  the  impact  of  those  legal  issues  in  other factual contexts. That process may be truncated, how‐ ever, if a district court issues a nationwide injunction.   Moreover,  where  nationwide  injunctions  are  possible,  courts  must  be  cognizant  of  the  potential  for  forum  shop‐ ping  by  plaintiffs.  Commentators  have  documented  this  phenomenon  over  the  past  decades,  which  transcends  ad‐ ministrations  and  political  parties.  For  instance,  under  the  Obama  administration,  such  injunctions  stymied  many  of  the President’s policies, with five nationwide injunctions is‐ sued  by  Texas  district  courts  in  just  over  a  year.  See  Bray,  Multiple Chancellors, 131 Harvard L. Rev. at 458–59 and cases  cited  therein.  At  that  time,  then‐Senator  and  now‐Attorney  General  Sessions  characterized  the  upholding  of  one  such  nationwide  preliminary  injunction  as  “a  victory  for  the  American people and for the rule of law.” Press Release, Sen.  Jeff  Sessions  III,  June  23,  2016.  Now,  many  who  advocated  for broad injunctions in those Obama‐era cases are opposing  them.  In  fact,  support  for  or  opposition  to  nationwide  injunc‐ tions would likely vary with the nature of the controversial  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 26 26  No. 17‐2991  issue  at  stake  and  the  identity  of  the  persons  in  power.  For  example, if a different Administration concluded that certain  weapons were a threat to public safety, and conditioned re‐ ceipt  of  Byrne  JAG  funds  on  a  state  or  locality  adopting  a  policy  banning  assault  weapons,  it  is  quite  likely  that  the  sides  would  reverse  once  again  as  to  the  need  for  and  ap‐ propriateness  of  nationwide  injunctions.  Although  the  pur‐ suit of nationwide injunctions may be influenced by shifting  political motivations, that neither means that nationwide in‐ junctions  themselves  are  inherently  evil,  nor  that  such  in‐ junctions  should  never  be  issued.  Instead,  courts  in  deter‐ mining the proper scope of injunctive relief, must be cogni‐ zant of the potential for such injunctions to have a profound  impact on national policy.  In light of those concerns with limiting the input of other  courts  and  with  forum  shopping,  nationwide  injunctions  should be utilized only in rare circumstances. That said, na‐ tionwide  injunctions  nevertheless  play  an  important  and  proper  role  in  some  circumstances.  Certainly,  for  issues  of  widespread national impact, a nationwide injunction can be  beneficial in terms of efficiency and certainty in the law, and  more importantly, in the avoidance of irreparable harm and  in furtherance of the public interest.   In fact, the Supreme Court in Trump v. Intern. Refugee As‐ sistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), recently denied in part  a request for a stay of a nationwide injunction in a challenge  to  an  Executive  Order  that  suspended  entry  of  foreign  na‐ tionals  from  seven  countries.  The  Court  recognized  that  “[c]rafting  a  preliminary  injunction  is  an  exercise  of  discre‐ tion and judgment, often dependent as much on the equities  of  a  given  case  as  the  substance  of  the  legal  issues  it  pre‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 27 No. 17‐2991  27 sents.” Id. at 2087. The Court refused to stay the nationwide  injunction  as  to  enforcement  against  foreign  nationals  who  have  a  credible  claim  of  a  bona  fide  relationship  with  per‐ sons or entities in the  United States. Id. at 2088. The district  court  in  fashioning  that  preliminary  injunction,  and  in  weighing the equities, had focused on the concrete burdens  that  would  fall  on  the  particular  named  individuals  in  the  case  who  sought  injunctive  relief,  and  reasoned  that  the  hardships  were  sufficiently  weighty  and  immediate  to  out‐ weigh the Government’s interest. Id. at 2087. The court then  approved injunctions that covered not merely those individ‐ uals,  but  parties  similarly  situated  to  them  nationwide,  and  the  Supreme  Court  determined  that  the  injunction  should  remain  in  place  even  as  to  those  similarly‐situated  persons.  Id. 2088.   The dissent in Trump raised the same objections that the  Attorney  General  asserts  in  this  case,  but  those  arguments  did  not  carry  the  day  in  Trump  and  should  not  do  so  here  either. The Trump dissenters argued that it could have been  reasonable for the Court to have left the injunctions in place  as to the individuals who sought relief in the case, but that it  was improper to allow the injunction to remain as to an “un‐ identified,  unnamed  group  of  foreign  nationals  abroad.”  Id.  at  2090.  The  dissenters  complained  that  no  class  had  been  certified, and the parties had not asked for the scope of relief  provided.  Id.  Concluding  that  injunctive  relief  should  be  “’no  more  burdensome  to  the  defendant  than  necessary  to  provide complete relief to the plaintiffs ‘ in the case,” the dis‐ senters disagreed with the determination to allow the injunc‐ tion  to  remain  in  place  beyond  those  individual  plaintiffs.  Id., quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). The  Attorney General in this case also argues that injunctive re‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 28 28  No. 17‐2991  lief  should  not  extend  beyond  that  necessary  to  provide  complete  relief  to  the  particular  plaintiff—here,  the  City— but  as  Trump  demonstrates,  that  limitation  will  not  neces‐ sarily be proper where the balance of equities and the nature  of  the  claims  require  broader  relief.  See  also  Decker  v.  O’Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 618 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding a na‐ tionwide  injunction  even  though  factfinding  focused  on  Milwaukee  County,  because  the  case  had  evolved  to  chal‐ lenging the facial constitutionality with the evidence regard‐ ing Milwaukee County merely discussed as illustration).   The district court in this case was aware of all of the con‐ cerns identified above, and in fact on its own identified and  considered  the  articles  by  the  commentators  detailing  the  history  of  the  nationwide  injunction  and  the  concerns  with  the  use  of  it  as  a  remedy.  The  court  nevertheless  held  that  the  “equitable  balance”  necessitated  such  a  remedy  in  this  case. On appeal, we review the district court’s determination  as to the scope of the injunction only for an abuse of discre‐ tion. Harlan, 866 F.3d at 758.  The  Attorney  General  raises  three  challenges  to  the  na‐ tionwide  injunction.  First,  the  Attorney  General  argues  that  the City must seek standing as to each form of relief sought,  and  that  it  lacks  standing  to  seek  relief  that  benefits  third  parties. That argument is a non‐starter. The City had stand‐ ing to seek injunctive relief, and the district court had the au‐ thority  to  fashion  the  terms  of  that  injunction  as  it  deter‐ mined  necessary  for  the  public  interest  in  light  of  its  deter‐ mination that the City was likely to succeed on its claim that  the  actions  violated  the  constitutional  principles  of  separa‐ tion of powers. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyersʹ Co‐ op.,  532  U.S.  483,  496  (2001);  Zamecnik  v.  Indian  Prairie  Sch.  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 29 No. 17‐2991  29 Dist.  No.  204,  636  F.3d  874,  879  (7th  Cir.  2011)  (“’When  the  court believes the underlying right to be highly significant, it  may  write  injunctive  relief  as  broad  as  the  right  itself.’”)  quoting  1  Dan  B.  Dobbs, Law  of  Remedies §  2.4(6),  p.  113  (2d  ed.1993).  Courts,  including  the  Supreme  Court  recently  in  Trump as discussed above, have not found a lack of jurisdic‐ tion solely because a nationwide injunction was imposed in  the absence of a class action.  The Attorney General maintains that even apart from Ar‐ ticle III concerns, equitable principles require that the injunc‐ tion  be  no  more  burdensome  than  necessary  to  provide  complete  relief  to  the  City,  and  that  the  nationwide  injunc‐ tion  exceeds  that  limit.  Along  a  similar  vein,  the  Attorney  General also argues that the district court erred in conflating  the scope of Chicago’s legal argument with the scope of re‐ lief necessary to remedy the alleged injury, and that the City  as an individual plaintiff should not obtain the equivalent of  class‐wide relief.  Those  arguments  would  seek  a  bright‐line  rule  that  is  both inconsistent with precedent and inadvisable. Essential‐ ly, the Attorney General’s approach would limit nationwide  injunctions  to  class  actions,  but  that  is  inconsistent  with  Trump  and  the  myriad  cases  preceding  it  in  which  courts  have imposed nationwide injunctions in individual actions.   Nor  should  the  district  court  be  so  handcuffed  in  deter‐ mining the scope of relief that is proper. Certainly, the abil‐ ity to impose a nationwide injunction is a powerful remedy  that  should  be  employed  with  discretion.  Regardless,  there  are checks in the system to lessen the potential for any mis‐ use  of  nationwide  injunctions  by  the  court.  First,  the  appel‐ late  process  itself  operates  to  minimize  the  potential  for  er‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 30 30  No. 17‐2991  roneous  or  overbroad  injunctions.  In  fairly  short  order,  the  appellate process can ensure that multiple judges review the  determination, thus acting as a check on the possibility of a  judge overly‐willing to issue nationwide injunctions. And of  course,  nationwide  injunctions,  because  of  the  widespread  impact,  are  also  more  likely  to  get  the  attention  of  the  Su‐ preme Court.  Moreover, that focus on the potential shortcomings of na‐ tionwide  injunctions,  though  proper,  fails  to  recognize  the  need  for  such  relief  where  the  balance  of  equities  weighs  strongly  in  favor  of  such  relief.  Courts  must  be  able  to  de‐ termine  whether  an  action  implicates  the  Constitution,  and  once  a  court  determines  that  preliminary  relief  is  required,  the court must be able to engage in the “equitable balancing”  to  determine  the  relief  necessary.  Rarely,  that  will  include  nationwide  injunctions.  Granted,  it  is  an  imprecise  process,  but that is endemic to injunctions, and courts are capable of  weighing the appropriate factors while remaining cognizant  of the hazards of forum shopping and duplicative lawsuits.   The  case  before  us  presents  an  example  of  the  type  of  case in which a district court should properly be able to ap‐ ply an injunction nationwide. The case presents essentially a  facial  challenge  to  a  policy  applied  nationwide,  the  balance  of  equities  favors  nationwide  relief,  and  the  format  of  the  Byrne JAG grant itself renders individual relief ineffective to  provide full relief.   First,  the  challenge  here  presents  purely  a  narrow  issue  of  law;  it  is  not  fact‐dependent  and  will  not  vary  from  one  locality to another. The plaintiffs have demonstrated a likeli‐ hood  of  success  on  the  claim  that  the  Attorney  General  lacked any Constitutional authority to impose the conditions  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 31 No. 17‐2991  31 upon the grant recipients, and therefore that the actions vio‐ lated the separation of powers principles. We are faced, then,  with  conditions  on  the  receipt  of  critical  law  enforcement  funds  that  have  been  imposed  by  the  Attorney  General  without any authority in a manner that usurps the authority  of  Congress—made  more  egregious  because  Congress  itself  has repeatedly refused to pass bills with such restrictions. A  narrow question of law such as is present here is more likely  to lend itself to broader injunctive relief, and that is particu‐ larly  true where the plaintiff has established a  likelihood of  success on a claim that the Attorney General acted ultra vires  in  imposing  the  conditions  and  those  conditions  apply  uni‐ formly  on  all  grant  recipients.  Accordingly,  this  does  not  present  the  situation  in  which  the  courts  will  benefit  from  allowing  the  issue  to  percolate  through  additional  courts  and wind its way through the system in multiple independ‐ ent  court actions.  There  are  some legal issues which  benefit  from  consideration  in  multiple  courts—such  as  issues  as  to  the  reasonableness  of  searches  or  the  excessiveness  of  force—for  which  the  context  of  different  factual  scenarios  will better inform the legal principle. But a determination as  to the plain meaning of a sentence in a statute is not such an  issue.  For  that  issue,  the  duplication  of  litigation  will  have  little, if any, beneficial effect.  Moreover,  the  balance  of  equities  supports  the  district  court’s  determination  to  impose  the  injunction  nationwide.  As the Trump Court noted, in determining the proper scope  of  an  injunction,  the  court  must  weigh  the  balance  of  equi‐ ties,  which  explores  the  relative  harms  to  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  as  well  as  the  interests  of  the  public  at  large.  Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2087. The district court properly assessed  that  balance  of  harms  here.  The  harm  to  the  Attorney  Gen‐ Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 32 32  No. 17‐2991  eral is minimized because the Attorney General can distrib‐ ute  the  funds  without  mandating  the  conditions—as  has  been done for over a decade—and nothing in the injunction  prevents any state or local government from coordinating its  local law enforcement with the federal authorities and com‐ plying  with  the  conditions  sought  here.  And  we  have  seen  that  even  objecting  governments  such  as  the  City  willingly  cooperate  with  federal  authorities  as  to  those  individuals  who commit serious offenses. The adverse impact to the At‐ torney  General  is  limited  to  those  jurisdictions  who  oppose  the conditions, which presumably would be the jurisdictions  that  would  join  in  pursuing  the  multiplicitous  cases  that  would be needed to obtain the relief provided here, or which  would  not  have  the  means  to  pursue  such  litigation  and  would  face  the  choice  of  complying  with  the  apparently‐ unconstitutional  conditions  or  losing  crucial  law  enforce‐ ment  funds.  On  the  other  hand,  the  impact  on  localities  forced to comply with these provisions could be devastating.  Those  local  and  state  governments  have  concluded  that  the  safety of their communities is furthered by a relationship of  trust  with  the  undocumented  persons  and  lawful  immi‐ grants  residing  therein—and  those  localities  are  clearly  in  the  best  position  to  determine  the  security  needs  of  their  own  communities.  Such  trust,  once  destroyed  by  the  man‐ dated  cooperation  and  communication  with  the  federal  im‐ migration  authorities,  would  not  easily  be  restored.  And  given the significance of the federal funds at issue, amount‐ ing to hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for each  state, noncompliance is a particularly poor option.   Moreover, the public interest, which is also a factor in the  balance  of  equities,  see  Trump,  137  S.  Ct.  at  2087,  weighs  in  favor  of  the  nationwide  injunction.  The  public  interest  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 33 No. 17‐2991  33 would be ill‐served here by requiring simultaneous litigation  of this narrow question of law in countless jurisdictions. And  it  is  clear  from  the  nature  of  the  claim  and  the  response  of  amici in this case that litigation on this matter would indeed  be  widespread  and  simultaneous.  First,  the  actions  would  have  to  be  brought  swiftly  in  each  jurisdiction,  because  the  conditions  are  imposed  by  the  Attorney  General  in  the  award of the grant itself, and therefore the window for chal‐ lenging  the  conditions  is  limited  to  the  45‐day  period  be‐ tween the award of the grant and the deadline for accepting  or  rejecting  that  award.  This  is  not  a  situation  in  which  courts would be able to benefit from perusing the decisions  of other courts in the matter.   And it is clear that a significant number of award recipi‐ ents  oppose  the  conditions  and  would  challenge  the  condi‐ tions if financially able to do so. Among the amici asking the  district  court  to  uphold  the  injunction  in  the  stay  proceed‐ ings were 37 cities and counties. In fact, while the motion to  stay was pending in the district court, the United States Con‐ ference  of  Mayors,  representing  the  interests  of  1,400  cities  nationwide,  including  many  Byrne  JAG  grant  applicants,  moved to intervene, but that motion was denied in part be‐ cause the nationwide injunction was sufficient to protect the  interests of its members. Moreover, 14 states and the District  of Columbia filed an amicus brief in this court also arguing  for affirmance of the nationwide injunction, thus further ex‐ hibiting  the  likelihood  of  widespread,  duplicative  litigation  in the absence of such relief. The district court appropriately  held that judicial economy counseled against requiring all of  those  jurisdictions,  and  potentially  others,  from  filing  indi‐ vidual lawsuits to decide anew the narrow legal question in  this case.   Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 34 34  No. 17‐2991  Finally,  the  structure  of  the  Byrne  JAG  program  itself  supports  the  district  court’s  determination  to  impose  a  na‐ tionwide  injunction  because  the  recipients  of  the  grant  are  interconnected.  Funding  under  the  statute  is  allocated  among  states  and  localities  from  one  pool  based  on  a  strict  formula. The states and cities seeking grants under the Byrne  JAG program are not islands, in which actions as to one are  without  impact  on  others.  The  conditions  imposed  on  one  can impact the amounts received by others. For instance, the  amounts  allocated  under  the  Byrne  JAG  program  can  vary  based on the participation of the states and localities, and the  distribution structure includes explicit provisions for reallo‐ cation  of  funds  in  some  circumstances—such  as  to  units  of  local  government  if  the  State  is  unable  to  qualify  to  receive  funds or chooses not to participate. 34 U.S.C. § 10156(f). Fur‐ thermore,  funds  allocated  to  Byrne  JAG  recipients  can  be  withheld as a penalty for non‐compliance with other statuto‐ ry requirements, and those funds are then reallocated to oth‐ er,  compliant,  Byrne  JAG  recipients.  See  e.g.  34  U.S.C.  § 20927, § 30307(e). The City further points out that under its  provisions,  the  City  is  obligated  to  apply  for  Byrne  JAG  funds not only for itself but for eleven neighboring localities.  Thus, the recipients of Byrne JAG funding are interconnect‐ ed and an impact to one recipient can have a ripple effect on  others.  Under  such a formula  grant  in  which  the  states  and  local governments are intertwined, and where the conditions  imposed preclude all funding to those who refuse to comply,  piecemeal relief is ineffective to redress the injury, and only  nationwide relief can provide proper and complete relief. In  sum, this is an instance in which the court could, and did in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  appropriately  enter  a  nation‐ wide injunction.  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 35 No. 17‐2991  35 Our review here is a narrow one. We can reverse only if  the  Attorney  General  has  established  that  the  district  court  abused its discretion in determining that the scope of the in‐ junction  should  be  nationwide.  Judge  Leinenweber  in  this  case set forth his thoughtful consideration of the appropriate  factors in the decision below denying the stay, and given the  purely legal nature of the issue here, the broad and uniform  impact  on  all  grant  recipients,  the  minimal  harm  to  the  At‐ torney General given the continued ability for voluntary co‐ operation,  and  the  structure  of  the  Byrne  JAG  statute  that  interconnects  those  grant  recipients,  we  conclude  that  the  court did not abuse its discretion here.  V.  Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining  that the City established a likelihood of success on the merits  of  its  contention  that  the  Attorney  General  lacked  the  au‐ thority to impose the notice and access conditions on receipt  of the Byrne JAG grants, and did not abuse its discretion in  granting the  nationwide  preliminary injunction in this case.  The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.  Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 36 36  No. 17‐2991  MANION,  Circuit  Judge,  concurring  in  the  judgment  in  part and dissenting in part. Unless done for a purpose “un‐ related  to  the  enforcement  of  a  civil  immigration  law,”  the  City of Chicago forbids its agencies or agents to   (A) permit ICE [Immigration and Customs En‐ forcement] agents access to a person being de‐ tained  by,  or  in  the  custody  of,  the  agency  or  agent;  (B)  permit  ICE  agents  use  of  agency  fa‐ cilities  for  investigative interviews  or  other in‐ vestigative  purpose;  or  (C)  while  on  duty,  ex‐ pend their time responding to ICE inquiries or  communicating  with  ICE  regarding  a  person’s  custody status or release date.  Chicago, Ill.,  Muni.  Code  § 2‐173‐042(b)(1). This ordinance’s  proscription on  cooperation  does not  apply  if  the subject of  the  investigation  falls  within  at  least  one  of  four  excepted  classes of persons: those with outstanding criminal warrants,  felons, those with a felony charge pending, and known gang  members.  Id.  at  §  2‐173‐042(c).  For  Chicago,  this  ordinance  barring collaboration with federal immigration authorities is  important  to  maintaining  its  image  as  a  “Welcoming  City,”  open to aliens both documented and undocumented. It con‐ siders it an expression of its independent sovereignty that it  can choose not to assist the federal government in enforcing  the nation’s immigration laws. For the Attorney General, the  ordinance  is  an  obstacle  to  effective  law  enforcement.  His  interest is in getting deportable criminal aliens off the streets,  and he believes Chicago’s policies endanger the community.  This debate casts a long shadow over this appeal, but ul‐ timately these broad questions touching on immigration pol‐ icy and federal/local cooperation in law enforcement are not    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 37 No. 17‐2991  37  at  issue  in  this  case.  Instead,  this  is  a  case  about  federal  funds  and  who  gets  to  decide  the  terms  by  which  those  funds are distributed.  Since  2006,  the  federal  government  has  given  money  to  local  governments  for  law  enforcement  purposes  through  the  Byrne  JAG  program.  For  Fiscal  Year  2017,  the Attorney  General wants to impose immigration‐related conditions on  the receipt of those funds. Specifically, the Attorney General  wants  Byrne  JAG  recipients  to  provide  federal  immigration  agents  with  notice  of  the  release  dates  of  certain  aliens  in  their custody (the “Notice” condition); provide immigration  agents  with  access  to  facilities  to  conduct  interviews  with  certain detainees (the “Access” condition); and provide a cer‐ tification  of  compliance  with  8  U.S.C.  §  1373,  which  bars  governments  from  prohibiting  their  officials  “from  sending  to,  or  receiving  from,  the  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service  information  regarding  the  citizenship  or  immigra‐ tion  status,  lawful  or  unlawful,  of  any  individual”  (the  “Compliance” condition).  