Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1139 Page 1 of 13 1 CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General 2 WILLIAM C. PEACHEY 3 Director WILLIAM C. SILVIS 4 Assistant Director 5 SARAH B. FABIAN Senior Litigation Counsel 6 NICOLE MURLEY 7 Trial Attorney U.S. Department of Justice 8 Office of Immigration Litigation 9 District Court Section Box 868, Ben Franklin Station 10 Washington, DC 20442 11 Telephone: (202) 532-4824 Fax: (202) 616-8962 12 ADAM L. BRAVERMAN United States Attorney SAMUEL W. BETTWY Assistant U.S. Attorney California Bar No. 94918 Office of the U.S. Attorney 880 Front Street, Room 6293 San Diego, CA 92101-8893 619-546-7125 619-546-7751 (fax) Attorneys for Federal RespondentsDefendants 13 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 16 17 MS. L., et al. 18 Case No. 18-cv-428 DMS MDD Petitioner-Plaintiff, 19 20 vs. 21 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al., 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 HEARING DATE: May 4, 2018 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw Respondents-Defendants. RESPONDENT-DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1140 Page 2 of 13 1 I 2 INTRODUCTION 3 Plaintiffs have provided no reason why this Court should not dismiss the Amended 4 Complaint as a matter of law. Plaintiffs persist in ignoring the fact that the separation of a 5 purported family unit is a Government action or decision that does not occur in a vacuum, 6 but rather occurs as an incident of lawful immigration and criminal enforcement, and thus 7 it does not violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment or the Administrative 8 Procedure Act (“APA”). By persisting in their erroneous view, Plaintiffs fail to rebut the 9 Government’s showing of the lawfulness of the legal framework in which the separation of 10 a purported family unit may occur, and thus fail to provide any reason why their Amended 11 Complaint should not be dismissed. 12 II 13 ARGUMENT 14 15 16 A. The Claims of Named Plaintiff Ms. L. Should Be Dismissed Because They Are Moot. Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the doctrine of voluntary cessation applies to rescue 17 Ms. L’s claims from mootness, despite the fact that she has been released from U.S. 18 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody and reunited with her daughter, 19 S.S. In support of their position, Plaintiffs contend that “Ms. L.’s reunification with S.S. 20 was the result of Defendants’ own decision to end their separation before this Court could 21 rule.” Opposition, ECF No. 58, at 12. However, Ms. L.’s reunification with S.S. occurred 22 through the operation of the applicable laws governing her detention and the custody of S.S. 23 In such cases, the doctrine of “voluntary cessation” does not apply. See Sze v. I.N.S., 153 24 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1998) (“For the [voluntary cessation] exception to apply, 25 however, the INS’s voluntary cessation must have arisen because of the litigation.”) 26 (internal quotations omitted); see also A.C.L.U. v. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 27 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2013) (“The voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply when the voluntary 28 cessation of the challenged activity occurs because of reasons unrelated to the litigation.”) 1 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1141 Page 3 of 13 1 (quoting M. Redish, Moore's Fed. Practice, § 101.99[2]); O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 2 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A defendant cannot be said to have voluntarily ceased 3 allegedly illegal conduct where, as here, the controversy has become moot through the 4 normal course of events rather than through the unilateral action of the defendant.”). 5 Ms. L. originally was detained because she was subject to mandatory detention under 6 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and she was not held with S.S. because ICE had reason to question the 7 family relationship and was unable to immediately verify the relationship between Ms. L. 8 and S.S. at the time the decision to detain her had to be made. See Declaration of Mario 9 Ortiz (“Ortiz Decl.”), ECF No. 46-1, ¶ 5; ECF No. 50 at 12. Ms. L. subsequently was 10 released after she filed a motion to reconsider her removal order with the immigration court, 11 ECF No. 50 at 33-47, and ICE granted her request for a stay of removal given this pending 12 motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 50 at 48-49. Once released from detention, Ms. L. was 13 able to be evaluated as a potential sponsor for S.S. under the Trafficking Victims Protection 14 and Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 15 Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) therefore made the TVPRA-mandated 16 “determination that the proposed custodian is capable of providing for the child’s physical 17 and mental well-being.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A); see also ORR Guide §§ 2.2, 2.7.8; Status 18 Report, Mar. 19, 2018, ECF No. 49. Once ORR had completed the steps mandated by the 19 TVPRA, on March 16, 2018, ORR released S.S. into Ms. L.’s custody. 20 Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, Ms. L. was not released or reunified with S.S. 21 as a result of “voluntary cessation.” Rather, her release and reunification with S.S. occurred 22 in accordance with the operations of ICE and ORR processes under the Immigration and 23 Nationality Act and the TVPRA. The voluntary cessation doctrine therefore is inapplicable 24 here, and does not save Ms. L.’s claims from mootness. 