Subject: Date: HEPG Agenda and Registration Confirmation Wednesday, March 8, 2017 10:21:36 AM HEPG Draft Agenda, March 30-31,2017 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP Harvard Electricity Policy Group Eighty-Sixth Plenary Session The Mansion on Forsyth Park Savannah, Georgia Thursday and Friday, March 30-31, 2017 Draft Agenda Thursday, March 30 Breakfast and Informal Discussion 8:30 am 9:00 am Session One. Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward? Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own. Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model. Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full-scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?” What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks? Jeffrey Burleson, Southern Company Ralph Cavanagh, Natural Resources Defense Council Karen Lefkowitz, PEPCO Abe Silverman, NRG Energy Thursday, March 30 (cont’d) 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion Lunch 12:00 pm 1:15 pm Session Two. Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills? There are few, if any, resources used in electric generation that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise noneconomic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency? On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected? Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs? Alexandra Klass, University of Minnesota Law School Lawrence Makovich, IHS and Harvard Kennedy School Francis O’Sullivan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ACC 000001 Molly Sherlock, Congressional Research Service 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception and Dinner Friday, March 31 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now? In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan. Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP? Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways. The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of the new Trump Administration could change everything. Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives. The list of questions and possible futures is as dizzying as it is important. How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy? Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long-term policy direction? We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now? Doug Scott, Great Plains Institute Paul Sotkiewicz Michael Wara, Stanford Law School Jurgen Weiss, The Brattle Group 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC 000002 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Mahoney, Jo-Ann Gill, Susan HEPG Agenda and Registration Confirmation Wednesday, March 8, 2017 10:21:36 AM HEPG 3 10-12 draftagenda as of March 7.docx We look forward to your participation in the upcoming Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held in Savannah, Georgia, on Thursday-Friday, March 30-31.  As you know, the session will take place at the Mansion on Forsyth Park, and will convene with breakfast on Thursday March 30 and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening in town.  Our agenda with speakers in place is attached.    Since we plan to re-envision our discussions about the Clean Power Plan from our Houston session, you might find it valuable to review the Rapporteur’s Report from that meeting.  The CPP panel presentation and discussion begins on page 65.   If your plans have changed since registering, kindly let us know.    Regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000003 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GRO HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Mansion on Forsyth Park Savannah, Georgia THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, MARCH 30-31, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, March 30 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward? Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own. Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model. Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full-scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?” What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks? Jeffrey Burleson, Southern Company Ralph Cavanagh, Natural Resources Defense Council Karen Lefkowitz, PEPCO Abe Silverman, NRG Energy ACC 000004 HEPG Draft Agenda, March 30-31,2017 Thursday, March 30 (cont’d) 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills? There are few, if any, resources used in electric generation that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency? On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected? Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs? Alexandra Klass, University of Minnesota Law School Lawrence Makovich, IHS and Harvard Kennedy School Francis O’Sullivan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Molly Sherlock, Congressional Research Service 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception and Dinner ACC 000005 HEPG Draft Agenda, March 30-31,2017 Friday, March 31 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now? In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan. Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP? Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways. The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of the new Trump Administration could change everything. Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives. The list of questions and possible futures is as dizzying as it is important. How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy? Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long-term policy direction? We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now? Doug Scott, Great Plains Institute Paul Sotkiewicz Michael Wara, Stanford Law School Jurgen Weiss, The Brattle Group 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC 000006 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Mahoney, Jo-Ann Gill, Susan Invitation to HEPG Savannah Dinner; Please RSVP by 3/22 Friday, March 17, 2017 1:26:41 PM Dear HEPG Participants,   You are cordially invited to the reception and dinner for our Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held on Thursday, March 30, at the Georgia landmark, Elizabeth’s on 37th.  Chef Kelly Yambour will be preparing a meal that reflects the Southern heritage.  Jackets are required.   Transportation to the restaurant will be provided from the conference hotel.   Kindly rsvp to susan gill@hks.harvard.edu by Wednesday, March 22.   We look forward to seeing you in Savannah.   Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000007 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan Doug Little Andrea Gaston RE: HEPG Meeting in March 2017 Wednesday, March 22, 2017 10:56:58 AM Good afternoon, Doug,   Will you be able to join us next week for the HEPG reception and dinner which will be held at Elizabeth’s on 37th on Thursday, March 30?  If you would let me know when you have a chance, I would appreciate it.   Regards,   Susan     Dear HEPG Participants,   You are cordially invited to the reception and dinner for our Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held on Thursday, March 30, at the Georgia landmark, Elizabeth’s on 37th.  Chef Kelly Yambour will be preparing a meal that reflects the Southern heritage.  Jackets are required.   Transportation to the restaurant will be provided from the conference hotel.   Kindly rsvp to susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu by Wednesday, March 22.   We look forward to seeing you in Savannah.   Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2017 3:48 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: HEPG Meeting in March 2017   Susan,   ACC 000008 Attached please find my registration for the HEPG meeting in March.  If you have any question, please feel free to reach out to Andrea or me.   Please confirm you received this and thanks in advance for your assistance.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message. ACC 000009 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Doug Little Gill, Susan Andrea Gaston Re: HEPG Meeting in March 2017 Wednesday, March 22, 2017 11:00:45 AM Susan, I have been trying unsuccessfully to deconflict a couple of schedule issues surrounding the HEPG meeting in Savannah.  I'm afraid that I will be unable to attend this one.  Please keep me in mind for future meetings.  They are always highly educational.  Best regards, Doug Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission From: Gill, Susan Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2017 10:56:50 AM To: Doug Little Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: HEPG Meeting in March 2017   Good afternoon, Doug,   Will you be able to join us next week for the HEPG reception and dinner which will be held at Elizabeth’s on 37th on Thursday, March 30?  If you would let me know when you have a chance, I would appreciate it.   Regards,   Susan     Dear HEPG Participants,   You are cordially invited to the reception and dinner for our Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held on Thursday, March 30, at the Georgia landmark, Elizabeth’s on 37th.  Chef Kelly Yambour will be preparing a meal that reflects the Southern heritage.  Jackets are required.   Transportation to the restaurant will be provided from the conference hotel.   Kindly rsvp to susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu by Wednesday, March 22.   We look forward to seeing you in Savannah. ACC 000010   Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2017 3:48 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: HEPG Meeting in March 2017   Susan,   Attached please find my registration for the HEPG meeting in March.  If you have any question, please feel free to reach out to Andrea or me.   Please confirm you received this and thanks in advance for your assistance.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message. ACC 000011 From: To: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan Doug Little RE: HEPG Meeting in March 2017 Wednesday, March 22, 2017 11:31:39 AM Doug,   Thanks for letting us know. We hope to see you at a future meeting.   Regards,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2017 2:01 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: HEPG Meeting in March 2017 Susan, I have been trying unsuccessfully to deconflict a couple of schedule issues surrounding the HEPG meeting in Savannah. I'm afraid that I will be unable to attend this one. Please keep me in mind for future meetings. They are always highly educational. Best regards, Doug Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission From: Gill, Susan Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2017 10:56:50 AM To: Doug Little Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: HEPG Meeting in March 2017 Good afternoon, Doug,   Will you be able to join us next week for the HEPG reception and dinner which will be held at Elizabeth’s on 37th on Thursday, March 30?  If you would let me know when you have a chance, I would appreciate it.   ACC 000012 Regards,   Susan     Dear HEPG Participants, You are cordially invited to the reception and dinner for our Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held on Thursday, March 30, at the Georgia landmark, Elizabeth’s on 37th. Chef Kelly Yambour will be preparing a meal that reflects the Southern heritage. Jackets are required. Transportation to the restaurant will be provided from the conference hotel. Kindly rsvp to susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu by Wednesday, March 22. We look forward to seeing you in Savannah. Best regards, Jo-Ann Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2017 3:48 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: HEPG Meeting in March 2017 Susan,   Attached please find my registration for the HEPG meeting in March.  If you have any question, please feel free to reach out to Andrea or me.   Please confirm you received this and thanks in advance for your assistance.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little ACC 000013 Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message. ACC 000014 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Doug Little Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42:23 AM Registration Form Commissioners- June 2017.docx Dear Commissioner Little,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000015 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 THE CHARLES HOTEL CAMBRIDGE, MA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. LOGISTICS The conference will take place at The Charles Hotel (adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School, as the school is under construction.) The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennett Street, Cambridge. (617) 864-1200. HEPG will arrange lodging for commissioners in Cambridge and will provide hotel confirmation information. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu ACC 000016 Subject: Date: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42:23 AM Registration Form HEPG Eighty-Seventh Plenary Session Thursday and Friday, June 1-2, 2017 The Charles Hotel Cambridge, MA TO:             Harvard Electricity Policy Group                 John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM:   Name                 Title                 Affiliation                 Address                 Phone                 E-mail  __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. LOGISTICS The conference will take place at The Charles Hotel (adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School, as the school is under construction.)  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennett Street, Cambridge.  (617) 864-1200. HEPG will arrange lodging for commissioners in Cambridge and will provide hotel confirmation information. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: jo-ann_mahoney@hks harvard.edu ACC 000017 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Doug Little Andrea Gaston Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 11:58:05 AM Registration Form Commissioners- June 2017.docx Andrea, Can you complete the attached registration form and get it back to Jo-Ann?  I would be arriving on Wednesday, May 31st in the afternoon and returning to Phoenix on a late afternoon flight on Friday, June 2nd. Thanks in advance! Doug Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission _____________________________ From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Sent: Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42 AM Subject: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting To: Doug Little Dear Commissioner Little,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     ACC 000018 Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000019 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 THE CHARLES HOTEL CAMBRIDGE, MA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. LOGISTICS The conference will take place at The Charles Hotel (adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School, as the school is under construction.) The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennett Street, Cambridge. (617) 864-1200. HEPG will arrange lodging for commissioners in Cambridge and will provide hotel confirmation information. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu ACC 000020 Subject: Date: Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 11:58:05 AM Registration Form HEPG Eighty-Seventh Plenary Session Thursday and Friday, June 1-2, 2017 The Charles Hotel Cambridge, MA TO:             Harvard Electricity Policy Group                 John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM:   Name                 Title                 Affiliation                 Address                 Phone                 E-mail  __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. LOGISTICS The conference will take place at The Charles Hotel (adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School, as the school is under construction.)  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennett Street, Cambridge.  (617) 864-1200. HEPG will arrange lodging for commissioners in Cambridge and will provide hotel confirmation information. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: jo-ann_mahoney@hks harvard.edu ACC 000021 Subject: Date: Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 11:58:06 AM Registration Form HEPG Eighty-Seventh Plenary Session Thursday and Friday, June 1-2, 2017 The Charles Hotel Cambridge, MA TO:             Harvard Electricity Policy Group                 John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM:   Name                 Title                 Affiliation                 Address                 Phone                 E-mail  __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. LOGISTICS The conference will take place at The Charles Hotel (adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School, as the school is under construction.)  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennett Street, Cambridge.  (617) 864-1200. HEPG will arrange lodging for commissioners in Cambridge and will provide hotel confirmation information. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: jo-ann_mahoney@hks harvard.edu ACC 000022 To: Subject: Date: Doug Little RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 1:22:55 PM Doug,   Yes, I’m completing the form now. I went to lunch with Jessica, Comm Burns’ previous Aide. She said to tell you hello.   I will move the Peak Reliability meeting on 5/31 as well. Do you think the 30th will work? Or should I try for another week?   Best,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 11:58 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   Can you complete the attached registration form and get it back to Jo-Ann?  I would be arriving on Wednesday, May 31st in the afternoon and returning to Phoenix on a late afternoon flight on Friday, June 2nd.   Thanks in advance!   Doug     Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission _____________________________ From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Sent: Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42 AM Subject: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting To: Doug Little ACC 000023 Dear Commissioner Little,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000024 From: To: Subject: Date: Andrea Gaston Doug Little RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 1:29:00 PM Doug,   Yes, I’m completing the form now. I went to lunch with Jessica, Comm Burns’ previous Aide. She said to tell you hello.   I will move the Peak Reliability meeting on 5/31 as well. Do you think the 30th will work? Or should I try for another week?   Best,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 11:58 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   Can you complete the attached registration form and get it back to Jo-Ann?  I would be arriving on Wednesday, May 31st in the afternoon and returning to Phoenix on a late afternoon flight on Friday, June 2nd.   Thanks in advance!   Doug     Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission _____________________________ From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Sent: Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42 AM Subject: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting ACC 000025 To: Doug Little Dear Commissioner Little,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000026 From: To: Subject: Date: Doug Little Andrea Gaston Re: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 3:37:03 PM Andrea,   I suspect that the 30th is fine, but with Monday being Memorial Day, they may want to do it another time.  I am flexible either way.   Best,   Doug     From: Andrea Gaston Date: Monday, May 1, 2017 at 1:29 PM To: Doug Little Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Doug,   Yes, I’m completing the form now. I went to lunch with Jessica, Comm Burns’ previous Aide. She said to tell you hello.   I will move the Peak Reliability meeting on 5/31 as well. Do you think the 30th will work? Or should I try for another week?   Best,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 11:58 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   Can you complete the attached registration form and get it back to Jo-Ann?  I would be arriving on ACC 000027 Wednesday, May 31st in the afternoon and returning to Phoenix on a late afternoon flight on Friday, June 2nd.   Thanks in advance!   Doug     Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission _____________________________ From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Sent: Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42 AM Subject: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting To: Doug Little Dear Commissioner Little,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 ACC 000028 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495?1390 ACC 000029 From: To: Subject: Date: Andrea Gaston Doug Little RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Monday, May 1, 2017 3:38:00 PM OK. I’ll look into it.   I’ve sent the registration to Jo-Ann and put the event on your calendar.   Best,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 3:37 PM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   I suspect that the 30th is fine, but with Monday being Memorial Day, they may want to do it another time.  I am flexible either way.   Best,   Doug     From: Andrea Gaston Date: Monday, May 1, 2017 at 1:29 PM To: Doug Little Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Doug,   Yes, I’m completing the form now. I went to lunch with Jessica, Comm Burns’ previous Aide. She said to tell you hello.   I will move the Peak Reliability meeting on 5/31 as well. Do you think the 30th will work? Or should I ACC 000030 try for another week?   Best,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 11:58 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   Can you complete the attached registration form and get it back to Jo-Ann?  I would be arriving on Wednesday, May 31st in the afternoon and returning to Phoenix on a late afternoon flight on Friday, June 2nd.   Thanks in advance!   Doug     Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission _____________________________ From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Sent: Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42 AM Subject: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting To: Doug Little Dear Commissioner Little,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and ACC 000031 feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000032 From: To: Subject: Date: Andrea Gaston Doug Little RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Tuesday, May 2, 2017 10:33:00 AM Doug,   I heard back from the Peak Reliability representatives. They said that they could meet on the 30th at 3:30 or 4:00. If you would like me to arrange that, let me know. I’ve checked with the other offices and no one has meetings scheduled with Peak Reliability at all.   Thank you.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 3:37 PM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   I suspect that the 30th is fine, but with Monday being Memorial Day, they may want to do it another time.  I am flexible either way.   Best,   Doug     From: Andrea Gaston Date: Monday, May 1, 2017 at 1:29 PM To: Doug Little Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Doug,   Yes, I’m completing the form now. I went to lunch with Jessica, Comm Burns’ previous Aide. She said to tell you hello. ACC 000033   I will move the Peak Reliability meeting on 5/31 as well. Do you think the 30th will work? Or should I try for another week?   Best,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 11:58 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   Can you complete the attached registration form and get it back to Jo-Ann?  I would be arriving on Wednesday, May 31st in the afternoon and returning to Phoenix on a late afternoon flight on Friday, June 2nd.   Thanks in advance!   Doug     Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission _____________________________ From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Sent: Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42 AM Subject: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting To: Doug Little Dear Commissioner Little,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and ACC 000034 market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000035 To: Subject: Date: Doug Little RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Tuesday, May 2, 2017 10:33:20 AM Doug,   I heard back from the Peak Reliability representatives. They said that they could meet on the 30th at 3:30 or 4:00. If you would like me to arrange that, let me know. I’ve checked with the other offices and no one has meetings scheduled with Peak Reliability at all.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 3:37 PM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   I suspect that the 30th is fine, but with Monday being Memorial Day, they may want to do it another time.  I am flexible either way.   Best,   Doug     From: Andrea Gaston Date: Monday, May 1, 2017 at 1:29 PM To: Doug Little Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Doug,   Yes, I’m completing the form now. I went to lunch with Jessica, Comm Burns’ previous Aide. She said to tell you hello.   I will move the Peak Reliability meeting on 5/31 as well. Do you think the 30th will work? Or should I try for another week? ACC 000036   Best,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Doug Little Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 11:58 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: Fwd: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Andrea,   Can you complete the attached registration form and get it back to Jo-Ann?  I would be arriving on Wednesday, May 31st in the afternoon and returning to Phoenix on a late afternoon flight on Friday, June 2nd.   Thanks in advance!   Doug     Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission _____________________________ From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Sent: Monday, May 1, 2017 11:42 AM Subject: Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting To: Doug Little Dear Commissioner Little,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will ACC 000037 convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000038 From: To: Subject: Date: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Mahoney, Jo-Ann HEPG Registration Confirmation; Topic Description Thursday, May 4, 2017 8:53:48 AM Dear HEPG Participant,   We have received your registration and look forward to your participation in the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  Our topic descriptions and order are listed below.  As usual, the meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.  We plan to send out the agenda with speakers shortly.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   Thursday, June 1, 2017 REV and Beyond:  Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier.  From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding.  The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon.  In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options.  In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions.  Research on technology innovation is active both through private initiatives and public programs such as at APRPA-E in DOE.  What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future?  How do these technologies provide benefits and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences?  How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight?  How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? Ancillary Service Markets: Is There a Link Between Value and Price? Market reforms that have included recognition not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive.  How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market ACC 000039 rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that, perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues, and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any, are needed, and how should they and their underlying economics, be dealt with?   Friday, June 2, 2017 Re-regulation Redux?  Or Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack.  The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation.  Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base, or contractual equivalents thereof.  ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, for more subsidized zero marginal cost generation. For non-renewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem.  Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring.  Is there a trend toward reregulation, and, if so, is it good policy?  Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity? ACC 000040 Subject: Date: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Wednesday, May 17, 2017 12:05:43 PM HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP Harvard Electricity Policy Group Eighty-Sixth Plenary Session The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts Thursday and Friday, June 1-2, 2017 Draft Agenda Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active through both private initiatives and public programs such as at ARPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits, and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? Timothy Heidel, NRECA Christopher Irwin, U.S. Department of Energy Craig Miller, NRECA Alain Steven, Advanced Microgrid Solutions 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Services Markets: Is There a Link between Value and Price? Market reforms have included recognition, not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any, are needed, and how should they be dealt with? Stu Bresler, PJM Interconnection Keith Casey, California ISO Kelli Joseph, NRG Energy Tom Kaslow, First Light Power Coffee Break 2:45 pm 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:30 pm Reception and Dinner Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy Street, Cambridge ACC 000041 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or, Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, of more subsidized zero-marginal-cost generation. For non-renewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity? Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics Jim Bushnell, UC Davis Steve Schleimer, Calpine Raja Sundararajan, American Electric Power 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion Adjourn 12:00 pm ACC 000042 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Mahoney, Jo-Ann Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Wednesday, May 17, 2017 12:05:43 PM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx Dear Participants,   We have finalized the agenda for the next Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Charles Hotel in Cambridge on June 1-2, 2017.   (Attached.)  We look forward to having you with us.   We plan to host a conference reception and dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club on Thursday evening, June 1, and we hope that you will join us.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.  Kindly RSVP by May 22  to Susan Gill (susan gill@hks.harvard.edu) and indicate your preference of rack of lamb or sea bass for a main course.  (A vegetarian option is also available.)     Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC 000043 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active through both private initiatives and public programs such as at ARPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits, and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? Timothy Heidel, NRECA Christopher Irwin, U.S. Department of Energy Craig Miller, NRECA Alain Steven, Advanced Microgrid Solutions 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC 000044 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Services Markets: Is There a Link between Value and Price? Market reforms have included recognition, not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any, are needed, and how should they be dealt with? Stu Bresler, PJM Interconnection Keith Casey, California ISO Kelli Joseph, NRG Energy Tom Kaslow, First Light Power 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:30 pm Reception and Dinner Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy Street, Cambridge ACC 000045 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or, Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, of more subsidized zero-marginal-cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity? Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics Jim Bushnell, UC Davis Steve Schleimer, Calpine Raja Sundararajan, American Electric Power 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC 000046 From: To: Subject: Date: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Doug Little HEPG Hotel Accommodations Friday, May 19, 2017 8:05:20 AM Dear Doug,   We have arranged accommodations for you at the Sheraton Commander Hotel, arriving May 31 and departing on June 2. The hotel is  located at 16 Garden Street in Cambridge.  (617) 547-4800.  Your confirmation number is 733410.      Please note that the conference will take place at the Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennet Street.  It is a lovely walk between the hotels through the Radcliffe quad.    Regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Waterbury, Jamie A [mailto:Jamie.A.Waterbury@maine.gov] Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 2:12 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: FW: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Good afternoon,   Commissioner Williamson will be arriving Wednesday evening, and leaving after the meeting on Friday.  Do you have a confirmation number for his hotel stay May 31 and June 1?  Please let me know.  Thanks.   Jamie   From: Williamson, Bruce Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2017 3:25 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Waterbury, Jamie A Subject: RE: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   ACC 000047 Jo-Ann,   It took just a second to fill it out, so here’s my registration.  Thanks again, Jo-Ann.     Dr. R Bruce Williamson Commissioner Maine Public Utilities Commission 101 Second Street, Hallowell, ME  04347 Mail:  18 SHS, Augusta, ME  04333-0018 Tel:  (207) 287- 3831           From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, April 28, 2017 3:28 PM To: Williamson, Bruce Subject: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Dear Commissioner Williamson,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School ACC 000048 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495?1390 ACC 000049 From: To: Subject: Date: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Doug Little Correction: HEPG Hotel Accommodations Friday, May 19, 2017 8:06:40 AM Dear Doug,   We have arranged accommodations for you at the Sheraton Commander Hotel, arriving May 31 and departing on June 2. The hotel is  located at 16 Garden Street in Cambridge.  (617) 547-4800.  Your confirmation number is 733404.      Please note that the conference will take place at the Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennet Street.  It is a lovely walk between the hotels through the Radcliffe quad.    Regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Waterbury, Jamie A [mailto:Jamie.A.Waterbury@maine.gov] Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 2:12 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: FW: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Good afternoon,   Commissioner Williamson will be arriving Wednesday evening, and leaving after the meeting on Friday.  Do you have a confirmation number for his hotel stay May 31 and June 1?  Please let me know.  Thanks.   Jamie   From: Williamson, Bruce Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2017 3:25 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Waterbury, Jamie A Subject: RE: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   ACC 000050 Jo-Ann,   It took just a second to fill it out, so here’s my registration.  Thanks again, Jo-Ann.     Dr. R Bruce Williamson Commissioner Maine Public Utilities Commission 101 Second Street, Hallowell, ME  04347 Mail:  18 SHS, Augusta, ME  04333-0018 Tel:  (207) 287- 3831           From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, April 28, 2017 3:28 PM To: Williamson, Bruce Subject: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Dear Commissioner Williamson,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School ACC 000051 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495?1390 ACC 000052 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Gill, Susan Mahoney, Jo-Ann Gill, Susan Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Thursday, August 17, 2017 12:39:14 PM Commissioners Registration Form - October 2017 fillable.pdf Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000053 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Af?liation Address Phone E-mail I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. HOTEL INFORMATION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel is located at 133 9th Ave Calgary, Alberta. Phone: (403) 262-1234 To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: ACC 000054 Subject: Date: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Thursday, August 17, 2017 12:39:14 PM REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. HOTEL INFORMATION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel is located at 133 9th Ave SW, Calgary, Alberta. Phone: (403) 262-1234  To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: susan_gill@hks harvard.edu ACC 000055 Subject: Date: DOE Grid Study Thursday, August 24, 2017 1:48:41 PM Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report to the Secretary on Electricity Markets and Reliability August 2017 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Table of Contents  Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................  List of Figures ......................................................................................................................................  List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................  1 Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1 2 Findings of This Study ............................................................................................................... 10 3 Power Plant Retirements .......................................................................................................... 15 3.1 Coal Plant Retirements ............................................................................................................... 20 3.2 Natural Gas Plant Retirements ................................................................................................... 24 3.3 Nuclear Plant Retirements .......................................................................................................... 27 3.4 Hydropower Retirements and Repowering ................................................................................ 34 3.5 Falling Natural Gas Prices ............................................................................................................ 35 3.6 Environmental Regulations ......................................................................................................... 39 3.7 Growing VRE Deployment ........................................................................................................... 47 3.8 Flattening Electricity Demand ..................................................................................................... 54 3.9 Power Plant Retirements Looking Forward ................................................................................ 57 4 Reliability and Resilience .......................................................................................................... 61 4.1 Assessing Challenges to Reliability .............................................................................................. 63 4.2 Diversity, Fuel Assurance, and Onsite Storage ........................................................................... 89 4.3 High-Risk Events and System Resilience ..................................................................................... 97 4.4 Enhancing Reliability and Resilience ........................................................................................... 99 4.5 Reliability and Resilience Looking Forward ............................................................................... 100 5 Wholesale Electricity Markets ................................................................................................. 102 5.1 Evolution of U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets ....................................................................... 102 5.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets Today ........................................................................................ 104 5.3 Challenges in Wholesale Electricity Markets ............................................................................ 107 5.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets Looking Forward ...................................................................... 118 6 Affordability ........................................................................................................................... 119 6.1 Affordability of Generation Portfolios ...................................................................................... 119 6.2 The Wholesale-Retail Disconnect ............................................................................................. 120 6 3 Affordability Looking Forward .................................................................................................. 124 7 Policy Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 126 8 Areas for Further Research ..................................................................................................... 128 Appendix A:  National and Regional Profiles ................................................................................... 130 Appendix B:  VRE Integration Studies .............................................................................................. 151 Appendix C:  Power Plant Cycling ................................................................................................... 154 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy   List of Figures Figure 1 1. Regions Used in This Study ......................................................................................................... 4 Figure 1.2. Schematic of Typical Daily Load Curve Showing Base Load ........................................................ 6 Figure 3.1. Location of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and All Other Retirements, 2002–2016 ,  ................... 15 Figure 3 2. Net Generation Capacity Additions and Retirements ............................................................... 16 Figure 3.3. Retirements of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and Other Generating Units, 2002–2022 ............ 18 Figure 3.4. Retirements by Date, Location, Ownership, and Capacity ....................................................... 18 Figure 3.5. Operating Generation Capacity, Additions, Retirements, and Announced Retirements by Region for All Generation Types, January 2002–December 2022 .............................................................. 20 Figure 3.6. Location of the Existing Coal Fleet ............................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.7. Location of Coal Retirements, 2002–2016 ................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.8. U.S. Utility-Scale Coal-Fired Electric Generating Capacity Additions by Coal Type and Initial Operating Year   .......................................................................................................................................... 22 Figure 3.9. Location of the Existing Natural Gas Fleet ................................................................................ 25 Figure 3.10. Capacity Additions of U.S. Utility-Scale Natural GasFired Electricity Generation by Technology Type and Initial Operating Year ............................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.11. Natural Gas Fleet Capacity Factors ......................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.12. Location of Natural Gas Retirements ...................................................................................... 27 Figure 3.13. Location of the Existing Nuclear Fleet .................................................................................... 28 Figure 3.14. Location of Nuclear Power Plant Retirements: Closed, Announced, and Averted  ................ 30 Figure 3.15. Nuclear Plant Retirements Compared to NRC Plant Operating License Terms   .................... 33 Figure 3.16. Hydropower Plants in the United States by Capacity and Average Annual Runoff ................ 34 Figure 3.17. Conventional and Shale Natural Gas Production, 2007– 2016 ................................................ 36 Figure 3 18. Wholesale Day-Ahead Electricity Prices vs. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Monthly Average) .................................................................................................................................................................... 37 Figure 3.19. Total Annual U.S. Natural Gas Generation, 1950–2016 ......................................................... 38 Figure 3 20. Heat Rates for Coal, Nuclear, and Natural Gas, 2002–2016 ................................................... 39 Figure 3.21. PJM Merit-Order Dispatch: Various Control Technologies ..................................................... 42 Figure 3.22. Changes in U.S. Coal Capacity, December 2014–April 2016 ................................................... 44 Figure 3.23. Average Coal Plant Capacity Factors, 2008–2014 ................................................................... 45 Figure 3.24. Projected and Actual Coal Retirements, 2008–2018 .............................................................. 46 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.25. VRE Generation by Fuel as Percentage of Total U.S. Generation, 2002–2016 ....................... 48 Figure 3.26. Cumulative U.S. Utility-Scale Wind and Hydroelectric Generation Capacity, 1915–December 2016 ............................................................................................................................................................ 48 Figure 3.27. Relationship between the PTC and Annual Wind Capacity Additions .................................... 50 Figure 3.28. VRE Penetration as a Percentage of 2016 Generation versus Retired Capacity since 2010 as a Percentage of Non-VRE Capacity ................................................................................................................ 51 Figure 3.29. Gross Domestic Product and Net Electricity Production, Historical (1950–2016) and Projected (2017–2027)    ............................................................................................................................. 54 Figure 3.30. Estimated U.S. Energy Savings from Structural Changes in the Economy and Energy Efficiency, 1980–2016  ................................................................................................................................ 55 Figure 3.31. EIA Annual Electricity Sales 2000–2016 (terawatthours) and AEO Reference Case Electricity Sales Projections 2017–2030 ...................................................................................................................... 56 Figure 3.32. Baseload Capacity Additions and Retirements from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) ..................................................................................................................................................... 57 Figure 3.33. Modeled Projections for Natural Gas Price, Electricity Sales, and VRE Generation from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) ................................................................................................. 58 Figure 3.34. NGCC Capacity Factors and Number of Starts, 1998–2016 ACC 000056 .................................................... 59 Figure 4.1. System Operation Time Scales .................................................................................................. 62 Figure 4.2. Five-Year Average Reserve Margins across Different Regions (2018–2022) ............................ 66 Figure 4 3. Historical Solar On-Peak Capacity Factors in ERCOT ................................................................. 67 Figure 4.4. NERC Definitions of Reserves Used to Provide ERS .................................................................. 70 Figure 4.5. System Frequency after a Grid Event (Top) and How Frequency Control Mechanisms Work to Restore Frequency (Bottom)....................................................................................................................... 71 Figure 4.6. EEI Historical and Project Transmission Investment (Nominal Dollars).................................... 76 Figure 4.7. Location of the Existing Wind Fleet .......................................................................................... 77 Figure 4.8 Wind Energy Share of Electric Generation by State, 2016......................................................... 78 Figure 4 9. Ways To Integrate VRE, Arrayed by Type of Intervention and Cost (2014)  ............................. 80 Figure 4.10. CAISO Load, Net Load, and Wind and Solar Output on Example Weekdays during 2014 ...... 82 Figure 4.11. The CAISO Duck Curve ............................................................................................................ 83 Figure 4 12. Demand and Net Demand Shapes at Different Distributed Energy Resource Penetration Levels........................................................................................................................................................... 84 Figure 4.13. Mapping Reliability Attributes Against Resources  ................................................................. 86 Figure 4.14 Selected Ancillary Service Market Design Characteristics ....................................................... 87 Figure 4.15. Ancillary Service Products Exchanged in the Centrally Organized Markets, Listed by RTO/ISO and Category of Ancillary Service ............................................................................................................... 88 Figure 4 16. Generation Mix and Various Economic and Policy Drivers Since 1949, Including Diversity Index............................................................................................................................................................ 89  Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.17. Changes in U.S. Capacity (Top) and Generation (Bottom) Mix over Time (Left to Right: 2002, 2009, 2016) ................................................................................................................................................. 90 Figure 4.18. Natural Gas Storage Facilities ................................................................................................. 93 Figure 4.19. Coal Stocks and Days of Burn, January 2010–May 2017 ........................................................ 96 Figure 4.20. Electricity Generation Changes from 2013 to 2014 by Fuel Type .......................................... 97 Figure 4.21. Sandia National Laboratories’ Resilience Analysis Process................................................... 101 Figure 5 1. Utility Restructuring by State as of May 2017 ........................................................................ 104 Figure 5.2. The Seven RTOs or ISOs in the United States  ......................................................................... 105 Figure 5.3. States and Regions along the Spectrum from Traditional to Fully Restructured Electric Markets ..................................................................................................................................................... 106 Figure 5.4. How Market Prices Allow Resource Costs to be Recovered in a Centrally-organized Wholesale Market ....................................................................................................................................................... 110 Figure 5.5. Simulated ERCOT Dispatch Curves .......................................................................................... 112 Figure 5.6. Type of Fuel Used in PJM (by Real-Time Marginal Units): 2004 through March 2017 ........... 113 Figure 5.7. Annual Average Capacity Factors of Coal and Natural Gas Generators ................................. 113 Figure 5.8. Negative Northwest Off-Peak Daily Spot Prices ($/MWh) in 2011 ......................................... 116 Figure 6 1. Average U.S. Residential Sector Retail Electricity Prices over Time ....................................... 121 Figure 6.2. Average Wholesale Electric Costs/MWh Have Fallen between 2002 and 2016.  ................... 122 Figure 6.3. Day-Ahead, On-Peak Wholesale Electric Prices Reach Near-Record Lows in 2016. ............... 123 Figure 8.1. Average Three-Year Capacity Factors for Retired U.S. Coal Plants ......................................... 155 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy List of Tables Table 3-1. Direct Employment and Income in Industries Related to Electric Power Supply, 2016 ............ 23 Table 3-2. Nuclear Plant Retirements, Announced Closures, and Plants Averted by State Action   .......... 31 Table 3-3. Average Nuclear Costs by Plant Size and Operator Type, 2016 ................................................. 32 Table 3-4. Major Environmental Regulations Related to Coal, Natural Gas, and Nuclear Generation ...... 40 Table 3-5. Fiscal Year 2013 Electricity Production Subsidies and Support ................................................. 53 Table 4-1. How Various Energy Storage Options Can Deliver Grid-Level Applications .............................. 74 Table 4-2. Characteristics of VRE, Grid Integration Challenges, and Mitigation Options ........................... 78 Table 4-3. Dependence on Imported Just-in-Time Energy for Electricity ................................................... 94 Table B-1. VRE Integration Studies  .......................................................................................................... 151 1 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 1 Introduction  On April 14, 2017, Energy Secretary Rick Perry issued a memorandum requesting a study to examine electricity markets and reliability. With this document, Department of Energy (DOE) staff are delivering a study that seeks not only to evaluate the present status of the electricity system, but more importantly to exercise foresight to help ensure a system that is reliable, resilient, and affordable long into the future. Therefore, while carefully acknowledging history, this study focuses on the present trajectory of trends that are of particular concern in meeting those long-term goals.  Specifically, the April 14 memo directed a study that explores the following three issues: The evolution of wholesale electricity markets, including the extent to which Federal policy interventions and the changing nature of the electricity fuel mix are challenging the original policy assumptions that shaped the creation of those markets; Whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes such as on-site fuel supply and other factors that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which this could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future; and The extent to which continued regulatory burdens, as well as mandates and tax and subsidy policies, are responsible for forcing the premature retirement of baseload power plants. The U.S. electricity industry is facing unprecedented changes. Last year, for the first time in history, natural gas replaced coal as the leading source of electricity generation. In 2015, a record-high amount of generating capacity retired. Over the course of the last decade, overall growth in electricity consumption at the national level has stalled, while many generation sources—particularly natural gas, wind, and solar—frequently hit new record levels of penetration.  The stakes are high around these issues because electricity is crucial to modern society and economic activity, and because of the physical and financial magnitude of the industry. As noted in the report, Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (QER 1.2): The United States has around 7,700 operating power plants 1 that generate electricity from a variety of primary energy sources; 707,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines; 2 more than 1 million rooftop solar installations; 3 55,800 substations; 4 6.5 million miles of local distribution lines; 5 and 3,354 distribution utilities 6 delivering electricity to 148.6 million customers. The total amount of money paid by end users end for electricity in 2015 was about $400 billion. 7 This drives an $18.6 trillion U.S. gross domestic product and significantly influences global economic activity totaling roughly $80 trillion. 8 Recognizing how vital electricity is to our society and the health of the U.S. economy, the April 14 memo asked staff to “provide concrete policy recommendations and solutions.” It also offered principles for policy formulation: “the Trump Administration will be guided by the principles of reliability, resilience, affordability, and fuel diversity—principles that underpin a thriving economy.” To that end, this report concludes by outlining policy recommendations to advance those principles.  Section 2 of this study offers a summary of findings. Sections 3 through 6 provide the analytical framework, relevant data, and research. In addition, each of these sections concludes with a “looking forward” note, as many of the issues raised in the April 14 memo are of growing importance. Section 1 2 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy presents policy recommendations available—to DOE and others—to address the issues identified in this study. Section 8 outlines potential areas for further research. Data Used in This Study This study uses data collected by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) for the years 2002 through 2017, looking back before 2002 on a few specific issues. The 2002–2017 time range captures several important developments: Centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets (Regional Transmission Operators [RTOs] and Independent System Operators [ISOs]) were in the early stages of implementation in 2002. Competition within centrally-organized markets among a large segment of merchant generation did not take effect until the mid-2000s. Three RTO/ISOs initiated mandatory capacity markets in 2006–2007: New York ISO (NYISO), PJM Interconnection (PJM), and ISO-New England (ISONE). The emergence of a large amount of unconventional natural gas production—the shale revolution—started in 2006–2007. The consequent drop in natural gas prices began in 2009 under the combined impacts of low demand during the economic recession and a significant increase in supply. The recession contributed to a significant drop in electricity demand in 2008, and it took several years for demand to return to 2008 levels. Although ACC 000057 economic activity has picked up in recent years, electricity consumption and gross domestic product (GDP)—which grew together for decades—now appear less correlated as industries have become less energy-intensive and energy efficiency measures have taken full effect. Several environmental regulations implemented under statutes enacted in the 1970s and 1990s, which raise capital and operating costs for affected power plants, had compliance deadlines in the period 2010–2017. Driven in part by Federal and state policies, tax incentives, and mandates, significant quantities of variable renewable energy (VRE) resources—specifically wind and solar, and at levels high enough to alter traditional patterns of grid operation— began to impact certain areas around 2010. Also around 2010, demand response emerged as a way for customers to compete in most centrallyorganized wholesale markets. Because all of the above factors have emerged over the past 15 years—each affecting power supply and demand in different ways—looking at data since 2002 helps to reveal the impact and interactions of these changes.  Additionally, EIA believes that the highly detailed EIA data used in this study (down to the level of individual generators) is most reliable for 2002 forward.   Further, the data used for this study include power plant fuel conversions as retirements for the original fuel source. This study reports power (e.g. generation capacity) and energy (e.g. production or consumption over time) in megawatts (MW) and megawatt-hours (MWh), respectively (unless otherwise noted). Finally, all generation capacity figures reported in this study are net summer capacity as opposed to nameplate (unless otherwise noted).  3 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy The U.S. bulk power system (BPS) is a patchwork of different markets for electricity, shaped over time by technological changes, as well as state, regional, and Federal policies. This patchwork presents organizational and operational challenges, but its diversity also contributes to the system’s robustness.  The U.S. power system in the lower 48 states a is divided into three synchronized grids: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). b, 9 There are limited connections between the Eastern and Western Interconnections, and even fewer connections from ERCOT to the other grids. Issues confronting the BPS vary widely across regions. This study divides the lower 48 states into nine regions that represent either individual or groups of electric systems, known as balancing authority areas (see Figure 1 1). Within these regions, there are 66 balancing authorities (which can be as small as individual utilities or as large as a multi-state region). Using nine balancing authority-based regions for this analysis is a useful way of aggregating electricity data and revealing regional trends. a Both Alaska and Hawaii have unique islanded electric power systems that are not comparable to the rest of the Nation and thus are not included in this study. This is discussed in detail in a later section.  b For most purposes, ERCOT can be considered electrically isolated from the other grids. ERCOT is also not subject to most elements of the Federal Power Act and therefore economic regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. A significant exception is Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversight and regulation of power system reliability, which does apply to ERCOT. Defining Regions 4 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 1.1. Regions Used in This Study 10 Seven of the nine regions analyzed in this study correlate primarily or directly to the seven ISOs and RTOs in the United States that supply about two-thirds of electricity delivered to end-use customers: c NE = ISO-NE NY = NYISO ERCOT = Electric Reliability Council of Texas MidAtl = PJM Midwest = Mid-Continent ISO (MISO) Central = Southwest Power Pool (SPP) CAISO+ = California ISO (plus smaller balancing areas in the state) The two remaining regions include numerous balancing authorities, all of which lie outside RTO/ISO service areas: SE = Southeast West = non-CAISO+ Western Interconnection. c The last four regions in this list include a few additional (mostly small) balancing authorities outside the formal ISO or RTO footprint.  5 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy This study defines baseload generation as power plants that are operated in baseload patterns—that is, plants that run at high, sustained output levels and high capacity factors, with limited cycling or ramping. While this definition includes most nuclear, coal, and natural gas steam generators, it is not a given that every nuclear, coal, or natural gas steam generator is operated as a baseload plant, or that o ther technologies cannot function as baseload plants (such as hydroelectric generators). In addition, this study uses the term conventional generation to mean coal, nuclear, and natural gas power plants, regardless of how they are operated. d Other organizations and publications use similar definitions. For example, PJM defines baseload generation as “those units which operate the great majority of hours of the year to meet load requirements.” 11  The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) offers an explanation as well: There is a distinction between baseload generation and the characteristics of generation providing reliable “baseload” power. Baseload is a term used to describe generation that falls at the bottom of the economic dispatch stack, meaning [those power plants] are the most economical to run. Coal and nuclear resources, by design, are designed for low cost O&M [operation and maintenance] and continuous operation […]  H owever, it is not the economics nor the fuel type that make these resources attractive from a reliability perspective. Rather, these conventional steamdriven generation resources have low forced and maintenance outage hours traditionally and have low exposure to fuel supply chain issues. Therefore, “baseload” generation is not a requirement; however, having a portion of a resource fleet with high reliability characteristics, such as low forced and maintenance outage rates and low exposure to fuel supply chain issues, is one of the most fundamental necessities of a reliable BPS. These characteristics ensure that “baseload” generation is more resilient to disruptions. 12 The electricity industry has traditionally referred to baseload generation as the power plants that are used to meet “base” load—the minimum level of electricity that customers demand around the clock, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Large nuclear, coal, natural gas steam, and hydroelectric plants have historically been used for baseload generation. e Baseload plants generally have high capital costs but low fuel costs, and they tend to be fairly fuel efficient. Although the output level of these plants can be changed, they are most economic—in terms of cost per unit of electricity produced—when operated at near-full capacity at all times (although hydroelectric plants are more flexible). Traditional baseload units tend to have longer start-up and shut-down times and generally move (ramp) slowly between production levels to avoid damaging plant components with thermal stress or metal fatigue (see Appendix C on cycling).  d QER 1.2 does not define the term baseload in its glossary. However, the report states in a caption on page 1-21 that “baseload is considered coal, nuclear, and natural gas combined-cycle plants.” e Other technologies that have traditionally operated as baseload include geothermal and biomass power plants. However, those technologies represent a relatively small portion of total U.S. electricity generation; while valuable for the grid reliability services they provide, they are not covered in this report. Defining Baseload Generation 6 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 1.2. Schematic of Typical Daily Load Curve Showing Base Load 13 Intermediate or mid-merit plants are used to follow load, meeting daily variations in demand. Depending on the mix of generation resources available in different regions of the country and relative fuel prices, natural gas and/or coal units are typically used for load following. Short-duration demand peaks, which occur infrequently throughout the year, are generally met by natural gas units with high heat rates. f More recently, customer-provided demand response is helping to meet peak demand. Analysis in Section 3 shows that many of the power plants that retired between 2002 and 2016 were used for baseload generation in the past, but were no longer operating in that role at the time of retirement due to changes in electricity market dynamics. With the sustained drop in natural gas prices, for example, natural gasfired combined-cycle (NGCC) plants are currently a less costly source of baseload generation than coal or nuclear power in many regions of the country.  VRE resources such as wind and solar are beginning to serve more of minimum load, albeit at variable or intermittent output levels. g The proliferation of these sources has also led grid operators in some regions to place an increasing premium on flexible generation resources (e.g., NGCC units) that can help balance VRE variability by meeting base load and intermediate load, both of which are affected by a f According to EIA, “Heat rate is one measure of the efficiency of a generator or power plant that converts a fuel into heat and into electricity. The heat rate is the amount of energy used by an electrical generator or power plant to generate one kilowatthour (kWh) of electricity.” https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=107&t=3.  g For the purposes of this study, wind and solar are referred to as VRE. Terms such as “non-dispatchable” and “intermittent” may also apply to these technologies, but for consistency, this study uses the term variable. In contrast, some renewables are dispatchable—that is, sources that can provide power to the grid within sub-hourly time scales to match demand during any 24hour period. Dispatchable renewables include sources such as biofuels, geothermal, and hydropower (with the caveat on hydropower that it may only be seasonally dispatchable in some cases). 7 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy changing net load profile. h These factors, among others, have collectively lessened the immediate need for traditional baseload resources in certain regions, but still speak to the need for baseload generation. Defining Premature Retirement The ACC 000058 dictionary definition of premature is “happening … or performed before the proper, usual or intended time.” 14 The Department does not have an official definition for the term “premature retirement” i with respect to power plants, as the term is highly subjective. Below are some of the prevailing viewpoints and associated meanings:  Power plant engineers may think a power plant retired prematurely if it has not yet run to the end of its nominal design life (for instance, approximately 40 years for post-1970 coal plants) or through the term of reasonable plant life extension modifications. An RTO/ISO or reliability organization may think a power plant retirement is premature if its continued operation is still required to deliver Essential Reliability Services (ERS) j in that location (in which case the operator may delay retirement by designating it a “reliability-must-run” resource). A policymaker or legislator may think a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the plant delivers benefits that the state or society values, such as emissions-free energy, local jobs, or maintaining local generation. A mayor or employee may think a power plant is retiring prematurely if the retirement causes harms to the community and the individuals who work there. A merchant competitor that built or acquired a power plant may think its plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the merchant has not been able to recover its investment in the plant through sales of energy and capacity or through other revenue streams. A vertically integrated utility executive may think a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the utility has not yet fully recovered its rate-based capital investment in the plant and its return on that rate base. Nuclear or hydroelectric plant owners and regulators may think a power plant has retired prematurely if it has not yet run through the full term of its operating license and/or license extension. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) hydro licenses run for up to 50 years with potential reauthorizations of 30–50 years, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nuclear operating licenses run for 40 years with potential 20-year extensions. Electricity economists may think a power plant retired has prematurely if the plant was still able to sell electricity competitively against other energy sources but was required to close due to policy directives. On the other hand, economists may also think a power plant retired h “Net load” is the instantaneous difference between total customer electricity demand (load) and VRE generation. i QER 1.2—Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review—discussed “premature nuclear retirements” but did not explicitly define the term. For example, in Chapter 3, page 24, the report notes: “When analyzing the impacts of premature nuclear retirements on power generation in the state, a state of Illinois report considered a scenario in which 80 percent of the replacement generation was coal. Other analysis concludes that roughly  75 percent of the at-risk nuclear generation nationwide would be replaced with fossil generation, largely powered with natural gas.” [notes omitted, emphasis added]   j See Section 4 1.1 for a discussion of ERS.  8 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy prematurely if the plant provided un-priced benefits to society that, if priced, would have made the plant profitable. A long-term planner and risk manager may think a power plant has retired prematurely if it offered valuable diversity, reliability, resilience, and optionality benefits that are not yet fully recognized, valued, and/or compensated. Each of these viewpoints represents a valid perspective, particularly those of grid operators and other institutions responsible for reliability. While stakeholders may maintain that a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely based on one or more of the considerations above, the results of this study show that some observed power plant retirements were appropriate and consistent with markets as they are currently functioning. In other words, not every power plant retirement is cause for alarm. However, NERC is concerned with the trend of retirements as it relates to reliability and resilience. NERC wrote in response to the April 14 memo: As conventional resources prematurely retire, sufficient amounts of essential reliability services, such as frequency and voltage support, ramping capability, etc., must be replaced based on the configuration and needs of the system. 15 [emphasis added] Given the difficulty in assigning a single definition to premature retirement, as well as the subjective nature of such a definition, this study does not attempt to determine whether any specific power plant retirements have been premature. Instead, this study assesses the various factors that contribute to power plant retirement trends. Topics Beyond the Scope of This Study This study does not directly address several topics for the following reasons: Cybersecurity is a critical component to ensuring the reliable and resilient operation of the Nation’s energy infrastructure. Existing and emerging cybersecurity threats can affect any aspect of the electric sector, ranging from power plants, to transmission and distribution systems, to customers and end-use devices. The December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian electricity system and the 2012 Shamoon virus targeting the energy sector in Saudi Arabia, for example, were wake-up calls. 16    DOE takes these threats seriously and is designated as the Federal Government’s lead SectorSpecific Agency for cybersecurity for the energy sector, which entails supporting the cyber protection of the Nation’s critical energy infrastructure. k However, while cybersecurity is a significant concern and top priority, it is not addressed in this report because it is the subject of an upcoming joint report between DOE and the Department of Homeland Security being prepared in response to Executive Order No. 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure. Alaska and Hawaii: While the broad trends discussed in this report apply in Alaska and Hawaii as well as the lower 48 states, many of this study’s economic observations do not directly apply to the power plants in the Hawaii and Alaska power systems, as they are not large, interconnected energy markets, and utility system operators in the states face unique operational and fuel supply chain considerations.                                                             k For more information, visit DOE’s website on the Department’s cyber activities: https://www.energy.gov/national-securitysafety/cybersecurity.  9 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy The Hawaii and Alaska power systems are remote, vertically integrated systems with plant sizes that tend to fall below the size screens used in this study. The average generating unit sizes in Hawaii and Alaska are 18 MW and 5 MW, respectively, compared to an average unit size of 70 MW in the lower 48 states. 17 Because neither state is interconnected with any of the major U.S. interconnections, or to any transmission or distribution network in Canada, utilities in both states must self-supply all ERS. l As a result, utilities in these isolated systems might consider different parameters for reliability in their system planning compared to utilities in the contiguous United States, who can obtain reliability services and products in real time through markets and bilateral transactions. 18 Their experiences, however, may inform the efforts of utilities in the contiguous U.S. seeking to better manage rural systems and effectively integrate VRE and microgrids. Geothermal, biomass, and combined heat and power plants are often operated as baseload plants, operating at a relatively stable level over a long period of time. However, because these types of plants are not as prevalent or widespread as gas, coal, and nuclear plants, this study did not perform detailed analyses of trends and closures for these technologies. l In 2014, an intertie to the Western Interconnection of British Columbia was proposed to the Alaska Energy Authority in order to bring power to Alaska. However, as of 2016, no further work on the project had been completed due to economic reasons. http://energy-alaska.wikidot.com/railbelt.   10 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy 2 Findings of This Study  This study identified several critical issues central to protecting the long-term reliability of the electric grid in accordance with the April 14 memo, which asked staff to explore: 1) The evolution of wholesale electricity markets, including the extent to which Federal policy interventions and the changing nature of the electricity fuel mix are challenging the original policy assumptions that shaped the creation of those markets. While centrally-organized markets have achieved reliable wholesale electricity delivery with economic efficiencies in their short-term operations, changing circumstances have challenged both centrallyorganized and, to a lesser extent, vertically-integrated markets. m To date, wholesale markets have withstood a number of stresses. While markets have evolved since their introduction, they are currently functioning as designed—to ensure reliability and minimize the short-term costs of wholesale electricity—despite pressures from flat demand growth, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels. The resulting low average wholesale energy prices, while beneficial for buyers of wholesale electricity, represent a critical juncture for many existing baseload generation resources and their role in preserving reliability and resilience. n Market designs may be inadequate given potential future challenges. VRE—with near-zero marginal costs and if at high penetrations—will lower wholesale energy prices independent of effects of the current low natural gas prices. This would put additional economic pressure on revenues for traditional baseload (as well as non-baseload) resources, requiring careful consideration of continued market evolutions. Markets need further study and reform to address future services essential to grid reliability and resilience. System operators are working toward recognizing, defining, and compensating for resource attributes that enhance reliability and resilience (on both the supply and demand side). However, further efforts should reflect the urgent need for clear definitions of reliability- and resilience-enhancing attributes and should quickly establish the market means to value or the regulatory means to provide them.  ACC 000059 Evolving market conditions and the need to accommodate VRE have led to the increased flexible operation of generation and other grid resources. Some generation technologies originally designed to operate as baseload were not intended to operate flexibly, and in nuclear power’s case, do not have a regulatory regime that allows them to do so.                                                            m This study also refers to vertically integrated markets as bilateral markets. n Former FERC Commissioner Tony Clark summarizes today’s changing demands on centrally-organized markets: “Affordable power was the goal when markets were created. The current markets are still procuring affordable power, but many state public policy makers no longer see that as the only goal […] other public policy goals [include…] incenting in-state jobs, promoting ‘green’ energy  or other politically favored resources, preserving carbon-free resources, and retaining substantial tax revenues to state and local government.” Clark goes on to say, “[Markets] were never designed for job creation, tax preservation, politically popular generation, or anything other than reliable, affordable electricity.” http://www.wbklaw.com/uploads/file/Articles-%20News/2017%20articles%20publications/Market%20Identity%20Crisis%20Fin al%20(7-14-17).pdf. 11 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Generation from VRE can change widely over the course of a single day, which requires dispatchable power plants to be operated more nimbly. Additionally, in some areas of the country, there may be overgeneration from VRE at some points in a day, which drives prices to almost zero yet requires quick-ramping assets when VRE subsides. Taken together, these trends have placed a premium on flexible output rather than the steady output of traditional baseload power plants. This flexibility is generally provided by generation resources. However, nongeneration sources of flexibility—such as flexible demand, increased transmission, and energy storage technologies—are being explored as ways to enhance system flexibility. Society places value on attributes of electricity provision beyond those compensated by the current design of the wholesale market.  Americans and their elected representatives value the various benefits specific power plants offer, such as jobs, community economic development, low emissions, local tax payments, resilience, energy security, or the national security benefits associated with a nuclear industrial base. Most of these benefits are not recognized or compensated by wholesale electricity markets, and this has given rise to a variety of state and private efforts that include keeping open or shutting down established baseload generators and incentivizing VRE generation. 2) Whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes such as onsite fuel supply and other factors that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which this could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. Markets recognize and compensate reliability, and must evolve to continue to compensate reliability, but more work is needed to address resilience. Reliable and affordable electricity is essential to the modern economy, including the manufacturing, services, and financial sectors. NERC’s most recent annual State of Reliability report concludes that during 2016, the “bulk power system reliability remained within defined performance objectives to provide an Adequate Level of Reliability (ALR).” o NERC reached the same conclusion for 2013–2015. However, in a May 2017 letter to the Secretary of Energy, NERC pressed the importance of reliability issues that require attention, including maintaining ERS as conventional generation retires and ensuring flexibility and sufficient transmission to supplement and offset VRE. 19 These issues are indicative of the technological and institutional changes that are now affecting the electricity sector, and dealing with these issues will require new levels of coordination and collaboration among the sector’s many constituencies. Presently, BPS reliability is adequate despite the retirement of a portion of baseload capacity and unique regional hurdles posed by the changing resource mix. Fuel assurance is a growing consideration for the electricity system. Maintaining onsite fuel resources is one way to improve fuel assurance, but most generation technologies have experienced fuel deliverability challenges in the past. While coal facilities typically store enough o NERC defines ALR as “the state that the design, planning, and operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) will achieve when the [five] listed Reliability Performance Objectives are met.” These objectives are detailed at http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Resources/Documents/Adequate_Level_of_Reliability_Definition_(Informational_Filing).pdf.  12 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy fuel onsite to last for 30 days or more, extreme cold can lead to frozen fuel stockpiles and disruption in train deliveries. Natural gas is delivered by pipeline as needed. The NERC letter to DOE emphasized ensuring natural gas fuel supply and mitigating delivery vulnerabilities. Capacity challenges on existing pipelines combined with the difficulty in some areas of siting and constructing new natural gas pipelines, along with competing uses for natural gas such as for home heating, have created supply constraints in the past. Supply constraints can create increased price risk and, in extreme cases, could impact reliability. p Recent severe weather events have demonstrated the need to improve system resilience. The range of potential disruptive events is broad, and the system needs to be designed to handle high-impact, low probability events. This makes it very challenging to develop cost-effective programs to improve resilience at the regional, state, or utility levels. Planning, practice, and coordination on an all-hazards basis and having a mix of resources and fuels available when a major disturbance occurs are both essential to fast response. Work still remains to identify facilities that merit hardening; stage periodic exercises and drills so that governmental agencies and utilities are prepared for emergencies; and ensure that wholesale electricity markets are designed to recognize and incentivize investments that would achieve or enhance resiliencerelated objectives. Significant progress is already being made to understand what is needed to maintain power system reliability under changing market conditions, but more work is needed to understand what can be done to maintain resilience in a variety of conditions as the grid changes over the coming years. Further, low natural gas prices are driving greater use of natural gas for electricity generation, which has made exposure to natural gas price risk related to availability a growing concern in several regions. There are tradeoffs between multiple desirable attributes of the grid. For example, within power systems, it may be the case that a more reliable and resilient system is more costly than the least-cost system that a centrally-organized wholesale market is intended to deliver. Similarly, policies that seek to deliver more jobs, reduce pollution, or reduce risk may require more upfront investment at an initially higher cost to society as a whole than a least-cost system. It is important that policymakers have a clear understanding of the true costs and benefits of services to the grid, as well as an understanding of the tradeoffs between desirable attributes like reliability, flexibility, and affordability.                                                              p Indeed, ISO-NE has repeatedly expressed that reliability and resilience concerns are not being adequately addressed by the New England region on natural gas. 13 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 3) The extent to which continued regulatory burdens, as well as mandates and tax and subsidy policies, are responsible for forcing the premature retirement of baseload power plants. The recent and unprecedented rise of natural gas as a top electricity generation resource, the increase in VRE penetration, the flattening of electricity demand growth, and a host of policy issues—regulations, mandates, and subsidies at the state and Federal levels—have negatively impacted traditional baseload generation, particularly coal and nuclear power plants.  Between 2002 and 2016, 132,000 MW of generation capacity retired—representing about 15 percent of the total 2002 installed base—and 390,500 MW of new capacity was added. While power plants retire for a variety of reasons, several factors have contributed to recent retirements and continuing pressure for additional retirements. The biggest contributor to coal and nuclear plant retirements has been the advantaged economics of natural gas-fired generation.  Low-cost, abundant natural gas and the development of highly-efficient NGCC plants resulted in a new baseload competitor to the existing coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric plants. In 2016, natural gas was the largest source of electricity generation in the United States—overtaking coal for the first time since data collection began. 20 The increased use of natural gas in the electric sector has resulted in sustained low wholesale market prices that reduce the profitability of other generation resources important to the grid. The fact that new, high-efficiency natural gas plants can be built relatively quickly, compared to coal and nuclear power, also helped to grow gas-fired generation. Production costs of coal and nuclear plants remained somewhat flat, while the new and existing, more flexible, and relatively lower-operating cost natural gas plants drove down wholesale market prices to the point that some formerly profitable nuclear and coal facilities began operating at a loss. The development of abundant, domestic natural gas made possible by the shale revolution also has produced significant value for consumers and the economy overall. Another factor contributing to the retirement of power plants is low growth in electricity demand. Growth of total electricity use has slowed from averaging 2.5 percent annually in the late 1990s, to averaging 1.0 percent annually from 2000 to 2008, to remaining roughly flat since then. 21 Changes in electricity demand— particularly the apparent decoupling of economic output and electricity demand—have been driven in part by energy efficiency policies. The combination of slow growth in electricity demand and the 390,500 MW of capacity additions from 2002 to 2016 made significant amounts of older, ACC 000060 higher-cost capacity redundant. Dispatch of VRE has negatively impacted the economics of baseload plants. Since 2007, the contribution to total generation from wind and solar has grown quickly, accelerated by government policies and mandates. State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) have been the largest contributor—associated with 60 percent of VRE growth since 2000— followed by Federal tax credits and government research (which contributed to the dramatic drop in wind and solar technology costs). Because these resources have lower variable operating costs than traditional baseload generators, they are dispatched first and displace baseload resources when they are available. Participants on a panel of economists at a May 2017 FERC technical conference cited state-level RPS and Federal tax credits for VRE as examples of wholesale market impacts and distortions. 14 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Competition from resources that benefit from such policies q reduces revenues for traditional baseload power plants by lowering the wholesale electric prices they receive and by displacing a portion of their output.  Investments required for regulatory compliance have also negatively impacted baseload plant economics, and the peak in baseload plant retirements (2015) correlated with deadlines for power plant regulations as well as strong signals of future regulation.  A suite of environmental regulations scheduled for implementation between 2011 and 2022 has had varying degrees of effects on the cost of generation. For example, the largest number of coal plant retirements occurred in 2015—the deadline for coal and oil plants to add pollution control equipment for Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (MATS) compliance. In the same year, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized its Clean Power Plan, which, if fully implemented, would place additional pressure on coal-fired generation. Nuclear power plants also face regulatory costs—principally the Cooling Water Intake Rule. Three nuclear plants that announced closure (Oyster Creek, Diablo Canyon, and Indian Point) have cited disputes with their respective states, who implement the rule, as among the reasons for plant retirement.  Ultimately, the continued closure of traditional baseload power plants calls for a comprehensive strategy for long-term reliability and resilience. States and regions are accepting increased risks that could affect the future reliability and resilience of electricity delivery for consumers in their regions. Hydropower, nuclear, coal, and natural gas power plants provide ERS and fuel assurance critical to system resilience. A continual comprehensive regional and national review is needed to determine how a portfolio of domestic energy resources can be developed to ensure grid reliability and resilience.                                                                q These same economists also cited other “out-of-market” interventions as distorting efficient price formation in wholesale markets, such as recently enacted and pending state laws that provide support to existing nuclear units. During the economist’s panel discussion at the FERC May 2017 technical conference, the phrase “subsidies beget subsidies” was used. 15 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 3 Power Plant Retirements A combination of factors is causing power plant retirements, including low natural gas prices, wholesale competition, low customer demand growth, regulation-driven cost increases, and the growth of VRE. As Figure 3.1 shows, the types, magnitude, and timing of conventional power plant retirements vary regionally. Figure 3.1. Location of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and All Other Retirements, 2002–2016 22, r To understand observed power plant capacity retirements, it is useful to begin with an examination of historical capacity additions. From 1950 to 2015, capacity additions of different generation technologies tended to come in waves that were largely influenced by policy, fuel costs, and technology development (see Figure 3.2 ). Coal expansion was highest from 1950 to 1990, nuclear power was widely deployed in the 1970s and 1980s, natural gas capacity additions peaked in the early 2000s and continue through today, and VRE has grown rapidly over the last decade. s  r VIEU stands for vertically integrated electric utilities. s Not depicted: prior to the 1950s, hydropower was a large source of generation capacity additions, the vast majority of which is still operational today. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30312.   16 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.2. Net Generation Capacity Additions and Retirements t23  Power plant retirements have accelerated since 2011, and retirement trends vary significantly by generation source. For instance, the current wave of nuclear plant retirements only occurred over the last five years. u Some of the nuclear units now closing are doing so because of state policy pressure (as with California’s Diablo Canyon, New Jersey’s Oyster Creek, and New York’s Indian Point), and some have had maintenance issues that were too costly to fix. However, most plants are closing or threatening closure because–given the economics in some regions—they have become unable to compete against primarily low-cost, gas-fired generation and, to a lesser extent, subsidized and mandated VRE in a low electricity demand environment.  The design of traditional baseload power plants assumed operations primarily at a constant output level with limited cycling (see Appendix C). 24 As the electricity system continues to evolve and market conditions change, these plants are increasingly being moved into load-following operations, or are                                                            t Acronyms: Clean Air Act (CAA), Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992), Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), Investment Tax Credit (ITC), Production Tax Credit (PTC). u However, we note that 29 U.S. nuclear power plants retired from 1974 through 2001, including 13 power plants in the commercial utility nuclear fleet sized at 700 MW or larger. These plants retired for a variety of reasons, including damage (Fort St. Vrain), safety or operational difficulties (Three Mile Island 2, Zion 1 & 2, Millstone 1), costly safety requirements (Humboldt Bay), and state or utility policy choices (Rancho Seco, Trojan, Indian Point 1). This study only looks at the nuclear units in operation in 2002 and beyond. 17 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy required to more frequently adjust the load and the on/off dispatch of their units. The extra costs incurred to do so can affect a retirement decision. QER 1.2 discusses these issues: Currently, the changing electricity sector is causing the closure of many coal and nuclear plants in a shift from recent trends. From 2000 through 2009, power plant retirements were dominated by natural gas steam turbines. Over the past 6 years (2010–2015), power plant retirements were dominated by coal plants (37 GW), which accounted for over 52 percent of recently retired power plant capacity. Over the next 5 years (between 2016 and 2020), 34.4 GW of summer capacity is planned to be retired, and 79 percent of this planned retirement capacity are coal and natural gas plants (49 percent and 30 percent, respectively). The next largest set of planned retirements are nuclear plants (15 percent). 25 Retirements typically can be tied to the units’ inability to compete economically, but the factors complicating a given plant’s economics can be numerous and can compound each other. Currently, these factors include low wholesale electricity prices (driven by competing generators with low marginal costs, as well as subsidies); higher operating costs from unit age or lower efficiency; and looming capital needs, including compliance with safety and/or environmental regulations; among others. Further, minimal growth in electricity demand has compounded the impact of VRE policy; in an era of low-cost natural gas and increasing levels of state-mandated renewable generation—for example, a 20-percent share of wind and solar by 2020—lack of demand growth means natural gas and new VRE added to meet state mandates compete with existing conventional generation to satisfy a static level of demand. A review of coal, nuclear, and natural gas retirements to date shows that power plant retirements reflect regional patterns of generation development, state policies, and differences in market structure across regions. However, national patterns also emerge—Figure 3 3 shows that a significant amount of capacity (the highest on record) retired in 2015, coinciding with the MATS compliance deadline (which applied to coal- and oil-fired units across the country) as well as the finalization of the Clean Power Plan rule.  18 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.3. Retirements of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and Other Generating Units, 2002–2022 26  Figure 3.4 highlights retirement trends by ownership type (i.e., merchant vs. VIEU) and time period. Merchant plants accounted for nearly 70 percent of retired capacity during the period 2002–2010 (depicted as triangles below; note how most of the triangles are purple and dark blue). VIEU plants tended to retire later (depicted as circles below; note how most of the circles are light blue and green). The merchant vs. VIEU comparison indicates that market structure is a significant factor in power plant retirements, particularly the timing of retirements. Figure 3.4. Retirements by Date, Location, Ownership, and Capacity 27 19 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy The data displayed in Figure 3.4 is categorized into four time frames because a variety of economic trends and regulatory events occurred throughout the period 2002–2017: During the period 2002–2006 (shown in purple), VIEU plants retired or sold many of their generating assets to third parties through state-initiated processes collectively known as restructuring. During the late 1990s, many states passed legislation initiating restructuring concurrent with the creation of several RTOs and ISOs. The majority of retirements occurring during this period were smaller, older merchant power plants in restructured areas including California, Texas, the Northeast, and the mid-Atlantic region. The period 2007–2010 (shown in dark blue) saw early growth of subsidized utility-scale wind generation; the economic recession from 2008 through 2011; and the start of the shale revolution in 2006–2007, ACC 000061 with natural gas prices starting a downward trend. Also in this time frame was the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Massachusetts v. EPA, finding that the EPA has the authority to regulate carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), opening the door to further regulation under the Clean Air Act. 28 Older, less fuel efficient natural gas-fired plants retired early in this period, but the fall in natural gas prices starting in 2009 also began to force the shutdown of smaller, older coal and oil plants in 2009. In the period 2011–2015 (shown in light blue), low natural gas prices proved to be a longlasting rather than a short-term phenomenon. The compliance deadline for MATS converged with tightening pollution limits in sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxide (NO X ) trading programs. Many of the coal and oil retirements in this period were plants whose owners chose to shut down a plant rather than invest in costly environmental remediation measures. Further, the EPA’s final Clean Power Plan rule was finalized during this time. v This period had the most power plant retirements, with a marked increase in California, the mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Southeast. During this period, it also became clear that a portion of the customer electricity demand lost from the recession was not going to reappear in the near term, which meant that electricity demand would not support the higher-cost plants that occupied higher positions on the supply curve. In 2016 and going forward (shown in green), power plant retirements are and may continue to be driven by continued economic challenges in the form of market dynamics and compliance costs of regulations, as well as operational pressures from a changing resource mix. Figure 3.5 shows generation capacity, additions, retirements, announced retirements, and demand response w as a percentage of 2002 total installed net summer capacity in each region. The graphic shows that in every region except CAISO+, the proportion of retirements between 2002 and 2016 (in v Although the Clean Power Plan was later stayed by the Supreme Court, the investment uncertainty around the time of the final rule made reinvestment in coal technology a difficult decision for plant owners. https://www.iaee.org/ej/ejexec/EJ391_ExecSum_Morris.pdf. w Demand response is “a voluntary program offered by independent system operators/regional transmission organizations, local utility service providers, or third parties, which compensate end-use (retail) customers for reducing and/or changing the pattern of their electricity use (load) over a defined period of time, when requested or automatically instructed to do so during periods of high power prices or when the reliability of the grid is threatened.” https://energy.gov/epsa/quadrennialenergyreview-second-installment.   20 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy orange) is 20 percent or less of the total installed capacity available in 2002 (in red, orange, and light blue). The figure also shows that the amount of new capacity added (dark blue) exceeds the combined amounts of capacity retired (in red) and planned for retirement (in orange) in every region over the study period. x   Figure 3.5. Operating Generation Capacity, Additions, Retirements, and Announced Retirements by Region for All Generation Types, January 2002–December 2022 29  3.1 Coal Plant Retirements There were approximately 306,000 MW 30 of coal-fired power plants in the United States at the start of 2002 and 270,000 MW 31 at the end of 2016, representing a net retirement of approximately 36,000 MW (about 12 percent) of coal capacity. The remaining fleet of coal-fired generators covers most of the lower 48 states, with the exception of the Northeast, Northwest, and California, as shown in Figure 3.6.                                                             x While the graphic includes currently planned additions in EIA’s data, this figure does not show generation (megawatt-hour) or technology type, and most of planned and added capacity (megawatt) comes from new natural gas and VRE sources that do not meet the NERC baseload characteristic discussed earlier. 21 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.6. Location of the Existing Coal Fleet EIA reports that: Coal-fired electricity generators accounted for 25% of operating electricity generating capacity in the United States and generated about 30% of U.S. electricity in 2016. Most coalfired capacity (88%) was built between 1950 and 1990, and the capacity-weighted average age of operating coal facilities is 39 years. 32 More than 90 percent of the coal consumed in the United States is used for power generation. 33 Coal energy production peaked in 2007 and has been declining since. No new coal plants have been built for domestic utility electricity production since 2014 34 because new coal plants are more expensive to build and operate than natural gas-fired plants. 35 Further, as Figure 3.7 shows, coal retirements span many regions.  Figure 3.7. Location of Coal Retirements, 2002–2016 36 22 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,000 MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet. The age of coal plants is an important factor. As Figure 3.8 shows, the vast majority of coal-fired capacity was built before 1990, with the average of the fleet built in the mid to late 1970s. 37 According to the Congressional Research Service, the service life of coal-fired generators reportedly “averages between 35 and 50 years, and varies according to boiler type, maintenance practices, and the type of coal burned, among other factors.” 