Because of its commitment to being a “Welcoming City,”1  Chicago does not want to comply with these conditions. But  it  still  wants  to  receive  its  Byrne  JAG  allotment,  so  it  filed  this lawsuit against the Attorney General seeking to prevent                                                    1  As  the  court  notes,  Chicago  uses  the  term  “Welcoming  City,”  but  its  policies  place  it  in  the  same  camp  as  other  so‐called  “sanctuary  cities.”  Maj.  Op.  at  10–11.  The  court  calls  this  a  misnomer:  those  cities  do  not  “interfere in any way with the federal government’s lawful pursuit of its  civil immigration activities.” Id. at 11. Whether and to what extent such  “sanctuary”  policies  constitute  passive  non‐cooperation  or  active  inter‐ ference is the subject of other litigation. See United States v. California, No.  18‐264 (E.D. Cal. filed Mar. 6, 2018).    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 38 38  No. 17‐2991  him from enforcing these conditions. The case is before us on  appeal  from  a  grant  of  a  preliminary  injunction  forbidding  the Attorney  General  from  enforcing  the  Notice  and Access  conditions.  The  Compliance  condition  is  not  at  issue  in  this  appeal.  To  get  a  preliminary  injunction,  a  plaintiff  like  Chicago  must  show  “that  [it]  is  likely  to  succeed  on  the  merits,  that  [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of pre‐ liminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor,  and  that  an  injunction  is  in  the  public  interest.”  Winter  v.  Nat’l Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The dis‐ trict court decided a preliminary injunction was appropriate.  It concluded that Chicago was likely to succeed on the merits  because  the Attorney  General  lacks  the  authority  to  impose  the  Notice  and  Access  conditions  and  that  Chicago  would  suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. The court de‐ termined  that  the  balance  of  the  equities  and  the  public  in‐ terest “favor neither party.” City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F.  Supp. 3d 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2017).  On appeal, the Attorney General only challenges one as‐ pect  of  the  district  court’s  reasoning  for  entering  an  injunc‐ tion: he argues he does have the authority to impose the No‐ tice  and  Access  conditions.2  The  court  today  says  he  does                                                    2 Surprisingly, the Attorney General does not challenge any other detail  of the district court’s reasoning, even though the district court appears to  have misapplied Winter. The district court treated the four requirements  of the Winter test as factors to be weighed rather than elements to be met.  Thus, even though the district court specifically concluded the balance of  the equities and the public interest did not favor Chicago, it still entered  an injunction. Because Chicago did not meet all four elements as laid out  in Winter, it seems the district court should not have entered an injunc‐ tion.  See  Real  Truth  About  Obama,  Inc.  v.  Fed.  Election  Comm’n,  575  F.3d    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 39 No. 17‐2991  39  not, and I agree. As that is all the Attorney General challeng‐ es about the district court’s reasoning, I concur in the court’s  judgment that the decision to enter an injunction protecting  Chicago was not an abuse of discretion.   However, the court today also concludes that it was with‐ in the district court’s discretion to impose that injunction na‐ tionwide.  Because  I  believe  the  entry  of  the  nationwide  in‐ junction  constituted  an  overstep  of  the  district  court’s  au‐ thority, I dissent from that portion of the court’s decision.  I.  The  Notice  and  Access  conditions,  viewed  in  isolation,  are  perfectly  reasonable.  No  one  should  find  it  surprising  that the federal government would require cooperation with  its law enforcement efforts in exchange for the receipt of fed‐ eral  law  enforcement  funds.  Indeed,  the Attorney  General’s  obvious  frustration  at  applicants  for  Byrne  JAG  funds  who  “insist on their entitlement to federal law enforcement grants  even as they refuse to provide the most basic cooperation in  immigration  enforcement”  is  eminently  understandable.  Appellant’s  Brief  at  17.  But  the  reasonableness  and  sound‐ ness of the conditions are not at issue here. Courts do not (or  at  least  should  not)  decide  legal  issues  based  on  the  courts’  impression  of  the  propriety  of  particular  policies.  Conse‐                                                                                                               342,  347  (4th  Cir.  2009)  (“Winter  articulates  four  requirements,  each  of  which  must  be  satisfied  as  articulated….”),  judgment  vacated  on  other  grounds by 559 U.S. 1089 (2010). Nevertheless, because the Attorney Gen‐ eral  has  not  challenged  this  aspect  of  the  district  court’s  order,  he  has  waived it as a grounds for reversal. See Hojnacki v. Klein‐Acosta, 285 F.3d  544, 549 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A party waives any argument that it does not  raise  before  the  district  court  or, if  raised  in  the  district  court, it  fails  to  develop on appeal.”).    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 40 40  No. 17‐2991  quently, the debates over how much the states should be in‐ volved  in  enforcing  immigration  policy  should  not  distract  from the issues within the court’s purview to resolve.  Because  this  case  deals  with  the  awarding  of  a  federal  grant, it necessarily concerns the spending of federal money.  The  Constitution  places  the  power  to  spend  federal  money  in the legislative branch. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The  Congress  shall  have  Power…to  pay  the  Debts  and  provide  for  the…general  Welfare  of  the  United  States….”);  see  also  Nat’l  Federation  of  Indep.  Bus.  v.  Sebelius,  567  U.S.  519,  576  (2012)  (“We  have  long  recognized  that  Congress  may  use  [the  Spending  Clause]  power  to  grant  federal  funds  to  the  states  and  determining  priority  purposes  for  formula  grants.”).  With  this  power  comes  the  ancillary  authority  to  place conditions on the receipt of federal funds. Nat’l Federa‐ tion of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 576. Accordingly, there is no in‐ herent executive authority to place conditions on the receipt  of  federal  funds—any  such  authority  must  be  given  to  the  executive  by  the  legislature.  See  generally  La.  Pub.  Serv.  Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency liter‐ ally has no power to act…unless and until Congress confers  power upon it.”).  Recognizing  this,  the  Attorney  General  directs  us  to  34  U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6), which states that the Assistant Attorney  General  for  the  Office  of  Justice  Programs,  which  oversees  the  Byrne  JAG  program,  shall  “exercise  such  other  powers  and  functions  as  may  be  vested  in  the  Assistant  Attorney  General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the At‐ torney  General,  including  placing  special  conditions  on  all  grants….” 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (emphasis added). The At‐ torney General argues this is a broad‐sweeping grant of au‐   Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 41 No. 17‐2991  41  thority to impose any conditions on any grants, the only lim‐ it being the Constitution itself. I agree with the court that this  is not so.  Therefore, because I agree that the Attorney General does  not have the authority to impose the Notice and Access con‐ ditions,  and  because  that  is  all  the  Attorney  General  chal‐ lenges concerning the propriety of an injunction, I concur in  the  judgment  of  the  court  affirming  the  entry  of  a  prelimi‐ nary  injunction  prohibiting  the  Attorney  General  from  im‐ posing those conditions on Chicago. 3  II.  But  a  simple  preliminary  injunction  protecting  Chicago  (the only plaintiff in this suit) is not all the district court en‐ tered. Instead, the district court announced as follows: “This  injunction against imposition of the notice and access condi‐ tions is nationwide in scope, there being no reason to think  that the legal issues present in this case are restricted to Chi‐ cago  or  that  the  statutory  authority  given  to  the  Attorney                                                    3  The  Attorney  General  does  not  have authority  to  force  Chicago  to  co‐ operate  with  federal  immigration‐enforcement  efforts  as  a  condition  to  receiving  Byrne  JAG  funds.  But  that  does  not  mean  that  such  coopera‐ tion  is  not  allowed.  Indeed,  based  on  the  exceptions  in  Chicago’s  ordi‐ nance,  Chicago  itself  has  concluded  that  cooperation  with  the  federal  government concerning certain classes of alien is to its benefit. I assume  and  expect  that,  for  example,  when  Chicago  finds  itself  with  custody  over a deportable alien who was convicted of a felony, members of vari‐ ous law enforcement agencies in Chicago are free to work with ICE and  provide notice of release and access to that alien. The Attorney General  cannot force that cooperation as a condition of receiving funds, but it is  likely  there  are  a  number  of  Chicago  police  officers  and  other  officials  who are ready, willing, and able to work with ICE agents in such situa‐ tions, and they are free to do so.    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 42 42  No. 17‐2991  General would differ in another jurisdiction.” City of Chicago,  264 F. Supp. 3d at 951.  This was a gratuitous application of an extreme remedy.  This  court  now  upholds  the  district  court’s  overreach  be‐ cause  “[t]he  case  presents  essentially  a  facial  challenge  to  a  policy applied nationwide, the balance of equities favors na‐ tionwide relief, and the format of the Byrne JAG grant itself  renders  individual  relief  ineffective  to  provide  full  relief.”  Maj.  Op.  at  30.  In  doing  so,  the  court  bypasses  Supreme  Court  precedent,  disregards  what  the  district  court  actually  concluded concerning the equities in this case, and misreads  the effect of providing relief to Chicago only.  A. United States v. Mendoza  First,  the  court  says  a  nationwide  injunction  was  appro‐ priate in this case because it “presents purely a narrow issue  of  law…  [that]  will  not  vary  from  one  locality  to  another.”  Maj. Op. at 30. This reasoning is contrary to Supreme Court  precedent.  A nationwide injunction is similar in effect to nonmutual  offensive collateral estoppel, which “occurs when the plain‐ tiff  seeks  to  foreclose  the  defendant  from  litigating  an  issue  the  defendant  has  previously  litigated  unsuccessfully  in  an  action with another party.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439  U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979). In United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S.  154  (1984),  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  “nonmutual  offen‐ sive  collateral  estoppel…does  not  apply  against  the  Gov‐ ernment in such a way as to preclude relitigation of issues.”  Id.  at  162.  The  Court  did  so  primarily  because  “allowing  nonmutual  collateral  estoppel  against  the  Govern‐ ment…would  substantially  thwart  the  development  of  im‐   Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 43 No. 17‐2991  43  portant  questions  of  law  by  freezing  the  first  final  decision  rendered on a particular legal issue.” Id. at 160. Additionally,  it  noted  that  “[a]llowing  only  one  final  adjudication  would  deprive [the] Court of the benefit it receives from permitting  several  courts  of  appeals  to  explore  a  difficult  question  be‐ fore  [the]  Court  grants  certiorari.”  Id.  As  the  Fourth  and  Ninth Circuits have both recognized, these concerns are just  as present in the context of nationwide injunctions. See L.A.  Haven  Hospice,  Inc.  v.  Sebelius,  638  F.3d  644,  664  (9th  Cir.  2011);  Va.  Soc’y  for  Human  Life,  Inc.  v.  Fed.  Election  Comm’n,  263 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by  The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681  F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012).  Though the court does not cite Mendoza in its opinion to‐ day, it implicitly attempts to distinguish that decision. It says  that this case “does not present the situation in which courts  will benefit from allowing the issue to percolate through ad‐ ditional courts and wind its way through the system in mul‐ tiple  independent  court  actions.”  Maj.  Op.  at  31.  It  claims  this  case  is  different  from  ones  involving  issues  “for  which  the  context  of  different  factual  scenarios  will  better  inform  the legal principle.” Id. But if a lack of factual differentiation  is  all  that  is  needed  to  distinguish  Mendoza,  then  a  nation‐ wide  injunction  is  appropriate  in  every  statutory‐ interpretation  case.  That  cannot  be  the  law.  If  anything,  the  opposite  is  true.  Different  parties  litigating  the  same  issues  in  different  forums  will  likely  engage  different  arguments,  leading  to  diverse analyses and  enhancing the likelihood  of  the  strongest  arguments  coming  to  the  fore.  Courts  faced  with  difficult  statutory  questions  are  the  ones  who  benefit  the  most  from  the  existence  of  multiple  well‐reasoned  deci‐ sions from which to draw.    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 44 44  No. 17‐2991  Virginia Society for Human Life is illustrative. In that case,  the Fourth Circuit was faced with deciding the constitution‐ ality  of  a  federal  regulation,  “a  ‘purely  legal’  issue  [for  which]  further  factual  development  will  not  assist…in  [the]  resolution.”  Va.  Society  for  Human  Life,  Inc.,  263  F.3d  at  390  (quoting  Abbott  Labs.  v.  Gardner,  387  U.S.  136,  149  (1967)).  Nevertheless,  the  Fourth  Circuit  concluded  that  a  nation‐ wide  injunction  would  have  “the  effect  of  precluding  other  circuits  from  ruling  on  the  constitutionality  of”  the  regula‐ tion,  thus  “conflict[ing]  with  the  principle  that  a  federal  court of appeals’s decision is only binding within its circuit.”  Id. at 393. The court recognized that to uphold the injunction  would be to impose its “view of the law on all the other cir‐ cuits.” Id. at 394. That the underlying issue was purely legal  did not alter that fact.  The district court’s order in this case, and this court’s de‐ cision to affirm it, directly conflict with these principles. We  are  not  the  Supreme  Court,  and  we  should  not  presume  to  decide  legal  issues  for  the  whole  country,  even  if  they  are  purely  facial  challenges  involving  statutory  interpretation.  While we may be convinced that the statute says one thing,  we  should  not  discount  the  fact  that  our  honorable  col‐ leagues in other districts and other circuits may view things  differently. Just as we can disagree with them, they can disa‐ gree with us. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.  Peña, 44 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[W]hile we  carefully consider the opinions of our sister circuits, we cer‐ tainly do not defer to them.”).        Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 45 No. 17‐2991  45  B. Equities  The  court’s  opinion  also  says  the  balance  of  the  equities  weighs  in  favor  of  a  nationwide  injunction.  Essentially,  the  court concludes it would have no serious impact on the At‐ torney  General  to  distribute  the  money  absent  these  condi‐ tions.  But  if  the  conditions  are  imposed,  jurisdictions  like  Chicago  who  do  not  want  to  comply  will  be  denied  their  federal  funds  or  will  be  forced  to  sacrifice  the  trust  of  their  (undocumented) immigrant communities.  On  this  point,  there  is  no  basis  to  second‐guess  the  rea‐ soning of the district court, which expressly determined that  the balance of the equities and the public interest “favor nei‐ ther  party.”  City  of  Chicago,  264  F.  Supp.  3d  at  951.  The  dis‐ trict  court  acknowledged  Chicago’s  purported  interest  in  “the  benefits  that  flow  from  immigrant  communities  freely  reporting crimes and acting as witnesses,” but it also recog‐ nized the Attorney General’s “need to enforce federal immi‐ gration  law.”  Id.  The  district  court  explained  that  “[b]oth  sides can claim that concerns of public safety justify their po‐ sitions”  and  that  “[b]oth  parties  have  strong  public  policy  arguments, the wisdom of which is not for the Court to de‐ cide.”  Id.  So  equity  weighs  on  both  sides,  and  it  certainly  does not justify the entry of a nationwide injunction. Indeed,  as  alluded  to  in  note  2,  supra,  a  court  in  the  Fourth  Circuit  would  likely  not  even  have  entered  a  more  limited  injunc‐ tion  when  the  equities  were  so  evenly  balanced.  See  Real  Truth  About  Obama,  Inc.,  575  F.3d  at  347.  If  an  injunction  is  going  to  be  nationwide,  it  should  at  least  be  one  that  could  have been entered anywhere in the nation.  The  court  also  suggests  that  avoiding  “widespread,  du‐ plicative litigation in the absence of” a nationwide injunction    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 46 46  No. 17‐2991  is in the public interest. Maj. Op. at 33. But a nationwide in‐ junction is not the only way, nor even the best way, to avoid  this problem. Chicago could have filed a class action pursu‐ ant to Rule 23(b)(2) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief  on behalf of all jurisdictions that do not want to comply with  the conditions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (“A class action may  be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:…(2) the party  opposing  the  class  has  acted  or  refused  to  act  on  grounds  that  apply  generally  to  the  class,  so  that  final  injunctive  or  declaratory  relief  is  appropriate  respecting  the  class  as  a  whole….”).  Requiring  a  class  action  has  the  benefit  of  deal‐ ing  with  the  one‐way‐ratchet  nature  of  the  nationwide  in‐ junction. A nationwide injunction ties the Attorney General’s  hands when he loses, but if Chicago had lost here, then some  other municipality could have filed suit against the Attorney  General in some other jurisdiction, and that process could in  theory  continue  until  a  plaintiff  finally  prevailed.  With  a  class  action,  a  decision  would  bind  those  other  municipali‐ ties  just  as  it  would  bind  the  Attorney  General,  and  they  could not run off to the 93 other districts for more bites at the  apple.  C. The Byrne JAG Statute  The court’s final reason for upholding the nationwide in‐ junction  is  that  the  nature  of  the  Byrne  JAG  program  re‐ quires it. Byrne JAG is a formula grant, meaning “allocations  of  money  to  states  or  their  subdivisions  are  in  accordance  with a scheme prescribed by law or by administrative regu‐ lation.”  Federal  Grant  Practice  §  16:5  (2017  ed.).  The  Byrne  JAG  formula  provides  that  of  the  money  appropriated  by  Congress,  50%  goes  to  the  states  based  on  population  and  50%  goes  to  the  states  based  on  violent  crime  statistics.  34    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 47 No. 17‐2991  47  U.S.C.  §  10156(a)(1).  Of  the  amount  allotted  to  each  state,  40% goes to local governments. Id. at (b)(2). If a jurisdiction  fails  to  comply  with  certain  statutory  requirements,  the  funds  can  be  withheld  and  redistributed.  See  34  U.S.C.  §§  20927, 30307. The court notes that these and other considera‐ tions  suggest  that  “an  impact  to  one  recipient  can  have  a  ripple effect on others.” Maj. Op. at 34.  This argument is not sufficient to justify a nationwide in‐ junction. It is axiomatic that the extraordinary relief of an in‐ junction  “should  be  no  more  burdensome  to  the  defendant  than  necessary  to  provide  complete  relief  to  the  plaintiffs.”  Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). This means that  broad  relief,  even  relief  that  benefits  non‐parties,  is  some‐ times  necessary  to  provide  complete  relief  to  the  actual  plaintiffs.  The  classic  examples  of  such  scenarios  are  deseg‐ regation  cases.  See,  e.g.,  Bailey  v.  Patterson,  323  F.2d  201,  206  (5th Cir. 1963). In those cases, the plaintiffs did “not seek the  right to use those parts of segregated facilities that have been  set aside for use by ‘whites only.’” Id. Rather, “they [sought]  the  right  to  use  facilities  which  have  been  desegregated….”  Id.  Accordingly,  “[t]he  very  nature  of  the  rights  [the  plain‐ tiffs]  [sought]  to  vindicate  require[d]  that  the  decree  run  to  the benefit not only of [the plaintiffs] but also for all persons  similarly  situated.”  Id.  In  the  same  vein,  cases  suggesting  ubiquitous harm, such as federal violations of the Establish‐ ment Clause, could  also justify a nationwide  injunction,  be‐ cause an establishment of religion by the federal government  would  harm the plaintiffs wherever it was taking place. See  generally Decker v. O’Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 618 (7th Cir. 1980).  In those cases, the relief to non‐parties could be called a side‐ effect of the relief given to the plaintiffs.    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 48 48  No. 17‐2991  This was the case in International Refugee Assistance Project  v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). There, the Fourth Cir‐ cuit upheld a nationwide injunction on the President’s “trav‐ el  ban”  because  the  plaintiffs  were  “dispersed  throughout  the United States,” there was an interest in ensuring uniform  application  of  immigration  laws,  and  the  court  concluded  the ban “likely violates the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 605;  see also Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 787–88 (9th Cir. 2017).  Without directly addressing the merits of why the injunction  should  be nationwide,  the  Supreme  Court declined  to  com‐ pletely  stay  the  injunction.  See  Trump  v.  Int’l  Refugee  Assis‐ tance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017).  The  same  need  to  protect  third  parties  to  provide  com‐ plete  relief  is  not  present  here.  The  structure  of  the  Byrne  JAG program does not require granting relief to non‐parties.  While  the  statute  does  provide  situations  in  which  money  would  be  withheld  and  redistributed,  there  are  no  provi‐ sions for redistribution of funds withheld for failing to abide  by the Attorney General’s “special conditions.”4 The formula  provides for the calculation of allotments, and then those al‐ lotments  are  claimed  by  grantees  submitting  applications.  Apart  from  instructing  that  money  withheld  from  a  state  should be redistributed to its local governments, 34 U.S.C. §  10156(f), the statute is completely silent on what happens if a  potential  grantee is denied or  if  it simply fails  to  submit an  application.  Chicago  has  not  shown  how  that  situation  would resolve itself, and it has certainly not shown how an                                                    4  This may be further indication the Attorney General does not have the  broad  conditioning  authority  he  claims  he  does,  and  underscores  the  need for Congress to intervene to fill in any blanks the Attorney General,  or any other litigant, deems necessary.    Case: 17-2991 Document: 111 Filed: 04/19/2018 Pages: 49 Add. 49 No. 17‐2991  49  injunction  preventing  the  Attorney  General  from  enforcing  the conditions at all is necessary to protect its own interest in  collecting  its  allotment.  If  money  were  withheld  and  redis‐ tributed  from  other  jurisdictions,  Chicago  would  benefit  by  getting more money. Finally, this case is tangentially related  to immigration law and policy, but it is ultimately a funding  case,  and  it  does  not  come  close  to  implicating  the  nation‐ wide  uniformity  concerns  raised  in  other  cases.  