25 Moreover, there is no basis on which to find that Ms. L. would again be separated 26 from S.S. under the same circumstances that gave rise to this litigation, where ICE separated 27 her from S.S. because it could not verify the family relationship between them. ORR has 28 now confirmed the family relationship between Ms. L. and S.S. through DNA testing, and 2 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1142 Page 4 of 13 1 thus separation on that basis would not occur in the future. Plaintiffs should not be allowed 2 to avoid mootness by broadly asserting that any possibility of separation might exist in the 3 future, even if such separation could only occur under entirely different legal circumstances. 4 Accordingly, there is no basis to apply the voluntary cessation doctrine to Ms. L., and her 5 claims should be dismissed as moot. 6 7 8 B. The Claims of Named Plaintiff Ms. C. Should be Dismissed Because This Court is Not The Proper Venue For Any of Her Claims. Plaintiffs dispute that the general rule that each named plaintiff in a putative class 9 action must independently establish that the Court has venue over her claims should apply 10 to this case. See Saravia, et al. v. Sessions, et al., 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 11 2017) (“At least in most instances, the rule in a proposed class action is that each named 12 plaintiff must independently establish venue.”). But, contrary to Plaintiffs’ contentions, 13 none of the case law cited by Plaintiffs establishes that this general rule should not apply in 14 this case simply because it is brought against federal government defendants. 15 To start, it should be noted that even if Plaintiffs are correct that the general rule 16 should not apply, their contention that Ms. C. should be allowed to continue as a named 17 plaintiff relies on an assumption that the Court had venue over Ms. L.’s claims at the time 18 that the Amended Complaint—including Ms. C.’s claims—was filed. However, Ms. L.’s 19 claims were moot at that time. Even assuming that venue over Ms. C.’s claims could lie in 20 this Court based solely on the fact that the Court had venue over Ms. L’s claims, such a rule 21 should not apply where Ms. L.’s claims became moot before Ms. C.’s claims were ever 22 filed. Plaintiffs point to no case that would allow this Court to take venue over Ms. C.’s 23 claims in this scenario. 24 Additionally, Plaintiffs point to case law holding that for suits against the 25 Government with multiple plaintiffs, venue needs to be found under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) 26 only as to a single plaintiff. Opposition at 13-15. Plaintiffs then contend that this holding 27 should be applied to overrule the general rule with regard to venue for the named plaintiffs 28 in a class action against government defendants. Id. No case law in the Ninth Circuit 3 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1143 Page 5 of 13 1 requires this conclusion,1 and there is good reason not to reach it in this case. As explained 2 in the Government’s recently filed opposition to preliminary injunction (ECF No. 57), the 3 separation of Ms. L. and S.S. occurred for very different reasons than that of Ms. C. and J. 4 Specifically, Ms. L. and S.S. were separated because Ms. L. was subject to mandatory 5 immigration detention and because ICE could not verify the relationship between them, 6 ECF No. 57 at 7-9, while Ms. C. and J. were separated because Ms. C. was referred for 7 prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice, and served time in criminal custody. Id. at 8 9-10. Moreover, while Ms. L.’s case is based on actions taken by ICE agents based within 9 this District, Ms. C.’s case is based on actions by U.S. Border Patrol agents in the District 10 of New Mexico, U.S. Department of Justice prosecutors in the District of New Mexico, and 11 ICE agents in the Western District of Texas. Id. There is simply no overlap in facts or 12 defendants between the claims of Ms. L. and Ms. C., and this provides good reason not to 13 overrule the general rule that each named Plaintiff for this putative class action should be 14 required to establish venue in this District. Even more so where, as here, the only claims 15 that are based within the Southern District of California are moot. Finally, Plaintiffs are incorrect to contend that there is any basis to find that Ms. C. 16 17 may properly bring her habeas claims in this District. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs are 18 incorrect to contend that a remote supervisory official may properly be the respondent to 19 Ms. C.’s habeas petition. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (for “core” 20 habeas challenges—defined as “challenges to present physical confinement”—brought 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the 22 facility where the prisoner is being held . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (providing that “[t]he writ, 23 or order to show cause, shall be directed to the person having custody of the person 24 detained.”). But even if Plaintiffs are correct, none of those remote supervisory officials to 25 whom Plaintiffs refer reside for purposes of venue within this District. Moreover, none of 26 1 Plaintiffs contend that Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001 WL 1902806, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2001), held as such, but the language to which Plaintiffs point is only dicta, 28 and not a holding of the court in that case. 27 4 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1144 Page 6 of 13 1 the cases cited by Plaintiffs call into question the rule that “for core habeas petitions 2 challenging present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district 3 of confinement.” 