38 Figure 3.8. U.S. Utility-Scale Coal-Fired Electric Generating Capacity Additions by Coal Type and Initial Operating Year 39 40 Between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,000 MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet. 41 EIA reported that coal-fired power plants made up more than 80 percent of the 18,000 MW of electric generating capacity that retired in 2015, and that the retiring units “tended to be older and smaller in capacity than the coal generation fleet that continues to operate.” 42 An analysis of coal plant and other data indicates several important trends and attributes: About 70 percent of the plants that retired between 2010 and 2016 had a capacity factor of less than 50 percent in the year prior to retirement, and about half of the future planned retirements operated below a 50 percent capacity factor in 2016. 43 While none of the units that retired between 2010 and 2016 had significant SO 2 control equipment installed, more than half of the future announced retirements have SO 2 control. The average size of planned retirements (380 MW) exceeds the average size of recent retirements (218 MW), indicating that future retirements will be generally larger than previous ones. 4423 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Retired plants are older than the remaining fleet. The coal units that retired in 2015 were mainly built between 1950 and 1970, and the average age of those retired units was 54 years. The remaining coal fleet is relatively younger, with an average age of 38 years in 2016. 45 In summary, until quite recently, the coal plants that have retired were smaller, older, had higher heat rates, and therefore were dispatched less often and ran at lower capacity factors. Most of the earliest coal retirements were merchant-owned units in the Northeast and Midwest that were more exposed to competition from other generators and fuel types, while VIEU-owned plants in the Southeast and elsewhere experienced a longer period of protection from low market prices. Workforce Impacts of Coal Plant Retirements and Shifts in Coal Production Falling demand for coal due to coal plant retirements and capacity factor reductions, a regional shift in coal production, and automation in mining have led to a reduction in coal production jobs. Between 2011 and September 2016, increased mechanization and a shift to western coal resulted in a loss of 36,000 coal mining jobs, of which nearly 90 percent were in Appalachia. 46 As shown in Table 3-1, more than 80 percent of the coal jobs in the United States support electricity production. 47 The oil and gas extraction sector is not subdivided and includes many non-power uses. About 35 percent of the natural gas and roughly one percent of petroleum jobs in the United States support electricity production. 48 Growth in some energy sectors, such as solar energy deployment, supported new jobs, but they vary regionally and often do not correlate well with concurrent job losses in sectors such as coal mining or power plant operations. Job growth in other energy sectors and regions cannot sufficiently offset job losses in the coal sector without adequate training, salary adjustments, or transition assistance. Table 3-1. Direct Employment and Income in Industries Related to Electric Power Supply, 2016 49 Industry Sector/Subsector Jobs Percent Related to Electricity Industry Average Annual Income Electric power generation 191,000 100% $113,000 Electric power transmission and distribution 292,000 100% $99,000 Electric power total 483,000 100% $104,000 Coal mining y 55,000 ~80% $82,000 Oil and gas extraction z 377,000 ~35% of gas, ~1% of oil $118,000 Mining and extraction total 432,000 Unknown $113,000 y Includes supporting North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry categories. z Includes supporting NAICS industry categories.  24 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Coal Plant Closure Considerations 50 In September 2016, Ed Malley of Power Magazine noted: The primary recent drivers of coal plant retirement announcements include low natural gas prices and new environmental regulations —especially the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), Clean Water Act Section 316(b), and the Coal Combustion Residuals rule. Other contributing factors include more competitive markets and a variety of regional and state-level policies involving renewables and carbon pricing. Most of the power plants being closed today were built in the 1940s to 1960s, before the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970. Many have minimal air pollution controls, use once-through cooling water, and sluice wet coal ash to ponds. Scrubbers, closed-loop cooling, and dry ash handling are current requirements, or will be phased in over the next few years. Because much of the older capacity tends to be smaller units less than 300 megawatts (MW), ACC 000062 which are not economical to retrofit, they are therefore retired. Many closures coincided with the MATS deadlines in 2015 and 2016, at a time when natural gas prices were at historic lows. Now that the MATS deadlines have passed, additional companies are announcing closures, including Dynegy (5,000 MW) and DTE Energy (2,100 MW). Economics, renewable energy mandates, and reduced demand for electricity are driving these additional closures. Power plant closure activity began on the East and West Coasts in oil-fired plants because of the high cost of fuel. Closures are now occurring in the coal belts, the Upper Midwest, and the Southeast. There are even some coal-fired plant closures in Western states. 3.2 Natural Gas Plant Retirements In recent years, the story of natural gas for electricity generation has been one of overall growth rather than decline.  However, many natural gas plants have retired since 2002. Natural gas plants are located across the lower 48 states, and are concentrated around major population centers, as shown in Figure 3.9.  According to EIA: In 2016, natural gas-fired generators accounted for 42% of the operating electricity generating capacity in the United States. Natural gas provided 34% of total electricity generation in 2016, surpassing coal to become the leading generation source. The increase in natural gas generation since 2005 is primarily a result of the continued costcompetitiveness of natural gas relative to coal. 51 25 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.9. Location of the Existing Natural Gas Fleet 52 NGCC units accounted for 54 percent of the 447,000 MW of total U.S. natural gas-powered generator capacity in 2016. Combined-cycle generators have been a popular technology choice since the 1990s and made up a large share of the capacity added between 2000 and 2005. Some other types of natural gasfired technology, such as combustion turbines (CTs, representing about 28 percent of total natural gas-powered generator capacity) and steam turbines (NGSTs, 17 percent), generally only run during hours when electricity demand is high.  The capacity-weighted average age of U.S. natural gas power plants is 22 years, which is less than hydro (64 years), coal (39 years), and nuclear (36 years). The improved efficiency of NGCC plants has led to them being used to a greater degree as baseload generation and increased the overall generation from natural gas. Figure 3.10 shows the initial operating years for the three types of natural gas-fired capacity additions (and their respective share of total natural gas generation in 2016).  26 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3 10. Capacity Additions of U.S. Utility-Scale Natural Gas-Fired Electricity Generation by Technology Type and Initial Operating Year 53  Figure 3.11 shows total natural gas-fired net generation and how the capacity factors of these plants vary by technology over the period 2011–2016. Although NGSTs were originally built principally for baseload use, since the early 2000s, they have been displaced in the dispatch merit order by more efficient NGCC plants designed for greater flexibility. As shown in Figure 3.11, NGST units operate at significantly lower capacity factors than NGCC units.  Figure 3.11. Natural Gas Fleet Capacity Factors 54  The States of California, Texas, New York, and Florida all had more than 20,000 MW of natural gas-fired capacity at the end of 2016. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) reports that, due to the flexibility, efficiency, and cost competitiveness of NGCC power plants, grid operators have been dispatching NGCC plants more frequently as baseload generators. 55 In consequence, the average capacity factor for all NGCC plants has grown from about 40 percent in 2008 to roughly 56 percent in 2016, surpassing that of coal. 56  27 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.12. Location of Natural Gas Retirements 57 Figure 3.12 shows the retirements of natural gas plants between 2002 and 2016. The ERCOT and CAISO markets have presented difficulties for merchant natural gas (depicted as triangles above; note the concentration of merchant retirements in California and Texas). EIA reported in 2011 that between 2000 and 2010, 33,000 MW of natural gas-fired generation retired (72 percent steam turbines), with an average age at retirement of 48 years and with significantly higher heat rates than the average NGCC. 58 3.3 Nuclear Plant Retirements The current operating nuclear power fleet consists of approximately 54,000 MW of generating capacity in regulated markets and approximately 45,000 MW in restructured electricity markets. 59 This represents nine percent of total U.S. utility-scale generation capacity in 2017 and 20 percent of U.S. electric generation in 2016. EIA reports that nuclear plants have higher capacity factors than any other electric generation technology, averaging more than 90 percent (nearly full capacity, full time) over the past five years. The plants refuel every 18 to 24 months. 60  28 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.13. Location of the Existing Nuclear Fleet 61  The first of these units went online in 1969, and the capacity-weighted average age of the nuclear fleet is 37 years old. 62 Almost all of the operating plants have received approval to conduct at least one capacity uprate; through 2016, these uprates to the existing fleet have contributed more than 7,000 MW of additional nuclear capacity. 63 In addition to capital investments for capacity uprates, nuclear owners make significant capital investments to replace aging components to qualify for license renewal, as well as a suite of additional security and safety investments to comply with new regulations following 9/11 and the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. The United States has the world’s largest nuclear reactor fleet. Nuclear power plants contribute about 60 percent of total U.S. emissions-free generation. 64 Located in 60 power plants, the 99 active nuclear reactors provide almost half a million jobs and contribute more than $60 billion to the U.S. GDP. 65 Nuclear energy is viewed as a key strategic asset for the United States, and continued U.S. leadership in the global nuclear energy market has important nonproliferation and safety ramifications to national security interests. 66 As noted recently by Prof. Michael Webber of the University of Texas: While the environmental and reliability impacts of the [nuclear plant] closures are wellunderstood, what many don't realize is that these closures also pose long-term risks to our national security. As the nuclear power industry declines, it discourages the development of our most important anti-proliferation asset: a bunch of smart nuclear scientists and engineers….The loss of expertise from a declining domestic nuclear workforce makes it hard for Americans to conduct the inspections that help keep the world safe from nuclear weapons. 67 Of the 99 active nuclear units, 51 are owned by VIEUs, which rely on regulated cost-of-service ratemaking. This form of ratemaking provides a stable source of cost recovery assuming reasonably prudent operation and management by the utility. The continued operation of these units depends on decisions by their ratemaking authorities: state regulators; state governments; city councils; cooperative boards; Federal entities; and state regulatory bodies. If these plants become less competitive, authorities may decide to close nuclear units on economic grounds. Authorities can also decide to close nuclear units on grounds other than economics—for example, proximity to the New York City 29 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy metropolitan area (36 miles) has been cited as an additional concern in the continued operation of the Indian Point nuclear plant. Twenty-eight nuclear plants are now merchant plants that were spun off by VIEUs to affiliates under state electric restructuring efforts in the early 2000s. All of these merchant nuclear units operate in centrally-organized wholesale markets. Many of the units were spun off to exploit high locational marginal prices (LMPs) in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets in the days of high natural gas prices. aa  In New York and Illinois, Clean Energy Standards and associated Zero Emission Credits (ZEC) for nuclear plants are being used to help maintain the economic viability and continued operations of nuclear plants, in part to help meet the states’ GHG-limiting goals. Modeled after existing RPS and Renewable Energy Certificates (REC), these ZEC payments 68 69 have been established to direct additional funds to existing nuclear power plants that are no longer cost-competitive. Currently, only New York and Illinois have Clean Energy Standard programs, and these programs are being litigated in the courts. A recent Idaho National Laboratory report observes that 70 There is an industrywide systemic economic and financial challenge to operating nuclear power plants in centrally organized markets; Given the confluence of market factors in combination with market structure in centrally organized markets, a significant number of operating nuclear plants have negative cash flow positions today; Given current trends, these market factors are unlikely to change significantly over the next five years; Retirement of nuclear plants before their operating licenses expire is caused primarily by lower revenues as opposed to higher operating costs, as wholesale electricity prices have precipitously fallen over the last several years; The magnitude of the gap between operating revenues and operating costs is in the range of $5–$15 per megawatt-hour (MWh). For a 1,000 MW nuclear unit, approximately every $5/MWh of gap represents about $40 million in annual negative cash flow; Without action to enhance revenue (e.g., New York ZEC payments), more nuclear plants will face retirements before the end of their operating license in the future. 71 Figure 3.14 shows the nuclear reactors that have announced retirement, those that have closed, and those whose closure has been averted by state action. Between 2002 and 2016, 4,666 MW of nuclear generating capacity was announced for retirement, or approximately 4.7 percent of the U.S. total. 72  aa Profits from high wholesale prices are not available to utility cost-of-service regulated units because their revenues are set by state regulators to recover operating costs and provide a target return on invested capital.  30 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000063 Figure 3.14. Location of Nuclear Power Plant Retirements: Closed, Announced, and Averted 73  As shown in Table 3-2, another eight reactors representing 7,167 MW of nuclear capacity (7.2 percent of U.S. nuclear capacity and 0.6 percent of total U.S. generating capacity 74 ) have announced retirement plans since 2016. This does not include seven reactors that averted early retirement through state action. 31 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Table 3-2. Nuclear Plant Retirements, Announced Closures, and Plants Averted by State Action 75 76 77 As Table 3-2 shows, Indian Point is the only announced closure that lists state policy as the sole reason for retirement. 12 of the 16 plant closure announcements refer to unfavorable market conditions as the driver for plant retirement. Four of the five nuclear power plants (six reactors) that have shut down since 2013 were single-unit plants. Of the 11 nuclear power plants (15 reactors) that have announced  32 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy intentions to close—including the five plants (seven reactors) in New York and Illinois that will remain open as a result of state action—four are dual-unit plants and seven are single-unit plants.  Table 3-3 shows the range of nuclear plant average costs in 2016 (in $/MWh). The data indicates that single-unit plants are more costly than multi-unit plants, and that operators who own only one nuclear plant have higher costs than those who own a fleet of plants. This is largely because some operating costs, such as security, do not scale linearly with plant size. As a result, single-unit or smaller plants are more expensive, and thus more likely to be retired prior to the end of their license terms.  Table 3-3. Average Nuclear Costs by Plant Size and Operator Type, 2016 78  A nuclear plant fully exposed to low wholesale energy prices can earn additional revenues in three other ways: it may receive capacity payments if it is located in a centrally-organized market with a capacity payment scheme (New York, New England, MISO, and PJM), it can earn revenues for providing reliability products such as frequency response, bb or it may receive ZEC or similar subsidy payments from its host state.  If a nuclear plant is owned by a VIEU, its regulators may allow it to continue collecting capital recovery from its ratepayers even though the utility is effectively paying more to run the nuclear unit than it would cost to buy the same energy and capacity under a bilateral contract or spot market purchases. However, as long as natural gas prices stay low and there is an oversupply of energy in many hours, the typical nuclear plant may not be profitable. Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates that 34 of the Nation’s 60 nuclear plants are losing money. 79 Not all nuclear power plants close due to unfavorable economics alone. For example, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) has decided to shut down its dual-unit Diablo canyon plant in California due to several factors, including changes in state policy (California is moving to 50 percent RPS by 2040), new environmental regulations (replace once-through cooling system at an estimated cost of $8–$12 billion), local opposition to the NRC relicensing extension application, and uncertainty about future loads to be                                                            bb See Section 4 1.1 for the technical definition of frequency. 33 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy served by the regulated utility (specifically, community choice aggregation, which allows for third-party retail suppliers).  The NRC’s nuclear relicensing program is another factor affecting the future of U.S. nuclear power generation. The NRC issues initial reactor operating licenses covering a 40-year term, but those licenses have been routinely extended. Of the 99 operating nuclear reactors in the United States, 84 have been approved to operate for 60 years, while another nine are currently under review. 80 However, based on the current and potential license extensions to 60 years, only three units (Comanche Peak Unit 2 and Watts Bar Units 1 and 2) will still be operating after 2050, unless subsequent license extensions—out to 80 years—are submitted and approved. Two utilities have already announced plans to seek subsequent license renewal for two plants. 81   Extended nuclear plant operations often entail major capital upgrades of plant equipment. According to DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, the required capital costs for equipment upgrades drive the total cost for extension; these costs vary by plant. DOE estimates that it requires $500 million to $1 billion per plant of additional capital expenditures to operate a plant for an additional 20 years. 82 These routine maintenance and equipment replacements would be required in this time frame regardless of the licensing process. 83 Figure 3.15 shows a comparison of license duration to planned closure date. As depicted, most decisions to retire have come well before the expiration of the plant’s license. A few of the plants shown in the figure (indicated by a box around the plant name) were able to avert closure as a result of state actions. Figure 3.15. Nuclear Plant Retirements Compared to NRC Plant Operating License Terms 84 85 86  34 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy 3.4 Hydropower Retirements and Repowering In 2015, the U.S. hydropower fleet included 2,198 active power generation plants with a total capacity of 79,600 MW and 42 pumped-storage hydropower plants totaling 21,600 MW. 87 As of 2016, hydropower accounted for more than six percent of net U.S. power sector electricity generation, nearly nine percent of U.S. electric generating capacity, and 97 percent of U.S. utility-scale electrical storage capacity. 88 Hydropower is currently the largest source of renewable generation, providing nearly 44 percent of all U.S. renewable energy in 2016. 89 90 Half of U.S. hydro capacity is located in the States of Washington, California, and Oregon. The hydropower fleet is the oldest in the U.S. -- as stated in QER 1.2, “About half the U.S. hydroelectric fleet is over 50 years old since many large dams were built between the 1940s and 1960s,” 91 and the average hydroelectric facility has been operating for 64 years. However, with routine maintenance and refurbishment of turbines and electrical equipment, the expected life of a hydropower facility is likely to be 100 years or more. 92 Hydropower is a varied resource. Forty-eight states (see Figure 3.16) have hydropower facilities, led by California, Oregon, and Washington. Ownership of hydropower plants is highly diverse, split across a wide range of private and public entities. Approximately 50 percent of hydropower capacity is owned by the Federal Government—the three main Federal agencies authorized by Congress to own and operate hydropower plants are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Other public ownership includes public utility districts, irrigation districts, states, and rural cooperatives, whose hydropower resources consist of about 24 percent of the total installed capacity. Private owners—including VIEUs, merchant power producers, and industrial companies— control the remaining 25 percent of total installed capacity. 93  Figure 3.16. Hydropower Plants in the United States by Capacity and Average Annual Runoff 94 35 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy While some hydropower plants are operated as baseload resources, many also support the dynamic behavior of grid operations by offering a full range of ancillary services, including load following, spinning and non-spinning reserve, and voltage and frequency support. This flexibility has historically complimented other traditional forms of baseload generation, such as coal and nuclear. The majority of hydropower capacity is operated as either peaking or run-of-river. Peaking plants shift or delay water releases used for generation to higher value times of the day, contingent on a project’s storage capability and the regulatory requirements governing its operation. While peaking plants have usable storage from a project’s reservoir, run-of-river facilities have little to no ability to store water, and generation only changes based on the natural variability of flows, though even these types of facilities are capable of providing a number of ERS. In some regions, hydropower assets have been operated in more flexible modes in recent years as VRE penetration increases. 95  At the beginning of 2011, hydropower plants comprised 24 of the 25 oldest operating power facilities in the United States, with 72 percent of facilities older than 60 years. 96 However, significant capital investment toward modernizing and upgrading the existing fleet is consistently taking place to maintain reliability and, at times, uprate the capacity of existing facilities. From 2007 to 2016, the industry invested at least $8.7 billion in refurbishments, replacements, and upgrades to hydropower plants at 143 hydropower facilities, including $1.2 billion and 34 plants in 2016 alone. 97 This often includes equipment upgrades, turbine efficiency improvements, and modifications that ensure environmental protection and mitigation as part of relicensing terms. Most of the recent hydropower capacity additions in the United States have come from unit upgrades or additions to existing projects. 98 While FERC does receive appropriations from Congress to defray operating costs, these appropriations are recovered completely through annual charges and administrative fees. 99 EIA public reports indicate that 1,376 MW (of the total 79,985 MW of U.S. hydroelectric capacity) retired between 2002 and 2017—in most cases as part of repowering projects in which the retired turbine generators were replaced with new equipment. Fifty-two relatively small-scale hydroelectric generators representing 283 MW of generation capacity were retired without replacement. 100 3.5 Falling Natural Gas Prices Shale gas development has significantly expanded the availability of natural gas and lowered its cost across the United States and the world. 101 Before the widespread use of horizontal drilling techniques in the past decade, U.S. natural gas prices averaged more than $7 per million British thermal unit (MMBtu) between 2003 and 2008, and approached $14/MMBtu in several short periods (including in 2005 after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reduced production and delivery from Gulf of Mexico sources). 102 Hydraulic fracturing practices spread and made previously inaccessible gas sources economic, causing natural gas prices to fall, averaging ACC 000064 less than $3.20/MMBtu between 2012 and 2016. 103    36 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.17. Conventional and Shale Natural Gas Production, 2007–2016 104  Wholesale electricity prices generally tracked natural gas prices for the study period, as shown in Figure 3.18. This is likely because gas-fired mid-merit and peaker power plants have been the marginal generators following load in many hours of the day, and their short-run marginal costs are driven by natural gas prices. 105 Thus, natural gas plants and gas prices have been the largest single driver of spot electricity prices.  37 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.18. Wholesale DayAhead Electricity Prices vs. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Monthly Average) 106 The price of natural gas is a key factor in the prices generators offer in the bid-based RTO/ISO wholesale electricity markets. It is also a factor in the prices set in bilateral power sales, including in the nonRTO/ISO regions such as the Southeast. Consequently, wholesale and bilateral transaction prices are often driven by natural gas prices across large parts of the U.S. power market. cc On one hand, wholesale electricity prices have become increasingly exposed to potential volatility in natural gas delivered prices. On the other hand, the Nation has realized significant economic benefits from the shale revolution— falling natural gas prices between 2007 and 2013 generated an estimated net economic benefit of $48 billion per year over this period. 107 Natural gas-fired generation has grown nearly continuously since the late 1980s (see Figure 3.19) for several key reasons. These plants have low capital costs and are, in general, relatively less expensive than some competing technologies. 108 They are also much less land-intensive than many other types of generation, and thus often can be more easily sited in urban areas near electric demand. 109 Similarly, natural gas pipelines can be built more quickly than electric transmission lines (in most states) because they have a comparatively streamlined permitting process, which often has made it easier for a plant developer to build a new gasfired plant near a large electric load than to build a power plant farther away and transmit its electricity to large load centers by wire. dd  cc When natural gas prices were high, this situation yielded large profits to the then lower-cost coal and nuclear power producers. However, as gas prices and therefore wholesale and bilateral contract power prices have declined, the situation has reversed, and many coal and nuclear plants have been losing money. dd Interstate natural gas pipelines can often be built more quickly than transmission lines because the pipeline owners, once granted a FERCissued certificate of public convenience and necessity, have eminent domain power under section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act and the procedures set forth under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 71A). By contrast, electric transmission developers are dependent on states to grant eminent domain authorization.  38 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.19. Total Annual U.S. Natural Gas Generation, 1950–2016 110  The two main types of natural gas generators (NGCCs and CTs) offer distinct operational advantages. NGCC generators are very efficient and have significantly higher capacity factors than single 111 (simple) cycle natural gas CTs, which contribute primarily to meeting peak load and may only operate for a few hours a year. 112 A CT’s short start-up time and fast ramp rate make it the most responsive component for ensuring enough capacity exists to meet demand during the highest-peak demand hours of the year and help maintain grid reliability, absent affordable grid-scale storage. For this reason, CT capacity factors are usually low ee (generally below 10 percent). 113 CTs can go from cold start-up to 100 percent output in seven to 11 minutes; in contrast, coal-fired units ramp on the order of hours, and doing so incurs increased operations and maintenance costs. 114 NGCC ramp rates fall somewhere in between, and some NGCC units can ramp to full-rated power in less than 30 minutes. 115 This flexibility makes NGCCs and CTs useful in complementing VRE because their flexibility allows these plants to match changes in solar or wind output. Until recently, most NGCC units were used for intermediate and peak loads rather than baseload. However, because natural gas prices have been low for a sustained period, and because NGCC plants retain some of the flexible characteristics of CTs and operate at a higher efficiency and lower cost, these units often are now used for baseload power. As a result, some coal plants have been pushed higher on the merit order, which reduces their average capacity factors, negatively impacts their economics, and can ultimately lead to retirements.                                                            ee Some states rely on CTs more regularly than other locations; most notably, Texas, Louisiana, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island all have CT capacity factors greater than 20 percent. https://energy.gov/epsa/downloads/electricitygeneration-baseline-report.  39 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy On top of low fuel prices, natural gas-fired power plants have become more fuel efficient over the study period. Figure 3.20 shows how the fuel energy usage per unit of electricity generation of the fleet of generators has changed from 2002 to 2016 for each fuel type. The natural gas fleet has become increasingly efficient (i.e , achieved a lower heat rate) as old steam electric plants have retired and many new, highly efficient NGCC plants have been built and operated at high utilization rates. 116 Figure 3.20. Heat Rates for Coal, Nuclear, and Natural Gas, 2002–2016 117 3.6 Environmental Regulations A suite of environmental regulations affecting the electricity generation sector had implementation deadlines between 2011 and 2021, stemming from statutes enacted between 1970 and 1990. These regulations have had disparate effects on the costs of various power generation technologies. While the cost of environmental regulations has been significant for coal-fired power plants in particular, the evidence reviewed below indicates that regulations were not the sole cause of observed coal retirements, but were certainly a contributing factor. Following are two key takeaways:  1. Timing suggests that regulations had an impact on retirements. Of the 59,392 MW of coalfired power plants that retired between 2002 and 2016, approximately 48,800 MW or 82 percent of that capacity retired in the period 2012–2016, when significant environmental regulations would have affected the invest-or-retire decision. This left 270,000 MW of coal-fired capacity on the grid (down from 315,000 MW in 2002), which produced 30 percent 118 of total 2016 U.S. electricity output (down from 50 percent in 2002). 2. Many of the coal plants that retired were no longer “baseload.” Due to low natural gas prices and abundant natural gas generation capacity additions, most of the coal plants that retired between 2011 and 2015 (when the environmental regulations took effect) had not been operating in their intended baseload fashion for several years. 119 40 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy All nuclear power plants are affected by regulations pertaining to safety, security, and upgrades required for license renewal. In addition, nuclear plants are affected by the Cooling Water Intake Rule, and some announced closures have cited, among other reasons, state requirements to modify cooling water systems as a reason for retirement. 120 121 Hydropower plants are also affected by other environmental regulations and unique licensing processes. Table 3-4 summarizes major environmental regulations finalized after 2011 affecting coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants.  Table 3-4. Major Environmental Regulations Related to Coal, Natural Gas, and Nuclear Generation  Name Year Finalized ff Year (s) Implemented Authorizing Statute gg Major Provisions Generation Sources Affected Cooling Water Intake Rule 122 2001 (Phase 1), 2003 (revised Phase 1), 2014 (Phase II)  Phase II: 2014–2018 123 Clean Water Act  Promulgated under 316(b) of the Clean Water Act. New sources regulated under Phase I and existing sources regulated under Phase II. States consider requirements for power plants on a case-by-case basis. 124 Requires controls to reduce mortality to fish and other aquatic organisms. Coal Gas Nuclear Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 125 2011 Phase 1: 2015 Phase 2: 2017 Clean Air Act The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule replaced the Clean Air Interstate Rule starting on January 1, 2015, and requires states to reduce power plant emissions of SO 2 and NOx that contribute to ozone emissions and fine particle pollution in other states. 126 Coal Gas Steam Electric Effluent Limitations Guidelines 127 1974; policy updates in 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, and 2015 1982; 2015 update is stayed while EPA reviews rule 40 CFR 423 Established limitations on the discharge of toxic and other chemical pollutants and thermal discharges from existing and new steam electric power plants, as well as pretreatment standards. The 2015 update sets the first Federal limits on levels of toxic metals that can be discharged. Coal Gas New Source Review hh 1980; policy updates in 1996 and 2002 1980; 2002 updates under court challenge Clean Air Act Affects stationary sources of air pollutants. Requires that a new or modified power plant obtain a pre-construction permit to ensure, among other things, that modern pollution control equipment is installed. Requirements differ depending on whether or not the plant is located in an area that Coal Gas ff Dates shown here reflect the date of publication in the Federal Register. gg For regulations only. hh The New Source Review (NSR) program affects most new and modified power plants and manufacturing facilities. Determining when a facility is making a modification that triggers NSR has been a subject of debate. Attempts have been made over decades to update NSR—the latest in 2002. More information can be found at: http://www.rff.org/research/publications/epa-s-new-source-review-program-time-reform and http://www.aei.org/publication/making-sense-of-new-source-review/  41 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy meets the requirements under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 128  2012 2015–2016 Clean Air ACC 000065 Act Establishes emissions limits for mercury, arsenic, acid gases, and other toxic pollutants from coal- and oil-fired power plants. 129 Utilities had until April 2015 to comply with the standards with many plants receiving a 1-year extension. Coal Coal Combustion Residuals Rule 130 2015 20152018 ii Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Addresses groundwater contamination risks from coal combustion residuals (i.e., “coal ash”) disposal in unlined landfills and surface impoundments by establishing national standards for disposal. Coal Regional Haze Rule 1999; policy revisions in 2017 Revised state plans due in 2021 Clean Air Act Requires states to develop long-term strategies, including enforceable measures to improve visibility in 156 national parks and wilderness areas. Aims at returning visibility to natural conditions by 2064. Coal Carbon Pollution Standards and Clean Power Plan 131 2015 Under EPA review Clean Air Act Carbon Pollution Standards established CO 2 emission standards for new fossil fuelfired generators under Clean Air Act section 111(b). The Clean Power Plan, promulgated under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, establishes CO 2 emission standards for existing power plants. Coal Gas The collective impact of this suite of regulations required owners to weigh the cost implications of a variety of compliance options for their plants, and to also look closely at whether their market prospects (expected production costs and capital needs, relative coal and natural gas fuel costs, competition from other generators, technology availability, and customer demand levels) or regulatory regime would allow recovery of those costs in future operating years.  Most of these rules were litigated and delayed—the Clean Power Plan, for example, currently is stayed and ultimately may be rescinded, but uncertainty about its implementation nonetheless affected plant owners’ compliance and retirement planning. In 2011, looking at then-current energy market prospects and fuel prices, it appeared that many power plants would be affected by these environmental regulations. Fitch Ratings estimated that 51,000 MW of coal units (smaller than 200 MW each, with a capacity-weighted average age of nearly  50 years) were at risk for retirement, particularly those operating in restructured electricity markets with no recourse to regulated cost recovery. 132  In 2011 and 2012, electric industry projections of likely regulation-induced retirements that focused on the many unknowns associated with pending environmental regulations sometimes showed a very large number of retirements. These unknowns included how stringent environment remediation requirements would be; what remediation technology and strategies might satisfy those requirements; how close together the compliance deadlines would fall; and the implications for regional reliability, ii The Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act S.612, passed in December 2016, authorizes states to create their own permitting programs for coal combustion residuals disposal, subject to EPA approval. The act specifies that states may adopt alternative standards that are “at least as protective” as national standards. EPA has not yet issued guidelines or regulations by which state permitting programs can be approved.   42 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy energy production costs, and retail energy rates if too many power plants were to close rather than invest in remediation.  Environmental regulations generally increase power plant operating costs by requiring plant owners to install capital equipment that controls plant emissions. The electrical load from equipment such as SO 2 scrubbers (“parasitic load”) may also reduce the plant’s net generation available for sale on the grid. Increased operating costs push the compliant plant farther out on the energy supply (dispatch) curve and can cause it to be dispatched less frequently than it would have without the emissions controls, as shown in Figure 3 21 using coal as an example.  Figure 3.21. PJM Merit-Order Dispatch: Various Control Technologies 133  This figure shows power plants separated by technology type for PJM, in “merit order”, i.e., based on their marginal cost of generation, in the year 2012. The vertical lines represent various levels of load. The diamonds represent marginal costs (sum of fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs) for one subcritical pulverized coal plant with no control technology and that same plant with variations of two select pollution control technologies that reduce acid gas pollution. In principal, all the plants left of a vertical line operate at the level of demand represented by that line. (In reality, transmission constraints and reliability considerations can change that significantly.)  As a plant moves to the right on the curve it will tend to operate less due to the increase in marginal cost. Control technologies key: dry FGD = dry flue gas desulfurization; three types of DSI (hydrated lime, trona, and sodium bicarbonate) = dry sorbent injection.  Another control technology not shown that is used to reduce acid gas emissions is wet flue gas desulfurization. Technology key: Renew = other renewables not including hydropower or wind power; Water = hydropower; LOil = light oil-fired power plants; HOil = heavy oil-fired power plants; Nuc = nuclear power.  43 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 3.6.1 Coal Plants and Environmental Regulation Existing coal-fired power plants must not only comply with all Federal requirements related to emissions and water use, wastewater treatment, and solid waste management, but also with any additional applicable state regulations. 134 Cost impacts of these regulations varied. The EPA reported that a typical coal-fueled unit with a capacity of 700 MW could incur incremental operating and maintenance costs ranging from $287 million to $351 million to install a scrubber, from $116 million to $137 million to install a selective catalytic reduction unit, and from $97 million to $114 million to install a baghouse (fabric filter). Fitch estimated the lifetime costs and reduced cash flow associated with environmental retrofits at $1,700–$1,900 per kilowatt (kW) for a 100 MW plant burning bituminous coal, as compared with a range of $1,200–$1,300/kW for a 500 MW plant. 135 These costs are on par with those of constructing a new typical (i e., subcritical) coal plant of similar size during this same time period (averaging $1,361/kW). 136 Reported planned retirements from that time suggest that approximately  27,000 MW or 8.5 percent of 2011 coal-fired capacity was rendered uneconomic under the combination of regulatory compliance costs, little demand growth, and falling natural gas prices. 137 The MATS rule was potentially the most expensive and immediate of the suite of pending regulations, with a compliance deadline of April 2015 (later extended to April 2016 for some plants). Further, owners of coal facilities were dealing with MATS compliance in combination with the cost of imminent additional regulations of CO 2 , along with other GHGs. EIA reported that by the end of 2012, 64 percent of the U.S. coal generating capacity in the electric power sector already had the appropriate environmental control equipment (most reported using flue gas desulfurization) to comply with the MATS rule and operate past 2016; another six percent planned to add control equipment; 10 percent had announced plans to retire; and the other 20.4 percent still had to decide whether, how, and when to upgrade or retire their plants. 138  The dominant MATS compliance strategy among coal-fired plant owners was to install activated carbon injection (Figure 3.22 ), which averaged a relatively modest $5.8 million per generator from 2015 to 2016. EIA estimates that “operators invested at least $6.1 billion from 2014 to 2016 to comply with MATS or other environmental regulations.” 139 In its rulemaking, EPA estimated an annualized cost of $9.6 billion in 2015, declining to $7.4 billion annually in 2030. 140  44 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.22. Changes in U.S. Coal Capacity, December 2014–April 2016 141  The retrofit-or-retire decision for owners is also impacted by EPA's New Source Review (NSR) regulations that can affect owners’ ability to enhance plant efficiency due to the delay, cost, and uncertainty associated with obtaining an NSR permit. The NSR permitting program requires stationary sources of air pollution—including factories, industrial boilers, and power plants—to get permits before construction starts, whether the unit is being newly built or modified. 142 This is an important concern for owners considering retrofitting an existing power plant with carbon capture equipment to reduce CO 2 emissions, or adding new components to improve operating efficiency. These upgrades could trigger the NSR requirements of the Clean Air Act because they would constitute a “physical change,” or lead to a designation of the change as a “major modification,” subjecting the unit to NSR permitting requirements.  The uncertainty stemming from NSR creates an unnecessary burden that discourages rather than encourages installation of CO 2 emission control equipment and investments in efficiency because of the additional expenditures and delays associated with the permitting process. 143 144 Ironically, the uncertainty surrounding NSR requirements has led to a significant lack of investment in plant and efficiency upgrades, which would otherwise lead to more efficient power generation, benefits to grid management, and reduced environmental impacts. EPA has acknowledged these burdens and has made attempts to reform the rules to improve and streamline NSR: As applied to existing power plants and refineries, EPA concludes that the NSR program has impeded or resulted in the cancellation of projects which would maintain and improve reliability, efficiency and safety of existing energy capacity. Such discouragement results in lost capacity, as well as lost opportunities to improve energy efficiency and reduce air pollution. 145 The NSR program distinguished between “routine maintenance and repair” of existing facilities—which would be allowed—and more “substantial modification” of existing facilities, which would put the facilities over the threshold and thus require them to meet new emissions standards.  Environmentalists argued that owners of electric generation and industrial plants were building virtually new facilities from the inside out by exploiting the “routine maintenance and repair” exclusion from NSR. EPA changed ACC 000066 its interpretation in the 1990s to a more rigorous standard, culminating in numerous enforcement-related lawsuits beginning in the late 1990s. 146 45 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy By the late 2000s, some older coal units operating without pollution controls were no longer operating as baseload units, having operational capacity factors estimated at 47 percent to 56 percent. 147 As Figure 3.23 shows, rather than acting as baseload units at high capacity factors, these older units (with an average capacity of 109 MW) were operating at falling capacity factors. The units that retired in 2014 had an average capacity factor of 13 percent in 2013. Figure 3.23. Average Coal Plant Capacity Factors, 2008–2014 148 Coal plant capacity factors generally fell from 2008 through 2014, with plants that retired in 2014 operating at much lower capacity factors than all coal plants. Some owners delayed their retirement announcements and retrofit decisions in order to see how the regulation litigation challenges played out, in case a late court ruling made compliance unnecessary, signifying that the cost of complying with those regulations was a factor in their retirement decisions. Others delayed closing uneconomic plants to see if enough other plants retired, in hopes that the resulting shift in market dynamics and prices might render the unretired plants profitable again. 149  Figure 3.24 shows total U.S. coal capacity from 2008 through mid2016 and projections through  mid-2018. While there was a fall in coal plant capacity in 2015 associated with the MATS compliance deadline, EIA finds that fewer coal facilities retired in 2015 and the first half of 2016 than EIA had projected ahead of the compliance deadline. Specifically, in 2015 and until the April 2016 extended MATS deadline, about 20,000 MW of coal capacity retired and another 9,000 MW of coal capacity converted to natural gas, while EIA projected 50,000 MW of retirements between 2013 and 2020, with the majority retiring in 2015 in response to MATS. 150 However, EIA’s projection also included other factors that can drive retirement decisions, such as the Clean Power Plan.  46 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.24. Projected and Actual Coal Retirements, 2008–2018 151  Fewer coal plants retired in 2015–2016 than projected. 3.6.2 Natural Gas Plants and Environmental Regulation Because natural gas emits far less air pollution than coal-fired power plants, 152 the regulatory burden and cost to natural gas-fired power plants is much lower than for coal plants. ERCOT’s December 2014 analysis estimated that the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) jj and the Cooling Water Intake Rule would impose moderate compliance costs on natural gas-fired power plants. 153 Specifically, ERCOT estimated costs of $0.10–$2.75/MWh for CSAPR and $0.10–$0.50/MWh for the Cooling Water Intake Rule.  The large majority of natural gas plants that have retired are NGSTs, which are less efficient than the newer NGCCs. 154 From 2002 to 2016, there was a steady stream of NGST retirements, some of which may be linked to decisions about the cost effectiveness of retrofit upgrades. However, during the period 2014–2016, 23,500 MW of new natural gas capacity was added, nearly double the total natural gas capacity that was retired as part of the transition from NGST units to more efficient NGCC units. 155 NGCC plants have replaced NGST plants for baseload use and natural gas combustion turbines have been built for peak power demand.  3.6.3 Nuclear Plants and Environmental Regulation The principal environmental regulation affecting nuclear power plants is the Cooling Water Intake Rule, which applies to all types of power plants but is most challenging for nuclear plants. A revised version of the Cooling Water Intake Rule has been in effect since 2003. The rule was promulgated to protect aquatic life. States may decide how to implement the rule, such as by requiring a nuclear (or other) plant to invest in a closed-loop cooling system to replace once-through ocean or waterway cooling. Three of the nuclear plants that have announced closures (Oyster Creek in New Jersey, Diablo Canyon in                                                            jj Finalized in 2011 and effective in 2015. 47 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy California, and Indian Point in New York) have cited disputes with their respective states over cooling water rule compliance among the reasons for plant retirement. 156 157 The Administrative Consent Order between Exelon and New Jersey establishing Oyster Creek’s 2019 retirement specifically mentions Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act as part of the state’s justification in requiring the construction of cooling towers if the plant were to operate for the full duration of its license extension. 158  Nuclear plants are also affected by other regulatory factors and fees that are not imposed on other types of power plants. Recent examples include major safety reviews following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant failures in 2011. A recent study found that the rising regulatory costs of nuclear energy— which approach $60 million per year—exceed the profit margins of many of these plants. 159 3.6.4 Hydropower Plants and Environmental Regulation As authorized under the Federal Power Act, FERC issues licenses to non-Federal hydropower projects, which comprise roughly 50 percent of existing U.S. hydropower capacity. The FERC regulatory framework involves numerous participants, such as Federal and state resource agencies; nongovernmental organizations; state, local, and tribal entities; and the public. Because of the complexity of the regulatory processes and numerous agencies involved, hydropower licensing timelines often are cited as being among the lengthiest and costliest for energy projects in the United States. A DOE analysis looking at the development timelines of 29 projects that came online from 2005 to 2013 found that the median project took over 15 years from application to operation. 160 For wind and solar, the average permitting time is two to four years. 161 A few hydroelectric power plants have not sought relicensing due to concerns over the cost of meeting mandatory environmental requirements imposed by Federal and state resource agencies. Capital upgrade requirements can include capacity uprates (initiated by the plant owner rather than a regulator), dam safety upgrades, or environmental improvements. 162   3.7 Growing VRE Deployment Wind and solar PV—collectively, VRE—have constituted the vast majority of the VRE deployed in recent years. Wind first surpassed 1 percent of total U.S. generation in 2008, while total solar generation reached that threshold in 2015. kk Figure 3 25 shows trends in penetration—as a percentage of total generation—for wind, solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, and biomass power plants in the United States since 2001. Total end-use demand served by wind generation tripled from 1.5 percent in 2008 to 4.5 percent in 2013. Total renewable generation has now exceeded 14 percent of the U.S. total, with hydro and wind comprising the largest components.  kk While annual variation in water availability affects conventional hydroelectric output from year to year, hydro generally has been consistent between 6 percent and 8 percent of total generation since 2001. https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7_6.pdf. 48 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.25. VRE Generation by Fuel as Percentage of Total U.S. Generation, 2002–2016 163 At the end of 2016, U.S. installed wind capacity surpassed that of hydro for the first time (see Figure 3 26). 164 165  However, given the hydro fleet’s higher average capacity factors and the above-normal precipitation on the West Coast so far this year, hydro generation will likely once again exceed wind generation in 2017, though the gap continues to narrow. Figure 3.26. Cumulative U.S. Utility-Scale Wind and Hydroelectric Generation Capacity, 1915– December 2016 166  3.7.1 Technology and Policy Drivers for Deployment The deployment of wind and solar power has been spurred by a combination of technology cost declines; state RPS; private sector sustainability goals; consumer choice; Federal and state incentives; 49 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy transmission expansion—such as the Texas Competitive Renewable Energy Zone project—to reach highquality resource areas; and Federal and state environmental, air quality, and GHG emissions reductions policies.  RPS—now in 29 states and the District of Columbia, covering 55 percent of total U.S. retail electricity sales—have also been substantial drivers of VRE growth, as they are associated with 60 percent of renewable generation growth since 2000. 167 Though wind has historically been the largest beneficiary of RPS policies, more RPS-driven solar than wind was added in 2015. 168 RPS also create a market for RECs. RECs represent some of the environmental attributes of renewable generation that can be bought, sold, and applied to meet certain state RPS plans, and they create an additional subsidy to renewable generation. Technologies typically experience cost reductions as their deployment grows due to technology improvement and increasing economies of scale. Lower investment costs, in turn, spur further deployment—since 2009, solar PV installed system costs have fallen approximately 60 percent on a per kilowatt basis for residential and commercial systems (from $7.06/W DC to $2.93/W DC for residential and from $5.23/W DC to $2.13/W DC for commercial) and 70 percent for utility-scale systems (from $4.46/W DC to $1.42/W DC ). 169 However, other factors can interrupt this general trend; for example, increases in warranty costs and the prices of commodities such as steel and fiberglass (among other factors) drove wind turbine installed system costs on a permegawatt basis to double between 2000 and 2008 (though these costs went on to decline by 40 percent since 2010). 170  Importantly, these capital cost trends do not account for technology improvements that improve performance and economics. For wind, improvements in turbine technologies and taller towers have resulted in increased capacity factors. For example, in 2015, capacity factors averaged 25.8 percent for wind projects built from 1998–2003 and averaged 41.2 percent for wind projects built in 2014. 171 Similarly, for utility-scale PV, optimized system design—including use of ACC 000067 single-axis tracking and increasing inverter loading ratios—partially contributes to capacity factors increasing from  21 percent for 2010 vintage projects to 26.7 percent for 2014 vintage projects in 2015.  In addition to research and development (R&D)—which is aimed at reducing technology costs through innovation—the investment tax credit (ITC) and PTC, as well as state-level RPS, have driven expansion of VRE, particularly wind and solar. Figure 3.27 shows the substantial increase in wind capacity since 1998 during the period when a PTC has been in effect. It also suggests the wind industry’s tendency to increase investments in years when the tax credit was due to expire and its extension was uncertain. The current PTC is scheduled to be phased out after 2019. 172 The solar ITC—currently at  30 percent—will be reduced after 2021 to its statutory level of 10 percent for commercial and industrial projects, and will be phased out completely for residential projects. 173  50 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.27. Relationship between the PTC and Annual Wind Capacity Additions  The PTC has accelerated wind project deployment significantly—between 2000 and 2013, cumulative wind capacity grew from less than 5,000 MW to more than 60,000 MW— though capacity additions noticeably track the PTC expiration and extension schedule. Similarly, the dramatic decrease in wind capacity additions during PTC expiration years underscore the notion that credits are driving deployment, rather than market decisions. For example, during the PTC expiration “cliff” in 2013, new builds counted for 1 MW of added capacity. After renewal of the PTC, new capacity jumped to 5 MW. 174 This change occurred in the absence of any change in state RPS requirements. A panel of economists at a May 2017 FERC technical conference cited state-level RPS and Federal tax credits for VRE as examples of market-distorting subsidies and mandates. These policies reduce revenues for traditional baseload power plants by lowering the wholesale electric prices they receive and by displacing a portion of their output. To date, however, the data do not show a widespread relationship between VRE penetration and baseload retirements, as shown in Figure 3.28. 175    51 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.28. VRE Penetration as a Percentage of 2016 Generation versus Retired Capacity since 2010 as a Percentage of Non-VRE Capacity 176 While concerns exist about the impact of widespread deployment of renewable energy on the retirement of coal and nuclear power plants, the data do not suggest a correlation. Subsidies Federal and state governments use subsidies, mandates, and prohibitions to affect how public and private entities behave. Subsidies make the favored behavior or product more appealing relative to other competing products by accelerating its development (as with R&D and direct construction expenditures), lowering its ultimate cost to the consumer (as with tax incentives, low lease payments or grants), or making the product better known and more appealing (customer education, ratings, and marketing). In contrast to subsidies, mandates and prohibitions create absolute requirements for the user for whether and how much of the targeted product to consume.  The Federal Government has always used a variety of subsidies to support a myriad of public and private sector goals. Over the long term, subsidies are spent on different technologies at different times, reflecting differing societal priorities and technology maturities. Early subsidies included Federal construction of hydroelectric dams and multi-purpose water management projects beginning in the 1930s. Energy R&D spending began in the 1950s with the passage of the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, with major Federal investments in the commercialization of nuclear electricity. R&D investments  52 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy increased sharply after the oil price shocks and energy crisis in the 1970s, and renewable energy R&D supported VRE. Accurately accounting for energy subsidies and expenditures is highly dependent on the scope and time period of the analysis. For example, some tax incentives may affect energy industries but are not specific energy-related measures, such as Section 199 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which allows tax deductions for domestic manufacturing. Natural gas producers, along with many other types of manufacturers, have been able to take advantage of this tax incentive even though it was not an energyspecific measure. This is just one example of the difficulty in examining energy-related subsidies and expenditures both from Federal and non-Federal sources, many of which may not be directly comparable. ll As a snapshot of Federal subsidies and support for electricity generating technologies for a given year, Table 3-5 shows electricity production subsidies and support that includes breakouts by direct expenditures, tax expenditures, R&D, and other Federal programs, compiled by EIA for Fiscal Year 2013. Although this data has not been compiled for every year, the 2013 data can be instructive. For example, VRE technologies received a majority of Federal support that year relative to other technologies, particularly reflecting the technical maturity of VRE relative to conventional technologies.                                                             ll For a longer discussion on energy subsidies and various reports examining energy subsidies, see https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 53 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Table 3-5. Fiscal Year 2013 Electricity Production Subsidies and Support 177 Similarly, it is important to note how these particular results are driven by the unique nature of a given year. For example, the large direct expenditures for wind and solar overwhelmingly arise due to the Treasury 1603 program enabled by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which allowed one-time cash grants to eligible renewable generators in lieu of tax credits. This was only available to generators who began construction in 2009–2011, and as such is no longer a direct expenditure.  There is no complete multi-year assessment available that describes and analyzes the Federal subsidies and support provided to different generation technologies over time. Continued examination of Federal subsidies and support, and provision of this information to the public, can better inform the decisions made by Federal, state, and local entities.   Workforce Impacts of Growing VRE Deployment As the electricity system changes, so do the types of jobs, skills needed, and education or training required. The evolving demands of the grid are creating new opportunities in information and communication technologies and in the deployment of new generation, including natural gas and VRE. Job growth has been strong in the VRE sector, and the solar and wind workforce increased by 25 and 32 percent, respectively, in 2016. 178 DOE’s 2017 U.S. Energy and Employment Report found that the solar and wind industries provide 373,000 and 101,000 jobs, respectively, across the Nation. 179 Veterans  54 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy comprise a higher percentage of employees in the electricity industry compared to other industries, and in 2015, the solar industry provided nearly 17,000 jobs for veterans in manufacturing, installation, and project management. 180  3.8 Flattening Electricity Demand Between 1970 and 2005, total U.S. electricity generation to meet customer demand grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.7 percent. 181 But since 2005, generation growth has stalled with a CAGR of only 0.05 percent from 2005 to 2015, even as the Nation’s GDP grew by 1.3 percent per year over the same period. 182   Electricity demand historically had risen with economic growth (real GDP), but the two began decoupling around 2000, as shown in Figure 3.29. EIA attributes this decline in the demand growth rate to a variety of factors, including the cumulative impact of energy efficiency programs, standards, and codes; technology improvements in appliances, lighting, and other end-use equipment; and broader structural changes, such as a shift toward less electricity-intensive industries and slower population growth. 183  Figure 3.29. Gross Domestic Product and Net Electricity Production, Historical (1950–2016) and Projected (2017–2027) 184 185 186 187  Figure 3.30 shows one analysis of how efficiency improvements, coupled with structural changes in the economy, have led to flattening energy use in recent years. Overall, there has been significant progress across the U.S. economy in improving the value of goods and services produced per unit input of energy. For example, electricity productivity in the industrial sector—measured in dollars of economic output per kilowatt-hour of electricity input— nearly doubled between 1990 and 2014. The noticeable dip in both GDP and net electricity generation in 2008–2009 reflects the U.S. recession, which lowered electricity usage enough to affect power plant economics and prompt some plant closures. 188 55 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.30. Estimated U.S. Energy Savings from Structural Changes in the Economy and Energy Efficiency, 1980–2016 189 190 The U.S. economy has made significant progress in improving the value of goods and services produced per unit input of energy, through both energy efficiency and structural changes to the U.S. economy.  Figure 3.31 shows more broadly the impact of these changes on the EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) Reference case electricity sales forecast for various years. Each AEO forecast is made assuming that laws and regulations in effect at the time of the projection will continue unchanged through the projection period, unless scheduled end dates for those laws and regulations are within that period. The objective is to provide a “business-as-usual case;” no assumptions about new policies are included. Over the past several decades, new Federal and state policies, market forces, and broader economic factors have contributed to lowering levels of electricity consumption compared to what was expected to occur in absence of any new policy, as shown by the comparison of historical Reference case projections to actual U.S. electricity sales (shown as dotted lines in Figure 3.31).  56 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. ACC 000068 Department of Energy Figure 3.31. EIA Annual Electricity Sales 2000–2016 (terawatt-hours) and AEO Reference Case Electricity Sales Projections 2017–2030 191   A changing policy and market environment since 2000 has made it challenging to accurately forecast electricity demand. TWh is terawatt-hours. As stated in QER 1.2:  Currently, about 90 percent of residential, 60 percent of commercial, and 30 percent of industrial energy consumption are used in appliances and equipment that are subject to Federal minimum efficiency standards implemented, and periodically updated, by the Department of Energy. Between 2009 and 2030, these cost-effective standards are projected to save consumers more than $545 billion in utility costs, reduce energy consumption by 40.8 quads, and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by over 2.26 billion metric tons. 192 There are two significant impacts from the growth in energy efficiency. First, suppliers can no longer expect robust demand growth. Second, because customers are buying less electricity, the market price of electricity clears lower on the electricity supply curve (all else equal). Thus, higher-cost power plants that might have been dispatched and earned revenues in a higher-demand market are dispatched less frequently and earn less revenue due to increased energy efficiency.                                                              nn The report, Economic and Market Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Commercial Fleet, produced by Idaho National Laboratory and the Center for Advanced Energy Studies (September 2016), attributes low electricity market prices to “low natural gas prices, low demand growth, increased penetration of renewable generation, and negative electricity market prices.” 57 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 3.9 Power Plant Retirements Looking Forward While recognizing the difficulty in making any long-range forecast, it is useful to examine modeled scenarios to understand how the factors affecting retirements are expected to evolve. Figure 3.32 shows the announced and modeled coal, NGCC, and nuclear retirements and additions from 2017 through 2030 in EIA’s AEO 2017. This shows that coal retirements are projected to continue in the near term— with 37,800 MW projected to retire between 2017 and 2022—and taper off in the longer term, with another 4,400 MW of retirements between 2023 and 2030. Announced nuclear retirements in the near term account for most projected retirements, with an additional 3,000 MW of modeled unplanned retirements in the period 2019–2020 due to market conditions and uncertainty. A modest number of NGCC plants are also expected to retire in the near term in this modeled scenario. Figure 3.32. Baseload Capacity Additions and Retirements from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) 193 Three factors impacting the economic conditions of baseload generators that are modeled in the AEO— natural gas price, electricity sales, and VRE generation—are shown in Figure 3.33 below. In general, there is a mixed outlook for these factors as they affect baseload generators: 1. Natural gas prices for the electric power sector are modeled to rise modestly, increasing 30 percent over 2017 levels by 2022 and rising more slowly thereafter. While this may provide some upward pressure on electricity prices, natural gas prices are notoriously challenging to predict. 2. Electricity continues to grow at a slow rate—modeled at 0.8 percent CAGR through 2030. 3. Over the same period, VRE generation is modeled to approximately double to 600 terawatthours by 2030. The majority of this growth occurs by 2024 and slows thereafter, reflecting the expiration and stepdown of the PTC and ITC in 2020 and 2022, respectively. Based on these trends, unless natural gas prices or electricity demand rise significantly faster than projected, the economic conditions of baseload generators are not projected to change significantly in the near term. 58 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.33. Modeled Projections for Natural Gas Price, Electricity Sales, and VRE Generation from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) 194  VRE generation includes wind, utility-scale PV, and distributed PV. MCf is million cubic feet While the financial strains on existing coal, nuclear, and even older natural gas plants have been real and significant, the role of conventional resources continues to evolve. PJM notes the changing nature of baseload: “Baseload” can generally be thought of as those units which operate the great majority of hours of the year to meet load requirements. Given the reduction in gas prices, we have seen a noticeable inversion in the types of units which clear in the market in the off-peak hours and thus fit the traditional notion of “baseload.” Specifically, due to low energy prices and the overall efficiency of the units, combined cycle natural gas units are dispatched as baseload with coal units more often being cycled and thus dispatched in what has traditionally been deemed “mid-merit” units. 195 EIA staff analyzed NGCC unit dispatch trends over time, from 1998 to 2016. 196 NGCC plant operation closely follows natural gas prices—when prices were high in the mid-2000s, the number of NGCC starts (when the plant goes from zero output into production) increased as the capacity factor decreased, confirming that these plants were used more in load-following mode rather than baseload-operation mode. Capacity factor has been rising steadily and starts have fallen since about 2010, indicating that NGCC units are being used in more hours at higher capacity factors—i.e., in baseload-type operation (see Figure 3.34). 59 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 3.34. NGCC Capacity Factors and Number of Starts, 1998–2016 Decreased starts and increased capacity factors indicate that NGCC plants are increasingly used for baseload-type operation. Market conditions will continue to be dynamic, such as with the scheduled phasing out of the wind PTC and solar ITC. Trends in natural gas prices and efficiency gains would also need to be thoroughly examined and accurately forecast in order to get a clearer picture of expected retirements over the coming years. In the event present market, policy, and technology conditions continue, the retirement of coal and nuclear facilities is likely to continue, as well as new builds of natural gas and VRE capacity. Going forward, coal and natural gas generators will continue to monitor several EPA rules: The Steam Electric Effluent Limitation Guidelines have been postponed until EPA completes review of the rule finalized in 2015. 197 EPA recently completed an extended public comment period of the rule and comments are currently being reviewed. 198 Based on the 2015 finalized rule, EPA estimated industry-wide costs at approximately $480 million per year, 199 although industry groups such as the Utility Water Act Group dispute this estimate. oo 200 The Cooling Water Intake Rule for existing sources is currently being phased in. Regions have been given authority to consider requirements for power plants on a case-by-case basis. EPA estimated an annualized post-tax final rule cost of $147.6 million for electric generators. 201 However, due to the flexibility allotted to the regional permit directors, the compliance timeline and costs are unclear. While MATS and CSAPR have affected plant decisions to retrofit or retire in the recent past, most of the capital investment for MATS and CSAPR compliance has already occurred (see Table 3-4). In the future, generators will continue to have smaller operating and maintenance costs associated with MATS. For example, based on generator survey responses, ERCOT estimates an average operating and maintenance cost for MATS of $0.75/MWh, 202 which is approximately oo According to a petition submitted by the Utility Water Act Group, selected individual compliance cost estimates from its members included: $308 million (Dynegy), $200 million (NRG Energy), and $400–$500 million (American Electric Power).   60 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy 3 percent of the average monthly day-ahead wholesale electricity price (approximately $23.5/MWh) for the ERCOT North Hub from 2015 to 2016. 203 The Coal Combustion Residuals Rule, prompted by a 2008 coal ash spill, is currently being implemented. 204 EPA estimated the annualized cost of the rule to be $509–$735 million for coalfired electric utilities. 205  The Regional Haze Rule, which currently requires states to submit state plans for compliance by 2021, is expected to mainly affect Western states (the rule aims to improve visibility in national parks, which are located primarily in Western states). It also includes a provision allowing power plants that are already complying with CSAPR (eastern half of the United States 206 ) to substitute their compliance status for compliance with the Regional Haze Rule. 207 208 In 2015, EPA finalized New Source Performance Standards, entitled Carbon Pollution Standards, which set CO 2 emission limits for new generators. pp These standards are currently under legal challenge. The Clean Power Plan rule to reduce CO 2 emissions from existing power plants was promulgated by EPA in 2015 for effect in 2022 for existing plants, but those rules are under review by EPA— which may initiate actions to rescind them—and by the courts.  Several large coal plants built after 1970 with capacities greater than 1,000 MW have announced plans to retire in the next few years. These plants have already made the capital investments needed to comply with MATS, indicating that MATS itself is not the single forcing factor in these retirement decisions. Although these plants were designed to operate around the clock, low wholesale electric prices tied to natural gas were a significant driver that caused them to operate at lower capacity factors. As Rhodium Group analyst John Larsen states: The wider market dynamics are more concerning for coal…. For a power plant to make money today, it must be able to ramp up and down to coincide with the variable levels of renewable generation coming online. That makes combined cycle natural gas plants profitable, even at lower prices. [But] coal plants have relatively high and fixed operating costs and are relatively inflexible. They make their money by running full-out. 209  While there have been significantly fewer retirements of hydropower generation than coal or nuclear, this does not mean that hydropower operators are immune to the same market and regulatory forces that have affected other ACC 000069 baseload plants. Depressed prices and costly regulatory barriers decrease the margins on all hydroelectric facilities and, in some cases, cause economic stress. 210 A certain amount of new development continues, primarily through powering existing non-powered dams and installing hydropower in conduits and other constructed waterways. Two hundred and forty-two new hydropower projects, with a total capacity of 3,250 MW, were in the U.S. development pipeline at the end of 2016, including 93 MW under construction. At least nine projects (225 MW) reached commercial operation in 2016. 211                                                            pp Under current market conditions, these standards were not expected to affect new build decisions because economic conditions were already unfavorable for building new coal units. For example, EIA’s 2015 AEO, which does not include the Clean Air Act 111(b) carbon standards for new coal plants, builds only a very small amount (roughly 400 MW) of new coal capacity by 2040 beyond what is already planned. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf.  61 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 4 Reliability and Resilience The April 14 memo expressed concerns over whether the erosion of baseload power is compromising a reliable and resilient grid. It also asked whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which that could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. Indeed, a recent National Academies study indicates that there is a growing emphasis within the industry on grid resilience. 212 In this chapter, we address those issues, starting with the question of whether grid reliability has been lessened by the retirement of baseload and other coal, nuclear, and natural gas power plants over the past 15 years. The Department staff offer three general findings: 1) A diverse portfolio of generation resources and well-planned transmission investments are critical to meeting regional reliability objectives. A resource portfolio approach is necessary to ensure ERS, fuel assurance, and flexibility capabilities are available. Conventional generation sources, in particular hydropower, combustion turbines, and steam turbines, are currently the chief providers of these attributes.   2) One of the greatest challenges to integrating VRE lies in managing its effects (variability, uncertainty, location specificity, non-synchronous generation, and low capacity factor) on grid operations and planning. Lack of long-term forecasting, for example, increases risks when scheduling planned generation outages and managing severe weather events. 3) There are tradeoffs between multiple desirable attributes for the electric grid. A more reliable and resilient system may be more costly than the least-cost system. Consumer life, safety and health are dependent on a reliable and resilient electric grid, making the grid a national security asset. Infrastructure hardening 213 and grid recovery and restoration strategies require advanced planning and investment. Reliability NERC defines BPS reliability as a function of adequacy and operating reliability. In this context, NERC defines adequacy as, “the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.” Operating reliability is defined as, “the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances to system stability or unanticipated loss of system components.” qq 214  Reliability operates in different time scales. Long-term reliability is closer to resource adequacy: it is the business of ensuring that there will be enough resources available to serve customers’ load several years qq  Both components of reliability are needed. Adequacy, often called “resource adequacy,” is much easier to model and thus forecast for the future, particularly a decade or two out. Most longer-term studies, such as by DOE and its national laboratories, largely look at this one aspect of reliability (with some consideration of operational reliability aspects as well). Operational reliability, in contrast, is very difficult (both in data needed and computational complexity) to completely model and thus forecast in definitive terms many years out.  62 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy out plus a reserve margin (typically 15 percent). Short-term reliability ensures that there will be enough capacity to meet demand over the next few hours. Maintaining short-term reliability has grown more complex in light of higher levels of VRE, evolving customer electricity usage patterns, and the wider use of 15-minute load metering and customer time-of-use rates. However, grid operators have kept up with these factors by developing new information technology and analysis capabilities, such as more sophisticated wind and solar forecasting tools.  Figure 4 1. illustrates the timescale for different grid events. Events on very short timescales, such as frequency regulation, match second-by-second generation and demand. Medium-term activities and factors include day-ahead and day-of energy markets, security-constrained economic dispatch, rr contingency analysis, asset availability, relay and other equipment operations, and operator action. Longer-term activities and factors include system planning, capacity markets, interconnection rules, reliability standards, and energy market designs. Grid operators must thoroughly consider all these timescales and their associated events in ensuring short-term through long-term reliability. Figure 4.1. System Operation Time Scales 215  Planning to maintain system reliability depends on managing (potentially) multiple events in varying time scales. NERC’s CEO Gerry Cauley spoke to the Energy Secretary’s concerns by describing the current reliability issues. As a common thread in each of our Reliability Assessments, the most pressing reliability issues in North America are:  As conventional resources prematurely retire, sufficient amounts of essential reliability services, such as frequency and voltage support, ramping capability, etc., must be replaced based on the configuration and needs of the system. 
 Resource flexibility is needed to supplement and offset the variable characteristics of solar and wind generation. 
 Higher reliance on natural gas exposes electric generation to fuel supply and delivery vulnerabilities, particularly during extreme weather conditions. Maintaining fuel diversity and security provides best assurance for resilience. Premature retirements  rr “Security-constrained economic dispatch [of power plants] is an area-wide optimization process designed to meet electricity demand at the lowest cost, given the operational and reliability limitations of the area’s generation fleet and transmission system.” https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/final_ED_03_01_07_rev2.pdf.   63 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy of fuel secure baseload generating stations reduces resilience to fuel supply disruptions. 
 Because the system was designed with large, central-station generation as the primary source of electricity, significant amounts of new transmission may be needed to support renewable resources located far from load centers. 216 To make risk-informed decisions about how to maintain and protect BPS reliability, NERC has often stressed the need to study evolving market, technology, policy, and regulatory factors, as well as to understand how they are affecting “fuel supply, generation and transmission infrastructure planning, operations and investment decisions.” 217 Resilience NERC uses the infrastructure resilience definition that the National Infrastructure Advisory Council developed in 2010: “Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.” 218 Examples of events that test a system’s resilience include severe natural events (wildfires, hurricanes, floods, droughts, and earthquakes) and coordinated, extensive physical and cyber-attacks and geomagnetic disturbances.   Resilience is typically achieved through hardening or recovery. Hardening refers to physically changing infrastructure to make it less susceptible to damage. Hardening improves the durability and stability of energy infrastructure, making it better able to withstand the impacts of hurricanes, weather events or attacks. Recovery, by contrast, refers to the ability of an energy facility to recover quickly from damage to any of its components or to any of the external systems on which it depends – typically through storage and redundancy. Recovery measures do not prevent damage; rather, they enable energy systems to continue operating despite damage, and/or they promote a rapid return to normal operations when damages/outages occur. Advanced planning for contingencies, interagency coordination, and training exercises enable an effective restoration process.  BPS reliability is adequate 219 today despite the retirement of 11 percent of the generating capacity available in 2002, as significant additions from natural gas, wind, and solar have come online since then. Overall, at the end of 2016, the system had more dispatchable capacity capable of operating at high utilization rates than it did in 2002. 220 The composition of the BPS and its requirements, however, are changing, so simple extrapolation of previous reliability trends is not prudent. In this chapter, we review current system reliability and resilience, look at how power plant operations are changing with the evolving generation mix, and evaluate potential reliability and resilience issues.  4.1 Assessing Challenges to Reliability NERC is the primary entity responsible for ensuring BPS reliability, ss and collaborates with FERC to ensure compliance. Over the last several years, NERC has consistently highlighted how the power ss NERC is the designated “electric reliability organization” under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, monitoring reliability for all lower 48 states and, under special agreement, portions of the Canadian and Mexican grids.  64 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy sector’s rapid transformation may require new approaches to reliability measurement and planning in order to ensure continued reliability. tt 221 222 223 224 225   NERC believes BPS reliability is adequate as measured by various metrics, 226 but is undertaking ACC 000070 various initiatives to address potential reliability challenges posed by the changing generation mix. For example, NERC created an Essential Reliability Services Working Group to draw attention to the need to maintain these services uu as the resource mix evolves. 227 NERC also created the Integration of Variable Generation Task Force and the Distributed Energy Resources Task Force to address the reliability implications of increasing levels of distributed generation. 228 NERC’s position on the reliability implications of the evolving resource mix is best summarized in its recent communication with DOE (see text box below).  NERC: How the Changing Resource Mix Affects Reliability 229 The North American BPS is designed to be a highly reliable, robust, and resilient system. The system is interconnected, and the integrated networks work together to maintain reliability through both wide-area interregional planning and coordinated system operations. The adequacy of the system is maintained by having the right combination and amount of resources and transmission to deal with unexpected facility outages or extreme weather events that increase system demand. Operating reliability is maintained in real time through highly coordinated operator actions across many operating companies. The system is also planned as many as 15 years in advance by performing highly detailed, complex, and data-intensive power system simulations.  The resource mix of the BPS is changing in fundamental ways. Variable energy resources, especially wind and solar, are rapidly expanding and capturing the majority share of new capacity additions. Conventional generation (such as coal and nuclear) are retiring and have become economically marginalized. The balancing resource tends to be natural gas, as environmental rules and commodity economics tend to make oil-fired generation uneconomic. Developing hydroelectric resources, a major energy source in some parts of the country (such as the West), is extremely challenging. The confluence of the changing resource mix can fundamentally impact reliability in two major ways:  1. A balancing authority responsible for managing the balance of demand and resources through unit commitment. Forecasting may become capacity deficient and unable to serve firm load. Resources may not be available when needed, particularly those that have not secured onsite fuel. In that instance, manual load shedding may be required to maintain reliability.  2. Large, unanticipated voltage or frequency deviations during a disturbance, which can lead to uncontrolled, cascading instability. With no mass, moving parts, or inertia, increasing amounts of inverter-based resources (such as solar photovoltaic) present new risks to reliability, such as managing faster fault-clearing times, reduced oscillation dampening, and unexpected inverter action.  The rapid changes occurring in the generation resource mix and technologies are altering the operational characteristics of the grid and will challenge system planners and operators to maintain reliability. More specifically:  Impact of Premature Retirements: Conventional units, such as coal plants, provide frequency support services as a function of their large spinning generators and governor-control settings, along with reactive support for voltage control. Power system operators use these services to plan  tt NERC’s concerns about the reliability implications of the fast-evolving grid transformation underway were so strong that it chose to rename a set of key components of operational reliability from a term understood only by engineers and others directly involved in reliability, the term “ancillary services,” to the plainer English and self-defining, “essential reliability services.”  uu ERS include frequency response, voltage support, and ramping. 65 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy and operate reliably under a variety of system conditions, generally without the concern of having too few of these services available. Coal-fired and nuclear generation have the added benefits of high availability rates, low forced outages, and secured onsite fuel. Many months of onsite fuel allow these units to operate in a manner independent of supply chain disruptions.  Replacement Resource Capability and Characteristics: As the generation resource mix evolves, the reliability of the electric grid depends on the operating characteristics of the replacement resources. Natural gas-fired units, variable generation, storage, and other resources can provide similar reliability services. However, as a practical matter, costs, market rules, or regulatory requirements (or lack thereof) can affect whether these resources are equipped and available to provide reliability services. To ensure reliability, new generator and load resources must maintain the balance between load and generation, especially during ramping periods. In addition, in some jurisdictions, substantial amounts of generation are now being added “behind the meter” (e.g., roof top solar), and these resources are invisible to system operators. Planning Reserve Margins In terms of the resource adequacy part of reliability, NERC reports that all regions project more than sufficient planning reserve margins. NERC and its regional reliability coordinators conduct ongoing analyses to assess resource adequacy as system conditions change over time. Figure 4.2. shows that planning reserve margins vv exceed their respective regional targets despite the loss of traditional baseload capacity since 2002. 230 The orange bars in the figure indicate regional or NERC-determined target reserve margins for resource adequacy, which in most cases are administratively set at 15 percent above the predicted peak load. The calculation of resources in most regions includes current VIEUowned generation and merchant plant capacity (modified by an expected forced outage rate ww and reduced by expected retirements), planned capacity additions (with interconnection agreements and customer contracts), renewable generation (derated to expected capacity at peak load hour), xx contracted imports, energy efficiency, DR, and distributed generation (derated to expected capacity at peak hour). vv Forecasts of reserve margins may decline in the outyears of a projection because new resources such as power plants, demand response, and energy efficiency are not firm at the time the forecast is made. Because of the uncertainty associated with more distant years, NERC planning reserve margin determinations do not look out past 10 years.  ww ISONew England reports that the expected forced outage rate for generators in their regions have increased because power plants in the region are operating under more stressed conditions. Older power plants in each region are less reliable and go out of service more often as they age. https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/10/f18/08a-REthier.pdf  xx Each ISO and RTO calculates the on-peak contribution of renewable resources as a function of historic resource performance. Land-based wind plants are assumed to deliver four to 14 percent of nameplate capacity during peak summer afternoon periods, and solar resources are assumed to deliver between 10 percent and 80 percent of nameplate capacity. Note, however, that as the level of PV penetration increases, the cumulative amount of PV generation on summer afternoons is moving net load peak hour later.   66 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4 2. Five-Year Average Reserve Margins across Different Regions (2018–2022) 231  All regions have reserve margins above resource adequacy targets. The types of resources available within a region affect the reserve margin calculation. Each type of resource has a different availability rate (based on past performance) that reflects the likelihood that it can be relied upon to be available at system peak. For instance, 1,000 MW of coal units with an on-peak availability rate of 90 percent would have a greater impact on the reserve margin than 1,000 MW of wind with an on-peak availability rate of 10 percent; in other words, the actual nameplate capacity totals underlying these reserve margin calculations are significantly higher than the reserve margins suggest. NERC and regional planning authorities are working to understand how common dependencies or failure modes, such as gas pipeline outages or a weather front affecting wind and solar performance across a wide area, could affect reserve margins. NERC and others are also studying how the on-peak hourly capacity factor (similar in concept to capacity value yy ) of VRE changes as a function of VRE penetration, as shown for solar in Figure 4.3.                                                             yy NERC defines capacity value as “the contribution of a power plant to the generation adequacy of the power system. It gives the amount of additional load that can be served in the system at the same reliability level due to the addition of the unit.” http://www.nerc com/docs/pc/ivgtf/omalley-ieee-confidential.pdf  67 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.3. Historical Solar On-Peak Capacity Factors in ERCOT 232 As increased solar penetration in ERCOT shifts the net peak load further into the evening, its net on-peak capacity factor diminishes. As the Department has previously noted, however, having an adequate planning reserve margin is necessary but not sufficient to ensure resource adequacy (see text box below): “Rules” to Enable Reliable Operation 233 In December 2016, DOE articulated four consolidated “rules” that must be maintained to enable reliable operation. These include the following: 1. Power generation and transmission capacity must be sufficient to meet peak demand for electricity. The power grid must have sufficient capacity available to meet the demand for electricity. Because there are uncertainties in forecasting demand and the potential for generation and transmission outages, the total amount of capacity must exceed the expected level of demand by a given fraction, termed the reserve margin, often about 15 percent. 2. Power systems must have adequate flexibility to address variability and uncertainty in demand (load) and generation resources. The level of demand changes throughout the day and from season to season. This, and the addition of variable generation such as wind and solar, places a premium on having flexible generation capacity that can change its level of output to account for changes in demand and the amount of generation from variable resources (such as when the wind stops blowing or the sun goes down). 3. Power systems must be ACC 000071 able to maintain steady frequency. 68 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy The power system uses what is called alternating current (AC), where the electricity reverses direction 60 times per second (60 hertz (Hz)). If this frequency of oscillation were to deviate significantly from 60 Hz, it could damage machines and electronics. Any mismatch between the supply and demand of electricity can cause this sort of deviation, and several mechanisms operating at different timescales are used to maintain a steady frequency. 4. Power systems must be able to maintain voltage within an acceptable range. In addition to maintaining a steady frequency, the electric grid must also deliver electricity at a given voltage. This voltage varies throughout the power grid, with transformers used to change voltages. Maintaining the correct voltage requires the management of “reactive power,” which is a property of AC electricity that allows power to flow. If the levels of reactive power are too high or too low, the voltage level can change, potentially even collapsing catastrophically. NERC notes that traditional calculations of resource adequacy based on capacity (such as the planning reserve margin) will need to change:  Until recently, new generators have generally added significant energy capability along with the capacity they provide. With the advent of newer energy limited technologies replacing older ones (e.g , with emerging larger penetrations of variable generation), an assumption of energy adequacy cannot be made simply on the basis of capacity adequacy. Future-looking detailed probabilistic assessments of resource adequacy (energy, capacity and operability), transmission adequacy and congestion are increasingly becoming an essential requirement, consistent with the growing penetration of variable generation, and in the changing nonrenewable supply mix environment. 234 4.1.1 Essential Reliability Services Reliable operation of the BPS requires a suite of Essential Reliability Services (ERS). One key ERS is the control of system frequency, a parameter which NERC explains as follows: Each Interconnection is actually a large machine, as every generator within the island is pulling in tandem with the others to supply electricity to all customers. This occurs as the rotation of electric generating units, nearly all in (steady-state) synchronism. The “speed” (of rotation) of the Interconnection is frequency, measured in cycles per second or Hertz (Hz). If the total Interconnection generation exceeds customer demand, frequency increases beyond the target value, typically 60 Hz, until energy balance is achieved. Conversely, if there is a temporary generation deficiency, frequency declines until balance is again restored at a point below the scheduled frequency. 235 NERC further expands on the two main types of frequency control, Primary and Secondary: Primary frequency control (immediate) comes from automatic generator governor response, load response, and other devices based on local (device-level) frequency-sensing control systems. In general, frequency response refers to the initial actions provided by the autonomous devices within an interconnection to arrest and stabilize frequency deviations, typically from the unexpected sudden loss of a generator or load. Primary frequency control is quick and automatic; it is not driven by any centralized control system, and it begins seconds after a system frequency event. Response to a frequency event can be provided by various sources, including generation resources, loads, and storage devices. Secondary frequency control (seconds to minutes) and tertiary frequency control (ten minutes and longer) -- Secondary and tertiary control are the centralized, coordinated control of generation, demand response, and storage resources, and these controls are performed 69 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy by the system operator’s energy management system over minutes to hours to balance generation and load. 236 In addition to frequency control, NERC provides definitions for two other ERS, ramping and voltage support: Ramping – Ramping is related to frequency, but more in an “operations as usual” sense rather than after an event. Changes in the amount of non-dispatchable resources, system constraints, load behaviors, and the generation mix can impact the ramp rates needed to keep the system in balance.  Voltage – Voltage must be controlled to protect the system and move power where it is needed. This control tends to be more local in nature, such as at individual transmission substations, in sub-areas of lower-voltage transmission nodes and the distribution system. Ensuring sufficient voltage control and “stiffness” of the system is important both for normal operations and for events impacting normal operations (i.e., disturbances). 237 If grid voltage levels fall too low, customers connected to distribution networks may see their devices “brown out” and stop working.  An area that has inadequate voltage support is vulnerable to voltage collapse, so the system must be operated such that a single contingency would not result in voltage collapse or cascading outages. Generators provide voltage support by producing both real and reactive power. As FERC explains in its 2016 Reliability Primer: Power transferred along transmission lines consists of both “real” power and “reactive” power. The real power is the energy that is capable of performing work in electrical devices including industrial equipment, refrigerators, or toasters. Reactive power is needed to maintain the voltage as well as electric and magnetic fields in AC equipment, which includes air conditioners, motors, transmission lines, and other devices. Together, real power and reactive power comprise apparent power, which is measured in units of Volt-Amperes or kilo VoltAmperes - kVA.  Reactive power cannot be transmitted as far as real power and instead must be replenished locally. Moreover, a deficit in reactive power causes voltage to drop. This is seen when the lights dim as an electric motor starts. While reactive power consumed by facilities or devices tends to cause the voltage to drop, it can also be produced or injected into the system to increase voltage in what is often referred to as “voltage support.” This is accomplished in a variety of ways, including by adjusting the reactive power output of generators or by activating capacitor banks or other power electronic equipment. If reactive power is not supplied promptly and in sufficient quantity, voltages decline, and in extreme cases a “voltage collapse” may result. 238  FERC Order No. 827, issued in June 2016, revised FERC’s pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement and pro forma Small Generator Interconnection Agreement to eliminate the previous exemption for wind generators from reactive power requirements, thereby requiring all newly interconnecting, non-synchronous generators—including new wind generators—to provide reactive power as a condition of interconnection to the transmission system. FERC wrote:  We therefore conclude that improvements in technology, and the corresponding declining costs for newly interconnecting wind generators to provide reactive power, make it unjust, unreasonable and unduly discriminatory and preferential to exempt such non-synchronous generators from the reactive power requirement when other types of generators are not exempt. Further, requiring all newly interconnecting non-synchronous generators to design their Generating Facilities to maintain the required power factor range ensures they are subject to comparable requirements as other generators. 239  70 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy FERC’s primary frequency response Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to require new large and small generators to install, maintain and operate equipment capable of providing primary frequency response as a condition of interconnection. 240 NERC explains the various reserve products from which grid operators obtain these ERS:  Frequency-Responsive Reserve: On-line generation with headroom that has been tested and verified to be capable of providing droop […] In most cases, only portions of a, b and c in [Figure 4.4] qualify as Frequency Responsive Reserve.  Nonspinning Reserve: Operating Reserve capable of serving demand or Interruptible Demand that can be removed from the system, within 10 minutes. (This is c in [Figure 4.4])  Operating Reserve: That capability above firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, equipment forced and scheduled outages, and local area protection. (This is a+b+c+d+e in [Figure 4.4]). Regulating Reserve: An amount of spinning reserve responsive to Automatic Generation Control, which is sufficient to provide normal regulating margin. (This is “a” in [Figure 4.4])  Replacement Reserve: (This is d+e in [Figure 4.4]). NOTE: Each NERC Region sets times for reserve restoration, typically in the 30–90 minute range. The default contingency reserve restoration period is 90 minutes after the disturbance recovery period.  Spinning Reserve: Unloaded, synchronized, resource, deployable in 10 minutes. (This is b in [Figure 4.4]). 241 Figure 4.4. NERC Definitions of Reserves Used to Provide ERS 242  Figure 4.5 shows how system frequency falls after a major generation loss. The decline in frequency is determined by the size of the generation loss event and the availability of frequency control reserves to respond. The frequency rebound that follows is due to automated primary frequency control measures 71 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy (governor response from generators and frequency-responsive DR from customer loads controlled by relays). Secondary frequency control may derive from many sources, including from local plant controls, from a centralized control system, or from instructions issued by balancing authorities. Tertiary frequency control refers to operator-initiated, off-line resources. If these frequency management measures don’t work, system frequency can keep dropping, resulting in under-frequency load shedding procedures.  Figure 4 5. System Frequency after a Grid Event (Top) and How Frequency Control Mechanisms Work to Restore Frequency (Bottom) 243 System operators have a number of levels of frequency control to manage a significant grid event. Not all generators can provide primary frequency control, as explained by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL): Some generators, including all current nuclear generators, most wind turbines in North America, as ACC 000072 well as many new natural gas turbines do not provide governor response. Other generators, which may be capable of providing governor response, are sometimes operated in ways that prevent them from providing that response. For example, a generator operated  72 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy at its maximum capability cannot provide upward primary frequency control because it has no head room. Finally, some generators have additional controls […] that override the sustained delivery of governor response. 244 NERC recognized several years ago that the changes affecting the grid—particularly retirement of traditional baseload capacity, increased generation from VRE, and greater use of DR and distributed generation—could create BPS reliability problems without careful study and management. In 2014, a task force under NERC’s direction identified ERS as the elemental reliability building blocks from supply and demand resources that are necessary to maintain grid reliability. NERC stated that:  To meet the needs of the future Bulk Power System, maintaining sufficient ERS will include a mix of market approaches, technology enhancements, and reliability rules or other regulatory rule changes.  While the solution sets will likely be different in various regions, it may be necessary for regulators to make appropriate adjustments to market rules and reliability standards that will ensure reliable operation of the BPS. 245 Although NERC has requirements for balancing areas, zz it does not require that individual generators provide primary frequency response, which involves the automatic, autonomous, and rapid action of turbine governors or equivalent controls. Further, there is no mandatory compensation for primary frequency response, though FERC Order No. 755 provides for compensation for secondary frequency response. 246 Because provision of primary frequency response may require a generator to operate at less than its full output (so it can increase power production if needed to manage frequency), standing prepared to provide frequency response services means that a generator may forgo some potential revenues.  The reliability attributes discussed above are recognized as valuable, but regional procurement and compensation for these services varies across the centrallyorganized markets. In vertically integrated regions that use bilaterally organized markets, it is generally the incumbent utility’s obligation to provide ERS; some interconnection agreements specify other generators’ reliability service obligations if any. 4.1.2 Inertia and Inertial Response PJM explains how conventional generators provide inertia: Due to electro-mechanical coupling, a generator's rotating mass provides kinetic energy to the grid (or absorbs it from the grid) in case of a frequency deviation to arrest frequency change and stabilize the electric system. The contribution of inertia is an inherent and crucial feature of rotating synchronous generators. 247 