The  nation‐ wide injunction is simply unnecessary here.   III.  Given  the  conclusion  that  Chicago  has  a  likelihood  to  prevail on the merits in this case, and the fact that the Attor‐ ney General has not  challenged any other aspect of the dis‐ trict court’s preliminary‐injunction analysis, I join the court’s  judgment affirming the entry of the injunction. I do so, how‐ ever,  only  for  an  injunction  that  protects  Chicago.  Other  ju‐ risdictions  that  do  not  want  to  comply  with  the  Notice  and  Access  conditions  were  not  parties  to  this  suit,  and  there  is  no need to protect them in order to protect Chicago. An in‐ junction, particularly a preliminary injunction, is an extreme  remedy.  A  nationwide  preliminary  injunction  is  more  ex‐ treme still. One should only be issued where it is absolutely  necessary, and it is far from absolutely necessary here. Con‐ sequently,  I  would  remand  with  instructions  to  the  district  court to modify the injunction so as to prevent the Attorney  General from enforcing the conditions only concerning Chi‐ cago’s application for funds.    Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 1 of 41 PageID #:1116 Add. 50 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff, Case No. 17 C 5720 v. Judge Harry D. Leinenweber JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This case involves the intersection between immigration policies and local control over policing. federal Defendant Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, the Attorney General of the United States, seeks grant relied federal to on enforcement initiatives. cooperation with federal impose by new the These conditions City of conditions immigration on an Chicago require officials annual for law additional and directly conflict with Chicago’s local policy, codified in its Welcoming City Ordinance, which restricts local officials’ participation in certain policies federal engender immigration safer efforts. streets by Chicago fostering claims its trust and cooperation between the immigrant community and local police. Chicago’s policies are at odds with the immigration enforcement Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 2 of 41 PageID #:1117 Add. 51 priorities and view of public safety espoused by the Attorney General. Against these new this backdrop, conditions are the City unlawful of and Chicago claims that unconstitutional, and implores this Court to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining their imposition. For the reasons described herein, the Court grants in part, and denies in part, the City of Chicago’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. I. A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program The federal grant at issue is awarded by the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice grant”). Assistance Grant Program (the “Byrne JAG See, 34 U.S.C. § 10151 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 3750). Named after a fallen New York City police officer, the Byrne JAG grant supports state and local law enforcement efforts by providing additional funds for personnel, equipment, training, and other criminal justice (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 3751). formula grant, which means statutorily defined formula. 42 U.S.C. § 3755). needs. See, 34 U.S.C. § 10152 The Byrne JAG grant is known as a funds are awarded based on a See, 34 U.S.C. § 10156 (formerly Each state’s allocation is keyed to its population and the amount of reported violent crimes. Ibid. - 2 - The Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 3 of 41 PageID #:1118 Add. 52 City of Chicago (the “City”) has received Byrne JAG funds since 2005, including $2.33 million last year on behalf of itself and neighboring political entities. ¶¶ 3, 11-12.) (See, Decl. of Larry Sachs, The City has used these funds to buy police vehicles and to support the efforts of non-profit organizations working in high crime communities. B. (See, id. ¶ 4.) New Conditions on the Byrne JAG Grant In late July 2017, the Attorney General announced two new conditions on every grant provided by the Byrne JAG program. (See, Byrne JAG Program, FY 2017 Local Solicitation, Ex. 11 to Def.’s Br.) authorities The two new conditions require, first, that local provide federal agents advance notice of the scheduled release from state or local correctional facilities of certain individuals suspected of immigration violations, and, second, that local authorities provide immigration agents with access to therein. City detention facilities and individuals detained Additionally, a condition on Byrne JAG funds was added last year that requires the City to certify compliance with a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits local government and law enforcement officials from restricting the sharing of information with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) individual. regarding the citizenship status of any (See, FY 2016 Chicago/Cook County JAG Program Grant - 3 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 4 of 41 PageID #:1119 Add. 53 Award, dated Sept. 7, 2017, at 2-13, Ex. C to Decl. of Alan Hanson (“Hanson Decl.”).) is also imposed on 2017 The condition to certify compliance Byrne JAG funds. (See, Byrne Program, FY 2017 Local Solicitation, Ex. 11 to Def.’s Br.) JAG The exact text of the three conditions is as follows: (1) A State statute, or a State rule, regulation, -policy, or -practice, must be in place that is designed to ensure that, when a State (or State-contracted) correctional facility receives from DHS a formal written request authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act that seeks advance notice of the scheduled release date and time for a particular alien in such facility, then such facility will honor such request and -- as early as practicable -- provide the requested notice to DHS. (2) A State statute, or a State rule, regulation, -policy, or -practice, must be in place that is designed to ensure that agents of the United States acting under color of federal law in fact are given to access any State (or State-contracted) correctional facility for the purpose of permitting such agents to meet with individuals who are (or are believed by such agents to be) aliens and to inquire as to such individuals’ right to be or remain in the United States. (3) The applicant local government must submit the required ‘Certification of Compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373’ (executed by the chief legal officer of the local government). (Byrne JAG Program Grant Award for County of Greenville, Special Conditions (“Byrne Conditions”), ¶¶ 53, 55-56, Ex. A to Hanson Decl.; see also Hanson Decl., ¶ 6.) - 4 - These conditions will be Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 5 of 41 PageID #:1120 Add. 54 referred to respectively as the notice condition, the access condition, and the compliance condition. The City claims all three conditions are unlawful and unconstitutional, even though it acquiesced to the compliance condition when accepting the 2016 Byrne JAG funds. The compliance condition requires the City to certify compliance with Section 1373. (Byrne Conditions ¶ 53.) Section 1373 is titled “Communication between government agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service” and provides follows, 8 U.S.C. § 1373: (a) In General Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual. (b) Additional Authority of Government Entities Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual: (1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. (2) Maintaining such information. (3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local government entity. - 5 - as Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 6 of 41 PageID #:1121 Add. 55 (c) Obligation to Respond to Inquiries The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information. C. The City’s Welcoming Ordinance Chicago’s Welcoming City Ordinance (the “Ordinance”) is a codified local policy that restricts the sharing of immigration status between residents and police officers. Illinois, Municipal Code § 2-173-005 et seq. See, Chicago, The explicit purpose of the Ordinance is to “clarify what specific conduct by City employees is prohibited because such conduct significantly harms the City’s relationship with immigrant communities.” Id. § 2-173-005. The Ordinance reflects the City’s belief that the “cooperation of the City’s immigrant communities is essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety and security in the entire City” and that the “assistance from a person, whether documented or not, who is a victim of, or a witness to, a crime is important to promoting the safety of all its residents.” Ibid. Since the mid-1980s, the City has had in place some permutation of this policy, typically in the form of executive orders that prohibited City agents and agencies from - 6 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 7 of 41 PageID #:1122 Add. 56 requesting or citizenship. Pl.’s Br.) disseminating (See, information about individuals’ Order 89-6, Exs. Executive 85-1, A-B to First codified in Chicago’s Municipal Code in 2006, the Ordinance was augmented in 2012 to refuse immigration agents access to requests Illinois City facilities unless certain Municipal Code and to criteria § deny immigration detainer were met. Chicago, 2-173-005. An See, immigration detainer request is a request from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), asking local law enforcement to detain a specific individual for up to 48 hours to permit federal assumption of custody. The Ordinance prohibits any “agent or agency” from “request[ing] information about or otherwise investigat[ing] or assist[ing] in immigration status investigation the is investigation of any required of person by the unless Illinois State citizenship such Statute, regulation, or court decision.” Id. § 2-173-020. forbid any agent or agency from inquiry or or federal It goes on to “disclos[ing] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any person.” Id. § “[c]ivil 2-173-030. immigration The Ordinance enforcement specifically actions” responsibility,” and provides as follows: - 7 - as characterizes a “[f]ederal Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 8 of 41 PageID #:1123 Add. 57 a. Except for such reasonable time as is necessary to conduct the investigation specified in subsection (c) of this section, no agency or agent shall: 1. arrest, detain or continue to detain a person solely on the belief that the person is not present legally in the United States, or that the person has committed a civil immigration violation; 2. arrest, detain, or continue to detain a person based on an administrative warrant entered into the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center database, or successor or similar database maintained by the United States, when the administrative warrant is based solely on a violation of a civil immigration law; or 3. detain, or continue to detain, a person based upon an immigration detainer, when such immigration detainer is based solely on a violation of a civil immigration law. b. 1. Unless an agency or agent is acting pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement purpose that is unrelated to the enforcement of a civil immigration law, no agency or agent shall: A. permit ICE agents access to a person being detained by, or in the custody of, the agency or agent; B. permit ICE agents use of agency facilities for investigative interviews or other investigative purpose; or - 8 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 9 of 41 PageID #:1124 Add. 58 C. while on duty, expend their time responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding a person’s custody status or release date. 2. An agency or agent is authorized to communicate with ICE in order to determine whether any matter involves enforcement based solely on a violation of a civil immigration law. c. This section shall not apply when an investigation conducted by the agency or agent indicates that the subject of the investigation: 1. has an outstanding criminal warrant; 2. has been convicted of a felony in any court of competent jurisdiction; 3. is a defendant in a criminal case in any court of competent jurisdiction where a judgment has not been entered and a felony charge is pending; or 4. has been identified as a known gang member either in a law enforcement agency’s database or by his own admission. Id. § 2-173-042. The Ordinance is thus irreconcilable with the notice and access conditions the Attorney General has imposed on the 2017 Byrne JAG grant. After receiving notice of the Attorney General’s new conditions on the Byrne JAG grant program, the City filed suit alleging that the conditions were unconstitutional and unlawful. Throughout this litigation, the City has strenuously argued for - 9 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 10 of 41 PageID #:1125 Add. 59 its prerogative to allocate scarce local police resources as it sees fit – that is, to areas other than civil immigration enforcement – and for the soundness of doing so based on the integral role undocumented reporting and solving crime. immigrant communities play (See, Pl.’s Br. at 2-4.) in Before the Court is the City’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, requesting the Court enjoin the Attorney General from imposing the three above-described conditions on FY 2017 Byrne JAG funds. The Court grants the City a preliminary injunction against the imposition of the notice and access conditions on the Byrne JAG grant. The Court declines to grant the preliminary injunction with respect to the compliance condition. II. A. ANALYSIS Legal Standard To warrant the entry of a preliminary injunction, the City “must establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits, that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in its favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Higher Soc’y of Indiana v. Tippecanoe Cty., Indiana, 858 F.3d 1113, 1116 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Where the Government is the opposing party, the last two factors merge. - 10 - Nken v. Holder, Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 11 of 41 PageID #:1126 Add. 60 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Further, under Seventh Circuit precedent, the Court must also “weigh the harm the plaintiff will suffer without an injunction against the harm the defendant will suffer with one.” Harlan v. Scholz, 866 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2017). B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits This case presents three questions: Did Congress authorize the Attorney General to impose substantive conditions on the Byrne JAG authorize grant? those If so, conditions did Congress under the have Spending the power Clause? finally, does Section 1373 violate the Tenth Amendment? to And We take these questions in turn. 1. Executive Authority under the Byrne JAG Statute Whether the new conditions on the Byrne JAG grant are proper depends on whether Congress conferred authority on the Attorney General to delegate authority through statute. 457, 472 impose and them. discretion Congress to the may permissibly Executive Branch See, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. (2001). The contours of the Executive Branch’s authority are circumscribed by statute because the “power to act . . . [is] authoritatively prescribed by Congress.” Arlington, Accordingly, Tex. we v. must 569 F.C.C., look to the - 11 - U.S. 290, statute to 297-98 City of (2013). determine the Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 12 of 41 PageID #:1127 Add. 61 authority of the Attorney General to impose conditions on the Byrne JAG grant. In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. 392, 396 (7th Cir. See, United States v. Berkos, 543 F.3d 2008). “If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, regarded as conclusive.” that language must ordinarily be Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). The language and design of the statute as a whole may guide determining the plain meaning of the text. the Court in Berkos, 543 F.3d at 396. The Byrne JAG program was created in 2006 and is codified at 34 U.S.C. §§ 10151-10158 (formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 3750-3757). These provisions are housed in Subchapter entitled “Justice System Improvement.” V of Chapter 101 Subchapter V enumerates the various “Bureau of Justice Assistance Grant Programs” in three parts: covering Part A covering the Byrne JAG program, Part B “Discretionary Grants,” “Administrative Provisions.” and Part C discussing The authority explicitly granted to the Attorney General within the Byrne JAG statute is limited. The Attorney General is authorized to: determine the “form” of the application, 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a); “reasonably require” “the applicant [to] maintain and report - 12 - . . . data, records, and Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 13 of 41 PageID #:1128 Add. 62 information (programmatic 10152(a)(4); assessment” and “in and “develop[] coordination financial),” guidelines” with the 34 for U.S.C. “a National § program Institute of Justice,” 34 U.S.C. § 10152. In light of the limited express authority the statute confers on the Attorney General, the City argues that Congress did not authorize the Attorney General conditions on the Byrne JAG grant. to place substantive The fact that Congress did authorize the Attorney General to place substantive conditions on other grants, the City contends, reservation of that authority. 42 U.S.C. textual § 3742). authority By within an express See, 34 U.S.C. § 10142 (formerly failing the indicates to direct Byrne JAG the Court statute to any itself, the Attorney General appears to concede the point. However, expressly the authorized Attorney General imposition of the argues that challenged Congress conditions through a provision of Subchapter I establishing the Office of Justice Programs, which provision allows the Assistant Attorney General to “plac[e] special conditions on all grants” and to “determin[e] priority purposes for formula grants.” 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 3712(a)(6)). The difficulty with the Attorney General’s reading of the statute is that this grant of authority to the Assistant Attorney General is located - 13 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 14 of 41 PageID #:1129 Add. 63 in an entirely different subchapter governing Office of Justice Programs, whereas Congress codified the later-in-time Byrne JAG program under the aegis of Bureau of Justice Assistant Grant Programs. The statute contains no textual reference that applies this section to the rest of the chapter or specifically to the Byrne JAG program. In fact, Chapter 101 comprises 38 subchapters implicating a broad swath of federal programs and subject matter, ranging from grants for residential substance abuse treatment, see, 34 U.S.C. §§ 10421-10426, to criminal child support enforcement, see, 34 U.S.C. §§ 10361-10367. Even grant, assuming reading the that § 10102(a) statute as the applies to Attorney the Byrne General JAG advises results in multiple incongruities within the text. First, it renders superfluous the explicit statutory authority Congress gave to the Director to impose conditions on other Bureau of Justice Assistance grants housed within the same subchapter as the Byrne JAG statute. Congress explicitly provides the Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance with authority to “determine[]” “terms and conditions” discretionary grants itemized in Part B of the statute: The Director shall have the following duties: [. . .] - 14 - for the Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 15 of 41 PageID #:1130 Add. 64 (2) Establishing programs in accordance with part B of subchapter V of this chapter and, following public announcement of such programs, awarding and allocating funds and technical assistance in accordance with the criteria of part B of subchapter V of this chapter, and on terms and conditions determined by the Director to be consistent with part B of subchapter V of this chapter. 34 U.S.C. § 10142 (emphases added). As noted earlier, the Byrne JAG grant is a formula grant located in Part A of Subchapter V. The most natural reading of the statute, then, is that Congress endowed the Director with authority to impose conditions on the discretionary grants under Part B, but specifically withheld that authorization for the formula grant, the Byrne JAG grant, in Part A. statute Congress See, ibid. therefore to provisions. The Attorney General’s reading of the ignores withhold the ostensibly comparable clear authority in decision the Byrne by JAG See, N.L.R.B. v. SW General, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 929, 940 (2017) (noting the expressio unius canon’s application when “circumstances support a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded”) (quotations and alterations omitted). Regardless, it would be quite odd for Congress Attorney to conditions give on the the General discretionary grants authority if it to had impose already provided the Attorney General authority to impose conditions on all grants through Section 10102(a)(6). - 15 - See, 34 U.S.C. § Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 16 of 41 PageID #:1131 Add. 65 10102(a)(6). statutory This reading would render superfluous the explicit grant discretionary of grants authority in Part to B. impose See, conditions Marquez v. on the Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S., 836 F.3d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 2016) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”) (quotations and citations omitted). This conclusion is supported by the fact that Congress specifically conferred authority to impose conditions on other grants housed in the same chapter. did so clearly. Where Congress did so, it For example, Subchapter XIX of Chapter 101 provides federal funds for efforts designed to combat violence against women. See, 34 U.S.C. § 10446-10453 (formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg-0 to 3796gg-11). There, Congress expressly authorized the Attorney General to impose conditions when administering the grant: In disbursing grants under this subchapter, the Attorney General may impose reasonable conditions on grant awards to ensure that the States meet statutory, regulatory, and other program requirements. 34 U.S.C. § 10446(e)(3) (emphasis added). Further, Congress expressly limited its delegation of authority to apply only to funds awarded under that specific - 16 - subchapter. Ibid. “Where Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 17 of 41 PageID #:1132 Add. 66 Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” and Russello, 464 U.S. at 23. What is more, “[w]e do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.” Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005). Second, even if there were a basis for importing § 10102(a) into the Byrne JAG statute, it is suspect to ground the Attorney General’s authority to impose the challenged conditions via the power See, Congress 34 conferred U.S.C. § on the Assistant 10102(a)(6); Whitman, Attorney 531 U.S. General. at 468 (“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”). Furthermore, § 10102(a)(6) provides that the Assistant Attorney General shall exercise “such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General.” 