542 U.S. at 443. Ms. C. alleges that at the time the Amended Complaint 4 was filed she was held by ICE in the West Texas Detention Facility, which is located in 5 Sierra Blanca, Texas, within the Western District of Texas. Accordingly, the only proper 6 district for her habeas claims was the Western District of Texas. 7 8 9 C. Plaintiffs Have Not Established That This Court Has Jurisdiction to Order The Relief They Seek. Plaintiffs do not dispute the Government’s argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction 10 to order ICE to parole, rather than detain, the named Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do, however, argue 11 that this Court may review ICE’s decisions regarding where the named Plaintiffs are to be 12 detained. Plaintiffs’ argument is based on a decision of the First Circuit, Aguilar v. ICE, 510 13 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2007), which found that decisions on where to detain aliens were not 14 delegated to the discretion of the Attorney General. Yet Plaintiffs entirely ignore the Ninth 15 Circuit’s decision in Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, in which that Court “recognized 16 the Attorney General's broad discretion in exercising his authority to choose the place of 17 detention for deportable aliens.” 795 F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th Cir. 1986), as amended, 807 F.2d 18 769 (1987). In that case, the Ninth Circuit considered the precursor to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1), 19 which contained very similar language and directed the Attorney General “to arrange for 20 appropriate places of detention for those aliens whom he shall take into custody and detain 21 under this section.” Id. at 1440 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c)). Because the Ninth Circuit has 22 previously found that decisions of the Executive as to the location where an alien will be 23 detained are discretionary, there is good reason to find that those determinations may not be 24 reviewed or directed by this Court, and thus the Court lacks jurisdiction to order Defendants 25 to hold Plaintiffs or putative class members in any particular ICE facility. By ignoring this 26 precedent, Plaintiffs fail to provide any reason why this Court should conclude otherwise. 27 Plaintiffs also are incorrect in arguing that such review is not barred because 28 “decisions that violate the constitution cannot be ‘discretionary[.]’” Opposition at 12 5 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1145 Page 7 of 13 1 (quoting Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2004)). This argument 2 ignores the plain fact that Plaintiffs themselves have never alleged that Ms. L.’s detention 3 by ICE, or in the case of Ms. C. her criminal custody and later detention by ICE, was 4 unlawful or in any way violated the constitution. By acknowledging the lawfulness of this 5 detention, Plaintiffs forego their argument that this Court can review the location of that 6 detention on the basis that it is unlawful. Accordingly, this doctrine provides no basis to 7 conclude that this Court has the authority to order the relief that Plaintiffs seek. 8 D. Plaintiffs Have Not Stated a Due Process Claim. 9 Plaintiffs seek to bolster their argument that the Government has violated their 10 substantive due process rights by contending that the Government’s arguments regarding 11 the basis for its separations of the named Plaintiffs from their children are “shifting and 12 unpersuasive.” Opposition at 16. But in making this argument Plaintiffs ignore the fact that 13 the arguments they point to have been made in different contexts. Those arguments made 14 by the Government in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss are necessarily 15 limited by the facts pled in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, and focused on the named 16 Plaintiffs Ms. L. and Ms. C. However, in opposing Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction 17 motions, the Government is able to provide additional facts and additional explanation for 18 its actions relating to not only the named Plaintiffs, but also the putative class. Thus, where 19 Plaintiffs did not plead that Ms. L. arrived in the United States without her identity 20 documents, Defendants were limited in the context of their motion to dismiss in their ability 21 to explain this basis for her detention. This does not mean, as Plaintiffs suggest, that the 22 Government has abandoned its position that doubts about family relationship are a 23 legitimate and necessary basis for DHS to separate a purported family unit, as explained 24 extensively in the Government’s opposition to preliminary injunction (ECF No. 57 at 1425 18). At the same time, as explained in Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 56-1 at 1426 27 28 6 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1146 Page 8 of 13 1 18), even as pled, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Ms. L. do not establish any substantive 2 due process violation by the Government. 