 Every operating conventional generator has mass that spins, including rotors, turbines and other masses connected to the shaft of the generator or motor. The rotating mass in each generator collectively provides inertia to help keep grid frequency at a relatively stable level, for example slowing the rate of frequency drop after a major grid event and giving other automatic controls time to act to restore frequency. Inertia also works to slow the spike in frequency that occurs after the loss of a large amount of load (for instance, if part of a city “blacks out” suddenly from a transmission or distribution failure).                                                             zz NERC Reliability Standard BAL-003-1.1 establishes requirements for balancing authorities, but does not include requirements for individual generator owners or operators. However, some ISOs/RTOs, including CAISO, ISO-NE, and PJM, have implemented operating requirements for individual generating resources within their regions. Regional Reliability Standard BAL-001-TRE-01 (Primary Frequency Response in the ERCOT Region) establishes requirements for the balancing authority, generator owners, and operators in ERCOT. 73 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Recently, manufacturers have designed electronic controls for newer model wind turbines that can provide automatic generation control, primary frequency response and synthetic inertia. General Electric (GE) notes: A key difference between wind inertia and fast frequency response from other resources (batteries, PV, flywheels) is that wind turbines do not need to be pre-curtailed in order to provide synthetic inertial response. Wind inertia extracts some of the kinetic energy from the spinning rotor and uses it to provide increased power output within seconds. 248 There has not yet been much analysis of how much primary frequency response will be needed as the composition of the grid changes, nor how best to complement primary frequency response from traditional sources, such as governors, with electronics-based synthetic inertia or non-governor-based forms of primary frequency response, such as storage or DR. These are substantive engineering questions that merit further study, particularly in a future with increasing VRE levels and decreasing rotating mass-based inertia. 249 4.1.3 Energy Storage Energy storage will be critical in the future if higher levels of VRE are deployed on the grid and require additional balancing of energy supply and demand in real time. A few storage mechanisms such as pumped hydroelectric storage and thermal energy storage have been used for years to shift energy demand from peak to off-peak periods. A grid with higher levels of VRE and more dynamic customer loads will need more of the services that energy storage can provide by acting on both the supply and demand side, including energy, capacity, energy management, backup power, load leveling, and ERS, over periods from seconds to hours or days. However, the need for storage may not be as great for a grid more reliant on traditional baseload generation. 250  DOE has been investing in energy storage technology development for two decades, and major private investment is now active in commercializing and the beginnings of early deployment of grid-level storage, including within microgrids. aaa The DOE Grid Energy Storage program notes that as energy storage technologies mature and become commercially viable, they will need to achieve the following: Cost competitive energy storage technology—Achievement of this goal requires attention to factors such as life-cycle cost and performance (round-trip efficiency, energy density, cycle life, capacity fade, etc.) for energy storage technology as deployed. It is expected that early deployments will be in high value applications, but long term success requires further cost reductions and the ability to monetize revenues for all grid services that storage provides. Validated reliability and safety— Validation of the safety, reliability, and performance of energy storage is essential for user confidence. Equitable regulatory environment— Value propositions for supplyside grid storage depend on reducing institutional and regulatory hurdles to levels comparable with those of other grid resources. bbb 251 aaa Storage is an important component of most micro-grid designs reliant on VRE and is expected to play an essential role in helping customers and the BPS recover from extreme weather events (and should improve resilience and recovery following severe, high-impact events). bbb A recent FERC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks to identify and reduce such barriers for increased participation by energy storage in centrally-organized wholesale markets.  74 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Industry acceptance—industry adoption requires manufacturers to have confidence that storage will deploy as expected, and deliver as predicted and promised. 252 Table 4-1 details DOE analysis of how energy storage options can be used to provide grid-level services. Table 4-1. How Various Energy Storage Options Can Deliver Grid-Level Applications 253 State policies are emerging to encourage further use of energy storage technologies for grid support and energy security. California has directed its utilities to acquire 500 MW of energy storage by 2020; Massachusetts has ordered its utilities to procure 200 MWh of energy storage by the end of 2019; New York’s legislators have proposed creation of an Energy Storage Deployment Program, with a 2030 procurement target; Maryland has adopted at 30 percent investment tax credit for storage facilities; and Nevada’s legislature has passed a storage incentivize. These programs are generally technology-neutral and will support the use of storage at the grid-level or behind the meter (on the customer’s premises). 254 255 4.1.4 Transmission The transmission system is a vast engineered network that transmits electricity from generators to local substations for distribution to end-use consumers. As DOE’s Annual U.S. Transmission Data Review (2016) states, “Transmission planning activities are undertaken to enable future reliable and efficient utilization of transmission facilities by addressing, among other things, reliability concerns, constraints, and congestion.” 256 Transmission reliability is maintained by enforcing operating procedures that ensure efficient system utilization, including preventing users from transmitting more power over a line than its 75 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy rated power capacity. Transmission congestion results from the inability to dispatch the lowest-cost generation resources due to transmission constraints.  Transmission investments provide an array of benefits that include providing reliable electricity service to customers, relieving congestion, facilitating robust wholesale market competition, enabling a diverse and changing energy portfolio, and mitigating damage and limiting customer outages (resilience) during adverse conditions. Well-planned transmission investments also reduce total costs. SPP analyzed the costs and benefits of transmission projects from 2012–2014 and found that the planned $3.4 billion investment in transmission was expected to reduce customer cost by $12 billion. ccc This yielded an estimated benefit of $3.50 for every dollar invested in the region. 257  A robust transmission system is needed to provide the flexibility that will enable the modern electric system to operate. Although much transmission has been built to enhance reliability and meet customer needs, ACC 000073 continued investment and development will be needed to provide that flexibility.  The challenge for building transmission continues to revolve around the three traditional steps involved, each of which can be time-consuming, involved, and complex: (1) demonstrating a need for the transmission project, also known as transmission planning, (2) determining who pays for the transmission project, also called cost allocation, and (3) state and Federal agency siting and permitting. FERC has taken steps to help with the first two, with reforms such as Order No. 1000, which remains a work in progress. 258 259 260 261 262 Transmission planning entities, as well as regional state-based groups, are also contributing to improving these three necessary process steps. The current and past administrations, aided by various new Federal laws, have issued various Executive Orders and other initiatives to improve the processes involved in siting and permitting of transmission when Federal lands or waters are involved. All three transmission building steps can be time-intensive and complex; in particular, siting and permitting for large networks or long multi-state lines is challenging. 263 264 265 The second necessary step of cost-allocation can be time-consuming as well. For example, large overlay networks now being built in MISO (“Multi-Value Projects”) 266 and SPP (“Highway/Byway Plan”) 267 required several years of sensitive negotiations among states brokered by the respective Organization of MISO States and SPP Regional State Committee to determine the cost allocation of each large transmission buildout. 268 269 ccc Nearly $12 billion in net present value benefits for consumers over the next 40 years, or around $800 for each person currently served by SPP, or $2,400 per each metered customer.  76 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.6. EEI Historical and Project Transmission Investment (Nominal Dollars) 270  Prudent and well planned transmission can reduce total system costs by reducing localized congestion that sometimes leads to high wholesale electricity prices at transmission-constrained nodes. Transmission investments in future years could increase as utilities and system operators seek to mitigate reliability impacts of plant closures and bring new generation to load centers. 4.1.5 System Requirements to Meet Higher Levels of VRE on the Grid Levels of wind and solar penetration—including distributed and utility-scale installations— have grown in recent years from 0.3 percent of total annual generation nationwide in 2002 to 6.9 percent in 2016. ddd 271 Various integration studies (see Appendix B:) have explored grid operations at higher levels of VRE penetration (ranging from 10 percent to 60 percent) and examined the technical challenges for grid operators. eee These challenges can generally be met at lower levels through a number of changes to grid operation, planning, and transmission expansion practices, and with other sources of grid flexibility. Solutions vary by region, depending on existing transmission constraints, generators, sources of flexibility, and institutions and markets – each of which comes with associated implementation costs and other consequences to address. Costs can change over time as technologies and markets evolve, or                                                            ddd AEO 2017 reference case indicates that this could grow to 17% by 2030. eee The studies (see Appendix B) that look into the distant future are exploratory only and represent initial investigations into how to implement high levels of VRE. They do not look into all the operational aspects of reliability due to the needed complex and computationally challenging modeling. Typical assumptions (sometimes implicit) include successful siting of (at times long multistate) transmission lines and new generation, sufficient new and existing economically viable conventional generation and other resources to support the VRE, institutional and market changes, and relevant grid modernization-type spending at both the transmission and distribution level. One study, for the ease of modeling, even assumes the nation’s 66 balancing authorities, including their governing boards and member states, would agree to one national joint dispatch). Some of these assumptions are non-trivial. These studies recognize that given enough time and money, power system engineers can make any resource and configuration reliable, as long as the laws of physics are not violated; whether the changes needed are indeed affordable, doable, and desirable may be a different question. Also, affordability was typically not in the scope of these studies. 77 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy as other enabling technologies such as storage mature. Grid operators and planners continually evaluate and determine how to maintain reliability as the resource mix changes and evolves. Figure 4.7. Location of the Existing Wind Fleet 272 Most of the contiguous United States’ wind power plants are installed in the center of the Nation, which has the best wind resources. Total penetration of VRE is increasing rapidly in several regions, and wind represents the majority of current installed VRE. Wind turbines have contributed more than one-third of the nearly 200,000 MW of total utility-scale generating capacity added since 2007, reflecting a combination of improved wind turbine technology and lower costs, increased access to transmission capacity, state-level RPS, and Federal tax credits and grants. Distribution of wind capacity across the contiguous United States is shown in Figure 4.7. Percentage wind generation by state is shown in Figure 4.8 . In particularly windy hours, wind output in regions with significant wind capacity can be very high. On May 16, 2017, the CAISO hit a new daily renewables record when the combination of wind, solar, hydro, and other renewables served nearly 42 percent of electricity demand; during peak renewables production (the 2:00 p.m. hour), renewables supplied nearly 72 percent of electricity. 273 In Texas, at the end of 2016, ERCOT had more than 17,600 MW of installed wind capacity and 566 MW of utility-scale solar capacity. 274 ERCOT reached 50 percent wind penetration in the early morning on March 23, 2017, when load was below 29,000 MW; at 5:00 p.m. that afternoon, when peak load hit 45,391 MW, wind contributed about 30 percent to the energy needed to meet that peak. 275 SPP recently set a new wind-penetration record of 52.1 percent on February 12, 2017, the highest across North American RTOs. ggg 276 277 ggg On the other hand, there are times when wind generation can be low. For example, ERCOT reports that for 2016, wind generation was below 2,500 MW (approximately 15% of total operating wind capacity as of November 2016) for 17 percent of the year’s hours. http://www.ercot.com/news/releases/show/113533. 78 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.8 Wind Energy Share of Electric Generation by State, 2016 278 One of the greatest barriers to widespread VRE adoption is the challenge of managing its variability and corresponding impacts on net load. Table 4-2 summarizes the characteristics of VRE, the challenges to integration, and how to mitigate those challenges. Table 4-2. Characteristics of VRE, Grid Integration Challenges, and Mitigation Options 279 Wind & Solar Characteristics Potential Grid Integration Challenges Mitigation Options Variability Generator output can vary as underlying resource fluctuates. In many power systems, sufficient flexibility exists to integrate additional variability, but this flexibility may not be fully accessible without changes to power system operations or other institutional factors (e.g., increased ramping of generation and improved coordination across markets and balancing areas) (Lew et al. 2013).  Uncertainty Generation cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy (day-ahead, day of).  Integration of advanced renewable supply forecasting into dispatch and market operations has reduced uncertainties, improved scheduling of other resources to reduce reserves and fuel consumption, and enabled VRE to participate as dispatchable resources 79 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy (IEA 2014; Lew et al. 2011). Examples: Xcel Energy, U.S. RTOs/ISOs (Porter et al. 2012).  Location specificity Generation is more economical where highest-quality resources are available. Competitive Renewable Energy Zones in Texas are an example of an approach to quickly develop generation and transmission in coordination (18.5 GW and 3,600 miles were completed nine years after Competitive Renewable Energy Zones legislation was signed) to access wind resources in remote parts of the state.  Non- synchronous generation  Generators provide voltage support and frequency control in a different manner than traditional resources. Grid code requirements are evolving in response to technological advances and anticipation of high VRE penetration levels. For example, ERCOT, which is a small interconnection and more vulnerable to frequency excursions, now requires wind generators to provide inertial response, which helps keep a system stable in the initial moments after a disturbance (Bird, Cochran, and Wang 2014).  Low capacity factor  Availability of the underlying energy resource limits the run- time of the plant. Capacity payments or markets, potentially tied to performance, could ensure sufficient cost recovery. The potential for stranded assets is not unique to VRE and can occur whenever generation with lower marginal costs is added to the system. For example, low natural gas prices have reduced the market competitiveness of nuclear plants, contributing to recent retirements (Wernau and Richards 2014).  Utility-scale wind and solar plants are more location-limited than some other generation types, so they may require transmission construction to be able to interconnect with the grid and secure deliverability to customer load centers. LBNL researchers state that power systems with large or growing amounts of VRE: [W]ill benefit if the rest of the electricity system is flexible – able to respond to shifts in demand and VRE availability. VRE impacts and system costs will be driven lower as power systems transform to manage the unique characteristics that VRE resources introduce. Power systems that resist change as VRE penetrations increase will experience greater challenges in maintaining reliability and managing costs. 280  Figure 4.9 shows a suite of options for integrating VRE effectively, spanning physical, operational, markets, load, and other ACC 000074 means. hhh hhh However, proponents of dispatchable renewables (biomass, hydro, and geothermal) argue that other approaches should also be considered. http://www.sciencedirect com/science/article/pii/S104061901500024X   80 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.9. Ways To Integrate VRE, Arrayed by Type of Intervention and Cost (2014) 281   Forecasting of VRE is a critical challenge to system operators to manage high-risk weather days.  Specific issues include wind icing forecasts and weather fronts that result in low-level jet winds and other wind cut-out scenarios. Since long-term VRE forecasting is not practicable today, system operators will have to rethink outage scheduling if a region has high dependency on wind as a resource. 282 FERC, NERC, and the RTO/ISOs have undertaken several initiatives to modify requirements for interconnecting VRE to improve grid reliability. These initiatives include early work to develop lowvoltage ride-through requirements for interconnecting wind and solar generation (which are included as a requirement for wind plant interconnection under the FERC open access transmission tariff), as well as California updating its solar photovoltaic (PV) distribution interconnection requirements to include smart inverters. Other nations have grid codes that require the provision of specific ERS for new VRE resources as a condition of interconnection. And FERC and several RTOs and ISOs have sought to remove barriers to participation in organized markets by DR resources that can deliver some ERS and provide benefits to consumers. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) offers a good example of managing the challenges of integrating VRE effectively using better operational and business practices. Wind generation capacity in BPA’s balancing authority area grew from 250 MW to 4,782 MW within a 10-year span, driven by state RPS requirements and Federal tax credits. Much of the wind generation is located along the Columbia River Gorge, connecting to the high-voltage transmission system serving the Federal Columbia River hydroelectric plants, so the wind fleet had little diversity and could swing output as much as 1,000 MW within an hour. BPA began charging for using hydropower to balance the wind generation (also called a balancing capacity rate and since adopted by FERC for other regions), and it set a penalty rate to encourage accurate wind production scheduling. Wind forecasting and scheduling practices and tools have since improved significantly. 283  81 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Because wind generation receives the PTC and has PPAs that encourage production regardless of system demand, it can be economical for wind to generate even when market prices are negative. As a result, generators that are “must-run” (either for statutory or reliability reasons) must compete with resources that will generate when prices are negative. Anticipating the growing challenges posed by the changing resource mix in the region, BPA worked with stakeholders to develop the Oversupply Management Protocol to displace generation in BPA’s balancing authority area and replace it with Federal hydroelectric generation that must run for endangered fish operations. Displaced generators are compensated for any costs that they incur, and BPA recovers these costs through rates to its wholesale customers. 284 However, this over-supply situation combined with sustained low natural gas prices has continued to erode the price of wholesale power in the western wholesale market. Changes in the wholesale market may be necessary to better balance state priorities, maintain grid reliabilities, and appropriately compensate baseload and other flexible resources, such as hydropower, for the ERS they provide. 285  The process of BPS consolidation and market cooperation among producers across a larger electric market and operational region has been shown to smooth out VRE output variability. MISO found that [T]here are significant benefits from the geographic diversity of wind generating facilities and the size of the MISO operating footprint. The large number of individual turbines and plants, spread across a large geographic area with dimensions in the hundreds of miles, results in statistical smoothing of production changes driven by local meteorological effects. Large changes in aggregate production are driven by large-scale meteorological phenomena such as weather fronts, and occur over longer timescales from many tens of minutes to several hours. 286 4.1.6 Impact of VRE on Net Load More than 60 percent of all utility-scale electric generating capacity that came online in 2016 was from wind and solar technologies. 287 In March 2017, wind and solar accounted for 10 percent of total U.S. electricity generation, up from 7 percent for the whole of 2016. 288 The increase in VRE has altered grid operation in some regions and the way dispatchable generation and DR are used to protect the grid and meet loads.  The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), a Federal power marketing agency, operates 8,000 MW of hydroelectric generation and three balancing areas in 15 states across the West. WAPA sums up the operational changes and challenges for grid managers facing VRE, variable loads, and a variety of generation types with differing capabilities and constraints: Generation operators, including VERs [Variable Energy Resources], must coordinate with their host Balancing Authority (BA) to ensure that their output continuously matches load. Generation is adjusted throughout the day to meet scheduled output and is made available to regulate moment variations intra-hour. For VERs when the wind drops off or clouds pass over a solar array, less energy may be produced than scheduled (over-scheduled/underproduced), and additional resources must be brought on-line to make up the difference. There is a cost associated to these added generation resources. Similarly, if VERs are producing more than what was scheduled, or if electrical demand is less than anticipated, other resources must be backed down to ensure resources and load are balanced. Not all generation is capable of responding. Traditional generation, like coal, is not capable of reacting quickly to changing needs and takes hours or days to reach full operating potential. Gas turbines can react fairly quickly, but only if the plants are not already producing at full rated generating capacity. Hydro generation, while being an ideal resource to help with VER  82 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy integration, is generally scheduled to meet reservoir requirements or provide for downstream water demands, including fish, wildlife, and other environmental mitigation requirements. 289 To illustrate how VRE can increase the need for flexibility, Figure 4.10 demonstrates how VRE impacts system operations. The figure introduces the concept of “net load”—electricity demand minus VRE generation—which represents the demand that must be supplied by the conventional generation fleet if all VRE is to be utilized. The dark orange line in the graph represents total demand and shows the daily variability of demand on an hourly basis. The light blue area shows wind energy, and the yellow area shows solar energy. The dark blue line represents the demand (less VRE) that must be supplied by the remaining generators, assuming no curtailment of wind energy. The graph shows that often the output level of the remaining generators must change more quickly and be turned up or down inversely with VRE production.  Figure 4.10. CAISO Load, Net Load, and Wind and Solar Output on Example Weekdays during 2014 290  CAISO data show the effect of VRE on net load (total customer load minus wind and solar output) during representative days in the spring, summer, and fall. As the amount of VRE generation increases, daily net load decreases, and the impacts on net load become more acute in shoulder months. In regions with high penetration of VRE, sharper fluctuations in net load require increased flexibility (ramping up and down) from conventional sources. While the resulting ‘duck curve’ of daily net load has so far been limited to regions such as California and the Southwest where solar generation is highest, other regions such as the Carolinas are beginning to see similar net load patterns. 291  83 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy What the Duck Curve Tells Us About Managing a Green Grid 292 Figure 4.11. The CAISO Duck Curve The electric grid and the requirements to manage it are changing… The ISO created future scenarios of net load curves to illustrate these changing conditions. Net load is the difference between forecasted load and expected electricity production from variable generation resources. In certain times of the year, these curves produce a ‘belly’ appearance in the mid-afternoon that quickly ramps up to produce an “arch” similar to the neck of a duck — hence the industry moniker of ‘The Duck Chart.’  …[S]everal conditions emerge that will require specific operational capabilities: Short-steep ramps – when the ISO must bring on or shut down generation resources to meet an increasing or decreasing electricity demand quickly, over a short period of time; Oversupply risk – when more electricity is supplied than is needed to satisfy real-time electricity requirements; and Decreased frequency response – when less resources are operating and available to automatically adjust electricity production to maintain grid reliability.” […] To ensure reliability under changing grid conditions, the ISO needs resources with ramping flexibility and the ability to start and stop multiple times per day […] Addressing concerns about frequency response capabilities in times of low load and high renewable generation may require operating renewable generators such that they can increase power with automated frequency response capability.  At some level of penetration of distributed PV, the collective amount of PV will shift the time of peak load net of solar generation away from its previous point to later in the evening when insolation (and therefore PV production) is lower, as shown by NERC in Figure 4.12.  84 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.12. Demand and Net Demand Shapes at Different Distributed Energy Resource Penetration Levels 293  To date, RTOs and ISOs are working hard to integrate growing levels of VRE through extensive study, deliberate planning, and careful operations and ACC 000075 adjustments.  The Role of Technical Standards and Grid Codes for Effective VRE Integration Several types of standards apply to VRE and other generation. Interoperability standards define basic technical and engineering performance requirements, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 1547, which defines uniform requirements for the performance, operation, testing, safety, and maintenance of interconnection between distributed generation resources and the grid. Regulatory requirements such as FERC’s pro forma open access transmission tariff (including interconnection requirements) dictate further reliability and performance terms for generators. As the level of installed wind and solar generation has grown, early technical requirements and standards for wind and solar have required updates to ensure performance under disturbance conditions.  The examples described below illustrate the need to evolve standards as the penetration of nonsynchronous generation increases.  In August 2016, the Blue Cut wildfire crossed a major transmission corridor in Southern California, resulting in 15 line faults. One of these faults caused the near-instantaneous loss of 85 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 1,200 MW of utility-scale PV in Southern California. Approximately 700 MW of this loss occurred when PV inverters tripped due to a “perceived, though incorrect, low system frequency condition.” 294 Another 450 MW of this loss occurred when system voltage fell below the lowvoltage ride-through setting of the inverters— resulting in “momentary cessation.” 295 The subsequent NERC disturbance report determined that 11 similar inverter events occurred between August 16, 2017 and February 6, 2017, and NERC made several recommendations with respect to inverter settings and standards that would prevent or mitigate these events. 296  Australia’s Renewable Energy Target has achieved significant VRE use; 35 percent of South Australia’s generating capacity is wind-powered. On September 28, 2016, severe weather resulted in multiple faults on the South Australian transmission system. A number of faults in quick succession caused 456 MW of wind generation to trip off-line within approximately seven seconds as a result of a protection feature that disconnects or reduces wind turbine output when the number of low-voltage ride-through events in a specific time period exceeds a predefined limit. 297 This loss of generation increased imports from the AC interconnector until protective relays activated, islanding South Australia. Unable to rapidly shed load to match the reduced supply, the islanded region experienced a blackout. The Australian Energy Market Operator’s report on the incident noted the role of changes in the fuel mix: a low amount of synchronous generation dispatched—and hence low inertia—at the time of the event resulted in a faster frequency change than had previously been experienced during separation events. 298 The report produced a list of 19 recommendations, including changes to operating procedures, regulations, and performance standards. The German Energiewende initiative encouraged high levels of wind and distribution-level solar installations, leading to over-generation and the need for VRE’ curtailment in some hours. The grid technical code in place at the time required PV inverters to immediately disconnect from the grid if system frequency increased from nominal 50 Hz to 50.2 Hz. However, Germany discovered that the combination of this technical code and the growing amount of distributionlevel PV capacity heightened the risk of some excess PV generation causing all PV capacity to disconnect simultaneously and create severe under-frequency conditions, potentially causing rolling blackouts and grid collapse. 299 In response, Germany modified its standards to require inverter retrofits with different low-frequency performance requirements. 300 4 1.7 Mapping Reliability Attributes to Generation Resources To assess its changing resource mix, PJM developed a matrix of reliability attributes needed to maintain reliable grid operation under its operating procedures (see Figure 4.13). Ultimately, a diverse generation portfolio is necessary to provide the reliability attributes discussed in this section.  86 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.13. Mapping Reliability Attributes Against Resources iii 301  Conventional generation sources—particularly hydroelectricity, combustion turbines (natural gas and oil), and steam turbines (oil, coal, and natural gas)—performed very well against most of PJM’s reliability requirements. Nuclear units are not optimized for significant flexibility or ramping capability, but do exhibit strong fuel assurance jjj attributes. Batteries and storage meet all flexibility requirements, and DR offers high flexibility and ramping management capability. Wind and solar are highly time dependent and do not offer fuel assurance on their own, but can offer good flexibility if they have the proper controls and contractual arrangements.  The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) summarizes how regional grid operators use centrallyorganized markets to procure specific reliability attributes from generators:                                                            iii Combined-cycle plants are included in the Natural Gas – Steam group. jjj Fuel assurance is the resource portfolio’s ability to access sufficient fuel to meet system needs and maintain reliability; aspects of fuel assurance include onsite fuel storage, as well as a generator’s access to sufficient fuel supplies through markets or bilateral contracts. 87 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Ancillary Services in Centrally-Organized Markets 302 … [E]ach ISO also operates auction markets for spinning, non-spinning reserves, and regulation with uniform clearing prices, with additional performance payments for regulation. (ERCOT, however, does not offer performance payments). Table 2 [Figure 4 14 on the following page] presents some of the terminology and characteristics. The hourly requirements for these services are set based on reliability standards and operational requirements that vary by ISO. The market designs generally co-optimize energy and reserves. Although ancillary service market designs can be complicated, the level of procurement typically only comprises less than 2% of total market volume. Ancillary service pricing is also used to signal short-term supply shortages. Because procurement of these ancillary services is allowed to be deficient before load is curtailed, the failure to procure sufficient reserves is often a first indicator of supply shortage. Hence, the ISOs include administrative scarcity prices in the market designs. Such pricing allows ancillary service prices —along with energy prices, when opportunity costs are included—to increase during shortages to levels more consistent with the value of lost load than the energy market offer caps. These scarcity prices are established differently in each ISO.  There are a number of recent initiatives to modify the ancillary service markets. CAISO and MISO have recently implemented types of ramping reserves, intended to increase the ramping range from committed resources available during real-time energy dispatch. Some ISOs, notably ERCOT, have also begun to develop designs for frequencyresponsive and inertial response reserve markets.  Two ancillary services—voltage support/reactive power and black start services—are not yet considered to have the appropriate characteristics for competitive markets and are thus compensated through cost-based rates.  Figure 4 14 Selected Ancillary Service Market Design Characteristics Continued on next page88 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4 15. Ancillary Service Products Exchanged in the Centrally Organized Markets, Listed by RTO/ISO and Category of Ancillary Service  Note: (“DAM” = day-ahead market; RTM = real-time market) Several flexibility options are available to grid operators, such as DR, fast-ramping natural gas generation, and energy storage. As stated in QER 1.2:  A recent study of the value of fast-ramping gas for supporting variable renewables noted that, ‘…to date FRF [fast ramping fossil] technologies have enabled RE [renewable energy] diffusion by providing reliable and dispatchable back-up capacity to hedge against variability of supply... renewables and fast-reacting fossil technologies appear as highly complementary and… should be jointly installed to meet the goals of cutting emissions and ensuring a stable supply.’ 303  In addition to existing sources of flexibility and reliability services, there is a growing understanding of the abilities of VRE to economically contribute to grid flexibility and reliability through operational changes and advanced power electronics. Recent technology advancements now enable wind plants to provide nearly the full spectrum of ERS (synthetic inertial control, primary frequency control, and automatic generation control). Similarly, for PV, CAISO, First Solar, and NREL recently demonstrated a First Solar 300 MW PV plant that provides active and reactive power controls, plant participation in automatic generation control, primary frequency control, ramp rate control, and voltage regulation. 304  A recent NERC assessment on reliability in the BPS noted that DR can enhance system flexibility and reliability by providing, “regulation, governor response, spinning reserve, non‐spinning reserve, and supplemental operating reserve[. F]or example, ERCOT obtains half of its spinning reserves from DR and is considering a DR‐based Fast Frequency Response Service that is positioned between inertia and governor response.” 305 Consumer end uses—including building energy management systems, as well as water and space heating and cooling—can also serve as DR resources using load control and communicating technologies to ramp their consumption up or down in order to support VRE integration. 306 Demand-side flexibility via “smart charging” plug-in electric vehicles is another potential source of grid flexibility. This involves a utility or some other centralized entity remotely controlling the charging patterns of participating vehicles and/or charging stations. An aggregated fleet of vehicles or chargers can act as a DR resource, shifting load in response to price signals or operational needs; for example, vehicle charging could be shifted to the middle of the day to absorb high levels of solar generation and 89 Staff Report on Electricity ACC 000076 Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy shifted away from evening hours when solar generation disappears and system net load peaks. Research in this area is currently underway at the national laboratories. 307 4.2 Diversity, Fuel Assurance, and Onsite Storage The April 14 memo raises the questions of whether the diversity of the generation resources in the electric system has diminished and whether this is a problem for grid reliability and resilience. In fact, when looked at nationally, the electric system is more diverse today than it was 20 years ago, although increased national diversity does not necessarily mean diversity has increased in all regions. A holistic view of reliability and risk management, however, must include both diversity and fuel assurance.  4.2.1 Fuel Diversity The U.S. generation mix has continually evolved as changes in technology, economics, government policy, and geopolitical forces affected the relative availability, economics, and feasibility of competing energy sources. PJM documents this evolution in Figure 4.16 , which also displays a diversity index showing increasing diversity levels from about 2000 through 2014. PJM observes that, “government policy has played a major role in the development of generation resources, including policies that focused on energy security, jobs, environmental protection and conservation.” 308 The chart shows how the mix of U.S. electricity use has moved in cycles for decades—how the generation share of hydroelectric facilities (most built with Federal funds during the 1930s and 1940s) declined as coal and natural gas grew (helped with funding from low-cost Federal land and mineral leases); how nuclear generation grew (aided by Federal policy and funding assistance) in the 1960s; how nuclear energy displaced hydroelectricity and natural gas-fired electricity in the 1970s; and how coal, nuclear, and natural gas-fired electricity have displaced oil-fired generation since the 1980s.  Figure 4.16. Generation Mix and Various Economic and Policy Drivers Since 1949, Including Diversity Index 309  90 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Closely tracking the PJM trends, the national picture of the resource mix shows coal and oil being displaced by gas and VRE. In addition to this, Figure 4.17 shows how the national U.S. capacity and generation mix have become more diverse over time. Changes in capacity (top) have moved the resource mix toward a greater proportion of natural gas, wind, and solar, while coal and oil capacity have decreased. Energy generation trends for these resources (bottom) have tracked changes in capacity, with natural gas generation almost doubling in proportion. While nuclear capacity has decreased relative to other resources, the proportion of nuclear generation remains unchanged as capacity factors for nuclear units have increased Figure 4.17. Changes in U.S. Capacity (Top) and Generation (Bottom) Mix over Time (Left to Right: 2002, 2009, 2016) 310  The grid was, on average, more diverse in 2016 than in 2002 in terms of both capacity and generation. Diversity can be a useful tool for managing both reliability and financial risks. For the power system, developing and maintaining a portfolio of diverse generation, storage, and demand-side options can be useful for system planners and operators in creating optionality and hedging risks. Physical and financial risks can also be managed and hedged using reliability standards, operating rules, and financial markets and contracts. Better system diversity with greater use of domestic energy sources enhances U.S. energy security. However, greater fuel diversity does not always translate to increased system reliability. Risk, Reliability, and Fuel Diversity 311 In a summary of the policy implications of the impacts of fuel diversity on risk and reliability, Devin Hartman of the R Street Institute states that: Policymakers and regulators should recognize that fuel diversity is a poor proxy for valid policy objectives, like risk management and reliability. Specifically, a high level of fuel diversity does not necessarily mean that an electricity system manages risk efficiently or meets reliability needs. Conversely, policies or market-design changes intended to increase fuel diversity will not necessarily improve risk management or reliability.  Fuel neutrality is essential for both monopoly-utility resource planning and competitive markets to manage risk and achieve reliability efficiently. Interventions to promote specific fuel types—such as 44% 19% 2% 3% 20% 7% 2% 1% 0% 2% 23% 30% 28% 3% 2% 20% 7% 6% 1% 1% 3% 34% 50% 10% 3% 5% 20% 7% 0% 2% 0% 2% 18% 31% 20% 12% 8% 10% 8% 3% 6% 0% 2% 40% 26% 23% 12% 7% 9% 8% 8% 3% 2% 2% 42% 36% 12% 12% 12% 11% 9% 0% 7% 0% 2% 35% Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other91 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy bailouts for coal and nuclear or mandates and subsidies for renewables—skew investment risk and can undermine incentives for reliabilityenhancing behavior (e.g., a public intervention to finance pipeline expansion removes incentives for the private sector to invest in fuel security). Fuelspecific subsidies and mandates replace individual choice with collective choice. This one-size-fits-all approach to risk mitigation ignores variances in individuals’ risk tolerances, results in high-cost risk mitigation, and creates perverse incentives for market participants by transferring risk and costs from the private to the public sector.  For regulators, attempts to achieve fuel diversity in market designs explicitly would likely result in inefficient and potentially discriminatory practices that are inconsistent with the Federal Power Act. The reliable performance of power generators varies across and within fuel types and changes with fluctuating conditions. This renders any attempt to value fuel diversity very complex. It would require extensive administrative judgment, expanding the potential for government failure. Ultimately, the central aim of market design should remain to procure specific reliability attributes at the least cost.  4.2.2 Fuel Assurance and Onsite Storage FERC uses the term fuel assurance to mean a generator’s access to sufficient fuel supplies through markets or bilateral contracts (and the degree to which those arrangements are firm). On the RTO/ISO level, fuel assurance refers to the regional resource portfolio’s ability to access sufficient fuel to meet system needs and maintain reliability. 312 313 NERC’s 2017 State of Reliability report identified “lack of fuel” among the top ten causes of forced outages for 2014 and 2015. 314 While lack of fuel is a relatively infrequent cause of generator outages, it can still have major repercussions when it does occur because system fuel supply chain disruptions can impact many generators during a single widespread fuel shortage event. Nuclear and coal plants typically have advantages associated with onsite fuel storage compared to natural gas. While having fuel onsite reduces the risk that a generator will be unable to operate when needed, every type of fuel and power generation source has known vulnerabilities that can compromise its ability to perform reliably.  Valuation or regulation of onsite fuel storage varies across the Nation’s organized markets. Onsite fuel supplies can be required, incentivized, or not compensated—depending on the RTO/ISO in question. For example, some dual-fuel generators in the New York City region (NYISO Zone J) are required under local reliability rules to maintain onsite fuel to protect against the loss of gas supplies. 315 Several markets have also attempted to incentivize firm and onsite fuel supplies by adding performance requirements to their capacity markets. In PJM and ISO-NE, these requirements were adopted after generator underperformance occurred during several instances of system stress between 2010 and 2014. kkk The incentives in these markets are designed to reward or penalize generators based upon how they respond to the system operator during performance events.  According to Gordon van Welie, President and CEO of ISO-NE: We currently have a precarious operating situation in the winter time and we're worried about it becoming unsustainable beyond 2019… The reality is that we're really operating with a very slim operating margin during the winter time that may not cover these large contingencies that worry us. 316 kkk These events included both situations in which natural gas power plants were unable to draw fuel from pipelines, as well as ones in which sufficient fuel was available but unit outages and/or start times inhibited operation.  92 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Both programs remain in their infancy: ISO-NE’s takes effect in 2018, and PJM’s has only been active since 2016 (with a gradual phase-in through the 2019/2020 delivery year). In the interim, ISO-NE instituted a stopgap measure called the Winter Reliability Program, which compensates some dual-fuel generators for procuring onsite fuel. 317 Outside of these regions, onsite fuel is not compensated or, in the case of VIEU, is incorporated into integrated resource planning (IRP) efforts. Other aspects of fuel assurance include having dual fuel capabilities and having low exposure to supply chain interruptions (including adequate, reliable infrastructure and sufficient contractual arrangements for fuel delivery).  Natural Gas NERC refers to the “single point of disruption risk” as the increasing risk of fuel disruption that threatens generator availability. In a letter to Secretary Perry, NERC CEO Gerry Cauley observed that:  Growing reliance on natural gas continues to raise reliability concerns regarding the ability of both gas and electric infrastructures to maintain the BPS reliability at acceptable levels. Many efforts have focused on the gas-electric interface and yet, insufficient progress has been made reconciling the planning approaches and operating practices (scheduling situation awareness, information sharing) between these two inter-linked sectors. Planning approaches, operational coordination, and regulatory partnerships are needed to assure fuel deliverability, availability, security (physical and cyber), and resilience to potential disruptions. Unfortunately, an approach not obvious in electricity markets today. 318  Natural gas-fired generators have been described as relying on “just-in-time” fuel delivery. 319 NERC, FERC, and several of the ISOs and RTOs have studied the gas-electric interactions and interdependence, which are most severe in the areas where natural gas ACC 000077 generation is growing most quickly, but natural gas pipeline infrastructure is more constrained—particularly New England and California. NERC has concluded that: […] areas with a growing reliance on natural gas-fired generation are increasingly vulnerable to issues related to gas supply unavailability. Common-mode, single contingency-type disruptions to fuel supply and deliverability in areas with a high penetration of natural gasfired generation are reducing resource adequacy and potentially introducing localized risks to reliability. Not only can impacts to BPS reliability occur during the gas-load peaking winter season, but they can also manifest during the summer season when electric demand is high and natural gas facilities are out of service, which can lower the operational capacity and flow of the pipeline system. 320 NERC recommends a number of planning and operational changes to address this challenge, including risk-based approaches to study the potential regional reliability implications of greater natural gas dependence; the potential for wide-spread, common-mode failure events such as interstate gas pipeline or supply source losses; regional mitigation strategies; better information-sharing and coordination between electric generators, gas suppliers, and pipeline operators; and ensuring the availability of more flexible resources for use to mitigate the added uncertainties associated with natural gas fuel risks. 321 Natural gas storage is a way to reduce the just-in-time delivery problem. Natural gas is stored in depleted natural gas and oil fields, depleted natural aquifers, and salt caverns. Figure 4.18 shows natural gas storage facilities across the Nation. The ideal storage facilities are near major gas consumption centers, where storage can supplement gas pipelines to meet high demand levels and fill in deliveries in the event of any delivery disruptions. 93 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.18. Natural Gas Storage Facilities 322 The United States has over 400 natural gas storage facilities; the majority are depleted natural gas fields used for storage, with salt domes concentrated in the Southeast and aquifer storage concentrated in Illinois and Indiana. Data presented at a recent testimony before FERC offers an interesting perspective on areas that depend on just-in-time energy. The data in Table 4-3 show a dozen states that depend on high levels of just-in-time imports, whether those imports are natural gas for in-area generation or transmissionenabled electricity imports. These areas may need greater planning and resilience measures to ensure fuel security, which may include some availability of petroleum-based fuels for units that can use them when natural gas may be difficult or expensive to source.  94 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Table 4-3. Dependence on Imported Just-in-Time Energy for Electricity 323  The leaks discovered at California’s Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility in October 2015 California illustrate another natural gas common failure mode problem, according to analysis completed by PJM: Analysis performed after the leak identified 17 nearby electric generators with a combined output of over 9,800 MW that relied on Aliso Canyon for fuel supply. Some of these generators are required for local reliability; however, without supply from Aliso Canyon, low pressure in gas pipelines could stop the flow of gas to the generators, leaving them unable to operate. 324 The loss of Aliso Canyon gas storage field highlights the risk to the power grid from failures in the pipeline infrastructure. Electric market and regulatory changes in California resulting from this event include: expedited procurement of electric storage resources, enhanced gas-electric coordination, expanded demand response program and a constraint in the electric market that reflects gas limitations. 325  After the 2014 Polar Vortex, when many gas-fired power plants were forced off-line due to natural gas production and delivery problems, inadequate gas supply contracts, and spiked natural gas prices, NERC recommended the following:  Examine and review the natural gas supply issues encountered during the event. Industry should also work with gas suppliers, markets, and regulators to quickly identify issues with natural gas supply and transportation so that appropriate actions can be developed and implemented to allow generators to be able to secure firm supply and transportation at a reasonable rate. 326  FERC has since promulgated orders to improve coordination between natural gas and power industry operations. While various electric and gas industry groups, including NERC, have had and continue coordination efforts, a significant amount of coordination remains unresolved.  95 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear As NERC noted, low exposure to fuel supply issues is one of the fundamental necessities of a reliable BPS. Still, fuel availability does not always guarantee dependable performance, particularly during extreme weather events. In 2010, the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama was throttled back to 50 percent of its maximum output because the plant was unable to draw and return enough water (due to environmental regulations) to cool all three of its reactors. 327  Nuclear generators have onsite fuel storage due to their 18-month or 24-month refueling cycles. 328 During the Polar Vortex, some coal and nuclear plants had fuel onsite but failed to perform nonetheless. However, overall nuclear generators performed extremely well during the Polar Vortex, with an average capacity factor of 95 percent. 329 Nuclear power plants tend to have a very high number of “days of burn” onsite relative to coal, as their refueling occurs in 18-month or 24-month cycles. During each refueling, about one-third of the core is replaced with new fuel. The new fuel arrives onsite between nine and five weeks prior to the planned refueling. However, even if there is a delay in the arrival of new fuel, the reactor could continue to operate for an additional three months before reaching 70 percent capacity and two more months beyond that (for a total of five months) before decreasing to 50 percent capacity. The fuel that is replaced during each refueling has typically been used in the reactor for four-and-a-half to six years before it is removed. Planned refueling outages are typically scheduled for the spring and fall and average 35 days. 330 Coal A limited number of coal plants, including all plants that use lignite coal, are “mine-mouth” facilities that rely on dedicated, nearby coal mines. Otherwise, coal plants rely on rail, barge, or truck delivery of coal, and they maintain onsite coal stockpiles to accommodate both normal variance in deliveries and the possibility of a major supply disruption. Coal stockpiles have recently been slightly smaller than historical averages, while days of burn have increased slightly relative to historic averages from the 70–80-day range to the 85–100-day range (see Figure 4.19 ). lll 331  lll At an individual plant, stockpiles can be viewed in terms of days of burn. The days-of-burn calculation considers both the current stockpile level at a plant and its estimated consumption (burn) rates in coming months to approximate how many days the plant could run at historical levels before depleting its existing stockpile. 96 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.19. Coal Stocks and Days of Burn, January 2010–May 2017 332 While bituminous coal stockpiles in tons have been slightly lower than historic averages in recent months, these stocks are expected to last relatively longer than historic average (measured in days of burn) due to lower capacity factors and expected lower fuel consumption in coal plants. Subbituminous coal stocks (not pictured) have increased in recent months relative to historic averages both in terms of tons and days of burn. For the winter of 2014, compared to 2013, coal-fueled generation provided 92 percent of increased generation, as shown in Figure 4.20. Although electricity demand was greater in 2014, natural gas generation decreased because natural gas was diverted to fuel residential heating needs and gas prices rose to greater than three times those of coal. 97 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.20. Electricity Generation Changes from 2013 to 2014 by Fuel Type Competition for natural gas between residential heating and power production caused a rise in natural gas prices in the early months of 2014. The high gas prices coupled with onsite coal storage led to a sharp increase in coal electricity production in those months compared to the winter of 2013. Coal plants can also experience delivery interruptions. In 2013, there were 166 power plants (172,000 MW of generating capacity) across the United States that used subbituminous coal from the Powder River Basin. During the winter of 2013–2014, BNSF Railway rationed and limited coal deliveries to many of these generators due to construction and other disruptions. Stockpiles fell from 25 percent to 40 percent below normal levels at coal plants across the Midwest, Central, and Texas regions; many plants feared that they might not be able to rebuild their inventories in time to meet winter electric demands. 333  4.3 High-Risk Events and System Resilience The April 14 memo asks whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which not compensating resilience attributes could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. A resilience approach recognizes that while not all risks can be avoided, many risks can be managed to mitigate damage and expedite recovery. Some options to improve grid resilience may be risk-specific (e.g., to protect against flooding) or component-specific (to protect a transformer), while others are “threat-agnostic, providing systemwide resilience to a broad range of threats including those that cannot be anticipated” according to the Grid Modernization Lab Consortium (GMLC). 334 As the fuel mix evolves and as threats change, there will be more ways that elements and regions of the BPS can fail. Causes of failure can include extreme weather events and cyber or physical attacks on grid infrastructure. 335 336 98 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Extreme Weather Events In January and February 2014, the Nation was swept by the Polar Vortex as a band of very cold weather spread across much of the eastern United States, creating record-high winter peak electric demand for heating and equally high demand for ACC 000078 natural gas for residential heating. While the Polar Vortex tested the integrity of electricity supply, grid operators generally met demand, even under these severe conditions.  However, electricity and gas prices surged for many consumers as energy supplies were stressed. The extremely cold weather caused a variety of power system performance problems, including the loss of 35,000 MW of generation capacity across a wide stretch of the Nation, with 55 percent of the affected generation from natural gas plants, 26 percent coal plants and five percent nuclear. 337 In PJM, one of the regions most affected by the event, 22 percent of generating capacity was in forced outage. 338 Many natural gas-fired generators had their fuel supplies curtailed because they were buying gas on non-firm, interruptible contracts, or because demand was so high that pipelines implemented delivery restrictions to power plants located near major metropolitan areas. In the Northeast, after several days of extremely cold weather, some generators experienced fuelgelling, where the natural gas froze in the fuel injectors and was unable to feed into the turbines. 339 In Texas, a major source for natural gas production and a transport hub, several gas field production facilities froze up, as did some gas compressor stations along pipelines—shutting down gas feeds into and through pipelines that were to be shipped into New Mexico and elsewhere. This caused fuel shortages to the power plants served by those pipelines. 340 Limited supplies led to natural gas price spikes across much of the country; in some areas, gas to produce electricity was more expensive than liquid fuel, even though the price of oil for generation rose to over $400 per barrel. 341 Many coal plants could not operate due to conveyor belts and coal piles freezing 342 , which—coupled with outages across other fuels and high electricity demand—led operators to call on older plants nearing the end of their useful lives. American Electric Power reported that it deployed 89 percent of its coal units scheduled for retirement in 2014 to meet demand during the Polar Vortex, and Southern Company reported using 75 percent of its coal units scheduled for closure. 343 Using these retiring units enabled utilities to meet customer demand during a period when already limited natural gas resources were diverted from electricity production to meet residential heating needs. 344 345 Once retired, however, these units will not be available for the next unseasonably cold winter.  In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy caused large-scale flooding and wind damage in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast, as well as blizzard conditions in the central and southern Appalachians. Three nuclear reactors totaling 2,845 MW of capacity were shut down, and five operated at reduced levels due to disruptions in transmission infrastructure, reduced demand from distribution outages, and precautionary measures to protect equipment. 346 The storm impacts significantly disrupted East Coast refining activity. Spectra Energy lost two natural gas compressor stations on its Texas Eastern Transmission pipeline in northern New Jersey due to the loss of commercial power and the failure of backup generation to operate as intended, which affected gas supply to upstream gas-fired power plants. New Jersey Natural Gas shut down part of its natural gas infrastructure serving Ocean and Monmouth counties, including Long Beach Island and the barrier islands from Bay Head to Seaside Park, with subsequent distribution line damages. 347 Sandy also damaged solar PV installations in New Jersey, with storm surges causing $3 million of damage to ground-mounted PV systems and wind and lightning damage to rooftop PV systems. 348 99 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 4.4 Enhancing Reliability and Resilience Recently, based on extensive information about the operational profiles of PJM resources, PJM assessed the capability of each generator type to provide different ERS. mmm PJM then built a series of hypothetical resource portfolios using different mixes of generation types to determine how well each portfolio performed at delivering sufficient reliability. PJM also considered the risk that each portfolio would fail to meet resource adequacy needs and thus cause reliability problems. After simulating many combinations and portfolios, the following conclusions were reached: The expected near-term resource portfolio is among the highest-performing portfolios and is well equipped to provide the generator reliability attributes. As the potential future resource mix moves in the direction of less coal and nuclear generation, generator reliability attributes of frequency response, reactive capability and fuel assurance decrease, but flexibility and ramping attributes increase. A marked decrease in operational reliability was observed for portfolios with significantly increased amounts of wind and solar capacity (compared to the expected near-term resource portfolio), suggesting de facto performance-based upper bounds on the percent of system capacity from these resource types. Additionally, most portfolios with solar unforced capacity shares of 20 percent or greater were classified infeasible because they resulted in LOLE criterion violations at night. Nevertheless, PJM could maintain reliability with unprecedented levels of wind and solar resources, assuming a portfolio of other resources that provides a sufficient amount of reliability services. Portfolios composed of up to 86 percent natural gas-fired resources maintained operational reliability. Thus, this analysis did not identify an upper bound for natural gas. However, additional risks, such as gas deliverability during polar vortextype conditions and uncertainties associated with economics and public policy, were not fully captured in this analysis. Risks with respect to natural gas may lie not in capability to provide the generator reliability attributes but rather in these other uncertainties. More diverse portfolios are not necessarily more reliable; rather, there are resource blends between the most diverse and least diverse portfolios which provide the most generator reliability attributes. 349 [original footnotes omitted] Significantly, when PJM tested the most desirable portfolios (in terms of reliability) against a polar vortex event, only a third of those were resilient: Only 34 of the 98 portfolios which were classified as desirable were resilient when subjected to a polar vortex event. This sensitivity specifically captured the increased risk of natural gas delivery under extremely cold and high load conditions. The polar vortex sensitivity highlights the importance of resilience, which is not captured by the generator reliability attributes that were considered in this study. 350 DOE, NERC, and industry stakeholders prepare for a variety of potential threats, including high-impact, low-frequency events, to improve resilience and recovery. Planning, practice, and coordination on an allhazards basis are as important for improving resilience as having a mix of resources and fuels available when a major grid disturbance occurs. A diverse resource portfolio could complement wholesale market products that recognize and compensate providers for the value of ERS on a technology-neutral basis. mmm The PJM study assumed firm gas supply contracts for natural gas-fired generators.  100 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy DOE’s Grid Modernization Initiative (GMI) works to better understand what resilience means for the power system and how to measure and achieve it. Transmission planning also supports grid reliability and resilience through interconnecting diverse resources, and it occurs at a variety of levels—ranging from individual utility system studies to regional and interconnection-wide studies. In 2009, DOE issued a series of grants to support interconnectionwide transmission planning. In 2011, FERC issued Order No. 1000, which (among other requirements) mandates regional transmission planning and interregional coordination. As noted in a recent study for the WIRES group: The analytical approaches applied to interregional [transmission] planning should look beyond “base cases” or “business-as-usual cases” and explicitly consider a broader range of plausible market conditions, system contingencies, and public policy environments to capture the short- and long-term flexibility benefits and insurance value that a more robust interregional transmission infrastructure can offer in terms of shielding customers from highcost outcomes. … we recommend that such futures be evaluated to identify transmission projects that address current needs but also provide the insurance and flexibility value to mitigate highcost outcomes across a range of uncertain but not implausible futures. 351 Given the many problems that can affect different generation and fuel types, system-wide reliability and resilience can be supported by a diverse portfolio of generation resources that limit over-dependence on any single fuel or technology type, plus demand-side resources that reduce overall demand and better protect customers in the event of a widespread extreme event. 4.5 Reliability and Resilience Looking Forward Although the BPS is performing reliably today with the current mix of resources, technologies, and loads, the entire system remains volatile. Low customer demands and a flatter supply curve mean that many generators face continuing economic stress, retirements may continue, and utility-scale and customerside VRE additions (enabled by subsidies and mandates) will continue. These factors and the uncertainty about future conditions are making it harder for grid planners and operators to maintain today’s level of reliability.   Any successful strategy to address BPS reliability and resilience going forward should include developing portfolios of resources that deliver both resource adequacy and ERS to advance reliable grid operations. Resource portfolios could be complemented with wholesale market and product designs that recognize and complement resource diversity by compensating providers for the value of ERS on a technologyneutral basis.  More work is needed to define, quantify, and value resilience; Sandia National Laboratories has made efforts to do so, as shown in Figure 4 21. 101 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 4.21. Sandia National Laboratories’ Resilience Analysis Process 352  102 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy 5 Wholesale Electricity Markets  The wholesale electricity market issues outlined in the April 14 memo are central to the future of U.S. electricity ACC 000079 markets and policy. At the same time, they are the subject of intense debate among stakeholders with differing regional and economic interests. Noting the wide range of opinion on these issues, DOE staff offer three general findings:  1) Changing circumstances are challenging centrally-organized wholesale markets. Flat demand growth, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels are creating stresses on wholesale electricity markets. The centrally-organized markets are successfully achieving reliable and economically efficient delivery of wholesale electricity in their short-term operations, but the changing circumstances portend potential long-term problems for centrally-organized and, to a lesser extent, bilateral markets.  2) New technologies with very low marginal costs, i.e. VRE, reduce wholesale prices, independent of— and in addition to—the effects of low natural gas prices. To the extent that additional development of such resources is driven by subsidies and mandates, their price suppressive effect might place undue economic pressure on revenues for traditional baseload (as well as non-baseload) resources and could require changes in market design. 353 354 355   3) Markets need further work to address grid resilience. Market mechanisms are designed to incentivize individual resources rather than develop balanced portfolios. System operators are working toward recognizing, defining, and compensating for reliability- and resilience-enhancing resource attributes (on both the supply and demand side), but more work must be done.  U.S. market structures vary widely, but despite substantial differences between markets, some patterns emerge and are worth addressing in response to the April 14 memo. 5.1 Evolution of U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets Until the 1970s, investor-owned electric utilities were vertically integrated (i.e., provided generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to their customers at regulated rates and with administratively determined profits). This concept was loosely referred to as the “regulatory 103 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy compact.” nnn  Interspersed with VIEUs were—and still are—over 3,200 cooperatively owned electric utilities. ooo 356  In the 1920s, policymakers accepted the idea that non-utility companies might be able to generate electricity at equal or lower cost than VIEUs, to the benefit of electricity consumers. 357 In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which introduced competition to the VIEU model and set the stage for later regulatory reform of the electricity industry. 358 At the time, PURPA was largely an effort to curb the electricity industry’s reliance on high-cost natural gas and oil. ppp PURPA provided for “increased conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electric utilities, and equitable retail rates for electric consumers.” 359 It also made developing new generation resources easier—specifically renewable energy and cogeneration facilities. 360 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 allowed FERC to approve “exempt wholesale generators,” using any fuel and any generation technology, to go into the generation business and sell electricity at competitive prices. The act also authorized FERC to order transmission owners to provide transmission service. 361 Also in 1992, Congress enacted the PTC to incentivize VRE energy production, which Congress has extended and modified several times since. 362 In 1996, FERC required transmission owners under its jurisdiction to provide open-access transmission to the interstate transmission grid through its landmark Order No. 888. Open access means charging all similarly situated parties the same rate (including, if applicable, what the utility would charge itself to use its transmission facilities) and providing service to all similarly situated parties under the same terms and conditions. 363 This action by FERC greatly assisted the development of competition among wholesale power producers because it meant that utilities would find it difficult to limit access to their transmission facilities as a means of protecting their generation assets from competitors. FERC Order No. 2000 (issued in December 1999) promoted voluntary participation in RTO/ISOs by further clarifying both necessary characteristics of RTO/ISOs and benefits of such participation. 364  Between 1998 and 2006, 23 states made changes to require their VIEUs to divest some or all of their generating assets and thus allow competition. 365 Divestiture was pursued most aggressively by the states with high retail electricity prices (most of New England, New York, the Mid-Atlantic states, and nnn “The ‘state regulatory compact’ evolved as a concept ‘to characterize the set of mutual rights, obligations, and benefits that exist between the utility and society.’ It is not a binding agreement. Under this ‘compact,’ a utility typically is given exclusive access to a designated—or franchised—service territory and can recover its prudent costs (as determined by the regulator) plus a reasonable rate of return on its investments. In return, the utility must fulfill its service obligation of providing universal access service within its territory. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/AppendixElectricity%20System%20Overview.pdf  ooo Most public power utilities are distribution-only; however, some are vertically integrated. Distributiononly cooperatives typically purchase all or some of their electricity at the wholesale level from generation and transmission cooperative utilities. ppp Also in 1978, the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act prohibited “(1) the use of natural gas or petroleum as a[n] energy source in any new electric power plant; and (2) construction of any new electric power plant without the capability to use coal or any alternate fuel as a primary energy source.” https://www.congress.gov/bill/95th-congress/house-bill/5146  The Fuel Use Act was mostly repealed in 1987, which “set the stage for a dramatic increase in the use of natural gas for electric generation and industrial processing.” https://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/repeal.html  104 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy California) with the hope that competition would bring lower retail consumer prices. qqq 366 Generating units that had been operating under cost-of-service regulation were sold to merchant plant owners or transferred to unregulated, investor-owned utility affiliates.  This wave of restructuring did not sweep the entire Nation. In large areas—particularly the Southeast and the West, apart from the expanding Energy Imbalance Market—the wholesale electricity industry is still vertically integrated. In these areas, the wholesale market consists of bilateral transactions.  Because restructuring did not take hold in all states, a range of organizational structures exist at the wholesale level in the United States today, as shown in Figure 5.1. States considered “Partially Restructured” below have divested some generation and/or allowed a portion of customers to choose their energy provider. Figure 5.1. Utility Restructuring by State as of May 2017 367    5.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets Today  Over the past two decades, a diverse set of wholesale electricity markets has evolved in different regions of the United States. These wholesale markets can be divided into two broad categories. For the purposes of this section, regions of the country that have not joined RTO/ISOs are called traditional                                                            qqq Whether this objective has been achieved is mixed in the literature. Availability rates for generation have improved significantly and, as predicted, as competition incentivized operators to run their units as efficiently as possible. Dispatch over the much broader footprints of RTO/ISOs also increases efficiency and thus reduces costs. PJM notes (July 26, 2017 written statement before Subcommittee on Energy, U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce) “nearly $2 billion of annual savings to customers.” On the other hand, Borenstein’s 2015 review claims “the electricity rate changes since restructuring have been driven more by exogenous factors - such as generation technology advances and natural gas price fluctuations - than by the effects of restructuring.” See two meta-studies: Severin Borenstein and James Bushnell, “The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of Restructuring,” May 2015, https://ei.haas.berkeley edu/research/papers/WP252.pdf and James Bushnell, Erin T. Mansur, and Kevin Novan, “Review of the Economics Literature on US Electricity Restructuring,” April 2017, for DOE, unpublished. 105 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy bilateral markets, while those that have are called centrally-organized markets. These regions are shown in Figure 5.2, with RTO/ISOs labeled and colored, and bilateral markets depicted in gray.  Figure 5.2. The Seven RTOs or ISOs in the United States rrr 368 There are currently seven centrally-organized markets operating across the United States. The diversity of approaches to market organization and resource adequacy can be visualized along a spectrum, as shown in Figure 5.3—from VIEUs with minimal market organization on one end, to fully restructured markets without formal resource adequacy requirements on the other. Between vertically integrated and energy-only regions, there are diverse approaches to allocating the financial risk of generation investment and the responsibility to provide resource adequacy. rrr Map redrawn from FERC’s December 2016 website.  106 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 5.3. States and Regions along the Spectrum from Traditional to Fully Restructured Electric Markets 369  In the Southeast and West, bilateral markets are dominated by VIEUs that operate under a regulated cost-of-service model. States in these regions retain strong control over electric utility resource decisions and oversee resource adequacy, and they consider non-market factors in their oversight of utility decisions through a utility’s IRP process. Once approved by state regulators, ratepayers guarantee the cost recovery of VIEU generation investments through retail rates (or merchant generators through long-term PPAs with utilities). Thus, the financial viability of these generators is not immediately exposed to the same price ACC 000080 volatility that generators face in market-oriented regions. However, new resource decisions in VIEU regions are beginning to account for low natural gas prices, low load growth, and zero-marginal cost generation. sss Public power and rural cooperative utilities also have a significant presence in some regions. Utility asset ownership models can vary from vertically integrated to distribution-only. Merchant generators also operate within these regions, but most electricity is produced and delivered by the integrated utilities, with minimal additional spot transactions. 370  In centrally-organized markets, generators offer electricity bids on a day-ahead and real-time basis. The RTO/ISO then pools these bids into a single supply curve and calculates the clearing price that matches supply to demand, considering transmission limitations for the next interval. This calculation yields a set of market-clearing prices, one for each location and time horizon. Centrally-organized markets also compensate resources that provide certain ERS through ancillary service markets. Furthermore, in some cases, RTO/ISOs provide supplemental revenues to generators that are dispatched out-of-market, such as ones that are needed to ensure local reliability.                                                             sss See, for example, 152 FERC ¶ 61,013 (Florida Power & Light Company) or Steve Wright, General Manager, Chelan County PUD, a vertically integrated utility in Washington, told DOE staff in a June 19, 2017, conversation that the relatively low wholesale prices traditionally seen in the Northwest due to an abundance of low-cost hydro are now further stressed by the export of surplus zero-marginal cost California rooftop solar, so much so that he is “finding it hard to even justify spending on energy efficiency in [his utility’s] integrated resource plan.” 107 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy RTOs/ISOs operate as a single balancing authority and achieve cost savings by procuring reserves and other ancillary services for the system. For example, MISO estimates that because it operates an ancillary service market across the entire region, spinning reserve requirements can be based upon the entire region’s needs rather than the sum of individual balancing authorities’ spinning reserve requirements. By operating the ancillary services market, MISO reduced its average spinning reserves requirement from 1,482 MW to 935 MW and saved almost $25 million per year for its members by freeing up generation from having to meet the reserve requirement. 371 CAISO, MISO, and SPP retain aspects of the bilateral markets, particularly that states still oversee resource procurement and resource adequacy of their VIEUs, through the IRP process. 372 California, MISO and SPP, as well as traditional bilateral market states, incorporate considerations other than shortterm economic efficiency into their resource choices, such as portfolio diversity, job retention or creation, environmental protection, and other factors. 5 2.1 Responsibility for Resource Adequacy and Capacity Some states require utilities to build new or subsidize specific power plants outside the RTO/ISO resource adequacy processes. Other centrally-organized markets (namely PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO) have implemented capacity markets as a mechanism to provide sufficient revenue for resources to ensure resource adequacy. In these markets, the system operator conducts an auction process, and wholesale customers procure resources (including generation, energy efficiency, DR, and transmission-enabled resource imports) to meet the electricity demands of their customers. These markets can be mandatory (PJM Interconnection and ISO New England); voluntary, where states can choose to operate under an IRP process and where load-serving entities can satisfy their requirements through a combination of the market and/or showing that they have rights to adequate capacity (MISO); or voluntarily backstopped by a mandatory process (NYISO). ERCOT does not have a formal resource adequacy requirement. 5 3 Challenges in Wholesale Electricity Markets Centrallyorganized markets are now 15–20 years old, and their original designs (even with continual and evolving updates) are showing signs of strain from the pace of change now underway in the electricity industry. Many of these changes were not foreseen during the restructuring and wholesale market designs of the 1990s–2000s. Flat demand growth, flattened supply curves, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels are placing pressures on centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets, resulting in low average wholesale energy prices. These markets were designed when supply curves tilted sharply upward, demand grew over time, and capacity was not explicitly compensated to make up for insufficient revenues from an energy-only market. A 2014 FERC staff report notes: A failure to properly reflect in market prices the value of reliability to consumers and operator actions taken to ensure reliability can lead to inefficient prices in the energy and ancillary services markets leading to inefficient system utilization, and muted investment signals. 373  108 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy The issue of revenue insufficiency and generator retirements in centrally-organized electricity markets is a complex topic, with causality difficult to assign beyond the individual asset/owner level. ttt Each plant has its own cost structure, and plant revenues can differ between neighboring nodes in a single market.  Traditional, bilateral-only wholesale markets are not immune to these issues either, but may not be seeing them yet at the same scale as the three eastern RTO/ISOs that have a predominance of merchant generation. An issue that is more prevalent in these regions than in regions with bilateral markets is the PURPA “must-purchase obligation” that still applies to those regions. After Congress amended PURPA in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, many utilities in regions with centrally-organized wholesale markets have sought and received from FERC orders terminating their obligations. 374  By contrast, utilities in regions with traditional, bilateral-only wholesale markets remain subject to the PURPA requirement to buy power from Qualifying Facilities (QFs) under PPAs, with up to 20-year terms and at rates that the applicable state regulator has determined reflect the purchasing utility’s avoided costs. In some instances, generation purchased from QFs has displaced utilityowned generation and thus reduced utility revenue. PURPA remains a subject of ongoing debate within the industry, as evidenced by a discussion during a FERC June 2016 Technical Conference. 375  5 3.1 Revenue Insufficiency due to Market Structure: The Missing Money Problem In the mid2000s it became apparent that merchant generators were failing to recover sufficient revenues through the energy-only markets to cover both their variable and fixed costs. The issue subsequently became known as the “missing money problem.” uuu In testimony before a 2014 FERC technical conference, David Patton, the independent market monitor for ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO, and NYISO, described the issue as stemming from overlystringent planning reserve requirements: With reasonable assumptions about capacity cost and energy prices, [the one-day-in-tenyears] reliability standard implies a value of lost load of $100,000 to $200,000 per MWh. Hence, without substantially inflated shortage prices, energy-only markets cannot provide enough revenue to satisfy planning reserve requirements. Additional revenue is needed to satisfy these requirements, which is the “missing money” problem addressed by the capacity markets. 376 William Hogan of Harvard University noted in 2005 that the missing money problem can also be attributed to price caps: The missing money problem arises when occasional market price increases are limited by administrative actions such as price caps. By preventing prices from reaching high levels during times of relative scarcity, these administrative actions reduce the payments that could be applied towards the fixed operating costs of existing generation plants and the investment costs of new plants. 377 To mitigate the missing money problem, centrally-organized markets have, to varying degrees, utilized shortage pricing and capacity markets.                                                            ttt The market issues discussed in this section are most pertinent to a merchant generator operating within centrally-organized markets that are not subject to regulated rate recovery.  uuu The first use of this term is attributed to Roy Shanker in his 2003 testimony before FERC. William W. Hogan, Harvard University, “’Energy Only’ Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy,” September 23, 2005 109 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Shortage Pricing Shortage pricing, also referred to as scarcity pricing, seeks to ensure that energy market revenues reflect the value consumers place on reliability. It does this through administrative rules that raise prices above marginal costs during times of system stress. FERC has actively sought to improve the utilization of techniques like shortage pricing. In a 2014 analysis, FERC staff provided a useful overview of the rationale for shortage pricing: When the system operator is unable to meet system needs, it applies administrative pricing rules to ensure that costs, including the costs associated with the failure to meet minimum operating reserve requirements, are reflected in market prices. …Under such conditions, prices should rise, inducing performance of existing supply resources and encouraging load to reduce consumption so that the system operator would not need to administratively curtail load to maintain reliability. 378 All of the Nation’s RTO/ISOs currently employ shortage pricing to some degree; however, the designs are not uniform. FERC Order No. 831 raised energy offer caps in jurisdictional RTO/ISOs from $1,000 to $2,000/MWh. 379 Conditions required to trigger shortage pricing vary from year to year. This variance could present challenges to market participants who require a threshold level of certainty to make an investment decision. Remarks by market monitors David Patton and Joe Bowring critique the practice of relying solely on shortage pricing: [David Patton:] Shortage pricing is not like a capacity market where you’re going to get a level of revenue that might fluctuate by 10 to 20 percent per year. With shortage pricing, you might get 10 ACC 000081 years of revenue in one year and then the other nine years the generators are going to think they’re going bankrupt. 380 [Joe Bowring]: What will happen if you go through eight years of very low revenues under scarcity pricing … and a significant number of units decide to retire because they can’t see into the future? They don’t know if [in] the ninth or 10th year there’s going to be $20 billion. They retire if the revenues aren’t adequate. 381  Capacity Markets Four RTO/ISOs currently operate centralized capacity markets: ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM hold mandatory auctions, while MISO’s is voluntary. Capacity markets address the missing money problem by imposing resource adequacy requirements on load-serving entities (LSEs). Spees, Newell, and Pfeifenberger provide a useful overview of how this process works: A resource adequacy [requirement] requires LSEs to procure sufficient generation or demand-response capacity to serve their own customers’ coincident peak load plus a mandatory planning reserve margin. If each LSE procures their required capacity, then the system as a whole will be able to meet its planning reserve margin requirement and target resource adequacy level. … [Capacity] has value as a stand-alone commodity, the demand for which is driven by LSEs needing to meet their resource adequacy requirement. 382  According to the authors, capacity market revenues should in theory ameliorate the missing money problem by providing “the incremental payment needed to recover their investment costs in addition to the operating profits earned through energy and ancillary service sales.” 383 Figure 5.4 provides a useful illustration of how capacity payments are intended to close the missing money gap.  110 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 5.4. How Market Prices Allow Resource Costs to be Recovered in a Centrally-organized Wholesale Market 384  Revenues from energy sold in the wholesale market pay for a generators' variable costs and some portion of fixed costs (indicated by green arrows). The unrecovered portion of fixed cost (missing money) is recovered through capacity market revenues (indicated by blue arrow).   Some observers note that capacity markets may not provide sufficient revenues as originally intended. For example, the 2016 PJM Market Monitor’s report finds PJM’s markets can provide adequate revenue to support some existing capacity, but the outlook varies widely by technology, fuel choice, time interval, and location: Analysis of the total unit revenues of theoretical new entrant CTs and CCs for three representative locations shows that units that entered the PJM markets in 2007 have not covered their total costs, including the return on and of capital, on a cumulative basis through 2016. The analysis also shows that theoretical new entrant CTs and CCs that entered the PJM markets in 2012 have covered their total costs on a cumulative basis in the eastern PSEG [New Jersey] and BGE [Baltimore] zones but have not covered total costs in the western ComEd [Chicago] Zone. Energy market revenues were not sufficient to cover total costs in any scenario except the new entrant CC unit that went into operation in 2012 in BGE, which demonstrates the critical role of capacity market revenue in covering total costs. vvv 385 5.3.2 Revenue Insufficiency due to External Forces While RTO/ISOs have sought to address the missing money problem as previously defined, newer variants of it continue to permeate stakeholder discussions. Economist Severin Borenstein notes that the definition has expanded to include the supply curve impact of subsidies: Money has been going missing for many years, according to owners of power plants. They’ve used the term for more than a decade to refer to the fact that wholesale electricity markets have price caps (mostly between $1,000 and $10,000 per MWh) that constrain how  vvv As part of the review of market performance, the market monitor analyzed the net revenues earned by CTs, NGCCs, coal, diesel, nuclear, solar, and wind generating units. 111 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy much sellers can make when supply is tight. Without that income, generators argue, it may not be profitable to build new capacity, or extend the life of existing capacity, that is needed to meet demand. More recently, the definition of missing money has been expanded to include the price impacts of subsidized or mandated renewables generation. In California, New York and many other states, wind and solar are pushing down wholesale prices and making continued operation of some nuclear and fossil fuel generation unprofitable. 386  Shifts in the Generation Supply Curve Changes in the Nation’s generation mix have generally reduced revenues for incumbent baseload generators in wholesale markets, as highlighted in QER 1.2: [P]rice suppression is occurring in RTO/ISO wholesale markets, with noticeable amounts of wind and solar generation (and low-cost gas generation). While passing on savings to consumers is desirable, in some regions, these low prices have put pressure on baseload units, particularly zero-carbon emissions nuclear generation. 387 Put more specifically, shifts in market supply curves have lowered the infra-marginal rents www earned by baseload generators. Crucially, this reduction has occurred because of changes along both axes of the supply curve. Along the horizontal (supply) axis, the entry of new resources has pushed the curve to the right, resulting in a lower clearing price at the same level of demand. Meanwhile, reductions in marginal fuel costs (vertical axis) have lowered the slope of the curve. The net effect of these changes—as illustrated by a simulated dispatch curve in ERCOT—is shown in Figure 5.5. www Infra-marginal rents are the differences between the market-clearing price and the submitted bid of each generator. Generators that bid less than the market-clearing price receive a payment equal to this difference.  112 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 5.5. Simulated ERCOT Dispatch Curves xxx   Changes in fuel costs and the supply mix have impacted market clearing prices, and thus lowered inframarginal rents for incumbent generators. Reductions in natural gas prices have clearly flattened the curve, reducing revenues for generation resources. The entry of new, near-zero marginal cost resources has also pushed the overall curve to the right. The entry of wind and solar resources is visible in lower left.  Natural Gas and Incumbent Baseload The frequency with which natural gas sets the price of electricity has increased in many of the Nation’s markets. For example, 2017 could mark the first time in PJM’s history that gas is marginal for more intervals than coal (see Figure 5.6). This transition means that infra-marginal rents that were previously based on the marginal cost of coal resources have been supplanted by the marginal cost of natural gas resources.                                                            xxx EIA, analysis performed for DOE using EIA and ABB Ventyx software to show estimated plantspecific estimated production costs for July 15 of each year modeled, using then-current delivered energy prices (in 2009 $) within ERCOT and estimated, plant-specific heat rates to estimate plant-specific marginal costs of electricity production, June 2017 113 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Figure 5.6. Type of Fuel Used in PJM (by Real-Time Marginal Units): 2004 through March 2017 388 Natural gas is rising as the marginal electricity generation source in PJM. The low price of natural gas has resulted in the competitive displacement of coal in many of the Nation’s markets. This trend is visible in Figure 5.7 by comparing the 2005 curve to the 2015 version. The interspersed nature of the coal and gas generators in the 2015 curve reflects that the two now compete for the same runtime. While gas had been a mid-merit source in previous years, it has become more of a baseload resource in recent years. The phenomenon is visible on a national level by examining the capacity factors of the respective technologies. Figure 5.7. Annual Average Capacity Factors of Coal and Natural Gas Generators 114 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy NGCC generators have seen a steady increase in fleet average capacity factor from 35% in 2005 to 56% in 2015; in that year, the NGCC fleet average eclipsed that of coal generators, which has declined from approximately 68% in 2010 to 55% in 2015. 389 Negative Pricing Negative pricing events in electricity markets reflect a complex set of economic, reliability, environmental, and safety variables. The interaction of these variables differs depending on the region, season, and time in question, but negative pricing often reflects some combination of excess generation (often exacerbated by must-run requirements), transmission constraints, and economic factors.  According to analysis from LBNL, negative pricing events have historically been rare at many major pricing hubs (less than two percent of total hours in real-time markets in 2016), and have had almost no impact on annual average day-ahead or real-time wholesale electricity prices. However, more frequent negative pricing has been observed in CAISO, and in constrained hubs that feature a relatively large amount of VRE and/or nuclear generation. 390 In addition, PJM has observed that “prices go negative at nuclear units buses in approximately 2,176 hours – representing 14 percent of off-peak hours.” 391  The term economic factors in this case serves as a catchall for those negative pricing events that are not the direct result of must-run requirements. EIA provides examples of why generators might choose to run, even if it means accepting negative prices: Technical and economic factors may drive power plant operators to run generators even when power supply outstrips demand. For example: For technical and cost recovery reasons, nuclear plant operators try to continuously operate at full power. Eligible generators can take a 2.2¢/kWh or $22/MWh [yyy] production tax credit (PTC) on electricity sold. This means that some generators may be willing to sell their output for as low as -$22/MWh to continue producing power. Typically, wind generators are the largest such group in any region. There are maintenance and fuel-cost penalties when operators shut down and start up large steam turbine (usually fossil-fueled) plants as demand varies over a day or a week. These costs may be avoided if the generator sells at a loss to attract a buyer when ACC 000082 demand is low. 392 As EIA notes, the PTC can create an incentive for wind generators to bid at negative prices. If other generators located at nodes in the areas affected by negative prices are unable or unwilling to reduce output, they will have to pay the negative price for their output. That scenario has unfolded on some buses in PJM, as outlined in comments to DOE from PJM staff: Tax and subsidy policies have had an impact on the economics of certain types of generation. The Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit and renewable energy mandates have had the most significant impact on nuclear generation. Specifically, the nuclear and wind generation are competing to clear in the market during off-peak hours when wind resources are the strongest and load is reduced. In those off-peak hours, the production tax credit has created an incentive for renewable resources to bid negative prices as they must run in order to receive their payment from the federal treasury. Since 2014, PJM has seen prices go negative at nuclear unit buses in approximately 2,176 hours— representing 14 percent of off-peak hours. 