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (emphasis added). The language of the statute, - 17 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 18 of 41 PageID #:1133 Add. 67 including its use of the term “may,” implies that any authority of the Assistant Attorney General to place special conditions on grants must delegation General. flow of either power See, from the independently statute Jama, 543 U.S. possessed at customarily connotes discretion.”). this litigation has pointed itself 346 by or the (“The from a Attorney word ‘may’ Yet the Attorney General in to no provision other than § 10102(a)(6) to ground its purported authority to condition Byrne JAG grants. The Attorney General’s reliance on 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) is persuasive only to the extent one scrutinizes the provision without the illumination of the rest of the statute. See, Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 273 (2006) (statutes “should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions”). Viewed in its context, however, § 10102(a)(6) is better understood as allowing the Attorney General to delegate powers to the Assistant Attorney General to aid in administering the Office of Justice Programs – whereas the Byrne JAG grant is a Bureau of Justice Assistance Program that is both housed in a distinctly different subchapter of Chapter 101 and isolated from other discretionary grants within its own subchapter. § 10102(a)(6) to authorize the Attorney General to Reading impose substantive conditions on all grants under the entire chapter is - 18 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 19 of 41 PageID #:1134 Add. 68 discordant with the specific and clear grants of authority in other sections of the statute. This conclusion interpretation. rests principles of statutory It does not imply that Congress cannot impose the conditions at issue. 451 Halderman, on U.S. 1, See, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 17 (1981) (“[O]ur cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal Congress may conditions money well or have delegate to the States.”). Spending to the Clause Executive On power Branch the to contrary, impose the power the to impose them, including the notice and access condition, but it must exert that power through statute. cannot impose the conditions without The Executive Branch Congressional authority, and that authority has not been conferred through Section 10102. The notice and access conditions therefore exceed statutory authority, and, consequently, the efforts to impose them violate the separation of powers doctrine and are ultra vires. The City has shown a likelihood of success on the merits as to these conditions. access We do not reach the question whether the notice and conditions violate the Spending Clause because, regardless, Congress did not authorize the Attorney General to impose them. - 19 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 20 of 41 PageID #:1135 Add. 69 The Attorney General points to one other statutory provision, 34 U.S.C. § 10153 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 3752), for the authority to impose the compliance condition specifically. Section 10153(a) lays out the Byrne JAG application requirements, which read in relevant part: (A) In general To request a grant under this part, the chief executive officer of a State or unit of local government shall submit an application to the Attorney General within 120 days after the date on which funds to carry out this part are appropriated for a fiscal year, in such form as the Attorney General may require. Such application shall include the following: [. . .] (5) A certification, made in a form acceptable to the Attorney General and executed by the chief executive officer of the applicant (or by another officer of the applicant, if qualified under regulations promulgated by the Attorney General), that— [. . .] (D) the applicant will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws. 34 U.S.C. Attorney § 10153(a) General argues (emphases that § added). Specifically, 10153(a)(5)(D) furnishes the the authority to require a Byrne JAG applicant’s compliance with federal law, including Section 1373. See, ibid. Undeniably, Section 1373 is a federal law that, by its terms, is applicable - 20 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 21 of 41 PageID #:1136 Add. 70 to the City. The City responds that “all other applicable Federal laws” merely refers to compliance with the narrow body of law governing federal grant-making. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 6102. Both positions are plausible, but for the reasons discussed below, the Attorney General’s position is more consistent with the plain language of the statute. We, as statute. always, begin with the plain language of the See, Jackson v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 833 F.3d 860, 863 (7th Cir. 2016). We “must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” 281, 291 (1988). K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. “If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that conclusive.” The language ordinarily be regarded as Russello, 464 U.S. at 20. statutory applicable must Federal language at issue laws.” Black’s here Law is “all Dictionary other defines “applicable” as “[c]apable of being applied; fit and right to be applied” group, or or Dictionary parties’ “affecting or relating to a particular situation; having direct relevance.” (10th 2014). This definition ed. interpretations. However, - 21 - the person, Black’s embraces prefatory term Law both in Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 22 of 41 PageID #:1137 Add. 71 § 10153(a)(5)(D), “all other,” implies a broader meaning than that tolerated by the City’s interpretation. Furthermore, if Congress intended to have the applicant only certify compliance with a limited body of Federal grant-making law, it could have so stated. The City seeks to read into § 10153(a)(5)(D) references to specific federal statutes that are not there. The City argues that the word “applicable” must have a narrowing effect. (Pl.’s Brief at 19.) However, it is equally reasonable to read “applicable” as referring to the noun, in other words, to refer to the federal laws applicable to the applicant – in this case, Chicago. 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D). The Court will not stretch the natural meaning of the text, especially here where the City offers no case law or other authority to support its straitjacketed interpretation of “all other applicable Federal laws.” 34 U.S.C. § 10153; see also, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S.Ct. 870, 876 (2014) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”) (quotations omitted). The Court interpreting broadly found similar interpreted no directly constructions, the term analogous the “applicable case, Supreme laws.” but when Court has See, e.g., Dep’t of Treasury v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, - 22 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 23 of 41 PageID #:1138 Add. 72 930 (1990) (interpreting the statutory term “applicable laws” as “laws outside the Act”); see also, Bennett Enters., Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 493, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that “all applicable susceptible compliance to an with laws” is “not interpretation state and federal reasonably that tax does or not laws”); fairly encompass United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. F.L.R.A., 844 F.2d 1087, 109495 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding statutory requirement that Executive Branch managers follow “applicable laws” to exclude Office of Management and Budget circulars but to encompass a broad panoply of statutory law); United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1977) (reference to “all applicable laws” relating to admiralty grants “very broad statutory authority”). With no “applicable authority . . . to laws” support in a a more statutory narrow reading context, and of some authority (albeit in a different context) to support a broad reading of the phrase, combined with the plain meaning of the language, the Court finds that “all other applicable Federal laws” encompasses Section 1373 as applicable to the Byrne JAG applicant – in this case, the City of Chicago. Here, it is the City’s burden as the movant to show otherwise, and it fails to meet that burden on this record. U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (“It See, Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 frequently - 23 - is observed that a Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 24 of 41 PageID #:1139 Add. 73 preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”). This interpretation leads to a rational reading of the statute, as Congress could expect an entity receiving federal funds to certify its compliance with federal law, as the entity is – independent comply. At of oral receiving federal argument, the funds City – obligated argued that to this interpretation is limitless, allowing the Attorney General to pick from the United States Code like a menu at a restaurant. For several reasons, the City’s consternation can be assuaged. First, the default assumption is that states and localities do comply with all federal laws. Second, the discretion to demand certifications of compliance is not limitless. The limitations on federal grant conditions announced in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. condition, 203, such 207-08 (1987), as compliance a require that a certification, relation to the purpose of the federal funds. particular bear some And further, as noted at oral argument, any condition attached to federal grants that is too burdensome defeats itself because a state or local government Attorney could reject General’s the attempt funds to and induce condition. - 24 - thus undermine compliance with the the Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 25 of 41 PageID #:1140 Add. 74 The City argues that previous conditions have all been tethered to statutes that by their terms apply to federal grant recipients. This may be true, but the fact that the Attorney General has not exercised authority does not necessarily speak to whether he possesses it, especially where the statutory terms embrace such an authorization. The City has not met its burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits regarding the lack of statutory authority for the compliance condition. statute authorizes the The most natural reading of the Attorney General to require a certification of compliance with all other applicable federal laws, which by the plainest definition includes Section 1373. The City offers no statutory or case law authority to support its narrower reading. Because the lack of authority supporting a narrower interpretation and the plain language of the statute counsel against applicable General the Federal has City’s laws,” statutory interpretation the Court authority finds to of that impose “all the other Attorney the compliance the compliance condition on the Byrne JAG grant. 2. Constitutionality of Section 1373 Even with Congressional condition must be proper authorization, under the Spending Section 1373 must pass constitutional muster. - 25 - Clause, and As the City has Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 26 of 41 PageID #:1141 Add. 75 not argued that the compliance condition violates the Spending Clause, the Court now turns to the Section 1373 question. Although Congressional power is substantial, Congress may not simply “commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling regulatory program.” them to enact and enforce a federal Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998). It also cannot require states “to govern according to Congress’ instructions” or circumvent the “conscripting the State’s officers directly.” rule by Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). of federalism These prohibitions derive from principles ingrained in our constitutional system, under which “both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012); see also, Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459 (“In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”). With the conflict. existence of two sovereigns comes occasional The Supremacy Clause provides the clear rule that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or notwithstanding.” Laws of any Art. VI, cl. 2. - 26 - state to the Contrary “As long as it is acting Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 27 of 41 PageID #:1142 Add. 76 within the powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose its will on the States [and] . . . may legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States.” at 459-60. Gregory, 501 U.S. Further, the presumption attached to every statute is that it is a constitutional exercise of legislative power. 528 Reno, U.S. at 148. We start there, attaching presumption of constitutionality to Section 1373. in relevant part, provides that “no person the Section 1373, or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to information regarding the immigration unlawful, of any individual: or requesting Immigration information; Federal, and (3) State, or lawful or (1) Sending such information to, receiving such Naturalization information Service; Exchanging such or government local status, (2) from, the Maintaining such information with entity.” any 8 other U.S.C. § 1373(b). It is undisputed that Congress legislate on the subject of aliens. Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, has plenary power to See, Takahashi v. Fish and 419 (1948) (“The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, - 27 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 28 of 41 PageID #:1143 Add. 77 and the Indeed, terms regulation of and their naturalization.”). enforcement are federal See, Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396-97. Nonetheless, the argues because conditions immigration functions. City and it that Section “requires 1373 state violates and local the Tenth officers Amendment to provide information that belongs to Chicago and is available to them only in their official capacity” and requires “state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statute by regulating private individuals.” (Pl.’s Brief at 20 (internal quotations omitted).) Specifically, the City contends that Section 1373 commandeers state and local governments by “controlling the actions of their employees.” Ibid. The constitutionality of Section 1373 has been challenged before. The Second Circuit in City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999), addressed a facial challenge to Section 1373 in similar circumstances. New York providing City prohibited federal its immigration By executive order, employees from voluntarily authorities with information concerning the immigration status of any alien. The city sued constitutionality the of United Section 1373 Id. at 32. - 28 - States, under the Id. at 31-32. challenging Tenth the Amendment. Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 29 of 41 PageID #:1144 Add. 78 The Second Circuit found that Section 1373 did not compel state or local governments to enact or administer any federal regulatory program or conscript local employees into its service, and therefore did not run afoul of the rules gleaned from the Supreme Court’s Printz and New York decisions. New York, 179 F.3d at 35. City of Rather, the court held that Section 1373 prohibits local governmental entities and officials only from directly restricting the voluntary exchange of immigration information with the INS. Ibid. The Court found that the Tenth Amendment, normally a shield from federal power, could not be turned into “a sword allowing states and localities to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal programs.” Ibid. The Second and local Circuit concluded governments from that Congress outlawing their may forbid state officials’ voluntary cooperation with the INS without violating the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. As such, the court nullified New York City’s executive order mandating non-cooperation with federal immigration authorities to the extent it conflicted with Section 1373. Id. at 37. The City argues that City of New York v. United States contravenes the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), by impermissibly balancing analysis to encroachments on federalism. - 29 - applying a We agree Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 30 of 41 PageID #:1145 Add. 79 with the City infringement precedent is in that balancing inappropriate, Travis, 163 the not F.3d weight only at of under 1003, a federalism this but Circuit’s Supreme Court precedent as well. See, Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 (noting that, where whole “it is the object of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, such a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate . . . [N]o comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental defect.”) (emphasis omitted). holding is not However, the logic of City of New York’s indebted to an impermissible balancing test. Rather, City of New York relies on the distinction between an affirmative obligation and a proscription: In the case of Sections 434 and [1373], Congress has not compelled state and local governments to enact or administer any federal regulatory program. Nor has it affirmatively conscripted states, localities, or their employees into the federal government’s service. These Sections do not directly compel states or localities to require or prohibit anything. Rather, they prohibit state and local governmental entities or officials only from directly restricting the voluntary exchange of immigration information with the INS. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34-35 (citation omitted). The improper balancing the City highlights occurs where the Second Circuit addressed a secondary question yet found the record insufficient to supplant its prior analysis. Id. at 36-37. The - 30 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 31 of 41 PageID #:1146 Add. 80 prior analysis was its holding – free from any inappropriate balancing – that states do not have the power “to passive resistance to federal programs.” Id. at 37. command Granted, City of New York does not fully address or answer two arguments that are presented in this case: first, that the federal government cannot demand information belonging to the state; and second, that it cannot (even indirectly) control the scope and nature of the duties of state and local employees. Id. at 36. The Second Circuit merely deemed the record insufficient on both scores. Regardless, Ibid. Supreme Court precedent does not command a different result. The City relies on Printz, but there, the statute at issue required state officers to perform mandatory background checks on prospective handgun purchasers – an affirmative act foisted on local officials by Congress. Supreme Court held that the See, 521 U.S. at 933. statute violated the The Tenth Amendment, because the federal government cannot “command the States’ officers . regulatory program.” not require the . . to administer Id. at 935. “forced or enforce a However, Section 1373 does participation” of state officers “administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” 917-18. federal to Id. at It merely precludes a state or local government from “prohibit[ing], or in any way restrict[ing], any . . . official” - 31 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 32 of 41 PageID #:1147 Add. 81 from sending, “information requesting, regarding the maintaining, immigration individual.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373. or status . exchanging . . of any In other words, it prohibits prohibitions on local officials’ voluntary participation. For similar reasons, other cases cited by the City do not advance the ball either. (finding the Driver’s See, e.g., Reno, 528 U.S. at 151 Privacy Protection Act constitutional because “[i]t does not require the [state] Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist private in the enforcement individuals”); New of York, federal 505 statutes U.S. at 188 regulating (finding a “take title” provision on nuclear waste unconstitutional because it forced a state to “enact or administer a federal regulatory program” by affirmatively requiring it to legislate a certain way or take ownership 456 Mississippi, U.S. of 742, nuclear 765 Amendment violation in provisions Regulatory Policies Act permitting utilities on condition proposals, as the the statute waste); (1982) that of (finding the states they contained F.E.R.C. Public to no nothing Tenth Utilities regulate entertain v. public federal “directly compelling” states to enact a legislative program). At its core, this case boils down to whether state and local governments can restrict their officials from voluntarily - 32 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 33 of 41 PageID #:1148 Add. 82 cooperating with a federal scheme. The Court has not been presented with, nor could it uncover, any case holding that the scope of state sovereignty includes the power to forbid state or local employees program. from voluntarily complying with a federal Like the statute at issue in Reno, Section 1373 “does not require” the City “to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal U.S. statutes at 151. regulating Without a private doubt, individuals.” Section 1373 Reno, 528 restricts the ability of localities to prohibit state or local officials from assisting a federal program, but it does not require officials to assist in the enforcement distinction is meaningful. of a federal program. This In this distinction, Section 1373 is consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and Printz. U.S. at 161-63. See, Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 Because no case has gone so far as to prohibit the federal government from restricting actions that directly frustrate federal constitutionally prevent local law, when it officers the Court determines from finds that voluntarily that Congress localities cooperating acts may not with a federal program or discipline them for doing so. It is worth noting, however, that this case poses a unique and novel constitutional question. - 33 - The characterization of Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 34 of 41 PageID #:1149 Add. 83 Section 1373 as a prohibition that requires no affirmative state action accurately conveys the literal text of the statute, but it does not accurately portray its practical import. Section 1373 mandates that state and city employees have the option of furnishing to the INS information on individuals’ immigration status while the employee is acting in his or her capacity as a state or local official. local governments cannot both comply The corollary is that with Section 1373 and discipline an employee for choosing to spend his or her time assisting in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. state or local government cannot control the scope If a of its officials’ employment by limiting the extent of their paid time spent cooperating with the INS, then Section 1373 may practically limit the ability of state and local governments to decline to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. In this way, Section 1373 may implicate the logic underlying the Printz decision more than it does the Reno rationale. See, Printz, 521 U.S. at 929-30. Read literally, Section 1373 imposes no affirmative obligation on local governments. But, by leaving it up to local officials in immigration whether to priorities, assist the statute enforcement may of effectively federal thwart policymakers’ ability to extricate their state or municipality - 34 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 35 of 41 PageID #:1150 Add. 84 from involvement in a federal program. however, only violation of Supreme Second affirmative the Court Tenth precedent Circuit, neither demands Under current case law, on Amendment. and of states Here, we the persuasive which elevates degree urged by the City here. constitute follow a binding authority of the federalism to the A decision to the contrary would require an expansion of the law that only a higher court could establish. Accordingly, the City has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits on the constitutionality of Section 1373. C. The City preliminary assessing has Irreparable Harm demonstrated injunction irreparable the analysis harm, – courts second factor irreparable must analyze of harm. whether the In the “harm . . . cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final judgment after trial.” Roland Mach. Co. Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984). v. Dresser Indus., Injury to reputation or goodwill is not easily measurable in monetary terms, and so often is deemed irreparable. Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, the City contends that, in the absence of an injunction, it must either forego the Byrne JAG grant funds it has specifically earmarked for life-saving technology that detects when and where - 35 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 36 of 41 PageID #:1151 Add. 85 gunshots are fired (P.I. Hrg. Tr. at 31:8-32:9) or accede to the new conditions the Attorney General has placed on the funds and suffer the collapse of trust between local law enforcement and immigrant communities that is essential to ferreting out crime. Two recent cases have dealt with preliminary injunctions regarding facts similar to those before the Court. Though the legal issues presented in these cases are different than those at bar, the harms alleged are sufficiently analogous. In both cases, the district court found that the plaintiff established irreparable injury. In City of El Cenizo v. State, the court entered a preliminary injunction and credited the plaintiff’s assertion that it would suffer two forms of irreparable harm: (1) “Trust between local law enforcement and the people they serve, which police departments have worked so hard to promote, will be rates”; substantially and (2) eroded “Local and result jurisdictions in face increased severe crime economic consequences . . . including . . . the loss of grant money.” City of El Cenizo v. State, No. SA-17-CV-404-OLG, 3763098, at *39 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2017). 2017 WL In County of Santa Clara v. Trump, the court found that the plaintiff established a “constitutional injury” and irreparable harm “by being forced to comply with injury.” an unconstitutional law or else face financial County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-CV-00485-WHO, - 36 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 37 of 41 PageID #:1152 Add. 86 2017 WL 1459081, reconsideration at denied, *27 (N.D. No. Cal. Apr. 17-CV-00485-WHO, 2017 25, 2017), WL 3086064 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2017). The harm to the City’s relationship with the immigrant community if it should accede to the conditions is irreparable. Once such trust is lost, it cannot be repaired through an award of money damages, making it the type of harm that is especially hard to “rectif[y] by [a] final judgment.” Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 386. The Attorney General minimizes the impact of the relatively modest Byrne JAG funds on public safety and argues that the City could, by simply declining the funds, avoid any loss of trust between local However, a law enforcement “Hobson’s choice” and can the immigrant establish communities. irreparable harm. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992). In Morales, the Supreme Court held that a forced choice between acquiescing to a law that the plaintiff believed to be unconstitutional and violating the law under pain of liability was sufficient to establish irreparable injury. Ibid. In the same way, forcing the City either to decline the grant funds based on what it believes to be unconstitutional conditions or accept them and face an irreparable harm, is “Hobson’s choice” that supports irreparable harm. - 37 - the type of Further, a Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 38 of 41 PageID #:1153 Add. 87 constitutional violation may be sufficient irreparable injury as a matter of law. to establish See, 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1 (2d ed. 1995) (“When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.”); see also, Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 698–700 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Mundy, 514 F.2d 1179, 1183 (7th Cir. 1975). The lack of injury afflicting the Attorney General in the absence of an injunction irreparable harm. buttresses the City’s showing of The Seventh Circuit has described this factor as follows: In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court must also consider any irreparable harm that the defendant might suffer from the injunction—harm that would not be either cured by the defendant’s ultimately prevailing in the trial on the merits or fully compensated by the injunction bond that Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the district court to make the plaintiff post. The cases do not usually speak of the defendant’s irreparable harm, but the qualification is implicit; if the defendant will not be irreversibly injured by the injunction because a final judgment in his favor would make him whole, the injunction will not really harm him. But since the defendant may suffer irreparable harm from the entry of a preliminary injunction, the court must not only determine that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is denied—a threshold requirement for granting a preliminary injunction—but also weigh that harm against any irreparable harm that - 38 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 39 of 41 PageID #:1154 Add. 88 the defendant can show injunction is granted. he will suffer if the Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 387 (emphasis in original). Although harm to federal interests should not be diminished, a delay in the imposition of new conditions that have yet to go into effect will likely not cause any harm akin to that alleged by the City. The Attorney General has put forth no comparable claim that a delay in imposition of the new Byrne JAG conditions would permanently harm community relationships or any other interest that would be difficult to remedy through money damages. See, Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 1213, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that maintaining the status quo was unlikely to affect a substantial public interest in the short time of the injunction). Thus, the Court finds that the City has established that it would suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not entered. D. The Balancing of Equities and the Public Interest remaining two factors in the preliminary analysis merge where the Government is a party. at 435. Both injunction Nken, 556 U.S. These two factors are not outcome-determinative here. sides can claim that concerns their positions. - 39 - of public safety justify Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 40 of 41 PageID #:1155 Add. 89 The City and amici strongly emphasize the studies and other evidence demonstrating their counterparts. that sanctuary cities are safer than Although both parties before the Court have emphatically stressed the importance of their policy choice to decrease crime and support law enforcement – with Chicago emphasizing the benefits that flow from immigrant communities freely reporting Attorney crimes General and emphasizing acting the as witnesses, need to and enforce the federal immigration law – choosing between competing public policies is outside the realm of judicial expertise and is best left to the legislative and executive branch. See, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012) (noting that the courts are “vested with the authority to interpret the law; [they] possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments”). Accordingly, the final two factors favor neither party. Both parties have strong public policy arguments, the wisdom of which is not for the Court to decide. finds that balancing the equities and Accordingly, the Court weighing the public interest do not tip the scale in favor of either party. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the City a preliminary injunction against the Attorney General’s imposition - 40 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 78 Filed: 09/15/17 Page 41 of 41 PageID #:1156 Add. 90 of the notice and access conditions on the Byrne JAG grant. The City has established a likelihood of success on the merits as to these two conditions and irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue, and the other two preliminary injunction factors do not sway the analysis. This injunction against imposition of the notice and access conditions is nationwide in scope, there being no reason to think that the legal issues present in this case are restricted to Chicago or that the statutory authority given to the jurisdiction. Attorney General would differ in another See, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir. 2017). The Court denies the City’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction with respect to the compliance condition, because the City has failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. IT IS SO ORDERED. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court Dated: September 15, 2017 - 41 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 1 of 17 PageID #:1378 Add. 91 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff, Case No. 17 C 5720 v. Judge Harry D. Leinenweber JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Attorney application of General this moves Court’s to stay preliminary the nationwide injunction against imposition of certain conditions on the 2017 Byrne JAG grant pending resolution Seventh Circuit herein, Defendant’s of Court the of Attorney General’s Appeals. Motion to Stay For the Nationwide appeal reasons to the stated Application of Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 80] is denied. I. BACKGROUND The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts of this case as recited in its opinion granting in part the City of Chicago’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See, generally, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017). In support of the instant motion, the Attorney General has pointed to additional Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 2 of 17 PageID #:1379 Add. 92 facts that merit discussion here. The Attorney General’s office has applications received nearly a thousand for Byrne JAG funding for FY 2017, and nearly all those applications await award notifications “Department”). from (See, Hanson, ¶ 4.) the ECF Department No. 82, Second of Justice Decl. of (the Alan R. In prior years, the majority of Byrne JAG awards were already issued by this time of the year. (Id. ¶ 9.) The Attorney General argues that this Court’s nationwide preliminary injunction prevents the Department from issuing the Byrne JAG award notifications because, even if the appeal is successful, the Attorney General will be unable to add the notice and access conditions after the award notifications issue. General urges process past imposing budgets under that which significant September heavy (id. a ¶ burdens 11), states of this on year in the grant-making raises the prospect localities disrupting issue delay state sub-awards The Attorney of with relatively grant-making Byrne JAG of small processes funds (id. ¶ 12), and undermining recovery efforts in jurisdictions that have recently suffered natural disasters (id. ¶ 13). this delay and the attendant burdens, the requests a stay of the preliminary injunction. - 2 - Attorney To avoid General Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 3 of 17 PageID #:1380 Add. 93 II. LEGAL STANDARD The analysis for “granting a stay pending appeal mirrors that for granting Enters., Inc. a preliminary 742 II, F.3d injunction.” 763, 766 (7th In Cir. re A & 2014). F In determining whether to grant a stay, the court should consider “the moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits, the irreparable harm that will result to each side if the stay is either granted interest movant issue. (7th or favors can denied one in side demonstrate error, or the the first and whether other.” two Ibid. factors is the public Whether a the threshold See, In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 115 F.3d 1294, 1300 Cir. 1997). “If the movant can make these threshold showings, the court then moves on to balance the relative harms considering all four factors using a ‘sliding scale’ approach.” Id. at 1300-01. A stay pending appeal is intended “to minimize the costs of error” and “to mitigate the damage that can be done during the interim period resolved on its merits.” before a legal issue is finally In re A & F Enters., 742 F.3d at 766. As the Supreme Court recently stated, “[c]rafting a preliminary injunction dependent is as an much exercise on the of discretion equities of a and given substance of the legal issues it presents.” - 3 - judgment, case often as the Trump v. Int’l Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 4 of 17 PageID #:1381 Add. 94 Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”), 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (citations omitted). III. ANALYSIS The Attorney General argues that the City of Chicago (the “City”) lacks Article III standing beyond its alleged injury-in-fact. for any remedy that goes (The Court notes that this argument may be mooted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ pending Motion to Intervene, but in this Opinion does not consider the effect of such an intervention.) There is no dispute that the City has standing vis-à-vis the notice and access conditions. Nonetheless, the Attorney General contends that the City’s standing is cut off at its jurisdictional boundaries, preventing the Court from fashioning a remedy any broader in scope than that required disagrees. to redress the City’s injury. The Court Once a constitutional violation has been shown, “the nature of the remedy must be determined by the nature and the scope of the constitutional violation.” Koo v. McBride, 124 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 1997); see also, Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89 (1995) (“The nature of the . . . remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope violation.”) (quotation omitted). likely constitutional violation. of the constitutional The City has demonstrated a It is the “nature and scope of the constitutional violation” that defines the remedy for this - 4 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 5 of 17 PageID #:1382 Add. 95 violation, not the particular plaintiff. Here, Ibid. the constitutional transgression is national in scope because the notice and access conditions, shown unconstitutional, were imposed nationwide. to be likely Thus, a preliminary injunction may “bind” the “part[y]” before the Court, in this case the Attorney General, to prevent the constitutional violations at issue regardless of where they may occur. CIV. P. 65(d). “[O]nce a constitutional FED. R. violation is demonstrated, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)). The Constitution vests a district court with “the judicial Power of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. This power is not limited to the jurisdiction in which the district court sits: “[i]t is not beyond the power of a court, in appropriate circumstances, to issue a nationwide injunction.” 188 (5th Cir. 2015), as Texas v. U.S., 809 F.3d 134, revised (Nov. 25, 2015), aff’d by equally divided court, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016). The circumstances here are appropriate. Because the Attorney General’s authority, or lack thereof, will not vary by jurisdiction, the cases cited - 5 - in support of a stay are Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 6 of 17 PageID #:1383 Add. 96 inapposite. In Lewis v. 518 Casey, U.S. 343 (1996), the evidence failed to show systemic violations necessary to justify a state-wide injunction in Arizona’s prison libraries, as the challenged conduct could have been present in some prisons but not others. at Id. 359-60. This case, on the other hand, implicates a facial challenge to a federal statute; the Attorney General’s authority to impose Byrne JAG conditions on the City will not differ from his authority to do so elsewhere. No additional evidence is needed to justify the nationwide scope of the injunction because the Attorney General’s authority does not vary state by state like the conditions libraries may vary prison to prison. of access to legal See, id. Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1645, 1648-49 (2017), is also unavailing. There, the Court analyzed whether an intervenor as a matter of right has standing to claim a remedy separate from that sought by the plaintiff. found no case extending Town of Chester’s This Court has rationale to the proposition advanced by the Attorney General - that, regardless of the standing likely is constitutional barred from violation injunctive shown, relief a broader party with than that which directly impacts it. Next, the Attorney General argues that equitable principles require that the injunction be no more burdensome than necessary - 6 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 7 of 17 PageID #:1384 Add. 97 to resolve a plaintiff’s injury. While true that an injunction should be “no more burdensome than necessary to provide complete relief,” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 778 (1994), a nationwide injunction is necessary to provide complete relief from the likely constitutional violation at issue here. See, McBride, 124 F.3d at 873; see also, Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963) (“The very nature of the rights appellants seek to vindicate requires that the decree run to the benefit not only of appellants but also for all persons similarly situated.”). As the City’s cited authority indicates, nationwide injunctions have been upheld numerous times where the remedy provided relief to non-parties as well as the plaintiff. See, e.g., Decker v. O’Donnell, 661 F.2d 598, 618 (7th Cir. 1980); Texas nationwide v. scope U.S., of 809 F.3d at preliminary 187-88 n. injunction 211 (upholding and collecting cases). Most validates significantly, the injunction here. a nationwide recent Supreme application of Court the decision preliminary In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 583 U.S. __ (2017), the Fourth Circuit upheld the nationwide scope of a preliminary injunction enjoining, inter alia, portions of the President’s executive order barring - 7 - certain foreign nationals Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 8 of 17 PageID #:1385 Add. 98 from entering the United States. The government appealed and, while moved the appeal injunction. was pending, for a stay of the See, Trump v. IRAP, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2083 (2017). The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to stay the nationwide injunction. Id. at 2089. Although the Supreme Court narrowed the categories of persons to whom the injunction applied, the nationwide application of the injunction was upheld “with respect to parties similarly situated to [the plaintiffs].” Id. at 2088. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis, the scope of the nationwide preliminary injunction at issue here includes governments. argument injunction situated states and local In fact, the dissenting Justices made the exact the criticizing similarly Attorney the for General majority other for similarly advances upholding situated here, the specifically scope persons and of the ignoring that “a court’s role is to provide relief only to claimants.” Id. at 2090 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quotations and alterations omitted) (“But the Court takes the additional step of keeping the injunctions in place with regard to an unidentified, unnamed group of foreign nationals abroad.”). The Attorney General’s argument to stay the injunction parallels that adopted by the dissent but clearly rejected by - 8 - the majority of the Supreme Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 9 of 17 PageID #:1386 Add. 99 Court. See, id. at 2088. Thus, the Court is duty-bound to reject it here as well. Similarly, injunction the where Seventh the Circuit evidence involved one jurisdiction. has before upheld the a nationwide court primarily In Decker, the appellant argued that the district court erred by entering a nationwide injunction where the fact-finding had focused on Milwaukee County. Decker, 661 F.2d at 617-18. See, The court affirmed the nationwide scope of the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the court’s “analysis . . . relied primarily on the statute and regulation and ha[d] used the evidence on funding in Milwaukee County merely as illustration.” Id. at 618. The Attorney General’s authority for cabining injunctive relief to only the plaintiff’s injury is distinguishable. In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010), the Supreme Court violation federal of reviewed the agency statement overturned lawfully completing the to the to a new injunction Policy complete environmental an alfalfa. emphasizing partial based Environmental deregulating injunction, approve permanent National failed prior a The that deregulation environmental - 9 - of impact harming the plaintiffs. Id. at 165-66. the Act on a where a impact Supreme Court agency could alfalfa statement before without Because the district Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 10 of 17 PageID #:1387 Add. 100 court had enjoined the agency from approving not just a complete but also a partial deregulation, the injunction was overbroad. Ibid. does Monsanto not apply here. In Monsanto, the injunction prevented the agency from using its lawful authority to impose a partial deregulation that had not been shown to harm the plaintiffs. has lawful no authority conditions. An inhibits Attorney the Here, the Attorney General likely See, ibid. to injunction statutory authority. impose is General not the assessed injunction defendants’ “whether burden significant no acting and access it merely his likely where beyond Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. the more government Because the injunction there First applied a different standard. Court notice overbroad from 753 (1994), is also inapplicable. restricted the Amendment rights, See, id. at 765. challenged speech interest.” than There, the provisions necessary Ibid. Madsen No to of the serve similar a First Amendment concern is present here. With General respect argues to that equitable staying considerations, the nationwide the sweep Attorney of the injunction would allow the Department to include the notice and access conditions in award notifications while a decision on the merits is reached, thus preventing burdens on localities that might attend a significant delay in Byrne JAG funding. - 10 - The Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 11 of 17 PageID #:1388 Add. 101 difficulty with this proposition is that, in essence, the proposed “fix” would allow the Attorney General to impose what this Court has ruled are likely unconstitutional conditions across a number of jurisdictions prior to a decision on the merits. This is not an equitable result, particularly where the Court’s preliminary injunction merely preserves the status quo to await a final decision. AND PROCEDURE § 65.20 522 Weinberger, See, Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2017); F.2d 921, see 926 also, (7th Am. Cir. Med. 1975) Ass’n v. (upholding preliminary injunction that preserved status quo for resolution on the merits). Finally, the Attorney General argues that applicants who contest the conditions may file their own lawsuits while jurisdictions that do not contest the conditions may receive immediate funding conditions while by the acceding appeal is to the notice pending. and access Considering that thirty-seven cities and counties have signed on as amicus curiae in support of the City, judicial economy counsels against requiring all these jurisdictions (and potentially others) to file their own lawsuits to decide the same legal question before this Court. (See, generally, ECF No. 51, Brief of Amici Curiae County of Santa Clara, 36 Additional Cities, Counties and Municipal Agencies, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National - 11 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 12 of 17 PageID #:1389 Add. 102 League of Cities, International the National Municipal Association Lawyers of Counties, Association, and the the International City/County Management Association (“Amicus Brief of Counties, Cities, and Others”).) Furthermore, all jurisdictions remain free to adopt the substance of the notice and access conditions if they wish to do so. only prevents the Attorney General conditions on the Byrne JAG funds. from The injunction imposing them as If, however, the Attorney General wishes to reserve his right to tether the notice and access conditions to eligibility for these funds, he must await a decision that upholds his authority to do so. Although not specifically raised by the Attorney General, there are injunction. reasons to be cautious when imposing a nationwide Recent legal scholarship has identified significant concerns related to the use of nationwide injunctions at the district court and circuit court levels. See, generally, Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction (February 9, 2017) (forthcoming publication), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract= 2864175; Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 487 (2016); Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non- 12 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 13 of 17 PageID #:1390 Add. 103 Class Litigation, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 2017 (2015). injunctions may increase forum shopping, lead to Nationwide conflicting injunctions, and stymie the development of the law within the Circuits prior to Supreme Court review. These concerns are not insignificant but fail to overcome the benefits of a nationwide injunction in this specific instance. First and foremost, there has been no evidence of forum shopping here and neither party has argued as such. Second, as explained above, judicial economy favors avoiding “a flood of duplicative litigation” from other Byrne JAG applicants who want the same protections as the City of Chicago. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Certainly, it would at least include the thirty-seven cities and counties that filed briefs in support of the City of Chicago as amici. See, ECF No. 51, Amicus Brief of Counties, Cities, and Others; see also, A-1 Cigarette Vending, Inc. v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. 345, 358 (2001) (“It would be senseless to require the relitigation of the validity of a regulation in all federal district courts”). Nevertheless, issuing a nationwide injunction should not be a default approach. It is an extraordinary remedy that should be limited by the nature of the constitutional violation and subject to prudent use by the courts. See, Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (noting - 13 - that injunctive relief is Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 14 of 17 PageID #:1391 Add. 104 limited to the “extent of the violation established”). In this case, the Court finds it an appropriate remedy based on the need for federal uniformity and the unfairness resulting from disparate applications. The rule of law is undermined where a court holds that the Attorney General conduct, but jurisdictions is likely nevertheless across the engaging allows country. in legally that The unauthorized conduct Courts have in other a “well- recognized interest in ensuring that federal courts interpret federal law in a uniform way.” 362, 389–90 (2000). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. Further, the public interest and perception of the law supports “having congressional enactments properly interpreted protection and of applied. the public . . . interest As it with is which principally [the court the is] concerned, no artificial restrictions of the court’s power to grant equitable relief in the furtherance of that interest can be acknowledged.” Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 534- 35 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (internal quotations and citations omitted). All similarly-situated persons are entitled to similar outcomes under the law, and as a corollary, an injunction that results in unequal treatment of litigants appears arbitrary. See, id. at 534 (“[Where] a lower court . . . has spoken, that court would ordinarily give the same relief to any individual who comes to - 14 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 15 of 17 PageID #:1392 Add. 105 it with an essentially similar cause of action. . . . The rule of law requires no less.”); see also, Sandford v. R. L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he settled rule is that whether plaintiff proceeds as an individual or on a class suit basis, the requested injunctive relief generally will benefit not only the claimant but all other persons subject to the practice or the rule under attack.”) (internal quotations and alterations scope would omitted). leave the An injunction Attorney more General restricted free to in continue enforcing the likely invalid conditions against all other Byrne JAG applicants. This state of affairs flies in the face of the rule of law and the role of the courts to ensure the rule of law is enforced. This is especially true considering the judiciary has an important role to play in enforcing the separation of powers. See, NLRB v. Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2559-60 (2014) (“[T]he separation of powers . . . serve[s] to safeguard individual liberty, and . . . it is the duty of the judicial department — in a separation-of-powers case as in any other — to say what the law is.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). the court significant, believes it right itself.” may the write underlying injunctive right relief to as “When be highly broad as the Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 636 - 15 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 16 of 17 PageID #:1393 Add. 106 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (quotations omitted). District courts appropriate Capitol are scope Serv., given of Inc., an broad authority injunction. 756 F.2d to See, 502, determine United 507 (7th States Cir. the v. 1985) (“Geographical limitations regarding the issues at trial do not alter the court’s broad remedial powers.”); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, (affirming Inc., the 444 F.2d “district 1194, court’s 1201-02 power to (7th Cir. consider 1971) extending relief beyond the named plaintiff” “where justice requires such action”). If this Court is incorrect, the appellate process is the vehicle to correct the error. The Court is sympathetic to the Attorney General’s quandary and agrees that, ideally, a final decision on the merits would be reached before practical constraints force a surrender of his policy position (at least for FY 2017). However, this concern is better dealt with through expedited proceedings than a stay that would likely result in imposition conditions on Byrne JAG applicants. Attorney General opposed the of unconstitutional The Court notes that the City’s Motion for Expedited Briefing that would have resulted in an earlier decision on the City’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (See, ECF No. 28, Def.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Expedite Briefing Schedule.) - 16 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 98 Filed: 10/13/17 Page 17 of 17 PageID #:1394 Add. 107 Applicants for a stay have a threshold burden to demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and that irreparable harm will result if the stay is denied. Matter of Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d at 1300–01. Where the applicant “does not make the requisite showings on either of [the threshold] factors, the court’s inquiry into the balance of harms is unnecessary, and the further analysis.” Id. at 1301. stay should be denied without Because the Attorney General is not able to meet its threshold burden of showing some likelihood of success on its motion to stay nationwide application of the preliminary injunction, no further analysis is necessary. See, ibid. For the reasons IV. CONCLUSION stated herein, the Attorney General’s Motion to Stay Nationwide Application of Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 80] is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court Dated: October 13, 2017 - 17 - Case: 17-2991 Document: 27 Filed: 10/20/2017 Pages: 3 Add. 108 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 ORDER October 20, 2017 Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff - Appellee No. 17-2991 v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant - Appellant Originating Case Information: District Court No: 1:17-cv-05720 Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division District Judge Harry D. Leinenweber The following are before the court: 1. MOTION TO SUSPEND BRIEFING ON AND CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL STAY PENDING APPEAL, filed on October 16, 2017, by counsel for the appellee. 2. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING ON AND CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANTAPPELLANT’S MOTION FOR A PARTIAL STAY PENDING APPEAL, filed on October 18, 2017, by counsel for the appellee. Case: 17-2991 Document: 27 Filed: 10/20/2017 Pages: 3 Add. 109 Appeal No. 17-2991 Page 2 On September 15, 2017, the district court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the City of Chicago's request for a preliminary injunction. The order enjoined imposition of notice and access conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program and applied the injunction nationwide. The Attorney General appealed on September 26 and asked this court to stay the nationwide application of the district court's order. On October 13 the City asked the district court to partially reconsider its preliminary injunction order and enjoin the imposition of a third grant condition requiring it to certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. The City then asked us to suspend proceedings in this court, arguing that its motion to reconsider deprives this court of jurisdiction over the Attorney General's appeal. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(i) says, "If a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or enters a judgment--but before it disposes of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A)--the notice becomes effective to appeal a judgment or order, in whole or in part, when the order disposing of the last such remaining motion is entered." The list in Rule 4(a)(4)(A) includes a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59. The City of Chicago filed its motion to reconsider within 28 days after entry of the district court's preliminary injunction order, making it a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). In Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 403 (1982), the Supreme Court said that "a premature notice of appeal 'shall have no effect' . . . In short it is as if no notice of appeal were filed at all. And if no notice of appeal is filed at all, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to act." Griggs quoted an earlier version of Rule 4(a)(4) that required dismissal of a premature appeal; under the current version of the rule a court of appeals may stay an appeal until the motion to reconsider is decided, but the appellate court lacks jurisdiction until the notice of appeal becomes effective. See Katerinos v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 368 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 2004). The Attorney General concedes that the City's motion to reconsider is one filed under Rule 59(e), but argues that this court retains jurisdiction because the motion to reconsider does not pertain to the grant of injunctive relief that is the subject of his appeal. The Attorney General argues that the district court's ruling on the City's motion to reconsider the denial of injunctive relief on the § 1373 condition will have no effect on this court's review of the portion of the district court's order granting injunctive relief on the notice and access conditions. But a "judgment" as defined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) includes "any order from which an appeal lies." The City of Chicago has filed a motion to alter or amend the same judgment that the Attorney General seeks to appeal. To prevent two courts from having power to modify the same judgment, Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(i) renders a notice of appeal ineffective until the motion to reconsider the judgment is resolved. See Square D Co. v. Fastrak Softworks, Inc., 107 F.3d 448, 450 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal from grant of preliminary injunction as premature because motion to reconsider pending in district court); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 739 F.2d 284, 284 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal where motion to Case: 17-2991 Document: 27 Filed: 10/20/2017 Pages: 3 Add. 110 Appeal No. 17-2991 Page 3 reconsider addressed copyright claim and notice of appeal addressed different parts of judgment). The Attorney General also argues that it is significant that the motion to reconsider was filed by the party that prevailed on its request for injunctive relief rather than the party that appealed. But Rule 4(a)(4)(A) says that the filing of a designated motion extends "the time for appeal for all parties" (emphasis added) and thus the notice of appeal has no effect even if not filed by the appealing party. See Haas v. Tulsa Police Dept. ex rel. City of Tulsa, 58 Fed. Appx. 429 (10th Cir. 2003). Under the clear language of Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(i), the Attorney General's appeal does not take effect until the motion to reconsider is resolved. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the City of Chicago's motion is GRANTED and proceedings in this court are SUSPENDED until the district court resolves the City's motion for reconsideration. The parties shall file a status report with this court within two days after the district court resolves the City's motion to reconsider. form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177) Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 1 of 31 PageID #:1746 Add. 111 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff, Case No. 17 C 5720 v. Judge Harry D. Leinenweber JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Two Motions are before the Court. The first is the City of Chicago’s (“Chicago”) Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Court’s September 15, 2017 Opinion granting in part and denying in part Chicago’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction against certain conditions on the 2017 Byrne JAG grant. The second is the United States Conference of Mayors’ Motion to Intervene as of right and, alternatively, permissively. For the reasons stated herein, Chicago’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration [ECF No. 99] and the Conference’s Motion to Intervene [ECF No. 91] are denied. I. BACKGROUND The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (“Byrne JAG grant”) is an annual federal grant that provides financial assistance for state and local law enforcement Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 2 of 31 PageID #:1747 Add. 112 efforts. See, 34 U.S.C. § 10152. The Attorney General has attached three conditions to the 2017 Byrne JAG grant that are contested in this lawsuit, referred to as the notice, access, and compliance conditions, respectively. See, City of Chi. v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847, at *4-9 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017). The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts of this case as recited in its previous opinion granting in part and denying in part Chicago’s motion for a preliminary injunction, see, generally, id., and will engage in only a procedural summary here. On August 10, 2017, preliminary injunction, imposed the on unconstitutional. On September 2017 Chicago arguing Byrne moved that JAG all grant for a nationwide three conditions were unlawful and Sessions, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847 at *4. 15, 2017, the Court granted a preliminary injunction as to the notice and access conditions, but denied the preliminary injunction as to the compliance condition. Id. at *44. On September 26, 2017, the Attorney General filed a notice of appeal and moved to stay the nationwide scope of the injunction pending appeal. 2017, ECF Preliminary No. 79; Motion Injunction, (See, Notice of Appeal, Sept. 26, to Stay Sept. 26, Nationwide 2017, ECF Application No. 80.) of The Attorney General argued to this Court that Chicago, as the only - 2 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 3 of 31 PageID #:1748 Add. 113 plaintiff, lacked standing to pursue an injunction nationwide in scope. The United States Conference of Mayors (the “Conference”) then moved to intervene on October 6, 2017. (See, Conference’s Mot. to Intervene, Oct. 6, 2017, ECF No. 91.) On October 13, 2017, this Court denied the Attorney General’s Motion to Stay the nationwide scope of the injunction. City of Chi. v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169518, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017). On that same day, the Attorney Circuit General nationwide petitioned injunction, the and Seventh Chicago to moved stay for the partial reconsideration of the denial of the preliminary injunction as to the third condition, Defendant-Appellant’s Mot. the for compliance Partial condition. Stay of (See, Prelim. Inj. Pending Appeal, No. 17-2991, Oct. 13, 2017, Dkt. 8; Chicago’s Mot. for October Partial 16, Recons., 2017, Chicago Oct. 13, moved 2017, to ECF No. suspend 99.) On briefing and consideration of the partial stay in the Seventh Circuit due to the motion Court. for partial reconsideration pending before this (See, Mot. to Suspend Consideration of Mot. for Partial Stay, No. 17-2991, Oct. 16, 2017, Dkt. 10.) On October 20, 2017, the Seventh Circuit granted Chicago’s Motion to suspend proceedings on appeal pending this Court’s Chicago’s motion for partial reconsideration. - 3 - resolution of (See, Order, City Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 4 of 31 PageID #:1749 Add. 114 of Chi. v. Case Sessions, No. 17-2991, Dkt. 27 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2017).) This Court now takes the two pending motions in turn. II. A. Chicago ANALYSIS The City of Chicago’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration asks the Court to reconsider its denial of the preliminary injunction as to the compliance condition on the Byrne JAG grant. As explored thoroughly in the Court’s September 15, 2017 Opinion, the compliance condition requires a grant applicant to certify its compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a federal law that prohibits certain restrictions on communication between federal immigration agents and state and local government officials regarding an individual’s immigration status. See, 8 U.S.C. § 1373. Chicago bases its Motion on a letter to Eddie T. Johnson, Chicago Superintendent of Police, from Alan Hanson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, dated October 11, 2017. (See, Oct. 11, 2017 Letter, Ex. A to Decl. of Ari Holtzblatt, ECF No. 103 (“DOJ Letter”).) The letter states that the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) has determined that Chicago is in violation of Section 1373 based on its preliminary review of ineligible Chicago’s for Byrne laws JAG and policies, funding. - 4 - (Ibid.) and is therefore According to the Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 5 of 31 PageID #:1750 Add. 115 letter, the DOJ found that at least one section of Chicago’s Welcoming City Ordinance violates Section 1373 (and potentially several other sections as well, depending interpretation of the ordinance). (Ibid.) by inviting a response and/or on Chicago’s The letter concludes additional documentation from Chicago based on the DOJ’s preliminary assessment, noting that the letter does not constitute final agency action. (Ibid.) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for motions for reconsideration. do not expressly However, these motions are common and understood to fall under either Rule 59(e) (to amend or alter a judgment) or Rule 60(b) (for relief from a judgment or order). See, FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 60. Although Chicago does not explicitly state the Federal Rule it is moving under, the Seventh Circuit reconsideration under proceedings appeal, and (See, Order, their on briefs. Rule construed 59(e) the in Chicago’s its parties City of decision reference Chi. v. motion to for suspend Rule 59 Sessions, in Case No. 17-2991, Dkt. 27 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2017); Chicago’s Mot. for Partial Recons., ¶ 5; Opp’n to Pl.’s Recons., at 2, Oct. 23, 2017, ECF No. 110.) Mot. for Partial As such, the Court construes the motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Rule 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a judgment if the movant clearly establishes: (1) that the court committed a - 5 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 6 of 31 PageID #:1751 Add. 116 manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013). provide a vehicle for a party to undo its “It does not own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.” Ibid. (quoting Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)). on the second Chicago moves this Court to reconsider based option: newly evidence. To succeed on a motion under Rule 59 by invoking newly discovered evidence, a party must show that: discovered “(1) it has evidence that was discovered post-trial [or judgment]; (2) it had exercised due diligence to discover the new evidence; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence is material; and (5) the evidence is such that [it] would probably produce a new result.” Id. at 955 (quoting Envtl. Barrier Co., LLC v. Slurry Sys., Inc., 540 F.3d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 2008)) (citation omitted). Motions for reconsideration “should only be granted in rare circumstances,” and district courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to grant them. Anderson v. Holy See, 934 F.Supp.2d 954, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of - 6 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 7 of 31 PageID #:1752 Add. 117 Chicago, 759 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2014); see also, Harrington v. City of Chi., 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that motions to reconsider are discretionary). In support of its motion to reconsider, Chicago points to this Court’s holding that “only affirmative demands on states constitute a violation of the Tenth Amendment” and “Section 1373 imposes no affirmative obligation on local governments.” of Chi. v. Sessions, No. 17 C 5720, 2017 149847, at *37-38 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 15, 2017). DOJ Letter obligations interprets in Section contravention reconsideration proper. of U.S. City Dist. LEXIS It argues that the 1373 to impose this Court’s affirmative ruling, making See, ibid. The Court disagrees. Nothing in the DOJ Letter contravenes the Court’s prior ruling, which did not rest on either the DOJ or Chicago’s interpretation of Section 1373’s requirements but, instead, rests solely on the text of Section 1373. Sessions, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149487 at *35-38. ruled on the challenge. construction constitutionality See, ibid. during the of Section 1373 as See, The Court a facial Both parties not only agreed with that preliminary injunction hearing, but framed the central legal issue in facial terms and argued for such an approach. In response to the Court’s question about what Section 1373 allows, Mr. Readler on behalf of the Attorney - 7 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 8 of 31 PageID #:1753 Add. 118 General stated: “Let me say we’re also here on a facial challenge, so [Chicago] [has] not – [Chicago is] not asking for a preliminary injunction today to declare that [Chicago’s] law is in compliance with 1373. That issue would probably require some discovery in terms of how it’s executed.” Hr’g at 53:3-8.) (Prelim. Inj. Similarly, in response to the Court’s question about whether Chicago was requesting an injunction limited to Chicago, Honor. Mr. Safer on behalf of Chicago answered, “No, your We’re asking for a nationwide injunction because this is a facial challenge to a . . . provision that is applied across the country.” (Id. at 62:9-14.) question about whether The Court asked a follow-up Chicago’s Welcoming City Ordinance distinguished it from other jurisdictions, to which Mr. Safer responded that he “agree[d] with the Attorney General . . . that this is a facial challenge, and . . . [that] it is a matter of saying that these conditions are unconstitutional, ultra vires, without (Id. at authority, and 62:7-63:5.) interpretation of that The Section applies DOJ 1373 throughout Letter would the country.” a different advancing not change facial analysis of the Tenth Amendment challenge. the DOJ Letter does not meet two of the Court’s Accordingly, requirements reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence: - 8 - the for it is not Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 9 of 31 PageID #:1754 Add. 119 “material” to the Court’s facial analysis, and its consideration would not “produce a new result.” Beyrer, 722 F.3d at 955. Furthermore, Chicago’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration brings up issues that were never previously before the Court. Chicago did not request a declaration of compliance with Section 1373 in its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, making its Motion for Reconsideration an improper vehicle for injecting this issue into the case. See, Beyrer, 722 F.3d at 954 (quoting Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 529) (“[Reconsideration] certainly does not allow a party to . . . advance arguments that could . . . have been presented judgment.”). In to the addition, district a denial court of prior Chicago’s to the Motion for Reconsideration will not prevent it from seeking this relief. Included in Chicago’s seven-count Complaint is Count V, which seeks a declaratory Section 1373. Motion for judgment that Chicago complies with The argument that Chicago makes in support of its Reconsideration is a distinct issue and more appropriately ruled upon separately, rather than inserting an as-applied challenge into what was previously unanimously formulated and subsequently ruled on as a facial challenge. Moreover, addressing an as-applied challenge Section 1373 based on the DOJ Letter is premature. to The DOJ Letter specifically disclaims final agency action and invites - 9 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 10 of 31 PageID #:1755 Add. 120 Chicago to respond before a final determination is made. If the DOJ makes a final determination that Chicago is eligible for 2017 Byrne JAG funds, then no harm accrues to Chicago. Although Chicago argues that the DOJ letter “staked out a final view” on Section 1373, this does not change the fact that the DOJ has yet to make a determination about Chicago’s eligibility for funds. (See, Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Recons., ECF No. 114, Oct. 30, 2017, at 3.) Litigating a policy position based on a preliminary assessment is premature, and this Court will not do so. Accordingly, the Court denies Chicago’s Motion for Reconsideration because the DOJ letter is not “material” to the Court’s facial analysis and its consideration would not “produce a new result.” Beyrer, 722 F.3d at 955. Further, reconsideration is improper because the question whether Chicago complies with Section 1373 was not before the Court in its prior ruling. See, id. at 954. B. The U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Motion to Intervene The Conference Rule 24(a) of the moves Federal to intervene Rules of as Civil alternatively, permissively under Rule 24(b). P. 24. of right Procedure under and, See, FED. R. CIV. The Seventh Circuit has cautioned district courts to keep the two inquiries — the inquiry under Rule 24(a) and the - 10 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 11 of 31 PageID #:1756 Add. 121 inquiry under Rule 24(b) — distinct. City of Chi. v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 987 (7th Cir. 2011). The Conference is the official non-partisan organization of U.S. cities with populations of 30,000 or more. Intervene, ¶ 2.) that federal The Conference’s role includes “ensur[ing] policy “coordinat[ion] (See, Mot. to on meets shared urban policy needs” goals.” and (See, promoting Intervenor’s Compl., Ex. 1 to Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 91, Oct. 6, 2017, ¶¶ 17-19.) The Conference alleges that its members adopt policy positions that collectively represent the views of the nation’s mayors. (See, Mot. to Intervene, ¶ 2.) In this specific instance, the Conference has adopted a policy opposing punitive sanctuary city practices, including challenged in this litigation. 1. the three conditions (Ibid.) Standing Before we proceed to determine if the Conference meets the requirements of intervention under either Rule, we must first analyze whether it has standing. The U.S. Supreme Court recently held that “an intervenor of right must have Article III standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that which is sought by a party with standing.” Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017). parties dispute whether the Conference - 11 - is seeking The relief Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 12 of 31 PageID #:1757 Add. 122 “different” from that Chicago seeks. Regardless, in this Circuit an intervenor as of right must demonstrate Article III standing. See, Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 578 F.3d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 2009) (“No one can maintain an action in a federal court … unless he has standing to sue, in the sense required by Article III of the Constitution . . . .”); see also, FEMA, 660 F.3d at 985 (noting that “more than Article III standing must be required” for intervention). Article III of the Constitution limits the exercise of the judicial power to “Cases” art. III, § 2, cl. 1. and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. “‘The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.’” Town of 137 S.Ct. 568 U.S. Chester, at 1650 398, 408 (quoting Clapper (2013)). “Standing exists when the plaintiff suffers an actual v. Amnesty Int’l USA, or impending injury, no matter how small; the injury is caused by the defendant’s acts; and a judicial plaintiff’s favor would redress the injury.” decision in the Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “It has long been settled that even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members.” Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. - 12 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 13 of 31 PageID #:1758 Add. 123 274, 281 (1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted). association has members where: standing to bring a suit on behalf of An its “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” the Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Because its constituents have standing to bring the same challenge that Chicago has brought and the Conference has adopted a policy at odds with the Attorney General’s Byrne JAG conditions, the Conference asserts that it has associational standing. The Attorney General disputes standing. First, the Attorney General argues that the Conference cannot represent the cities (who have individual standing) because it is composed of mayors rather than the cities themselves. The Conference responds that it is comprised of cities but represented by their respective motion to mayors. In intervene, allegations as true. evaluating the of the must potential accept intervenor’s all factual Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1995). assertions Court a Accordingly, we accept the factual Conference at - 13 - this stage. Second, the Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 14 of 31 PageID #:1759 Add. 124 Attorney General argues that the Conference is not authorized to litigate on behalf of the cities, but offers no authority for the proposition that litigation must be specifically authorized by members. proposition interest. Indeed, the Court can find no authority for this outside the context of inter-member conflicts of See, Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 76 F.3d 856, 865 (7th Cir. 1996). Finally, the Attorney General contends that the Conference does not have approximately Conference standing 1,400 itself is to cities bring that ineligible claims it for on behalf represents Byrne JAG of the because the funds and it cannot represent the members because the member cities would not be bound by the judgment. The Seventh Circuit has rejected this argument: The defendants argue that the association should not be accorded standing because a judgment against it might not be binding upon its members. We see little likelihood that the defendants will suffer the burden of relitigating the claims raised in this case. The Stare decisis effect of our decision provides the defendants with substantial protection against further litigation. Chicago-Midwest Meat Ass’n v. City of Evanston, 589 F.2d 278, 281 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1978). Additionally, although members may not in individually be bound cases - 14 - based on associational Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 15 of 31 PageID #:1760 Add. 125 standing, the U.S. Supreme associational standing. Turning to the Court has nonetheless recognized See, Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. requirements for associational standing, first, the member cities have the ability to sue on their own behalf, just as Chicago does. Second, the Conference’s interest in protecting local policy decisions in immigration enforcement is germane to the organizational power of city government. Mot. to Intervene, ¶¶ purpose as it involves the (See, Intervenor’s Compl., Ex. 1 to 17-22.) Additionally, the Conference adopted three official resolutions regarding federal sanctuary policies. (Id. ¶¶ 58-70.) Each resolution passed by a wide majority of its voting members. (Id. at ¶ 70.) Third, the relief sought is of a sort – declaratory and injunctive – that is amenable to associational standing. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld a union’s associational standing where neither the “claims nor the relief sought required the District Court to consider the individual circumstances of any aggrieved [union] member” Brock, and 477 “[t]he U.S. at suit raise[d] 288; see also, a pure question Crawford v. of law.” Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (holding that the Democratic Party had standing to assert the rights of members prevented from voting by imposition of a new photo ID law). Here, the Conference seeks to intervene - 15 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 16 of 31 PageID #:1761 Add. 126 to support the nationwide scope of relief and intends to raise only raises legal questions that are not contingent on evidence from a specific city. (See, Intervenor’s Compl., Ex. 1 to Mot. to Intervene, ¶¶ 91-154.) Furthermore, the Conference reassures the Court that its intervention will not require individualized proof or other additional evidence. (See, Reply in Supp. of Pl.’s 11.) Mot. reflects for Partial questions of Recons., law, at the Conference As its has complaint established associational standing and therefore can represent the interests of its members who may suffer an impending injury caused by the defendant’s acts, which injury may be remedied by a favorable judicial decision. at 708. See, Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; Bauer, 620 F.3d This is sufficient to demonstrate standing. 2. See, ibid. Intervention as of Right a. Legal Standard In order to intervene as of right, the U.S. Conference of Mayors must satisfy four requirements: (1) timely application; (2) an interest relating to the subject matter of the action; (3) potential interest by impairment, the disposition as of a practical the action; matter, of and lack (4) that of adequate representation of the interest by the existing parties to the action. Reich, 64 F.3d at 321 (quotation omitted). “The burden is on the party seeking to intervene of right to show - 16 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 17 of 31 PageID #:1762 Add. 127 that all four criteria are met.” Reid L. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 289 F.3d 1009, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985)). Failure to satisfy any one factor mandates denial of the petition. United States v. City of Chicago, 908 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir.1990), cert. 498 denied, U.S. 1067 (1991). The Court analyzes the four factors, although it does so out of sequence for reasons that will become apparent. b. Timeliness Turning to the first requirement, “[t]imeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances.” Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973). Such a determination is committed discretion of the district judge. Ibid. to the sound The Seventh Circuit has characterized the test as “essentially one of reasonableness,” stating that “potential intervenors need to be reasonably diligent in learning of a suit that might affect their rights, and upon Reich, 64 assessment so learning F.3d of at they 321 timeliness need to (quotation is made act reasonably omitted). under the promptly.” Although totality circumstances, the Court should consider four factors: of the the “(1) the length of time the intervenor knew or should have known of his or her interest in this case; (2) the prejudice to the original - 17 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 18 of 31 PageID #:1763 Add. 128 party caused by the delay; (3) the resulting prejudice to the intervenor if the circumstances.” motion is denied, and (4) any unusual Ragsdale, 941 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1985)). “In making this determination, we must also consider the prejudice to the original parties if intervention is permitted and the prejudice to the intervenor if his motion is denied.” Reich, 64 F.3d at 321 (citation omitted). The Conference argues that its Motion to Intervene is timely because it did not recognize a need to intervene, nor could it reasonably have been expected to, until September 26, 2017, when the Attorney General filed a motion to stay arguing that Chicago did not have standing to sustain the nationwide injunction. The Conference appeared before the Court two days later and, after securing leave, filed its motion to intervene eight days later. (See, Mot. to Intervene, ¶ 19.) The Attorney General argues that the Conference knew or should have known that its putative interests were at stake in this litigation from the filing date of this lawsuit, August 7, 2017, and thus was required to intervene from the beginning (or at least much earlier). The Court finds the Conference’s Motion timely. Timeliness is not determined from “the moment the suit is filed or even at - 18 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 19 of 31 PageID #:1764 Add. 129 the time they learn of its existence,” but from “the time the potential intervenors impaired.” learn that their interest might be Reich, 64 F.3d at 321 (citing United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1989); Rowe, 759 F.2d at 612); but see, United States v. City of Chicago, 908 F.2d 197, 199 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that courts should still consider the length of time the intervenor knew or should have known of his interest in the case). Here, the Conference persuasively argues that the Attorney General’s motion to stay was its first indication of potential impairment to its members’ interests. Indeed, an earlier intervention attempt would likely have been dead on arrival, as it would have been difficult to argue that Chicago was an inadequate Conference’s members’ interests. representative of the See, Flying J, 578 F.3d at 572 (holding that intervention was timely even after judgment where state attorney general decided not to pursue appeal because “[h]ad the association sought to intervene earlier, its motion would doubtless (and properly) have been denied on the ground that the state’s attorney general was defending the statute . . . .”); Wisconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (when “the prospective intervenor and the named party have the same goal, a presumption exists that representation is adequate”) - 19 - (alterations and quotation Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 20 of 31 PageID #:1765 Add. 130 omitted). In the same vein, the Seventh Circuit in Reich found intervention timely where the intervenors moved to intervene as soon as reasoning they discovered that “we do the not other expect party a was party to inadequate, petition for intervention in instances in which the potential intervenor has no reason to believe its interests are not being properly represented; we went so far as to suggest that the potential intervenor would be laughed out of court.” 322. Nevertheless, intervention as the even using lodestar, the the Reich, 64 F.3d at time from approximately filing to three-month interim is reasonably timely under the circumstances, especially in view of the untimely intervention cases cited by the Attorney General involving intervention action was filed. attempts many years after the See, CE Design Ltd. v. King Supply Co., 791 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 2015); Larson v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 530 F.3d 578, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2008); Sokaogon Chippewa Community. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. City of Chicago, 908 F.2d 197, 197-200 (7th Cir. 1990). The intervene Attorney is General untimely also contends because the that the Conference motion to chose to participate as an amicus at the beginning of the litigation and cannot now alter that decision after a favorable ruling. - 20 - The Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 21 of 31 PageID #:1766 Add. 131 Attorney General implies that the Conference held back on intervention due to gamesmanship – that the Conference waited to see how the Court would rule on Chicago’s motion for a preliminary injunction before moving to intervene because it did not want to be bound by any unfavorable judgment. However, it is doubtful that this was the motivation for the Conference’s later intervention, as the individual member cities may not be bound by an Section II.B.1, reason for unfavorable Secondly, supra.) waiting – decision its belief regardless. the that (See, Conference’s Chicago was adequately representing its members’ interests – are colorable. other cases appropriate found where intervene. the have a intervention specific later event in revealed asserted the Indeed, litigation the need to For example, in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, Supreme Court held that intervention was timely on the rationale that “[a]s soon as it became clear to the respondent that the interests of the unnamed class members would no longer be protected by the named class representatives, she promptly moved to intervene to protect those interests.” United Airlines, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977). In determining timeliness, “the possible prejudice to the parties.” v. Coglianese, 236 F.R.D. 379, 384 - 21 - Court must assess the Zurich Capital Mkts., Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 22 of 31 PageID #:1767 Add. 132 Reich, 64 F.3d proceeding General. at does 322). not Intervention significantly at this time prejudice the in the Attorney Although the Court has made substantive rulings, the litigation is not at an advanced stage, and the Attorney General has yet to answer the intervention, noting that Complaint. “any See, prejudice (granting ibid to ZCM that would result from the Liquidator’s intervention would result simply by virtue of the Liquidator’s involvement in the case, not from the Liquidator’s caused by delay delay in is moving further to intervene”). diminished by Any the prejudice Conference’s assertion that it will not seek to add any new legal issues into the case nor members. Recons., adduce (See, at 11.) substantial Reply in “[I]n Supp. the evidence of Pl.’s absence of from Mot. any individual for Partial indication of prejudice . . . , the motion cannot be adjudged untimely as a matter of law. We don’t want a rule that would require a potential intervenor to intervene at the drop of a hat; that would just clog the district courts with motions to intervene.” Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Craddieth, 442 F.3d 1018, 1027 (7th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, there is little prejudice to the Conference if intervention is denied as it could bring its own litigation. The Court does not find any significant unusual - 22 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 23 of 31 PageID #:1768 Add. 133 circumstances present to either support or deny intervention. Thus, on balance, the Court finds timeliness satisfied. c. Lack of Adequate Representation Next, an intervenor must demonstrate a lack of adequate representation. This requirement is met “if the applicant shows that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as minimal.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10 (1972) (citation omitted). “However, when the representative party is a governmental body charged by law with protecting the interests of the proposed intervenors, the representative is presumed to adequately represent their interests unless there is a showing of gross negligence or bad faith.” Ligas ex rel. Foster v. Maram, 478 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The Conference argues that the Attorney General’s motion for a stay of the nationwide injunction specifically challenges Chicago’s ability to represent the Conference and its members’ interests. The law requires a high threshold showing of inadequacy where a governmental body, like Chicago, is a party to the litigation. However, that high threshold only applies where the “governmental body or officer [is] charged by law with representing the interests of the proposed intervenor.” - 23 - Keith, Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 24 of 31 PageID #:1769 Add. 134 764 F.2d at 1270 (citations omitted). Here, the high threshold is inapplicable because Chicago as a governmental entity is not charged by Conference law with member representing cities. the Since interests the high of other threshold is inapplicable, the burden is “minimal” and has been met here. The Attorney General’s challenge to Chicago’s ability to pursue a nationwide injunction for member cities of the Conference is sufficient to meet this minimal burden. See, Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n. 10. d. Interest Relating to the Subject Matter of the Action The Court sufficient next interest analyzes in the whether subject the Conference matter of the has a action. Although “[t]he ‘interest’ required by Rule 24(a)(2) has never been defined with particular precision,” it must be “a direct, significant legally protectable interest.” Hartford v. Schipporeit, Inc., 69 F.3d Sec. Ins. Co. of 1377, 1380 (7th Cir. 1995); Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. City of Chi., 865 F.2d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). The necessary interest is “something more than a mere ‘betting’ interest, but less than a property right.” (internal citations Schipporeit, 69 F.3d at 1380–81 omitted). The central inquiry considers “the issues to be resolved by the litigation and whether the potential intervenor has an interest in those issues.” - 24 - Reich, Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 25 of 31 PageID #:1770 Add. 135 64 F.3d at 322 (citations omitted). “Whether an applicant has an interest sufficient to warrant intervention as a matter of right is a highly fact-specific determination, making comparison to other cases of limited value.” Schipporeit, 69 F.3d at 1381 (citations omitted). The Conference contends that it and its members have an interest in protecting their local law enforcement decisions and priorities from being compromised by the three conditions the Attorney General seeks to impose on the 2017 Byrne JAG grant. (See, Mot. to Intervene, ¶ 15.) their complaint leadership,” a list of including The Conference attached to their “2017 information on elected and whether a appointed particular member is slated to receive a Byrne JAG grant allocation. Ex. A to Intervenor’s Compl.) (See, Of the 81 cities listed, 70 cities anticipate receiving a 2017 Byrne JAG grant allocation. (Ibid.) for The Attorney General does not argue the interest factor intervention. Based on each individual city member’s ability to bring its own lawsuit asserting the same interest as Chicago and the Conference’s adoption of the sanctuary city resolutions, the Court finds the interest requirement met. e. Potential Impairment of the Conference’s Interest Finally, the Court must analyze whether the Conference would face “potential impairment, as a practical matter, of that - 25 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 26 of 31 PageID #:1771 Add. 136 interest by the disposition of the action.” 