2 Plaintiffs also misunderstand the Government’s discussion about the role that the 3 4 TVPRA plays where it is necessary to separate a purported family group, and thus 5 mistakenly contend that the Government has argued that “federal statutes require them to 6 separate parents from their children . . . .” Opposition at 18. The Government has made no 7 such argument. Relatedly, the Government also has never contended that detention of a 8 family unit together in an ICE family residential center is unlawful. See id. Detention at an 9 ICE family residential center is not mandated and cannot be required by this Court. Rather, 10 ICE may in its discretion determine that detention of a family unit in a family residential 11 center may be appropriate if space is available. In some cases, such as that of Ms. L. where 12 the family relationship is in doubt and could not be verified, detention in an ICE family 13 residential center may not be an available option. This is just one scenario illustrating the 14 need for case-by-case considerations and the use of discretion in detention decisions. In cases such as that of Ms. L. where detention in an ICE family residential center is 15 16 not an option, and where ICE determines not to exercise its discretion to release the parent 17 along with the child, then the parent must be detained in an ICE adult detention facility, and 18 the TVPRA operates to provide for the care and custody of the child who has become an 19 unaccompanied alien child as defined in 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2). This argument does not, as 20 Plaintiffs argue, suggest that the Government believes that the TVPRA mandates the 21 separation of a parent and child. See Opposition at 19-20. Rather, the TVPRA provides for 22 the care and custody of a minor whose parent has become unavailable to provide the same, 23 2 Plaintiffs also suggest that the Government previously took the position that it “would start 24 separating families as a way ‘to deter’ future asylum seekers and other families from coming 25 to the United States[,]” Opposition at 16, but later abandoned that position in support of the positions taken in this lawsuit. Id. at 17. Defendants take no such position in this case. 26 Moreover, there is simply no evidence that either of the named Plaintiffs, or any putative 27 class member, has been separated from his or her child for purposes of deterrence. Thus, again, Defendants are not shifting positions, but rather are litigating the case at hand. 28 7 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1147 Page 9 of 13 1 either because of immigration enforcement actions taken against him or her, or because of 2 criminal prosecution and detention. Thus, while Ms. L. was in ICE custody, and Ms. C. was 3 in criminal custody and later ICE custody, S.S. and J. were properly in the custody of ORR 4 until they could be released to a suitable custodian. Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs’ 5 argument, Opposition at 20, once J. was transferred to the custody of ORR, the plain 6 language of the TVPRA does, in fact, prevent ORR from releasing J. into Ms. C.’s custody 7 until it has evaluated her suitability as a custodian in accordance with the terms of 8 U.S.C. 8 § 1232(c)(3). Plaintiffs provide no basis to find otherwise. 9 Finally, Plaintiffs have not provided any basis to conclude that there is a due process 10 right to family unity that prohibited the separation of Ms. L. from S.S. or Ms. C. from J. 11 Plaintiffs seek to distinguish the case law upon which the Government relies by arguing that 12 “the practice [of family separation] here is not a necessary incident of detention; it is the 13 result of an unnecessary governmental action intended to separate family units who were 14 arrested together, and who are being detained far apart despite the availability of family 15 detention facilities that were specifically established to house families together.” Opposition 16 at 21. But for all of the reasons explained by the Government in its briefs thus far, this 17 argument reflects the fundamental misunderstanding on which Plaintiffs’ claims rely. In 18 fact, the opposite is true. The cases of family separation at issue here are precisely what 19 Plaintiffs say that they are not: a necessary incident of the detention of the parent. The 20 Government does not, as Plaintiffs contend, make a “decision to forcibly separate parents 21 and children, in service of no compelling or even legitimate purpose . . . .” Opposition at 22 22. Rather, the Government’s immigration and criminal enforcement actions taken in these 23 cases that resulted in the separation of Plaintiffs from their children serve the legitimate 24 purpose of allowing the Government to carry out its immigration and criminal enforcement 25 role. Because Plaintiffs’ argument relies entirely on their erroneous presumption to the 26 contrary, their substantive due process claims fail. Moreover, for all of these reasons 27 Plaintiffs also are incorrect that they have stated any procedural due process claim. 28 8 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1148 Page 10 of 13 1 E. Plaintiffs Have Not Stated an APA Claim. 2 Plaintiffs contend that the Government’s discretionary decision not to hold Plaintiffs 3 with their children in an ICE family residential center is reviewable under the APA. 4 Opposition at 13-14. This is because Plaintiffs dispute that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1) provides 5 ICE with discretionary authority over the place of detention for aliens. Id. However, 6 Plaintiffs again fail to address the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees, 7 in which that Court “recognized the Attorney General's broad discretion in exercising his 8 authority to choose the place of detention for deportable aliens.” 795 F.2d at 1440. Because 9 the Ninth Circuit has previously found that decisions of the Executive as to the location 10 where an alien will be detained are discretionary determinations, there is good reason to 11 find that those determinations may not be reviewed by this Court under the APA, and 12 Plaintiffs have provided no basis to find otherwise. 