393 [footnotes omitted from original text] yyy While the PTC value was $23/MWh in 2016, this figure was based upon EIA’s interpretation of the PTC benefit at the time. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php? id=8870 115 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ERCOT’s market monitor identified 130 negative-priced hours for the entire system in 2016, an increase from 50 hours in 2015. 394 Negative prices in ERCOT are now on the rise due to subsidized wind, as noted by William Hogan and Susan Pope in a recent study filed with the PUC of Texas by Calpine and NRG: Prior to the increase in wind and other intermittent capacity in the ISOs, negative prices sometimes occurred in the middle of the night, as load dropped and generators needed for operation the following day were pinned at their minimum loads. In contrast, the increasing incidence of negative prices in ERCOT is caused by the incentive of the owners of wind generation capacity receiving the PTC to continue to produce even when the locational price is negative. 395 In addition to the PTC, VRE may also be incentivized to submit negative bids into markets by demand for RECs (to satisfy state environmental mandates and/or corporate sustainability goals).  Conventional generators also face economic factors that lead them to submit negative bids. Existing nuclear plants in the United States, as well as some fossil units, may bid in during these periods to avoid costly start-ups and shutdowns. 396 For example, steam turbine plants may choose not to cut back their production if they are not designed to cycle economically.  Operational attributes can also create or exacerbate negative prices. For example, hydroelectric plants are limited in their ability to curtail output because of environmental and safety reasons. Flood control and wildlife regulations are two important reasons this can take place. As this winter’s record precipitation gave way to snowmelt this spring, CAISO found itself with an abundance of un-curtailed hydroelectricity that competed with solar generation. 397 A similar dynamic played out in 2011 following significant precipitation in the Pacific Northwest, as shown in Figure 5.8. zzz zzz In Figure 5.8, Off-peak is 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. on Monday through Saturday and all hours on Sunday. Mid C is Mid-Columbia, COB is California-Oregon Border, and NOB is Nevada-Oregon Border.  116 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Figure 5.8. Negative Northwest Off-Peak Daily Spot Prices ($/MWh) in 2011 398  5.3.3 State Actions Impacting Wholesale Markets There is growing concern about the impact of state government intervention in wholesale markets, such as the creation of ZEC programs to keep nuclear plants in operation, as well as RPS and other state policy requirements.  This concern was reflected in comments at the May 1–2, 2017 FERC Technical Conference on state policies in the three eastern wholesale markets: aaaa [Roy Shanker, independent consultant]: It is difficult to identify any element in the wholesale electric market (energy, capacity, ancillary services and transmission) that is not being directly and materially impacted by discriminatory mandates driven by state policy actions. Price taking energy and capacity offers linked to these mandates directly impact price formation. The intermittent nature of virtually all RPS resources requires material modification of dispatch and significant increases in flexible resources and associated ancillary services. 399 [William Hogan, Harvard University]: The increasing impact of Federal and state policies to support particular technologies, raises questions about the viability of wholesale power markets. 400 [Susan Tierney, Analysis Group]: These state policies can and often do affect the price of electricity in wholesale power markets, and the entry, exit and cost of operations of electric generating resources…there is no reason to expect that state decision makers will make  aaaa The full transcript of (and all written statements from) this technical conference is available on FERC’s website. FERC Technical Conference, “Docket No. AD17-11-000”, May 1-2, 2017. 117 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy determinations that singularly focus on economic efficiency and the continued viability of wholesale capacity-market designs ahead of other all objectives… Already, we see that in a market that depends upon the flow of private capital and diversity in the asset mix, some suppliers of capacity resources (including demand-response and nuclear generation) have recently decided that the markets are not producing financial outcomes consistent with the requirements of private capital markets… I remain concerned that the current centralized wholesale capacity markets in PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE will not be sustainable, from an economic, financial and political point of view and in light of states’ policies and preferences. 401 [Cliff Hamel, Navigant Consulting]: [P]roblems in the current centralized [capacity] market approach are fundamental. 402 [Samuel Newell, The Brattle Group]: The centralized wholesale markets do not, however, and should not be expected to meet goals they were not designed to meet. Many states now have far-reaching carbon and clean energy goals. Yet today’s centralized energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets are mostly not designed to differentiate generation resources based on their unpriced carbon emissions or other unpriced attributes. 403  [Lawrence Makovich, IHS Markit]: In summary, out-of-market interventions cause predictable distortions and consequences, including: 1. Reduced market-based cash flows for non-peaking generating resources, causing lower investment in electric generating production efficiency. 2. Uneconomic displacement of lower cost energy production causing a shift toward a less costeffective fuel and technology mix and resulting in higher overall average electricity supply costs. 3. Less supply diversity causing more generation production cost and availability risk. 4. Premature retirements of low CO2 emitting resources, causing replacement with higher CO2 emitting resources that subvert market intervention policy goals. 404 While this panel of economists commented on these effects on the wholesale markets resulting from state policies, members of a panel of state officials at the same FERC Technical Conference clearly said their states will continue to pursue their policies: [Jeffrey Bentz, New England States Committee on Electricity]: States aren't interested in having markets just for the sake of having markets… 405 [Angela O’Connor, Department of Public Utilities of Massachusetts] […] what the legislature requires us to do we have to do… 406 [Sarah Hofman, Vermont Public Service Board]: […] we cannot tell what our legislators [what to] do. And so they are going to have policies and it doesn't matter what anybody here or any place else says, they will have policies that set the stage for what the state wants and that's what legislators are for.[…] there is no question that state lawmakers will continue passing legislation that sets public policy. It is now our challenge to continue to work together to find effective ways to carry out those policies while also continuing to benefit from competitive wholesale markets. 407 Tony Clark recently expressed similar views on the original policy assumptions behind the creation of centrally-organized wholesale markets: Affordable power was the goal. The current markets are still procuring affordable power but many state public policy makers no longer see that as the only goal. It is little wonder we hear some decry that the markets are not delivering what people want. It is because they were never designed for job creation, tax preservation, politically popular generation, or  118 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy anything other than reliable, affordable electricity. To the degree policy makers and elected officials have moved the goal posts, it is time to consider rational pathways forward. 408 5.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets Looking Forward Changes in the centrally-organized markets must catch up to the broad technology-driven and policydriven electricity market dynamics identified in the April 14 memo. Overall, centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets are effective at driving energy prices toward suppliers’ short-run marginal costs. However, the revenue insufficiency problem has become more pronounced in recent years.  Generator profitability could become a public policy concern if so much generation is financially challenged that the reliability or resilience of the BPS become threatened.  New market structures may be necessary to reflect these market dynamics, particularly in an industry in which suppliers with high fixed capital costs and relatively low marginal costs often struggle to recover their long-run average costs.  In addition, while markets as currently designed do not explicitly recognize or compensate system resilience, RTO/ISOs are considering ways to better support system resilience objectives in the same way that they explicitly recognized and administratively incorporated reliability standards into dispatch practices in the past. For example, the variety of problems that arose during the Polar Vortex (as discussed in Section 4) caused PJM and ISO-NE to change their capacity market rules to ensure generator performance during scarcity conditions. 409 410 In summary, the debates surrounding wholesale markets are complex ACC 000083 and multifaceted, but the institutions and the grid itself have historically proven flexible, strong, and able to adapt. Questions about revenue sufficiency and resilience must be addressed quickly, before the fast-moving evolution of our power system outpaces our ability to understand and manage it responsibly. 119 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy 6 Affordability The April 14 memo asked whether the loss of coal, natural gas, nuclear, and hydroelectric baseload power is making the grid less affordable. There is no widely accepted metric for an “affordable” grid or an “affordable” electricity bill. DOE’s GMI defines affordability as “maintain[ing] reasonable costs to customers.” 411 Typically, the meaning of “affordable” is contextual, i.e. dependent on the size of a consumer’s household budget. This indicator of energy affordability can be represented as energy burden, which is a household’s annual spending on energy as a percentage of its gross annual income. 412 413 Because electricity is an important energy service, it can be broken out as “electricity burden.” bbbb In 2011, the median electricity burden for all households was four percent, but it averaged 8.3 percent for low-income households and 2.9 percent for non-low-income households. 414 415 416 For low-income families, more spending on energy bills translates into less spending on other expenses, such as food, health care, and education. 417 The limited increases in electricity rates suggest that electricity bills have not become less affordable for most customers. However, changes in cost allocation and rate designs could have disparate effects on bills for different groups of customers.  For example, utilities raising fixed charges to counterbalance decreases in revenues from energy efficiency gains could disproportionately impact low-consumption customers, for whom fixed charges comprise a larger portion of the bill. Customers on fixed incomes and those who rely on electricityintensive medical devices may have an acute need to maintain affordability. 418 Most states and utilities offer programs like concessionary rates for these customers, and ensuring affordability options for vulnerable customers remains a priority as electricity stakeholders explore market, regulatory, and rate reforms to accommodate an evolving grid. Low electricity prices can also boost businesses’ competitiveness and bring new economic activity to an area, as evidenced by companies locating electricity-intensive industrial facilities, such as server farms, to regions with low, stable electricity prices. 419 420 421 422 Today, many businesses are more actively managing their energy costs by investing heavily in energy efficiency, energy management systems, solar PV installations, and direct PPAs with VRE providers. 423 Industrial electricity prices are typically close to wholesale prices because providing electricity to high-voltage, high-use industrial customers is less expensive and more efficient than serving distribution-level customers. 424 Thus, low wholesale electricity prices can allow businesses and industrial customers to thrive, support job growth, and drive economic development. 425  6.1 Affordability of Generation Portfolios The affordability of a given generation portfolio is largely shaped by region- and state- specific market structures. Merchant investment decisions (where applicable) and regional resource availability (for example, NGCC has a lower levelized cost of electricity (LCOE, the per-MWh cost of building and operating assets over their lifetime) in the Gulf States where gas is abundant than it has in the North bbbb However, this is complicated by the fact that electricity usage varies significantly from region to region, so the electricity burden would be much higher in regions that use electricity for heating and cooling, as is common in the West and South. In addition to electricity, energy burden includes direct fuel use, such as natural gas or propane for cooking and heating, and can vary based on a household’s activities, appliances, and location.   120 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Central states) contribute to regional variation in charges to end-users. 426 The Energy Information Administration estimated in the Annual Energy Outlook for 2017 that the BPS (generation and transmission) comprises roughly two-thirds of the total average price of electricity. Generation costs accounted for 57 percent of the average price of electricity in 2016, compared to distribution’s 32 percent and transmission’s 11 percent. 427 In vertically integrated areas, state PUCs seek to avoid uneconomic outcomes and ensure affordable service to customers 428 by requiring VIEUs to submit IRPs in which they consider least-cost, long-term plans for providing service including, among other things, LCOE. 429 The IRP must also account for any additional state-mandated requirements such as energy efficiency resource standards or RPS. 430 Notably, VIEU assets are usually guaranteed the recovery of investment and operational costs regardless of whether they would prove to be cost-competitive in a short-run marginal cost market environment. 431 432  By contrast, in some of the centrally-organized markets (e.g., most of the states in PJM, ERCOT, all but two in ISO-NE, NYISO, and Illinois for MISO), the generation portfolio is determined by the wholesale market itself (subject to any generation and demand-side mandates) rather than a state-overseen IRP by the VIEU. cccc Merchant generators make investment decisions by comparing an asset’s expected lifetime costs with the expected revenues from any PPAs, financial incentives such as tax credits, and sales in wholesale energy and capacity markets. Lifetime costs considered by merchant generators include fixed investment costs and operational costs.  6.2 The Wholesale-Retail Disconnect Tracing the relationships between wholesale and retail prices is difficult because ratemaking practices vary widely from state to state, and there are many other contributing factors involved besides the wholesale cost of electricity. 433 434 Retail rates include a variety of charges that are not included in the bulk electricity charges passed through by RTO/ISOs or VIEUs. These include components of the transmission costs not captured in the RTO prices (such as state-regulated transmission investments), payments that the distribution utility makes to merchant transmission suppliers, various fixed charges, customer service, state and local sales taxes and franchise fees, and public benefits charges. 435  Retail electricity bills can also include additional costs to support state policy goals—such as RPS, energy efficiency resource standards, or programs to promote use of distributed energy resources, among others. 436 Most utilities have undertaken substantial programs to modernize their distribution systems, and a significant subset have invested in infrastructure needed to integrate higher levels of distributed energy resources. 437 Under established cost-of-service ratemaking principles, these costs are typically allocated to retail customers and periodically examined by regulators. The wholesale-retail electricity price disconnect means that, in most areas, the conventional generation retirements can affect wholesale rates but have little or no immediately visible impact on retail rates.                                                            cccc Many state, regional, and Federal policies can impact the expected profits for merchant generators, including environmental regulations; carbon trading programs; tax credits; and state procurements, mandates, or other mechanisms that take generation or demand-side resources out of markets available to merchants and/or subsidize those resources. 121 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy However, despite the difficulty in attributing retail price impacts to wholesale changes, considering the trends in both wholesale and retail prices can provide greater understanding of affordability.  On average, national retail electricity rates have been roughly flat for more than a decade, and rates have closely followed the historical average since 1960. dddd 438 Retail rates in nominal dollars have been increasing at a low annual rate for approximately two decades, while the real retail price has stayed relatively constant over the last decade, as shown in Figure 6.1. From 2011 to 2016, nominal residential prices increased at an average of 1.9 percent annually, about the same rate as overall inflation. 439 In 2016, the national average retail electricity price declined for the first time since 2002, with residential customers paying a national average of 12 55 cents/kWh.  Figure 6.1. Average U.S. Residential Sector Retail Electricity Prices over Time 440 dddd The use of national averages for this analysis provides a broad picture, but limits insight into regional and state-level impacts of BPS changes that may lead to higher-than-average retail rate increases among some customers and utilities. National averages mean little to subsets of ratepayers seeing significant retail rate increases or those who have faced consistently high bills. Even use of state-level retail averages can mask exceptions that greatly vary from the average. For example, California residents who live near the coast enjoy a temperate climate with limited need for cooling or heating. In contrast, those living inland see very hot summers that require high use of air conditioning and thus see high electric bills. A more thorough analysis would consider affordability and rate increases at a more granular level.  122 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Average retail prices vary widely across states and regions, with New England, California and the MidAtlantic paying the highest rates. 441 However, a comparison of electricity rates alone can be misleading; for instance, California’s average residential electricity rate is over 18 cents/kWh (one of the highest in the Nation), but due to low average residential consumption, the average California electricity bill is only $95/month, ranking it in the bottom third of the Nation. By comparison, Washington state has the lowest average retail rates in the Nation at less than nine cents/kWh (less than half the average rate in California), but because of higher consumption, residential customers in that state see average bills of $95/month, the same average electricity bill as in California. 442 443 It is not yet clear what impact recent coal, nuclear, and natural gas plant retirements will have on customer bills in the future, nor how the continuing trend of retirements will affect the overall cost of the BPS, which will ultimately be borne by ratepayers. Natural gas generation has proven ACC 000084 to be a strong competitor with coal and nuclear power because natural gas prices have fallen over the past decade. Wind and solar generation have also increased, and while their capital costs are much higher than those of natural gas (particularly if normalized by capacity factor), their marginal cost is nearly zero. 444 Changes in the BPS since 2002—lower demand, lower natural gas prices, and growth in VRE—have reduced wholesale electricity prices, as shown in Figure 6.2. 445  Figure 6.2. Average Wholesale Electric Costs/MWh Have Fallen between 2002 and 2016 446  From 2002–2016, wholesale electricity prices have increasingly tracked natural gas prices, and as natural gas generation has increased over time, the differences in price between regions have also decreased (e.g., prices in NYISO and PJM are much closer in 2016 than in 2004).    Figure 6 3 illustrates wholesale prices at electricity trading hubs, emphasizing 2016 prices on a regional basis as derived by FERC staff. eeee FERC notes in its 2016 State of the Markets report that prices were down in 2016 from 2015, and that prices in PJM were the lowest they have been since the RTO formed in 1999. 447                                                            eeee Derived by FERC staff from S&P Global Intelligence data. Prices are a simple average of day-ahead, onpeak physical prices. 123 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy Figure 6.3. Day-Ahead, On-Peak Wholesale Electric Prices Reach Near-Record Lows in 2016 448 FERC’s most recent State of the Markets report shows that all areas of the United States are experiencing low wholesale electricity prices. In 2016, prices were highest in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest and were lowest in the Northwest. Historically, wholesale prices would show much more regional variation. The dollar values are average 2016 day-ahead on peak prices; the percentages indicate the change from 2015 to 2016.  While wholesale electricity prices have tracked natural gas price trends, the impacts of other generation trends on affordability are less obvious. 449 Because coal, hydro, and nuclear plants have historically had relatively stable and predictable fuel costs, these power plants have provided a valuable hedge against the price volatility of natural gas and oil. Today, nuclear, hydro, and VRE all serve as hedges against generation whose fuel cost is more volatile and represents a larger portion of the total delivered price (i.e. natural gas and oil). For example, the variable operating, maintenance, and fuel costs of hydroelectric and nuclear average just $5/MWh and $12/MWh, respectively, compared to $41/MWh for NGCC and $34/MWh for coal. 450 Increasingly, VRE also performs a price stabilizing role—wind, solar PV, hydropower, and geothermal generation offer near zero-marginal-cost electricity. To the degree that VRE and nuclear can stabilize the short run cost of bulk power, those resources could also improve the month-to-month manageability of customer bills.  Among the nine regions examined in this study, the CAISO+, Midwest, ERCOT, and Central regions have the most non-hydro VRE generation today. RPS compliance costs were found to total $2.6 billion in  124 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy 2014, averaging $12/MWh for VRE and equating to 1.3 percent of average retail electricity bills. ffff 451 The actual effects of zero-marginal cost electricity on consumers’ bills is situational, and growth in VRE can drive additional costs, including transmission and integration costs. 452 453 Because many utility-scale VRE plants are built in locations distant from load centers, they sometimes require major transmission additions to connect the remote generation to the rest of the grid and to load centers. Over the past five years, a portion of the 24,000 miles of new transmission built (about twice the number of miles added from 2006–2010) and $102 billion invested to strengthen the grid and interconnect new generation has been made to interconnect VRE. 454 455 Transmission investments (regulated or merchant) can increase bulk power costs and therefore increase customers’ retail bills to the extent that they are not offset by savings attributable to access to lower-cost generation or reduced congestion costs.  Higher levels of VRE penetration also require system integration services, such as additional ERS. It is unclear how the costs of these integration requirements will affect wholesale electricity costs as VRE penetrations continue to increase. In addition, as the PTC for wind generation expires and the ITC for residential solar PV installations reduces in the coming years, their costs relative to other resources will rise. However, declining wind and solar capital costs and higher productivity will likely somewhat offset these losses, albeit to an unknown degree. 456 457 458 459 Finally, several states have created subsidies to favor or retain nuclear generation. If such subsidies are being funded by taxpayer dollars – like the PTC and ITC – rather than a charge to electricity customers, this will affect wholesale costs in some way, but will probably have little discernable effect on the customers’ retail electricity bills. However, if subsidies for power plant retention are funded as a direct charge to retail electricity customers, electricity bills could rise and affordability could decrease.  Overall, ISOs and RTOs face many challenges that ultimately affect the allocation of transmission and integration costs when they make decisions on how to spread those costs among cost-causers, reliability and other service providers, and consumers, as well as decisions on how to keep cost allocation practices up to date as the generation mix, transmission capacity, and load evolves over time. 460 461 462 463 6.3 Affordability Looking Forward There appears to be little near-term risk that natural gas prices will rise significantly and thereby reduce electricity affordability. However, natural gas is an extractive commodity traded internationally—prices are affected by policies impacting how the resource is produced, and prices show periodic regional, seasonal, or local price spikes, and even sustained price increases. It is reasonable to expect continuing regional differentials between natural gas delivered costs, reflecting differences in proximity to natural gas production fields, production costs, and deliverability (including the effects of pipeline or liquefied natural gas deliverability constraints). If natural gas prices rise, wholesale electricity costs are likely to rise in regions where natural gas remains the marginal fuel in a significant number of hours. This would be true for both RTO/ISO and non-RTO/ISO regions. It is unclear how rising natural gas prices and                                                            ffff Studies on RPS compliance costs do not fully capture the “all-in” costs that the ratepayer (and taxpayers) ultimately bear. These other costs are harder to measure, but may not be insignificant. They may be harder to quantify for many reasons, such as having multiple drivers behind those investments and various distribution-level grid modernization investments (e.g., smart meters and others that are touted to aid VRE integration). New transmission (other than the direct transmission interconnection charged to the renewable generation project and thus reflected in their PPA), as well as effects of VRE variability on the dispatchable fleet, are other examples of costs often not included in grid integration cost studies. Costs of various tax and other subsidies are also not counted. 125 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy additional VRE generation would affect the large-scale displacement of coal and nuclear generation, and ultimately, electricity affordability for affected consumers.  The variety of generation portfolios operating throughout the U.S. lends itself to further study. To date, limited work has focused on the affordability of the BPS as a system or portfolio—relatively more attention has focused on retail electricity prices 464 or the stand-alone cost of generation technologies (such as LCOE). Some research has focused on analysis of system-wide LCOE, 465 but more can be done. Looking forward, another potential challenge to affordability is determining how the proliferation of distributed PV across much of the Nation is changing the cost structure for non-participating customers. A growing body of research considers whether and how distributed PV users continue to benefit from their grid connection for balancing services and energy storage, as well as how to reallocate utility energy, capital, and system costs and rates fairly among all users. Concerns about more customers installing distributed PV under net metering tariffs, gggg which potentially shifts costs and increases the burden on non-distributed PV customers, have caused multiple states to re-open their net metering tariff processes and, in some cases, implement new policies. However, some studies have quantified the retail rate impacts of net metering to all residential customers (i.e., participants and non-participants) and found that current and projected levels of net metering have very little impact, especially compared to broader drivers of retail rate increases in the electric industry. 466   gggg According to the EIA, “net metering tariffs enable customers to use the electricity they generate in excess of their consumption at certain times to offset their use of electricity from the grid at other times. These tariffs are designed to encourage distributed renewable generation. These arrangements describe how an electric utility customer who installs a qualifying generator (typically a rooftop solar array, less often a small wind turbine, or a small combined heat-and-power system) will be compensated by their utility for the electricity they generate in excess of their consumption.” https://www eia gov/todayinenergy/detail php?id=6190  126 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy 7 Policy Recommendations The April 14 memo asked staff to “not only analyze problems but also provide concrete policy recommendations and solutions.” To that end, DOE staff prepared a list of recommendations below. Some actions fit squarely within DOE’s authority, while others might fall to other government agencies or private organizations.  Wholesale markets: FERC should expedite its efforts with states, RTO/ISOs, and other stakeholders to improve energy price formation in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets. After several years of fact finding and technical conferences, the record now supports energy price formation reform, such as the proposals laid out by PJM 467 and ACC 000085 others. 468 Further, negative offers should be mitigated to the broadest extent possible. Valuation of Essential Reliability Services (ERS): Where feasible and within its statutory authority, FERC should study and make recommendations regarding efforts to require valuation of new and existing ERS by creating fuel-neutral markets and/or regulatory mechanisms that compensate grid participants for services that are necessary to support reliable grid operations. Pricing mechanisms or regulations should be fuel and technology neutral and centered on the reliability services provided. DOE should provide technical and policy support that strengthen and accelerate these efforts.  Bulk Power System (BPS) resilience: DOE should support utility, grid operator, and consumer efforts to enhance system resilience. Transmission planning entities should conduct periodic disasterpreparedness exercises involving electric utilities, regional offices of Federal agencies, and state agencies. NERC should consider adding resilience components to its mission statement and develop a program to work with its member utilities to broaden their use of emerging ways to better incorporate resilience. RTOs and ISOs should further define criteria for resilience, identify how to include resilience in business practices, and examine resilience-related impacts of their resource mix. Promote Research and Development (R&D) of next-generation/21 st century grid reliability and resilience tools: DOE should focus R&D efforts to enhance utility, grid operator, and consumer efforts to enhance system reliability and resilience. DOE R&D opportunities include the following activities:   Develop grid technical tools to facilitate new-generation technologies’ operations to support BPS reliability (e.g., by enabling technologies to provide ERS), and maximize use of the DOE national laboratories. Expand cooperation on grid reliability across North America, including working with NERC to further enhance the reliability of our shared BPS through technical engagement with Mexico and Canada. With the National Science Foundation, sponsor the development of new open-source software for the next-generation electric grid research community. Focus R&D on improving VRE integration through grid modernization technologies that can increase grid operational flexibility and reliability through a variety of innovations in sensors and controls, storage technology, grid integration, and advanced power electronics. The Grid Modernization Initiative should also consider additional applications of high-performance computing for grid modeling to advance grid resilience. Support Federal and regional approaches to electricity workforce development and transition assistance: In partnership with other agencies and the private sector, DOE should facilitate programs 127 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy and regional approaches for electricity sector workforce development. Unemployed workers nearing but not yet eligible for retirement may have difficulty retraining after careers built on specialized skills that may be in declining demand. Where possible, Federal agencies should leverage existing government, nongovernment, labor, and industry workforce consortia.  Energy dominance: Executive Order 13783 (Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth) outlined an approach to promote the clean and safe development of energy resources while at the same time minimizing regulatory barriers to energy production, economic growth, and job creation. The Order called for a rescission of certain energy and climate related policies, rescinded specific reports, and ordered the review of key environmental regulations. While DOE is not the main agency tasked in the Order, it should continue to prioritize energy dominance and implementing the Executive Order broadly and quickly.  Infrastructure development: DOE and related Federal agencies should accelerate and reduce costs for the licensing, relicensing, and permitting of grid infrastructure such as nuclear, hydro, coal, advanced generation technologies, and transmission. DOE should review regulatory burdens for siting and permitting for generation and gas and electricity transmission infrastructure and should take actions to accelerate the process and reduce costs. Specific reforms could include the following: Hydropower: Encourage FERC to revisit the current licensing and relicensing process and minimize regulatory burden, particularly for small projects and pumped storage. Nuclear Power: Encourage the NRC to ensure the safety of existing and new nuclear facilities without unnecessarily adding to the operating costs and economic uncertainty of nuclear energy. Revisit nuclear safety rules under a risk-based approach. Coal Generation: Encourage EPA to allow coal-fired power plants to improve efficiency and reliability without triggering new regulatory approvals and associated costs. In a regulatory environment that would allow for improvement of the existing fleet, DOE should pursue a targeted R&D portfolio aiming at increasing efficiency. Electric-gas coordination: Utilities, states, FERC, and DOE should support increased coordination between the electric and natural gas industries to address potential reliability and resilience concerns associated with organizational and infrastructure differences. DOE and FERC should support wellfunctioning commodity markets for natural gas by expeditiously processing liquefied natural gas export and cross-border natural gas pipeline applications.128 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 8 Areas for Further Research DOE staff identified several research topics that are relevant to the April 14 memo and merit further indepth analysis. Some topics may be appropriate for offices within the Department, national laboratories, academia, other government agencies, or private organizations.  Market structure and pricing Study mechanisms for enabling equitable, value-based remuneration for desired grid attributes—such as ERS, fuel availability, high resilience, low emissions, flexibility, etc.—with alternative market and non-market structures. This research could assess potentially underrecognized contributions from baseload power plants, using fuel-neutral metrics and values relevant to analyze all resource options. Evaluate ongoing capacity market reforms. Several of the Nation’s electricity markets use mandatory capacity markets to procure capacity for future years and ensure resource adequacy. The design of these constructs has been the subject of near-constant debate within the RTO/ISOs and before FERC. After undergoing substantial changes from 2014–2015, capacity markets have come under new scrutiny in light of recent actions by restructured states to preserve or promote certain resources or resource types and to further state policy goals. Explore market operations in a higher VRE/low marginal cost system, and examine recent changes in energy price trends—including the drivers of wholesale electricity prices in the context of limited load growth—quantifying the relative contributions of fossil fuel prices. With significant amounts of near-zero marginal cost generation available, security-constrained economic dispatch of BPS based on marginal costs may not sufficiently compensate resources for all fixed and variable costs. Academic and other research should be expanded in this area, to include capacity market reforms and the role of capacity markets in a higher VRE/low marginal cost system. Reliability and resilience Develop policy metrics and tools for evaluating BPS-wide provision of resilience and considering all aspects of the electricity system that contribute to resilience, including regional generation characteristics, imports and exports, fuel supply and storage, transmission capability, DR, electricity storage, inertia, and other factors that determine the ability of grid operators to provide reliable electricity supplies. As PJM notes, “criteria for resilience are not explicitly defined or quantified today.” 469  Each RTO/ISO should strive to explicitly define resilience on its system and conduct resource diversity assessments to more fully understand the resilience of different resource portfolios. Federal, state, and local work to define and support system-wide resilience is also needed. EIA and NERC should examine ways to improve power generator fuel delivery data collection; additional data on fuel deliveries and potential disruptions would further improve forecasting necessary for electric reliability planning.129 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Cost and affordability Estimate the bulk power system-wide costs of different generation mixes, also considering the sensitivity of system costs to various fuel price fluctuations. Further, examine the relationship between wholesale and retail electricity rates to understand the present disconnect. On a regular basis, update the EIA analysis of subsidies and support for electricity production (most recently updated using FY 2013 data). 470 Regulatory Explore the potential for utilizing existing Federal authorities under the Federal Power Act and the DOE Organization Act, among others, to ensure system reliability and resilience. Explore costs and benefits of states applying cost-ofservice regulation to specific at-risk plants that contribute to grid resilience. In centrally-organized wholesale markets, these resources may sometimes be unable to recoup all costs of generating electricity—especially capital investments that are needed to ensure long-term viability.130 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Appendix A: National and Regional Profiles operational capacity) Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy U.S. National Profile Retirements, 2002-2017 Notes: Capacity values are summer capacity. Data for utility-scale resources only (1+ MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas technologies: CC = combined cycle, CT = combustion turbine, ST = steam turbine. Ownership type: VIEU = vertically integrated electric utility. Map includes 2017 Q1 actual and Q2-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas = Henry Hub, Coal = Central App., Electricity = PJM Western Hub. *Total % Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacity / (retired capacity + 2016 operational capacity) 2002-2016 100% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Retirements (GW) 20% 40% 60% 80% Capacity Mix 100% $0 $5 $10 $15 $20 0% 25 $ NG Coal Elec. Prices (real 2009$) $25 $250 $20 $200 $15 $150 $10 $100 $5 $50 coal/gas $/MMBtu electricity $/MWh 100% ACC 000086 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% Generation Mix 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 2002 2009 2016 Capacity Factors Coal Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Energy Sources Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 151 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Appendix B: VRE Integration Studies Numerous technical studies on electricity systems in most regions of the Nation have concluded that significantly higher levels of VRE can be successfully integrated without compromising resource adequacy. hhhh Demonstrating resource adequacy is essential, but achieving the modeled levels of VRE penetration requires a full consideration of “all-in” costs, land use, siting, and other environmental impacts; sustainable economics for non-wind and solar resources; for some studies, required changes at the distribution level; wholesale market design and organizational changes; spending on relevant transmission and distribution grid modernization activities; and ensuring all aspects of operational reliability. iiii These caveats are non-trivial, as they would be for any substantial major changes in the electric power system. Table B-1. VRE Integration Studies 471 Region VRE Pen. Author Study Year Study Title United States 50% NREL 2012 Renewable Electricity Futures Study Western Interconnection 33% NREL 2013 Western Wind and Solar Integration Study: Phase 2 33% GE Energy 2014 Western Wind and Solar Integration Study Phase 3 – Frequency Response and Transient Stability 33% GE Energy 2015 Western Wind and Solar Integration Study Phase 3A: Low Levels of Synchronous Generation 35% E3 and NREL 2015 Western Interconnection Flexibility Assessment 52% NREL 2015 Renewable Electricity Futures: Operational Analysis of the Western Interconnection at Very High Renewable Penetrations CAISO 12% CAISO 2010 Integration of Renewable Resources at 20% RPS 50% # GE Energy 2011 California ISO Frequency Response Study 37% E3 2014 Investigating a Higher Renewables Portfolio Standard in California hhhh However, these studies (particularly those examining high VRE levels) may often assume (or ignore) modeled conditions that could be difficult and/or costly to achieve in practice, such as a large transmission buildout that may face siting or other obstacles, ability of non-wind and solar plants to remain financially viable and thus available, institutional changes, or, for one study, synchronization of all three interconnections. iiii Operational reliability (which includes ensuring a set of ERS are maintained to help the electric system react to sudden stability disruptions or unanticipated losses of system components in real-time) is just as important as the resource adequacy aspect of BPS reliability. But modeling all needed aspects of operational reliability is very difficult computationally, and so not usually examined in its totality in these studies. For example, NREL in its Renewable Electricity Futures Study states, “The study did not conduct a full reliability analysis, which would include sub-hourly, stability, and AC power flow analysis.” In fact, page xviii of that study qualitatively concludes “Additional challenges to power system planning and operation would arise in a high renewable electricity future, including management of low-demand periods.” http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52409-1.pdf   152 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 45% NREL 2016 Low-Carbon Grid Study West 35% GE Energy 2010 Western Wind and Solar Integration Study: Phase 1 17% LBNL, ANL, NREL 2013 Integrating Solar PV in Utility System Operations 30% Xcel Energy 2011 Wind Induced Coal Plant Cycling Costs and the Implications of Wind Curtailment for Public Service of Colorado 18% * Navigant, Sandia, PNNL 2011 Large-Scale Solar Integration Study 17% Idaho Power 2014 Solar Integration Study Report 9% Portland General Electric 2014 2013 Integrated Resource Plan: Appendix D PGE Wind Integration Study Phase 4 47% * PacifiCorp 2017 2017 Integrated Resource Plan ERCOT 17% GE Energy 2008 Analysis of Wind Generation Impact on ERCOT Ancillary Services Requirements 47% Brattle 2013 Exploring Natural Gas and Renewables in ERCOT Part II: Future Generation Scenarios for Texas Eastern Interconnection 30% EnerNex 2011 Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study 25% # GE Energy 2013 Eastern Frequency Response Study 30% NREL 2016 Eastern Renewable Generation Integration Study Central 40% EnerNex et al. 2010 Nebraska Statewide Wind Integration Study 40% Charles River Associates 2010  SPP WITF Wind Integration Study 60% # SPP 2016 2016 Wind Integration Study Central and Southeast 20% EPRI and LCG 2011 DOE: Integrating Midwest Wind Energy into Southeast Electricity Markets Southeast 7% PNNL 2014 Duke Energy Photovoltaic Integration Study: Carolinas Service Areas Mid-Atlantic 30% GE Energy 2014 PJM Renewable Integration Study 21% Navigant 2016 Virginia Solar Pathways Project: Study 2 Solar PV Generation System Integration Impacts Midwest 50% GE Energy 2014 Minnesota Renewable Energy Integration and Transmission Study 37% * Northern States Power 2015 2015 Resource Plan: Appendix E – Renewable Energy New York 12% NYISO 2010 Growing Wind: Final Report of the NYISO 2010 Wind Generation Study 15% NYISO 2016 Solar Impact on Grid Operations-An Initial Assessment New England 24% GE Energy 2010 New England Wind Integration Study 153 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Hawaii 20% NREL and GE Energy 2013 Hawaii Solar Integration Study Notes: VRE penetration listed as percentage of annual energy (i.e. MWH, not MW), except where marked (# indicates instantaneous penetration, *  indicates VRE nameplate as percentage of peak load); VRE includes only wind and solar.   154 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Appendix C: Power Plant Cycling Traditional baseload power plants were designed to operate primarily at constant output levels with limited cycling. 472 As the electricity system continues to evolve and market conditions change, these plants are increasingly following load or being required to more frequently adjust the load and the on/off dispatch of their units. The extra costs incurred to do so can affect a plant’s retirement decision. Every time a power plant is turned off and on, the boiler, steam lines, turbine, and auxiliary components go through unavoidably large thermal and pressure stresses, which cause damage. 473 This damage is made worse for hightemperature components by the phenomenon called creep-fatigue interaction. While cycling-related increases in failure rates may not be noted immediately, critical components will eventually start to fail. Shorter component life expectancies will result in higher plant equivalent forced outage rates jjjj and/or higher capital and maintenance costs to replace components at or near the end of their service lives. 474 In addition, it may result in shortened overall plant life. How soon these detrimental effects will occur depends on the amount of creep damage present and the specific types and frequency of the cycling. Several VRE integration studies, including those performed by NREL and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council, have recognized that high penetration of VRE into the wholesale electricity markets could increase cycling of conventional power plants. 475 Today, coal unit cycling does occur with current levels of wind and solar. kkkk 476 477 478 The retirement of many of the older, smaller coal-fired units that have provided cycling operation in the past will require more flexibility in the remaining coal fleet through improved technologies. 479 General Electric has also studied the effects of cycling on power plant maintenance and operations and observes the following: Wear-and-tear cycling costs can increase with the changing power portfolio or fuel prices. These costs are generator-specific. They can impact financial viability of generators. Incorporating cycling costs into commitment and dispatch decisions can change these decisions. Solar and wind generation resources have different impacts on cycling. Operational and/or physical changes to coal/gas plants can increase flexibility. Retrofits have the potential to increase overall profitability. 480 The cycling issues described above have similar impacts on gas-fired steam and older, combined-cycle generators. Some coal and NGCC units can (and have) made capital investments to improve their cycling performance to remain competitive. 481 jjjj NERC defines equivalent forced outage rates as “the probability that a unit will not meet its demand periods for generating requirements because of forced outages or deratings.”  http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/Pages/SummerVsWinterEFORdRates.aspx  kkkk “Existing thermal generation plants are being forced to cycle more with the addition of intermittent wind generation and low variable cost base-load generation.” http://www.energy-tech.com/ram/article_65131bb2- ACC 000087 42d0-11e6-8c80e729cc172758.html   155 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability  U.S. Department of Energy Existing U.S. nuclear power plants were designed with a similar goal of operations at a set generation output, and—with few exceptions—they were not designed with flexible operation modes. Fuel is loaded in 18-month or 24-month cycles, thus keeping the marginal cost of operation low. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission prohibits nuclear power plant control systems from interfacing or being automatically controlled from grid network control systems, 482 so what limited load following is allowed must be scheduled from one to three days in advance and is in small increments of power output. 483    Nuclear units receive no benefit to load following or ramping, as they do not save on fuel costs. Like fossil plants, ramping a nuclear plant will also result in more wear and tear due to thermal gradients and mechanical stresses and will likely increase capital expenditures. Less restrictive, but still carefully controlled, nuclear load following is permitted and utilized in other countries, such as France, for which nuclear has a higher percentage of electricity output on the system.  A review of the literature about coal plant cycling by Argonne National Laboratory 484 reports that coal plant heat rates increase with plant age, while plant availability decreases. Cycling and load following exacerbate the effects of plant aging and reduce component life. 485 These operational patterns impose higher costs (including maintenance and fuel costs), as well as lower capacity factors (Figure 8.1). llll  Figure 8.1. Average Three-Year Capacity Factors for Retired U.S. Coal Plants 486 Plants that have retired since 2010 tended to have lower average capacity factors.  llll A lower capacity factor means fixed costs are spread over fewer operating hours (i e. megawatt-hours), which in turn means higher unit costs ($/megawatt-hour). 156 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Endnotes 1 “Frequently Asked Questions: How Many Power Plants Are There in the United States?,” Energy Information Administration,  accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=65&t=2, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf.  2 Ellen Flynn Giles and Kathy L. Brown, eds., 2015 UDI Directory of Electric Power Producers and Distributors: 123rd Edition of the Electrical World Directory (New York, NY: Platts, 2014), vi–vii, https://www.platts.com/im.platts.content/downloads/udi/eppd/eppddir.pdf, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20ReviewSecond%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 3 Julia Pyper, “The US Solar Market Is Now 1 Million Installations Strong,” Greentech Media, April 21, 2016, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-U.S.-Solar-Market-Now-One-Million-Installations-Strong, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20ReviewSecond%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 4 “Electric Substations,” Platts, generated March 6, 2009, http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/ProductsServices/Products/gismetadata/substatn.pdf quoted Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 5 Ellen Flynn Giles and Kathy L. Brown, eds., 2015 UDI Directory of Electric Power Producers and Distributors: 123rd Edition of the Electrical World Directory (New York, NY: Platts, 2014), vi–vii, https://www.platts.com/im.platts.content/downloads/udi/eppd/eppddir.pdf, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20ReviewSecond%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 6 Ellen Flynn Giles and Kathy L. 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Accessed August, 2017. https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/the-u-s-electric-grids-cost-in-2-charts/ 466 Galen Barbose, Putting the Potential Rate Impacts of Distributed Solar into Context (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Energy Analysis and Impacts Division, January 2017), LBNL1007060, https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lbnl-1007060.pdf. 467 PJM Interconnection, Energy Price Formation and Valuing Flexibility (PJM Interconnection, June 2017), http://www.pjm com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170615-energy-market-price-formation.ashx. 468 Midcontinent Independent System Operator Energy, “Extended Locational Marginal Pricing (ELMP),” November 2011, https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/Strategic%20Initiatives/ELMP%20FAQs.pdf. 469 PJM Interconnection, PJM’s Evolving Resource Mix and System Reliability (PJM Interconnection, March 2017), 6, http://www.pjm com/~/media/library/reportsnotices/special-reports/20170330-pjms-evolving-resource-mix-and-systemreliability.ashx. 470 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington, DC: EIA, March 2015), xix, ACC 000099 https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 471 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, internal analysis for the Department of Energy, June 2017. 472 N. Kumar, P. Besuner, S. Lefton, D. Agan, and D. Hilleman, Power Plant Cycling Costs (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, April 2012), iv, http://www nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55433.pdf. 473 The National Coal Council, Reliable & Resilient, The Value of Our Existing Coal Fleet: An Assessment of Measures to Improve Reliability and Efficiency While Reducing Emissions (Washington, DC: National Coal Council, May 2014), 3, http://www.nationalcoalcouncil.org/reports/1407/NCCValueExistingCoalFleet.pdf. 474 N. Kumar, P. Besuner, S. Lefton, D. Agan, and D. Hilleman, Power Plant Cycling Costs (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, April 2012), iv, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55433.pdf. 475 N. Kumar, P. Besuner, S. Lefton, D. Agan, and D. Hilleman, Power Plant Cycling Costs (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, April 2012), iv, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55433.pdf. 476 Steven A. Lefton and Douglas Hilleman, “Make Your Plant Ready for Cycling Operations,” Power Magazine, August 1, 2011, http://www.powermag.com/make-your-plant-readyfor-cycling-operations/. 477 Nikhil Kumar, “Should You Care about Power Plant Cycling?,” Intertek (blog), http://www.intertek.com/blog/2012-1226power-plant-cycling/. 478 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Fossil Fleet Transition with Fuel Changes and Large Scale Variable Renewable Integration (Palo Alto, CA: EPRI, March 2015), https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002006517/. 479 The National Coal Council, Reliable & Resilient, The Value of Our Existing Coal Fleet: An Assessment of Measures to Improve Reliability and Efficiency While Reducing Emissions (Washington, DC: National Coal Council, May 2014), 3, http://www.nationalcoalcouncil.org/reports/1407/NCCValueExistingCoalFleet.pdf.  480 Debra Lew, “Coal/Gas Plant Cycling: Costs, Causes, Impacts” (presented at Harvard Electricity Policy Group, March 11, 2016), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2016/March%202016/Lew%20Presentation.pdf. 481 NREL, “Power Plant Cycling Costs”, April 2012, Accessed August 2017, https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55433.pdf 482 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, input to Department of Energy request for information, “Addressing Policy and Logistical Challenges to Smart Grid Implementation,” 75 Fed. Reg. 180,57006–57011 (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-09-17/html/2010-23251.htm.  483 D. T. Ingersoll, C. Colbert, Z. Houghton, R. Snuggerud, J. W. Gaston, and M. Empey, “Integrating Nuclear and Renewables,” Nuclear Engineering International Magazine, February 1, 2016, http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureintegratingnuclear-and-renewables-4795860/. 181 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy 484 Dave Schmalzer, An Analysis of the Power Plant Cycling Phenomena, May 29, 2017 draft (Argonne National Laboratory, forthcoming). 485 Revis James, Stephen Hesler, and John Bistline, Fossil Fleet Transition with Fuel Changes and Large Scale Variable Renewable Integration (Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute, September 2015), DOE-EPRI-OE0000614, 4-38–4-39, https://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/1224949. 486 Energy Information Administration (EIA): "Monthly Update to Annual Electric Generator Report," March 2017, https://www eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/; and internal analysis, June 2017 ACC 000100 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Doug Little Christopher Kempley DOE Grid Study Thursday, August 24, 2017 1:48:51 PM Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability 0.pdf Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission ACC 000101 Staff Report to the Secretary on Electricity Markets and Reliability August 2017 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000102 Table of Contents Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................ List of Figures...................................................................................................................................... List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1 2 Findings of This Study ............................................................................................................... 10 3 Power Plant Retirements .......................................................................................................... 15 3.1 Coal Plant Retirements ............................................................................................................... 20 3.2 Natural Gas Plant Retirements ................................................................................................... 24 3.3 Nuclear Plant Retirements .......................................................................................................... 27 3.4 Hydropower Retirements and Repowering ................................................................................ 34 3.5 Falling Natural Gas Prices............................................................................................................ 35 3.6 Environmental Regulations ......................................................................................................... 39 3.7 Growing VRE Deployment........................................................................................................... 47 3.8 Flattening Electricity Demand ..................................................................................................... 54 3.9 Power Plant Retirements Looking Forward ................................................................................ 57 4 Reliability and Resilience .......................................................................................................... 61 4.1 Assessing Challenges to Reliability.............................................................................................. 63 4.2 Diversity, Fuel Assurance, and Onsite Storage ........................................................................... 89 4.3 High-Risk Events and System Resilience ..................................................................................... 97 4.4 Enhancing Reliability and Resilience ........................................................................................... 99 4.5 Reliability and Resilience Looking Forward............................................................................... 100 5 Wholesale Electricity Markets ................................................................................................. 102 5.1 Evolution of U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets ....................................................................... 102 5.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets Today ........................................................................................ 104 5.3 Challenges in Wholesale Electricity Markets ............................................................................ 107 5.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets Looking Forward ...................................................................... 118 6 Affordability ........................................................................................................................... 119 6.1 Affordability of Generation Portfolios ...................................................................................... 119 6.2 The Wholesale-Retail Disconnect ............................................................................................. 120 6.3 Affordability Looking Forward .................................................................................................. 124 7 Policy Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 126 8 Areas for Further Research ..................................................................................................... 128 Appendix A: National and Regional Profiles ................................................................................... 130 Appendix B: VRE Integration Studies .............................................................................................. 151 Appendix C: Power Plant Cycling ................................................................................................... 154 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000103 List of Figures Figure 1.1. Regions Used in This Study ......................................................................................................... 4 Figure 1.2. Schematic of Typical Daily Load Curve Showing Base Load ........................................................ 6 Figure 3.1. Location of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and All Other Retirements, 2002–2016, ................... 15 Figure 3.2. Net Generation Capacity Additions and Retirements............................................................... 16 Figure 3.3. Retirements of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and Other Generating Units, 2002–2022 ............ 18 Figure 3.4. Retirements by Date, Location, Ownership, and Capacity ....................................................... 18 Figure 3.5. Operating Generation Capacity, Additions, Retirements, and Announced Retirements by Region for All Generation Types, January 2002–December 2022 .............................................................. 20 Figure 3.6. Location of the Existing Coal Fleet ............................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.7. Location of Coal Retirements, 2002–2016................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.8. U.S. Utility-Scale Coal-Fired Electric Generating Capacity Additions by Coal Type and Initial Operating Year .......................................................................................................................................... 22 Figure 3.9. Location of the Existing Natural Gas Fleet ................................................................................ 25 Figure 3.10. Capacity Additions of U.S. Utility-Scale Natural Gas-Fired Electricity Generation by Technology Type and Initial Operating Year ............................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.11. Natural Gas Fleet Capacity Factors ......................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.12. Location of Natural Gas Retirements ...................................................................................... 27 Figure 3.13. Location of the Existing Nuclear Fleet .................................................................................... 28 Figure 3.14. Location of Nuclear Power Plant Retirements: Closed, Announced, and Averted ................ 30 Figure 3.15. Nuclear Plant Retirements Compared to NRC Plant Operating License Terms .................... 33 Figure 3.16. Hydropower Plants in the United States by Capacity and Average Annual Runoff ................ 34 Figure 3.17. Conventional and Shale Natural Gas Production, 2007–2016................................................ 36 Figure 3.18. Wholesale Day-Ahead Electricity Prices vs. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Monthly Average) .................................................................................................................................................................... 37 Figure 3.19. Total Annual U.S. Natural Gas Generation, 1950–2016 ......................................................... 38 Figure 3.20. Heat Rates for Coal, Nuclear, and Natural Gas, 2002–2016 ................................................... 39 Figure 3.21. PJM Merit-Order Dispatch: Various Control Technologies ..................................................... 42 Figure 3.22. Changes in U.S. Coal Capacity, December 2014–April 2016 ................................................... 44 Figure 3.23. Average Coal Plant Capacity Factors, 2008–2014................................................................... 45 Figure 3.24. Projected and Actual Coal Retirements, 2008–2018 .............................................................. 46 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000104 Figure 3.25. VRE Generation by Fuel as Percentage of Total U.S. Generation, 2002–2016 ....................... 48 Figure 3.26. Cumulative U.S. Utility-Scale Wind and Hydroelectric Generation Capacity, 1915–December 2016 ............................................................................................................................................................ 48 Figure 3.27. Relationship between the PTC and Annual Wind Capacity Additions .................................... 50 Figure 3.28. VRE Penetration as a Percentage of 2016 Generation versus Retired Capacity since 2010 as a Percentage of Non-VRE Capacity ................................................................................................................ 51 Figure 3.29. Gross Domestic Product and Net Electricity Production, Historical (1950–2016) and Projected (2017–2027) ............................................................................................................................. 54 Figure 3.30. Estimated U.S. Energy Savings from Structural Changes in the Economy and Energy Efficiency, 1980–2016 ................................................................................................................................ 55 Figure 3.31. EIA Annual Electricity Sales 2000–2016 (terawatt-hours) and AEO Reference Case Electricity Sales Projections 2017–2030 ...................................................................................................................... 56 Figure 3.32. Baseload Capacity Additions and Retirements from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) ..................................................................................................................................................... 57 Figure 3.33. Modeled Projections for Natural Gas Price, Electricity Sales, and VRE Generation from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) ................................................................................................. 58 Figure 3.34. NGCC Capacity Factors and Number of Starts, 1998–2016 .................................................... 59 Figure 4.1. System Operation Time Scales .................................................................................................. 62 Figure 4.2. Five-Year Average Reserve Margins across Different Regions (2018–2022) ............................ 66 Figure 4.3. Historical Solar On-Peak Capacity Factors in ERCOT................................................................. 67 Figure 4.4. NERC Definitions of Reserves Used to Provide ERS .................................................................. 70 Figure 4.5. System Frequency after a Grid Event (Top) and How Frequency Control Mechanisms Work to Restore Frequency (Bottom)....................................................................................................................... 71 Figure 4.6. EEI Historical and Project Transmission Investment (Nominal Dollars).................................... 76 Figure 4.7. Location of the Existing Wind Fleet .......................................................................................... 77 Figure 4.8 Wind Energy Share of Electric Generation by State, 2016......................................................... 78 Figure 4.9. Ways To Integrate VRE, Arrayed by Type of Intervention and Cost (2014) ............................. 80 Figure 4.10. CAISO Load, Net Load, and Wind and Solar Output on Example Weekdays during 2014 ...... 82 Figure 4.11. The CAISO Duck Curve ............................................................................................................ 83 Figure 4.12. Demand and Net Demand Shapes at Different Distributed Energy Resource Penetration Levels........................................................................................................................................................... 84 Figure 4.13. Mapping Reliability Attributes Against Resources ................................................................. 86 Figure 4.14 Selected Ancillary Service Market Design Characteristics ....................................................... 87 Figure 4.15. Ancillary Service Products Exchanged in the Centrally Organized Markets, Listed by RTO/ISO and Category of Ancillary Service ............................................................................................................... 88 Figure 4.16. Generation Mix and Various Economic and Policy Drivers Since 1949, Including Diversity Index............................................................................................................................................................ 89 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000105 Figure 4.17. Changes in U.S. Capacity (Top) and Generation (Bottom) Mix over Time (Left to Right: 2002, 2009, 2016) ................................................................................................................................................. 90 Figure 4.18. Natural Gas Storage Facilities ................................................................................................. 93 Figure 4.19. Coal Stocks and Days of Burn, January 2010–May 2017 ........................................................ 96 Figure 4.20. Electricity Generation Changes from 2013 to 2014 by Fuel Type .......................................... 97 Figure 4.21. Sandia National Laboratories’ Resilience Analysis Process................................................... 101 Figure 5.1. Utility Restructuring by State as of May 2017 ........................................................................ 104 Figure 5.2. The Seven RTOs or ISOs in the United States ......................................................................... 105 Figure 5.3. States and Regions along the Spectrum from Traditional to Fully Restructured Electric Markets ..................................................................................................................................................... 106 Figure 5.4. How Market Prices Allow Resource Costs to be Recovered in a Centrally-organized Wholesale Market....................................................................................................................................................... 110 Figure 5.5. Simulated ERCOT Dispatch Curves .......................................................................................... 112 Figure 5.6. Type of Fuel Used in PJM (by Real-Time Marginal Units): 2004 through March 2017 ........... 113 Figure 5.7. Annual Average Capacity Factors of Coal and Natural Gas Generators ................................. 113 Figure 5.8. Negative Northwest Off-Peak Daily Spot Prices ($/MWh) in 2011......................................... 116 Figure 6.1. Average U.S. Residential Sector Retail Electricity Prices over Time ....................................... 121 Figure 6.2. Average Wholesale Electric Costs/MWh Have Fallen between 2002 and 2016. ................... 122 Figure 6.3. Day-Ahead, On-Peak Wholesale Electric Prices Reach Near-Record Lows in 2016. ............... 123 Figure 8.1. Average Three-Year Capacity Factors for Retired U.S. Coal Plants ......................................... 155 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000106 List of Tables Table 3-1. Direct Employment and Income in Industries Related to Electric Power Supply, 2016 ............ 23 Table 3-2. Nuclear Plant Retirements, Announced Closures, and Plants Averted by State Action .......... 31 Table 3-3. Average Nuclear Costs by Plant Size and Operator Type, 2016................................................. 32 Table 3-4. Major Environmental Regulations Related to Coal, Natural Gas, and Nuclear Generation ...... 40 Table 3-5. Fiscal Year 2013 Electricity Production Subsidies and Support ................................................. 53 Table 4-1. How Various Energy Storage Options Can Deliver Grid-Level Applications .............................. 74 Table 4-2. Characteristics of VRE, Grid Integration Challenges, and Mitigation Options ........................... 78 Table 4-3. Dependence on Imported Just-in-Time Energy for Electricity ................................................... 94 Table B-1. VRE Integration Studies .......................................................................................................... 151 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000107 1 Introduction On April 14, 2017, Energy Secretary Rick Perry issued a memorandum requesting a study to examine electricity markets and reliability. With this document, Department of Energy (DOE) staff are delivering a study that seeks not only to evaluate the present status of the electricity system, but more importantly to exercise foresight to help ensure a system that is reliable, resilient, and affordable long into the future. Therefore, while carefully acknowledging history, this study focuses on the present trajectory of trends that are of particular concern in meeting those long-term goals. Specifically, the April 14 memo directed a study that explores the following three issues:  The evolution of wholesale electricity markets, including the extent to which Federal policy interventions and the changing nature of the electricity fuel mix are challenging the original policy assumptions that shaped the creation of those markets;  Whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes such as on-site fuel supply and other factors that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which this could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future; and  The extent to which continued regulatory burdens, as well as mandates and tax and subsidy policies, are responsible for forcing the premature retirement of baseload power plants. The U.S. electricity industry is facing unprecedented changes. Last year, for the first time in history, natural gas replaced coal as the leading source of electricity generation. In 2015, a record-high amount of generating capacity retired. Over the course of the last decade, overall growth in electricity consumption at the national level has stalled, while many generation sources—particularly natural gas, wind, and solar—frequently hit new record levels of penetration. The stakes are high around these issues because electricity is crucial to modern society and economic activity, and because of the physical and financial magnitude of the industry. As noted in the report, Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (QER 1.2): The United States has around 7,700 operating power plants1 that generate electricity from a variety of primary energy sources; 707,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines;2 more than 1 million rooftop solar installations;3 55,800 substations;4 6.5 million miles of local distribution lines;5 and 3,354 distribution utilities6 delivering electricity to 148.6 million customers. The total amount of money paid by end users end for electricity in 2015 was about $400 billion.7 This drives an $18.6 trillion U.S. gross domestic product and significantly influences global economic activity totaling roughly $80 trillion.8 Recognizing how vital electricity is to our society and the health of the U.S. economy, the April 14 memo asked staff to “provide concrete policy recommendations and solutions.” It also offered principles for policy formulation: “the Trump Administration will be guided by the principles of reliability, resilience, affordability, and fuel diversity—principles that underpin a thriving economy.” To that end, this report concludes by outlining policy recommendations to advance those principles. Section 2 of this study offers a summary of findings. Sections 3 through 6 provide the analytical framework, relevant data, and research. In addition, each of these sections concludes with a “looking forward” note, as many of the issues raised in the April 14 memo are of growing importance. Section 1 1 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000108 presents policy recommendations available—to DOE and others—to address the issues identified in this study. Section 8 outlines potential areas for further research. Data Used in This Study This study uses data collected by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) for the years 2002 through 2017, looking back before 2002 on a few specific issues. The 2002–2017 time range captures several important developments:  Centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets (Regional Transmission Operators [RTOs] and Independent System Operators [ISOs]) were in the early stages of implementation in 2002. Competition within centrally-organized markets among a large segment of merchant generation did not take effect until the mid-2000s. Three RTO/ISOs initiated mandatory capacity markets in 2006–2007: New York ISO (NYISO), PJM Interconnection (PJM), and ISO-New England (ISO-NE).  The emergence of a large amount of unconventional natural gas production—the shale revolution—started in 2006–2007. The consequent drop in natural gas prices began in 2009 under the combined impacts of low demand during the economic recession and a significant increase in supply.  The recession contributed to a significant drop in electricity demand in 2008, and it took several years for demand to return to 2008 levels. Although economic activity has picked up in recent years, electricity consumption and gross domestic product (GDP)—which grew together for decades—now appear less correlated as industries have become less energy-intensive and energy efficiency measures have taken full effect.  Several environmental regulations implemented under statutes enacted in the 1970s and 1990s, which raise capital and operating costs for affected power plants, had compliance deadlines in the period 2010–2017.  Driven in part by Federal and state policies, tax incentives, and mandates, significant quantities of variable renewable energy (VRE) resources—specifically wind and solar, and at levels high enough to alter traditional patterns of grid operation—began to impact certain areas around 2010.  Also around 2010, demand response emerged as a way for customers to compete in most centrally-organized wholesale markets. Because all of the above factors have emerged over the past 15 years—each affecting power supply and demand in different ways—looking at data since 2002 helps to reveal the impact and interactions of these changes. Additionally, EIA believes that the highly detailed EIA data used in this study (down to the level of individual generators) is most reliable for 2002 forward. Further, the data used for this study include power plant fuel conversions as retirements for the original fuel source. This study reports power (e.g. generation capacity) and energy (e.g. production or consumption over time) in megawatts (MW) and megawatt-hours (MWh), respectively (unless otherwise noted). Finally, all generation capacity figures reported in this study are net summer capacity as opposed to nameplate (unless otherwise noted). 2 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000109 Defining Regions The U.S. bulk power system (BPS) is a patchwork of different markets for electricity, shaped over time by technological changes, as well as state, regional, and Federal policies. This patchwork presents organizational and operational challenges, but its diversity also contributes to the system’s robustness. The U.S. power system in the lower 48 statesa is divided into three synchronized grids: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).b, 9 There are limited connections between the Eastern and Western Interconnections, and even fewer connections from ERCOT to the other grids. Issues confronting the BPS vary widely across regions. This study divides the lower 48 states into nine regions that represent either individual or groups of electric systems, known as balancing authority areas (see Figure 1.1). Within these regions, there are 66 balancing authorities (which can be as small as individual utilities or as large as a multi-state region). Using nine balancing authority-based regions for this analysis is a useful way of aggregating electricity data and revealing regional trends. a Both Alaska and Hawaii have unique islanded electric power systems that are not comparable to the rest of the Nation and thus are not included in this study. This is discussed in detail in a later section. b For most purposes, ERCOT can be considered electrically isolated from the other grids. ERCOT is also not subject to most elements of the Federal Power Act and therefore economic regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. A significant exception is Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversight and regulation of power system reliability, which does apply to ERCOT. 3 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000110 Figure 1.1. Regions Used in This Study10 Seven of the nine regions analyzed in this study correlate primarily or directly to the seven ISOs and RTOs in the United States that supply about two-thirds of electricity delivered to end-use customers:c  NE = ISO-NE  NY = NYISO  ERCOT = Electric Reliability Council of Texas  Mid-Atl = PJM  Midwest = Mid-Continent ISO (MISO)  Central = Southwest Power Pool (SPP)  CAISO+ = California ISO (plus smaller balancing areas in the state) The two remaining regions include numerous balancing authorities, all of which lie outside RTO/ISO service areas:  SE = Southeast  West = non-CAISO+ Western Interconnection. c The last four regions in this list include a few additional (mostly small) balancing authorities outside the formal ISO or RTO footprint. 4 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000111 Defining Baseload Generation This study defines baseload generation as power plants that are operated in baseload patterns—that is, plants that run at high, sustained output levels and high capacity factors, with limited cycling or ramping. While this definition includes most nuclear, coal, and natural gas steam generators, it is not a given that every nuclear, coal, or natural gas steam generator is operated as a baseload plant, or that other technologies cannot function as baseload plants (such as hydroelectric generators). In addition, this study uses the term conventional generation to mean coal, nuclear, and natural gas power plants, regardless of how they are operated.d Other organizations and publications use similar definitions. For example, PJM defines baseload generation as “those units which operate the great majority of hours of the year to meet load requirements.”11 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) offers an explanation as well: There is a distinction between baseload generation and the characteristics of generation providing reliable “baseload” power. Baseload is a term used to describe generation that falls at the bottom of the economic dispatch stack, meaning [those power plants] are the most economical to run. Coal and nuclear resources, by design, are designed for low cost O&M [operation and maintenance] and continuous operation […] However, it is not the economics nor the fuel type that make these resources attractive from a reliability perspective. Rather, these conventional steam-driven generation resources have low forced and maintenance outage hours traditionally and have low exposure to fuel supply chain issues. Therefore, “baseload” generation is not a requirement; however, having a portion of a resource fleet with high reliability characteristics, such as low forced and maintenance outage rates and low exposure to fuel supply chain issues, is one of the most fundamental necessities of a reliable BPS. These characteristics ensure that “baseload” generation is more resilient to disruptions.12 The electricity industry has traditionally referred to baseload generation as the power plants that are used to meet “base” load—the minimum level of electricity that customers demand around the clock, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Large nuclear, coal, natural gas steam, and hydroelectric plants have historically been used for baseload generation.e Baseload plants generally have high capital costs but low fuel costs, and they tend to be fairly fuel efficient. Although the output level of these plants can be changed, they are most economic—in terms of cost per unit of electricity produced—when operated at near-full capacity at all times (although hydroelectric plants are more flexible). Traditional baseload units tend to have longer start-up and shut-down times and generally move (ramp) slowly between production levels to avoid damaging plant components with thermal stress or metal fatigue (see Appendix C on cycling). d QER 1.2 does not define the term baseload in its glossary. However, the report states in a caption on page 1-21 that “baseload is considered coal, nuclear, and natural gas combined-cycle plants.” e Other technologies that have traditionally operated as baseload include geothermal and biomass power plants. However, those technologies represent a relatively small portion of total U.S. electricity generation; while valuable for the grid reliability services they provide, they are not covered in this report. 5 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000112 Figure 1.2. Schematic of Typical Daily Load Curve Showing Base Load13 Intermediate or mid-merit plants are used to follow load, meeting daily variations in demand. Depending on the mix of generation resources available in different regions of the country and relative fuel prices, natural gas and/or coal units are typically used for load following. Short-duration demand peaks, which occur infrequently throughout the year, are generally met by natural gas units with high heat rates.f More recently, customer-provided demand response is helping to meet peak demand. Analysis in Section 3 shows that many of the power plants that retired between 2002 and 2016 were used for baseload generation in the past, but were no longer operating in that role at the time of retirement due to changes in electricity market dynamics. With the sustained drop in natural gas prices, for example, natural gas-fired combined-cycle (NGCC) plants are currently a less costly source of baseload generation than coal or nuclear power in many regions of the country. VRE resources such as wind and solar are beginning to serve more of minimum load, albeit at variable or intermittent output levels.g The proliferation of these sources has also led grid operators in some regions to place an increasing premium on flexible generation resources (e.g., NGCC units) that can help balance VRE variability by meeting base load and intermediate load, both of which are affected by a f According to EIA, “Heat rate is one measure of the efficiency of a generator or power plant that converts a fuel into heat and into electricity. The heat rate is the amount of energy used by an electrical generator or power plant to generate one kilowatthour (kWh) of electricity.” https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=107&t=3. g For the purposes of this study, wind and solar are referred to as VRE. Terms such as “non-dispatchable” and “intermittent” may also apply to these technologies, but for consistency, this study uses the term variable. In contrast, some renewables are dispatchable—that is, sources that can provide power to the grid within sub-hourly time scales to match demand during any 24hour period. Dispatchable renewables include sources such as biofuels, geothermal, and hydropower (with the caveat on hydropower that it may only be seasonally dispatchable in some cases). 6 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000113 changing net load profile.h These factors, among others, have collectively lessened the immediate need for traditional baseload resources in certain regions, but still speak to the need for baseload generation. Defining Premature Retirement The dictionary definition of premature is “happening … or performed before the proper, usual or intended time.”14 The Department does not have an official definition for the term “premature retirement”i with respect to power plants, as the term is highly subjective. Below are some of the prevailing viewpoints and associated meanings:  Power plant engineers may think a power plant retired prematurely if it has not yet run to the end of its nominal design life (for instance, approximately 40 years for post-1970 coal plants) or through the term of reasonable plant life extension modifications.  An RTO/ISO or reliability organization may think a power plant retirement is premature if its continued operation is still required to deliver Essential Reliability Services (ERS)j in that location (in which case the operator may delay retirement by designating it a “reliability-must-run” resource).  A policymaker or legislator may think a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the plant delivers benefits that the state or society values, such as emissions-free energy, local jobs, or maintaining local generation.  A mayor or employee may think a power plant is retiring prematurely if the retirement causes harms to the community and the individuals who work there.  A merchant competitor that built or acquired a power plant may think its plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the merchant has not been able to recover its investment in the plant through sales of energy and capacity or through other revenue streams.  A vertically integrated utility executive may think a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the utility has not yet fully recovered its rate-based capital investment in the plant and its return on that rate base.  Nuclear or hydroelectric plant owners and regulators may think a power plant has retired prematurely if it has not yet run through the full term of its operating license and/or license extension. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) hydro licenses run for up to 50 years with potential reauthorizations of 30–50 years, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nuclear operating licenses run for 40 years with potential 20-year extensions.  Electricity economists may think a power plant retired has prematurely if the plant was still able to sell electricity competitively against other energy sources but was required to close due to policy directives. On the other hand, economists may also think a power plant retired h “Net load” is the instantaneous difference between total customer electricity demand (load) and VRE generation. i QER 1.2—Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review—discussed “premature nuclear retirements” but did not explicitly define the term. For example, in Chapter 3, page 24, the report notes: “When analyzing the impacts of premature nuclear retirements on power generation in the state, a state of Illinois report considered a scenario in which 80 percent of the replacement generation was coal. Other analysis concludes that roughly 75 percent of the at-risk nuclear generation nationwide would be replaced with fossil generation, largely powered with natural gas.” [notes omitted, emphasis added] j See Section 4.1.1 for a discussion of ERS. 7 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000114 prematurely if the plant provided un-priced benefits to society that, if priced, would have made the plant profitable.  A long-term planner and risk manager may think a power plant has retired prematurely if it offered valuable diversity, reliability, resilience, and optionality benefits that are not yet fully recognized, valued, and/or compensated. Each of these viewpoints represents a valid perspective, particularly those of grid operators and other institutions responsible for reliability. While stakeholders may maintain that a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely based on one or more of the considerations above, the results of this study show that some observed power plant retirements were appropriate and consistent with markets as they are currently functioning. In other words, not every power plant retirement is cause for alarm. However, NERC is concerned with the trend of retirements as it relates to reliability and resilience. NERC wrote in response to the April 14 memo: As conventional resources prematurely retire, sufficient amounts of essential reliability services, such as frequency and voltage support, ramping capability, etc., must be replaced based on the configuration and needs of the system.15 [emphasis added] Given the difficulty in assigning a single definition to premature retirement, as well as the subjective nature of such a definition, this study does not attempt to determine whether any specific power plant retirements have been premature. Instead, this study assesses the various factors that contribute to power plant retirement trends. Topics Beyond the Scope of This Study This study does not directly address several topics for the following reasons:  Cybersecurity is a critical component to ensuring the reliable and resilient operation of the Nation’s energy infrastructure. Existing and emerging cybersecurity threats can affect any aspect of the electric sector, ranging from power plants, to transmission and distribution systems, to customers and end-use devices. The December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian electricity system and the 2012 Shamoon virus targeting the energy sector in Saudi Arabia, for example, were wake-up calls.16 DOE takes these threats seriously and is designated as the Federal Government’s lead SectorSpecific Agency for cybersecurity for the energy sector, which entails supporting the cyber protection of the Nation’s critical energy infrastructure.k However, while cybersecurity is a significant concern and top priority, it is not addressed in this report because it is the subject of an upcoming joint report between DOE and the Department of Homeland Security being prepared in response to Executive Order No. 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure.  Alaska and Hawaii: While the broad trends discussed in this report apply in Alaska and Hawaii as well as the lower 48 states, many of this study’s economic observations do not directly apply to the power plants in the Hawaii and Alaska power systems, as they are not large, interconnected energy markets, and utility system operators in the states face unique operational and fuel supply chain considerations. k For more information, visit DOE’s website on the Department’s cyber activities: https://www.energy.gov/national-securitysafety/cybersecurity. 8 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000115 The Hawaii and Alaska power systems are remote, vertically integrated systems with plant sizes that tend to fall below the size screens used in this study. The average generating unit sizes in Hawaii and Alaska are 18 MW and 5 MW, respectively, compared to an average unit size of 70 MW in the lower 48 states.17 Because neither state is interconnected with any of the major U.S. interconnections, or to any transmission or distribution network in Canada, utilities in both states must self-supply all ERS.l As a result, utilities in these isolated systems might consider different parameters for reliability in their system planning compared to utilities in the contiguous United States, who can obtain reliability services and products in real time through markets and bilateral transactions.18 Their experiences, however, may inform the efforts of utilities in the contiguous U.S. seeking to better manage rural systems and effectively integrate VRE and microgrids.  Geothermal, biomass, and combined heat and power plants are often operated as baseload plants, operating at a relatively stable level over a long period of time. However, because these types of plants are not as prevalent or widespread as gas, coal, and nuclear plants, this study did not perform detailed analyses of trends and closures for these technologies. l In 2014, an intertie to the Western Interconnection of British Columbia was proposed to the Alaska Energy Authority in order to bring power to Alaska. However, as of 2016, no further work on the project had been completed due to economic reasons. http://energy-alaska.wikidot.com/railbelt. 9 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000116 2 Findings of This Study This study identified several critical issues central to protecting the long-term reliability of the electric grid in accordance with the April 14 memo, which asked staff to explore: 1) The evolution of wholesale electricity markets, including the extent to which Federal policy interventions and the changing nature of the electricity fuel mix are challenging the original policy assumptions that shaped the creation of those markets. While centrally-organized markets have achieved reliable wholesale electricity delivery with economic efficiencies in their short-term operations, changing circumstances have challenged both centrally-organized and, to a lesser extent, vertically-integrated markets.m  To date, wholesale markets have withstood a number of stresses. While markets have evolved since their introduction, they are currently functioning as designed—to ensure reliability and minimize the short-term costs of wholesale electricity—despite pressures from flat demand growth, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels. The resulting low average wholesale energy prices, while beneficial for buyers of wholesale electricity, represent a critical juncture for many existing baseload generation resources and their role in preserving reliability and resilience.n  Market designs may be inadequate given potential future challenges. VRE—with near-zero marginal costs and if at high penetrations—will lower wholesale energy prices independent of effects of the current low natural gas prices. This would put additional economic pressure on revenues for traditional baseload (as well as non-baseload) resources, requiring careful consideration of continued market evolutions.  Markets need further study and reform to address future services essential to grid reliability and resilience. System operators are working toward recognizing, defining, and compensating for resource attributes that enhance reliability and resilience (on both the supply and demand side). However, further efforts should reflect the urgent need for clear definitions of reliabilityand resilience-enhancing attributes and should quickly establish the market means to value or the regulatory means to provide them. Evolving market conditions and the need to accommodate VRE have led to the increased flexible operation of generation and other grid resources. Some generation technologies originally designed to operate as baseload were not intended to operate flexibly, and in nuclear power’s case, do not have a regulatory regime that allows them to do so. m This study also refers to vertically integrated markets as bilateral markets. n Former FERC Commissioner Tony Clark summarizes today’s changing demands on centrally-organized markets: “Affordable power was the goal when markets were created. The current markets are still procuring affordable power, but many state public policy makers no longer see that as the only goal […] other public policy goals [include…] incenting in-state jobs, promoting ‘green’ energy or other politically favored resources, preserving carbon-free resources, and retaining substantial tax revenues to state and local government.” Clark goes on to say, “[Markets] were never designed for job creation, tax preservation, politically popular generation, or anything other than reliable, affordable electricity.” http://www.wbklaw.com/uploads/file/Articles-%20News/2017%20articles%20publications/Market%20Identity%20Crisis%20Fin al%20(7-14-17).pdf. 10 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000117  Generation from VRE can change widely over the course of a single day, which requires dispatchable power plants to be operated more nimbly. Additionally, in some areas of the country, there may be over-generation from VRE at some points in a day, which drives prices to almost zero yet requires quick-ramping assets when VRE subsides. Taken together, these trends have placed a premium on flexible output rather than the steady output of traditional baseload power plants. This flexibility is generally provided by generation resources. However, nongeneration sources of flexibility—such as flexible demand, increased transmission, and energy storage technologies—are being explored as ways to enhance system flexibility. Society places value on attributes of electricity provision beyond those compensated by the current design of the wholesale market.  Americans and their elected representatives value the various benefits specific power plants offer, such as jobs, community economic development, low emissions, local tax payments, resilience, energy security, or the national security benefits associated with a nuclear industrial base. Most of these benefits are not recognized or compensated by wholesale electricity markets, and this has given rise to a variety of state and private efforts that include keeping open or shutting down established baseload generators and incentivizing VRE generation. 2) Whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes such as onsite fuel supply and other factors that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which this could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. Markets recognize and compensate reliability, and must evolve to continue to compensate reliability, but more work is needed to address resilience.  Reliable and affordable electricity is essential to the modern economy, including the manufacturing, services, and financial sectors. NERC’s most recent annual State of Reliability report concludes that during 2016, the “bulk power system reliability remained within defined performance objectives to provide an Adequate Level of Reliability (ALR).”o NERC reached the same conclusion for 2013–2015. However, in a May 2017 letter to the Secretary of Energy, NERC pressed the importance of reliability issues that require attention, including maintaining ERS as conventional generation retires and ensuring flexibility and sufficient transmission to supplement and offset VRE.19 These issues are indicative of the technological and institutional changes that are now affecting the electricity sector, and dealing with these issues will require new levels of coordination and collaboration among the sector’s many constituencies. Presently, BPS reliability is adequate despite the retirement of a portion of baseload capacity and unique regional hurdles posed by the changing resource mix.  