321 (quotation omitted). Reich, 64 F.3d at “The existence of ‘impairment’ depends on whether the decision of a legal question involved in the action would proposed as a practical intervenors in a matter foreclose subsequent rights proceeding.” of the Meridian Homes Corp. v. Nicholas W. Prassas & Co., 683 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). The Conference argues that it and its members’ ability to protect their interests would be impaired without intervention because they would potentially have to file over a thousand additional lawsuits to vindicate the same rights at issue here. (See, Mot. to Intervene, ¶ 16.) correctly points out that However, the Attorney General under the Conference’s theory, it should only need to file one additional lawsuit – its own – in order to support a nationwide injunction to protect these interests. The Attorney General contends that the Conference cannot demonstrate impairment because its rights will not be prejudiced by a judgment in the DOJ’s favor. As the Conference will not be bound by the judgment of this Court, it will be free — if Chicago loses on appeal – to bring litigation challenging the notice and injunction. access conditions and seeking a nationwide However, the fact that the Conference may bring its - 26 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 27 of 31 PageID #:1772 Add. 137 own lawsuit is not determinative. would-be intervenor if “[T]he possibility that the refused intervention might have an opportunity in the future to litigate his claim has been held not to be an automatic bar to intervention.” FEMA, 660 F.3d at 985 (citation omitted). “Impairment under the meaning of Rule 24(a)(2) depends on whether a ruling on a legal question would as a practical matter foreclose the intervenor’s rights in a subsequent proceeding. Such foreclosure is measured by the general standards of stare decisis.” Ill. Revelis v. Napolitano, 844 F.Supp.2d 915, 925 (N.D. 2012) (internal citation omitted). A decision of a district court is not sufficient to establish impairment based on stare decisis. See, Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he opinion of a single district judge rarely yields reasoning carries. an effect broader than the force its Such an influence is not reason enough to complicate litigation by adding [] parties. . . .”). What is more, granted intervention based on stare decisis should be infrequently: When should the prospect of an appellate decision cutting off further litigation in the circuit (or the nation as a whole, if the Supreme Court decides the case) be enough to support intervention? “Infrequently” is one response, an essential one if cases are to remain manageable. Trade associations, labor unions, consumers, and many others may be - 27 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 28 of 31 PageID #:1773 Add. 138 affected by (and hence colloquially “interested” in) the rules of law established by appellate courts. To allow them to intervene as of right would turn the court into a forum for competing interest groups, submerging the ability of the original parties to settle their own dispute (or have the court resolve it expeditiously). Participation as amicus curiae will alert the court to the legal contentions of concerned bystanders, and because it leaves the parties free to run their own case is the strongly preferred option. Id. at 532–33. amicus curiae Accordingly, the Conference’s involvement as is “strongly preferred,” especially considering that any delay here is uniquely harmful given the timeline of the Byrne JAG awards. See, The ibid. nationwide injunction currently in force is sufficient to protect the interests of the Conference’s members and, regardless, a Seventh Circuit decision overturning the nationwide injunction would not suffice to show the potential impairment necessary for intervention as of right. An appellate judgment in the DOJ’s favor that Chicago lacks standing for a nationwide injunction will not preclude or impair the Conference’s ability to bring a subsequent action for a nationwide injunction enjoining the three conditions at issue. See, The ibid. standing issue present for Chicago is not present for the Conference and, thus, this is not a case where the “parties are free to relitigate but are unlikely to get anywhere.” 1119, Ibid. 1122–24 (citing (7th Colby v. Cir.1987)). - 28 - J.C. As to Penney the Co., Seventh 811 F.2d Circuit’s Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 29 of 31 PageID #:1774 Add. 139 ruling on appeal of the notice and access conditions, the Conference’s participation as amicus curiae is adequate to make its legal arguments. The Court finds that the Conference cannot show that a Seventh Circuit ruling will impair or impede its ability to bring an action for a nationwide injunction on behalf of its members. unable to Accordingly, the Court finds the Conference demonstrate potential impairment to its (or its members’) interests at this time. * * * Because the Conference is unable to demonstrate impairment to its interests, we deny the Conference’s Motion to Intervene as of right. See, United States v. City of Chi., 908 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991). 3. Permissive Intervention The Conference moves in the alternative for this Court to allow it to intervene permissively. The court may permit anyone to intervene who, “[o]n timely motion,” “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1). “In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3). Permissive intervention is a practical inquiry. In Justice Posner’s estimation, assuming its - 29 - Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 30 of 31 PageID #:1775 Add. 140 prerequisites have been met, “Rule 24(b) [is] just about economy in litigation.” FEMA, 660 F.3d at 987. The timeliness of the Conference’s Motion to Intervene has been established. (See, Section II.B.2.b, supra.) Further, the Court concludes that there exists a common question of law upon which to base intervention, because the Conference’s involve the same legal questions as Chicago’s claims. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1). Accordingly, the claims See, FED. prerequisites for permissive intervention are met. The Conference argues that permissive intervention is proper here because it intends to advance the exact same claims that Chicago has already advanced, such that intervention will cause no delay or prejudice. It further argues that permissive intervention supports judicial economy by obviating the need for other member cities to bring lawsuits to adjudicate the exact same issues urges that before the intervention Court. Additionally, would resolve the the legal Conference question of standing, obviating the need for the parties and the Seventh Circuit to expend resources addressing it. Permissive finds it premature: currently intervention inappropriate in is this discretionary case. and the Intervention Court here is The interests of the Conference’s member cities are protected via the nationwide - 30 - injunction, and its Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document #: 125 Filed: 11/16/17 Page 31 of 31 PageID #:1776 Add. 141 members’ interests have so far been given a voice via the amicus curiae device. Unless and until the status of the nationwide injunction changes, there is no reason to permit an intervention that will further complicate this litigation. The addition into the case of the Conference and its member cities, while it will not significantly augment the legal or evidentiary issues so as to prejudice the Attorney General, does pose the prospect of needlessly complicating a case that has already engendered significant motions practice. Accordingly, the Court denies the Conference’s Motion for Permissive Intervention. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, Chicago’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration [ECF No. 99] is denied. The Conference’s Motion to Intervene [ECF No. 91] is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge United States District Court Dated: November 16, 2017 - 31 - Case: 17-2991 Document: 33 Filed: 11/21/2017 Pages: 2 Add. 142 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov ORDER November 21, 2017 Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff - Appellee No. 17-2991 v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant - Appellant Originating Case Information: District Court No: 1:17-cv-05720 Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division District Judge Harry D. Leinenweber The following are before the court: 1. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL, filed on October 13, 2017, by counsel for the appellant. 2. OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY NATIONWIDE APPLICATION OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, filed on October 18, 2017, by counsel for the appellee. Case: 17-2991 Document: 33 Filed: 11/21/2017 Pages: 2 Add. 143 No. 17-2991 Page 2 3. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S STATUS REPORT, filed on November 17, 2017, by counsel for the appellant. 4. REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL, filed on November 17, 2017, by counsel for the appellant. 5. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S STATUS REPORT, filed on November 20, 2017, by counsel for the appellee. 6. BRIEF OF STATES OF CALIFORNIA AND ILLINOIS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF CITY OF CHICAGO’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL AND AGAINST THE STAY, filed on November 21, 2017, by counsel. IT IS ORDERED that the motion for partial stay of the preliminary injunction is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that briefing in this appeal shall proceed as follows: 1. The brief and required short appendix of the appellant are due by November 28, 2017. 2. The brief of the appellee is due by December 28, 2017. 3. The reply brief of the appellant, if any, is due by January 11, 2018. Important Scheduling Notice ! Notices of hearing for particular appeals are mailed shortly before the date of oral argument. Criminal appeals are scheduled shortly after the filing of the appellant's main brief; civil appeals after the filing of the appellee's brief. If you foresee that you will be unavailable during a period in which your particular appeal might be scheduled, please write the clerk advising him of the time period and the reason for such unavailability. Session data is located at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/cal/calendar.pdf. Once an appeal is formally scheduled for a certain date, it is very difficult to have the setting changed. See Circuit Rule 34(e). form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177) Case: 17-2991 Document: 116 Filed: 04/24/2018 Add. 144 Pages: 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse  Room 2722 ‐ 219 S. Dearborn Street  Chicago, Illinois 60604 Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435‐5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov ORDER April 24, 2018 Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge CITY OF CHICAGO,  Plaintiff ‐ Appellee No. 17‐2991 v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States,  Defendant ‐ Appellant  Originating Case Information: District Court No: 1:17‐cv‐05720 Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division District Judge Harry D. Leinenweber Upon consideration of the DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING A PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND, IF NECESSARY, A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, filed on April 23, 2018, by counsel for the appellant, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for partial stay is DENIED without prejudice to renewal. To the extent that Attorney General Jefferson Sessions is asking for reconsideration of this courtʹs order denying his motion for partial stay, issued on November 21, 2017, the request is DENIED. No member of the panel has requested that the motion be considered by the court en banc. See Seventh Circuit Operating Procedure 1(a)(2).  If Attorney General Sessions files a petition for rehearing en banc, he may ask this court for a partial stay with his petition or after any decision by this court to rehear this case en banc. It is more appropriate for the full court to consider a request for stay after Attorney General Sessions has presented his arguments for why en banc rehearing of this appeal is warranted.   form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177) Case: 17-2991 Document: 121 Filed: 04/30/2018 Pages: 1 Add. 145 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov REQUEST TO FILE AN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC April 30, 2018 CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff - Appellee No. 17-2991 v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant - Appellant Originating Case Information: District Court No: 1:17-cv-05720 Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division District Judge Harry D. Leinenweber A Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc was filed by counsel for appellant on April 27, 2018. Counsel for appellee is requested to file an answer to the petition by May 14, 2018. Counsel shall file thirty (30) copies of the answer, which shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages. Fed. R. App. P. 40(b). The cover of the answer, if used, must be white. Fed. R. App. P. 32(c)(2)(A). form name: c7_AnswerToEnbancRehearingRequest(form ID: 199) Case: 17-2991 Document: 122 Filed: 04/30/2018 Pages: 1 Add. 146 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 April 30, 2018 Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge No. 17-2991 CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:17-cv-05720 v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant-Appellant. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge. Upon consideration of the DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL STAY OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING REHEARING EN BANC AND, IF NECESSARY, A PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, filed on April 27, 2018, by counsel for the appellant, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED. 1 Judge Manion dissents. He would have granted the motion for the reasons given in his partial dissent to the April 19, 2018, opinion. 1 Case: 17-2991 Document: 124-1 Filed: 05/02/2018 Pages: 1 Add. 147 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT Office of the Clerk Phone: (312) 435-5850 www.ca7.uscourts.gov Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 ORDER May 2, 2018 Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff - Appellee No. 17-2991 v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant - Appellant Originating Case Information: District Court No: 1:17-cv-05720 Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division District Judge Harry D. Leinenweber The following is before the court: MOTION FOR EN BANC CONSIDERATION OF THE REQUEST FOR PARTIAL STAY PENDING EN BANC REVIEW UNDER IOP 1(a)(2), filed on May 2, 2018, by counsel for the appellant. The motion is taken under advisement for consideration by the full court should rehearing en banc be granted. form name: c7_Order_3J(form ID: 177)   Case: 17-2991 Document: 131 Filed: 06/14/2018 Add. 148 Pages: 1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit  Chicago, Illinois 60604    June 14, 2018          By the Court:    No. 17‐2991        CITY OF CHICAGO,                                Plaintiff‐Appellee,    v.    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney  General of the United States,    Defendant‐Appellant. Appeal from the United States District    Court for the Northern District of  Illinois, Eastern Division.    No. 17 C 5720    Harry D. Leinenweber,    Judge.    O R D E R      A letter sent today, June 14, 2018, on behalf of the Attorney General of the United  States requests a ruling on his motion of April 27, 2018, reiterated on May 2, to stay the  nationwide impact of the injunction issued against him in this case. The letter further  states that if the court declines to do so by the close of business on Monday, June 18, it is  the Attorney General’s intention to seek a stay from the Supreme Court. We  CONSTRUE this letter as a motion for an immediate ruling on the motions for a stay.    On June 5, 2018, the court granted the Attorney General’s petition for a rehearing  en banc, restricted to the question of the nationwide scope of the injunction. The court  recognized that this left unresolved the question whether to grant the Attorney  General’s motion for a partial stay. Rather than rule today on the April 27 and May 2  motions for a stay, the court has decided to await the Supreme Court’s resolution of  Trump v. Hawaii (2018) (No. 17‐965), which we anticipate will occur in the coming  weeks. Because that case raises similar issues, we expect that the Court’s opinion may  facilitate our disposition of the pending motions. We therefore DENY the Attorney  General’s request for an immediate ruling.  Case: 17-2991 Document: 128 Filed: 06/04/2018 Add. 149 Pages: 2 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 June 4, 2018 WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge No. 17-2991 CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellee, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. v. No. 1:17-cv-05720 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant-Appellant. Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge. ORDER The Attorney General has requested en banc review in this case limited to only one issue. He does not seek full court review of our decision that the district court properly preliminarily enjoined the imposition of the notice and access conditions on the Byrne JAG Grant because those conditions are likely to be unconstitutional. He seeks en banc review only as to the narrow issue of whether the preliminary injunction was properly applied beyond the City of Chicago to encompass jurisdictions nationwide. A majority of the judges in active service having voted to partially rehear the case en banc only as to the geographic scope of the preliminary injunction entered by the district court, the Petition for Rehearing En Banc is GRANTED to that extent. Part IV Case: 17-2991 No. 17-2991 Document: 128 Filed: 06/04/2018 Add. 150 Pages: 2 Page 2 of the panel's opinion of April 19, 2018 in this matter is VACATED and the panel's judgment of the same date is likewise VACATED insofar as it sustained the district court's decision to extend preliminary relief nationwide. By separate order, the court will set a date for oral argument en banc. Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document 82 Filed: 09/26/17 Page 1 of 4 PagelD #21173 Add. 151 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Civil Action No. 1: liar-05720 v. Hon. Harry B. Leinenweber JEFF SESSIONS, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant. SECOND DECLARATION OF ALAN R. HANSON Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, 1, Alan R. Hanson, declare as follows: 1. I am the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Of?ce of Justice Programs at the US. Department of Justice. I have held this position since anuary 30, 2017. As Acting Assistant Attorney General, I am the head of OJP. 2. OJP administers the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (?Byme program. 3. Applications under the FY 2017 Byrne JAG - Local Solicitationl were generally due by September 5, 2017 (with some exceptions relating to jurisdictions affected by Hurricane Harvey). Applications under the FY 2017 Byrne JAG - State Solicitation2 were due by August 25, 201?. 4. OJP received more than 900 applications under the FY 2017 Byrne JAG - Local Solicitation. OJ received?56 applications under the FY 2017 Byrne JAG - State Solicitation. In total, nearly one thousand FY 2017 Byrne JAG applications were received. This document is available at 2 This document is available at Case: 1:17-cv-0572O Document 82 Filed: 09/26/17 Page 2 of 4 PagelD #21174 Add . 5 2 S. In the FY 2017 Byme JAG cycle, OJP has issued two award noti?cations? to the County of Greenville, South Carolina and the City of Binghamton, New York??both on August 23, 2017. (Dirt. No. 32-1 3-4.) All other FY 2017 Byrne JAG applications presently remain outstanding. 6. The FY 2017 Byrne JAG - Local Solicitation states an estimated total amount available to be awarded of $83 million for the FY 2017 grant cycle. The FY 2017 Byrne JAG - State Solicitation states an estimated total amount available to be awarded of up to $174.4 million for the FY 2017 grant cycle. 7. Prior to the entry of a nationwide preliminary injunction in this case, 0] had aimed to issue FY 2017 Byrne JAG awards by September 30, 2017. This is stated in the FY 2017l Byrne JAG - Local Solicitation, the FY 2017 Byme JAG - State Solicitation, and a ?ling by the Defendant in this case (Dkt. No. 28 1] 4). That target is not a mandatory deadline, but re?ects prudential goal for effective administration of the Byme JAG program. 3. The ordinary federal 2017 ?scal year runs from October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017. The September 30 target for issuing FY 2017 Byrne JAG awards is thus the end of the relevant federal ?scal year. 9. Historically speaking, never have virtually all Byrne JAG applications remained oumtanding for the issuance of award documents at this advanced juncture a, late September] in the grant-making cycle. In other years, most Byrne JAG award noti?cations have been issued to prospective grant recipients well before September 30. As an example, FY 2016 Byrne JAG award documents were transmitted to the City of Chicago on September 7, 2016. (Dkt. No. 32-1 '11 7.) In years prior to that, Byrne JAG Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document 82 Filed: 09/26/17 Page 3 of 4 PagelD #21175 Add . 5 3 award documents were transmitted to the City of Chicago on September 1, 2015; August 26, 2014; August 22, 2013; August 1, 2012; September 2, 2011; August 18, 2010; August 28, 2009; August 15, 2008; September 4, 2007; and May 4, 2006. 10. DJP is concerned by the disruption to the Byrne JAG program that would be associated with a signi?cant delay (past September 30, 2017) in the issuance of FY 2017 Byrne JAG award noti?cations in response to the nearly 1,000 outstanding State and local applications. Such a delay would hinder the reasonably timely and reliable ?ow of funding under this important grant program that supports the law-enforcement activity of jurisdictions around the country. In many instances, the State or local ?scal year starts on July 1; thus, prospective FY 2017 Byrne JAG recipients may already be in ?arrears? in waiting for anticipated federal funds. The impact of a delay in the Byme JAG grant-making cycle would likely lend to fall especially heavily on localities. That is because localities, which generally? speaking may have relatively small budgets, may receive Byrne AG funding both through applications under the Local Solicitation, and additionally through sub-awards from State Administering Agencies that apply under the State Solicitation. 12. State Administering Agencies typically have strict timelines, set by each State based on the State?s ?scal year (which, I understand, often runs from July 1 to June 30), for reviewing sub-recipient applications and making sub-awards. A signi?cant delay in FY 2017 Byrne JAG grant-making process could disrupt the timelines under which States process their Byrne AG sub-awards and maintain that sub-award cycle within the con?nes of their State ?scal years. Case: 1:17-cv-05720 Document 82 Filed: 09/26/17 Page 4 of 4 PagelD #21176 Add . 5 4 13. A common (though by no means exclusive) use of Byrne AG funds is to cover State and local law enforcement overtime and equipment expenses. This year, funding for such expenses may at present be particularly critical to various State and local jurisdictions facing extraordinary law enforcement needs based on recent states of emergency caused by hurricane activity in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. A signi?cant delay in securing and coordinating FY 2017 Byrne AG funding for such jurisdictions presently facing emergency challenges would be counter-productive to federal attempts to assist with recovery efforts in disaster areas. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: September 26, 2017 9 . Mm Alan R. Hanson