13 Next, Plaintiffs argue that the Government’s “separation practice” is a “final agency 14 action” subject to APA review. However, Plaintiffs point to no actual Government policy 15 or practice regarding separation that this Court can review. Rather, Plaintiffs are challenging 16 a number of different immigration and criminal enforcement actions by multiple agencies 17 which, when taken with regard to the named Plaintiffs, resulted in the separation of each 18 named Plaintiff from her child. To be “final,” agency action must “mark the 19 ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process . . . .” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 20 154, 178 (1997) (citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 21 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)). It also must be an action “by which ‘rights or obligations have been 22 determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow[.]’” Id. (citing Port of Boston 23 Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)). As 24 Defendants have explained, the separation of a family unit is not itself the culmination of 25 any decision-making process; rather, it is incident to other agency actions and decisions 26 regarding immigration and criminal enforcement and detention. Relatedly, because a 27 decision to separate is made only as part of other agency decision-making processes, even 28 if such action has an “impact” on Plaintiffs’ rights, Opposition at 14, it cannot be said that 9 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1149 Page 11 of 13 1 any rights or obligations are actually “determined” from such an action, nor do any legal 2 consequences flow from it. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not established that they are asking 3 this Court to review any final agency action, and thus APA review cannot be had here. 4 Finally, Plaintiffs rely on their previous arguments to contend that the agency actions 5 at issue in this case are arbitrary and capricious. However, as explained above, the 6 Government has not argued that the separation of purported family units is required by 7 statute, nor have the Plaintiffs provided any basis on which to find that the Government has 8 shifted any policies with regard to family separation. Further, the Government has explained 9 why placement in an ICE family residential center may not be appropriate in all instances, 10 particularly in a case like that of Ms. L. where the Government cannot confirm the family 11 relationship at the time the decision regarding placement needs to be made. Thus, Plaintiffs 12 have provided no basis on which the Court should find that the Government’s actions are 13 arbitrary and capricious, and Plaintiffs’ APA claim should fail. 14 F. Plaintiffs’ Have Not Stated a Claim For Violation of the Asylum Statute. 15 Plaintiffs argue that they have standing to pursue their claims under the asylum statute 16 because they have, in fact, alleged harm. Opposition at 24-25. However, the harms to which 17 Plaintiffs point are generalized and unrelated to their right to apply for asylum, and thus are 18 insufficient to establish standing for their claims. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not show that they 19 have alleged how these harms directly flow from the Government’s actions. Plaintiffs’ 20 contention that they alleged an impediment to their asylum application “by denying them 21 the ability to speak to their children” misstates the allegations in the Amended Complaint, 22 and is conclusory in that it provides no explanation how such action impacted Plaintiffs’ 23 asylum applications in any way. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ Oppositions establishes that Plaintiffs 24 have stated any claim under the asylum statutes, and this claim should be dismissed. 25 V 26 CONCLUSION 27 For all of the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint should be dismissed in 28 its entirety. 10 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1150 Page 12 of 13 1 DATED: April 27, 2018 Respectfully submitted, 2 CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director WILLIAM C. SILVIS Assistant Director 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 /s/ Sarah B. Fabian SARAH B. FABIAN Senior Litigation Counsel NICOLE MURLEY Trial Attorney Office of Immigration Litigation Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 (202) 532-4824 (202) 616-8962 (facsimile) sarah.b.fabian@usdoj.gov 15 16 ADAM L. BRAVERMAN United States Attorney 17 18 19 20 s/ Samuel W. Bettwy SAMUEL W. BETTWY Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorneys for Respondents-Defendants 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 61 Filed 04/27/18 PageID.1151 Page 13 of 13 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 MS. L., et al. 5 Case No. 18-cv-428 DMS MDD Petitioner-Plaintiff, 6 7 vs. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 8 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al., 9 10 Respondents-Defendants. 11 12 IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT: 13 I, the undersigned, am a citizen of the United States and am at least eighteen years of age. 14 My business address is 450 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001. I am not a party to 15 the above-entitled action. I have caused service of the accompanying REPLY IN SUPPORT 16 OF MOTION TO DISMISS on all counsel of record, by electronically filing the foregoing 17 with the Clerk of the District Court using its ECF System, which electronically provides 18 notice. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 DATED: April 27, 2018 21 /s/ Sarah B. Fabian SARAH B. FABIAN 22 Senior Litigation Counsel 23 Office of Immigration Litigation Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice 24 25 Attorney for Respondents-Defendants 26 27 28 12