Fuel assurance is a growing consideration for the electricity system. Maintaining onsite fuel resources is one way to improve fuel assurance, but most generation technologies have experienced fuel deliverability challenges in the past. While coal facilities typically store enough o NERC defines ALR as “the state that the design, planning, and operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) will achieve when the [five] listed Reliability Performance Objectives are met.” These objectives are detailed at http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Resources/Documents/Adequate Level of Reliability Definition (Informational Filing).pdf. 11 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000118 fuel onsite to last for 30 days or more, extreme cold can lead to frozen fuel stockpiles and disruption in train deliveries. Natural gas is delivered by pipeline as needed. The NERC letter to DOE emphasized ensuring natural gas fuel supply and mitigating delivery vulnerabilities. Capacity challenges on existing pipelines combined with the difficulty in some areas of siting and constructing new natural gas pipelines, along with competing uses for natural gas such as for home heating, have created supply constraints in the past. Supply constraints can create increased price risk and, in extreme cases, could impact reliability.p  Recent severe weather events have demonstrated the need to improve system resilience. The range of potential disruptive events is broad, and the system needs to be designed to handle high-impact, low probability events. This makes it very challenging to develop cost-effective programs to improve resilience at the regional, state, or utility levels. Planning, practice, and coordination on an all-hazards basis and having a mix of resources and fuels available when a major disturbance occurs are both essential to fast response. Work still remains to identify facilities that merit hardening; stage periodic exercises and drills so that governmental agencies and utilities are prepared for emergencies; and ensure that wholesale electricity markets are designed to recognize and incentivize investments that would achieve or enhance resiliencerelated objectives.  Significant progress is already being made to understand what is needed to maintain power system reliability under changing market conditions, but more work is needed to understand what can be done to maintain resilience in a variety of conditions as the grid changes over the coming years. Further, low natural gas prices are driving greater use of natural gas for electricity generation, which has made exposure to natural gas price risk related to availability a growing concern in several regions. There are tradeoffs between multiple desirable attributes of the grid. For example, within power systems, it may be the case that a more reliable and resilient system is more costly than the least-cost system that a centrally-organized wholesale market is intended to deliver. Similarly, policies that seek to deliver more jobs, reduce pollution, or reduce risk may require more upfront investment at an initially higher cost to society as a whole than a least-cost system. It is important that policymakers have a clear understanding of the true costs and benefits of services to the grid, as well as an understanding of the tradeoffs between desirable attributes like reliability, flexibility, and affordability. p Indeed, ISO-NE has repeatedly expressed that reliability and resilience concerns are not being adequately addressed by the New England region on natural gas. 12 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000119 3) The extent to which continued regulatory burdens, as well as mandates and tax and subsidy policies, are responsible for forcing the premature retirement of baseload power plants. The recent and unprecedented rise of natural gas as a top electricity generation resource, the increase in VRE penetration, the flattening of electricity demand growth, and a host of policy issues?regulations, mandates, and subsidies at the state and Federal levels?have negatively impacted traditional baseload generation, particularly coal and nuclear power plants. Between 2002 and 2016, 132,000 MW of generation capacity retired?representing about 15 percent of the total 2002 installed base?and 390,500 MW of new capacity was added. While power plants retire for a variety of reasons, several factors have contributed to recent retirements and continuing pressure for additional retirements. The biggest contributor to coal and nuclear plant retirements has been the advantaged economics of natural gas-fired generation. 0 Low-cost, abundant natural gas and the development of highly-efficient NGCC plants resulted in a new baseload competitor to the existing coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric plants. In 2016, natural gas was the largest source of electricity generation in the United States?overtaking coal for the first time since data collection began.20 The increased use of natural gas in the electric sector has resulted in sustained low wholesale market prices that reduce the profitability of other generation resources important to the grid. The fact that new, high-efficiency natural gas plants can be built relatively quickly, compared to coal and nuclear power, also helped to grow gas-?red generation. Production costs of coal and nuclear plants remained somewhat flat, while the new and existing, more flexible, and relatively lower-operating cost natural gas plants drove down wholesale market prices to the point that some formerly pro?table nuclear and coal facilities began operating at a loss. The development of abundant, domestic natural gas made possible by the shale revolution also has produced signi?cant value for consumers and the economy overall. Another factor contributing to the retirement of power plants is low growth in electricity demand. 0 Growth of total electricity use has slowed from averaging 2.5 percent annually in the late 19905, to averaging 1.0 percent annually from 2000 to 2008, to remaining roughly flat since then.21 Changes in electricity demand?particularly the apparent decoupling of economic output and electricity demand?have been driven in part by energy efficiency policies. The combination of slow growth in electricity demand and the 390,500 MW of capacity additions from 2002 to 2016 made significant amounts of older, higher-cost capacity redundant. Dispatch of VRE has negatively impacted the economics of baseload plants. 0 Since 2007, the contribution to total generation from wind and solar has grown quickly, accelerated by government policies and mandates. State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) have been the largest contributor?associated with 60 percent of VRE growth since 2000? followed by Federal tax credits and government research (which contributed to the dramatic drop in wind and solar technology costs). Because these resources have lower variable operating costs than traditional baseload generators, they are dispatched first and displace baseload resources when they are available. 0 Participants on a panel of economists at a May 2017 FERC technical conference cited state-level RPS and Federal tax credits for VRE as examples of wholesale market impacts and distortions. 13 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000120 Competition from resources that benefit from such policiesq reduces revenues for traditional baseload power plants by lowering the wholesale electric prices they receive and by displacing a portion of their output. Investments required for regulatory compliance have also negatively impacted baseload plant economics, and the peak in baseload plant retirements (2015) correlated with deadlines for power plant regulations as well as strong signals of future regulation.  A suite of environmental regulations scheduled for implementation between 2011 and 2022 has had varying degrees of effects on the cost of generation. For example, the largest number of coal plant retirements occurred in 2015—the deadline for coal and oil plants to add pollution control equipment for Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (MATS) compliance. In the same year, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized its Clean Power Plan, which, if fully implemented, would place additional pressure on coal-fired generation. Nuclear power plants also face regulatory costs—principally the Cooling Water Intake Rule. Three nuclear plants that announced closure (Oyster Creek, Diablo Canyon, and Indian Point) have cited disputes with their respective states, who implement the rule, as among the reasons for plant retirement. Ultimately, the continued closure of traditional baseload power plants calls for a comprehensive strategy for long-term reliability and resilience. States and regions are accepting increased risks that could affect the future reliability and resilience of electricity delivery for consumers in their regions. Hydropower, nuclear, coal, and natural gas power plants provide ERS and fuel assurance critical to system resilience. A continual comprehensive regional and national review is needed to determine how a portfolio of domestic energy resources can be developed to ensure grid reliability and resilience. q These same economists also cited other “out-of-market” interventions as distorting efficient price formation in wholesale markets, such as recently enacted and pending state laws that provide support to existing nuclear units. During the economist’s panel discussion at the FERC May 2017 technical conference, the phrase “subsidies beget subsidies” was used. 14 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000121 3 Power Plant Retirements A combination of factors is causing power plant retirements, including low natural gas prices, wholesale competition, low customer demand growth, regulation-driven cost increases, and the growth of VRE. As Figure 3.1 shows, the types, magnitude, and timing of conventional power plant retirements vary regionally. Figure 3.1. Location of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and All Other Retirements, 2002?201622.Coal . . 3' 5 NG CC NG CT Capacuty (MW) I NG ST 1 Ownership I Nuclear 500 1 000 A Merchant Other VIEU 2 1.500 To understand observed power plant capacity retirements, it is useful to begin with an examination of historical capacity additions. From 1950 to 2015, capacity additions of different generation technologies tended to come in waves that were largely influenced by policy, fuel costs, and technology development (see Figure 3.2). Coal expansion was highest from 1950 to 1990, nuclear power was widely deployed in the 19705 and 19805, natural gas capacity additions peaked in the early 20005 and continue through today, and VRE has grown rapidly over the last decade.5 VIEU stands for vertically integrated electric utilities. 5 Not depicted: prior to the 19505, hydropower was a large source of generation capacity additions, the vast majority of which is still operational today. 15 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000122 Figure 3.2. Net Generation Capacity Additions and Retirements t23 Power plant retirements have accelerated since 2011, and retirement trends vary significantly by generation source. For instance, the current wave of nuclear plant retirements only occurred over the last five years.u Some of the nuclear units now closing are doing so because of state policy pressure (as with California’s Diablo Canyon, New Jersey’s Oyster Creek, and New York’s Indian Point), and some have had maintenance issues that were too costly to fix. However, most plants are closing or threatening closure because–given the economics in some regions—they have become unable to compete against primarily low-cost, gas-fired generation and, to a lesser extent, subsidized and mandated VRE in a low electricity demand environment. The design of traditional baseload power plants assumed operations primarily at a constant output level with limited cycling (see Appendix C).24 As the electricity system continues to evolve and market conditions change, these plants are increasingly being moved into load-following operations, or are t Acronyms: Clean Air Act (CAA), Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992), Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), Investment Tax Credit (ITC), Production Tax Credit (PTC). u However, we note that 29 U.S. nuclear power plants retired from 1974 through 2001, including 13 power plants in the commercial utility nuclear fleet sized at 700 MW or larger. These plants retired for a variety of reasons, including damage (Fort St. Vrain), safety or operational difficulties (Three Mile Island 2, Zion 1 & 2, Millstone 1), costly safety requirements (Humboldt Bay), and state or utility policy choices (Rancho Seco, Trojan, Indian Point 1). This study only looks at the nuclear units in operation in 2002 and beyond. 16 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000123 required to more frequently adjust the load and the on/off dispatch of their units. The extra costs incurred to do so can affect a retirement decision. QER 1.2 discusses these issues: Currently, the changing electricity sector is causing the closure of many coal and nuclear plants in a shift from recent trends. From 2000 through 2009, power plant retirements were dominated by natural gas steam turbines. Over the past 6 years (2010–2015), power plant retirements were dominated by coal plants (37 GW), which accounted for over 52 percent of recently retired power plant capacity. Over the next 5 years (between 2016 and 2020), 34.4 GW of summer capacity is planned to be retired, and 79 percent of this planned retirement capacity are coal and natural gas plants (49 percent and 30 percent, respectively). The next largest set of planned retirements are nuclear plants (15 percent).25 Retirements typically can be tied to the units’ inability to compete economically, but the factors complicating a given plant’s economics can be numerous and can compound each other. Currently, these factors include low wholesale electricity prices (driven by competing generators with low marginal costs, as well as subsidies); higher operating costs from unit age or lower efficiency; and looming capital needs, including compliance with safety and/or environmental regulations; among others. Further, minimal growth in electricity demand has compounded the impact of VRE policy; in an era of low-cost natural gas and increasing levels of state-mandated renewable generation—for example, a 20-percent share of wind and solar by 2020—lack of demand growth means natural gas and new VRE added to meet state mandates compete with existing conventional generation to satisfy a static level of demand. A review of coal, nuclear, and natural gas retirements to date shows that power plant retirements reflect regional patterns of generation development, state policies, and differences in market structure across regions. However, national patterns also emerge—Figure 3.3 shows that a significant amount of capacity (the highest on record) retired in 2015, coinciding with the MATS compliance deadline (which applied to coal- and oil-fired units across the country) as well as the finalization of the Clean Power Plan rule. 17 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000124 Figure 3.3. Retirements of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and Other Generating Units, 2002?202226 Capacity (MW) 25,000 Announced 20,000 1 5,000 10,000 5,000 2002 2003 2004 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Retirement Year I Coal Nuclear I Other Figure 3.4 highlights retirement trends by ownership type merchant vs. VIEU) and time period. Merchant plants accounted for nearly 70 percent of retired capacity during the period 2002-2010 (depicted as triangles below; note how most of the triangles are purple and dark blue). VIEU plants tended to retire later (depicted as circles below; note how most of the circles are light blue and green). The merchant vs. VIEU comparison indicates that market structure is a signi?cant factor in power plant retirements, particularly the timing of retirements. Figure 3.4. Retirements by Date, Location, Ownership, and Capacity27 .Capacity (MW) 0 . 9 I Retired 2002 to 2006 1 I Retired 2007 to 2010 Ownership I Retired 2011 to 2015 2) A Mme,? I Retired 2016 to March 2017 VIEU 22,000 0 18 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000125 The data displayed in Figure 3.4 is categorized into four time frames because a variety of economic trends and regulatory events occurred throughout the period 2002–2017:  During the period 2002–2006 (shown in purple), VIEU plants retired or sold many of their generating assets to third parties through state-initiated processes collectively known as restructuring. During the late 1990s, many states passed legislation initiating restructuring concurrent with the creation of several RTOs and ISOs. The majority of retirements occurring during this period were smaller, older merchant power plants in restructured areas including California, Texas, the Northeast, and the mid-Atlantic region.  The period 2007–2010 (shown in dark blue) saw early growth of subsidized utility-scale wind generation; the economic recession from 2008 through 2011; and the start of the shale revolution in 2006–2007, with natural gas prices starting a downward trend. Also in this time frame was the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Massachusetts v. EPA, finding that the EPA has the authority to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), opening the door to further regulation under the Clean Air Act.28 Older, less fuel efficient natural gas-fired plants retired early in this period, but the fall in natural gas prices starting in 2009 also began to force the shutdown of smaller, older coal and oil plants in 2009.  In the period 2011–2015 (shown in light blue), low natural gas prices proved to be a longlasting rather than a short-term phenomenon. The compliance deadline for MATS converged with tightening pollution limits in sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) trading programs. Many of the coal and oil retirements in this period were plants whose owners chose to shut down a plant rather than invest in costly environmental remediation measures. Further, the EPA’s final Clean Power Plan rule was finalized during this time.v This period had the most power plant retirements, with a marked increase in California, the mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Southeast. During this period, it also became clear that a portion of the customer electricity demand lost from the recession was not going to reappear in the near term, which meant that electricity demand would not support the higher-cost plants that occupied higher positions on the supply curve.  In 2016 and going forward (shown in green), power plant retirements are and may continue to be driven by continued economic challenges in the form of market dynamics and compliance costs of regulations, as well as operational pressures from a changing resource mix. Figure 3.5 shows generation capacity, additions, retirements, announced retirements, and demand responsew as a percentage of 2002 total installed net summer capacity in each region. The graphic shows that in every region except CAISO+, the proportion of retirements between 2002 and 2016 (in v Although the Clean Power Plan was later stayed by the Supreme Court, the investment uncertainty around the time of the final rule made reinvestment in coal technology a difficult decision for plant owners. https://www.iaee.org/ej/ejexec/EJ391 ExecSum Morris.pdf. w Demand response is “a voluntary program offered by independent system operators/regional transmission organizations, local utility service providers, or third parties, which compensate end-use (retail) customers for reducing and/or changing the pattern of their electricity use (load) over a defined period of time, when requested or automatically instructed to do so during periods of high power prices or when the reliability of the grid is threatened.” https://energy.gov/epsa/quadrennial-energyreview-second-installment. 19 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000126 orange) is 20 percent or less of the total installed capacity available in 2002 (in red, orange, and light blue). The figure also shows that the amount of new capacity added (dark blue) exceeds the combined amounts of capacity retired (in red) and planned for retirement (in orange) in every region over the study period.x Figure 3.5. Operating Generation Capacity, Additions, Retirements, and Announced Retirements by Region for All Generation Types, January 2002–December 202229 3.1 Coal Plant Retirements There were approximately 306,000 MW30 of coal-fired power plants in the United States at the start of 2002 and 270,000 MW31 at the end of 2016, representing a net retirement of approximately 36,000 MW (about 12 percent) of coal capacity. The remaining fleet of coal-fired generators covers most of the lower 48 states, with the exception of the Northeast, Northwest, and California, as shown in Figure 3.6. x While the graphic includes currently planned additions in EIA’s data, this figure does not show generation (megawatt-hour) or technology type, and most of planned and added capacity (megawatt) comes from new natural gas and VRE sources that do not meet the NERC baseload characteristic discussed earlier. 20 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000127 Figure 3.6. Location of the Existing Coal Fleet C) 500 Ownership C1 1.000 A Merchant I: ?1 21.500 0 VIEU EIA reports that: Coal-?red electricity generators accounted for 25% of operating electricity generating capacity in the United States and generated about 30% of U.S. electricity in 2016. Most coal- ?red capacity was built between 1950 and 1990, and the capacity-weighted average age of operating coal facilities is 39 years.32 More than 90 percent of the coal consumed in the United States is used for power generation.33 Coal energy production peaked in 2007 and has been declining since. No new coal plants have been built for domestic utility electricity production since 201434 because new coal plants are more expensive to build and operate than natural gas-fired plants.35 Further, as Figure 3.7 shows, coal retirements span many regions. Figure 3.7. Location of Coal Retirements, 2002?201636 . Capacity (MW) 0 50 500 Ownership A ix 11?00 A Merchant '1 )21,500 OVIEU 21 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000128 Between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,000 MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet. The age of coal plants is an important factor. As Figure 3.8 shows, the vast majority of coal-fired capacity was built before 1990, with the average of the fleet built in the mid to late 1970s.37 According to the Congressional Research Service, the service life of coal-fired generators reportedly “averages between 35 and 50 years, and varies according to boiler type, maintenance practices, and the type of coal burned, among other factors.”38 Figure 3.8. U.S. Utility-Scale Coal-Fired Electric Generating Capacity Additions by Coal Type and Initial Operating Year39 40 Between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,000 MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet.41 EIA reported that coal-fired power plants made up more than 80 percent of the 18,000 MW of electric generating capacity that retired in 2015, and that the retiring units “tended to be older and smaller in capacity than the coal generation fleet that continues to operate.”42 An analysis of coal plant and other data indicates several important trends and attributes:  About 70 percent of the plants that retired between 2010 and 2016 had a capacity factor of less than 50 percent in the year prior to retirement, and about half of the future planned retirements operated below a 50 percent capacity factor in 2016.43  While none of the units that retired between 2010 and 2016 had significant SO2 control equipment installed, more than half of the future announced retirements have SO2 control.  The average size of planned retirements (380 MW) exceeds the average size of recent retirements (218 MW), indicating that future retirements will be generally larger than previous ones.44 22 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000129 Retired plants are older than the remaining fleet. The coal units that retired in 2015 were mainly built between 1950 and 1970, and the average age of those retired units was 54 years. The remaining coal fleet is relatively younger, with an average age of 38 years in 2016.45 In summary, until quite recently, the coal plants that have retired were smaller, older, had higher heat rates, and therefore were dispatched less often and ran at lower capacity factors. Most of the earliest coal retirements were merchant-owned units in the Northeast and Midwest that were more exposed to competition from other generators and fuel types, while VlEU-owned plants in the Southeast and elsewhere experienced a longer period of protection from low market prices. Workforce Impacts of Coal Plant Retirements and Shifts in Coal Production Falling demand for coal due to coal plant retirements and capacity factor reductions, a regional shift in coal production, and automation in mining have led to a reduction in coal production jobs. Between 2011 and September 2016, increased mechanization and a shift to western coal resulted in a loss of 36,000 coal mining jobs, of which nearly 90 percent were in Appalachia.46 As shown in Table 3-1, more than 80 percent of the coal jobs in the United States support electricity production.47 The oil and gas extraction sector is not subdivided and includes many non-power uses. About 35 percent of the natural gas and roughly one percent of petroleum jobs in the United States support electricity production.48 Growth in some energy sectors, such as solar energy deployment, supported new jobs, but they vary regionally and often do not correlate well with concurrent job losses in sectors such as coal mining or power plant operations. Job growth in other energy sectors and regions cannot sufficiently offset job losses in the coal sector without adequate training, salary adjustments, or transition assistance. Table 3-1. Direct Employment and Income in Industries Related to Electric Power Supply, 201649 Industry Sector/Subsector Jobs Percent Related to Average Annual Electricity Industry Income Electric power generation 191 ,000 100% $1 13,000 Electric power transmission and 292,000 100% $99,000 distribution Electric power total 483,000 100% $104,000 Coal miningy 55,000 ~80% $82,000 Oil and gas extraction2 377,000 ~35% of gas, of oil $118,000 Mining and extraction total 432,000 Unknown $113,000 Includes supporting North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry categories. 1 Includes supporting NAICS industry categories. 23 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000130 Coal Plant Closure Considerations50 In September 2016, Ed Malley of Power Magazine noted: The primary recent drivers of coal plant retirement announcements include low natural gas prices and new environmental regulations—especially the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), Clean Water Act Section 316(b), and the Coal Combustion Residuals rule. Other contributing factors include more competitive markets and a variety of regional and state-level policies involving renewables and carbon pricing. Most of the power plants being closed today were built in the 1940s to 1960s, before the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970. Many have minimal air pollution controls, use once-through cooling water, and sluice wet coal ash to ponds. Scrubbers, closed-loop cooling, and dry ash handling are current requirements, or will be phased in over the next few years. Because much of the older capacity tends to be smaller units less than 300 megawatts (MW), which are not economical to retrofit, they are therefore retired. Many closures coincided with the MATS deadlines in 2015 and 2016, at a time when natural gas prices were at historic lows. Now that the MATS deadlines have passed, additional companies are announcing closures, including Dynegy (5,000 MW) and DTE Energy (2,100 MW). Economics, renewable energy mandates, and reduced demand for electricity are driving these additional closures. Power plant closure activity began on the East and West Coasts in oil-fired plants because of the high cost of fuel. Closures are now occurring in the coal belts, the Upper Midwest, and the Southeast. There are even some coal-fired plant closures in Western states. 3.2 Natural Gas Plant Retirements In recent years, the story of natural gas for electricity generation has been one of overall growth rather than decline. However, many natural gas plants have retired since 2002. Natural gas plants are located across the lower 48 states, and are concentrated around major population centers, as shown in Figure 3.9. According to EIA: In 2016, natural gas-fired generators accounted for 42% of the operating electricity generating capacity in the United States. Natural gas provided 34% of total electricity generation in 2016, surpassing coal to become the leading generation source. The increase in natural gas generation since 2005 is primarily a result of the continued costcompetitiveness of natural gas relative to coal.51 24 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000131 Figure 3.9. Location of the Existing Natural Gas Fleet52 FuelT Ca ci (MW) 0 0 ype paty fl NGCC 1 NG CT 500 Ownership 4" - I ST 1.000 A Merchant 21.500 OVIEU NGCC units accounted for 54 percent of the 447,000 MW of total U.S. natural gas-powered generator capacity in 2016. Combined-cycle generators have been a popular technology choice since the 19905 and made up a large share of the capacity added between 2000 and 2005. Some other types of natural gas-?red technology, such as combustion turbines (CTs, representing about 28 percent of total natural gas-powered generator capacity) and steam turbines 17 percent), generally only run during hours when electricity demand is high. The capacity-weighted average age of U.S. natural gas power plants is 22 years, which is less than hydro (64 years), coal (39 years), and nuclear (36 years). The improved ef?ciency of NGCC plants has led to them being used to a greater degree as baseload generation and increased the overall generation from natural gas. Figure 3.10 shows the initial operating years for the three types of natural gas-fired capacity additions (and their respective share of total natural gas generation in 2016). 25 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000132 Figure 3.10. Capacity Additions of U.S. Utility-Scale Natural Gas-Fired Electricity Generation by Technology Type and Initial Operating Year53 Figure 3.11 shows total natural gas-fired net generation and how the capacity factors of these plants vary by technology over the period 2011–2016. Although NGSTs were originally built principally for baseload use, since the early 2000s, they have been displaced in the dispatch merit order by more efficient NGCC plants designed for greater flexibility. As shown in Figure 3.11, NGST units operate at significantly lower capacity factors than NGCC units. Figure 3.11. Natural Gas Fleet Capacity Factors54 The States of California, Texas, New York, and Florida all had more than 20,000 MW of natural gas-fired capacity at the end of 2016. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) reports that, due to the flexibility, efficiency, and cost competitiveness of NGCC power plants, grid operators have been dispatching NGCC plants more frequently as baseload generators.55 In consequence, the average capacity factor for all NGCC plants has grown from about 40 percent in 2008 to roughly 56 percent in 2016, surpassing that of coal.56 26 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000133 Figure 3.12. Location of Natural Gas Retirements57 .Capacity (MW500 Ownership 1.000 A Merchant A 0 21,500 0 VIEU AA 0 Figure 3.12 shows the retirements of natural gas plants between 2002 and 2016. The ERCOT and CAISO markets have presented difficulties for merchant natural gas (depicted as triangles above; note the concentration of merchant retirements in California and Texas). EIA reported in 2011 that between 2000 and 2010, 33,000 MW of natural gas-?red generation retired (72 percent steam turbines), with an average age at retirement of 48 years and with significantly higher heat rates than the average NGCC.58 3.3 Nuclear Plant Retirements The current operating nuclear power ?eet consists of approximately 54,000 MW of generating capacity in regulated markets and approximately 45,000 MW in restructured electricity markets.59 This represents nine percent of total U.S. utility-scale generation capacity in 2017 and 20 percent of U.S. electric generation in 2016. EIA reports that nuclear plants have higher capacity factors than any other electric generation technology, averaging more than 90 percent (nearly full capacity, full time) over the past ?ve years. The plants refuel every 18 to 24 months.60 27 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000134 Figure 3.13. Location of the Existing Nuclear Fleet61 The first of these units went online in 1969, and the capacity-weighted average age of the nuclear fleet is 37 years old.62 Almost all of the operating plants have received approval to conduct at least one capacity uprate; through 2016, these uprates to the existing fleet have contributed more than 7,000 MW of additional nuclear capacity.63 In addition to capital investments for capacity uprates, nuclear owners make significant capital investments to replace aging components to qualify for license renewal, as well as a suite of additional security and safety investments to comply with new regulations following 9/11 and the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. The United States has the world’s largest nuclear reactor fleet. Nuclear power plants contribute about 60 percent of total U.S. emissions-free generation.64 Located in 60 power plants, the 99 active nuclear reactors provide almost half a million jobs and contribute more than $60 billion to the U.S. GDP.65 Nuclear energy is viewed as a key strategic asset for the United States, and continued U.S. leadership in the global nuclear energy market has important nonproliferation and safety ramifications to national security interests.66 As noted recently by Prof. Michael Webber of the University of Texas: While the environmental and reliability impacts of the [nuclear plant] closures are wellunderstood, what many don't realize is that these closures also pose long-term risks to our national security. As the nuclear power industry declines, it discourages the development of our most important anti-proliferation asset: a bunch of smart nuclear scientists and engineers….The loss of expertise from a declining domestic nuclear workforce makes it hard for Americans to conduct the inspections that help keep the world safe from nuclear weapons.67 Of the 99 active nuclear units, 51 are owned by VIEUs, which rely on regulated cost-of-service ratemaking. This form of ratemaking provides a stable source of cost recovery assuming reasonably prudent operation and management by the utility. The continued operation of these units depends on decisions by their ratemaking authorities: state regulators; state governments; city councils; cooperative boards; Federal entities; and state regulatory bodies. If these plants become less competitive, authorities may decide to close nuclear units on economic grounds. Authorities can also decide to close nuclear units on grounds other than economics—for example, proximity to the New York City 28 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000135 metropolitan area (36 miles) has been cited as an additional concern in the continued operation of the Indian Point nuclear plant. Twenty-eight nuclear plants are now merchant plants that were spun off by VIEUs to affiliates under state electric restructuring efforts in the early 2000s. All of these merchant nuclear units operate in centrally-organized wholesale markets. Many of the units were spun off to exploit high locational marginal prices (LMPs) in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets in the days of high natural gas prices.aa In New York and Illinois, Clean Energy Standards and associated Zero Emission Credits (ZEC) for nuclear plants are being used to help maintain the economic viability and continued operations of nuclear plants, in part to help meet the states’ GHG-limiting goals. Modeled after existing RPS and Renewable Energy Certificates (REC), these ZEC payments68 69 have been established to direct additional funds to existing nuclear power plants that are no longer cost-competitive. Currently, only New York and Illinois have Clean Energy Standard programs, and these programs are being litigated in the courts. A recent Idaho National Laboratory report observes that70  There is an industrywide systemic economic and financial challenge to operating nuclear power plants in centrally organized markets;  Given the confluence of market factors in combination with market structure in centrally organized markets, a significant number of operating nuclear plants have negative cash flow positions today;  Given current trends, these market factors are unlikely to change significantly over the next five years;  Retirement of nuclear plants before their operating licenses expire is caused primarily by lower revenues as opposed to higher operating costs, as wholesale electricity prices have precipitously fallen over the last several years;  The magnitude of the gap between operating revenues and operating costs is in the range of $5–$15 per megawatt-hour (MWh). For a 1,000 MW nuclear unit, approximately every $5/MWh of gap represents about $40 million in annual negative cash flow;  Without action to enhance revenue (e.g., New York ZEC payments), more nuclear plants will face retirements before the end of their operating license in the future.71 Figure 3.14 shows the nuclear reactors that have announced retirement, those that have closed, and those whose closure has been averted by state action. Between 2002 and 2016, 4,666 MW of nuclear generating capacity was announced for retirement, or approximately 4.7 percent of the U.S. total.72 aa Profits from high wholesale prices are not available to utility cost-of-service regulated units because their revenues are set by state regulators to recover operating costs and provide a target return on invested capital. 29 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000136 Figure 3.14. Location of Nuclear Power Plant Retirements: Closed, Announced, and Averted 73 As shown in Table 3-2, another eight reactors representing 7,167 MW of nuclear capacity (7.2 percent of U.S. nuclear capacity and 0.6 percent of total U.S. generating capacity74) have announced retirement plans since 2016. This does not include seven reactors that averted early retirement through state action. 30 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000137 Table 3-2. Nuclear Plant Retirements, Announced Closures, and Plants Averted by State Action75 76 77 As Table 3-2 shows, Indian Point is the only announced closure that lists state policy as the sole reason for retirement. 12 of the 16 plant closure announcements refer to unfavorable market conditions as the driver for plant retirement. Four of the five nuclear power plants (six reactors) that have shut down since 2013 were single-unit plants. Of the 11 nuclear power plants (15 reactors) that have announced 31 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000138 intentions to close—including the five plants (seven reactors) in New York and Illinois that will remain open as a result of state action—four are dual-unit plants and seven are single-unit plants. Table 3-3 shows the range of nuclear plant average costs in 2016 (in $/MWh). The data indicates that single-unit plants are more costly than multi-unit plants, and that operators who own only one nuclear plant have higher costs than those who own a fleet of plants. This is largely because some operating costs, such as security, do not scale linearly with plant size. As a result, single-unit or smaller plants are more expensive, and thus more likely to be retired prior to the end of their license terms. Table 3-3. Average Nuclear Costs by Plant Size and Operator Type, 201678 A nuclear plant fully exposed to low wholesale energy prices can earn additional revenues in three other ways: it may receive capacity payments if it is located in a centrally-organized market with a capacity payment scheme (New York, New England, MISO, and PJM), it can earn revenues for providing reliability products such as frequency response,bb or it may receive ZEC or similar subsidy payments from its host state. If a nuclear plant is owned by a VIEU, its regulators may allow it to continue collecting capital recovery from its ratepayers even though the utility is effectively paying more to run the nuclear unit than it would cost to buy the same energy and capacity under a bilateral contract or spot market purchases. However, as long as natural gas prices stay low and there is an oversupply of energy in many hours, the typical nuclear plant may not be profitable. Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates that 34 of the Nation’s 60 nuclear plants are losing money.79 Not all nuclear power plants close due to unfavorable economics alone. For example, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) has decided to shut down its dual-unit Diablo canyon plant in California due to several factors, including changes in state policy (California is moving to 50 percent RPS by 2040), new environmental regulations (replace once-through cooling system at an estimated cost of $8–$12 billion), local opposition to the NRC relicensing extension application, and uncertainty about future loads to be bb See Section 4.1.1 for the technical definition of frequency. 32 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000139 served by the regulated utility (specifically, community choice aggregation, which allows for third-party retail suppliers). The NRC’s nuclear relicensing program is another factor affecting the future of U.S. nuclear power generation. The NRC issues initial reactor operating licenses covering a 40-year term, but those licenses have been routinely extended. Of the 99 operating nuclear reactors in the United States, 84 have been approved to operate for 60 years, while another nine are currently under review.80 However, based on the current and potential license extensions to 60 years, only three units (Comanche Peak Unit 2 and Watts Bar Units 1 and 2) will still be operating after 2050, unless subsequent license extensions—out to 80 years—are submitted and approved. Two utilities have already announced plans to seek subsequent license renewal for two plants.81 Extended nuclear plant operations often entail major capital upgrades of plant equipment. According to DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, the required capital costs for equipment upgrades drive the total cost for extension; these costs vary by plant. DOE estimates that it requires $500 million to $1 billion per plant of additional capital expenditures to operate a plant for an additional 20 years.82 These routine maintenance and equipment replacements would be required in this time frame regardless of the licensing process.83 Figure 3.15 shows a comparison of license duration to planned closure date. As depicted, most decisions to retire have come well before the expiration of the plant’s license. A few of the plants shown in the figure (indicated by a box around the plant name) were able to avert closure as a result of state actions. Figure 3.15. Nuclear Plant Retirements Compared to NRC Plant Operating License Terms84 85 86 33 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000140 3.4 Hydropower Retirements and Repowering In 2015, the U.S. hydropower fleet included 2,198 active power generation plants with a total capacity of 79,600 MW and 42 pumped-storage hydropower plants totaling 21,600 MW.87 As of 2016, hydropower accounted for more than six percent of net U.S. power sector electricity generation, nearly nine percent of U.S. electric generating capacity, and 97 percent of U.S. utility-scale electrical storage capacity.88 Hydropower is currently the largest source of renewable generation, providing nearly 44 percent of all U.S. renewable energy in 2016.89 90 Half of U.S. hydro capacity is located in the States of Washington, California, and Oregon. The hydropower fleet is the oldest in the U.S. -- as stated in QER 1.2, “About half the U.S. hydroelectric fleet is over 50 years old since many large dams were built between the 1940s and 1960s,”91 and the average hydroelectric facility has been operating for 64 years. However, with routine maintenance and refurbishment of turbines and electrical equipment, the expected life of a hydropower facility is likely to be 100 years or more.92 Hydropower is a varied resource. Forty-eight states (see Figure 3.16) have hydropower facilities, led by California, Oregon, and Washington. Ownership of hydropower plants is highly diverse, split across a wide range of private and public entities. Approximately 50 percent of hydropower capacity is owned by the Federal Government—the three main Federal agencies authorized by Congress to own and operate hydropower plants are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Other public ownership includes public utility districts, irrigation districts, states, and rural cooperatives, whose hydropower resources consist of about 24 percent of the total installed capacity. Private owners—including VIEUs, merchant power producers, and industrial companies— control the remaining 25 percent of total installed capacity.93 Figure 3.16. Hydropower Plants in the United States by Capacity and Average Annual Runoff94 34 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000141 While some hydropower plants are operated as baseload resources, many also support the dynamic behavior of grid operations by offering a full range of ancillary services, including load following, spinning and non-spinning reserve, and voltage and frequency support. This flexibility has historically complimented other traditional forms of baseload generation, such as coal and nuclear. The majority of hydropower capacity is operated as either peaking or run-of-river. Peaking plants shift or delay water releases used for generation to higher value times of the day, contingent on a project’s storage capability and the regulatory requirements governing its operation. While peaking plants have usable storage from a project’s reservoir, run-of-river facilities have little to no ability to store water, and generation only changes based on the natural variability of flows, though even these types of facilities are capable of providing a number of ERS. In some regions, hydropower assets have been operated in more flexible modes in recent years as VRE penetration increases.95 At the beginning of 2011, hydropower plants comprised 24 of the 25 oldest operating power facilities in the United States, with 72 percent of facilities older than 60 years.96 However, significant capital investment toward modernizing and upgrading the existing fleet is consistently taking place to maintain reliability and, at times, uprate the capacity of existing facilities. From 2007 to 2016, the industry invested at least $8.7 billion in refurbishments, replacements, and upgrades to hydropower plants at 143 hydropower facilities, including $1.2 billion and 34 plants in 2016 alone.97 This often includes equipment upgrades, turbine efficiency improvements, and modifications that ensure environmental protection and mitigation as part of relicensing terms. Most of the recent hydropower capacity additions in the United States have come from unit upgrades or additions to existing projects.98 While FERC does receive appropriations from Congress to defray operating costs, these appropriations are recovered completely through annual charges and administrative fees.99 EIA public reports indicate that 1,376 MW (of the total 79,985 MW of U.S. hydroelectric capacity) retired between 2002 and 2017—in most cases as part of repowering projects in which the retired turbine generators were replaced with new equipment. Fifty-two relatively small-scale hydroelectric generators representing 283 MW of generation capacity were retired without replacement.100 3.5 Falling Natural Gas Prices Shale gas development has significantly expanded the availability of natural gas and lowered its cost across the United States and the world.101 Before the widespread use of horizontal drilling techniques in the past decade, U.S. natural gas prices averaged more than $7 per million British thermal unit (MMBtu) between 2003 and 2008, and approached $14/MMBtu in several short periods (including in 2005 after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reduced production and delivery from Gulf of Mexico sources).102 Hydraulic fracturing practices spread and made previously inaccessible gas sources economic, causing natural gas prices to fall, averaging less than $3.20/MMBtu between 2012 and 2016.103 35 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000142 Figure 3.17. Conventional and Shale Natural Gas Production, 2007–2016104 Wholesale electricity prices generally tracked natural gas prices for the study period, as shown in Figure 3.18. This is likely because gas-fired mid-merit and peaker power plants have been the marginal generators following load in many hours of the day, and their short-run marginal costs are driven by natural gas prices.105 Thus, natural gas plants and gas prices have been the largest single driver of spot electricity prices. 36 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000143 Figure 3.18. Wholesale Day-Ahead Electricity Prices vs. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Monthly Average)106 The price of natural gas is a key factor in the prices generators offer in the bid-based RTO/ISO wholesale electricity markets. It is also a factor in the prices set in bilateral power sales, including in the nonRTO/ISO regions such as the Southeast. Consequently, wholesale and bilateral transaction prices are often driven by natural gas prices across large parts of the U.S. power market.cc On one hand, wholesale electricity prices have become increasingly exposed to potential volatility in natural gas delivered prices. On the other hand, the Nation has realized significant economic benefits from the shale revolution— falling natural gas prices between 2007 and 2013 generated an estimated net economic benefit of $48 billion per year over this period.107 Natural gas-fired generation has grown nearly continuously since the late 1980s (see Figure 3.19) for several key reasons. These plants have low capital costs and are, in general, relatively less expensive than some competing technologies.108 They are also much less land-intensive than many other types of generation, and thus often can be more easily sited in urban areas near electric demand.109 Similarly, natural gas pipelines can be built more quickly than electric transmission lines (in most states) because they have a comparatively streamlined permitting process, which often has made it easier for a plant developer to build a new gas-fired plant near a large electric load than to build a power plant farther away and transmit its electricity to large load centers by wire.dd cc When natural gas prices were high, this situation yielded large profits to the then lower-cost coal and nuclear power producers. However, as gas prices and therefore wholesale and bilateral contract power prices have declined, the situation has reversed, and many coal and nuclear plants have been losing money. dd Interstate natural gas pipelines can often be built more quickly than transmission lines because the pipeline owners, once granted a FERC-issued certificate of public convenience and necessity, have eminent domain power under section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act and the procedures set forth under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 71A). By contrast, electric transmission developers are dependent on states to grant eminent domain authorization. 37 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000144 Figure 3.19. Total Annual U.S. Natural Gas Generation, 1950–2016110 The two main types of natural gas generators (NGCCs and CTs) offer distinct operational advantages. NGCC generators are very efficient and have significantly higher capacity factors than single111 (simple) cycle natural gas CTs, which contribute primarily to meeting peak load and may only operate for a few hours a year.112 A CT’s short start-up time and fast ramp rate make it the most responsive component for ensuring enough capacity exists to meet demand during the highest-peak demand hours of the year and help maintain grid reliability, absent affordable grid-scale storage. For this reason, CT capacity factors are usually lowee (generally below 10 percent).113 CTs can go from cold start-up to 100 percent output in seven to 11 minutes; in contrast, coal-fired units ramp on the order of hours, and doing so incurs increased operations and maintenance costs.114 NGCC ramp rates fall somewhere in between, and some NGCC units can ramp to full-rated power in less than 30 minutes.115 This flexibility makes NGCCs and CTs useful in complementing VRE because their flexibility allows these plants to match changes in solar or wind output. Until recently, most NGCC units were used for intermediate and peak loads rather than baseload. However, because natural gas prices have been low for a sustained period, and because NGCC plants retain some of the flexible characteristics of CTs and operate at a higher efficiency and lower cost, these units often are now used for baseload power. As a result, some coal plants have been pushed higher on the merit order, which reduces their average capacity factors, negatively impacts their economics, and can ultimately lead to retirements. ee Some states rely on CTs more regularly than other locations; most notably, Texas, Louisiana, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island all have CT capacity factors greater than 20 percent. https://energy.gov/epsa/downloads/electricitygeneration-baseline-report. 38 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000145 On top of low fuel prices, natural gas-fired power plants have become more fuel efficient over the study period. Figure 3.20 shows how the fuel energy usage per unit of electricity generation of the fleet of generators has changed from 2002 to 2016 for each fuel type. The natural gas fleet has become increasingly efficient (i.e., achieved a lower heat rate) as old steam electric plants have retired and many new, highly efficient NGCC plants have been built and operated at high utilization rates.116 Figure 3.20. Heat Rates for Coal, Nuclear, and Natural Gas, 2002–2016117 3.6 Environmental Regulations A suite of environmental regulations affecting the electricity generation sector had implementation deadlines between 2011 and 2021, stemming from statutes enacted between 1970 and 1990. These regulations have had disparate effects on the costs of various power generation technologies. While the cost of environmental regulations has been significant for coal-fired power plants in particular, the evidence reviewed below indicates that regulations were not the sole cause of observed coal retirements, but were certainly a contributing factor. Following are two key takeaways: 1. Timing suggests that regulations had an impact on retirements. Of the 59,392 MW of coal-fired power plants that retired between 2002 and 2016, approximately 48,800 MW or 82 percent of that capacity retired in the period 2012–2016, when significant environmental regulations would have affected the invest-or-retire decision. This left 270,000 MW of coal-fired capacity on the grid (down from 315,000 MW in 2002), which produced 30 percent118 of total 2016 U.S. electricity output (down from 50 percent in 2002). 2. Many of the coal plants that retired were no longer “baseload.” Due to low natural gas prices and abundant natural gas generation capacity additions, most of the coal plants that retired between 2011 and 2015 (when the environmental regulations took effect) had not been operating in their intended baseload fashion for several years.119 39 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000146 All nuclear power plants are affected by regulations pertaining to safety, security, and upgrades required for license renewal. In addition, nuclear plants are affected by the Cooling Water Intake Rule, and some announced closures have cited, among other reasons, state requirements to modify cooling water systems as a reason for retirement.120 121 Hydropower plants are also affected by other environmental regulations and unique licensing processes. Table 3-4 summarizes major environmental regulations finalized after 2011 affecting coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants. Table 3-4. Major Environmental Regulations Related to Coal, Natural Gas, and Nuclear Generation Name Year Year Authorizing Major Provisions Generation Finalized" Implemented Statute"I Sources Affected Cooling Water 2001 Phase II: Clean Water 0 Promulgated under 316(b) of the Clean Coal Intake Rulem (Phase 1), 2014?2018123 Act Water Act. New sources regulated under Gas 2003 Phase I and existing sources regulated Nuclear (revised under Phase II. Phase 1), 0 States consider requirements for power 2014 plants on a case-by?case basis.124 (Phase ll) . Requires controls to reduce mortality to ?sh and other aquatic organisms. CrossState Air 2011 Phase 1: 2015 Clean Air Act The CrossState Air Pollution Rule Coal Pollution Phase 2: 2017 replaced the Clean Air Interstate Rule Gas Rule?? starting on January 1, 2015, and requires states to reduce power plant emissions of $02 and N0x that contribute to ozone emissions and ?ne particle pollution in other states.m Steam Electric 1974; 1982; 2015 40 CFR 423 0 Established limitations on the discharge of Coal Ef?uent policy update is toxic and other chemical pollutants and Gas Limitations updates in stayed while thermal discharges from existing and new Guidelinesm 1977, EPA reviews steam electric power plants, as well as 1978, rule pretreatment standards. 1980, The 2015 update sets the ?rst Federal 1982, and limits on levels of toxic metals that can be 2015 discharged. New Source 1980; 1980; 2002 Clean Air Act 0 Affects stationary sources of air pollutants. Coal Review"" updates under Requires that a new or modi?ed power Gas updates in court plant obtain a pre-construction permit to 1996 and challenge ensure, among other things, that modern 2002 pollution control equipment is installed. 0 Requirements differ depending on whether or not the plant is located in an area that ff Dates shown here reflect the date of publication in the Federal Register. For regulations only. The New Source Review (NSR) program affects most new and modified power plants and manufacturing facilities. Determining when a facility is making a modi?cation that triggers NSR has been a subject of debate. Attempts have been made over decades to update NSR?the latest in 2002. More information can be found at: and 40 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000147 meets the requirements under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Mercury and Air 2012 2015?2016 Clean Air Act Establishes emissions limits for mercury, Coal Toxics arsenic, acid gases, and other toxic Standards128 pollutants from coal? and oil??red power plants.129 Utilities had until April 2015 to comply with the standards with many plants receiving a 1-year extension. Coal 2015 2015-2018ii Resource Addresses groundwater contamination Coal Combustion Conservation risks from coal combustion residuals Residuals and ?coal ash") disposal in unlined land?lls and Rule?? Recovery Act surface impoundments by establishing national standards for disposal. Regional Haze 1999; Revised state Clean Air Act Requires states to develop long?term Coal Rule policy plans due in strategies, including enforceable measures revisions 2021 to improve visibility in 156 national parks in 2017 and wildemess areas. Aims at returning vis bility to natural conditions by 2064. Carbon 2015 Under EPA Clean Air Act Carbon Pollution Standards established Coal Pollution review emission standards for new fossil fuel- Gas Standards and ?red generators under Clean Air Act Clean Power section 111(b). Plan131 The Clean Power Plan, promulgated under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, establishes C02 emission standards for existing power plants. The collective impact of this suite of regulations required owners to weigh the cost implications of a variety of compliance options for their plants, and to also look closely at whether their market prospects (expected production costs and capital needs, relative coal and natural gas fuel costs, competition from other generators, technology availability, and customer demand levels) or regulatory regime would allow recovery of those costs in future operating years. Most of these rules were litigated and delayed?the Clean Power Plan, for example, currently is stayed and ultimately may be rescinded, but uncertainty about its implementation nonetheless affected plant owners? compliance and retirement planning. In 2011, looking at then-current energy market prospects and fuel prices, it appeared that many power plants would be affected by these environmental regulations. Fitch Ratings estimated that 51,000 MW of coal units (smaller than 200 MW each, with a capacity-weighted average age of nearly 50 years) were at risk for retirement, particularly those operating in restructured electricity markets with no recourse to regulated cost recovery.132 In 2011 and 2012, electric industry projections of likely regulation-induced retirements that focused on the many unknowns associated with pending environmental regulations sometimes showed a very large number of retirements. These unknowns included how stringent environment remediation requirements would be; what remediation technology and strategies might satisfy those requirements; how close together the compliance deadlines would fall; and the implications for regional reliability, ii The Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act 5.612, passed in December 2016, authorizes states to create their own permitting programs for coal combustion residuals disposal, subject to EPA approval. The act specifies that states may adopt alternative standards that are ?at least as protective? as national standards. EPA has not yet issued guidelines or regulations by which state permitting programs can be approved. 41 US. Department of Energy ACC 000148 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability energy production costs, and retail energy rates if too many power plants were to close rather than invest in remediation. Environmental regulations generally increase power plant operating costs by requiring plant owners to install capital equipment that controls plant emissions. The electrical load from equipment such as SO2 scrubbers (“parasitic load”) may also reduce the plant’s net generation available for sale on the grid. Increased operating costs push the compliant plant farther out on the energy supply (dispatch) curve and can cause it to be dispatched less frequently than it would have without the emissions controls, as shown in Figure 3.21 using coal as an example. Figure 3.21. PJM Merit-Order Dispatch: Various Control Technologies133 This figure shows power plants separated by technology type for PJM, in “merit order”, i.e., based on their marginal cost of generation, in the year 2012. The vertical lines represent various levels of load. The diamonds represent marginal costs (sum of fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs) for one subcritical pulverized coal plant with no control technology and that same plant with variations of two select pollution control technologies that reduce acid gas pollution. In principal, all the plants left of a vertical line operate at the level of demand represented by that line. (In reality, transmission constraints and reliability considerations can change that significantly.) As a plant moves to the right on the curve it will tend to operate less due to the increase in marginal cost. Control technologies key: dry FGD = dry flue gas desulfurization; three types of DSI (hydrated lime, trona, and sodium bicarbonate) = dry sorbent injection. Another control technology not shown that is used to reduce acid gas emissions is wet flue gas desulfurization. Technology key: Renew = other renewables not including hydropower or wind power; Water = hydropower; LOil = light oil-fired power plants; HOil = heavy oil-fired power plants; Nuc = nuclear power. 42 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000149 3.6.1 Coal Plants and Environmental Regulation Existing coal-fired power plants must not only comply with all Federal requirements related to emissions and water use, wastewater treatment, and solid waste management, but also with any additional applicable state regulations.134 Cost impacts of these regulations varied. The EPA reported that a typical coal-fueled unit with a capacity of 700 MW could incur incremental operating and maintenance costs ranging from $287 million to $351 million to install a scrubber, from $116 million to $137 million to install a selective catalytic reduction unit, and from $97 million to $114 million to install a baghouse (fabric filter). Fitch estimated the lifetime costs and reduced cash flow associated with environmental retrofits at $1,700–$1,900 per kilowatt (kW) for a 100 MW plant burning bituminous coal, as compared with a range of $1,200–$1,300/kW for a 500 MW plant.135 These costs are on par with those of constructing a new typical (i.e., subcritical) coal plant of similar size during this same time period (averaging $1,361/kW).136 Reported planned retirements from that time suggest that approximately 27,000 MW or 8.5 percent of 2011 coal-fired capacity was rendered uneconomic under the combination of regulatory compliance costs, little demand growth, and falling natural gas prices.137 The MATS rule was potentially the most expensive and immediate of the suite of pending regulations, with a compliance deadline of April 2015 (later extended to April 2016 for some plants). Further, owners of coal facilities were dealing with MATS compliance in combination with the cost of imminent additional regulations of CO2, along with other GHGs. EIA reported that by the end of 2012, 64 percent of the U.S. coal generating capacity in the electric power sector already had the appropriate environmental control equipment (most reported using flue gas desulfurization) to comply with the MATS rule and operate past 2016; another six percent planned to add control equipment; 10 percent had announced plans to retire; and the other 20.4 percent still had to decide whether, how, and when to upgrade or retire their plants.138 The dominant MATS compliance strategy among coal-fired plant owners was to install activated carbon injection (Figure 3.22), which averaged a relatively modest $5.8 million per generator from 2015 to 2016. EIA estimates that “operators invested at least $6.1 billion from 2014 to 2016 to comply with MATS or other environmental regulations.”139 In its rulemaking, EPA estimated an annualized cost of $9.6 billion in 2015, declining to $7.4 billion annually in 2030.140 43 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000150 Figure 3.22. Changes in U.S. Coal Capacity, December 2014–April 2016141 The retrofit-or-retire decision for owners is also impacted by EPA's New Source Review (NSR) regulations that can affect owners’ ability to enhance plant efficiency due to the delay, cost, and uncertainty associated with obtaining an NSR permit. The NSR permitting program requires stationary sources of air pollution—including factories, industrial boilers, and power plants—to get permits before construction starts, whether the unit is being newly built or modified.142 This is an important concern for owners considering retrofitting an existing power plant with carbon capture equipment to reduce CO2 emissions, or adding new components to improve operating efficiency. These upgrades could trigger the NSR requirements of the Clean Air Act because they would constitute a “physical change,” or lead to a designation of the change as a “major modification,” subjecting the unit to NSR permitting requirements. The uncertainty stemming from NSR creates an unnecessary burden that discourages rather than encourages installation of CO2 emission control equipment and investments in efficiency because of the additional expenditures and delays associated with the permitting process.143 144 Ironically, the uncertainty surrounding NSR requirements has led to a significant lack of investment in plant and efficiency upgrades, which would otherwise lead to more efficient power generation, benefits to grid management, and reduced environmental impacts. EPA has acknowledged these burdens and has made attempts to reform the rules to improve and streamline NSR: As applied to existing power plants and refineries, EPA concludes that the NSR program has impeded or resulted in the cancellation of projects which would maintain and improve reliability, efficiency and safety of existing energy capacity. Such discouragement results in lost capacity, as well as lost opportunities to improve energy efficiency and reduce air pollution.145 The NSR program distinguished between “routine maintenance and repair” of existing facilities—which would be allowed—and more “substantial modification” of existing facilities, which would put the facilities over the threshold and thus require them to meet new emissions standards. Environmentalists argued that owners of electric generation and industrial plants were building virtually new facilities from the inside out by exploiting the “routine maintenance and repair” exclusion from NSR. EPA changed its interpretation in the 1990s to a more rigorous standard, culminating in numerous enforcement-related lawsuits beginning in the late 1990s.146 44 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000151 By the late 2000s, some older coal units operating without pollution controls were no longer operating as baseload units, having operational capacity factors estimated at 47 percent to 56 percent.147 As Figure 3.23 shows, rather than acting as baseload units at high capacity factors, these older units (with an average capacity of 109 MW) were operating at falling capacity factors. The units that retired in 2014 had an average capacity factor of 13 percent in 2013. Figure 3.23. Average Coal Plant Capacity Factors, 2008–2014148 Coal plant capacity factors generally fell from 2008 through 2014, with plants that retired in 2014 operating at much lower capacity factors than all coal plants. Some owners delayed their retirement announcements and retrofit decisions in order to see how the regulation litigation challenges played out, in case a late court ruling made compliance unnecessary, signifying that the cost of complying with those regulations was a factor in their retirement decisions. Others delayed closing uneconomic plants to see if enough other plants retired, in hopes that the resulting shift in market dynamics and prices might render the unretired plants profitable again.149 Figure 3.24 shows total U.S. coal capacity from 2008 through mid-2016 and projections through mid-2018. While there was a fall in coal plant capacity in 2015 associated with the MATS compliance deadline, EIA finds that fewer coal facilities retired in 2015 and the first half of 2016 than EIA had projected ahead of the compliance deadline. Specifically, in 2015 and until the April 2016 extended MATS deadline, about 20,000 MW of coal capacity retired and another 9,000 MW of coal capacity converted to natural gas, while EIA projected 50,000 MW of retirements between 2013 and 2020, with the majority retiring in 2015 in response to MATS.150 However, EIA’s projection also included other factors that can drive retirement decisions, such as the Clean Power Plan. 45 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000152 Figure 3.24. Projected and Actual Coal Retirements, 2008–2018151 Fewer coal plants retired in 2015–2016 than projected. 3.6.2 Natural Gas Plants and Environmental Regulation Because natural gas emits far less air pollution than coal-fired power plants,152 the regulatory burden and cost to natural gas-fired power plants is much lower than for coal plants. ERCOT’s December 2014 analysis estimated that the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)jj and the Cooling Water Intake Rule would impose moderate compliance costs on natural gas-fired power plants.153 Specifically, ERCOT estimated costs of $0.10–$2.75/MWh for CSAPR and $0.10–$0.50/MWh for the Cooling Water Intake Rule. The large majority of natural gas plants that have retired are NGSTs, which are less efficient than the newer NGCCs.154 From 2002 to 2016, there was a steady stream of NGST retirements, some of which may be linked to decisions about the cost effectiveness of retrofit upgrades. However, during the period 2014–2016, 23,500 MW of new natural gas capacity was added, nearly double the total natural gas capacity that was retired as part of the transition from NGST units to more efficient NGCC units.155 NGCC plants have replaced NGST plants for baseload use and natural gas combustion turbines have been built for peak power demand. 3.6.3 Nuclear Plants and Environmental Regulation The principal environmental regulation affecting nuclear power plants is the Cooling Water Intake Rule, which applies to all types of power plants but is most challenging for nuclear plants. A revised version of the Cooling Water Intake Rule has been in effect since 2003. The rule was promulgated to protect aquatic life. States may decide how to implement the rule, such as by requiring a nuclear (or other) plant to invest in a closed-loop cooling system to replace once-through ocean or waterway cooling. Three of the nuclear plants that have announced closures (Oyster Creek in New Jersey, Diablo Canyon in jj Finalized in 2011 and effective in 2015. 46 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000153 California, and Indian Point in New York) have cited disputes with their respective states over cooling water rule compliance among the reasons for plant retirement. 156 157 The Administrative Consent Order between Exelon and New Jersey establishing Oyster Creek’s 2019 retirement specifically mentions Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act as part of the state’s justification in requiring the construction of cooling towers if the plant were to operate for the full duration of its license extension.158 Nuclear plants are also affected by other regulatory factors and fees that are not imposed on other types of power plants. Recent examples include major safety reviews following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant failures in 2011. A recent study found that the rising regulatory costs of nuclear energy— which approach $60 million per year—exceed the profit margins of many of these plants.159 3.6.4 Hydropower Plants and Environmental Regulation As authorized under the Federal Power Act, FERC issues licenses to non-Federal hydropower projects, which comprise roughly 50 percent of existing U.S. hydropower capacity. The FERC regulatory framework involves numerous participants, such as Federal and state resource agencies; nongovernmental organizations; state, local, and tribal entities; and the public. Because of the complexity of the regulatory processes and numerous agencies involved, hydropower licensing timelines often are cited as being among the lengthiest and costliest for energy projects in the United States. A DOE analysis looking at the development timelines of 29 projects that came online from 2005 to 2013 found that the median project took over 15 years from application to operation.160 For wind and solar, the average permitting time is two to four years.161 A few hydroelectric power plants have not sought relicensing due to concerns over the cost of meeting mandatory environmental requirements imposed by Federal and state resource agencies. Capital upgrade requirements can include capacity uprates (initiated by the plant owner rather than a regulator), dam safety upgrades, or environmental improvements.162 3.7 Growing VRE Deployment Wind and solar PV—collectively, VRE—have constituted the vast majority of the VRE deployed in recent years. Wind first surpassed 1 percent of total U.S. generation in 2008, while total solar generation reached that threshold in 2015.kk Figure 3.25 shows trends in penetration—as a percentage of total generation—for wind, solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, and biomass power plants in the United States since 2001. Total end-use demand served by wind generation tripled from 1.5 percent in 2008 to 4.5 percent in 2013. Total renewable generation has now exceeded 14 percent of the U.S. total, with hydro and wind comprising the largest components. kk While annual variation in water availability affects conventional hydroelectric output from year to year, hydro generally has been consistent between 6 percent and 8 percent of total generation since 2001. https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7 6.pdf. 47 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000154 Figure 3.25. VRE Generation by Fuel as Percentage of Total U.S. Generation, 2002–2016163 At the end of 2016, U.S. installed wind capacity surpassed that of hydro for the first time (see Figure 3.26).164 165 However, given the hydro fleet’s higher average capacity factors and the above-normal precipitation on the West Coast so far this year, hydro generation will likely once again exceed wind generation in 2017, though the gap continues to narrow. Figure 3.26. Cumulative U.S. Utility-Scale Wind and Hydroelectric Generation Capacity, 1915– December 2016166 3.7.1 Technology and Policy Drivers for Deployment The deployment of wind and solar power has been spurred by a combination of technology cost declines; state RPS; private sector sustainability goals; consumer choice; Federal and state incentives; 48 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000155 transmission expansion—such as the Texas Competitive Renewable Energy Zone project—to reach highquality resource areas; and Federal and state environmental, air quality, and GHG emissions reductions policies. RPS—now in 29 states and the District of Columbia, covering 55 percent of total U.S. retail electricity sales—have also been substantial drivers of VRE growth, as they are associated with 60 percent of renewable generation growth since 2000.167 Though wind has historically been the largest beneficiary of RPS policies, more RPS-driven solar than wind was added in 2015.168 RPS also create a market for RECs. RECs represent some of the environmental attributes of renewable generation that can be bought, sold, and applied to meet certain state RPS plans, and they create an additional subsidy to renewable generation. Technologies typically experience cost reductions as their deployment grows due to technology improvement and increasing economies of scale. Lower investment costs, in turn, spur further deployment—since 2009, solar PV installed system costs have fallen approximately 60 percent on a per kilowatt basis for residential and commercial systems (from $7.06/WDC to $2.93/WDC for residential and from $5.23/WDC to $2.13/WDC for commercial) and 70 percent for utility-scale systems (from $4.46/WDC to $1.42/WDC).169 However, other factors can interrupt this general trend; for example, increases in warranty costs and the prices of commodities such as steel and fiberglass (among other factors) drove wind turbine installed system costs on a per-megawatt basis to double between 2000 and 2008 (though these costs went on to decline by 40 percent since 2010).170 Importantly, these capital cost trends do not account for technology improvements that improve performance and economics. For wind, improvements in turbine technologies and taller towers have resulted in increased capacity factors. For example, in 2015, capacity factors averaged 25.8 percent for wind projects built from 1998–2003 and averaged 41.2 percent for wind projects built in 2014.171 Similarly, for utility-scale PV, optimized system design—including use of single-axis tracking and increasing inverter loading ratios—partially contributes to capacity factors increasing from 21 percent for 2010 vintage projects to 26.7 percent for 2014 vintage projects in 2015. In addition to research and development (R&D)—which is aimed at reducing technology costs through innovation—the investment tax credit (ITC) and PTC, as well as state-level RPS, have driven expansion of VRE, particularly wind and solar. Figure 3.27 shows the substantial increase in wind capacity since 1998 during the period when a PTC has been in effect. It also suggests the wind industry’s tendency to increase investments in years when the tax credit was due to expire and its extension was uncertain. The current PTC is scheduled to be phased out after 2019.172 The solar ITC—currently at 30 percent—will be reduced after 2021 to its statutory level of 10 percent for commercial and industrial projects, and will be phased out completely for residential projects.173 49 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000156 Figure 3.27. Relationship between the PTC and Annual Wind Capacity Additions The PTC has accelerated wind project deployment significantly—between 2000 and 2013, cumulative wind capacity grew from less than 5,000 MW to more than 60,000 MW—though capacity additions noticeably track the PTC expiration and extension schedule. Similarly, the dramatic decrease in wind capacity additions during PTC expiration years underscore the notion that credits are driving deployment, rather than market decisions. For example, during the PTC expiration “cliff” in 2013, new builds counted for 1 MW of added capacity. After renewal of the PTC, new capacity jumped to 5 MW.174 This change occurred in the absence of any change in state RPS requirements. A panel of economists at a May 2017 FERC technical conference cited state-level RPS and Federal tax credits for VRE as examples of market-distorting subsidies and mandates. These policies reduce revenues for traditional baseload power plants by lowering the wholesale electric prices they receive and by displacing a portion of their output. To date, however, the data do not show a widespread relationship between VRE penetration and baseload retirements, as shown in Figure 3.28.175 50 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000157 Figure 3.28. VRE Penetration as a Percentage of 2016 Generation versus Retired Capacity since 2010 as a Percentage of Non-VRE Capacity176 While concerns exist about the impact of widespread deployment of renewable energy on the retirement of coal and nuclear power plants, the data do not suggest a correlation. Subsidies Federal and state governments use subsidies, mandates, and prohibitions to affect how public and private entities behave. Subsidies make the favored behavior or product more appealing relative to other competing products by accelerating its development (as with R&D and direct construction expenditures), lowering its ultimate cost to the consumer (as with tax incentives, low lease payments or grants), or making the product better known and more appealing (customer education, ratings, and marketing). In contrast to subsidies, mandates and prohibitions create absolute requirements for the user for whether and how much of the targeted product to consume. The Federal Government has always used a variety of subsidies to support a myriad of public and private sector goals. Over the long term, subsidies are spent on different technologies at different times, reflecting differing societal priorities and technology maturities. Early subsidies included Federal construction of hydroelectric dams and multi-purpose water management projects beginning in the 1930s. Energy R&D spending began in the 1950s with the passage of the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, with major Federal investments in the commercialization of nuclear electricity. R&D investments 51 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000158 increased sharply after the oil price shocks and energy crisis in the 1970s, and renewable energy R&D supported VRE. Accurately accounting for energy subsidies and expenditures is highly dependent on the scope and time period of the analysis. For example, some tax incentives may affect energy industries but are not specific energy-related measures, such as Section 199 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which allows tax deductions for domestic manufacturing. Natural gas producers, along with many other types of manufacturers, have been able to take advantage of this tax incentive even though it was not an energyspecific measure. This is just one example of the difficulty in examining energy-related subsidies and expenditures both from Federal and non-Federal sources, many of which may not be directly comparable.ll As a snapshot of Federal subsidies and support for electricity generating technologies for a given year, Table 3-5 shows electricity production subsidies and support that includes breakouts by direct expenditures, tax expenditures, R&D, and other Federal programs, compiled by EIA for Fiscal Year 2013. Although this data has not been compiled for every year, the 2013 data can be instructive. For example, VRE technologies received a majority of Federal support that year relative to other technologies, particularly reflecting the technical maturity of VRE relative to conventional technologies. ll For a longer discussion on energy subsidies and various reports examining energy subsidies, see https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 52 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000159 Table 3-5. Fiscal Year 2013 Electricity Production Subsidies and Support177 Similarly, it is important to note how these particular results are driven by the unique nature of a given year. For example, the large direct expenditures for wind and solar overwhelmingly arise due to the Treasury 1603 program enabled by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which allowed one-time cash grants to eligible renewable generators in lieu of tax credits. This was only available to generators who began construction in 2009–2011, and as such is no longer a direct expenditure. There is no complete multi-year assessment available that describes and analyzes the Federal subsidies and support provided to different generation technologies over time. Continued examination of Federal subsidies and support, and provision of this information to the public, can better inform the decisions made by Federal, state, and local entities. Workforce Impacts of Growing VRE Deployment As the electricity system changes, so do the types of jobs, skills needed, and education or training required. The evolving demands of the grid are creating new opportunities in information and communication technologies and in the deployment of new generation, including natural gas and VRE. Job growth has been strong in the VRE sector, and the solar and wind workforce increased by 25 and 32 percent, respectively, in 2016.178 DOE’s 2017 U.S. Energy and Employment Report found that the solar and wind industries provide 373,000 and 101,000 jobs, respectively, across the Nation.179 Veterans 53 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000160 comprise a higher percentage of employees in the electricity industry compared to other industries, and in 2015, the solar industry provided nearly 17,000 jobs for veterans in manufacturing, installation, and project management.180 3.8 Flattening Electricity Demand Between 1970 and 2005, total U.S. electricity generation to meet customer demand grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.7 percent.181 But since 2005, generation growth has stalled with a CAGR of only 0.05 percent from 2005 to 2015, even as the Nation’s GDP grew by 1.3 percent per year over the same period.182 Electricity demand historically had risen with economic growth (real GDP), but the two began decoupling around 2000, as shown in Figure 3.29. EIA attributes this decline in the demand growth rate to a variety of factors, including the cumulative impact of energy efficiency programs, standards, and codes; technology improvements in appliances, lighting, and other end-use equipment; and broader structural changes, such as a shift toward less electricity-intensive industries and slower population growth.183 Figure 3.29. Gross Domestic Product and Net Electricity Production, Historical (1950–2016) and Projected (2017–2027)184 185 186 187 Figure 3.30 shows one analysis of how efficiency improvements, coupled with structural changes in the economy, have led to flattening energy use in recent years. Overall, there has been significant progress across the U.S. economy in improving the value of goods and services produced per unit input of energy. For example, electricity productivity in the industrial sector—measured in dollars of economic output per kilowatt-hour of electricity input—nearly doubled between 1990 and 2014. The noticeable dip in both GDP and net electricity generation in 2008–2009 reflects the U.S. recession, which lowered electricity usage enough to affect power plant economics and prompt some plant closures.188 54 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000161 Figure 3.30. Estimated U.S. Energy Savings from Structural Changes in the Economy and Energy Efficiency, 1980–2016189 190 The U.S. economy has made significant progress in improving the value of goods and services produced per unit input of energy, through both energy efficiency and structural changes to the U.S. economy. Figure 3.31 shows more broadly the impact of these changes on the EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) Reference case electricity sales forecast for various years. Each AEO forecast is made assuming that laws and regulations in effect at the time of the projection will continue unchanged through the projection period, unless scheduled end dates for those laws and regulations are within that period. The objective is to provide a “business-as-usual case;” no assumptions about new policies are included. Over the past several decades, new Federal and state policies, market forces, and broader economic factors have contributed to lowering levels of electricity consumption compared to what was expected to occur in absence of any new policy, as shown by the comparison of historical Reference case projections to actual U.S. electricity sales (shown as dotted lines in Figure 3.31). 55 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000162 Figure 3.31. EIA Annual Electricity Sales 2000–2016 (terawatt-hours) and AEO Reference Case Electricity Sales Projections 2017–2030191 A changing policy and market environment since 2000 has made it challenging to accurately forecast electricity demand. TWh is terawatt-hours. As stated in QER 1.2: Currently, about 90 percent of residential, 60 percent of commercial, and 30 percent of industrial energy consumption are used in appliances and equipment that are subject to Federal minimum efficiency standards implemented, and periodically updated, by the Department of Energy. Between 2009 and 2030, these cost-effective standards are projected to save consumers more than $545 billion in utility costs, reduce energy consumption by 40.8 quads, and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by over 2.26 billion metric tons.192 There are two significant impacts from the growth in energy efficiency. First, suppliers can no longer expect robust demand growth. Second, because customers are buying less electricity, the market price of electricity clears lower on the electricity supply curve (all else equal). Thus, higher-cost power plants that might have been dispatched and earned revenues in a higher-demand market are dispatched less frequently and earn less revenue due to increased energy efficiency. nn The report, Economic and Market Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Commercial Fleet, produced by Idaho National Laboratory and the Center for Advanced Energy Studies (September 2016), attributes low electricity market prices to “low natural gas prices, low demand growth, increased penetration of renewable generation, and negative electricity market prices.” 56 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000163 3.9 Power Plant Retirements Looking Forward While recognizing the difficulty in making any long-range forecast, it is useful to examine modeled scenarios to understand how the factors affecting retirements are expected to evolve. Figure 3.32 shows the announced and modeled coal, NGCC, and nuclear retirements and additions from 2017 through 2030 in EIA’s AEO 2017. This shows that coal retirements are projected to continue in the near term— with 37,800 MW projected to retire between 2017 and 2022—and taper off in the longer term, with another 4,400 MW of retirements between 2023 and 2030. Announced nuclear retirements in the near term account for most projected retirements, with an additional 3,000 MW of modeled unplanned retirements in the period 2019–2020 due to market conditions and uncertainty. A modest number of NGCC plants are also expected to retire in the near term in this modeled scenario. Figure 3.32. Baseload Capacity Additions and Retirements from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario)193 Three factors impacting the economic conditions of baseload generators that are modeled in the AEO— natural gas price, electricity sales, and VRE generation—are shown in Figure 3.33 below. In general, there is a mixed outlook for these factors as they affect baseload generators: 1. Natural gas prices for the electric power sector are modeled to rise modestly, increasing 30 percent over 2017 levels by 2022 and rising more slowly thereafter. While this may provide some upward pressure on electricity prices, natural gas prices are notoriously challenging to predict. 2. Electricity continues to grow at a slow rate—modeled at 0.8 percent CAGR through 2030. 3. Over the same period, VRE generation is modeled to approximately double to 600 terawatthours by 2030. The majority of this growth occurs by 2024 and slows thereafter, reflecting the expiration and stepdown of the PTC and ITC in 2020 and 2022, respectively. Based on these trends, unless natural gas prices or electricity demand rise significantly faster than projected, the economic conditions of baseload generators are not projected to change significantly in the near term. 57 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000164 Figure 3.33. Modeled Projections for Natural Gas Price, Electricity Sales, and VRE Generation from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario)194 VRE generation includes wind, utility-scale PV, and distributed PV. MCf is million cubic feet While the financial strains on existing coal, nuclear, and even older natural gas plants have been real and significant, the role of conventional resources continues to evolve. PJM notes the changing nature of baseload: “Baseload” can generally be thought of as those units which operate the great majority of hours of the year to meet load requirements. Given the reduction in gas prices, we have seen a noticeable inversion in the types of units which clear in the market in the off-peak hours and thus fit the traditional notion of “baseload.” Specifically, due to low energy prices and the overall efficiency of the units, combined cycle natural gas units are dispatched as baseload with coal units more often being cycled and thus dispatched in what has traditionally been deemed “mid-merit” units.195 EIA staff analyzed NGCC unit dispatch trends over time, from 1998 to 2016.196 NGCC plant operation closely follows natural gas prices—when prices were high in the mid-2000s, the number of NGCC starts (when the plant goes from zero output into production) increased as the capacity factor decreased, confirming that these plants were used more in load-following mode rather than baseload-operation mode. Capacity factor has been rising steadily and starts have fallen since about 2010, indicating that NGCC units are being used in more hours at higher capacity factors—i.e., in baseload-type operation (see Figure 3.34). 58 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000165 Figure 3.34. NGCC Capacity Factors and Number of Starts, 1998–2016 Decreased starts and increased capacity factors indicate that NGCC plants are increasingly used for baseload-type operation. Market conditions will continue to be dynamic, such as with the scheduled phasing out of the wind PTC and solar ITC. Trends in natural gas prices and efficiency gains would also need to be thoroughly examined and accurately forecast in order to get a clearer picture of expected retirements over the coming years. In the event present market, policy, and technology conditions continue, the retirement of coal and nuclear facilities is likely to continue, as well as new builds of natural gas and VRE capacity. Going forward, coal and natural gas generators will continue to monitor several EPA rules:  The Steam Electric Effluent Limitation Guidelines have been postponed until EPA completes review of the rule finalized in 2015.197 EPA recently completed an extended public comment period of the rule and comments are currently being reviewed.198 Based on the 2015 finalized rule, EPA estimated industry-wide costs at approximately $480 million per year,199 although industry groups such as the Utility Water Act Group dispute this estimate.oo 200  The Cooling Water Intake Rule for existing sources is currently being phased in. Regions have been given authority to consider requirements for power plants on a case-by-case basis. EPA estimated an annualized post-tax final rule cost of $147.6 million for electric generators.201 However, due to the flexibility allotted to the regional permit directors, the compliance timeline and costs are unclear.  While MATS and CSAPR have affected plant decisions to retrofit or retire in the recent past, most of the capital investment for MATS and CSAPR compliance has already occurred (see Table 3-4). In the future, generators will continue to have smaller operating and maintenance costs associated with MATS. For example, based on generator survey responses, ERCOT estimates an average operating and maintenance cost for MATS of $0.75/MWh,202 which is approximately oo According to a petition submitted by the Utility Water Act Group, selected individual compliance cost estimates from its members included: $308 million (Dynegy), $200 million (NRG Energy), and $400–$500 million (American Electric Power). 59 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000166 3 percent of the average monthly day-ahead wholesale electricity price (approximately $23.5/MWh) for the ERCOT North Hub from 2015 to 2016.203  The Coal Combustion Residuals Rule, prompted by a 2008 coal ash spill, is currently being implemented.204 EPA estimated the annualized cost of the rule to be $509–$735 million for coalfired electric utilities.205  The Regional Haze Rule, which currently requires states to submit state plans for compliance by 2021, is expected to mainly affect Western states (the rule aims to improve visibility in national parks, which are located primarily in Western states). It also includes a provision allowing power plants that are already complying with CSAPR (eastern half of the United States206) to substitute their compliance status for compliance with the Regional Haze Rule.207 208  In 2015, EPA finalized New Source Performance Standards, entitled Carbon Pollution Standards, which set CO2 emission limits for new generators.pp These standards are currently under legal challenge.  The Clean Power Plan rule to reduce CO2 emissions from existing power plants was promulgated by EPA in 2015 for effect in 2022 for existing plants, but those rules are under review by EPA— which may initiate actions to rescind them—and by the courts. Several large coal plants built after 1970 with capacities greater than 1,000 MW have announced plans to retire in the next few years. These plants have already made the capital investments needed to comply with MATS, indicating that MATS itself is not the single forcing factor in these retirement decisions. Although these plants were designed to operate around the clock, low wholesale electric prices tied to natural gas were a significant driver that caused them to operate at lower capacity factors. As Rhodium Group analyst John Larsen states: The wider market dynamics are more concerning for coal…. For a power plant to make money today, it must be able to ramp up and down to coincide with the variable levels of renewable generation coming online. That makes combined cycle natural gas plants profitable, even at lower prices. [But] coal plants have relatively high and fixed operating costs and are relatively inflexible. They make their money by running full-out.209 While there have been significantly fewer retirements of hydropower generation than coal or nuclear, this does not mean that hydropower operators are immune to the same market and regulatory forces that have affected other baseload plants. Depressed prices and costly regulatory barriers decrease the margins on all hydroelectric facilities and, in some cases, cause economic stress.210 A certain amount of new development continues, primarily through powering existing non-powered dams and installing hydropower in conduits and other constructed waterways. Two hundred and forty-two new hydropower projects, with a total capacity of 3,250 MW, were in the U.S. development pipeline at the end of 2016, including 93 MW under construction. At least nine projects (225 MW) reached commercial operation in 2016.211 pp Under current market conditions, these standards were not expected to affect new build decisions because economic conditions were already unfavorable for building new coal units. For example, EIA’s 2015 AEO, which does not include the Clean Air Act 111(b) carbon standards for new coal plants, builds only a very small amount (roughly 400 MW) of new coal capacity by 2040 beyond what is already planned. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf. 60 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000167 4 Reliability and Resilience The April 14 memo expressed concerns over whether the erosion of baseload power is compromising a reliable and resilient grid. It also asked whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which that could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. Indeed, a recent National Academies study indicates that there is a growing emphasis within the industry on grid resilience.212 In this chapter, we address those issues, starting with the question of whether grid reliability has been lessened by the retirement of baseload and other coal, nuclear, and natural gas power plants over the past 15 years. The Department staff offer three general findings: 1) A diverse portfolio of generation resources and well-planned transmission investments are critical to meeting regional reliability objectives. A resource portfolio approach is necessary to ensure ERS, fuel assurance, and flexibility capabilities are available. Conventional generation sources, in particular hydropower, combustion turbines, and steam turbines, are currently the chief providers of these attributes. 2) One of the greatest challenges to integrating VRE lies in managing its effects (variability, uncertainty, location specificity, non-synchronous generation, and low capacity factor) on grid operations and planning. Lack of long-term forecasting, for example, increases risks when scheduling planned generation outages and managing severe weather events. 3) There are tradeoffs between multiple desirable attributes for the electric grid. A more reliable and resilient system may be more costly than the least-cost system. Consumer life, safety and health are dependent on a reliable and resilient electric grid, making the grid a national security asset. Infrastructure hardening213 and grid recovery and restoration strategies require advanced planning and investment. Reliability NERC defines BPS reliability as a function of adequacy and operating reliability. In this context, NERC defines adequacy as, “the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.” Operating reliability is defined as, “the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances to system stability or unanticipated loss of system components.”qq 214 Reliability operates in different time scales. Long-term reliability is closer to resource adequacy: it is the business of ensuring that there will be enough resources available to serve customers’ load several years qq Both components of reliability are needed. Adequacy, often called “resource adequacy,” is much easier to model and thus forecast for the future, particularly a decade or two out. Most longer-term studies, such as by DOE and its national laboratories, largely look at this one aspect of reliability (with some consideration of operational reliability aspects as well). Operational reliability, in contrast, is very difficult (both in data needed and computational complexity) to completely model and thus forecast in definitive terms many years out. 61 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000168 out plus a reserve margin (typically 15 percent). Short-term reliability ensures that there will be enough capacity to meet demand over the next few hours. Maintaining short-term reliability has grown more complex in light of higher levels of VRE, evolving customer electricity usage patterns, and the wider use of 15-minute load metering and customer time-of-use rates. However, grid operators have kept up with these factors by developing new information technology and analysis capabilities, such as more sophisticated wind and solar forecasting tools. Figure 4.1. illustrates the timescale for different grid events. Events on very short timescales, such as frequency regulation, match second-by-second generation and demand. Medium-term activities and factors include day-ahead and day-of energy markets, security-constrained economic dispatch,rr contingency analysis, asset availability, relay and other equipment operations, and operator action. Longer-term activities and factors include system planning, capacity markets, interconnection rules, reliability standards, and energy market designs. Grid operators must thoroughly consider all these timescales and their associated events in ensuring short-term through long-term reliability. Figure 4.1. System Operation Time Scales215 Planning to maintain system reliability depends on managing (potentially) multiple events in varying time scales. NERC’s CEO Gerry Cauley spoke to the Energy Secretary’s concerns by describing the current reliability issues. As a common thread in each of our Reliability Assessments, the most pressing reliability issues in North America are:  As conventional resources prematurely retire, sufficient amounts of essential reliability services, such as frequency and voltage support, ramping capability, etc., must be replaced based on the configuration and needs of the system. 
  Resource flexibility is needed to supplement and offset the variable characteristics of solar and wind generation. 
  Higher reliance on natural gas exposes electric generation to fuel supply and delivery vulnerabilities, particularly during extreme weather conditions. Maintaining fuel diversity and security provides best assurance for resilience. Premature retirements rr “Security-constrained economic dispatch [of power plants] is an area-wide optimization process designed to meet electricity demand at the lowest cost, given the operational and reliability limitations of the area’s generation fleet and transmission system.” https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/final ED 03 01 07 rev2.pdf. 62 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000169 of fuel secure baseload generating stations reduces resilience to fuel supply disruptions. 
  Because the system was designed with large, central-station generation as the primary source of electricity, significant amounts of new transmission may be needed to support renewable resources located far from load centers.216 To make risk-informed decisions about how to maintain and protect BPS reliability, NERC has often stressed the need to study evolving market, technology, policy, and regulatory factors, as well as to understand how they are affecting “fuel supply, generation and transmission infrastructure planning, operations and investment decisions.”217 Resilience NERC uses the infrastructure resilience definition that the National Infrastructure Advisory Council developed in 2010: “Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.”218 Examples of events that test a system’s resilience include severe natural events (wildfires, hurricanes, floods, droughts, and earthquakes) and coordinated, extensive physical and cyber-attacks and geomagnetic disturbances. Resilience is typically achieved through hardening or recovery. Hardening refers to physically changing infrastructure to make it less susceptible to damage. Hardening improves the durability and stability of energy infrastructure, making it better able to withstand the impacts of hurricanes, weather events or attacks. Recovery, by contrast, refers to the ability of an energy facility to recover quickly from damage to any of its components or to any of the external systems on which it depends – typically through storage and redundancy. Recovery measures do not prevent damage; rather, they enable energy systems to continue operating despite damage, and/or they promote a rapid return to normal operations when damages/outages occur. Advanced planning for contingencies, interagency coordination, and training exercises enable an effective restoration process. BPS reliability is adequate219 today despite the retirement of 11 percent of the generating capacity available in 2002, as significant additions from natural gas, wind, and solar have come online since then. Overall, at the end of 2016, the system had more dispatchable capacity capable of operating at high utilization rates than it did in 2002.220 The composition of the BPS and its requirements, however, are changing, so simple extrapolation of previous reliability trends is not prudent. In this chapter, we review current system reliability and resilience, look at how power plant operations are changing with the evolving generation mix, and evaluate potential reliability and resilience issues. 4.1 Assessing Challenges to Reliability NERC is the primary entity responsible for ensuring BPS reliability,ss and collaborates with FERC to ensure compliance. Over the last several years, NERC has consistently highlighted how the power ss NERC is the designated “electric reliability organization” under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, monitoring reliability for all lower 48 states and, under special agreement, portions of the Canadian and Mexican grids. 63 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000170 sector’s rapid transformation may require new approaches to reliability measurement and planning in order to ensure continued reliability.tt 221 222 223 224 225 NERC believes BPS reliability is adequate as measured by various metrics,226 but is undertaking various initiatives to address potential reliability challenges posed by the changing generation mix. For example, NERC created an Essential Reliability Services Working Group to draw attention to the need to maintain these servicesuu as the resource mix evolves.227 NERC also created the Integration of Variable Generation Task Force and the Distributed Energy Resources Task Force to address the reliability implications of increasing levels of distributed generation.228 NERC’s position on the reliability implications of the evolving resource mix is best summarized in its recent communication with DOE (see text box below). NERC: How the Changing Resource Mix Affects Reliability229 The North American BPS is designed to be a highly reliable, robust, and resilient system. The system is interconnected, and the integrated networks work together to maintain reliability through both wide-area interregional planning and coordinated system operations. The adequacy of the system is maintained by having the right combination and amount of resources and transmission to deal with unexpected facility outages or extreme weather events that increase system demand. Operating reliability is maintained in real time through highly coordinated operator actions across many operating companies. The system is also planned as many as 15 years in advance by performing highly detailed, complex, and data-intensive power system simulations. The resource mix of the BPS is changing in fundamental ways. Variable energy resources, especially wind and solar, are rapidly expanding and capturing the majority share of new capacity additions. Conventional generation (such as coal and nuclear) are retiring and have become economically marginalized. The balancing resource tends to be natural gas, as environmental rules and commodity economics tend to make oil-fired generation uneconomic. Developing hydroelectric resources, a major energy source in some parts of the country (such as the West), is extremely challenging. The confluence of the changing resource mix can fundamentally impact reliability in two major ways: 1. A balancing authority responsible for managing the balance of demand and resources through unit commitment. Forecasting may become capacity deficient and unable to serve firm load. Resources may not be available when needed, particularly those that have not secured onsite fuel. In that instance, manual load shedding may be required to maintain reliability. 2. Large, unanticipated voltage or frequency deviations during a disturbance, which can lead to uncontrolled, cascading instability. With no mass, moving parts, or inertia, increasing amounts of inverter-based resources (such as solar photovoltaic) present new risks to reliability, such as managing faster fault-clearing times, reduced oscillation dampening, and unexpected inverter action. The rapid changes occurring in the generation resource mix and technologies are altering the operational characteristics of the grid and will challenge system planners and operators to maintain reliability. More specifically:  Impact of Premature Retirements: Conventional units, such as coal plants, provide frequency support services as a function of their large spinning generators and governor-control settings, along with reactive support for voltage control. Power system operators use these services to plan tt NERC’s concerns about the reliability implications of the fast-evolving grid transformation underway were so strong that it chose to rename a set of key components of operational reliability from a term understood only by engineers and others directly involved in reliability, the term “ancillary services,” to the plainer English and self-defining, “essential reliability services.” uu ERS include frequency response, voltage support, and ramping. 64 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000171 and operate reliably under a variety of system conditions, generally without the concern of having too few of these services available. Coal-fired and nuclear generation have the added benefits of high availability rates, low forced outages, and secured onsite fuel. Many months of onsite fuel allow these units to operate in a manner independent of supply chain disruptions.  Replacement Resource Capability and Characteristics: As the generation resource mix evolves, the reliability of the electric grid depends on the operating characteristics of the replacement resources. Natural gas-fired units, variable generation, storage, and other resources can provide similar reliability services. However, as a practical matter, costs, market rules, or regulatory requirements (or lack thereof) can affect whether these resources are equipped and available to provide reliability services. To ensure reliability, new generator and load resources must maintain the balance between load and generation, especially during ramping periods. In addition, in some jurisdictions, substantial amounts of generation are now being added “behind the meter” (e.g., roof top solar), and these resources are invisible to system operators. Planning Reserve Margins In terms of the resource adequacy part of reliability, NERC reports that all regions project more than sufficient planning reserve margins. NERC and its regional reliability coordinators conduct ongoing analyses to assess resource adequacy as system conditions change over time. Figure 4.2. shows that planning reserve marginsvv exceed their respective regional targets despite the loss of traditional baseload capacity since 2002.230 The orange bars in the figure indicate regional or NERC-determined target reserve margins for resource adequacy, which in most cases are administratively set at 15 percent above the predicted peak load. The calculation of resources in most regions includes current VIEUowned generation and merchant plant capacity (modified by an expected forced outage rateww and reduced by expected retirements), planned capacity additions (with interconnection agreements and customer contracts), renewable generation (derated to expected capacity at peak load hour),xx contracted imports, energy efficiency, DR, and distributed generation (derated to expected capacity at peak hour). vv Forecasts of reserve margins may decline in the out-years of a projection because new resources such as power plants, demand response, and energy efficiency are not firm at the time the forecast is made. Because of the uncertainty associated with more distant years, NERC planning reserve margin determinations do not look out past 10 years. ww ISO-New England reports that the expected forced outage rate for generators in their regions have increased because power plants in the region are operating under more stressed conditions. Older power plants in each region are less reliable and go out of service more often as they age. https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/10/f18/08a-REthier.pdf xx Each ISO and RTO calculates the on-peak contribution of renewable resources as a function of historic resource performance. Land-based wind plants are assumed to deliver four to 14 percent of nameplate capacity during peak summer afternoon periods, and solar resources are assumed to deliver between 10 percent and 80 percent of nameplate capacity. Note, however, that as the level of PV penetration increases, the cumulative amount of PV generation on summer afternoons is moving net load peak hour later. 65 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000172 Figure 4.2. Five-Year Average Reserve Margins across Different Regions (2018–2022)231 All regions have reserve margins above resource adequacy targets. The types of resources available within a region affect the reserve margin calculation. Each type of resource has a different availability rate (based on past performance) that reflects the likelihood that it can be relied upon to be available at system peak. For instance, 1,000 MW of coal units with an on-peak availability rate of 90 percent would have a greater impact on the reserve margin than 1,000 MW of wind with an on-peak availability rate of 10 percent; in other words, the actual nameplate capacity totals underlying these reserve margin calculations are significantly higher than the reserve margins suggest. NERC and regional planning authorities are working to understand how common dependencies or failure modes, such as gas pipeline outages or a weather front affecting wind and solar performance across a wide area, could affect reserve margins. NERC and others are also studying how the on-peak hourly capacity factor (similar in concept to capacity valueyy) of VRE changes as a function of VRE penetration, as shown for solar in Figure 4.3. yy NERC defines capacity value as “the contribution of a power plant to the generation adequacy of the power system. It gives the amount of additional load that can be served in the system at the same reliability level due to the addition of the unit.” http://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/ivgtf/omalley-ieee-confidential.pdf 66 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000173 Figure 4.3. Historical Solar On-Peak Capacity Factors in ERCOT232 As increased solar penetration in ERCOT shifts the net peak load further into the evening, its net on-peak capacity factor diminishes. As the Department has previously noted, however, having an adequate planning reserve margin is necessary but not sufficient to ensure resource adequacy (see text box below): “Rules” to Enable Reliable Operation233 In December 2016, DOE articulated four consolidated “rules” that must be maintained to enable reliable operation. These include the following: 1. Power generation and transmission capacity must be sufficient to meet peak demand for electricity. The power grid must have sufficient capacity available to meet the demand for electricity. Because there are uncertainties in forecasting demand and the potential for generation and transmission outages, the total amount of capacity must exceed the expected level of demand by a given fraction, termed the reserve margin, often about 15 percent. 2. Power systems must have adequate flexibility to address variability and uncertainty in demand (load) and generation resources. The level of demand changes throughout the day and from season to season. This, and the addition of variable generation such as wind and solar, places a premium on having flexible generation capacity that can change its level of output to account for changes in demand and the amount of generation from variable resources (such as when the wind stops blowing or the sun goes down). 3. Power systems must be able to maintain steady frequency. 67 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000174 The power system uses what is called alternating current (AC), where the electricity reverses direction 60 times per second (60 hertz (Hz)). If this frequency of oscillation were to deviate significantly from 60 Hz, it could damage machines and electronics. Any mismatch between the supply and demand of electricity can cause this sort of deviation, and several mechanisms operating at different timescales are used to maintain a steady frequency. 4. Power systems must be able to maintain voltage within an acceptable range. In addition to maintaining a steady frequency, the electric grid must also deliver electricity at a given voltage. This voltage varies throughout the power grid, with transformers used to change voltages. Maintaining the correct voltage requires the management of “reactive power,” which is a property of AC electricity that allows power to flow. If the levels of reactive power are too high or too low, the voltage level can change, potentially even collapsing catastrophically. NERC notes that traditional calculations of resource adequacy based on capacity (such as the planning reserve margin) will need to change: Until recently, new generators have generally added significant energy capability along with the capacity they provide. With the advent of newer energy limited technologies replacing older ones (e.g., with emerging larger penetrations of variable generation), an assumption of energy adequacy cannot be made simply on the basis of capacity adequacy. Future-looking detailed probabilistic assessments of resource adequacy (energy, capacity and operability), transmission adequacy and congestion are increasingly becoming an essential requirement, consistent with the growing penetration of variable generation, and in the changing nonrenewable supply mix environment.234 4.1.1 Essential Reliability Services Reliable operation of the BPS requires a suite of Essential Reliability Services (ERS). One key ERS is the control of system frequency, a parameter which NERC explains as follows: Each Interconnection is actually a large machine, as every generator within the island is pulling in tandem with the others to supply electricity to all customers. This occurs as the rotation of electric generating units, nearly all in (steady-state) synchronism. The “speed” (of rotation) of the Interconnection is frequency, measured in cycles per second or Hertz (Hz). If the total Interconnection generation exceeds customer demand, frequency increases beyond the target value, typically 60 Hz, until energy balance is achieved. Conversely, if there is a temporary generation deficiency, frequency declines until balance is again restored at a point below the scheduled frequency.235 NERC further expands on the two main types of frequency control, Primary and Secondary:  Primary frequency control (immediate) comes from automatic generator governor response, load response, and other devices based on local (device-level) frequency-sensing control systems. In general, frequency response refers to the initial actions provided by the autonomous devices within an interconnection to arrest and stabilize frequency deviations, typically from the unexpected sudden loss of a generator or load. Primary frequency control is quick and automatic; it is not driven by any centralized control system, and it begins seconds after a system frequency event. Response to a frequency event can be provided by various sources, including generation resources, loads, and storage devices.  Secondary frequency control (seconds to minutes) and tertiary frequency control (ten minutes and longer) -- Secondary and tertiary control are the centralized, coordinated control of generation, demand response, and storage resources, and these controls are performed 68 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000175 by the system operator’s energy management system over minutes to hours to balance generation and load.236 In addition to frequency control, NERC provides definitions for two other ERS, ramping and voltage support: Ramping – Ramping is related to frequency, but more in an “operations as usual” sense rather than after an event. Changes in the amount of non-dispatchable resources, system constraints, load behaviors, and the generation mix can impact the ramp rates needed to keep the system in balance. Voltage – Voltage must be controlled to protect the system and move power where it is needed. This control tends to be more local in nature, such as at individual transmission substations, in sub-areas of lower-voltage transmission nodes and the distribution system. Ensuring sufficient voltage control and “stiffness” of the system is important both for normal operations and for events impacting normal operations (i.e., disturbances).237 If grid voltage levels fall too low, customers connected to distribution networks may see their devices “brown out” and stop working. An area that has inadequate voltage support is vulnerable to voltage collapse, so the system must be operated such that a single contingency would not result in voltage collapse or cascading outages. Generators provide voltage support by producing both real and reactive power. As FERC explains in its 2016 Reliability Primer: Power transferred along transmission lines consists of both “real” power and “reactive” power. The real power is the energy that is capable of performing work in electrical devices including industrial equipment, refrigerators, or toasters. Reactive power is needed to maintain the voltage as well as electric and magnetic fields in AC equipment, which includes air conditioners, motors, transmission lines, and other devices. Together, real power and reactive power comprise apparent power, which is measured in units of Volt-Amperes or kilo Volt-Amperes - kVA. Reactive power cannot be transmitted as far as real power and instead must be replenished locally. Moreover, a deficit in reactive power causes voltage to drop. This is seen when the lights dim as an electric motor starts. While reactive power consumed by facilities or devices tends to cause the voltage to drop, it can also be produced or injected into the system to increase voltage in what is often referred to as “voltage support.” This is accomplished in a variety of ways, including by adjusting the reactive power output of generators or by activating capacitor banks or other power electronic equipment. If reactive power is not supplied promptly and in sufficient quantity, voltages decline, and in extreme cases a “voltage collapse” may result.238 FERC Order No. 827, issued in June 2016, revised FERC’s pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement and pro forma Small Generator Interconnection Agreement to eliminate the previous exemption for wind generators from reactive power requirements, thereby requiring all newly interconnecting, non-synchronous generators—including new wind generators—to provide reactive power as a condition of interconnection to the transmission system. FERC wrote: We therefore conclude that improvements in technology, and the corresponding declining costs for newly interconnecting wind generators to provide reactive power, make it unjust, unreasonable and unduly discriminatory and preferential to exempt such non-synchronous generators from the reactive power requirement when other types of generators are not exempt. Further, requiring all newly interconnecting non-synchronous generators to design their Generating Facilities to maintain the required power factor range ensures they are subject to comparable requirements as other generators.239 69 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000176 FERC’s primary frequency response Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to require new large and small generators to install, maintain and operate equipment capable of providing primary frequency response as a condition of interconnection.240 NERC explains the various reserve products from which grid operators obtain these ERS:  Frequency-Responsive Reserve: On-line generation with headroom that has been tested and verified to be capable of providing droop […] In most cases, only portions of a, b and c in [Figure 4.4] qualify as Frequency Responsive Reserve.  Nonspinning Reserve: Operating Reserve capable of serving demand or Interruptible Demand that can be removed from the system, within 10 minutes. (This is c in [Figure 4.4])  Operating Reserve: That capability above firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, equipment forced and scheduled outages, and local area protection. (This is a+b+c+d+e in [Figure 4.4]).  Regulating Reserve: An amount of spinning reserve responsive to Automatic Generation Control, which is sufficient to provide normal regulating margin. (This is “a” in [Figure 4.4])  Replacement Reserve: (This is d+e in [Figure 4.4]). NOTE: Each NERC Region sets times for reserve restoration, typically in the 30–90 minute range. The default contingency reserve restoration period is 90 minutes after the disturbance recovery period.  Spinning Reserve: Unloaded, synchronized, resource, deployable in 10 minutes. (This is b in [Figure 4.4]). 241 Figure 4.4. NERC Definitions of Reserves Used to Provide ERS 242 Figure 4.5 shows how system frequency falls after a major generation loss. The decline in frequency is determined by the size of the generation loss event and the availability of frequency control reserves to respond. The frequency rebound that follows is due to automated primary frequency control measures 70 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000177 (governor response from generators and frequency-responsive DR from customer loads controlled by relays). Secondary frequency control may derive from many sources, including from local plant controls, from a centralized control system, or from instructions issued by balancing authorities. Tertiary frequency control refers to operator-initiated, off-line resources. If these frequency management measures don’t work, system frequency can keep dropping, resulting in under-frequency load shedding procedures. Figure 4.5. System Frequency after a Grid Event (Top) and How Frequency Control Mechanisms Work to Restore Frequency (Bottom)243 System operators have a number of levels of frequency control to manage a significant grid event. Not all generators can provide primary frequency control, as explained by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL): Some generators, including all current nuclear generators, most wind turbines in North America, as well as many new natural gas turbines do not provide governor response. Other generators, which may be capable of providing governor response, are sometimes operated in ways that prevent them from providing that response. For example, a generator operated 71 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000178 at its maximum capability cannot provide upward primary frequency control because it has no head room. Finally, some generators have additional controls […] that override the sustained delivery of governor response.244 NERC recognized several years ago that the changes affecting the grid—particularly retirement of traditional baseload capacity, increased generation from VRE, and greater use of DR and distributed generation—could create BPS reliability problems without careful study and management. In 2014, a task force under NERC’s direction identified ERS as the elemental reliability building blocks from supply and demand resources that are necessary to maintain grid reliability. NERC stated that: To meet the needs of the future Bulk Power System, maintaining sufficient ERS will include a mix of market approaches, technology enhancements, and reliability rules or other regulatory rule changes. While the solution sets will likely be different in various regions, it may be necessary for regulators to make appropriate adjustments to market rules and reliability standards that will ensure reliable operation of the BPS.245 Although NERC has requirements for balancing areas,zz it does not require that individual generators provide primary frequency response, which involves the automatic, autonomous, and rapid action of turbine governors or equivalent controls. Further, there is no mandatory compensation for primary frequency response, though FERC Order No. 755 provides for compensation for secondary frequency response.246 Because provision of primary frequency response may require a generator to operate at less than its full output (so it can increase power production if needed to manage frequency), standing prepared to provide frequency response services means that a generator may forgo some potential revenues. The reliability attributes discussed above are recognized as valuable, but regional procurement and compensation for these services varies across the centrally-organized markets. In vertically integrated regions that use bilaterally organized markets, it is generally the incumbent utility’s obligation to provide ERS; some interconnection agreements specify other generators’ reliability service obligations if any. 4.1.2 Inertia and Inertial Response PJM explains how conventional generators provide inertia: Due to electro-mechanical coupling, a generator's rotating mass provides kinetic energy to the grid (or absorbs it from the grid) in case of a frequency deviation to arrest frequency change and stabilize the electric system. The contribution of inertia is an inherent and crucial feature of rotating synchronous generators.247 
 Every operating conventional generator has mass that spins, including rotors, turbines and other masses connected to the shaft of the generator or motor. The rotating mass in each generator collectively provides inertia to help keep grid frequency at a relatively stable level, for example slowing the rate of frequency drop after a major grid event and giving other automatic controls time to act to restore frequency. Inertia also works to slow the spike in frequency that occurs after the loss of a large amount of load (for instance, if part of a city “blacks out” suddenly from a transmission or distribution failure). zz NERC Reliability Standard BAL-003-1.1 establishes requirements for balancing authorities, but does not include requirements for individual generator owners or operators. However, some ISOs/RTOs, including CAISO, ISO-NE, and PJM, have implemented operating requirements for individual generating resources within their regions. Regional Reliability Standard BAL-001-TRE-01 (Primary Frequency Response in the ERCOT Region) establishes requirements for the balancing authority, generator owners, and operators in ERCOT. 72 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000179 Recently, manufacturers have designed electronic controls for newer model wind turbines that can provide automatic generation control, primary frequency response and synthetic inertia. General Electric (GE) notes: A key difference between wind inertia and fast frequency response from other resources (batteries, PV, flywheels) is that wind turbines do not need to be pre-curtailed in order to provide synthetic inertial response. Wind inertia extracts some of the kinetic energy from the spinning rotor and uses it to provide increased power output within seconds.248 There has not yet been much analysis of how much primary frequency response will be needed as the composition of the grid changes, nor how best to complement primary frequency response from traditional sources, such as governors, with electronics-based synthetic inertia or non-governor-based forms of primary frequency response, such as storage or DR. These are substantive engineering questions that merit further study, particularly in a future with increasing VRE levels and decreasing rotating mass-based inertia.249 4.1.3 Energy Storage Energy storage will be critical in the future if higher levels of VRE are deployed on the grid and require additional balancing of energy supply and demand in real time. A few storage mechanisms such as pumped hydroelectric storage and thermal energy storage have been used for years to shift energy demand from peak to off-peak periods. A grid with higher levels of VRE and more dynamic customer loads will need more of the services that energy storage can provide by acting on both the supply and demand side, including energy, capacity, energy management, backup power, load leveling, and ERS, over periods from seconds to hours or days. However, the need for storage may not be as great for a grid more reliant on traditional baseload generation.250 DOE has been investing in energy storage technology development for two decades, and major private investment is now active in commercializing and the beginnings of early deployment of grid-level storage, including within microgrids.aaa The DOE Grid Energy Storage program notes that as energy storage technologies mature and become commercially viable, they will need to achieve the following:  Cost competitive energy storage technology—Achievement of this goal requires attention to factors such as life-cycle cost and performance (round-trip efficiency, energy density, cycle life, capacity fade, etc.) for energy storage technology as deployed. It is expected that early deployments will be in high value applications, but long term success requires further cost reductions and the ability to monetize revenues for all grid services that storage provides.  Validated reliability and safety— Validation of the safety, reliability, and performance of energy storage is essential for user confidence.  Equitable regulatory environment— Value propositions for supply-side grid storage depend on reducing institutional and regulatory hurdles to levels comparable with those of other grid resources.bbb 251 aaa Storage is an important component of most micro-grid designs reliant on VRE and is expected to play an essential role in helping customers and the BPS recover from extreme weather events (and should improve resilience and recovery following severe, high-impact events). bbb A recent FERC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks to identify and reduce such barriers for increased participation by energy storage in centrally-organized wholesale markets. 73 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000180  Industry acceptance—industry adoption requires manufacturers to have confidence that storage will deploy as expected, and deliver as predicted and promised.252 Table 4-1 details DOE analysis of how energy storage options can be used to provide grid-level services. Table 4-1. How Various Energy Storage Options Can Deliver Grid-Level Applications253 State policies are emerging to encourage further use of energy storage technologies for grid support and energy security. California has directed its utilities to acquire 500 MW of energy storage by 2020; Massachusetts has ordered its utilities to procure 200 MWh of energy storage by the end of 2019; New York’s legislators have proposed creation of an Energy Storage Deployment Program, with a 2030 procurement target; Maryland has adopted at 30 percent investment tax credit for storage facilities; and Nevada’s legislature has passed a storage incentivize. These programs are generally technology-neutral and will support the use of storage at the grid-level or behind the meter (on the customer’s premises).254 255 4.1.4 Transmission The transmission system is a vast engineered network that transmits electricity from generators to local substations for distribution to end-use consumers. As DOE’s Annual U.S. Transmission Data Review (2016) states, “Transmission planning activities are undertaken to enable future reliable and efficient utilization of transmission facilities by addressing, among other things, reliability concerns, constraints, and congestion.”256 Transmission reliability is maintained by enforcing operating procedures that ensure efficient system utilization, including preventing users from transmitting more power over a line than its 74 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000181 rated power capacity. Transmission congestion results from the inability to dispatch the lowest-cost generation resources due to transmission constraints. Transmission investments provide an array of benefits that include providing reliable electricity service to customers, relieving congestion, facilitating robust wholesale market competition, enabling a diverse and changing energy portfolio, and mitigating damage and limiting customer outages (resilience) during adverse conditions. Well-planned transmission investments also reduce total costs. SPP analyzed the costs and benefits of transmission projects from 2012–2014 and found that the planned $3.4 billion investment in transmission was expected to reduce customer cost by $12 billion.ccc This yielded an estimated benefit of $3.50 for every dollar invested in the region.257 A robust transmission system is needed to provide the flexibility that will enable the modern electric system to operate. Although much transmission has been built to enhance reliability and meet customer needs, continued investment and development will be needed to provide that flexibility. The challenge for building transmission continues to revolve around the three traditional steps involved, each of which can be time-consuming, involved, and complex: (1) demonstrating a need for the transmission project, also known as transmission planning, (2) determining who pays for the transmission project, also called cost allocation, and (3) state and Federal agency siting and permitting. FERC has taken steps to help with the first two, with reforms such as Order No. 1000, which remains a work in progress.258 259 260 261 262 Transmission planning entities, as well as regional state-based groups, are also contributing to improving these three necessary process steps. The current and past administrations, aided by various new Federal laws, have issued various Executive Orders and other initiatives to improve the processes involved in siting and permitting of transmission when Federal lands or waters are involved. All three transmission building steps can be time-intensive and complex; in particular, siting and permitting for large networks or long multi-state lines is challenging. 263 264 265 The second necessary step of cost-allocation can be time-consuming as well. For example, large overlay networks now being built in MISO (“Multi-Value Projects”)266 and SPP (“Highway/Byway Plan”)267 required several years of sensitive negotiations among states brokered by the respective Organization of MISO States and SPP Regional State Committee to determine the cost allocation of each large transmission buildout.268 269 ccc Nearly $12 billion in net present value benefits for consumers over the next 40 years, or around $800 for each person currently served by SPP, or $2,400 per each metered customer. 75 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000182 Figure 4.6. EEI Historical and Project Transmission Investment (Nominal Dollars) 270 Prudent and well planned transmission can reduce total system costs by reducing localized congestion that sometimes leads to high wholesale electricity prices at transmission-constrained nodes. Transmission investments in future years could increase as utilities and system operators seek to mitigate reliability impacts of plant closures and bring new generation to load centers. 4.1.5 System Requirements to Meet Higher Levels of VRE on the Grid Levels of wind and solar penetration—including distributed and utility-scale installations—have grown in recent years from 0.3 percent of total annual generation nationwide in 2002 to 6.9 percent in 2016.ddd 271 Various integration studies (see Appendix B:) have explored grid operations at higher levels of VRE penetration (ranging from 10 percent to 60 percent) and examined the technical challenges for grid operators.eee These challenges can generally be met at lower levels through a number of changes to grid operation, planning, and transmission expansion practices, and with other sources of grid flexibility. Solutions vary by region, depending on existing transmission constraints, generators, sources of flexibility, and institutions and markets – each of which comes with associated implementation costs and other consequences to address. Costs can change over time as technologies and markets evolve, or ddd AEO 2017 reference case indicates that this could grow to 17% by 2030. eee The studies (see Appendix B) that look into the distant future are exploratory only and represent initial investigations into how to implement high levels of VRE. They do not look into all the operational aspects of reliability due to the needed complex and computationally challenging modeling. Typical assumptions (sometimes implicit) include successful siting of (at times long multistate) transmission lines and new generation, sufficient new and existing economically viable conventional generation and other resources to support the VRE, institutional and market changes, and relevant grid modernization-type spending at both the transmission and distribution level. One study, for the ease of modeling, even assumes the nation’s 66 balancing authorities, including their governing boards and member states, would agree to one national joint dispatch). Some of these assumptions are non-trivial. These studies recognize that given enough time and money, power system engineers can make any resource and configuration reliable, as long as the laws of physics are not violated; whether the changes needed are indeed affordable, doable, and desirable may be a different question. Also, affordability was typically not in the scope of these studies. 76 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000183 as other enabling technologies such as storage mature. Grid operators and planners continually evaluate and determine how to maintain reliability as the resource mix changes and evolves. Figure 4.7. Location of the Existing Wind Fleet272 . Capacity(MW) 500 o' 1.000 1500 0 2.000 0' Most of the contiguous United States? wind power plants are installed in the center of the Nation, which has the best wind resources. Total penetration of VRE is increasing rapidly in several regions, and wind represents the majority of current installed VRE. Wind turbines have contributed more than one-third of the nearly 200,000 MW of total utility-scale generating capacity added since 2007, reflecting a combination of improved wind turbine technology and lower costs, increased access to transmission capacity, state-level RPS, and Federal tax credits and grants. Distribution of wind capacity across the contiguous United States is shown in Figure 4.7. Percentage wind generation by state is shown in Figure 4.8. In particularly windy hours, wind output in regions with signi?cant wind capacity can be very high. On May 16, 2017, the CAISO hit a new daily renewables record when the combination of wind, solar, hydro, and other renewables served nearly 42 percent of electricity demand; during peak renewables production (the 2:00 pm. hour), renewables supplied nearly 72 percent of electricity.273 In Texas, at the end of 2016, ERCOT had more than 17,600 MW of installed wind capacity and 566 MW of utility-scale solar capacity.274 ERCOT reached 50 percent wind penetration in the early morning on March 23, 2017, when load was below 29,000 at 5:00 pm. that afternoon, when peak load hit 45,391 MW, wind contributed about 30 percent to the energy needed to meet that peak.275 SPP recently set a new wind-penetration record of 52.1 percent on February 12, 2017, the highest across North American 276 277 333 On the other hand, there are times when wind generation can be low. For example, ERCOT reports that for 2016, wind generation was below 2,500 MW (approximately 15% of total operating wind capacity as of November 2016) for 17 percent of the year?s hours. 77 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000184 Figure 4.8 Wind Energy Share of Electric Generation by State, 2016278 2 9. 6% OK US. Total: 5.5% FL PR HI 6.(10% I 10% to <15% I 15% I0 (20% I 20% and higher One of the greatest barriers to widespread VRE adoption is the challenge of managing its variability and corresponding impacts on net load. Table 4-2 summarizes the characteristics of VRE, the challenges to integration, and how to mitigate those challenges. Table 4-2. Characteristics of VRE, Grid Integration Challenges, and Mitigation Options279 Wind Solar Potential Grid Integration Mitigation Options Characteristics Challenges Variability Generator output can In many power systems, suf?cient ?exibility exists to vary as underlying integrate additional variability, but this ?exibility may resource ?uctuates. not be fully accessible without changes to power system operations or other institutional factors increased ramping of generation and improved coordination across markets and balancing areas) (Lew et al. 2013). Uncertainty Generation cannot be Integration of advanced renewable supply forecasting predicted with perfect into dispatch and market operations has reduced accuracy (day-ahead, day uncertainties, improved scheduling of other resources of). to reduce reserves and fuel consumption, and enabled VRE to participate as dispatchable resources 78 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000185 Location speci?city Non- generation Low capacity factor Generation is more economical where highest-quality resources are available. Generators provide voltage support and frequency control in a different manner than traditional resources. Availability of the underlying energy resource limits the run- time of the plant. (IEA 2014; Lew et al. 2011). Examples: Xcel Energy, U.S. (Porter et al. 2012). Competitive Renewable Energy Zones in Texas are an example of an approach to quickly develop generation and transmission in coordination (18.5 GW and 3,600 miles were completed nine years after Competitive Renewable Energy Zones legislation was signed) to access wind resources in remote parts of the state. Grid code requirements are evolving in response to technological advances and anticipation of high VRE penetration levels. For example, ERCOT, which is a small interconnection and more vulnerable to frequency excursions, now requires wind generators to provide inertial response, which helps keep a system stable in the initial moments after a disturbance (Bird, Cochran, and Wang 2014). Capacity payments or markets, potentially tied to performance, could ensure suf?cient cost recovery. The potential for stranded assets is not unique to VRE and can occur whenever generation with lower marginal costs is added to the system. For example, low natural gas prices have reduced the market competitiveness of nuclear plants, contributing to recent retirements (Wernau and Richards 2014). Utility-scale wind and solar plants are more location-limited than some other generation types, so they may require transmission construction to be able to interconnect with the grid and secure deliverability to customer load centers. LBNL researchers state that power systems with large or growing amounts of VRE: [W]i l bene?t if the rest of the electricity system is ?exible able to respond to shifts in demand and VRE availability. VRE impacts and system costs will be driven lower as power systems transform to manage the unique characteristics that VRE resources introduce. Power systems that resist change as VRE penetrations increase will experience greater challenges in maintaining reliability and managing costs.280 Figure 4.9 shows a suite of options for integrating VRE effectively, spanning physical, operational, markets, load, and other means. However, proponents of dispatchable renewables (biomass, hydro, and geothermal) argue that other approaches should also be considered. Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability 79 U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000186 Figure 4.9. Ways To Integrate VRE, Arrayed by Type of Intervention and Cost (2014)281 Forecasting of VRE is a critical challenge to system operators to manage high-risk weather days. Specific issues include wind icing forecasts and weather fronts that result in low-level jet winds and other wind cut-out scenarios. Since long-term VRE forecasting is not practicable today, system operators will have to rethink outage scheduling if a region has high dependency on wind as a resource.282 FERC, NERC, and the RTO/ISOs have undertaken several initiatives to modify requirements for interconnecting VRE to improve grid reliability. These initiatives include early work to develop lowvoltage ride-through requirements for interconnecting wind and solar generation (which are included as a requirement for wind plant interconnection under the FERC open access transmission tariff), as well as California updating its solar photovoltaic (PV) distribution interconnection requirements to include smart inverters. Other nations have grid codes that require the provision of specific ERS for new VRE resources as a condition of interconnection. And FERC and several RTOs and ISOs have sought to remove barriers to participation in organized markets by DR resources that can deliver some ERS and provide benefits to consumers. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) offers a good example of managing the challenges of integrating VRE effectively using better operational and business practices. Wind generation capacity in BPA’s balancing authority area grew from 250 MW to 4,782 MW within a 10-year span, driven by state RPS requirements and Federal tax credits. Much of the wind generation is located along the Columbia River Gorge, connecting to the high-voltage transmission system serving the Federal Columbia River hydroelectric plants, so the wind fleet had little diversity and could swing output as much as 1,000 MW within an hour. BPA began charging for using hydropower to balance the wind generation (also called a balancing capacity rate and since adopted by FERC for other regions), and it set a penalty rate to encourage accurate wind production scheduling. Wind forecasting and scheduling practices and tools have since improved significantly.283 80 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000187 Because wind generation receives the PTC and has PPAs that encourage production regardless of system demand, it can be economical for wind to generate even when market prices are negative. As a result, generators that are “must-run” (either for statutory or reliability reasons) must compete with resources that will generate when prices are negative. Anticipating the growing challenges posed by the changing resource mix in the region, BPA worked with stakeholders to develop the Oversupply Management Protocol to displace generation in BPA’s balancing authority area and replace it with Federal hydroelectric generation that must run for endangered fish operations. Displaced generators are compensated for any costs that they incur, and BPA recovers these costs through rates to its wholesale customers.284 However, this over-supply situation combined with sustained low natural gas prices has continued to erode the price of wholesale power in the western wholesale market. Changes in the wholesale market may be necessary to better balance state priorities, maintain grid reliabilities, and appropriately compensate baseload and other flexible resources, such as hydropower, for the ERS they provide.285 The process of BPS consolidation and market cooperation among producers across a larger electric market and operational region has been shown to smooth out VRE output variability. MISO found that [T]here are significant benefits from the geographic diversity of wind generating facilities and the size of the MISO operating footprint. The large number of individual turbines and plants, spread across a large geographic area with dimensions in the hundreds of miles, results in statistical smoothing of production changes driven by local meteorological effects. Large changes in aggregate production are driven by large-scale meteorological phenomena such as weather fronts, and occur over longer timescales from many tens of minutes to several hours.286 4.1.6 Impact of VRE on Net Load More than 60 percent of all utility-scale electric generating capacity that came online in 2016 was from wind and solar technologies.287 In March 2017, wind and solar accounted for 10 percent of total U.S. electricity generation, up from 7 percent for the whole of 2016.288 The increase in VRE has altered grid operation in some regions and the way dispatchable generation and DR are used to protect the grid and meet loads. The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), a Federal power marketing agency, operates 8,000 MW of hydroelectric generation and three balancing areas in 15 states across the West. WAPA sums up the operational changes and challenges for grid managers facing VRE, variable loads, and a variety of generation types with differing capabilities and constraints: Generation operators, including VERs [Variable Energy Resources], must coordinate with their host Balancing Authority (BA) to ensure that their output continuously matches load. Generation is adjusted throughout the day to meet scheduled output and is made available to regulate moment variations intra-hour. For VERs when the wind drops off or clouds pass over a solar array, less energy may be produced than scheduled (over-scheduled/underproduced), and additional resources must be brought on-line to make up the difference. There is a cost associated to these added generation resources. Similarly, if VERs are producing more than what was scheduled, or if electrical demand is less than anticipated, other resources must be backed down to ensure resources and load are balanced. Not all generation is capable of responding. Traditional generation, like coal, is not capable of reacting quickly to changing needs and takes hours or days to reach full operating potential. Gas turbines can react fairly quickly, but only if the plants are not already producing at full rated generating capacity. Hydro generation, while being an ideal resource to help with VER 81 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000188 integration, is generally scheduled to meet reservoir requirements or provide for downstream water demands, including fish, wildlife, and other environmental mitigation requirements.289 To illustrate how VRE can increase the need for flexibility, Figure 4.10 demonstrates how VRE impacts system operations. The figure introduces the concept of “net load”—electricity demand minus VRE generation—which represents the demand that must be supplied by the conventional generation fleet if all VRE is to be utilized. The dark orange line in the graph represents total demand and shows the daily variability of demand on an hourly basis. The light blue area shows wind energy, and the yellow area shows solar energy. The dark blue line represents the demand (less VRE) that must be supplied by the remaining generators, assuming no curtailment of wind energy. The graph shows that often the output level of the remaining generators must change more quickly and be turned up or down inversely with VRE production. Figure 4.10. CAISO Load, Net Load, and Wind and Solar Output on Example Weekdays during 2014290 CAISO data show the effect of VRE on net load (total customer load minus wind and solar output) during representative days in the spring, summer, and fall. As the amount of VRE generation increases, daily net load decreases, and the impacts on net load become more acute in shoulder months. In regions with high penetration of VRE, sharper fluctuations in net load require increased flexibility (ramping up and down) from conventional sources. While the resulting ‘duck curve’ of daily net load has so far been limited to regions such as California and the Southwest where solar generation is highest, other regions such as the Carolinas are beginning to see similar net load patterns.291 82 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000189 What the Duck Curve Tells Us About Mariam a Green Grid292 Figure 4.11. The CAISO Duck Curve Typical Spring Day 28,000 ?6,000 74.000 22.000 20.000 Actual 3-hour rarrp [8.000 10 892- MW on dFebruary 1, 2016/ romp need ~13,000 MW in three hours Megawatts 10,000 ?.000 l?.000 10.000 l2cm Jan The electric grid and the requirements to manage it are The ISO created future scenarios of net load curves to illustrate these changing conditions. Net load is the difference between forecasted load and expected electricity production from variable generation resources. In certain times of the year, these curves produce a ?belly' appearance in the mid-afternoon that quickly ramps up to produce an ?arch? similar to the neck of a duck hence the industry moniker of ?The Duck Chart.? conditions emerge that will require speci?c operational capabilities: Short-steep ramps when the ISO must bring on or shut down generation resources to meet an increasing or decreasing electricity demand quickly, over a short period of time; Oversupply risk when more electricity is supplied than is needed to satisfy real-time electricity requirements; and Decreased frequency response when less resources are operating and available to automatically adjust electricity production to maintain grid reliability.? To ensure reliability under changing grid conditions, the ISO needs resources with ramping ?exibility and the ability to start and stop multiple times per day Addressing concerns about frequency response capabilities in times of low load and high renewable generation may require operating renewable generators such that they can increase power with automated frequency response capability. At some level of penetration of distributed PV, the collective amount of PV will shift the time of peak load net of solar generation away from its previous point to later in the evening when insolation (and therefore PV production) is lower, as shown by NERC in Figure 4.12. 83 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000190 Figure 4.12. Demand and Net Demand Shapes at Different Distributed Energy Resource Penetration Levels293 To date, RTOs and ISOs are working hard to integrate growing levels of VRE through extensive study, deliberate planning, and careful operations and adjustments. The Role of Technical Standards and Grid Codes for Effective VRE Integration Several types of standards apply to VRE and other generation. Interoperability standards define basic technical and engineering performance requirements, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 1547, which defines uniform requirements for the performance, operation, testing, safety, and maintenance of interconnection between distributed generation resources and the grid. Regulatory requirements such as FERC’s pro forma open access transmission tariff (including interconnection requirements) dictate further reliability and performance terms for generators. As the level of installed wind and solar generation has grown, early technical requirements and standards for wind and solar have required updates to ensure performance under disturbance conditions. The examples described below illustrate the need to evolve standards as the penetration of nonsynchronous generation increases.  In August 2016, the Blue Cut wildfire crossed a major transmission corridor in Southern California, resulting in 15 line faults. One of these faults caused the near-instantaneous loss of 84 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000191 1,200 MW of utility-scale PV in Southern California. Approximately 700 MW of this loss occurred when PV inverters tripped due to a “perceived, though incorrect, low system frequency condition.”294 Another 450 MW of this loss occurred when system voltage fell below the lowvoltage ride-through setting of the inverters—resulting in “momentary cessation.”295 The subsequent NERC disturbance report determined that 11 similar inverter events occurred between August 16, 2017 and February 6, 2017, and NERC made several recommendations with respect to inverter settings and standards that would prevent or mitigate these events.296  Australia’s Renewable Energy Target has achieved significant VRE use; 35 percent of South Australia’s generating capacity is wind-powered. On September 28, 2016, severe weather resulted in multiple faults on the South Australian transmission system. A number of faults in quick succession caused 456 MW of wind generation to trip off-line within approximately seven seconds as a result of a protection feature that disconnects or reduces wind turbine output when the number of low-voltage ride-through events in a specific time period exceeds a predefined limit.297 This loss of generation increased imports from the AC interconnector until protective relays activated, islanding South Australia. Unable to rapidly shed load to match the reduced supply, the islanded region experienced a blackout. The Australian Energy Market Operator’s report on the incident noted the role of changes in the fuel mix: a low amount of synchronous generation dispatched—and hence low inertia—at the time of the event resulted in a faster frequency change than had previously been experienced during separation events.298 The report produced a list of 19 recommendations, including changes to operating procedures, regulations, and performance standards.  The German Energiewende initiative encouraged high levels of wind and distribution-level solar installations, leading to over-generation and the need for VRE’ curtailment in some hours. The grid technical code in place at the time required PV inverters to immediately disconnect from the grid if system frequency increased from nominal 50 Hz to 50.2 Hz. However, Germany discovered that the combination of this technical code and the growing amount of distributionlevel PV capacity heightened the risk of some excess PV generation causing all PV capacity to disconnect simultaneously and create severe under-frequency conditions, potentially causing rolling blackouts and grid collapse.299 In response, Germany modified its standards to require inverter retrofits with different low-frequency performance requirements.300 4.1.7 Mapping Reliability Attributes to Generation Resources To assess its changing resource mix, PJM developed a matrix of reliability attributes needed to maintain reliable grid operation under its operating procedures (see Figure 4.13). Ultimately, a diverse generation portfolio is necessary to provide the reliability attributes discussed in this section. 85 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000192 Figure 4.13. Mapping Reliability Attributes Against Resources iii 301 Conventional generation sources—particularly hydroelectricity, combustion turbines (natural gas and oil), and steam turbines (oil, coal, and natural gas)—performed very well against most of PJM’s reliability requirements. Nuclear units are not optimized for significant flexibility or ramping capability, but do exhibit strong fuel assurancejjj attributes. Batteries and storage meet all flexibility requirements, and DR offers high flexibility and ramping management capability. Wind and solar are highly time dependent and do not offer fuel assurance on their own, but can offer good flexibility if they have the proper controls and contractual arrangements. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) summarizes how regional grid operators use centrallyorganized markets to procure specific reliability attributes from generators: iii Combined-cycle plants are included in the Natural Gas – Steam group. jjj Fuel assurance is the resource portfolio’s ability to access sufficient fuel to meet system needs and maintain reliability; aspects of fuel assurance include onsite fuel storage, as well as a generator’s access to sufficient fuel supplies through markets or bilateral contracts. 86 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000193 Ancillary Services in Centrally-Organized Markets302 [E]ach ISO also operates auction markets for spinning, non-spinning reserves, and regulation with uniform clearing prices, with additional performance payments for regulation. (ERCOT, however, does not offer performance payments). Table 2 [Figure 4.14 on the following page] presents some of the terminology and characteristics. The hour1y requirements for these services are set based on reliability standards and operational requirements that vary by ISO. The market designs generally co-optimize energy and reserves. Although ancillary service market designs can be complicated, the level of procurement typically only comprises less than 2% of total market volume. Ancillary service pricing is also used to signal short-tenn supply shortages. Because procurement of these ancillary services is allowed to be de?cient before load is curtailed, the failure to procure suf?cient reserves is often a ?rst indicator of supply shortage. Hence, the lSOs include administrative scarcity prices in the market designs. Such pricing allows ancillary service prices?along with energy prices, when opportunity costs are included?to increase during shortages to levels more consistent with the value of lost load than the energy market offer caps. These scarcity prices are established differently in each ISO. There are a number of recent initiatives to modify the ancillary service markets. CAISO and MISO have recently implemented types of ramping reserves, intended to increase the ramping range from committed resources available during real-time energy dispatch. Some ISOs, notably ERCOT, have also begun to develop designs for frequency-responsive and inertial response reserve markets. Two ancillary services?voltage support/reactive power and black start services?are not yet considered to have the appropriate characteristics for competitive markets and are thus compensated through cost-based rates. Figure 4.14 Selected Ancillary Service Market Design Characteristics Product name Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation up, Regulation Regulation up, Regulation down serVice Regulation down Performance Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulating Regulation-up Regulation mileage component service movement performance mileage mileage, up name (details in Regulationdown Regulation mileage Table 3-12) mileage down Day-ahead I procurement Real-time I I c/ I procurement Product name? Tenmlnute Spinning reserve SR Spinning reserve Spinning reserve Responsive Spinning reserve spinning reserve spinning reserve reserve Product name? Ten-minute non- Non-spinning Non- Supplemental Supplemental Non-spinning Non-spinning non-spinning spinning reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve and (T reserve (NSR) supplemental minute operating reserve reserve (TMOR) Forward (pre- 1 day-ahead) procurement Day-ahead I I I procurement Real-time I I procurement Continued on next page 87 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000194 Figure 4.15. Ancillary Service Products Exchanged in the Centrally Organized Markets, Listed by and Category of Ancillary Service Product name? Ramp Flexible romping ramp reserve capability product Ramp reserve? DAM and RTM PM and RTM [not when procured Voltage last opportunity Lost opportunity lost opportunity lost opportunity Compensation lost opportunity Provision payment control? cost and cost and fixed cost and AEP cost and AEP rate for cost for based on lost payment American tariff rate method method provision provision opportunity cost or mechanism Electric Power contract provision and (AEP) method capability Black start Paid standard Paid cost-based Receive revenue Receive cost- Not procured Procured Contracted through service block start rate rates based on 1 l0% based rate after through SPP through bi- reliability contracts payments or station- of annual black committing to 3- annual speci?c rate start costs year period competitive process Note: day-ahead market; RTM real-time market) Several flexibility options are available to grid operators, such as DR, fast-ramping natural gas generation, and energy storage. As stated in QER 1.2: A recent study of the value of fast-ramping gas for supporting variable renewables noted that, date FRF [fast ramping fossil] technologies have enabled RE [renewable energy] diffusion by providing reliable and dispatchable back-up capacity to hedge against variability of renewables and fast-reacting fossil technologies appear as highly complementary should be jointly installed to meet the goals of cutting emissions and ensuring a stable supply/3303 In addition to existing sources of ?exibility and reliability services, there is a growing understanding of the abilities of VRE to economically contribute to grid ?exibility and reliability through operational changes and advanced power electronics. Recent technology advancements now enable wind plants to provide nearly the full spectrum of ERS inertial control, primary frequency control, and automatic generation control). Similarly, for PV, CAISO, First Solar, and NREL recently demonstrated a First Solar 300 MW PV plant that provides active and reactive power controls, plant participation in automatic generation control, primary frequency control, ramp rate control, and voltage regulation.304 A recent NERC assessment on reliability in the BPS noted that DR can enhance system flexibility and reliability by providing, ?regulation, governor response, spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve, and supplemental operating reserve[. F]or example, ERCOT obtains half of its spinning reserves from DR and is considering a DR-based Fast Frequency Response Service that is positioned between inertia and governor response.?305 Consumer end uses?including building energy management systems, as well as water and space heating and cooling?can also serve as DR resources using load control and communicating technologies to ramp their consumption up or down in order to support VRE integration.306 Demand-side flexibility via ?smart charging? plug-in electric vehicles is another potential source of grid flexibility. This involves a utility or some other centralized entity remotely controlling the charging patterns of participating vehicles and/or charging stations. An aggregated fleet of vehicles or chargers can act as 3 DR resource, shifting load in response to price signals or operational needs; for example, vehicle charging could be shifted to the middle of the day to absorb high levels of solar generation and 88 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000195 shifted away from evening hours when solar generation disappears and system net load peaks. Research in this area is currently underway at the national laboratories.307 4.2 Diversity, Fuel Assurance, and Onsite Storage The April 14 memo raises the questions of whether the diversity of the generation resources in the electric system has diminished and whether this is a problem for grid reliability and resilience. In fact, when looked at nationally, the electric system is more diverse today than it was 20 years ago, although increased national diversity does not necessarily mean diversity has increased in all regions. A holistic view of reliability and risk management, however, must include both diversity and fuel assurance. 4.2.1 Fuel Diversity The U.S. generation mix has continually evolved as changes in technology, economics, government policy, and geopolitical forces affected the relative availability, economics, and feasibility of competing energy sources. PJM documents this evolution in Figure 4.16, which also displays a diversity index showing increasing diversity levels from about 2000 through 2014. PJM observes that, “government policy has played a major role in the development of generation resources, including policies that focused on energy security, jobs, environmental protection and conservation.”308 The chart shows how the mix of U.S. electricity use has moved in cycles for decades—how the generation share of hydroelectric facilities (most built with Federal funds during the 1930s and 1940s) declined as coal and natural gas grew (helped with funding from low-cost Federal land and mineral leases); how nuclear generation grew (aided by Federal policy and funding assistance) in the 1960s; how nuclear energy displaced hydroelectricity and natural gas-fired electricity in the 1970s; and how coal, nuclear, and natural gas-fired electricity have displaced oil-fired generation since the 1980s. Figure 4.16. Generation Mix and Various Economic and Policy Drivers Since 1949, Including Diversity Index309 89 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000196 Closely tracking the PJM trends, the national picture of the resource mix shows coal and oil being displaced by gas and VRE. In addition to this, Figure 4.17 shows how the national U.S. capacity and generation mix have become more diverse over time. Changes in capacity (top) have moved the resource mix toward a greater proportion of natural gas, wind, and solar, while coal and oil capacity have decreased. Energy generation trends for these resources (bottom) have tracked changes in capacity, with natural gas generation almost doubling in proportion. While nuclear capacity has decreased relative to other resources, the proportion of nuclear generation remains unchanged as capacity factors for nuclear units have increased Figure 4.17. Changes in U.S. Capacity (Top) and Generation (Bottom) Mix over Time (Left to Right: 2002, 2009, 2016)310 Coal 8% - - - Natural Gas (all) 23% I Natural Gas (CC) 20% I I, a? Natural Gas (CT) 40% 42% Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear 0% 0% Hydro 2% 2% 1% 3% Wind Solar Other a 19% 23% 34% The grid was, on average, more diverse in 2016 than in 2002 in terms of both capacity and generation. Diversity can be a useful tool for managing both reliability and financial risks. For the power system, developing and maintaining a portfolio of diverse generation, storage, and demand-side options can be useful for system planners and operators in creating optionality and hedging risks. Physical and financial risks can also be managed and hedged using reliability standards, operating rules, and financial markets and contracts. Better system diversity with greater use of domestic energy sources enhances U.S. energy security. However, greater fuel diversity does not always translate to increased system reliability. Risk, Reliability, and Fuel Diversity311 In a summary of the policy implications of the impacts of fuel diversity on risk and reliability, Devin Hartman of the Street Institute states that: Policymakers and regulators should recognize that fuel diversity is a poor proxy for valid policy objectives, like risk management and reliability. Speci?cally, a high level of fuel diversity does not necessarily mean that an electricity system manages risk ef?ciently or meets reliability needs. Conversely, policies or market-design changes intended to increase fuel diversity will not necessarily improve risk management or reliability. Fuel neutrality is essential for both monopoly-utility resource planning and competitive markets to manage risk and achieve reliability ef?ciently. Interventions to promote speci?c fuel types?such as 90 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000197 bailouts for coal and nuclear or mandates and subsidies for renewables—skew investment risk and can undermine incentives for reliability-enhancing behavior (e.g., a public intervention to finance pipeline expansion removes incentives for the private sector to invest in fuel security). Fuel-specific subsidies and mandates replace individual choice with collective choice. This one-size-fits-all approach to risk mitigation ignores variances in individuals’ risk tolerances, results in high-cost risk mitigation, and creates perverse incentives for market participants by transferring risk and costs from the private to the public sector. For regulators, attempts to achieve fuel diversity in market designs explicitly would likely result in inefficient and potentially discriminatory practices that are inconsistent with the Federal Power Act. The reliable performance of power generators varies across and within fuel types and changes with fluctuating conditions. This renders any attempt to value fuel diversity very complex. It would require extensive administrative judgment, expanding the potential for government failure. Ultimately, the central aim of market design should remain to procure specific reliability attributes at the least cost. 4.2.2 Fuel Assurance and Onsite Storage FERC uses the term fuel assurance to mean a generator’s access to sufficient fuel supplies through markets or bilateral contracts (and the degree to which those arrangements are firm). On the RTO/ISO level, fuel assurance refers to the regional resource portfolio’s ability to access sufficient fuel to meet system needs and maintain reliability.312 313 NERC’s 2017 State of Reliability report identified “lack of fuel” among the top ten causes of forced outages for 2014 and 2015.314 While lack of fuel is a relatively infrequent cause of generator outages, it can still have major repercussions when it does occur because system fuel supply chain disruptions can impact many generators during a single widespread fuel shortage event. Nuclear and coal plants typically have advantages associated with onsite fuel storage compared to natural gas. While having fuel onsite reduces the risk that a generator will be unable to operate when needed, every type of fuel and power generation source has known vulnerabilities that can compromise its ability to perform reliably. Valuation or regulation of onsite fuel storage varies across the Nation’s organized markets. Onsite fuel supplies can be required, incentivized, or not compensated—depending on the RTO/ISO in question. For example, some dual-fuel generators in the New York City region (NYISO Zone J) are required under local reliability rules to maintain onsite fuel to protect against the loss of gas supplies.315 Several markets have also attempted to incentivize firm and onsite fuel supplies by adding performance requirements to their capacity markets. In PJM and ISO-NE, these requirements were adopted after generator underperformance occurred during several instances of system stress between 2010 and 2014.kkk The incentives in these markets are designed to reward or penalize generators based upon how they respond to the system operator during performance events. According to Gordon van Welie, President and CEO of ISO-NE: We currently have a precarious operating situation in the winter time and we're worried about it becoming unsustainable beyond 2019… The reality is that we're really operating with a very slim operating margin during the winter time that may not cover these large contingencies that worry us.316 kkk These events included both situations in which natural gas power plants were unable to draw fuel from pipelines, as well as ones in which sufficient fuel was available but unit outages and/or start times inhibited operation. 91 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000198 Both programs remain in their infancy: ISO-NE’s takes effect in 2018, and PJM’s has only been active since 2016 (with a gradual phase-in through the 2019/2020 delivery year). In the interim, ISO-NE instituted a stopgap measure called the Winter Reliability Program, which compensates some dual-fuel generators for procuring onsite fuel.317 Outside of these regions, onsite fuel is not compensated or, in the case of VIEU, is incorporated into integrated resource planning (IRP) efforts. Other aspects of fuel assurance include having dual fuel capabilities and having low exposure to supply chain interruptions (including adequate, reliable infrastructure and sufficient contractual arrangements for fuel delivery). Natural Gas NERC refers to the “single point of disruption risk” as the increasing risk of fuel disruption that threatens generator availability. In a letter to Secretary Perry, NERC CEO Gerry Cauley observed that: Growing reliance on natural gas continues to raise reliability concerns regarding the ability of both gas and electric infrastructures to maintain the BPS reliability at acceptable levels. Many efforts have focused on the gas-electric interface and yet, insufficient progress has been made reconciling the planning approaches and operating practices (scheduling situation awareness, information sharing) between these two inter-linked sectors. Planning approaches, operational coordination, and regulatory partnerships are needed to assure fuel deliverability, availability, security (physical and cyber), and resilience to potential disruptions. Unfortunately, an approach not obvious in electricity markets today.318 Natural gas-fired generators have been described as relying on “just-in-time” fuel delivery.319 NERC, FERC, and several of the ISOs and RTOs have studied the gas-electric interactions and interdependence, which are most severe in the areas where natural gas generation is growing most quickly, but natural gas pipeline infrastructure is more constrained—particularly New England and California. NERC has concluded that: […] areas with a growing reliance on natural gas-fired generation are increasingly vulnerable to issues related to gas supply unavailability. Common-mode, single contingency-type disruptions to fuel supply and deliverability in areas with a high penetration of natural gasfired generation are reducing resource adequacy and potentially introducing localized risks to reliability. Not only can impacts to BPS reliability occur during the gas-load peaking winter season, but they can also manifest during the summer season when electric demand is high and natural gas facilities are out of service, which can lower the operational capacity and flow of the pipeline system.320 NERC recommends a number of planning and operational changes to address this challenge, including risk-based approaches to study the potential regional reliability implications of greater natural gas dependence; the potential for wide-spread, common-mode failure events such as interstate gas pipeline or supply source losses; regional mitigation strategies; better information-sharing and coordination between electric generators, gas suppliers, and pipeline operators; and ensuring the availability of more flexible resources for use to mitigate the added uncertainties associated with natural gas fuel risks.321 Natural gas storage is a way to reduce the just-in-time delivery problem. Natural gas is stored in depleted natural gas and oil fields, depleted natural aquifers, and salt caverns. Figure 4.18 shows natural gas storage facilities across the Nation. The ideal storage facilities are near major gas consumption centers, where storage can supplement gas pipelines to meet high demand levels and fill in deliveries in the event of any delivery disruptions. 92 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000199 Figure 4.18. Natural Gas Storage Facilities322 The United States has over 400 natural gas storage facilities; the majority are depleted natural gas fields used for storage, with salt domes concentrated in the Southeast and aquifer storage concentrated in Illinois and Indiana. Data presented at a recent testimony before FERC offers an interesting perspective on areas that depend on just-in-time energy. The data in Table 4-3 show a dozen states that depend on high levels of just-in-time imports, whether those imports are natural gas for in-area generation or transmissionenabled electricity imports. These areas may need greater planning and resilience measures to ensure fuel security, which may include some availability of petroleum-based fuels for units that can use them when natural gas may be difficult or expensive to source. 93 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000200 Table 4-3. Dependence on Imported Just-in-Time Energy for Electricity323 The leaks discovered at California’s Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility in October 2015 California illustrate another natural gas common failure mode problem, according to analysis completed by PJM: Analysis performed after the leak identified 17 nearby electric generators with a combined output of over 9,800 MW that relied on Aliso Canyon for fuel supply. Some of these generators are required for local reliability; however, without supply from Aliso Canyon, low pressure in gas pipelines could stop the flow of gas to the generators, leaving them unable to operate.324 The loss of Aliso Canyon gas storage field highlights the risk to the power grid from failures in the pipeline infrastructure. Electric market and regulatory changes in California resulting from this event include: expedited procurement of electric storage resources, enhanced gas-electric coordination, expanded demand response program and a constraint in the electric market that reflects gas limitations.325 After the 2014 Polar Vortex, when many gas-fired power plants were forced off-line due to natural gas production and delivery problems, inadequate gas supply contracts, and spiked natural gas prices, NERC recommended the following: Examine and review the natural gas supply issues encountered during the event. Industry should also work with gas suppliers, markets, and regulators to quickly identify issues with natural gas supply and transportation so that appropriate actions can be developed and implemented to allow generators to be able to secure firm supply and transportation at a reasonable rate.326 FERC has since promulgated orders to improve coordination between natural gas and power industry operations. While various electric and gas industry groups, including NERC, have had and continue coordination efforts, a significant amount of coordination remains unresolved. 94 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000201 Nuclear As NERC noted, low exposure to fuel supply issues is one of the fundamental necessities of a reliable BPS. Still, fuel availability does not always guarantee dependable performance, particularly during extreme weather events. In 2010, the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama was throttled back to 50 percent of its maximum output because the plant was unable to draw and return enough water (due to environmental regulations) to cool all three of its reactors.327 Nuclear generators have onsite fuel storage due to their 18-month or 24-month refueling cycles.328 During the Polar Vortex, some coal and nuclear plants had fuel onsite but failed to perform nonetheless. However, overall nuclear generators performed extremely well during the Polar Vortex, with an average capacity factor of 95 percent.329 Nuclear power plants tend to have a very high number of “days of burn” onsite relative to coal, as their refueling occurs in 18-month or 24-month cycles. During each refueling, about one-third of the core is replaced with new fuel. The new fuel arrives onsite between nine and five weeks prior to the planned refueling. However, even if there is a delay in the arrival of new fuel, the reactor could continue to operate for an additional three months before reaching 70 percent capacity and two more months beyond that (for a total of five months) before decreasing to 50 percent capacity. The fuel that is replaced during each refueling has typically been used in the reactor for four-and-a-half to six years before it is removed. Planned refueling outages are typically scheduled for the spring and fall and average 35 days.330 Coal A limited number of coal plants, including all plants that use lignite coal, are “mine-mouth” facilities that rely on dedicated, nearby coal mines. Otherwise, coal plants rely on rail, barge, or truck delivery of coal, and they maintain onsite coal stockpiles to accommodate both normal variance in deliveries and the possibility of a major supply disruption. Coal stockpiles have recently been slightly smaller than historical averages, while days of burn have increased slightly relative to historic averages from the 70–80-day range to the 85–100-day range (see Figure 4.19). lll 331 lll At an individual plant, stockpiles can be viewed in terms of days of burn. The days-of-burn calculation considers both the current stockpile level at a plant and its estimated consumption (burn) rates in coming months to approximate how many days the plant could run at historical levels before depleting its existing stockpile. 95 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000202 Figure 4.19. Coal Stocks and Days of Burn, January 2010–May 2017332 While bituminous coal stockpiles in tons have been slightly lower than historic averages in recent months, these stocks are expected to last relatively longer than historic average (measured in days of burn) due to lower capacity factors and expected lower fuel consumption in coal plants. Subbituminous coal stocks (not pictured) have increased in recent months relative to historic averages both in terms of tons and days of burn. For the winter of 2014, compared to 2013, coal-fueled generation provided 92 percent of increased generation, as shown in Figure 4.20. Although electricity demand was greater in 2014, natural gas generation decreased because natural gas was diverted to fuel residential heating needs and gas prices rose to greater than three times those of coal. 96 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000203 Figure 4.20. Electricity Generation Changes from 2013 to 2014 by Fuel Type Competition for natural gas between residential heating and power production caused a rise in natural gas prices in the early months of 2014. The high gas prices coupled with onsite coal storage led to a sharp increase in coal electricity production in those months compared to the winter of 2013. Coal plants can also experience delivery interruptions. In 2013, there were 166 power plants (172,000 MW of generating capacity) across the United States that used subbituminous coal from the Powder River Basin. During the winter of 2013–2014, BNSF Railway rationed and limited coal deliveries to many of these generators due to construction and other disruptions. Stockpiles fell from 25 percent to 40 percent below normal levels at coal plants across the Midwest, Central, and Texas regions; many plants feared that they might not be able to rebuild their inventories in time to meet winter electric demands.333 4.3 High-Risk Events and System Resilience The April 14 memo asks whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which not compensating resilience attributes could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. A resilience approach recognizes that while not all risks can be avoided, many risks can be managed to mitigate damage and expedite recovery. Some options to improve grid resilience may be risk-specific (e.g., to protect against flooding) or component-specific (to protect a transformer), while others are “threat-agnostic, providing system-wide resilience to a broad range of threats including those that cannot be anticipated” according to the Grid Modernization Lab Consortium (GMLC).334 As the fuel mix evolves and as threats change, there will be more ways that elements and regions of the BPS can fail. Causes of failure can include extreme weather events and cyber or physical attacks on grid infrastructure. 335 336 97 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000204 Extreme Weather Events In January and February 2014, the Nation was swept by the Polar Vortex as a band of very cold weather spread across much of the eastern United States, creating record-high winter peak electric demand for heating and equally high demand for natural gas for residential heating. While the Polar Vortex tested the integrity of electricity supply, grid operators generally met demand, even under these severe conditions. However, electricity and gas prices surged for many consumers as energy supplies were stressed. The extremely cold weather caused a variety of power system performance problems, including the loss of 35,000 MW of generation capacity across a wide stretch of the Nation, with 55 percent of the affected generation from natural gas plants, 26 percent coal plants and five percent nuclear.337 In PJM, one of the regions most affected by the event, 22 percent of generating capacity was in forced outage.338 Many natural gas-fired generators had their fuel supplies curtailed because they were buying gas on non-firm, interruptible contracts, or because demand was so high that pipelines implemented delivery restrictions to power plants located near major metropolitan areas. In the Northeast, after several days of extremely cold weather, some generators experienced fuel-gelling, where the natural gas froze in the fuel injectors and was unable to feed into the turbines.339 In Texas, a major source for natural gas production and a transport hub, several gas field production facilities froze up, as did some gas compressor stations along pipelines—shutting down gas feeds into and through pipelines that were to be shipped into New Mexico and elsewhere. This caused fuel shortages to the power plants served by those pipelines.340 Limited supplies led to natural gas price spikes across much of the country; in some areas, gas to produce electricity was more expensive than liquid fuel, even though the price of oil for generation rose to over $400 per barrel. 341 Many coal plants could not operate due to conveyor belts and coal piles freezing342, which—coupled with outages across other fuels and high electricity demand—led operators to call on older plants nearing the end of their useful lives. American Electric Power reported that it deployed 89 percent of its coal units scheduled for retirement in 2014 to meet demand during the Polar Vortex, and Southern Company reported using 75 percent of its coal units scheduled for closure.343 Using these retiring units enabled utilities to meet customer demand during a period when already limited natural gas resources were diverted from electricity production to meet residential heating needs.344 345 Once retired, however, these units will not be available for the next unseasonably cold winter. In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy caused large-scale flooding and wind damage in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast, as well as blizzard conditions in the central and southern Appalachians. Three nuclear reactors totaling 2,845 MW of capacity were shut down, and five operated at reduced levels due to disruptions in transmission infrastructure, reduced demand from distribution outages, and precautionary measures to protect equipment.346 The storm impacts significantly disrupted East Coast refining activity. Spectra Energy lost two natural gas compressor stations on its Texas Eastern Transmission pipeline in northern New Jersey due to the loss of commercial power and the failure of backup generation to operate as intended, which affected gas supply to upstream gas-fired power plants. New Jersey Natural Gas shut down part of its natural gas infrastructure serving Ocean and Monmouth counties, including Long Beach Island and the barrier islands from Bay Head to Seaside Park, with subsequent distribution line damages.347 Sandy also damaged solar PV installations in New Jersey, with storm surges causing $3 million of damage to ground-mounted PV systems and wind and lightning damage to rooftop PV systems.348 98 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000205 4.4 Enhancing Reliability and Resilience Recently, based on extensive information about the operational profiles of PJM resources, PJM assessed the capability of each generator type to provide different ERS.mmm PJM then built a series of hypothetical resource portfolios using different mixes of generation types to determine how well each portfolio performed at delivering sufficient reliability. PJM also considered the risk that each portfolio would fail to meet resource adequacy needs and thus cause reliability problems. After simulating many combinations and portfolios, the following conclusions were reached:  The expected near-term resource portfolio is among the highest-performing portfolios and is well equipped to provide the generator reliability attributes.  As the potential future resource mix moves in the direction of less coal and nuclear generation, generator reliability attributes of frequency response, reactive capability and fuel assurance decrease, but flexibility and ramping attributes increase.  A marked decrease in operational reliability was observed for portfolios with significantly increased amounts of wind and solar capacity (compared to the expected near-term resource portfolio), suggesting de facto performance-based upper bounds on the percent of system capacity from these resource types. Additionally, most portfolios with solar unforced capacity shares of 20 percent or greater were classified infeasible because they resulted in LOLE criterion violations at night. Nevertheless, PJM could maintain reliability with unprecedented levels of wind and solar resources, assuming a portfolio of other resources that provides a sufficient amount of reliability services.  Portfolios composed of up to 86 percent natural gas-fired resources maintained operational reliability. Thus, this analysis did not identify an upper bound for natural gas. However, additional risks, such as gas deliverability during polar vortex-type conditions and uncertainties associated with economics and public policy, were not fully captured in this analysis. Risks with respect to natural gas may lie not in capability to provide the generator reliability attributes but rather in these other uncertainties.  More diverse portfolios are not necessarily more reliable; rather, there are resource blends between the most diverse and least diverse portfolios which provide the most generator reliability attributes.349 [original footnotes omitted] Significantly, when PJM tested the most desirable portfolios (in terms of reliability) against a polar vortex event, only a third of those were resilient: Only 34 of the 98 portfolios which were classified as desirable were resilient when subjected to a polar vortex event. This sensitivity specifically captured the increased risk of natural gas delivery under extremely cold and high load conditions. The polar vortex sensitivity highlights the importance of resilience, which is not captured by the generator reliability attributes that were considered in this study.350 DOE, NERC, and industry stakeholders prepare for a variety of potential threats, including high-impact, low-frequency events, to improve resilience and recovery. Planning, practice, and coordination on an allhazards basis are as important for improving resilience as having a mix of resources and fuels available when a major grid disturbance occurs. A diverse resource portfolio could complement wholesale market products that recognize and compensate providers for the value of ERS on a technology-neutral basis. mmm The PJM study assumed firm gas supply contracts for natural gas-fired generators. 99 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000206 DOE’s Grid Modernization Initiative (GMI) works to better understand what resilience means for the power system and how to measure and achieve it. Transmission planning also supports grid reliability and resilience through interconnecting diverse resources, and it occurs at a variety of levels—ranging from individual utility system studies to regional and interconnection-wide studies. In 2009, DOE issued a series of grants to support interconnectionwide transmission planning. In 2011, FERC issued Order No. 1000, which (among other requirements) mandates regional transmission planning and interregional coordination. As noted in a recent study for the WIRES group: The analytical approaches applied to interregional [transmission] planning should look beyond “base cases” or “business-as-usual cases” and explicitly consider a broader range of plausible market conditions, system contingencies, and public policy environments to capture the short- and long-term flexibility benefits and insurance value that a more robust interregional transmission infrastructure can offer in terms of shielding customers from highcost outcomes. … we recommend that such futures be evaluated to identify transmission projects that address current needs but also provide the insurance and flexibility value to mitigate highcost outcomes across a range of uncertain but not implausible futures.351 Given the many problems that can affect different generation and fuel types, system-wide reliability and resilience can be supported by a diverse portfolio of generation resources that limit over-dependence on any single fuel or technology type, plus demand-side resources that reduce overall demand and better protect customers in the event of a widespread extreme event. 4.5 Reliability and Resilience Looking Forward Although the BPS is performing reliably today with the current mix of resources, technologies, and loads, the entire system remains volatile. Low customer demands and a flatter supply curve mean that many generators face continuing economic stress, retirements may continue, and utility-scale and customerside VRE additions (enabled by subsidies and mandates) will continue. These factors and the uncertainty about future conditions are making it harder for grid planners and operators to maintain today’s level of reliability. Any successful strategy to address BPS reliability and resilience going forward should include developing portfolios of resources that deliver both resource adequacy and ERS to advance reliable grid operations. Resource portfolios could be complemented with wholesale market and product designs that recognize and complement resource diversity by compensating providers for the value of ERS on a technologyneutral basis. More work is needed to define, quantify, and value resilience; Sandia National Laboratories has made efforts to do so, as shown in Figure 4.21. 100 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000207 Figure 4.21. Sandia National Laboratories’ Resilience Analysis Process 352 101 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000208 5 Wholesale Electricity Markets The wholesale electricity market issues outlined in the April 14 memo are central to the future of U.S. electricity markets and policy. At the same time, they are the subject of intense debate among stakeholders with differing regional and economic interests. Noting the wide range of opinion on these issues, DOE staff offer three general findings: 1) Changing circumstances are challenging centrally-organized wholesale markets. Flat demand growth, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels are creating stresses on wholesale electricity markets. The centrally-organized markets are successfully achieving reliable and economically efficient delivery of wholesale electricity in their short-term operations, but the changing circumstances portend potential long-term problems for centrally-organized and, to a lesser extent, bilateral markets. 2) New technologies with very low marginal costs, i.e. VRE, reduce wholesale prices, independent of— and in addition to—the effects of low natural gas prices. To the extent that additional development of such resources is driven by subsidies and mandates, their price suppressive effect might place undue economic pressure on revenues for traditional baseload (as well as non-baseload) resources and could require changes in market design.353 354 355 3) Markets need further work to address grid resilience. Market mechanisms are designed to incentivize individual resources rather than develop balanced portfolios. System operators are working toward recognizing, defining, and compensating for reliability- and resilience-enhancing resource attributes (on both the supply and demand side), but more work must be done. U.S. market structures vary widely, but despite substantial differences between markets, some patterns emerge and are worth addressing in response to the April 14 memo. 5.1 Evolution of U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets Until the 1970s, investor-owned electric utilities were vertically integrated (i.e., provided generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to their customers at regulated rates and with administratively determined profits). This concept was loosely referred to as the “regulatory 102 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000209 compact.”nnn Interspersed with VIEUs were—and still are—over 3,200 cooperatively owned electric utilities.ooo 356 In the 1920s, policymakers accepted the idea that non-utility companies might be able to generate electricity at equal or lower cost than VIEUs, to the benefit of electricity consumers.357 In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which introduced competition to the VIEU model and set the stage for later regulatory reform of the electricity industry.358 At the time, PURPA was largely an effort to curb the electricity industry’s reliance on high-cost natural gas and oil.ppp PURPA provided for “increased conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electric utilities, and equitable retail rates for electric consumers.” 359 It also made developing new generation resources easier—specifically renewable energy and cogeneration facilities.360 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 allowed FERC to approve “exempt wholesale generators,” using any fuel and any generation technology, to go into the generation business and sell electricity at competitive prices. The act also authorized FERC to order transmission owners to provide transmission service.361 Also in 1992, Congress enacted the PTC to incentivize VRE energy production, which Congress has extended and modified several times since.362 In 1996, FERC required transmission owners under its jurisdiction to provide open-access transmission to the interstate transmission grid through its landmark Order No. 888. Open access means charging all similarly situated parties the same rate (including, if applicable, what the utility would charge itself to use its transmission facilities) and providing service to all similarly situated parties under the same terms and conditions.363 This action by FERC greatly assisted the development of competition among wholesale power producers because it meant that utilities would find it difficult to limit access to their transmission facilities as a means of protecting their generation assets from competitors. FERC Order No. 2000 (issued in December 1999) promoted voluntary participation in RTO/ISOs by further clarifying both necessary characteristics of RTO/ISOs and benefits of such participation.364 Between 1998 and 2006, 23 states made changes to require their VIEUs to divest some or all of their generating assets and thus allow competition.365 Divestiture was pursued most aggressively by the states with high retail electricity prices (most of New England, New York, the Mid-Atlantic states, and nnn “The ‘state regulatory compact’ evolved as a concept ‘to characterize the set of mutual rights, obligations, and benefits that exist between the utility and society.’ It is not a binding agreement. Under this ‘compact,’ a utility typically is given exclusive access to a designated—or franchised—service territory and can recover its prudent costs (as determined by the regulator) plus a reasonable rate of return on its investments. In return, the utility must fulfill its service obligation of providing universal access service within its territory. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Appendix-Electricity%20System%20Overview.pdf ooo Most public power utilities are distribution-only; however, some are vertically integrated. Distribution-only cooperatives typically purchase all or some of their electricity at the wholesale level from generation and transmission cooperative utilities. ppp Also in 1978, the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act prohibited “(1) the use of natural gas or petroleum as a[n] energy source in any new electric power plant; and (2) construction of any new electric power plant without the capability to use coal or any alternate fuel as a primary energy source.” https://www.congress.gov/bill/95th-congress/house-bill/5146 The Fuel Use Act was mostly repealed in 1987, which “set the stage for a dramatic increase in the use of natural gas for electric generation and industrial processing.” https://www.eia.gov/oil gas/natural gas/analysis publications/ngmajorleg/repeal.html 103 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000210 California) with the hope that competition would bring lower retail consumer 366 Generating units that had been operating under cost-of?service regulation were sold to merchant plant owners or transferred to unregulated, investor-owned utility affiliates. This wave of restructuring did not sweep the entire Nation. In large areas?particularly the Southeast and the West, apart from the expanding Energy Imbalance Market?the wholesale electricity industry is still vertically integrated. In these areas, the wholesale market consists of bilateral transactions. Because restructuring did not take hold in all states, a range of organizational structures exist at the wholesale level in the United States today, as shown in Figure 5.1. States considered ?Partially Restructured? below have divested some generation and/or allowed a portion of customers to choose their energy provider. Figure 5.1. Utility Restructuring by State as of May 2017367 Fully Restructured Partially Restructured None 5.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets Today Over the past two decades, a diverse set of wholesale electricity markets has evolved in different regions of the United States. These wholesale markets can be divided into two broad categories. For the purposes of this section, regions of the country that have not joined are called traditional ??19 Whether this objective has been achieved is mixed in the literature. Availability rates for generation have improved significantly and, as predicted, as competition incentivized operators to run their units as efficiently as possible. Dispatch over the much broader footprints of also increases efficiency and thus reduces costs. PJM notes (July 26, 2017 written statement before Subcommittee on Energy, US. House Committee on Energy and Commerce) ?nearly $2 billion of annual savings to customers.? On the other hand, Borenstein?s 2015 review claims ?the electricity rate changes since restructuring have been driven more by exogenous factors - such as generation technology advances and natural gas price ?uctuations - than by the effects of restructuring.? See two meta-studies: Severin Borenstein and James Bushnell, "The US. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of Restructuring,? May 2015, and James Bushnell, Erin T. Mansur, and Kevin Novan, ?Review of the Economics Literature on US Electricity Restructuring,? April 2017, for DOE, unpublished. 104 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000211 bilateral markets, while those that have are called centrally-organized markets. These regions are shown in Figure 5.2, with RTO/ISOs labeled and colored, and bilateral markets depicted in gray. Figure 5.2. The Seven RTOs or ISOs in the United States rrr 368 There are currently seven centrally-organized markets operating across the United States. The diversity of approaches to market organization and resource adequacy can be visualized along a spectrum, as shown in Figure 5.3—from VIEUs with minimal market organization on one end, to fully restructured markets without formal resource adequacy requirements on the other. Between vertically integrated and energy-only regions, there are diverse approaches to allocating the financial risk of generation investment and the responsibility to provide resource adequacy. rrr Map redrawn from FERC’s December 2016 website. 105 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000212 Figure 5.3. States and Regions along the Spectrum from Traditional to Fully Restructured Electric Markets369 In the Southeast and West, bilateral markets are dominated by VIEUs that operate under a regulated cost-of-service model. States in these regions retain strong control over electric utility resource decisions and oversee resource adequacy, and they consider non-market factors in their oversight of utility decisions through a utility’s IRP process. Once approved by state regulators, ratepayers guarantee the cost recovery of VIEU generation investments through retail rates (or merchant generators through long-term PPAs with utilities). Thus, the financial viability of these generators is not immediately exposed to the same price volatility that generators face in market-oriented regions. However, new resource decisions in VIEU regions are beginning to account for low natural gas prices, low load growth, and zero-marginal cost generation.sss Public power and rural cooperative utilities also have a significant presence in some regions. Utility asset ownership models can vary from vertically integrated to distribution-only. Merchant generators also operate within these regions, but most electricity is produced and delivered by the integrated utilities, with minimal additional spot transactions.370 In centrally-organized markets, generators offer electricity bids on a day-ahead and real-time basis. The RTO/ISO then pools these bids into a single supply curve and calculates the clearing price that matches supply to demand, considering transmission limitations for the next interval. This calculation yields a set of market-clearing prices, one for each location and time horizon. Centrally-organized markets also compensate resources that provide certain ERS through ancillary service markets. Furthermore, in some cases, RTO/ISOs provide supplemental revenues to generators that are dispatched out-of-market, such as ones that are needed to ensure local reliability. sss See, for example, 152 FERC ¶ 61,013 (Florida Power & Light Company) or Steve Wright, General Manager, Chelan County PUD, a vertically integrated utility in Washington, told DOE staff in a June 19, 2017, conversation that the relatively low wholesale prices traditionally seen in the Northwest due to an abundance of low-cost hydro are now further stressed by the export of surplus zero-marginal cost California rooftop solar, so much so that he is “finding it hard to even justify spending on energy efficiency in [his utility’s] integrated resource plan.” 106 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000213 RTOs/ISOs operate as a single balancing authority and achieve cost savings by procuring reserves and other ancillary services for the system. For example, MISO estimates that because it operates an ancillary service market across the entire region, spinning reserve requirements can be based upon the entire region’s needs rather than the sum of individual balancing authorities’ spinning reserve requirements. By operating the ancillary services market, MISO reduced its average spinning reserves requirement from 1,482 MW to 935 MW and saved almost $25 million per year for its members by freeing up generation from having to meet the reserve requirement.371 CAISO, MISO, and SPP retain aspects of the bilateral markets, particularly that states still oversee resource procurement and resource adequacy of their VIEUs, through the IRP process.372 California, MISO and SPP, as well as traditional bilateral market states, incorporate considerations other than shortterm economic efficiency into their resource choices, such as portfolio diversity, job retention or creation, environmental protection, and other factors. 5.2.1 Responsibility for Resource Adequacy and Capacity Some states require utilities to build new or subsidize specific power plants outside the RTO/ISO resource adequacy processes. Other centrally-organized markets (namely PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO) have implemented capacity markets as a mechanism to provide sufficient revenue for resources to ensure resource adequacy. In these markets, the system operator conducts an auction process, and wholesale customers procure resources (including generation, energy efficiency, DR, and transmission-enabled resource imports) to meet the electricity demands of their customers. These markets can be mandatory (PJM Interconnection and ISO New England); voluntary, where states can choose to operate under an IRP process and where load-serving entities can satisfy their requirements through a combination of the market and/or showing that they have rights to adequate capacity (MISO); or voluntarily backstopped by a mandatory process (NYISO). ERCOT does not have a formal resource adequacy requirement. 5.3 Challenges in Wholesale Electricity Markets Centrally-organized markets are now 15–20 years old, and their original designs (even with continual and evolving updates) are showing signs of strain from the pace of change now underway in the electricity industry. Many of these changes were not foreseen during the restructuring and wholesale market designs of the 1990s–2000s. Flat demand growth, flattened supply curves, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels are placing pressures on centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets, resulting in low average wholesale energy prices. These markets were designed when supply curves tilted sharply upward, demand grew over time, and capacity was not explicitly compensated to make up for insufficient revenues from an energy-only market. A 2014 FERC staff report notes: A failure to properly reflect in market prices the value of reliability to consumers and operator actions taken to ensure reliability can lead to inefficient prices in the energy and ancillary services markets leading to inefficient system utilization, and muted investment signals.373 107 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000214 The issue of revenue insufficiency and generator retirements in centrally-organized electricity markets is a complex topic, with causality difficult to assign beyond the individual asset/owner level.ttt Each plant has its own cost structure, and plant revenues can differ between neighboring nodes in a single market. Traditional, bilateral-only wholesale markets are not immune to these issues either, but may not be seeing them yet at the same scale as the three eastern RTO/ISOs that have a predominance of merchant generation. An issue that is more prevalent in these regions than in regions with bilateral markets is the PURPA “must-purchase obligation” that still applies to those regions. After Congress amended PURPA in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, many utilities in regions with centrally-organized wholesale markets have sought and received from FERC orders terminating their obligations.374 By contrast, utilities in regions with traditional, bilateral-only wholesale markets remain subject to the PURPA requirement to buy power from Qualifying Facilities (QFs) under PPAs, with up to 20-year terms and at rates that the applicable state regulator has determined reflect the purchasing utility’s avoided costs. In some instances, generation purchased from QFs has displaced utility-owned generation and thus reduced utility revenue. PURPA remains a subject of ongoing debate within the industry, as evidenced by a discussion during a FERC June 2016 Technical Conference.375 5.3.1 Revenue Insufficiency due to Market Structure: The Missing Money Problem In the mid-2000s it became apparent that merchant generators were failing to recover sufficient revenues through the energy-only markets to cover both their variable and fixed costs. The issue subsequently became known as the “missing money problem.”uuu In testimony before a 2014 FERC technical conference, David Patton, the independent market monitor for ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO, and NYISO, described the issue as stemming from overly-stringent planning reserve requirements: With reasonable assumptions about capacity cost and energy prices, [the one-day-in-tenyears] reliability standard implies a value of lost load of $100,000 to $200,000 per MWh. Hence, without substantially inflated shortage prices, energy-only markets cannot provide enough revenue to satisfy planning reserve requirements. Additional revenue is needed to satisfy these requirements, which is the “missing money” problem addressed by the capacity markets.376 William Hogan of Harvard University noted in 2005 that the missing money problem can also be attributed to price caps: The missing money problem arises when occasional market price increases are limited by administrative actions such as price caps. By preventing prices from reaching high levels during times of relative scarcity, these administrative actions reduce the payments that could be applied towards the fixed operating costs of existing generation plants and the investment costs of new plants.377 To mitigate the missing money problem, centrally-organized markets have, to varying degrees, utilized shortage pricing and capacity markets. ttt The market issues discussed in this section are most pertinent to a merchant generator operating within centrally-organized markets that are not subject to regulated rate recovery. uuu The first use of this term is attributed to Roy Shanker in his 2003 testimony before FERC. William W. Hogan, Harvard University, “’Energy Only’ Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy,” September 23, 2005 108 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000215 Shortage Pricing Shortage pricing, also referred to as scarcity pricing, seeks to ensure that energy market revenues reflect the value consumers place on reliability. It does this through administrative rules that raise prices above marginal costs during times of system stress. FERC has actively sought to improve the utilization of techniques like shortage pricing. In a 2014 analysis, FERC staff provided a useful overview of the rationale for shortage pricing: When the system operator is unable to meet system needs, it applies administrative pricing rules to ensure that costs, including the costs associated with the failure to meet minimum operating reserve requirements, are reflected in market prices. …Under such conditions, prices should rise, inducing performance of existing supply resources and encouraging load to reduce consumption so that the system operator would not need to administratively curtail load to maintain reliability. 378 All of the Nation’s RTO/ISOs currently employ shortage pricing to some degree; however, the designs are not uniform. FERC Order No. 831 raised energy offer caps in jurisdictional RTO/ISOs from $1,000 to $2,000/MWh.379 Conditions required to trigger shortage pricing vary from year to year. This variance could present challenges to market participants who require a threshold level of certainty to make an investment decision. Remarks by market monitors David Patton and Joe Bowring critique the practice of relying solely on shortage pricing: [David Patton:] Shortage pricing is not like a capacity market where you’re going to get a level of revenue that might fluctuate by 10 to 20 percent per year. With shortage pricing, you might get 10 years of revenue in one year and then the other nine years the generators are going to think they’re going bankrupt.380 [Joe Bowring]: What will happen if you go through eight years of very low revenues under scarcity pricing … and a significant number of units decide to retire because they can’t see into the future? They don’t know if [in] the ninth or 10th year there’s going to be $20 billion. They retire if the revenues aren’t adequate.381 Capacity Markets Four RTO/ISOs currently operate centralized capacity markets: ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM hold mandatory auctions, while MISO’s is voluntary. Capacity markets address the missing money problem by imposing resource adequacy requirements on load-serving entities (LSEs). Spees, Newell, and Pfeifenberger provide a useful overview of how this process works: A resource adequacy [requirement] requires LSEs to procure sufficient generation or demand-response capacity to serve their own customers’ coincident peak load plus a mandatory planning reserve margin. If each LSE procures their required capacity, then the system as a whole will be able to meet its planning reserve margin requirement and target resource adequacy level. … [Capacity] has value as a stand-alone commodity, the demand for which is driven by LSEs needing to meet their resource adequacy requirement.382 According to the authors, capacity market revenues should in theory ameliorate the missing money problem by providing “the incremental payment needed to recover their investment costs in addition to the operating profits earned through energy and ancillary service sales.”383 Figure 5.4 provides a useful illustration of how capacity payments are intended to close the missing money gap. 109 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000216 Figure 5.4. How Market Prices Allow Resource Costs to be Recovered in a Centrally-organized Wholesale Market384 Revenues from energy sold in the wholesale market pay for a generators' variable costs and some portion of fixed costs (indicated by green arrows). The unrecovered portion of fixed cost (missing money) is recovered through capacity market revenues (indicated by blue arrow). Some observers note that capacity markets may not provide sufficient revenues as originally intended. For example, the 2016 PJM Market Monitor’s report finds PJM’s markets can provide adequate revenue to support some existing capacity, but the outlook varies widely by technology, fuel choice, time interval, and location: Analysis of the total unit revenues of theoretical new entrant CTs and CCs for three representative locations shows that units that entered the PJM markets in 2007 have not covered their total costs, including the return on and of capital, on a cumulative basis through 2016. The analysis also shows that theoretical new entrant CTs and CCs that entered the PJM markets in 2012 have covered their total costs on a cumulative basis in the eastern PSEG [New Jersey] and BGE [Baltimore] zones but have not covered total costs in the western ComEd [Chicago] Zone. Energy market revenues were not sufficient to cover total costs in any scenario except the new entrant CC unit that went into operation in 2012 in BGE, which demonstrates the critical role of capacity market revenue in covering total costs.vvv 385 5.3.2 Revenue Insufficiency due to External Forces While RTO/ISOs have sought to address the missing money problem as previously defined, newer variants of it continue to permeate stakeholder discussions. Economist Severin Borenstein notes that the definition has expanded to include the supply curve impact of subsidies: Money has been going missing for many years, according to owners of power plants. They’ve used the term for more than a decade to refer to the fact that wholesale electricity markets have price caps (mostly between $1,000 and $10,000 per MWh) that constrain how vvv As part of the review of market performance, the market monitor analyzed the net revenues earned by CTs, NGCCs, coal, diesel, nuclear, solar, and wind generating units. 110 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000217 much sellers can make when supply is tight. Without that income, generators argue, it may not be profitable to build new capacity, or extend the life of existing capacity, that is needed to meet demand. More recently, the definition of missing money has been expanded to include the price impacts of subsidized or mandated renewables generation. In California, New York and many other states, wind and solar are pushing down wholesale prices and making continued operation of some nuclear and fossil fuel generation unprofitable. 386 Shifts in the Generation Supply Curve Changes in the Nation’s generation mix have generally reduced revenues for incumbent baseload generators in wholesale markets, as highlighted in QER 1.2: [P]rice suppression is occurring in RTO/ISO wholesale markets, with noticeable amounts of wind and solar generation (and low-cost gas generation). While passing on savings to consumers is desirable, in some regions, these low prices have put pressure on baseload units, particularly zero-carbon emissions nuclear generation.387 Put more specifically, shifts in market supply curves have lowered the infra-marginal rentswww earned by baseload generators. Crucially, this reduction has occurred because of changes along both axes of the supply curve. Along the horizontal (supply) axis, the entry of new resources has pushed the curve to the right, resulting in a lower clearing price at the same level of demand. Meanwhile, reductions in marginal fuel costs (vertical axis) have lowered the slope of the curve. The net effect of these changes—as illustrated by a simulated dispatch curve in ERCOT—is shown in Figure 5.5. www Infra-marginal rents are the differences between the market-clearing price and the submitted bid of each generator. Generators that bid less than the market-clearing price receive a payment equal to this difference. 111 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000218 Figure 5.5. Simulated ERCOT Dispatch Curvesxxx Changes in fuel costs and the supply mix have impacted market clearing prices, and thus lowered inframarginal rents for incumbent generators. Reductions in natural gas prices have clearly flattened the curve, reducing revenues for generation resources. The entry of new, near-zero marginal cost resources has also pushed the overall curve to the right. The entry of wind and solar resources is visible in lower left. Natural Gas and Incumbent Baseload The frequency with which natural gas sets the price of electricity has increased in many of the Nation’s markets. For example, 2017 could mark the first time in PJM’s history that gas is marginal for more intervals than coal (see Figure 5.6). This transition means that infra-marginal rents that were previously based on the marginal cost of coal resources have been supplanted by the marginal cost of natural gas resources. xxx EIA, analysis performed for DOE using EIA and ABB Ventyx software to show estimated plant-specific estimated production costs for July 15 of each year modeled, using then-current delivered energy prices (in 2009 $) within ERCOT and estimated, plant-specific heat rates to estimate plant-specific marginal costs of electricity production, June 2017 112 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000219 Figure 5.6. Type of Fuel Used in PJM (by Real-Time Marginal Units): 2004 through March 2017 388 Natural gas is rising as the marginal electricity generation source in PJM. The low price of natural gas has resulted in the competitive displacement of coal in many of the Nation’s markets. This trend is visible in Figure 5.7 by comparing the 2005 curve to the 2015 version. The interspersed nature of the coal and gas generators in the 2015 curve reflects that the two now compete for the same runtime. While gas had been a mid-merit source in previous years, it has become more of a baseload resource in recent years. The phenomenon is visible on a national level by examining the capacity factors of the respective technologies. Figure 5.7. Annual Average Capacity Factors of Coal and Natural Gas Generators 113 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000220 NGCC generators have seen a steady increase in fleet average capacity factor from 35% in 2005 to 56% in 2015; in that year, the NGCC fleet average eclipsed that of coal generators, which has declined from approximately 68% in 2010 to 55% in 2015.389 Negative Pricing Negative pricing events in electricity markets reflect a complex set of economic, reliability, environmental, and safety variables. The interaction of these variables differs depending on the region, season, and time in question, but negative pricing often reflects some combination of excess generation (often exacerbated by must-run requirements), transmission constraints, and economic factors. According to analysis from LBNL, negative pricing events have historically been rare at many major pricing hubs (less than two percent of total hours in real-time markets in 2016), and have had almost no impact on annual average day-ahead or real-time wholesale electricity prices. However, more frequent negative pricing has been observed in CAISO, and in constrained hubs that feature a relatively large amount of VRE and/or nuclear generation.390 In addition, PJM has observed that “prices go negative at nuclear units buses in approximately 2,176 hours – representing 14 percent of off-peak hours.”391 The term economic factors in this case serves as a catchall for those negative pricing events that are not the direct result of must-run requirements. EIA provides examples of why generators might choose to run, even if it means accepting negative prices: Technical and economic factors may drive power plant operators to run generators even when power supply outstrips demand. For example:  For technical and cost recovery reasons, nuclear plant operators try to continuously operate at full power.  Eligible generators can take a 2.2¢/kWh or $22/MWh[yyy] production tax credit (PTC) on electricity sold. This means that some generators may be willing to sell their output for as low as -$22/MWh to continue producing power. Typically, wind generators are the largest such group in any region.  There are maintenance and fuel-cost penalties when operators shut down and start up large steam turbine (usually fossil-fueled) plants as demand varies over a day or a week. These costs may be avoided if the generator sells at a loss to attract a buyer when demand is low.392 As EIA notes, the PTC can create an incentive for wind generators to bid at negative prices. If other generators located at nodes in the areas affected by negative prices are unable or unwilling to reduce output, they will have to pay the negative price for their output. That scenario has unfolded on some buses in PJM, as outlined in comments to DOE from PJM staff: Tax and subsidy policies have had an impact on the economics of certain types of generation. The Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit and renewable energy mandates have had the most significant impact on nuclear generation. Specifically, the nuclear and wind generation are competing to clear in the market during off-peak hours when wind resources are the strongest and load is reduced. In those off-peak hours, the production tax credit has created an incentive for renewable resources to bid negative prices as they must run in order to receive their payment from the federal treasury. Since 2014, PJM has seen prices go negative at nuclear unit buses in approximately 2,176 hours—representing 14 percent of off-peak hours.393 [footnotes omitted from original text] yyy While the PTC value was $23/MWh in 2016, this figure was based upon EIA’s interpretation of the PTC benefit at the time. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=8870 114 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000221 ERCOT’s market monitor identified 130 negative-priced hours for the entire system in 2016, an increase from 50 hours in 2015.394 Negative prices in ERCOT are now on the rise due to subsidized wind, as noted by William Hogan and Susan Pope in a recent study filed with the PUC of Texas by Calpine and NRG: Prior to the increase in wind and other intermittent capacity in the ISOs, negative prices sometimes occurred in the middle of the night, as load dropped and generators needed for operation the following day were pinned at their minimum loads. In contrast, the increasing incidence of negative prices in ERCOT is caused by the incentive of the owners of wind generation capacity receiving the PTC to continue to produce even when the locational price is negative.395 In addition to the PTC, VRE may also be incentivized to submit negative bids into markets by demand for RECs (to satisfy state environmental mandates and/or corporate sustainability goals). Conventional generators also face economic factors that lead them to submit negative bids. Existing nuclear plants in the United States, as well as some fossil units, may bid in during these periods to avoid costly start-ups and shutdowns.396 For example, steam turbine plants may choose not to cut back their production if they are not designed to cycle economically. Operational attributes can also create or exacerbate negative prices. For example, hydroelectric plants are limited in their ability to curtail output because of environmental and safety reasons. Flood control and wildlife regulations are two important reasons this can take place. As this winter’s record precipitation gave way to snowmelt this spring, CAISO found itself with an abundance of un-curtailed hydroelectricity that competed with solar generation.397 A similar dynamic played out in 2011 following significant precipitation in the Pacific Northwest, as shown in Figure 5.8.zzz zzz In Figure 5.8, Off-peak is 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. on Monday through Saturday and all hours on Sunday. Mid C is Mid-Columbia, COB is California-Oregon Border, and NOB is Nevada-Oregon Border. 115 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000222 Figure 5.8. Negative Northwest Off-Peak Daily Spot Prices ($/MWh) in 2011398 5.3.3 State Actions Impacting Wholesale Markets There is growing concern about the impact of state government intervention in wholesale markets, such as the creation of ZEC programs to keep nuclear plants in operation, as well as RPS and other state policy requirements. This concern was reflected in comments at the May 1–2, 2017 FERC Technical Conference on state policies in the three eastern wholesale markets:aaaa [Roy Shanker, independent consultant]: It is difficult to identify any element in the wholesale electric market (energy, capacity, ancillary services and transmission) that is not being directly and materially impacted by discriminatory mandates driven by state policy actions. Price taking energy and capacity offers linked to these mandates directly impact price formation. The intermittent nature of virtually all RPS resources requires material modification of dispatch and significant increases in flexible resources and associated ancillary services.399 [William Hogan, Harvard University]: The increasing impact of Federal and state policies to support particular technologies, raises questions about the viability of wholesale power markets.400 [Susan Tierney, Analysis Group]: These state policies can and often do affect the price of electricity in wholesale power markets, and the entry, exit and cost of operations of electric generating resources…there is no reason to expect that state decision makers will make aaaa The full transcript of (and all written statements from) this technical conference is available on FERC’s website. FERC Technical Conference, “Docket No. AD17-11-000”, May 1-2, 2017. 116 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000223 determinations that singularly focus on economic efficiency and the continued viability of wholesale capacity-market designs ahead of other all objectives… Already, we see that in a market that depends upon the flow of private capital and diversity in the asset mix, some suppliers of capacity resources (including demand-response and nuclear generation) have recently decided that the markets are not producing financial outcomes consistent with the requirements of private capital markets… I remain concerned that the current centralized wholesale capacity markets in PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE will not be sustainable, from an economic, financial and political point of view and in light of states’ policies and preferences.401 [Cliff Hamel, Navigant Consulting]: [P]roblems in the current centralized [capacity] market approach are fundamental.402 [Samuel Newell, The Brattle Group]: The centralized wholesale markets do not, however, and should not be expected to meet goals they were not designed to meet. Many states now have far-reaching carbon and clean energy goals. Yet today’s centralized energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets are mostly not designed to differentiate generation resources based on their unpriced carbon emissions or other unpriced attributes.403 [Lawrence Makovich, IHS Markit]: In summary, out-of-market interventions cause predictable distortions and consequences, including: 1. Reduced market-based cash flows for non-peaking generating resources, causing lower investment in electric generating production efficiency. 2. Uneconomic displacement of lower cost energy production causing a shift toward a less cost-effective fuel and technology mix and resulting in higher overall average electricity supply costs. 3. Less supply diversity causing more generation production cost and availability risk. 4. Premature retirements of low CO2 emitting resources, causing replacement with higher CO2 emitting resources that subvert market intervention policy goals.404 While this panel of economists commented on these effects on the wholesale markets resulting from state policies, members of a panel of state officials at the same FERC Technical Conference clearly said their states will continue to pursue their policies: [Jeffrey Bentz, New England States Committee on Electricity]: States aren't interested in having markets just for the sake of having markets…405 [Angela O’Connor, Department of Public Utilities of Massachusetts] […] what the legislature requires us to do we have to do…406 [Sarah Hofman, Vermont Public Service Board]: […] we cannot tell what our legislators [what to] do. And so they are going to have policies and it doesn't matter what anybody here or any place else says, they will have policies that set the stage for what the state wants and that's what legislators are for.[…] there is no question that state lawmakers will continue passing legislation that sets public policy. It is now our challenge to continue to work together to find effective ways to carry out those policies while also continuing to benefit from competitive wholesale markets.407 Tony Clark recently expressed similar views on the original policy assumptions behind the creation of centrally-organized wholesale markets: Affordable power was the goal. The current markets are still procuring affordable power but many state public policy makers no longer see that as the only goal. It is little wonder we hear some decry that the markets are not delivering what people want. It is because they were never designed for job creation, tax preservation, politically popular generation, or 117 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000224 anything other than reliable, affordable electricity. To the degree policy makers and elected officials have moved the goal posts, it is time to consider rational pathways forward.408 5.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets Looking Forward Changes in the centrally-organized markets must catch up to the broad technology-driven and policydriven electricity market dynamics identified in the April 14 memo. Overall, centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets are effective at driving energy prices toward suppliers’ short-run marginal costs. However, the revenue insufficiency problem has become more pronounced in recent years. Generator profitability could become a public policy concern if so much generation is financially challenged that the reliability or resilience of the BPS become threatened. New market structures may be necessary to reflect these market dynamics, particularly in an industry in which suppliers with high fixed capital costs and relatively low marginal costs often struggle to recover their long-run average costs. In addition, while markets as currently designed do not explicitly recognize or compensate system resilience, RTO/ISOs are considering ways to better support system resilience objectives in the same way that they explicitly recognized and administratively incorporated reliability standards into dispatch practices in the past. For example, the variety of problems that arose during the Polar Vortex (as discussed in Section 4) caused PJM and ISO-NE to change their capacity market rules to ensure generator performance during scarcity conditions.409 410 In summary, the debates surrounding wholesale markets are complex and multifaceted, but the institutions and the grid itself have historically proven flexible, strong, and able to adapt. Questions about revenue sufficiency and resilience must be addressed quickly, before the fast-moving evolution of our power system outpaces our ability to understand and manage it responsibly. 118 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000225 6 Affordability The April 14 memo asked whether the loss of coal, natural gas, nuclear, and hydroelectric baseload power is making the grid less affordable. There is no widely accepted metric for an “affordable” grid or an “affordable” electricity bill. DOE’s GMI defines affordability as “maintain[ing] reasonable costs to customers.”411 Typically, the meaning of “affordable” is contextual, i.e. dependent on the size of a consumer’s household budget. This indicator of energy affordability can be represented as energy burden, which is a household’s annual spending on energy as a percentage of its gross annual income.412 413 Because electricity is an important energy service, it can be broken out as “electricity burden.”bbbb In 2011, the median electricity burden for all households was four percent, but it averaged 8.3 percent for low-income households and 2.9 percent for non-low-income households.414 415 416 For low-income families, more spending on energy bills translates into less spending on other expenses, such as food, health care, and education.417 The limited increases in electricity rates suggest that electricity bills have not become less affordable for most customers. However, changes in cost allocation and rate designs could have disparate effects on bills for different groups of customers. For example, utilities raising fixed charges to counterbalance decreases in revenues from energy efficiency gains could disproportionately impact low-consumption customers, for whom fixed charges comprise a larger portion of the bill. Customers on fixed incomes and those who rely on electricityintensive medical devices may have an acute need to maintain affordability.418 Most states and utilities offer programs like concessionary rates for these customers, and ensuring affordability options for vulnerable customers remains a priority as electricity stakeholders explore market, regulatory, and rate reforms to accommodate an evolving grid. Low electricity prices can also boost businesses’ competitiveness and bring new economic activity to an area, as evidenced by companies locating electricity-intensive industrial facilities, such as server farms, to regions with low, stable electricity prices.419 420 421 422 Today, many businesses are more actively managing their energy costs by investing heavily in energy efficiency, energy management systems, solar PV installations, and direct PPAs with VRE providers.423 Industrial electricity prices are typically close to wholesale prices because providing electricity to high-voltage, high-use industrial customers is less expensive and more efficient than serving distribution-level customers.424 Thus, low wholesale electricity prices can allow businesses and industrial customers to thrive, support job growth, and drive economic development.425 6.1 Affordability of Generation Portfolios The affordability of a given generation portfolio is largely shaped by region- and state- specific market structures. Merchant investment decisions (where applicable) and regional resource availability (for example, NGCC has a lower levelized cost of electricity (LCOE, the per-MWh cost of building and operating assets over their lifetime) in the Gulf States where gas is abundant than it has in the North bbbb However, this is complicated by the fact that electricity usage varies significantly from region to region, so the electricity burden would be much higher in regions that use electricity for heating and cooling, as is common in the West and South. In addition to electricity, energy burden includes direct fuel use, such as natural gas or propane for cooking and heating, and can vary based on a household’s activities, appliances, and location. 119 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000226 Central states) contribute to regional variation in charges to end-users. 426 The Energy Information Administration estimated in the Annual Energy Outlook for 2017 that the BPS (generation and transmission) comprises roughly two-thirds of the total average price of electricity. Generation costs accounted for 57 percent of the average price of electricity in 2016, compared to distribution’s 32 percent and transmission’s 11 percent.427 In vertically integrated areas, state PUCs seek to avoid uneconomic outcomes and ensure affordable service to customers428 by requiring VIEUs to submit IRPs in which they consider least-cost, long-term plans for providing service including, among other things, LCOE.429 The IRP must also account for any additional state-mandated requirements such as energy efficiency resource standards or RPS.430 Notably, VIEU assets are usually guaranteed the recovery of investment and operational costs regardless of whether they would prove to be cost-competitive in a short-run marginal cost market environment.431 432 By contrast, in some of the centrally-organized markets (e.g., most of the states in PJM, ERCOT, all but two in ISO-NE, NYISO, and Illinois for MISO), the generation portfolio is determined by the wholesale market itself (subject to any generation and demand-side mandates) rather than a state-overseen IRP by the VIEU.cccc Merchant generators make investment decisions by comparing an asset’s expected lifetime costs with the expected revenues from any PPAs, financial incentives such as tax credits, and sales in wholesale energy and capacity markets. Lifetime costs considered by merchant generators include fixed investment costs and operational costs. 6.2 The Wholesale-Retail Disconnect Tracing the relationships between wholesale and retail prices is difficult because ratemaking practices vary widely from state to state, and there are many other contributing factors involved besides the wholesale cost of electricity.433 434 Retail rates include a variety of charges that are not included in the bulk electricity charges passed through by RTO/ISOs or VIEUs. These include components of the transmission costs not captured in the RTO prices (such as state-regulated transmission investments), payments that the distribution utility makes to merchant transmission suppliers, various fixed charges, customer service, state and local sales taxes and franchise fees, and public benefits charges.435 Retail electricity bills can also include additional costs to support state policy goals—such as RPS, energy efficiency resource standards, or programs to promote use of distributed energy resources, among others.436 Most utilities have undertaken substantial programs to modernize their distribution systems, and a significant subset have invested in infrastructure needed to integrate higher levels of distributed energy resources.437 Under established cost-of-service ratemaking principles, these costs are typically allocated to retail customers and periodically examined by regulators. The wholesale-retail electricity price disconnect means that, in most areas, the conventional generation retirements can affect wholesale rates but have little or no immediately visible impact on retail rates. cccc Many state, regional, and Federal policies can impact the expected profits for merchant generators, including environmental regulations; carbon trading programs; tax credits; and state procurements, mandates, or other mechanisms that take generation or demand-side resources out of markets available to merchants and/or subsidize those resources. 120 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000227 However, despite the difficulty in attributing retail price impacts to wholesale changes, considering the trends in both wholesale and retail prices can provide greater understanding of affordability. On average, national retail electricity rates have been roughly flat for more than a decade, and rates have closely followed the historical average since 1960.dddd 438 Retail rates in nominal dollars have been increasing at a low annual rate for approximately two decades, while the real retail price has stayed relatively constant over the last decade, as shown in Figure 6.1. From 2011 to 2016, nominal residential prices increased at an average of 1.9 percent annually, about the same rate as overall inflation.439 In 2016, the national average retail electricity price declined for the first time since 2002, with residential customers paying a national average of 12.55 cents/kWh. Figure 6.1. Average U.S. Residential Sector Retail Electricity Prices over Time440 dddd The use of national averages for this analysis provides a broad picture, but limits insight into regional and state-level impacts of BPS changes that may lead to higher-than-average retail rate increases among some customers and utilities. National averages mean little to subsets of ratepayers seeing significant retail rate increases or those who have faced consistently high bills. Even use of state-level retail averages can mask exceptions that greatly vary from the average. For example, California residents who live near the coast enjoy a temperate climate with limited need for cooling or heating. In contrast, those living inland see very hot summers that require high use of air conditioning and thus see high electric bills. A more thorough analysis would consider affordability and rate increases at a more granular level. 121 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000228 Average retail prices vary widely across states and regions, with New England, California and the MidAtlantic paying the highest rates.441 However, a comparison of electricity rates alone can be misleading; for instance, California’s average residential electricity rate is over 18 cents/kWh (one of the highest in the Nation), but due to low average residential consumption, the average California electricity bill is only $95/month, ranking it in the bottom third of the Nation. By comparison, Washington state has the lowest average retail rates in the Nation at less than nine cents/kWh (less than half the average rate in California), but because of higher consumption, residential customers in that state see average bills of $95/month, the same average electricity bill as in California.442 443 It is not yet clear what impact recent coal, nuclear, and natural gas plant retirements will have on customer bills in the future, nor how the continuing trend of retirements will affect the overall cost of the BPS, which will ultimately be borne by ratepayers. Natural gas generation has proven to be a strong competitor with coal and nuclear power because natural gas prices have fallen over the past decade. Wind and solar generation have also increased, and while their capital costs are much higher than those of natural gas (particularly if normalized by capacity factor), their marginal cost is nearly zero.444 Changes in the BPS since 2002—lower demand, lower natural gas prices, and growth in VRE—have reduced wholesale electricity prices, as shown in Figure 6.2.445 Figure 6.2. Average Wholesale Electric Costs/MWh Have Fallen between 2002 and 2016446 From 2002–2016, wholesale electricity prices have increasingly tracked natural gas prices, and as natural gas generation has increased over time, the differences in price between regions have also decreased (e.g., prices in NYISO and PJM are much closer in 2016 than in 2004). Figure 6.3 illustrates wholesale prices at electricity trading hubs, emphasizing 2016 prices on a regional basis as derived by FERC staff.eeee FERC notes in its 2016 State of the Markets report that prices were down in 2016 from 2015, and that prices in PJM were the lowest they have been since the RTO formed in 1999.447 eeee Derived by FERC staff from S&P Global Intelligence data. Prices are a simple average of day-ahead, on-peak physical prices. 122 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000229 Figure 6.3. Day-Ahead, On-Peak Wholesale Electric Prices Reach Near-Record Lows in 2016448 FERC’s most recent State of the Markets report shows that all areas of the United States are experiencing low wholesale electricity prices. In 2016, prices were highest in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest and were lowest in the Northwest. Historically, wholesale prices would show much more regional variation. The dollar values are average 2016 day-ahead on peak prices; the percentages indicate the change from 2015 to 2016. While wholesale electricity prices have tracked natural gas price trends, the impacts of other generation trends on affordability are less obvious.449 Because coal, hydro, and nuclear plants have historically had relatively stable and predictable fuel costs, these power plants have provided a valuable hedge against the price volatility of natural gas and oil. Today, nuclear, hydro, and VRE all serve as hedges against generation whose fuel cost is more volatile and represents a larger portion of the total delivered price (i.e. natural gas and oil). For example, the variable operating, maintenance, and fuel costs of hydroelectric and nuclear average just $5/MWh and $12/MWh, respectively, compared to $41/MWh for NGCC and $34/MWh for coal.450 Increasingly, VRE also performs a price stabilizing role—wind, solar PV, hydropower, and geothermal generation offer near zero-marginal-cost electricity. To the degree that VRE and nuclear can stabilize the short run cost of bulk power, those resources could also improve the month-to-month manageability of customer bills. Among the nine regions examined in this study, the CAISO+, Midwest, ERCOT, and Central regions have the most non-hydro VRE generation today. RPS compliance costs were found to total $2.6 billion in 123 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000230 2014, averaging $12/MWh for VRE and equating to 1.3 percent of average retail electricity bills.ffff 451 The actual effects of zero-marginal cost electricity on consumers’ bills is situational, and growth in VRE can drive additional costs, including transmission and integration costs.452 453 Because many utility-scale VRE plants are built in locations distant from load centers, they sometimes require major transmission additions to connect the remote generation to the rest of the grid and to load centers. Over the past five years, a portion of the 24,000 miles of new transmission built (about twice the number of miles added from 2006–2010) and $102 billion invested to strengthen the grid and interconnect new generation has been made to interconnect VRE.454 455 Transmission investments (regulated or merchant) can increase bulk power costs and therefore increase customers’ retail bills to the extent that they are not offset by savings attributable to access to lower-cost generation or reduced congestion costs. Higher levels of VRE penetration also require system integration services, such as additional ERS. It is unclear how the costs of these integration requirements will affect wholesale electricity costs as VRE penetrations continue to increase. In addition, as the PTC for wind generation expires and the ITC for residential solar PV installations reduces in the coming years, their costs relative to other resources will rise. However, declining wind and solar capital costs and higher productivity will likely somewhat offset these losses, albeit to an unknown degree.456 457 458 459 Finally, several states have created subsidies to favor or retain nuclear generation. If such subsidies are being funded by taxpayer dollars – like the PTC and ITC – rather than a charge to electricity customers, this will affect wholesale costs in some way, but will probably have little discernable effect on the customers’ retail electricity bills. However, if subsidies for power plant retention are funded as a direct charge to retail electricity customers, electricity bills could rise and affordability could decrease. Overall, ISOs and RTOs face many challenges that ultimately affect the allocation of transmission and integration costs when they make decisions on how to spread those costs among cost-causers, reliability and other service providers, and consumers, as well as decisions on how to keep cost allocation practices up to date as the generation mix, transmission capacity, and load evolves over time.460 461 462 463 6.3 Affordability Looking Forward There appears to be little near-term risk that natural gas prices will rise significantly and thereby reduce electricity affordability. However, natural gas is an extractive commodity traded internationally—prices are affected by policies impacting how the resource is produced, and prices show periodic regional, seasonal, or local price spikes, and even sustained price increases. It is reasonable to expect continuing regional differentials between natural gas delivered costs, reflecting differences in proximity to natural gas production fields, production costs, and deliverability (including the effects of pipeline or liquefied natural gas deliverability constraints). If natural gas prices rise, wholesale electricity costs are likely to rise in regions where natural gas remains the marginal fuel in a significant number of hours. This would be true for both RTO/ISO and non-RTO/ISO regions. It is unclear how rising natural gas prices and ffff Studies on RPS compliance costs do not fully capture the “all-in” costs that the ratepayer (and taxpayers) ultimately bear. These other costs are harder to measure, but may not be insignificant. They may be harder to quantify for many reasons, such as having multiple drivers behind those investments and various distribution-level grid modernization investments (e.g., smart meters and others that are touted to aid VRE integration). New transmission (other than the direct transmission interconnection charged to the renewable generation project and thus reflected in their PPA), as well as effects of VRE variability on the dispatchable fleet, are other examples of costs often not included in grid integration cost studies. Costs of various tax and other subsidies are also not counted. 124 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000231 additional VRE generation would affect the large-scale displacement of coal and nuclear generation, and ultimately, electricity affordability for affected consumers. The variety of generation portfolios operating throughout the U.S. lends itself to further study. To date, limited work has focused on the affordability of the BPS as a system or portfolio—relatively more attention has focused on retail electricity prices464 or the stand-alone cost of generation technologies (such as LCOE). Some research has focused on analysis of system-wide LCOE,465 but more can be done. Looking forward, another potential challenge to affordability is determining how the proliferation of distributed PV across much of the Nation is changing the cost structure for non-participating customers. A growing body of research considers whether and how distributed PV users continue to benefit from their grid connection for balancing services and energy storage, as well as how to reallocate utility energy, capital, and system costs and rates fairly among all users. Concerns about more customers installing distributed PV under net metering tariffs,gggg which potentially shifts costs and increases the burden on non-distributed PV customers, have caused multiple states to re-open their net metering tariff processes and, in some cases, implement new policies. However, some studies have quantified the retail rate impacts of net metering to all residential customers (i.e., participants and non-participants) and found that current and projected levels of net metering have very little impact, especially compared to broader drivers of retail rate increases in the electric industry.466 gggg According to the EIA, “net metering tariffs enable customers to use the electricity they generate in excess of their consumption at certain times to offset their use of electricity from the grid at other times. These tariffs are designed to encourage distributed renewable generation. These arrangements describe how an electric utility customer who installs a qualifying generator (typically a rooftop solar array, less often a small wind turbine, or a small combined heat-and-power system) will be compensated by their utility for the electricity they generate in excess of their consumption.” https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=6190 125 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000232 7 Policy Recommendations The April 14 memo asked staff to “not only analyze problems but also provide concrete policy recommendations and solutions.” To that end, DOE staff prepared a list of recommendations below. Some actions fit squarely within DOE’s authority, while others might fall to other government agencies or private organizations. Wholesale markets: FERC should expedite its efforts with states, RTO/ISOs, and other stakeholders to improve energy price formation in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets. After several years of fact finding and technical conferences, the record now supports energy price formation reform, such as the proposals laid out by PJM467 and others.468 Further, negative offers should be mitigated to the broadest extent possible. Valuation of Essential Reliability Services (ERS): Where feasible and within its statutory authority, FERC should study and make recommendations regarding efforts to require valuation of new and existing ERS by creating fuel-neutral markets and/or regulatory mechanisms that compensate grid participants for services that are necessary to support reliable grid operations. Pricing mechanisms or regulations should be fuel and technology neutral and centered on the reliability services provided. DOE should provide technical and policy support that strengthen and accelerate these efforts. Bulk Power System (BPS) resilience: DOE should support utility, grid operator, and consumer efforts to enhance system resilience. Transmission planning entities should conduct periodic disasterpreparedness exercises involving electric utilities, regional offices of Federal agencies, and state agencies. NERC should consider adding resilience components to its mission statement and develop a program to work with its member utilities to broaden their use of emerging ways to better incorporate resilience. RTOs and ISOs should further define criteria for resilience, identify how to include resilience in business practices, and examine resilience-related impacts of their resource mix. Promote Research and Development (R&D) of next-generation/21st century grid reliability and resilience tools: DOE should focus R&D efforts to enhance utility, grid operator, and consumer efforts to enhance system reliability and resilience. DOE R&D opportunities include the following activities:  Develop grid technical tools to facilitate new-generation technologies’ operations to support BPS reliability (e.g., by enabling technologies to provide ERS), and maximize use of the DOE national laboratories.  Expand cooperation on grid reliability across North America, including working with NERC to further enhance the reliability of our shared BPS through technical engagement with Mexico and Canada.  With the National Science Foundation, sponsor the development of new open-source software for the next-generation electric grid research community.  Focus R&D on improving VRE integration through grid modernization technologies that can increase grid operational flexibility and reliability through a variety of innovations in sensors and controls, storage technology, grid integration, and advanced power electronics. The Grid Modernization Initiative should also consider additional applications of high-performance computing for grid modeling to advance grid resilience. Support Federal and regional approaches to electricity workforce development and transition assistance: In partnership with other agencies and the private sector, DOE should facilitate programs 126 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000233 and regional approaches for electricity sector workforce development. Unemployed workers nearing but not yet eligible for retirement may have difficulty retraining after careers built on specialized skills that may be in declining demand. Where possible, Federal agencies should leverage existing government, nongovernment, labor, and industry workforce consortia. Energy dominance: Executive Order 13783 (Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth) outlined an approach to promote the clean and safe development of energy resources while at the same time minimizing regulatory barriers to energy production, economic growth, and job creation. The Order called for a rescission of certain energy and climate related policies, rescinded specific reports, and ordered the review of key environmental regulations. While DOE is not the main agency tasked in the Order, it should continue to prioritize energy dominance and implementing the Executive Order broadly and quickly. Infrastructure development: DOE and related Federal agencies should accelerate and reduce costs for the licensing, relicensing, and permitting of grid infrastructure such as nuclear, hydro, coal, advanced generation technologies, and transmission. DOE should review regulatory burdens for siting and permitting for generation and gas and electricity transmission infrastructure and should take actions to accelerate the process and reduce costs. Specific reforms could include the following:  Hydropower: Encourage FERC to revisit the current licensing and relicensing process and minimize regulatory burden, particularly for small projects and pumped storage.  Nuclear Power: Encourage the NRC to ensure the safety of existing and new nuclear facilities without unnecessarily adding to the operating costs and economic uncertainty of nuclear energy. Revisit nuclear safety rules under a risk-based approach.  Coal Generation: Encourage EPA to allow coal-fired power plants to improve efficiency and reliability without triggering new regulatory approvals and associated costs. In a regulatory environment that would allow for improvement of the existing fleet, DOE should pursue a targeted R&D portfolio aiming at increasing efficiency. Electric-gas coordination: Utilities, states, FERC, and DOE should support increased coordination between the electric and natural gas industries to address potential reliability and resilience concerns associated with organizational and infrastructure differences. DOE and FERC should support wellfunctioning commodity markets for natural gas by expeditiously processing liquefied natural gas export and cross-border natural gas pipeline applications. 127 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000234 8 Areas for Further Research DOE staff identified several research topics that are relevant to the April 14 memo and merit further indepth analysis. Some topics may be appropriate for offices within the Department, national laboratories, academia, other government agencies, or private organizations. Market structure and pricing  Study mechanisms for enabling equitable, value-based remuneration for desired grid attributes—such as ERS, fuel availability, high resilience, low emissions, flexibility, etc.—with alternative market and non-market structures. This research could assess potentially underrecognized contributions from baseload power plants, using fuel-neutral metrics and values relevant to analyze all resource options.  Evaluate ongoing capacity market reforms. Several of the Nation’s electricity markets use mandatory capacity markets to procure capacity for future years and ensure resource adequacy. The design of these constructs has been the subject of near-constant debate within the RTO/ISOs and before FERC. After undergoing substantial changes from 2014–2015, capacity markets have come under new scrutiny in light of recent actions by restructured states to preserve or promote certain resources or resource types and to further state policy goals.  Explore market operations in a higher VRE/low marginal cost system, and examine recent changes in energy price trends—including the drivers of wholesale electricity prices in the context of limited load growth—quantifying the relative contributions of fossil fuel prices. With significant amounts of near-zero marginal cost generation available, security-constrained economic dispatch of BPS based on marginal costs may not sufficiently compensate resources for all fixed and variable costs. Academic and other research should be expanded in this area, to include capacity market reforms and the role of capacity markets in a higher VRE/low marginal cost system. Reliability and resilience  Develop policy metrics and tools for evaluating BPS-wide provision of resilience and considering all aspects of the electricity system that contribute to resilience, including regional generation characteristics, imports and exports, fuel supply and storage, transmission capability, DR, electricity storage, inertia, and other factors that determine the ability of grid operators to provide reliable electricity supplies.  As PJM notes, “criteria for resilience are not explicitly defined or quantified today.”469 Each RTO/ISO should strive to explicitly define resilience on its system and conduct resource diversity assessments to more fully understand the resilience of different resource portfolios. Federal, state, and local work to define and support system-wide resilience is also needed.  EIA and NERC should examine ways to improve power generator fuel delivery data collection; additional data on fuel deliveries and potential disruptions would further improve forecasting necessary for electric reliability planning. 128 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000235 Cost and affordability  Estimate the bulk power system-wide costs of different generation mixes, also considering the sensitivity of system costs to various fuel price fluctuations. Further, examine the relationship between wholesale and retail electricity rates to understand the present disconnect.  On a regular basis, update the EIA analysis of subsidies and support for electricity production (most recently updated using FY 2013 data).470 Regulatory   Explore the potential for utilizing existing Federal authorities under the Federal Power Act and the DOE Organization Act, among others, to ensure system reliability and resilience. Explore costs and benefits of states applying cost-of-service regulation to specific at-risk plants that contribute to grid resilience. In centrally-organized wholesale markets, these resources may sometimes be unable to recoup all costs of generating electricity—especially capital investments that are needed to ensure long-term viability. 129 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000236 Appendix A: National and Regional Profiles 130 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000237 U.S. National Profile .. Retirements, 2002-201] ?ted . 0 9.67% . . .. n: 2002-2016 Retirements (GW) 30 25 Energy Sources N0tes= Coal Capacity values are summer capacity. 20 Data for utility-scale resources only 15 Natural Gas (CC) MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas Natural Gas (CT) technologies: CC combined cycle, CT 10 Natural Gas (5T) combustion turbine, ST steam turbine. 5 Nuclear Ownership type: VIEU vertically Hydro integrated electric utility. Map includes Wind 2017 01 actual and 02-4 announced 809? Oil retirements. Prices: Natural gas Henry 0 Hub, Coal Central App., Electricity PJM 60% 0 ar western Hub. Other 'Total Capacity Reduction calculation: 40% retired capacity (retired capacity 2016 209? operational capacity) 0 $25 $150 rices rea $20 $200 coal/gas electricity Coal 2002 201 6 $15 $150 Capacity (MW) 884,930 1 ,056,710 Generation 3,860,853 4,085,765 $10 $100 $5550 Retirements by Energy'o rce,2002-2016 of Generators MW 30% Coal 531 59,392 60% Natural Gas 965 50,593 409? Nuclear 6 4,66? on 1,083 14,980 20% Hydro 140 283 Other (all other sources) 471 2,147 30% tam? Total Cap. Reduction? 11.1% 132,062 60% 40% NERG Reserve Margn, 2 Target Actual 20% v? Total NERC Area 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Depamtd?my U.S. National Profile Capacity Mix Generation Mix 2.25 1% '96 ?1 28% 1? 34% "El-1? Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Generation (million own) Coal 2.00 - Natural Gas (all) 1.75 Natural Gas (CC) 150 Natural Gas (CT) 125 I, Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear 1'00 Hydro 0-75 Wind 0.25 .1 . Solar o.oo 133m Other 2002 2009 2016 2002 2016 Capacity 8. Generation by En rgy Source, 2002 8. 2016 Capacity Generation 2002 2018 2002 2018 EnergySource GW GW thous. own thous. awn Coal 315.4 36% 270.1 26% 1,933.1 50% 1,240.1 30% NaturalGas 312.5 35% 447.0 42% 685.4 18% 1,380.3 34% Combined Cycle (CC) 106.1 12% 239.5 23% 387.7 10% 1,152.0 28% Combustion Turbine (CT) 103.4 12% 131.0 12% 98.8 3% 129.6 3% Steam Turbine (ST) 103.0 12% 76.4 7% 198.9 5% 98.6 2% Nuclear 98.7 11% 99.3 9% 780.1 20% 805.3 20% Hydro 79.4 9% 80.0 8% 264.3 7% 265.8 7% ??nd 44 0% 81.3 8% 10.4 0% 226.9 6% on 59.7 7% 36.4 3% 94.5 2% 23.9 1% Solar 0.4 0% 21.5 2% 0.6 0% 36.8 1% Other 14.6 2% 21.2 2% 92.5 2% 106.7 3% Total 884.9 100% 1,058.7 100% 3,880.9 100% 4,085.8 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Depamlsceb?wsy New England Regional Profile Energy Sources Notes: Coal Capacityvalues are summer Natural Gas (CC) capacrty. Data for utility-scale resources only MW Natural Gas (CT) nameplate capacity). Natural 63561.) Natural gas technologies: Nuclear CC combined cycle, Retirements, 2002?2017 Hydro CT combustionturbine, Wind ST steam turbine. Ownership Oil type:V EU vertically Solar integrated electric utility. Map Other includes 2017 01 actual and 02-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas =A gon. Gates, Coal Central App., Electricity ISO-NE Mass Hub. ?Total %Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacitv/ (retired capacity+ 2016 operational capacity) 4 2m2?2016 Retirements 3 (GW) 2 1 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% $25 $250 Prices (real 20095) coal/gas electric'ty $20$2m $10510) $5 $50 100% 80% 60% 40% - 20% 100% 80% 60% Capacity (MW) 1 (71500 ()1.000 1.500 A .. 1 )2000 )2.500 Ownership A A Merchant 0 VIEU A .4. 2002 201 6 Capacity (MW) 28,338 32,303 Generation 124,613 108,802 Retirements by Energy urce,2002-2016 of Generators MW Coal 7 784 Natural Gas 14 837 Nuclear 1 612 Ol 74 1,808 Hydro 50 27 Other (all other sources) 45 140 Total Cap. Reduction' 1 1.5% 4,209 40% NERO Reserve 20% - Target Actual England 16.74% 20.32% 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Depa?nmvb?bgg? New England Regional Profile 2002 Capacity ix Generation ix 16 14 12 1o enamoo 2M2 2009 2016 a ?All I I Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Capacity 8. Generation by En Energy Source Coal NaturalGas Combined Cycle (CC) Combustion Turbine (CT) Steam Turbine (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Total 2016 2002 rgy Source, 2002 8 2016 Capaclty 2002 28.3 100% 2016 GW 2.0 13.? 110.5 1.7 32100% 2002 thous. 18.8 44.8 35.6 5.4 33.9 6.2 0.0 11 1 0.0 9.8 124.6 Generation 2016 thous. 15% 2.8 2% 36% 5427% 32100% 108.8 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Depam may New York Regi Energy Sources Coal Natural Gas (CC) Natural Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro onal Profile Notes: Capacityvalues are summer capacity. Data for utility-scale resources only MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas technologies: CC combined cycle, CT combustion turbine, CurrertOwrerst'p Retied $49 Wind ST steam turbine. Ownership oil Vertically Solar integrated 9'95"? Map Retirements 2002?2017 Other includes 2017 Q1 actual and 02-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas =Transco ZS NY, Coal: Central App., Electricity NYISO NYC Zone J. ?Total %Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacity/ (retired capacity+ 2016 A operational capacity) 0 4 2002-2016 A A Retirements 3 (GW500 100% 1.000 1.500 2.000 80% 2.500 Owr Ish' 60% A Swim VIEU 40% 20% I A $255250 2009$) noes rea $20 $200 coal/gas electric?ty 2002 2016 $15 $150 Capacity (MW) 35,642 39,975 Generation 145,126 140,728 $10 $10) Retirements by Energy ource,2002-2016 100% of Generators MW 80% Goal 26 2,129 60% Natural Gas 37 1 ,202 40% Nuclear 0 0 200/ Ol 17 1,139 Hydro 13 15 100% WW Other (all othersources) 24 45 80% - apac'ty 0? Total%Cap.Reduction' 10.2% 4,529 60% -m A 40% NERC Reserve Margn,2 20% . Target Actual 0% . York 15.00% . 23.35% . 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Departmentobgogw New York Regional Profile 2002 2009 2016 3 Ca I .paaty MIX 0%1% . Coal - Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Generation Wind Mix Oil Solar Other Data Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal - -- Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Capacity Generation by En - Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 Energy Source GW GW lhous. thous. Coal 4.1 12% 1.7 4% 23.2 16% 1.8 1% NaturalGas 14.1 40% 22.1 55% 43.0 30% 62.8 45% Combined Cycle 4.8 13% 9.0 23% 22.3 15% 43.9 31% Combustion Turbine (CTSteam Turbine (ST) 6.5 18% 9.5 24% 18.3 13% 12.7 9% Nuclear 5.0 14% 5.4 14% 39.6 27% 41.6 30% Hydro 4.1 12% 4.7 12% 25.0 17% 26.6 19% Wind 0Solar 0Other 0Total 35.6 100% 40.0 100% 145.1 100% 140.7 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U-S- Deparmemm Mid-Atlantic Regional Profile Retirements, 2002-2017 Ownersh'p A GE 4) A A Merchant . A VIEU . . I. .: :1 500 0 1,000 A I . Merchant I 20?) '2 22,500 2 002-2016 Retirements Energy Sources ?0?55: (6W1 Capacnty values are summer capacrty. Data Coal for utility-scale resources only(1+ MW Natura Gas (CC) nameplate capacrty). Natural gas Natural Gas (CT) technologies: CC combined cycle, CT 4 Natural 635 (ST) combustionturbine, ST=steam turbine. 2 Nuclear Ownership type: VIEU =vertically Hydro integrated electric utility. Map includes 100% Wind 2017 01 actual andQZ-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas 80% 5 M3, Coal Central App., Electricity: PJM olar 60% Other Western Hub. ?Total Capacny Reduction calculation: 40% retired capacity/(retired capacity+ 2016 operational capacity) 20% $25 $250 Total Capacity&Genera Prim (real 2009s] 2002 2016 $20 52m coal/gas elechic'ty $15 $150 5 MM Capacity (MW) 180,697 186,759 Generation 833,01 1 810,922 $10 $1a) $5 $50 Retirements by Energy . urce, 2002-2016 100% of Generators MW 8096 Coal 163 21,791 60% Natural Gas 152 6,315 40% Nuclear 0 0 20?/ Oil 173 5,326 Hydro 3 2 100% Other (all othersources) 95 224 80% Total Cap. Reduction" 15.3% 33,657 60% 40% 20% 0% 2CDZ Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Mid-Atlantic Regional Profile 2009 Capacity ix Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear 23% Hydro Generation 0% 0% Wind Mix 1% 1%1% Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, NorthAmerican Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 100 Capaaty Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me. ACC 000289   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000290 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan Doug Little; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Andrea Gaston RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54:35 AM Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" ACC 000291 Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000292 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Doug Little Gill, Susan; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Andrea Gaston Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Friday, August 25, 2017 11:01:29 AM Commissioner Little Registration Form - October 2017 fillable copy.pdf Susan,   Trying again…   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Friday, August 25, 2017 at 10:54 AM To: Doug Little , "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann ACC 000293 Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   ACC 000294 Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000295 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail Doug Little Corporation Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 602-542-0656 dlittle@azcc.gov __________________________________ ✔ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. HOTEL INFORMATION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel is located at 133 9th Ave SW, Calgary, Alberta. Phone: (403) 262-1234 To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu ACC 000296 Subject: Date: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Friday, August 25, 2017 11:01:29 AM REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: H ARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. HOTEL INFORMATION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel is located at 133 9th Ave SW, Calgary, Alberta. Phone: (403) 262-1234  To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: susan_gill@hks harvard.edu ACC 000297 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Christopher Kempley Nicholas Loper FW: DOE Grid Study Tuesday, September 5, 2017 2:47:00 PM Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability 0.pdf     From: Doug Little Sent: Thursday, August 24, 2017 1:49 PM To: Christopher Kempley Subject: DOE Grid Study Doug Little Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission ACC 000298 Staff Report to the Secretary on Electricity Markets and Reliability August 2017 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000299 Table of Contents Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................ List of Figures...................................................................................................................................... List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1 2 Findings of This Study ............................................................................................................... 10 3 Power Plant Retirements .......................................................................................................... 15 3.1 Coal Plant Retirements ............................................................................................................... 20 3.2 Natural Gas Plant Retirements ................................................................................................... 24 3.3 Nuclear Plant Retirements .......................................................................................................... 27 3.4 Hydropower Retirements and Repowering ................................................................................ 34 3.5 Falling Natural Gas Prices............................................................................................................ 35 3.6 Environmental Regulations ......................................................................................................... 39 3.7 Growing VRE Deployment........................................................................................................... 47 3.8 Flattening Electricity Demand ..................................................................................................... 54 3.9 Power Plant Retirements Looking Forward ................................................................................ 57 4 Reliability and Resilience .......................................................................................................... 61 4.1 Assessing Challenges to Reliability.............................................................................................. 63 4.2 Diversity, Fuel Assurance, and Onsite Storage ........................................................................... 89 4.3 High-Risk Events and System Resilience ..................................................................................... 97 4.4 Enhancing Reliability and Resilience ........................................................................................... 99 4.5 Reliability and Resilience Looking Forward............................................................................... 100 5 Wholesale Electricity Markets ................................................................................................. 102 5.1 Evolution of U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets ....................................................................... 102 5.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets Today ........................................................................................ 104 5.3 Challenges in Wholesale Electricity Markets ............................................................................ 107 5.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets Looking Forward ...................................................................... 118 6 Affordability ........................................................................................................................... 119 6.1 Affordability of Generation Portfolios ...................................................................................... 119 6.2 The Wholesale-Retail Disconnect ............................................................................................. 120 6.3 Affordability Looking Forward .................................................................................................. 124 7 Policy Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 126 8 Areas for Further Research ..................................................................................................... 128 Appendix A: National and Regional Profiles ................................................................................... 130 Appendix B: VRE Integration Studies .............................................................................................. 151 Appendix C: Power Plant Cycling ................................................................................................... 154 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000300 List of Figures Figure 1.1. Regions Used in This Study ......................................................................................................... 4 Figure 1.2. Schematic of Typical Daily Load Curve Showing Base Load ........................................................ 6 Figure 3.1. Location of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and All Other Retirements, 2002–2016, ................... 15 Figure 3.2. Net Generation Capacity Additions and Retirements............................................................... 16 Figure 3.3. Retirements of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and Other Generating Units, 2002–2022 ............ 18 Figure 3.4. Retirements by Date, Location, Ownership, and Capacity ....................................................... 18 Figure 3.5. Operating Generation Capacity, Additions, Retirements, and Announced Retirements by Region for All Generation Types, January 2002–December 2022 .............................................................. 20 Figure 3.6. Location of the Existing Coal Fleet ............................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.7. Location of Coal Retirements, 2002–2016................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.8. U.S. Utility-Scale Coal-Fired Electric Generating Capacity Additions by Coal Type and Initial Operating Year .......................................................................................................................................... 22 Figure 3.9. Location of the Existing Natural Gas Fleet ................................................................................ 25 Figure 3.10. Capacity Additions of U.S. Utility-Scale Natural Gas-Fired Electricity Generation by Technology Type and Initial Operating Year ............................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.11. Natural Gas Fleet Capacity Factors ......................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.12. Location of Natural Gas Retirements ...................................................................................... 27 Figure 3.13. Location of the Existing Nuclear Fleet .................................................................................... 28 Figure 3.14. Location of Nuclear Power Plant Retirements: Closed, Announced, and Averted ................ 30 Figure 3.15. Nuclear Plant Retirements Compared to NRC Plant Operating License Terms .................... 33 Figure 3.16. Hydropower Plants in the United States by Capacity and Average Annual Runoff ................ 34 Figure 3.17. Conventional and Shale Natural Gas Production, 2007–2016................................................ 36 Figure 3.18. Wholesale Day-Ahead Electricity Prices vs. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Monthly Average) .................................................................................................................................................................... 37 Figure 3.19. Total Annual U.S. Natural Gas Generation, 1950–2016 ......................................................... 38 Figure 3.20. Heat Rates for Coal, Nuclear, and Natural Gas, 2002–2016 ................................................... 39 Figure 3.21. PJM Merit-Order Dispatch: Various Control Technologies ..................................................... 42 Figure 3.22. Changes in U.S. Coal Capacity, December 2014–April 2016 ................................................... 44 Figure 3.23. Average Coal Plant Capacity Factors, 2008–2014................................................................... 45 Figure 3.24. Projected and Actual Coal Retirements, 2008–2018 .............................................................. 46 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000301 Figure 3.25. VRE Generation by Fuel as Percentage of Total U.S. Generation, 2002–2016 ....................... 48 Figure 3.26. Cumulative U.S. Utility-Scale Wind and Hydroelectric Generation Capacity, 1915–December 2016 ............................................................................................................................................................ 48 Figure 3.27. Relationship between the PTC and Annual Wind Capacity Additions .................................... 50 Figure 3.28. VRE Penetration as a Percentage of 2016 Generation versus Retired Capacity since 2010 as a Percentage of Non-VRE Capacity ................................................................................................................ 51 Figure 3.29. Gross Domestic Product and Net Electricity Production, Historical (1950–2016) and Projected (2017–2027) ............................................................................................................................. 54 Figure 3.30. Estimated U.S. Energy Savings from Structural Changes in the Economy and Energy Efficiency, 1980–2016 ................................................................................................................................ 55 Figure 3.31. EIA Annual Electricity Sales 2000–2016 (terawatt-hours) and AEO Reference Case Electricity Sales Projections 2017–2030 ...................................................................................................................... 56 Figure 3.32. Baseload Capacity Additions and Retirements from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) ..................................................................................................................................................... 57 Figure 3.33. Modeled Projections for Natural Gas Price, Electricity Sales, and VRE Generation from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) ................................................................................................. 58 Figure 3.34. NGCC Capacity Factors and Number of Starts, 1998–2016 .................................................... 59 Figure 4.1. System Operation Time Scales .................................................................................................. 62 Figure 4.2. Five-Year Average Reserve Margins across Different Regions (2018–2022) ............................ 66 Figure 4.3. Historical Solar On-Peak Capacity Factors in ERCOT................................................................. 67 Figure 4.4. NERC Definitions of Reserves Used to Provide ERS .................................................................. 70 Figure 4.5. System Frequency after a Grid Event (Top) and How Frequency Control Mechanisms Work to Restore Frequency (Bottom)....................................................................................................................... 71 Figure 4.6. EEI Historical and Project Transmission Investment (Nominal Dollars).................................... 76 Figure 4.7. Location of the Existing Wind Fleet .......................................................................................... 77 Figure 4.8 Wind Energy Share of Electric Generation by State, 2016......................................................... 78 Figure 4.9. Ways To Integrate VRE, Arrayed by Type of Intervention and Cost (2014) ............................. 80 Figure 4.10. CAISO Load, Net Load, and Wind and Solar Output on Example Weekdays during 2014 ...... 82 Figure 4.11. The CAISO Duck Curve ............................................................................................................ 83 Figure 4.12. Demand and Net Demand Shapes at Different Distributed Energy Resource Penetration Levels........................................................................................................................................................... 84 Figure 4.13. Mapping Reliability Attributes Against Resources ................................................................. 86 Figure 4.14 Selected Ancillary Service Market Design Characteristics ....................................................... 87 Figure 4.15. Ancillary Service Products Exchanged in the Centrally Organized Markets, Listed by RTO/ISO and Category of Ancillary Service ............................................................................................................... 88 Figure 4.16. Generation Mix and Various Economic and Policy Drivers Since 1949, Including Diversity Index............................................................................................................................................................ 89 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000302 Figure 4.17. Changes in U.S. Capacity (Top) and Generation (Bottom) Mix over Time (Left to Right: 2002, 2009, 2016) ................................................................................................................................................. 90 Figure 4.18. Natural Gas Storage Facilities ................................................................................................. 93 Figure 4.19. Coal Stocks and Days of Burn, January 2010–May 2017 ........................................................ 96 Figure 4.20. Electricity Generation Changes from 2013 to 2014 by Fuel Type .......................................... 97 Figure 4.21. Sandia National Laboratories’ Resilience Analysis Process................................................... 101 Figure 5.1. Utility Restructuring by State as of May 2017 ........................................................................ 104 Figure 5.2. The Seven RTOs or ISOs in the United States ......................................................................... 105 Figure 5.3. States and Regions along the Spectrum from Traditional to Fully Restructured Electric Markets ..................................................................................................................................................... 106 Figure 5.4. How Market Prices Allow Resource Costs to be Recovered in a Centrally-organized Wholesale Market....................................................................................................................................................... 110 Figure 5.5. Simulated ERCOT Dispatch Curves .......................................................................................... 112 Figure 5.6. Type of Fuel Used in PJM (by Real-Time Marginal Units): 2004 through March 2017 ........... 113 Figure 5.7. Annual Average Capacity Factors of Coal and Natural Gas Generators ................................. 113 Figure 5.8. Negative Northwest Off-Peak Daily Spot Prices ($/MWh) in 2011......................................... 116 Figure 6.1. Average U.S. Residential Sector Retail Electricity Prices over Time ....................................... 121 Figure 6.2. Average Wholesale Electric Costs/MWh Have Fallen between 2002 and 2016. ................... 122 Figure 6.3. Day-Ahead, On-Peak Wholesale Electric Prices Reach Near-Record Lows in 2016. ............... 123 Figure 8.1. Average Three-Year Capacity Factors for Retired U.S. Coal Plants ......................................... 155 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000303 List of Tables Table 3-1. Direct Employment and Income in Industries Related to Electric Power Supply, 2016 ............ 23 Table 3-2. Nuclear Plant Retirements, Announced Closures, and Plants Averted by State Action .......... 31 Table 3-3. Average Nuclear Costs by Plant Size and Operator Type, 2016................................................. 32 Table 3-4. Major Environmental Regulations Related to Coal, Natural Gas, and Nuclear Generation ...... 40 Table 3-5. Fiscal Year 2013 Electricity Production Subsidies and Support ................................................. 53 Table 4-1. How Various Energy Storage Options Can Deliver Grid-Level Applications .............................. 74 Table 4-2. Characteristics of VRE, Grid Integration Challenges, and Mitigation Options ........................... 78 Table 4-3. Dependence on Imported Just-in-Time Energy for Electricity ................................................... 94 Table B-1. VRE Integration Studies .......................................................................................................... 151 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000304 1 Introduction On April 14, 2017, Energy Secretary Rick Perry issued a memorandum requesting a study to examine electricity markets and reliability. With this document, Department of Energy (DOE) staff are delivering a study that seeks not only to evaluate the present status of the electricity system, but more importantly to exercise foresight to help ensure a system that is reliable, resilient, and affordable long into the future. Therefore, while carefully acknowledging history, this study focuses on the present trajectory of trends that are of particular concern in meeting those long-term goals. Specifically, the April 14 memo directed a study that explores the following three issues:  The evolution of wholesale electricity markets, including the extent to which Federal policy interventions and the changing nature of the electricity fuel mix are challenging the original policy assumptions that shaped the creation of those markets;  Whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes such as on-site fuel supply and other factors that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which this could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future; and  The extent to which continued regulatory burdens, as well as mandates and tax and subsidy policies, are responsible for forcing the premature retirement of baseload power plants. The U.S. electricity industry is facing unprecedented changes. Last year, for the first time in history, natural gas replaced coal as the leading source of electricity generation. In 2015, a record-high amount of generating capacity retired. Over the course of the last decade, overall growth in electricity consumption at the national level has stalled, while many generation sources—particularly natural gas, wind, and solar—frequently hit new record levels of penetration. The stakes are high around these issues because electricity is crucial to modern society and economic activity, and because of the physical and financial magnitude of the industry. As noted in the report, Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (QER 1.2): The United States has around 7,700 operating power plants1 that generate electricity from a variety of primary energy sources; 707,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines;2 more than 1 million rooftop solar installations;3 55,800 substations;4 6.5 million miles of local distribution lines;5 and 3,354 distribution utilities6 delivering electricity to 148.6 million customers. The total amount of money paid by end users end for electricity in 2015 was about $400 billion.7 This drives an $18.6 trillion U.S. gross domestic product and significantly influences global economic activity totaling roughly $80 trillion.8 Recognizing how vital electricity is to our society and the health of the U.S. economy, the April 14 memo asked staff to “provide concrete policy recommendations and solutions.” It also offered principles for policy formulation: “the Trump Administration will be guided by the principles of reliability, resilience, affordability, and fuel diversity—principles that underpin a thriving economy.” To that end, this report concludes by outlining policy recommendations to advance those principles. Section 2 of this study offers a summary of findings. Sections 3 through 6 provide the analytical framework, relevant data, and research. In addition, each of these sections concludes with a “looking forward” note, as many of the issues raised in the April 14 memo are of growing importance. Section 1 1 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000305 presents policy recommendations available—to DOE and others—to address the issues identified in this study. Section 8 outlines potential areas for further research. Data Used in This Study This study uses data collected by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) for the years 2002 through 2017, looking back before 2002 on a few specific issues. The 2002–2017 time range captures several important developments:  Centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets (Regional Transmission Operators [RTOs] and Independent System Operators [ISOs]) were in the early stages of implementation in 2002. Competition within centrally-organized markets among a large segment of merchant generation did not take effect until the mid-2000s. Three RTO/ISOs initiated mandatory capacity markets in 2006–2007: New York ISO (NYISO), PJM Interconnection (PJM), and ISO-New England (ISO-NE).  The emergence of a large amount of unconventional natural gas production—the shale revolution—started in 2006–2007. The consequent drop in natural gas prices began in 2009 under the combined impacts of low demand during the economic recession and a significant increase in supply.  The recession contributed to a significant drop in electricity demand in 2008, and it took several years for demand to return to 2008 levels. Although economic activity has picked up in recent years, electricity consumption and gross domestic product (GDP)—which grew together for decades—now appear less correlated as industries have become less energy-intensive and energy efficiency measures have taken full effect.  Several environmental regulations implemented under statutes enacted in the 1970s and 1990s, which raise capital and operating costs for affected power plants, had compliance deadlines in the period 2010–2017.  Driven in part by Federal and state policies, tax incentives, and mandates, significant quantities of variable renewable energy (VRE) resources—specifically wind and solar, and at levels high enough to alter traditional patterns of grid operation—began to impact certain areas around 2010.  Also around 2010, demand response emerged as a way for customers to compete in most centrally-organized wholesale markets. Because all of the above factors have emerged over the past 15 years—each affecting power supply and demand in different ways—looking at data since 2002 helps to reveal the impact and interactions of these changes. Additionally, EIA believes that the highly detailed EIA data used in this study (down to the level of individual generators) is most reliable for 2002 forward. Further, the data used for this study include power plant fuel conversions as retirements for the original fuel source. This study reports power (e.g. generation capacity) and energy (e.g. production or consumption over time) in megawatts (MW) and megawatt-hours (MWh), respectively (unless otherwise noted). Finally, all generation capacity figures reported in this study are net summer capacity as opposed to nameplate (unless otherwise noted). 2 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000306 Defining Regions The U.S. bulk power system (BPS) is a patchwork of different markets for electricity, shaped over time by technological changes, as well as state, regional, and Federal policies. This patchwork presents organizational and operational challenges, but its diversity also contributes to the system’s robustness. The U.S. power system in the lower 48 statesa is divided into three synchronized grids: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).b, 9 There are limited connections between the Eastern and Western Interconnections, and even fewer connections from ERCOT to the other grids. Issues confronting the BPS vary widely across regions. This study divides the lower 48 states into nine regions that represent either individual or groups of electric systems, known as balancing authority areas (see Figure 1.1). Within these regions, there are 66 balancing authorities (which can be as small as individual utilities or as large as a multi-state region). Using nine balancing authority-based regions for this analysis is a useful way of aggregating electricity data and revealing regional trends. a Both Alaska and Hawaii have unique islanded electric power systems that are not comparable to the rest of the Nation and thus are not included in this study. This is discussed in detail in a later section. b For most purposes, ERCOT can be considered electrically isolated from the other grids. ERCOT is also not subject to most elements of the Federal Power Act and therefore economic regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. A significant exception is Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversight and regulation of power system reliability, which does apply to ERCOT. 3 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000307 Figure 1.1. Regions Used in This Study10 Seven of the nine regions analyzed in this study correlate primarily or directly to the seven ISOs and RTOs in the United States that supply about two-thirds of electricity delivered to end-use customers:c  NE = ISO-NE  NY = NYISO  ERCOT = Electric Reliability Council of Texas  Mid-Atl = PJM  Midwest = Mid-Continent ISO (MISO)  Central = Southwest Power Pool (SPP)  CAISO+ = California ISO (plus smaller balancing areas in the state) The two remaining regions include numerous balancing authorities, all of which lie outside RTO/ISO service areas:  SE = Southeast  West = non-CAISO+ Western Interconnection. c The last four regions in this list include a few additional (mostly small) balancing authorities outside the formal ISO or RTO footprint. 4 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000308 Defining Baseload Generation This study defines baseload generation as power plants that are operated in baseload patterns—that is, plants that run at high, sustained output levels and high capacity factors, with limited cycling or ramping. While this definition includes most nuclear, coal, and natural gas steam generators, it is not a given that every nuclear, coal, or natural gas steam generator is operated as a baseload plant, or that other technologies cannot function as baseload plants (such as hydroelectric generators). In addition, this study uses the term conventional generation to mean coal, nuclear, and natural gas power plants, regardless of how they are operated.d Other organizations and publications use similar definitions. For example, PJM defines baseload generation as “those units which operate the great majority of hours of the year to meet load requirements.”11 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) offers an explanation as well: There is a distinction between baseload generation and the characteristics of generation providing reliable “baseload” power. Baseload is a term used to describe generation that falls at the bottom of the economic dispatch stack, meaning [those power plants] are the most economical to run. Coal and nuclear resources, by design, are designed for low cost O&M [operation and maintenance] and continuous operation […] However, it is not the economics nor the fuel type that make these resources attractive from a reliability perspective. Rather, these conventional steam-driven generation resources have low forced and maintenance outage hours traditionally and have low exposure to fuel supply chain issues. Therefore, “baseload” generation is not a requirement; however, having a portion of a resource fleet with high reliability characteristics, such as low forced and maintenance outage rates and low exposure to fuel supply chain issues, is one of the most fundamental necessities of a reliable BPS. These characteristics ensure that “baseload” generation is more resilient to disruptions.12 The electricity industry has traditionally referred to baseload generation as the power plants that are used to meet “base” load—the minimum level of electricity that customers demand around the clock, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Large nuclear, coal, natural gas steam, and hydroelectric plants have historically been used for baseload generation.e Baseload plants generally have high capital costs but low fuel costs, and they tend to be fairly fuel efficient. Although the output level of these plants can be changed, they are most economic—in terms of cost per unit of electricity produced—when operated at near-full capacity at all times (although hydroelectric plants are more flexible). Traditional baseload units tend to have longer start-up and shut-down times and generally move (ramp) slowly between production levels to avoid damaging plant components with thermal stress or metal fatigue (see Appendix C on cycling). d QER 1.2 does not define the term baseload in its glossary. However, the report states in a caption on page 1-21 that “baseload is considered coal, nuclear, and natural gas combined-cycle plants.” e Other technologies that have traditionally operated as baseload include geothermal and biomass power plants. However, those technologies represent a relatively small portion of total U.S. electricity generation; while valuable for the grid reliability services they provide, they are not covered in this report. 5 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000309 Figure 1.2. Schematic of Typical Daily Load Curve Showing Base Load13 Intermediate or mid-merit plants are used to follow load, meeting daily variations in demand. Depending on the mix of generation resources available in different regions of the country and relative fuel prices, natural gas and/or coal units are typically used for load following. Short-duration demand peaks, which occur infrequently throughout the year, are generally met by natural gas units with high heat rates.f More recently, customer-provided demand response is helping to meet peak demand. Analysis in Section 3 shows that many of the power plants that retired between 2002 and 2016 were used for baseload generation in the past, but were no longer operating in that role at the time of retirement due to changes in electricity market dynamics. With the sustained drop in natural gas prices, for example, natural gas-fired combined-cycle (NGCC) plants are currently a less costly source of baseload generation than coal or nuclear power in many regions of the country. VRE resources such as wind and solar are beginning to serve more of minimum load, albeit at variable or intermittent output levels.g The proliferation of these sources has also led grid operators in some regions to place an increasing premium on flexible generation resources (e.g., NGCC units) that can help balance VRE variability by meeting base load and intermediate load, both of which are affected by a f According to EIA, “Heat rate is one measure of the efficiency of a generator or power plant that converts a fuel into heat and into electricity. The heat rate is the amount of energy used by an electrical generator or power plant to generate one kilowatthour (kWh) of electricity.” https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=107&t=3. g For the purposes of this study, wind and solar are referred to as VRE. Terms such as “non-dispatchable” and “intermittent” may also apply to these technologies, but for consistency, this study uses the term variable. In contrast, some renewables are dispatchable—that is, sources that can provide power to the grid within sub-hourly time scales to match demand during any 24hour period. Dispatchable renewables include sources such as biofuels, geothermal, and hydropower (with the caveat on hydropower that it may only be seasonally dispatchable in some cases). 6 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000310 changing net load profile.h These factors, among others, have collectively lessened the immediate need for traditional baseload resources in certain regions, but still speak to the need for baseload generation. Defining Premature Retirement The dictionary definition of premature is “happening … or performed before the proper, usual or intended time.”14 The Department does not have an official definition for the term “premature retirement”i with respect to power plants, as the term is highly subjective. Below are some of the prevailing viewpoints and associated meanings:  Power plant engineers may think a power plant retired prematurely if it has not yet run to the end of its nominal design life (for instance, approximately 40 years for post-1970 coal plants) or through the term of reasonable plant life extension modifications.  An RTO/ISO or reliability organization may think a power plant retirement is premature if its continued operation is still required to deliver Essential Reliability Services (ERS)j in that location (in which case the operator may delay retirement by designating it a “reliability-must-run” resource).  A policymaker or legislator may think a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the plant delivers benefits that the state or society values, such as emissions-free energy, local jobs, or maintaining local generation.  A mayor or employee may think a power plant is retiring prematurely if the retirement causes harms to the community and the individuals who work there.  A merchant competitor that built or acquired a power plant may think its plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the merchant has not been able to recover its investment in the plant through sales of energy and capacity or through other revenue streams.  A vertically integrated utility executive may think a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the utility has not yet fully recovered its rate-based capital investment in the plant and its return on that rate base.  Nuclear or hydroelectric plant owners and regulators may think a power plant has retired prematurely if it has not yet run through the full term of its operating license and/or license extension. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) hydro licenses run for up to 50 years with potential reauthorizations of 30–50 years, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nuclear operating licenses run for 40 years with potential 20-year extensions.  Electricity economists may think a power plant retired has prematurely if the plant was still able to sell electricity competitively against other energy sources but was required to close due to policy directives. On the other hand, economists may also think a power plant retired h “Net load” is the instantaneous difference between total customer electricity demand (load) and VRE generation. i QER 1.2—Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review—discussed “premature nuclear retirements” but did not explicitly define the term. For example, in Chapter 3, page 24, the report notes: “When analyzing the impacts of premature nuclear retirements on power generation in the state, a state of Illinois report considered a scenario in which 80 percent of the replacement generation was coal. Other analysis concludes that roughly 75 percent of the at-risk nuclear generation nationwide would be replaced with fossil generation, largely powered with natural gas.” [notes omitted, emphasis added] j See Section 4.1.1 for a discussion of ERS. 7 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000311 prematurely if the plant provided un-priced benefits to society that, if priced, would have made the plant profitable.  A long-term planner and risk manager may think a power plant has retired prematurely if it offered valuable diversity, reliability, resilience, and optionality benefits that are not yet fully recognized, valued, and/or compensated. Each of these viewpoints represents a valid perspective, particularly those of grid operators and other institutions responsible for reliability. While stakeholders may maintain that a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely based on one or more of the considerations above, the results of this study show that some observed power plant retirements were appropriate and consistent with markets as they are currently functioning. In other words, not every power plant retirement is cause for alarm. However, NERC is concerned with the trend of retirements as it relates to reliability and resilience. NERC wrote in response to the April 14 memo: As conventional resources prematurely retire, sufficient amounts of essential reliability services, such as frequency and voltage support, ramping capability, etc., must be replaced based on the configuration and needs of the system.15 [emphasis added] Given the difficulty in assigning a single definition to premature retirement, as well as the subjective nature of such a definition, this study does not attempt to determine whether any specific power plant retirements have been premature. Instead, this study assesses the various factors that contribute to power plant retirement trends. Topics Beyond the Scope of This Study This study does not directly address several topics for the following reasons:  Cybersecurity is a critical component to ensuring the reliable and resilient operation of the Nation’s energy infrastructure. Existing and emerging cybersecurity threats can affect any aspect of the electric sector, ranging from power plants, to transmission and distribution systems, to customers and end-use devices. The December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian electricity system and the 2012 Shamoon virus targeting the energy sector in Saudi Arabia, for example, were wake-up calls.16 DOE takes these threats seriously and is designated as the Federal Government’s lead SectorSpecific Agency for cybersecurity for the energy sector, which entails supporting the cyber protection of the Nation’s critical energy infrastructure.k However, while cybersecurity is a significant concern and top priority, it is not addressed in this report because it is the subject of an upcoming joint report between DOE and the Department of Homeland Security being prepared in response to Executive Order No. 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure.  Alaska and Hawaii: While the broad trends discussed in this report apply in Alaska and Hawaii as well as the lower 48 states, many of this study’s economic observations do not directly apply to the power plants in the Hawaii and Alaska power systems, as they are not large, interconnected energy markets, and utility system operators in the states face unique operational and fuel supply chain considerations. k For more information, visit DOE’s website on the Department’s cyber activities: https://www.energy.gov/national-securitysafety/cybersecurity. 8 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000312 The Hawaii and Alaska power systems are remote, vertically integrated systems with plant sizes that tend to fall below the size screens used in this study. The average generating unit sizes in Hawaii and Alaska are 18 MW and 5 MW, respectively, compared to an average unit size of 70 MW in the lower 48 states.17 Because neither state is interconnected with any of the major U.S. interconnections, or to any transmission or distribution network in Canada, utilities in both states must self-supply all ERS.l As a result, utilities in these isolated systems might consider different parameters for reliability in their system planning compared to utilities in the contiguous United States, who can obtain reliability services and products in real time through markets and bilateral transactions.18 Their experiences, however, may inform the efforts of utilities in the contiguous U.S. seeking to better manage rural systems and effectively integrate VRE and microgrids.  Geothermal, biomass, and combined heat and power plants are often operated as baseload plants, operating at a relatively stable level over a long period of time. However, because these types of plants are not as prevalent or widespread as gas, coal, and nuclear plants, this study did not perform detailed analyses of trends and closures for these technologies. l In 2014, an intertie to the Western Interconnection of British Columbia was proposed to the Alaska Energy Authority in order to bring power to Alaska. However, as of 2016, no further work on the project had been completed due to economic reasons. http://energy-alaska.wikidot.com/railbelt. 9 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000313 2 Findings of This Study This study identified several critical issues central to protecting the long-term reliability of the electric grid in accordance with the April 14 memo, which asked staff to explore: 1) The evolution of wholesale electricity markets, including the extent to which Federal policy interventions and the changing nature of the electricity fuel mix are challenging the original policy assumptions that shaped the creation of those markets. While centrally-organized markets have achieved reliable wholesale electricity delivery with economic efficiencies in their short-term operations, changing circumstances have challenged both centrally-organized and, to a lesser extent, vertically-integrated markets.m  To date, wholesale markets have withstood a number of stresses. While markets have evolved since their introduction, they are currently functioning as designed—to ensure reliability and minimize the short-term costs of wholesale electricity—despite pressures from flat demand growth, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels. The resulting low average wholesale energy prices, while beneficial for buyers of wholesale electricity, represent a critical juncture for many existing baseload generation resources and their role in preserving reliability and resilience.n  Market designs may be inadequate given potential future challenges. VRE—with near-zero marginal costs and if at high penetrations—will lower wholesale energy prices independent of effects of the current low natural gas prices. This would put additional economic pressure on revenues for traditional baseload (as well as non-baseload) resources, requiring careful consideration of continued market evolutions.  Markets need further study and reform to address future services essential to grid reliability and resilience. System operators are working toward recognizing, defining, and compensating for resource attributes that enhance reliability and resilience (on both the supply and demand side). However, further efforts should reflect the urgent need for clear definitions of reliabilityand resilience-enhancing attributes and should quickly establish the market means to value or the regulatory means to provide them. Evolving market conditions and the need to accommodate VRE have led to the increased flexible operation of generation and other grid resources. Some generation technologies originally designed to operate as baseload were not intended to operate flexibly, and in nuclear power’s case, do not have a regulatory regime that allows them to do so. m This study also refers to vertically integrated markets as bilateral markets. n Former FERC Commissioner Tony Clark summarizes today’s changing demands on centrally-organized markets: “Affordable power was the goal when markets were created. The current markets are still procuring affordable power, but many state public policy makers no longer see that as the only goal […] other public policy goals [include…] incenting in-state jobs, promoting ‘green’ energy or other politically favored resources, preserving carbon-free resources, and retaining substantial tax revenues to state and local government.” Clark goes on to say, “[Markets] were never designed for job creation, tax preservation, politically popular generation, or anything other than reliable, affordable electricity.” http://www.wbklaw.com/uploads/file/Articles-%20News/2017%20articles%20publications/Market%20Identity%20Crisis%20Fin al%20(7-14-17).pdf. 10 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000314  Generation from VRE can change widely over the course of a single day, which requires dispatchable power plants to be operated more nimbly. Additionally, in some areas of the country, there may be over-generation from VRE at some points in a day, which drives prices to almost zero yet requires quick-ramping assets when VRE subsides. Taken together, these trends have placed a premium on flexible output rather than the steady output of traditional baseload power plants. This flexibility is generally provided by generation resources. However, nongeneration sources of flexibility—such as flexible demand, increased transmission, and energy storage technologies—are being explored as ways to enhance system flexibility. Society places value on attributes of electricity provision beyond those compensated by the current design of the wholesale market.  Americans and their elected representatives value the various benefits specific power plants offer, such as jobs, community economic development, low emissions, local tax payments, resilience, energy security, or the national security benefits associated with a nuclear industrial base. Most of these benefits are not recognized or compensated by wholesale electricity markets, and this has given rise to a variety of state and private efforts that include keeping open or shutting down established baseload generators and incentivizing VRE generation. 2) Whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes such as onsite fuel supply and other factors that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which this could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. Markets recognize and compensate reliability, and must evolve to continue to compensate reliability, but more work is needed to address resilience.  Reliable and affordable electricity is essential to the modern economy, including the manufacturing, services, and financial sectors. NERC’s most recent annual State of Reliability report concludes that during 2016, the “bulk power system reliability remained within defined performance objectives to provide an Adequate Level of Reliability (ALR).”o NERC reached the same conclusion for 2013–2015. However, in a May 2017 letter to the Secretary of Energy, NERC pressed the importance of reliability issues that require attention, including maintaining ERS as conventional generation retires and ensuring flexibility and sufficient transmission to supplement and offset VRE.19 These issues are indicative of the technological and institutional changes that are now affecting the electricity sector, and dealing with these issues will require new levels of coordination and collaboration among the sector’s many constituencies. Presently, BPS reliability is adequate despite the retirement of a portion of baseload capacity and unique regional hurdles posed by the changing resource mix.  Fuel assurance is a growing consideration for the electricity system. Maintaining onsite fuel resources is one way to improve fuel assurance, but most generation technologies have experienced fuel deliverability challenges in the past. While coal facilities typically store enough o NERC defines ALR as “the state that the design, planning, and operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) will achieve when the [five] listed Reliability Performance Objectives are met.” These objectives are detailed at http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Resources/Documents/Adequate Level of Reliability Definition (Informational Filing).pdf. 11 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000315 fuel onsite to last for 30 days or more, extreme cold can lead to frozen fuel stockpiles and disruption in train deliveries. Natural gas is delivered by pipeline as needed. The NERC letter to DOE emphasized ensuring natural gas fuel supply and mitigating delivery vulnerabilities. Capacity challenges on existing pipelines combined with the difficulty in some areas of siting and constructing new natural gas pipelines, along with competing uses for natural gas such as for home heating, have created supply constraints in the past. Supply constraints can create increased price risk and, in extreme cases, could impact reliability.p  Recent severe weather events have demonstrated the need to improve system resilience. The range of potential disruptive events is broad, and the system needs to be designed to handle high-impact, low probability events. This makes it very challenging to develop cost-effective programs to improve resilience at the regional, state, or utility levels. Planning, practice, and coordination on an all-hazards basis and having a mix of resources and fuels available when a major disturbance occurs are both essential to fast response. Work still remains to identify facilities that merit hardening; stage periodic exercises and drills so that governmental agencies and utilities are prepared for emergencies; and ensure that wholesale electricity markets are designed to recognize and incentivize investments that would achieve or enhance resiliencerelated objectives.  Significant progress is already being made to understand what is needed to maintain power system reliability under changing market conditions, but more work is needed to understand what can be done to maintain resilience in a variety of conditions as the grid changes over the coming years. Further, low natural gas prices are driving greater use of natural gas for electricity generation, which has made exposure to natural gas price risk related to availability a growing concern in several regions. There are tradeoffs between multiple desirable attributes of the grid. For example, within power systems, it may be the case that a more reliable and resilient system is more costly than the least-cost system that a centrally-organized wholesale market is intended to deliver. Similarly, policies that seek to deliver more jobs, reduce pollution, or reduce risk may require more upfront investment at an initially higher cost to society as a whole than a least-cost system. It is important that policymakers have a clear understanding of the true costs and benefits of services to the grid, as well as an understanding of the tradeoffs between desirable attributes like reliability, flexibility, and affordability. p Indeed, ISO-NE has repeatedly expressed that reliability and resilience concerns are not being adequately addressed by the New England region on natural gas. 12 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000316 3) The extent to which continued regulatory burdens, as well as mandates and tax and subsidy policies, are responsible for forcing the premature retirement of baseload power plants. The recent and unprecedented rise of natural gas as a top electricity generation resource, the increase in VRE penetration, the flattening of electricity demand growth, and a host of policy issues?regulations, mandates, and subsidies at the state and Federal levels?have negatively impacted traditional baseload generation, particularly coal and nuclear power plants. Between 2002 and 2016, 132,000 MW of generation capacity retired?representing about 15 percent of the total 2002 installed base?and 390,500 MW of new capacity was added. While power plants retire for a variety of reasons, several factors have contributed to recent retirements and continuing pressure for additional retirements. The biggest contributor to coal and nuclear plant retirements has been the advantaged economics of natural gas-fired generation. 0 Low-cost, abundant natural gas and the development of highly-efficient NGCC plants resulted in a new baseload competitor to the existing coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric plants. In 2016, natural gas was the largest source of electricity generation in the United States?overtaking coal for the first time since data collection began.20 The increased use of natural gas in the electric sector has resulted in sustained low wholesale market prices that reduce the profitability of other generation resources important to the grid. The fact that new, high-efficiency natural gas plants can be built relatively quickly, compared to coal and nuclear power, also helped to grow gas-?red generation. Production costs of coal and nuclear plants remained somewhat flat, while the new and existing, more flexible, and relatively lower-operating cost natural gas plants drove down wholesale market prices to the point that some formerly pro?table nuclear and coal facilities began operating at a loss. The development of abundant, domestic natural gas made possible by the shale revolution also has produced signi?cant value for consumers and the economy overall. Another factor contributing to the retirement of power plants is low growth in electricity demand. 0 Growth of total electricity use has slowed from averaging 2.5 percent annually in the late 19905, to averaging 1.0 percent annually from 2000 to 2008, to remaining roughly flat since then.21 Changes in electricity demand?particularly the apparent decoupling of economic output and electricity demand?have been driven in part by energy efficiency policies. The combination of slow growth in electricity demand and the 390,500 MW of capacity additions from 2002 to 2016 made significant amounts of older, higher-cost capacity redundant. Dispatch of VRE has negatively impacted the economics of baseload plants. 0 Since 2007, the contribution to total generation from wind and solar has grown quickly, accelerated by government policies and mandates. State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) have been the largest contributor?associated with 60 percent of VRE growth since 2000? followed by Federal tax credits and government research (which contributed to the dramatic drop in wind and solar technology costs). Because these resources have lower variable operating costs than traditional baseload generators, they are dispatched first and displace baseload resources when they are available. 0 Participants on a panel of economists at a May 2017 FERC technical conference cited state-level RPS and Federal tax credits for VRE as examples of wholesale market impacts and distortions. 13 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000317 Competition from resources that benefit from such policiesq reduces revenues for traditional baseload power plants by lowering the wholesale electric prices they receive and by displacing a portion of their output. Investments required for regulatory compliance have also negatively impacted baseload plant economics, and the peak in baseload plant retirements (2015) correlated with deadlines for power plant regulations as well as strong signals of future regulation.  A suite of environmental regulations scheduled for implementation between 2011 and 2022 has had varying degrees of effects on the cost of generation. For example, the largest number of coal plant retirements occurred in 2015—the deadline for coal and oil plants to add pollution control equipment for Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (MATS) compliance. In the same year, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized its Clean Power Plan, which, if fully implemented, would place additional pressure on coal-fired generation. Nuclear power plants also face regulatory costs—principally the Cooling Water Intake Rule. Three nuclear plants that announced closure (Oyster Creek, Diablo Canyon, and Indian Point) have cited disputes with their respective states, who implement the rule, as among the reasons for plant retirement. Ultimately, the continued closure of traditional baseload power plants calls for a comprehensive strategy for long-term reliability and resilience. States and regions are accepting increased risks that could affect the future reliability and resilience of electricity delivery for consumers in their regions. Hydropower, nuclear, coal, and natural gas power plants provide ERS and fuel assurance critical to system resilience. A continual comprehensive regional and national review is needed to determine how a portfolio of domestic energy resources can be developed to ensure grid reliability and resilience. q These same economists also cited other “out-of-market” interventions as distorting efficient price formation in wholesale markets, such as recently enacted and pending state laws that provide support to existing nuclear units. During the economist’s panel discussion at the FERC May 2017 technical conference, the phrase “subsidies beget subsidies” was used. 14 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000318 3 Power Plant Retirements A combination of factors is causing power plant retirements, including low natural gas prices, wholesale competition, low customer demand growth, regulation-driven cost increases, and the growth of VRE. As Figure 3.1 shows, the types, magnitude, and timing of conventional power plant retirements vary regionally. Figure 3.1. Location of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and All Other Retirements, 2002?201622.Coal . . 3' 5 NG CC NG CT Capacuty (MW) I NG ST 1 Ownership I Nuclear 500 1 000 A Merchant Other VIEU 2 1.500 To understand observed power plant capacity retirements, it is useful to begin with an examination of historical capacity additions. From 1950 to 2015, capacity additions of different generation technologies tended to come in waves that were largely influenced by policy, fuel costs, and technology development (see Figure 3.2). Coal expansion was highest from 1950 to 1990, nuclear power was widely deployed in the 19705 and 19805, natural gas capacity additions peaked in the early 20005 and continue through today, and VRE has grown rapidly over the last decade.5 VIEU stands for vertically integrated electric utilities. 5 Not depicted: prior to the 19505, hydropower was a large source of generation capacity additions, the vast majority of which is still operational today. 15 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000319 Figure 3.2. Net Generation Capacity Additions and Retirements t23 Power plant retirements have accelerated since 2011, and retirement trends vary significantly by generation source. For instance, the current wave of nuclear plant retirements only occurred over the last five years.u Some of the nuclear units now closing are doing so because of state policy pressure (as with California’s Diablo Canyon, New Jersey’s Oyster Creek, and New York’s Indian Point), and some have had maintenance issues that were too costly to fix. However, most plants are closing or threatening closure because–given the economics in some regions—they have become unable to compete against primarily low-cost, gas-fired generation and, to a lesser extent, subsidized and mandated VRE in a low electricity demand environment. The design of traditional baseload power plants assumed operations primarily at a constant output level with limited cycling (see Appendix C).24 As the electricity system continues to evolve and market conditions change, these plants are increasingly being moved into load-following operations, or are t Acronyms: Clean Air Act (CAA), Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992), Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), Investment Tax Credit (ITC), Production Tax Credit (PTC). u However, we note that 29 U.S. nuclear power plants retired from 1974 through 2001, including 13 power plants in the commercial utility nuclear fleet sized at 700 MW or larger. These plants retired for a variety of reasons, including damage (Fort St. Vrain), safety or operational difficulties (Three Mile Island 2, Zion 1 & 2, Millstone 1), costly safety requirements (Humboldt Bay), and state or utility policy choices (Rancho Seco, Trojan, Indian Point 1). This study only looks at the nuclear units in operation in 2002 and beyond. 16 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000320 required to more frequently adjust the load and the on/off dispatch of their units. The extra costs incurred to do so can affect a retirement decision. QER 1.2 discusses these issues: Currently, the changing electricity sector is causing the closure of many coal and nuclear plants in a shift from recent trends. From 2000 through 2009, power plant retirements were dominated by natural gas steam turbines. Over the past 6 years (2010–2015), power plant retirements were dominated by coal plants (37 GW), which accounted for over 52 percent of recently retired power plant capacity. Over the next 5 years (between 2016 and 2020), 34.4 GW of summer capacity is planned to be retired, and 79 percent of this planned retirement capacity are coal and natural gas plants (49 percent and 30 percent, respectively). The next largest set of planned retirements are nuclear plants (15 percent).25 Retirements typically can be tied to the units’ inability to compete economically, but the factors complicating a given plant’s economics can be numerous and can compound each other. Currently, these factors include low wholesale electricity prices (driven by competing generators with low marginal costs, as well as subsidies); higher operating costs from unit age or lower efficiency; and looming capital needs, including compliance with safety and/or environmental regulations; among others. Further, minimal growth in electricity demand has compounded the impact of VRE policy; in an era of low-cost natural gas and increasing levels of state-mandated renewable generation—for example, a 20-percent share of wind and solar by 2020—lack of demand growth means natural gas and new VRE added to meet state mandates compete with existing conventional generation to satisfy a static level of demand. A review of coal, nuclear, and natural gas retirements to date shows that power plant retirements reflect regional patterns of generation development, state policies, and differences in market structure across regions. However, national patterns also emerge—Figure 3.3 shows that a significant amount of capacity (the highest on record) retired in 2015, coinciding with the MATS compliance deadline (which applied to coal- and oil-fired units across the country) as well as the finalization of the Clean Power Plan rule. 17 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000321 Figure 3.3. Retirements of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and Other Generating Units, 2002?202226 Capacity (MW) 25,000 Announced 20,000 1 5,000 10,000 5,000 2002 2003 2004 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Retirement Year I Coal Nuclear I Other Figure 3.4 highlights retirement trends by ownership type merchant vs. VIEU) and time period. Merchant plants accounted for nearly 70 percent of retired capacity during the period 2002-2010 (depicted as triangles below; note how most of the triangles are purple and dark blue). VIEU plants tended to retire later (depicted as circles below; note how most of the circles are light blue and green). The merchant vs. VIEU comparison indicates that market structure is a signi?cant factor in power plant retirements, particularly the timing of retirements. Figure 3.4. Retirements by Date, Location, Ownership, and Capacity27 .Capacity (MW) 0 . 9 I Retired 2002 to 2006 1 I Retired 2007 to 2010 Ownership I Retired 2011 to 2015 2) A Mme,? I Retired 2016 to March 2017 VIEU 22,000 0 18 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000322 The data displayed in Figure 3.4 is categorized into four time frames because a variety of economic trends and regulatory events occurred throughout the period 2002–2017:  During the period 2002–2006 (shown in purple), VIEU plants retired or sold many of their generating assets to third parties through state-initiated processes collectively known as restructuring. During the late 1990s, many states passed legislation initiating restructuring concurrent with the creation of several RTOs and ISOs. The majority of retirements occurring during this period were smaller, older merchant power plants in restructured areas including California, Texas, the Northeast, and the mid-Atlantic region.  The period 2007–2010 (shown in dark blue) saw early growth of subsidized utility-scale wind generation; the economic recession from 2008 through 2011; and the start of the shale revolution in 2006–2007, with natural gas prices starting a downward trend. Also in this time frame was the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Massachusetts v. EPA, finding that the EPA has the authority to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), opening the door to further regulation under the Clean Air Act.28 Older, less fuel efficient natural gas-fired plants retired early in this period, but the fall in natural gas prices starting in 2009 also began to force the shutdown of smaller, older coal and oil plants in 2009.  In the period 2011–2015 (shown in light blue), low natural gas prices proved to be a longlasting rather than a short-term phenomenon. The compliance deadline for MATS converged with tightening pollution limits in sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) trading programs. Many of the coal and oil retirements in this period were plants whose owners chose to shut down a plant rather than invest in costly environmental remediation measures. Further, the EPA’s final Clean Power Plan rule was finalized during this time.v This period had the most power plant retirements, with a marked increase in California, the mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Southeast. During this period, it also became clear that a portion of the customer electricity demand lost from the recession was not going to reappear in the near term, which meant that electricity demand would not support the higher-cost plants that occupied higher positions on the supply curve.  In 2016 and going forward (shown in green), power plant retirements are and may continue to be driven by continued economic challenges in the form of market dynamics and compliance costs of regulations, as well as operational pressures from a changing resource mix. Figure 3.5 shows generation capacity, additions, retirements, announced retirements, and demand responsew as a percentage of 2002 total installed net summer capacity in each region. The graphic shows that in every region except CAISO+, the proportion of retirements between 2002 and 2016 (in v Although the Clean Power Plan was later stayed by the Supreme Court, the investment uncertainty around the time of the final rule made reinvestment in coal technology a difficult decision for plant owners. https://www.iaee.org/ej/ejexec/EJ391 ExecSum Morris.pdf. w Demand response is “a voluntary program offered by independent system operators/regional transmission organizations, local utility service providers, or third parties, which compensate end-use (retail) customers for reducing and/or changing the pattern of their electricity use (load) over a defined period of time, when requested or automatically instructed to do so during periods of high power prices or when the reliability of the grid is threatened.” https://energy.gov/epsa/quadrennial-energyreview-second-installment. 19 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000323 orange) is 20 percent or less of the total installed capacity available in 2002 (in red, orange, and light blue). The figure also shows that the amount of new capacity added (dark blue) exceeds the combined amounts of capacity retired (in red) and planned for retirement (in orange) in every region over the study period.x Figure 3.5. Operating Generation Capacity, Additions, Retirements, and Announced Retirements by Region for All Generation Types, January 2002–December 202229 3.1 Coal Plant Retirements There were approximately 306,000 MW30 of coal-fired power plants in the United States at the start of 2002 and 270,000 MW31 at the end of 2016, representing a net retirement of approximately 36,000 MW (about 12 percent) of coal capacity. The remaining fleet of coal-fired generators covers most of the lower 48 states, with the exception of the Northeast, Northwest, and California, as shown in Figure 3.6. x While the graphic includes currently planned additions in EIA’s data, this figure does not show generation (megawatt-hour) or technology type, and most of planned and added capacity (megawatt) comes from new natural gas and VRE sources that do not meet the NERC baseload characteristic discussed earlier. 20 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000324 Figure 3.6. Location of the Existing Coal Fleet C) 500 Ownership C1 1.000 A Merchant I: ?1 21.500 0 VIEU EIA reports that: Coal-?red electricity generators accounted for 25% of operating electricity generating capacity in the United States and generated about 30% of U.S. electricity in 2016. Most coal- ?red capacity was built between 1950 and 1990, and the capacity-weighted average age of operating coal facilities is 39 years.32 More than 90 percent of the coal consumed in the United States is used for power generation.33 Coal energy production peaked in 2007 and has been declining since. No new coal plants have been built for domestic utility electricity production since 201434 because new coal plants are more expensive to build and operate than natural gas-fired plants.35 Further, as Figure 3.7 shows, coal retirements span many regions. Figure 3.7. Location of Coal Retirements, 2002?201636 . Capacity (MW) 0 50 500 Ownership A ix 11?00 A Merchant '1 )21,500 OVIEU 21 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000325 Between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,000 MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet. The age of coal plants is an important factor. As Figure 3.8 shows, the vast majority of coal-fired capacity was built before 1990, with the average of the fleet built in the mid to late 1970s.37 According to the Congressional Research Service, the service life of coal-fired generators reportedly “averages between 35 and 50 years, and varies according to boiler type, maintenance practices, and the type of coal burned, among other factors.”38 Figure 3.8. U.S. Utility-Scale Coal-Fired Electric Generating Capacity Additions by Coal Type and Initial Operating Year39 40 Between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,000 MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet.41 EIA reported that coal-fired power plants made up more than 80 percent of the 18,000 MW of electric generating capacity that retired in 2015, and that the retiring units “tended to be older and smaller in capacity than the coal generation fleet that continues to operate.”42 An analysis of coal plant and other data indicates several important trends and attributes:  About 70 percent of the plants that retired between 2010 and 2016 had a capacity factor of less than 50 percent in the year prior to retirement, and about half of the future planned retirements operated below a 50 percent capacity factor in 2016.43  While none of the units that retired between 2010 and 2016 had significant SO2 control equipment installed, more than half of the future announced retirements have SO2 control.  The average size of planned retirements (380 MW) exceeds the average size of recent retirements (218 MW), indicating that future retirements will be generally larger than previous ones.44 22 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000326 Retired plants are older than the remaining fleet. The coal units that retired in 2015 were mainly built between 1950 and 1970, and the average age of those retired units was 54 years. The remaining coal fleet is relatively younger, with an average age of 38 years in 2016.45 In summary, until quite recently, the coal plants that have retired were smaller, older, had higher heat rates, and therefore were dispatched less often and ran at lower capacity factors. Most of the earliest coal retirements were merchant-owned units in the Northeast and Midwest that were more exposed to competition from other generators and fuel types, while VlEU-owned plants in the Southeast and elsewhere experienced a longer period of protection from low market prices. Workforce Impacts of Coal Plant Retirements and Shifts in Coal Production Falling demand for coal due to coal plant retirements and capacity factor reductions, a regional shift in coal production, and automation in mining have led to a reduction in coal production jobs. Between 2011 and September 2016, increased mechanization and a shift to western coal resulted in a loss of 36,000 coal mining jobs, of which nearly 90 percent were in Appalachia.46 As shown in Table 3-1, more than 80 percent of the coal jobs in the United States support electricity production.47 The oil and gas extraction sector is not subdivided and includes many non-power uses. About 35 percent of the natural gas and roughly one percent of petroleum jobs in the United States support electricity production.48 Growth in some energy sectors, such as solar energy deployment, supported new jobs, but they vary regionally and often do not correlate well with concurrent job losses in sectors such as coal mining or power plant operations. Job growth in other energy sectors and regions cannot sufficiently offset job losses in the coal sector without adequate training, salary adjustments, or transition assistance. Table 3-1. Direct Employment and Income in Industries Related to Electric Power Supply, 201649 Industry Sector/Subsector Jobs Percent Related to Average Annual Electricity Industry Income Electric power generation 191 ,000 100% $1 13,000 Electric power transmission and 292,000 100% $99,000 distribution Electric power total 483,000 100% $104,000 Coal miningy 55,000 ~80% $82,000 Oil and gas extraction2 377,000 ~35% of gas, of oil $118,000 Mining and extraction total 432,000 Unknown $113,000 Includes supporting North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry categories. 1 Includes supporting NAICS industry categories. 23 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000327 Coal Plant Closure Considerations50 In September 2016, Ed Malley of Power Magazine noted: The primary recent drivers of coal plant retirement announcements include low natural gas prices and new environmental regulations—especially the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), Clean Water Act Section 316(b), and the Coal Combustion Residuals rule. Other contributing factors include more competitive markets and a variety of regional and state-level policies involving renewables and carbon pricing. Most of the power plants being closed today were built in the 1940s to 1960s, before the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970. Many have minimal air pollution controls, use once-through cooling water, and sluice wet coal ash to ponds. Scrubbers, closed-loop cooling, and dry ash handling are current requirements, or will be phased in over the next few years. Because much of the older capacity tends to be smaller units less than 300 megawatts (MW), which are not economical to retrofit, they are therefore retired. Many closures coincided with the MATS deadlines in 2015 and 2016, at a time when natural gas prices were at historic lows. Now that the MATS deadlines have passed, additional companies are announcing closures, including Dynegy (5,000 MW) and DTE Energy (2,100 MW). Economics, renewable energy mandates, and reduced demand for electricity are driving these additional closures. Power plant closure activity began on the East and West Coasts in oil-fired plants because of the high cost of fuel. Closures are now occurring in the coal belts, the Upper Midwest, and the Southeast. There are even some coal-fired plant closures in Western states. 3.2 Natural Gas Plant Retirements In recent years, the story of natural gas for electricity generation has been one of overall growth rather than decline. However, many natural gas plants have retired since 2002. Natural gas plants are located across the lower 48 states, and are concentrated around major population centers, as shown in Figure 3.9. According to EIA: In 2016, natural gas-fired generators accounted for 42% of the operating electricity generating capacity in the United States. Natural gas provided 34% of total electricity generation in 2016, surpassing coal to become the leading generation source. The increase in natural gas generation since 2005 is primarily a result of the continued costcompetitiveness of natural gas relative to coal.51 24 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000328 Figure 3.9. Location of the Existing Natural Gas Fleet52 FuelT Ca ci (MW) 0 0 ype paty fl NGCC 1 NG CT 500 Ownership 4" - I ST 1.000 A Merchant 21.500 OVIEU NGCC units accounted for 54 percent of the 447,000 MW of total U.S. natural gas-powered generator capacity in 2016. Combined-cycle generators have been a popular technology choice since the 19905 and made up a large share of the capacity added between 2000 and 2005. Some other types of natural gas-?red technology, such as combustion turbines (CTs, representing about 28 percent of total natural gas-powered generator capacity) and steam turbines 17 percent), generally only run during hours when electricity demand is high. The capacity-weighted average age of U.S. natural gas power plants is 22 years, which is less than hydro (64 years), coal (39 years), and nuclear (36 years). The improved ef?ciency of NGCC plants has led to them being used to a greater degree as baseload generation and increased the overall generation from natural gas. Figure 3.10 shows the initial operating years for the three types of natural gas-fired capacity additions (and their respective share of total natural gas generation in 2016). 25 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000329 Figure 3.10. Capacity Additions of U.S. Utility-Scale Natural Gas-Fired Electricity Generation by Technology Type and Initial Operating Year53 Figure 3.11 shows total natural gas-fired net generation and how the capacity factors of these plants vary by technology over the period 2011–2016. Although NGSTs were originally built principally for baseload use, since the early 2000s, they have been displaced in the dispatch merit order by more efficient NGCC plants designed for greater flexibility. As shown in Figure 3.11, NGST units operate at significantly lower capacity factors than NGCC units. Figure 3.11. Natural Gas Fleet Capacity Factors54 The States of California, Texas, New York, and Florida all had more than 20,000 MW of natural gas-fired capacity at the end of 2016. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) reports that, due to the flexibility, efficiency, and cost competitiveness of NGCC power plants, grid operators have been dispatching NGCC plants more frequently as baseload generators.55 In consequence, the average capacity factor for all NGCC plants has grown from about 40 percent in 2008 to roughly 56 percent in 2016, surpassing that of coal.56 26 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000330 Figure 3.12. Location of Natural Gas Retirements57 .Capacity (MW500 Ownership 1.000 A Merchant A 0 21,500 0 VIEU AA 0 Figure 3.12 shows the retirements of natural gas plants between 2002 and 2016. The ERCOT and CAISO markets have presented difficulties for merchant natural gas (depicted as triangles above; note the concentration of merchant retirements in California and Texas). EIA reported in 2011 that between 2000 and 2010, 33,000 MW of natural gas-?red generation retired (72 percent steam turbines), with an average age at retirement of 48 years and with significantly higher heat rates than the average NGCC.58 3.3 Nuclear Plant Retirements The current operating nuclear power ?eet consists of approximately 54,000 MW of generating capacity in regulated markets and approximately 45,000 MW in restructured electricity markets.59 This represents nine percent of total U.S. utility-scale generation capacity in 2017 and 20 percent of U.S. electric generation in 2016. EIA reports that nuclear plants have higher capacity factors than any other electric generation technology, averaging more than 90 percent (nearly full capacity, full time) over the past ?ve years. The plants refuel every 18 to 24 months.60 27 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000331 Figure 3.13. Location of the Existing Nuclear Fleet61 The first of these units went online in 1969, and the capacity-weighted average age of the nuclear fleet is 37 years old.62 Almost all of the operating plants have received approval to conduct at least one capacity uprate; through 2016, these uprates to the existing fleet have contributed more than 7,000 MW of additional nuclear capacity.63 In addition to capital investments for capacity uprates, nuclear owners make significant capital investments to replace aging components to qualify for license renewal, as well as a suite of additional security and safety investments to comply with new regulations following 9/11 and the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. The United States has the world’s largest nuclear reactor fleet. Nuclear power plants contribute about 60 percent of total U.S. emissions-free generation.64 Located in 60 power plants, the 99 active nuclear reactors provide almost half a million jobs and contribute more than $60 billion to the U.S. GDP.65 Nuclear energy is viewed as a key strategic asset for the United States, and continued U.S. leadership in the global nuclear energy market has important nonproliferation and safety ramifications to national security interests.66 As noted recently by Prof. Michael Webber of the University of Texas: While the environmental and reliability impacts of the [nuclear plant] closures are wellunderstood, what many don't realize is that these closures also pose long-term risks to our national security. As the nuclear power industry declines, it discourages the development of our most important anti-proliferation asset: a bunch of smart nuclear scientists and engineers….The loss of expertise from a declining domestic nuclear workforce makes it hard for Americans to conduct the inspections that help keep the world safe from nuclear weapons.67 Of the 99 active nuclear units, 51 are owned by VIEUs, which rely on regulated cost-of-service ratemaking. This form of ratemaking provides a stable source of cost recovery assuming reasonably prudent operation and management by the utility. The continued operation of these units depends on decisions by their ratemaking authorities: state regulators; state governments; city councils; cooperative boards; Federal entities; and state regulatory bodies. If these plants become less competitive, authorities may decide to close nuclear units on economic grounds. Authorities can also decide to close nuclear units on grounds other than economics—for example, proximity to the New York City 28 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000332 metropolitan area (36 miles) has been cited as an additional concern in the continued operation of the Indian Point nuclear plant. Twenty-eight nuclear plants are now merchant plants that were spun off by VIEUs to affiliates under state electric restructuring efforts in the early 2000s. All of these merchant nuclear units operate in centrally-organized wholesale markets. Many of the units were spun off to exploit high locational marginal prices (LMPs) in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets in the days of high natural gas prices.aa In New York and Illinois, Clean Energy Standards and associated Zero Emission Credits (ZEC) for nuclear plants are being used to help maintain the economic viability and continued operations of nuclear plants, in part to help meet the states’ GHG-limiting goals. Modeled after existing RPS and Renewable Energy Certificates (REC), these ZEC payments68 69 have been established to direct additional funds to existing nuclear power plants that are no longer cost-competitive. Currently, only New York and Illinois have Clean Energy Standard programs, and these programs are being litigated in the courts. A recent Idaho National Laboratory report observes that70  There is an industrywide systemic economic and financial challenge to operating nuclear power plants in centrally organized markets;  Given the confluence of market factors in combination with market structure in centrally organized markets, a significant number of operating nuclear plants have negative cash flow positions today;  Given current trends, these market factors are unlikely to change significantly over the next five years;  Retirement of nuclear plants before their operating licenses expire is caused primarily by lower revenues as opposed to higher operating costs, as wholesale electricity prices have precipitously fallen over the last several years;  The magnitude of the gap between operating revenues and operating costs is in the range of $5–$15 per megawatt-hour (MWh). For a 1,000 MW nuclear unit, approximately every $5/MWh of gap represents about $40 million in annual negative cash flow;  Without action to enhance revenue (e.g., New York ZEC payments), more nuclear plants will face retirements before the end of their operating license in the future.71 Figure 3.14 shows the nuclear reactors that have announced retirement, those that have closed, and those whose closure has been averted by state action. Between 2002 and 2016, 4,666 MW of nuclear generating capacity was announced for retirement, or approximately 4.7 percent of the U.S. total.72 aa Profits from high wholesale prices are not available to utility cost-of-service regulated units because their revenues are set by state regulators to recover operating costs and provide a target return on invested capital. 29 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000333 Figure 3.14. Location of Nuclear Power Plant Retirements: Closed, Announced, and Averted 73 As shown in Table 3-2, another eight reactors representing 7,167 MW of nuclear capacity (7.2 percent of U.S. nuclear capacity and 0.6 percent of total U.S. generating capacity74) have announced retirement plans since 2016. This does not include seven reactors that averted early retirement through state action. 30 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000334 Table 3-2. Nuclear Plant Retirements, Announced Closures, and Plants Averted by State Action75 76 77 As Table 3-2 shows, Indian Point is the only announced closure that lists state policy as the sole reason for retirement. 12 of the 16 plant closure announcements refer to unfavorable market conditions as the driver for plant retirement. Four of the five nuclear power plants (six reactors) that have shut down since 2013 were single-unit plants. Of the 11 nuclear power plants (15 reactors) that have announced 31 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000335 intentions to close—including the five plants (seven reactors) in New York and Illinois that will remain open as a result of state action—four are dual-unit plants and seven are single-unit plants. Table 3-3 shows the range of nuclear plant average costs in 2016 (in $/MWh). The data indicates that single-unit plants are more costly than multi-unit plants, and that operators who own only one nuclear plant have higher costs than those who own a fleet of plants. This is largely because some operating costs, such as security, do not scale linearly with plant size. As a result, single-unit or smaller plants are more expensive, and thus more likely to be retired prior to the end of their license terms. Table 3-3. Average Nuclear Costs by Plant Size and Operator Type, 201678 A nuclear plant fully exposed to low wholesale energy prices can earn additional revenues in three other ways: it may receive capacity payments if it is located in a centrally-organized market with a capacity payment scheme (New York, New England, MISO, and PJM), it can earn revenues for providing reliability products such as frequency response,bb or it may receive ZEC or similar subsidy payments from its host state. If a nuclear plant is owned by a VIEU, its regulators may allow it to continue collecting capital recovery from its ratepayers even though the utility is effectively paying more to run the nuclear unit than it would cost to buy the same energy and capacity under a bilateral contract or spot market purchases. However, as long as natural gas prices stay low and there is an oversupply of energy in many hours, the typical nuclear plant may not be profitable. Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates that 34 of the Nation’s 60 nuclear plants are losing money.79 Not all nuclear power plants close due to unfavorable economics alone. For example, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) has decided to shut down its dual-unit Diablo canyon plant in California due to several factors, including changes in state policy (California is moving to 50 percent RPS by 2040), new environmental regulations (replace once-through cooling system at an estimated cost of $8–$12 billion), local opposition to the NRC relicensing extension application, and uncertainty about future loads to be bb See Section 4.1.1 for the technical definition of frequency. 32 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000336 served by the regulated utility (specifically, community choice aggregation, which allows for third-party retail suppliers). The NRC’s nuclear relicensing program is another factor affecting the future of U.S. nuclear power generation. The NRC issues initial reactor operating licenses covering a 40-year term, but those licenses have been routinely extended. Of the 99 operating nuclear reactors in the United States, 84 have been approved to operate for 60 years, while another nine are currently under review.80 However, based on the current and potential license extensions to 60 years, only three units (Comanche Peak Unit 2 and Watts Bar Units 1 and 2) will still be operating after 2050, unless subsequent license extensions—out to 80 years—are submitted and approved. Two utilities have already announced plans to seek subsequent license renewal for two plants.81 Extended nuclear plant operations often entail major capital upgrades of plant equipment. According to DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, the required capital costs for equipment upgrades drive the total cost for extension; these costs vary by plant. DOE estimates that it requires $500 million to $1 billion per plant of additional capital expenditures to operate a plant for an additional 20 years.82 These routine maintenance and equipment replacements would be required in this time frame regardless of the licensing process.83 Figure 3.15 shows a comparison of license duration to planned closure date. As depicted, most decisions to retire have come well before the expiration of the plant’s license. A few of the plants shown in the figure (indicated by a box around the plant name) were able to avert closure as a result of state actions. Figure 3.15. Nuclear Plant Retirements Compared to NRC Plant Operating License Terms84 85 86 33 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000337 3.4 Hydropower Retirements and Repowering In 2015, the U.S. hydropower fleet included 2,198 active power generation plants with a total capacity of 79,600 MW and 42 pumped-storage hydropower plants totaling 21,600 MW.87 As of 2016, hydropower accounted for more than six percent of net U.S. power sector electricity generation, nearly nine percent of U.S. electric generating capacity, and 97 percent of U.S. utility-scale electrical storage capacity.88 Hydropower is currently the largest source of renewable generation, providing nearly 44 percent of all U.S. renewable energy in 2016.89 90 Half of U.S. hydro capacity is located in the States of Washington, California, and Oregon. The hydropower fleet is the oldest in the U.S. -- as stated in QER 1.2, “About half the U.S. hydroelectric fleet is over 50 years old since many large dams were built between the 1940s and 1960s,”91 and the average hydroelectric facility has been operating for 64 years. However, with routine maintenance and refurbishment of turbines and electrical equipment, the expected life of a hydropower facility is likely to be 100 years or more.92 Hydropower is a varied resource. Forty-eight states (see Figure 3.16) have hydropower facilities, led by California, Oregon, and Washington. Ownership of hydropower plants is highly diverse, split across a wide range of private and public entities. Approximately 50 percent of hydropower capacity is owned by the Federal Government—the three main Federal agencies authorized by Congress to own and operate hydropower plants are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Other public ownership includes public utility districts, irrigation districts, states, and rural cooperatives, whose hydropower resources consist of about 24 percent of the total installed capacity. Private owners—including VIEUs, merchant power producers, and industrial companies— control the remaining 25 percent of total installed capacity.93 Figure 3.16. Hydropower Plants in the United States by Capacity and Average Annual Runoff94 34 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000338 While some hydropower plants are operated as baseload resources, many also support the dynamic behavior of grid operations by offering a full range of ancillary services, including load following, spinning and non-spinning reserve, and voltage and frequency support. This flexibility has historically complimented other traditional forms of baseload generation, such as coal and nuclear. The majority of hydropower capacity is operated as either peaking or run-of-river. Peaking plants shift or delay water releases used for generation to higher value times of the day, contingent on a project’s storage capability and the regulatory requirements governing its operation. While peaking plants have usable storage from a project’s reservoir, run-of-river facilities have little to no ability to store water, and generation only changes based on the natural variability of flows, though even these types of facilities are capable of providing a number of ERS. In some regions, hydropower assets have been operated in more flexible modes in recent years as VRE penetration increases.95 At the beginning of 2011, hydropower plants comprised 24 of the 25 oldest operating power facilities in the United States, with 72 percent of facilities older than 60 years.96 However, significant capital investment toward modernizing and upgrading the existing fleet is consistently taking place to maintain reliability and, at times, uprate the capacity of existing facilities. From 2007 to 2016, the industry invested at least $8.7 billion in refurbishments, replacements, and upgrades to hydropower plants at 143 hydropower facilities, including $1.2 billion and 34 plants in 2016 alone.97 This often includes equipment upgrades, turbine efficiency improvements, and modifications that ensure environmental protection and mitigation as part of relicensing terms. Most of the recent hydropower capacity additions in the United States have come from unit upgrades or additions to existing projects.98 While FERC does receive appropriations from Congress to defray operating costs, these appropriations are recovered completely through annual charges and administrative fees.99 EIA public reports indicate that 1,376 MW (of the total 79,985 MW of U.S. hydroelectric capacity) retired between 2002 and 2017—in most cases as part of repowering projects in which the retired turbine generators were replaced with new equipment. Fifty-two relatively small-scale hydroelectric generators representing 283 MW of generation capacity were retired without replacement.100 3.5 Falling Natural Gas Prices Shale gas development has significantly expanded the availability of natural gas and lowered its cost across the United States and the world.101 Before the widespread use of horizontal drilling techniques in the past decade, U.S. natural gas prices averaged more than $7 per million British thermal unit (MMBtu) between 2003 and 2008, and approached $14/MMBtu in several short periods (including in 2005 after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reduced production and delivery from Gulf of Mexico sources).102 Hydraulic fracturing practices spread and made previously inaccessible gas sources economic, causing natural gas prices to fall, averaging less than $3.20/MMBtu between 2012 and 2016.103 35 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000339 Figure 3.17. Conventional and Shale Natural Gas Production, 2007–2016104 Wholesale electricity prices generally tracked natural gas prices for the study period, as shown in Figure 3.18. This is likely because gas-fired mid-merit and peaker power plants have been the marginal generators following load in many hours of the day, and their short-run marginal costs are driven by natural gas prices.105 Thus, natural gas plants and gas prices have been the largest single driver of spot electricity prices. 36 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000340 Figure 3.18. Wholesale Day-Ahead Electricity Prices vs. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Monthly Average)106 The price of natural gas is a key factor in the prices generators offer in the bid-based RTO/ISO wholesale electricity markets. It is also a factor in the prices set in bilateral power sales, including in the nonRTO/ISO regions such as the Southeast. Consequently, wholesale and bilateral transaction prices are often driven by natural gas prices across large parts of the U.S. power market.cc On one hand, wholesale electricity prices have become increasingly exposed to potential volatility in natural gas delivered prices. On the other hand, the Nation has realized significant economic benefits from the shale revolution— falling natural gas prices between 2007 and 2013 generated an estimated net economic benefit of $48 billion per year over this period.107 Natural gas-fired generation has grown nearly continuously since the late 1980s (see Figure 3.19) for several key reasons. These plants have low capital costs and are, in general, relatively less expensive than some competing technologies.108 They are also much less land-intensive than many other types of generation, and thus often can be more easily sited in urban areas near electric demand.109 Similarly, natural gas pipelines can be built more quickly than electric transmission lines (in most states) because they have a comparatively streamlined permitting process, which often has made it easier for a plant developer to build a new gas-fired plant near a large electric load than to build a power plant farther away and transmit its electricity to large load centers by wire.dd cc When natural gas prices were high, this situation yielded large profits to the then lower-cost coal and nuclear power producers. However, as gas prices and therefore wholesale and bilateral contract power prices have declined, the situation has reversed, and many coal and nuclear plants have been losing money. dd Interstate natural gas pipelines can often be built more quickly than transmission lines because the pipeline owners, once granted a FERC-issued certificate of public convenience and necessity, have eminent domain power under section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act and the procedures set forth under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 71A). By contrast, electric transmission developers are dependent on states to grant eminent domain authorization. 37 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000341 Figure 3.19. Total Annual U.S. Natural Gas Generation, 1950–2016110 The two main types of natural gas generators (NGCCs and CTs) offer distinct operational advantages. NGCC generators are very efficient and have significantly higher capacity factors than single111 (simple) cycle natural gas CTs, which contribute primarily to meeting peak load and may only operate for a few hours a year.112 A CT’s short start-up time and fast ramp rate make it the most responsive component for ensuring enough capacity exists to meet demand during the highest-peak demand hours of the year and help maintain grid reliability, absent affordable grid-scale storage. For this reason, CT capacity factors are usually lowee (generally below 10 percent).113 CTs can go from cold start-up to 100 percent output in seven to 11 minutes; in contrast, coal-fired units ramp on the order of hours, and doing so incurs increased operations and maintenance costs.114 NGCC ramp rates fall somewhere in between, and some NGCC units can ramp to full-rated power in less than 30 minutes.115 This flexibility makes NGCCs and CTs useful in complementing VRE because their flexibility allows these plants to match changes in solar or wind output. Until recently, most NGCC units were used for intermediate and peak loads rather than baseload. However, because natural gas prices have been low for a sustained period, and because NGCC plants retain some of the flexible characteristics of CTs and operate at a higher efficiency and lower cost, these units often are now used for baseload power. As a result, some coal plants have been pushed higher on the merit order, which reduces their average capacity factors, negatively impacts their economics, and can ultimately lead to retirements. ee Some states rely on CTs more regularly than other locations; most notably, Texas, Louisiana, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island all have CT capacity factors greater than 20 percent. https://energy.gov/epsa/downloads/electricitygeneration-baseline-report. 38 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000342 On top of low fuel prices, natural gas-fired power plants have become more fuel efficient over the study period. Figure 3.20 shows how the fuel energy usage per unit of electricity generation of the fleet of generators has changed from 2002 to 2016 for each fuel type. The natural gas fleet has become increasingly efficient (i.e., achieved a lower heat rate) as old steam electric plants have retired and many new, highly efficient NGCC plants have been built and operated at high utilization rates.116 Figure 3.20. Heat Rates for Coal, Nuclear, and Natural Gas, 2002–2016117 3.6 Environmental Regulations A suite of environmental regulations affecting the electricity generation sector had implementation deadlines between 2011 and 2021, stemming from statutes enacted between 1970 and 1990. These regulations have had disparate effects on the costs of various power generation technologies. While the cost of environmental regulations has been significant for coal-fired power plants in particular, the evidence reviewed below indicates that regulations were not the sole cause of observed coal retirements, but were certainly a contributing factor. Following are two key takeaways: 1. Timing suggests that regulations had an impact on retirements. Of the 59,392 MW of coal-fired power plants that retired between 2002 and 2016, approximately 48,800 MW or 82 percent of that capacity retired in the period 2012–2016, when significant environmental regulations would have affected the invest-or-retire decision. This left 270,000 MW of coal-fired capacity on the grid (down from 315,000 MW in 2002), which produced 30 percent118 of total 2016 U.S. electricity output (down from 50 percent in 2002). 2. Many of the coal plants that retired were no longer “baseload.” Due to low natural gas prices and abundant natural gas generation capacity additions, most of the coal plants that retired between 2011 and 2015 (when the environmental regulations took effect) had not been operating in their intended baseload fashion for several years.119 39 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000343 All nuclear power plants are affected by regulations pertaining to safety, security, and upgrades required for license renewal. In addition, nuclear plants are affected by the Cooling Water Intake Rule, and some announced closures have cited, among other reasons, state requirements to modify cooling water systems as a reason for retirement.120 121 Hydropower plants are also affected by other environmental regulations and unique licensing processes. Table 3-4 summarizes major environmental regulations finalized after 2011 affecting coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants. Table 3-4. Major Environmental Regulations Related to Coal, Natural Gas, and Nuclear Generation Name Year Year Authorizing Major Provisions Generation Finalized" Implemented Statute"I Sources Affected Cooling Water 2001 Phase II: Clean Water 0 Promulgated under 316(b) of the Clean Coal Intake Rulem (Phase 1), 2014?2018123 Act Water Act. New sources regulated under Gas 2003 Phase I and existing sources regulated Nuclear (revised under Phase II. Phase 1), 0 States consider requirements for power 2014 plants on a case-by?case basis.124 (Phase ll) . Requires controls to reduce mortality to ?sh and other aquatic organisms. CrossState Air 2011 Phase 1: 2015 Clean Air Act The CrossState Air Pollution Rule Coal Pollution Phase 2: 2017 replaced the Clean Air Interstate Rule Gas Rule?? starting on January 1, 2015, and requires states to reduce power plant emissions of $02 and N0x that contribute to ozone emissions and ?ne particle pollution in other states.m Steam Electric 1974; 1982; 2015 40 CFR 423 0 Established limitations on the discharge of Coal Ef?uent policy update is toxic and other chemical pollutants and Gas Limitations updates in stayed while thermal discharges from existing and new Guidelinesm 1977, EPA reviews steam electric power plants, as well as 1978, rule pretreatment standards. 1980, The 2015 update sets the ?rst Federal 1982, and limits on levels of toxic metals that can be 2015 discharged. New Source 1980; 1980; 2002 Clean Air Act 0 Affects stationary sources of air pollutants. Coal Review"" updates under Requires that a new or modi?ed power Gas updates in court plant obtain a pre-construction permit to 1996 and challenge ensure, among other things, that modern 2002 pollution control equipment is installed. 0 Requirements differ depending on whether or not the plant is located in an area that ff Dates shown here reflect the date of publication in the Federal Register. For regulations only. The New Source Review (NSR) program affects most new and modified power plants and manufacturing facilities. Determining when a facility is making a modi?cation that triggers NSR has been a subject of debate. Attempts have been made over decades to update NSR?the latest in 2002. More information can be found at: and 40 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000344 meets the requirements under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Mercury and Air 2012 2015?2016 Clean Air Act Establishes emissions limits for mercury, Coal Toxics arsenic, acid gases, and other toxic Standards128 pollutants from coal? and oil??red power plants.129 Utilities had until April 2015 to comply with the standards with many plants receiving a 1-year extension. Coal 2015 2015-2018ii Resource Addresses groundwater contamination Coal Combustion Conservation risks from coal combustion residuals Residuals and ?coal ash") disposal in unlined land?lls and Rule?? Recovery Act surface impoundments by establishing national standards for disposal. Regional Haze 1999; Revised state Clean Air Act Requires states to develop long?term Coal Rule policy plans due in strategies, including enforceable measures revisions 2021 to improve visibility in 156 national parks in 2017 and wildemess areas. Aims at returning vis bility to natural conditions by 2064. Carbon 2015 Under EPA Clean Air Act Carbon Pollution Standards established Coal Pollution review emission standards for new fossil fuel- Gas Standards and ?red generators under Clean Air Act Clean Power section 111(b). Plan131 The Clean Power Plan, promulgated under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, establishes C02 emission standards for existing power plants. The collective impact of this suite of regulations required owners to weigh the cost implications of a variety of compliance options for their plants, and to also look closely at whether their market prospects (expected production costs and capital needs, relative coal and natural gas fuel costs, competition from other generators, technology availability, and customer demand levels) or regulatory regime would allow recovery of those costs in future operating years. Most of these rules were litigated and delayed?the Clean Power Plan, for example, currently is stayed and ultimately may be rescinded, but uncertainty about its implementation nonetheless affected plant owners? compliance and retirement planning. In 2011, looking at then-current energy market prospects and fuel prices, it appeared that many power plants would be affected by these environmental regulations. Fitch Ratings estimated that 51,000 MW of coal units (smaller than 200 MW each, with a capacity-weighted average age of nearly 50 years) were at risk for retirement, particularly those operating in restructured electricity markets with no recourse to regulated cost recovery.132 In 2011 and 2012, electric industry projections of likely regulation-induced retirements that focused on the many unknowns associated with pending environmental regulations sometimes showed a very large number of retirements. These unknowns included how stringent environment remediation requirements would be; what remediation technology and strategies might satisfy those requirements; how close together the compliance deadlines would fall; and the implications for regional reliability, ii The Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act 5.612, passed in December 2016, authorizes states to create their own permitting programs for coal combustion residuals disposal, subject to EPA approval. The act specifies that states may adopt alternative standards that are ?at least as protective? as national standards. EPA has not yet issued guidelines or regulations by which state permitting programs can be approved. 41 US. Department of Energy ACC 000345 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability energy production costs, and retail energy rates if too many power plants were to close rather than invest in remediation. Environmental regulations generally increase power plant operating costs by requiring plant owners to install capital equipment that controls plant emissions. The electrical load from equipment such as SO2 scrubbers (“parasitic load”) may also reduce the plant’s net generation available for sale on the grid. Increased operating costs push the compliant plant farther out on the energy supply (dispatch) curve and can cause it to be dispatched less frequently than it would have without the emissions controls, as shown in Figure 3.21 using coal as an example. Figure 3.21. PJM Merit-Order Dispatch: Various Control Technologies133 This figure shows power plants separated by technology type for PJM, in “merit order”, i.e., based on their marginal cost of generation, in the year 2012. The vertical lines represent various levels of load. The diamonds represent marginal costs (sum of fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs) for one subcritical pulverized coal plant with no control technology and that same plant with variations of two select pollution control technologies that reduce acid gas pollution. In principal, all the plants left of a vertical line operate at the level of demand represented by that line. (In reality, transmission constraints and reliability considerations can change that significantly.) As a plant moves to the right on the curve it will tend to operate less due to the increase in marginal cost. Control technologies key: dry FGD = dry flue gas desulfurization; three types of DSI (hydrated lime, trona, and sodium bicarbonate) = dry sorbent injection. Another control technology not shown that is used to reduce acid gas emissions is wet flue gas desulfurization. Technology key: Renew = other renewables not including hydropower or wind power; Water = hydropower; LOil = light oil-fired power plants; HOil = heavy oil-fired power plants; Nuc = nuclear power. 42 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000346 3.6.1 Coal Plants and Environmental Regulation Existing coal-fired power plants must not only comply with all Federal requirements related to emissions and water use, wastewater treatment, and solid waste management, but also with any additional applicable state regulations.134 Cost impacts of these regulations varied. The EPA reported that a typical coal-fueled unit with a capacity of 700 MW could incur incremental operating and maintenance costs ranging from $287 million to $351 million to install a scrubber, from $116 million to $137 million to install a selective catalytic reduction unit, and from $97 million to $114 million to install a baghouse (fabric filter). Fitch estimated the lifetime costs and reduced cash flow associated with environmental retrofits at $1,700–$1,900 per kilowatt (kW) for a 100 MW plant burning bituminous coal, as compared with a range of $1,200–$1,300/kW for a 500 MW plant.135 These costs are on par with those of constructing a new typical (i.e., subcritical) coal plant of similar size during this same time period (averaging $1,361/kW).136 Reported planned retirements from that time suggest that approximately 27,000 MW or 8.5 percent of 2011 coal-fired capacity was rendered uneconomic under the combination of regulatory compliance costs, little demand growth, and falling natural gas prices.137 The MATS rule was potentially the most expensive and immediate of the suite of pending regulations, with a compliance deadline of April 2015 (later extended to April 2016 for some plants). Further, owners of coal facilities were dealing with MATS compliance in combination with the cost of imminent additional regulations of CO2, along with other GHGs. EIA reported that by the end of 2012, 64 percent of the U.S. coal generating capacity in the electric power sector already had the appropriate environmental control equipment (most reported using flue gas desulfurization) to comply with the MATS rule and operate past 2016; another six percent planned to add control equipment; 10 percent had announced plans to retire; and the other 20.4 percent still had to decide whether, how, and when to upgrade or retire their plants.138 The dominant MATS compliance strategy among coal-fired plant owners was to install activated carbon injection (Figure 3.22), which averaged a relatively modest $5.8 million per generator from 2015 to 2016. EIA estimates that “operators invested at least $6.1 billion from 2014 to 2016 to comply with MATS or other environmental regulations.”139 In its rulemaking, EPA estimated an annualized cost of $9.6 billion in 2015, declining to $7.4 billion annually in 2030.140 43 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000347 Figure 3.22. Changes in U.S. Coal Capacity, December 2014–April 2016141 The retrofit-or-retire decision for owners is also impacted by EPA's New Source Review (NSR) regulations that can affect owners’ ability to enhance plant efficiency due to the delay, cost, and uncertainty associated with obtaining an NSR permit. The NSR permitting program requires stationary sources of air pollution—including factories, industrial boilers, and power plants—to get permits before construction starts, whether the unit is being newly built or modified.142 This is an important concern for owners considering retrofitting an existing power plant with carbon capture equipment to reduce CO2 emissions, or adding new components to improve operating efficiency. These upgrades could trigger the NSR requirements of the Clean Air Act because they would constitute a “physical change,” or lead to a designation of the change as a “major modification,” subjecting the unit to NSR permitting requirements. The uncertainty stemming from NSR creates an unnecessary burden that discourages rather than encourages installation of CO2 emission control equipment and investments in efficiency because of the additional expenditures and delays associated with the permitting process.143 144 Ironically, the uncertainty surrounding NSR requirements has led to a significant lack of investment in plant and efficiency upgrades, which would otherwise lead to more efficient power generation, benefits to grid management, and reduced environmental impacts. EPA has acknowledged these burdens and has made attempts to reform the rules to improve and streamline NSR: As applied to existing power plants and refineries, EPA concludes that the NSR program has impeded or resulted in the cancellation of projects which would maintain and improve reliability, efficiency and safety of existing energy capacity. Such discouragement results in lost capacity, as well as lost opportunities to improve energy efficiency and reduce air pollution.145 The NSR program distinguished between “routine maintenance and repair” of existing facilities—which would be allowed—and more “substantial modification” of existing facilities, which would put the facilities over the threshold and thus require them to meet new emissions standards. Environmentalists argued that owners of electric generation and industrial plants were building virtually new facilities from the inside out by exploiting the “routine maintenance and repair” exclusion from NSR. EPA changed its interpretation in the 1990s to a more rigorous standard, culminating in numerous enforcement-related lawsuits beginning in the late 1990s.146 44 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000348 By the late 2000s, some older coal units operating without pollution controls were no longer operating as baseload units, having operational capacity factors estimated at 47 percent to 56 percent.147 As Figure 3.23 shows, rather than acting as baseload units at high capacity factors, these older units (with an average capacity of 109 MW) were operating at falling capacity factors. The units that retired in 2014 had an average capacity factor of 13 percent in 2013. Figure 3.23. Average Coal Plant Capacity Factors, 2008–2014148 Coal plant capacity factors generally fell from 2008 through 2014, with plants that retired in 2014 operating at much lower capacity factors than all coal plants. Some owners delayed their retirement announcements and retrofit decisions in order to see how the regulation litigation challenges played out, in case a late court ruling made compliance unnecessary, signifying that the cost of complying with those regulations was a factor in their retirement decisions. Others delayed closing uneconomic plants to see if enough other plants retired, in hopes that the resulting shift in market dynamics and prices might render the unretired plants profitable again.149 Figure 3.24 shows total U.S. coal capacity from 2008 through mid-2016 and projections through mid-2018. While there was a fall in coal plant capacity in 2015 associated with the MATS compliance deadline, EIA finds that fewer coal facilities retired in 2015 and the first half of 2016 than EIA had projected ahead of the compliance deadline. Specifically, in 2015 and until the April 2016 extended MATS deadline, about 20,000 MW of coal capacity retired and another 9,000 MW of coal capacity converted to natural gas, while EIA projected 50,000 MW of retirements between 2013 and 2020, with the majority retiring in 2015 in response to MATS.150 However, EIA’s projection also included other factors that can drive retirement decisions, such as the Clean Power Plan. 45 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000349 Figure 3.24. Projected and Actual Coal Retirements, 2008–2018151 Fewer coal plants retired in 2015–2016 than projected. 3.6.2 Natural Gas Plants and Environmental Regulation Because natural gas emits far less air pollution than coal-fired power plants,152 the regulatory burden and cost to natural gas-fired power plants is much lower than for coal plants. ERCOT’s December 2014 analysis estimated that the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)jj and the Cooling Water Intake Rule would impose moderate compliance costs on natural gas-fired power plants.153 Specifically, ERCOT estimated costs of $0.10–$2.75/MWh for CSAPR and $0.10–$0.50/MWh for the Cooling Water Intake Rule. The large majority of natural gas plants that have retired are NGSTs, which are less efficient than the newer NGCCs.154 From 2002 to 2016, there was a steady stream of NGST retirements, some of which may be linked to decisions about the cost effectiveness of retrofit upgrades. However, during the period 2014–2016, 23,500 MW of new natural gas capacity was added, nearly double the total natural gas capacity that was retired as part of the transition from NGST units to more efficient NGCC units.155 NGCC plants have replaced NGST plants for baseload use and natural gas combustion turbines have been built for peak power demand. 3.6.3 Nuclear Plants and Environmental Regulation The principal environmental regulation affecting nuclear power plants is the Cooling Water Intake Rule, which applies to all types of power plants but is most challenging for nuclear plants. A revised version of the Cooling Water Intake Rule has been in effect since 2003. The rule was promulgated to protect aquatic life. States may decide how to implement the rule, such as by requiring a nuclear (or other) plant to invest in a closed-loop cooling system to replace once-through ocean or waterway cooling. Three of the nuclear plants that have announced closures (Oyster Creek in New Jersey, Diablo Canyon in jj Finalized in 2011 and effective in 2015. 46 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000350 California, and Indian Point in New York) have cited disputes with their respective states over cooling water rule compliance among the reasons for plant retirement. 156 157 The Administrative Consent Order between Exelon and New Jersey establishing Oyster Creek’s 2019 retirement specifically mentions Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act as part of the state’s justification in requiring the construction of cooling towers if the plant were to operate for the full duration of its license extension.158 Nuclear plants are also affected by other regulatory factors and fees that are not imposed on other types of power plants. Recent examples include major safety reviews following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant failures in 2011. A recent study found that the rising regulatory costs of nuclear energy— which approach $60 million per year—exceed the profit margins of many of these plants.159 3.6.4 Hydropower Plants and Environmental Regulation As authorized under the Federal Power Act, FERC issues licenses to non-Federal hydropower projects, which comprise roughly 50 percent of existing U.S. hydropower capacity. The FERC regulatory framework involves numerous participants, such as Federal and state resource agencies; nongovernmental organizations; state, local, and tribal entities; and the public. Because of the complexity of the regulatory processes and numerous agencies involved, hydropower licensing timelines often are cited as being among the lengthiest and costliest for energy projects in the United States. A DOE analysis looking at the development timelines of 29 projects that came online from 2005 to 2013 found that the median project took over 15 years from application to operation.160 For wind and solar, the average permitting time is two to four years.161 A few hydroelectric power plants have not sought relicensing due to concerns over the cost of meeting mandatory environmental requirements imposed by Federal and state resource agencies. Capital upgrade requirements can include capacity uprates (initiated by the plant owner rather than a regulator), dam safety upgrades, or environmental improvements.162 3.7 Growing VRE Deployment Wind and solar PV—collectively, VRE—have constituted the vast majority of the VRE deployed in recent years. Wind first surpassed 1 percent of total U.S. generation in 2008, while total solar generation reached that threshold in 2015.kk Figure 3.25 shows trends in penetration—as a percentage of total generation—for wind, solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, and biomass power plants in the United States since 2001. Total end-use demand served by wind generation tripled from 1.5 percent in 2008 to 4.5 percent in 2013. Total renewable generation has now exceeded 14 percent of the U.S. total, with hydro and wind comprising the largest components. kk While annual variation in water availability affects conventional hydroelectric output from year to year, hydro generally has been consistent between 6 percent and 8 percent of total generation since 2001. https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7 6.pdf. 47 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000351 Figure 3.25. VRE Generation by Fuel as Percentage of Total U.S. Generation, 2002–2016163 At the end of 2016, U.S. installed wind capacity surpassed that of hydro for the first time (see Figure 3.26).164 165 However, given the hydro fleet’s higher average capacity factors and the above-normal precipitation on the West Coast so far this year, hydro generation will likely once again exceed wind generation in 2017, though the gap continues to narrow. Figure 3.26. Cumulative U.S. Utility-Scale Wind and Hydroelectric Generation Capacity, 1915– December 2016166 3.7.1 Technology and Policy Drivers for Deployment The deployment of wind and solar power has been spurred by a combination of technology cost declines; state RPS; private sector sustainability goals; consumer choice; Federal and state incentives; 48 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000352 transmission expansion—such as the Texas Competitive Renewable Energy Zone project—to reach highquality resource areas; and Federal and state environmental, air quality, and GHG emissions reductions policies. RPS—now in 29 states and the District of Columbia, covering 55 percent of total U.S. retail electricity sales—have also been substantial drivers of VRE growth, as they are associated with 60 percent of renewable generation growth since 2000.167 Though wind has historically been the largest beneficiary of RPS policies, more RPS-driven solar than wind was added in 2015.168 RPS also create a market for RECs. RECs represent some of the environmental attributes of renewable generation that can be bought, sold, and applied to meet certain state RPS plans, and they create an additional subsidy to renewable generation. Technologies typically experience cost reductions as their deployment grows due to technology improvement and increasing economies of scale. Lower investment costs, in turn, spur further deployment—since 2009, solar PV installed system costs have fallen approximately 60 percent on a per kilowatt basis for residential and commercial systems (from $7.06/WDC to $2.93/WDC for residential and from $5.23/WDC to $2.13/WDC for commercial) and 70 percent for utility-scale systems (from $4.46/WDC to $1.42/WDC).169 However, other factors can interrupt this general trend; for example, increases in warranty costs and the prices of commodities such as steel and fiberglass (among other factors) drove wind turbine installed system costs on a per-megawatt basis to double between 2000 and 2008 (though these costs went on to decline by 40 percent since 2010).170 Importantly, these capital cost trends do not account for technology improvements that improve performance and economics. For wind, improvements in turbine technologies and taller towers have resulted in increased capacity factors. For example, in 2015, capacity factors averaged 25.8 percent for wind projects built from 1998–2003 and averaged 41.2 percent for wind projects built in 2014.171 Similarly, for utility-scale PV, optimized system design—including use of single-axis tracking and increasing inverter loading ratios—partially contributes to capacity factors increasing from 21 percent for 2010 vintage projects to 26.7 percent for 2014 vintage projects in 2015. In addition to research and development (R&D)—which is aimed at reducing technology costs through innovation—the investment tax credit (ITC) and PTC, as well as state-level RPS, have driven expansion of VRE, particularly wind and solar. Figure 3.27 shows the substantial increase in wind capacity since 1998 during the period when a PTC has been in effect. It also suggests the wind industry’s tendency to increase investments in years when the tax credit was due to expire and its extension was uncertain. The current PTC is scheduled to be phased out after 2019.172 The solar ITC—currently at 30 percent—will be reduced after 2021 to its statutory level of 10 percent for commercial and industrial projects, and will be phased out completely for residential projects.173 49 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000353 Figure 3.27. Relationship between the PTC and Annual Wind Capacity Additions The PTC has accelerated wind project deployment significantly—between 2000 and 2013, cumulative wind capacity grew from less than 5,000 MW to more than 60,000 MW—though capacity additions noticeably track the PTC expiration and extension schedule. Similarly, the dramatic decrease in wind capacity additions during PTC expiration years underscore the notion that credits are driving deployment, rather than market decisions. For example, during the PTC expiration “cliff” in 2013, new builds counted for 1 MW of added capacity. After renewal of the PTC, new capacity jumped to 5 MW.174 This change occurred in the absence of any change in state RPS requirements. A panel of economists at a May 2017 FERC technical conference cited state-level RPS and Federal tax credits for VRE as examples of market-distorting subsidies and mandates. These policies reduce revenues for traditional baseload power plants by lowering the wholesale electric prices they receive and by displacing a portion of their output. To date, however, the data do not show a widespread relationship between VRE penetration and baseload retirements, as shown in Figure 3.28.175 50 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000354 Figure 3.28. VRE Penetration as a Percentage of 2016 Generation versus Retired Capacity since 2010 as a Percentage of Non-VRE Capacity176 While concerns exist about the impact of widespread deployment of renewable energy on the retirement of coal and nuclear power plants, the data do not suggest a correlation. Subsidies Federal and state governments use subsidies, mandates, and prohibitions to affect how public and private entities behave. Subsidies make the favored behavior or product more appealing relative to other competing products by accelerating its development (as with R&D and direct construction expenditures), lowering its ultimate cost to the consumer (as with tax incentives, low lease payments or grants), or making the product better known and more appealing (customer education, ratings, and marketing). In contrast to subsidies, mandates and prohibitions create absolute requirements for the user for whether and how much of the targeted product to consume. The Federal Government has always used a variety of subsidies to support a myriad of public and private sector goals. Over the long term, subsidies are spent on different technologies at different times, reflecting differing societal priorities and technology maturities. Early subsidies included Federal construction of hydroelectric dams and multi-purpose water management projects beginning in the 1930s. Energy R&D spending began in the 1950s with the passage of the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, with major Federal investments in the commercialization of nuclear electricity. R&D investments 51 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000355 increased sharply after the oil price shocks and energy crisis in the 1970s, and renewable energy R&D supported VRE. Accurately accounting for energy subsidies and expenditures is highly dependent on the scope and time period of the analysis. For example, some tax incentives may affect energy industries but are not specific energy-related measures, such as Section 199 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which allows tax deductions for domestic manufacturing. Natural gas producers, along with many other types of manufacturers, have been able to take advantage of this tax incentive even though it was not an energyspecific measure. This is just one example of the difficulty in examining energy-related subsidies and expenditures both from Federal and non-Federal sources, many of which may not be directly comparable.ll As a snapshot of Federal subsidies and support for electricity generating technologies for a given year, Table 3-5 shows electricity production subsidies and support that includes breakouts by direct expenditures, tax expenditures, R&D, and other Federal programs, compiled by EIA for Fiscal Year 2013. Although this data has not been compiled for every year, the 2013 data can be instructive. For example, VRE technologies received a majority of Federal support that year relative to other technologies, particularly reflecting the technical maturity of VRE relative to conventional technologies. ll For a longer discussion on energy subsidies and various reports examining energy subsidies, see https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 52 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000356 Table 3-5. Fiscal Year 2013 Electricity Production Subsidies and Support177 Similarly, it is important to note how these particular results are driven by the unique nature of a given year. For example, the large direct expenditures for wind and solar overwhelmingly arise due to the Treasury 1603 program enabled by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which allowed one-time cash grants to eligible renewable generators in lieu of tax credits. This was only available to generators who began construction in 2009–2011, and as such is no longer a direct expenditure. There is no complete multi-year assessment available that describes and analyzes the Federal subsidies and support provided to different generation technologies over time. Continued examination of Federal subsidies and support, and provision of this information to the public, can better inform the decisions made by Federal, state, and local entities. Workforce Impacts of Growing VRE Deployment As the electricity system changes, so do the types of jobs, skills needed, and education or training required. The evolving demands of the grid are creating new opportunities in information and communication technologies and in the deployment of new generation, including natural gas and VRE. Job growth has been strong in the VRE sector, and the solar and wind workforce increased by 25 and 32 percent, respectively, in 2016.178 DOE’s 2017 U.S. Energy and Employment Report found that the solar and wind industries provide 373,000 and 101,000 jobs, respectively, across the Nation.179 Veterans 53 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000357 comprise a higher percentage of employees in the electricity industry compared to other industries, and in 2015, the solar industry provided nearly 17,000 jobs for veterans in manufacturing, installation, and project management.180 3.8 Flattening Electricity Demand Between 1970 and 2005, total U.S. electricity generation to meet customer demand grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.7 percent.181 But since 2005, generation growth has stalled with a CAGR of only 0.05 percent from 2005 to 2015, even as the Nation’s GDP grew by 1.3 percent per year over the same period.182 Electricity demand historically had risen with economic growth (real GDP), but the two began decoupling around 2000, as shown in Figure 3.29. EIA attributes this decline in the demand growth rate to a variety of factors, including the cumulative impact of energy efficiency programs, standards, and codes; technology improvements in appliances, lighting, and other end-use equipment; and broader structural changes, such as a shift toward less electricity-intensive industries and slower population growth.183 Figure 3.29. Gross Domestic Product and Net Electricity Production, Historical (1950–2016) and Projected (2017–2027)184 185 186 187 Figure 3.30 shows one analysis of how efficiency improvements, coupled with structural changes in the economy, have led to flattening energy use in recent years. Overall, there has been significant progress across the U.S. economy in improving the value of goods and services produced per unit input of energy. For example, electricity productivity in the industrial sector—measured in dollars of economic output per kilowatt-hour of electricity input—nearly doubled between 1990 and 2014. The noticeable dip in both GDP and net electricity generation in 2008–2009 reflects the U.S. recession, which lowered electricity usage enough to affect power plant economics and prompt some plant closures.188 54 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000358 Figure 3.30. Estimated U.S. Energy Savings from Structural Changes in the Economy and Energy Efficiency, 1980–2016189 190 The U.S. economy has made significant progress in improving the value of goods and services produced per unit input of energy, through both energy efficiency and structural changes to the U.S. economy. Figure 3.31 shows more broadly the impact of these changes on the EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) Reference case electricity sales forecast for various years. Each AEO forecast is made assuming that laws and regulations in effect at the time of the projection will continue unchanged through the projection period, unless scheduled end dates for those laws and regulations are within that period. The objective is to provide a “business-as-usual case;” no assumptions about new policies are included. Over the past several decades, new Federal and state policies, market forces, and broader economic factors have contributed to lowering levels of electricity consumption compared to what was expected to occur in absence of any new policy, as shown by the comparison of historical Reference case projections to actual U.S. electricity sales (shown as dotted lines in Figure 3.31). 55 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000359 Figure 3.31. EIA Annual Electricity Sales 2000–2016 (terawatt-hours) and AEO Reference Case Electricity Sales Projections 2017–2030191 A changing policy and market environment since 2000 has made it challenging to accurately forecast electricity demand. TWh is terawatt-hours. As stated in QER 1.2: Currently, about 90 percent of residential, 60 percent of commercial, and 30 percent of industrial energy consumption are used in appliances and equipment that are subject to Federal minimum efficiency standards implemented, and periodically updated, by the Department of Energy. Between 2009 and 2030, these cost-effective standards are projected to save consumers more than $545 billion in utility costs, reduce energy consumption by 40.8 quads, and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by over 2.26 billion metric tons.192 There are two significant impacts from the growth in energy efficiency. First, suppliers can no longer expect robust demand growth. Second, because customers are buying less electricity, the market price of electricity clears lower on the electricity supply curve (all else equal). Thus, higher-cost power plants that might have been dispatched and earned revenues in a higher-demand market are dispatched less frequently and earn less revenue due to increased energy efficiency. nn The report, Economic and Market Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Commercial Fleet, produced by Idaho National Laboratory and the Center for Advanced Energy Studies (September 2016), attributes low electricity market prices to “low natural gas prices, low demand growth, increased penetration of renewable generation, and negative electricity market prices.” 56 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000360 3.9 Power Plant Retirements Looking Forward While recognizing the difficulty in making any long-range forecast, it is useful to examine modeled scenarios to understand how the factors affecting retirements are expected to evolve. Figure 3.32 shows the announced and modeled coal, NGCC, and nuclear retirements and additions from 2017 through 2030 in EIA’s AEO 2017. This shows that coal retirements are projected to continue in the near term— with 37,800 MW projected to retire between 2017 and 2022—and taper off in the longer term, with another 4,400 MW of retirements between 2023 and 2030. Announced nuclear retirements in the near term account for most projected retirements, with an additional 3,000 MW of modeled unplanned retirements in the period 2019–2020 due to market conditions and uncertainty. A modest number of NGCC plants are also expected to retire in the near term in this modeled scenario. Figure 3.32. Baseload Capacity Additions and Retirements from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario)193 Three factors impacting the economic conditions of baseload generators that are modeled in the AEO— natural gas price, electricity sales, and VRE generation—are shown in Figure 3.33 below. In general, there is a mixed outlook for these factors as they affect baseload generators: 1. Natural gas prices for the electric power sector are modeled to rise modestly, increasing 30 percent over 2017 levels by 2022 and rising more slowly thereafter. While this may provide some upward pressure on electricity prices, natural gas prices are notoriously challenging to predict. 2. Electricity continues to grow at a slow rate—modeled at 0.8 percent CAGR through 2030. 3. Over the same period, VRE generation is modeled to approximately double to 600 terawatthours by 2030. The majority of this growth occurs by 2024 and slows thereafter, reflecting the expiration and stepdown of the PTC and ITC in 2020 and 2022, respectively. Based on these trends, unless natural gas prices or electricity demand rise significantly faster than projected, the economic conditions of baseload generators are not projected to change significantly in the near term. 57 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000361 Figure 3.33. Modeled Projections for Natural Gas Price, Electricity Sales, and VRE Generation from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario)194 VRE generation includes wind, utility-scale PV, and distributed PV. MCf is million cubic feet While the financial strains on existing coal, nuclear, and even older natural gas plants have been real and significant, the role of conventional resources continues to evolve. PJM notes the changing nature of baseload: “Baseload” can generally be thought of as those units which operate the great majority of hours of the year to meet load requirements. Given the reduction in gas prices, we have seen a noticeable inversion in the types of units which clear in the market in the off-peak hours and thus fit the traditional notion of “baseload.” Specifically, due to low energy prices and the overall efficiency of the units, combined cycle natural gas units are dispatched as baseload with coal units more often being cycled and thus dispatched in what has traditionally been deemed “mid-merit” units.195 EIA staff analyzed NGCC unit dispatch trends over time, from 1998 to 2016.196 NGCC plant operation closely follows natural gas prices—when prices were high in the mid-2000s, the number of NGCC starts (when the plant goes from zero output into production) increased as the capacity factor decreased, confirming that these plants were used more in load-following mode rather than baseload-operation mode. Capacity factor has been rising steadily and starts have fallen since about 2010, indicating that NGCC units are being used in more hours at higher capacity factors—i.e., in baseload-type operation (see Figure 3.34). 58 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000362 Figure 3.34. NGCC Capacity Factors and Number of Starts, 1998–2016 Decreased starts and increased capacity factors indicate that NGCC plants are increasingly used for baseload-type operation. Market conditions will continue to be dynamic, such as with the scheduled phasing out of the wind PTC and solar ITC. Trends in natural gas prices and efficiency gains would also need to be thoroughly examined and accurately forecast in order to get a clearer picture of expected retirements over the coming years. In the event present market, policy, and technology conditions continue, the retirement of coal and nuclear facilities is likely to continue, as well as new builds of natural gas and VRE capacity. Going forward, coal and natural gas generators will continue to monitor several EPA rules:  The Steam Electric Effluent Limitation Guidelines have been postponed until EPA completes review of the rule finalized in 2015.197 EPA recently completed an extended public comment period of the rule and comments are currently being reviewed.198 Based on the 2015 finalized rule, EPA estimated industry-wide costs at approximately $480 million per year,199 although industry groups such as the Utility Water Act Group dispute this estimate.oo 200  The Cooling Water Intake Rule for existing sources is currently being phased in. Regions have been given authority to consider requirements for power plants on a case-by-case basis. EPA estimated an annualized post-tax final rule cost of $147.6 million for electric generators.201 However, due to the flexibility allotted to the regional permit directors, the compliance timeline and costs are unclear.  While MATS and CSAPR have affected plant decisions to retrofit or retire in the recent past, most of the capital investment for MATS and CSAPR compliance has already occurred (see Table 3-4). In the future, generators will continue to have smaller operating and maintenance costs associated with MATS. For example, based on generator survey responses, ERCOT estimates an average operating and maintenance cost for MATS of $0.75/MWh,202 which is approximately oo According to a petition submitted by the Utility Water Act Group, selected individual compliance cost estimates from its members included: $308 million (Dynegy), $200 million (NRG Energy), and $400–$500 million (American Electric Power). 59 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000363 3 percent of the average monthly day-ahead wholesale electricity price (approximately $23.5/MWh) for the ERCOT North Hub from 2015 to 2016.203  The Coal Combustion Residuals Rule, prompted by a 2008 coal ash spill, is currently being implemented.204 EPA estimated the annualized cost of the rule to be $509–$735 million for coalfired electric utilities.205  The Regional Haze Rule, which currently requires states to submit state plans for compliance by 2021, is expected to mainly affect Western states (the rule aims to improve visibility in national parks, which are located primarily in Western states). It also includes a provision allowing power plants that are already complying with CSAPR (eastern half of the United States206) to substitute their compliance status for compliance with the Regional Haze Rule.207 208  In 2015, EPA finalized New Source Performance Standards, entitled Carbon Pollution Standards, which set CO2 emission limits for new generators.pp These standards are currently under legal challenge.  The Clean Power Plan rule to reduce CO2 emissions from existing power plants was promulgated by EPA in 2015 for effect in 2022 for existing plants, but those rules are under review by EPA— which may initiate actions to rescind them—and by the courts. Several large coal plants built after 1970 with capacities greater than 1,000 MW have announced plans to retire in the next few years. These plants have already made the capital investments needed to comply with MATS, indicating that MATS itself is not the single forcing factor in these retirement decisions. Although these plants were designed to operate around the clock, low wholesale electric prices tied to natural gas were a significant driver that caused them to operate at lower capacity factors. As Rhodium Group analyst John Larsen states: The wider market dynamics are more concerning for coal…. For a power plant to make money today, it must be able to ramp up and down to coincide with the variable levels of renewable generation coming online. That makes combined cycle natural gas plants profitable, even at lower prices. [But] coal plants have relatively high and fixed operating costs and are relatively inflexible. They make their money by running full-out.209 While there have been significantly fewer retirements of hydropower generation than coal or nuclear, this does not mean that hydropower operators are immune to the same market and regulatory forces that have affected other baseload plants. Depressed prices and costly regulatory barriers decrease the margins on all hydroelectric facilities and, in some cases, cause economic stress.210 A certain amount of new development continues, primarily through powering existing non-powered dams and installing hydropower in conduits and other constructed waterways. Two hundred and forty-two new hydropower projects, with a total capacity of 3,250 MW, were in the U.S. development pipeline at the end of 2016, including 93 MW under construction. At least nine projects (225 MW) reached commercial operation in 2016.211 pp Under current market conditions, these standards were not expected to affect new build decisions because economic conditions were already unfavorable for building new coal units. For example, EIA’s 2015 AEO, which does not include the Clean Air Act 111(b) carbon standards for new coal plants, builds only a very small amount (roughly 400 MW) of new coal capacity by 2040 beyond what is already planned. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf. 60 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000364 4 Reliability and Resilience The April 14 memo expressed concerns over whether the erosion of baseload power is compromising a reliable and resilient grid. It also asked whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which that could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. Indeed, a recent National Academies study indicates that there is a growing emphasis within the industry on grid resilience.212 In this chapter, we address those issues, starting with the question of whether grid reliability has been lessened by the retirement of baseload and other coal, nuclear, and natural gas power plants over the past 15 years. The Department staff offer three general findings: 1) A diverse portfolio of generation resources and well-planned transmission investments are critical to meeting regional reliability objectives. A resource portfolio approach is necessary to ensure ERS, fuel assurance, and flexibility capabilities are available. Conventional generation sources, in particular hydropower, combustion turbines, and steam turbines, are currently the chief providers of these attributes. 2) One of the greatest challenges to integrating VRE lies in managing its effects (variability, uncertainty, location specificity, non-synchronous generation, and low capacity factor) on grid operations and planning. Lack of long-term forecasting, for example, increases risks when scheduling planned generation outages and managing severe weather events. 3) There are tradeoffs between multiple desirable attributes for the electric grid. A more reliable and resilient system may be more costly than the least-cost system. Consumer life, safety and health are dependent on a reliable and resilient electric grid, making the grid a national security asset. Infrastructure hardening213 and grid recovery and restoration strategies require advanced planning and investment. Reliability NERC defines BPS reliability as a function of adequacy and operating reliability. In this context, NERC defines adequacy as, “the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.” Operating reliability is defined as, “the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances to system stability or unanticipated loss of system components.”qq 214 Reliability operates in different time scales. Long-term reliability is closer to resource adequacy: it is the business of ensuring that there will be enough resources available to serve customers’ load several years qq Both components of reliability are needed. Adequacy, often called “resource adequacy,” is much easier to model and thus forecast for the future, particularly a decade or two out. Most longer-term studies, such as by DOE and its national laboratories, largely look at this one aspect of reliability (with some consideration of operational reliability aspects as well). Operational reliability, in contrast, is very difficult (both in data needed and computational complexity) to completely model and thus forecast in definitive terms many years out. 61 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000365 out plus a reserve margin (typically 15 percent). Short-term reliability ensures that there will be enough capacity to meet demand over the next few hours. Maintaining short-term reliability has grown more complex in light of higher levels of VRE, evolving customer electricity usage patterns, and the wider use of 15-minute load metering and customer time-of-use rates. However, grid operators have kept up with these factors by developing new information technology and analysis capabilities, such as more sophisticated wind and solar forecasting tools. Figure 4.1. illustrates the timescale for different grid events. Events on very short timescales, such as frequency regulation, match second-by-second generation and demand. Medium-term activities and factors include day-ahead and day-of energy markets, security-constrained economic dispatch,rr contingency analysis, asset availability, relay and other equipment operations, and operator action. Longer-term activities and factors include system planning, capacity markets, interconnection rules, reliability standards, and energy market designs. Grid operators must thoroughly consider all these timescales and their associated events in ensuring short-term through long-term reliability. Figure 4.1. System Operation Time Scales215 Planning to maintain system reliability depends on managing (potentially) multiple events in varying time scales. NERC’s CEO Gerry Cauley spoke to the Energy Secretary’s concerns by describing the current reliability issues. As a common thread in each of our Reliability Assessments, the most pressing reliability issues in North America are:  As conventional resources prematurely retire, sufficient amounts of essential reliability services, such as frequency and voltage support, ramping capability, etc., must be replaced based on the configuration and needs of the system. 
  Resource flexibility is needed to supplement and offset the variable characteristics of solar and wind generation. 
  Higher reliance on natural gas exposes electric generation to fuel supply and delivery vulnerabilities, particularly during extreme weather conditions. Maintaining fuel diversity and security provides best assurance for resilience. Premature retirements rr “Security-constrained economic dispatch [of power plants] is an area-wide optimization process designed to meet electricity demand at the lowest cost, given the operational and reliability limitations of the area’s generation fleet and transmission system.” https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/final ED 03 01 07 rev2.pdf. 62 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000366 of fuel secure baseload generating stations reduces resilience to fuel supply disruptions. 
  Because the system was designed with large, central-station generation as the primary source of electricity, significant amounts of new transmission may be needed to support renewable resources located far from load centers.216 To make risk-informed decisions about how to maintain and protect BPS reliability, NERC has often stressed the need to study evolving market, technology, policy, and regulatory factors, as well as to understand how they are affecting “fuel supply, generation and transmission infrastructure planning, operations and investment decisions.”217 Resilience NERC uses the infrastructure resilience definition that the National Infrastructure Advisory Council developed in 2010: “Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.”218 Examples of events that test a system’s resilience include severe natural events (wildfires, hurricanes, floods, droughts, and earthquakes) and coordinated, extensive physical and cyber-attacks and geomagnetic disturbances. Resilience is typically achieved through hardening or recovery. Hardening refers to physically changing infrastructure to make it less susceptible to damage. Hardening improves the durability and stability of energy infrastructure, making it better able to withstand the impacts of hurricanes, weather events or attacks. Recovery, by contrast, refers to the ability of an energy facility to recover quickly from damage to any of its components or to any of the external systems on which it depends – typically through storage and redundancy. Recovery measures do not prevent damage; rather, they enable energy systems to continue operating despite damage, and/or they promote a rapid return to normal operations when damages/outages occur. Advanced planning for contingencies, interagency coordination, and training exercises enable an effective restoration process. BPS reliability is adequate219 today despite the retirement of 11 percent of the generating capacity available in 2002, as significant additions from natural gas, wind, and solar have come online since then. Overall, at the end of 2016, the system had more dispatchable capacity capable of operating at high utilization rates than it did in 2002.220 The composition of the BPS and its requirements, however, are changing, so simple extrapolation of previous reliability trends is not prudent. In this chapter, we review current system reliability and resilience, look at how power plant operations are changing with the evolving generation mix, and evaluate potential reliability and resilience issues. 4.1 Assessing Challenges to Reliability NERC is the primary entity responsible for ensuring BPS reliability,ss and collaborates with FERC to ensure compliance. Over the last several years, NERC has consistently highlighted how the power ss NERC is the designated “electric reliability organization” under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, monitoring reliability for all lower 48 states and, under special agreement, portions of the Canadian and Mexican grids. 63 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000367 sector’s rapid transformation may require new approaches to reliability measurement and planning in order to ensure continued reliability.tt 221 222 223 224 225 NERC believes BPS reliability is adequate as measured by various metrics,226 but is undertaking various initiatives to address potential reliability challenges posed by the changing generation mix. For example, NERC created an Essential Reliability Services Working Group to draw attention to the need to maintain these servicesuu as the resource mix evolves.227 NERC also created the Integration of Variable Generation Task Force and the Distributed Energy Resources Task Force to address the reliability implications of increasing levels of distributed generation.228 NERC’s position on the reliability implications of the evolving resource mix is best summarized in its recent communication with DOE (see text box below). NERC: How the Changing Resource Mix Affects Reliability229 The North American BPS is designed to be a highly reliable, robust, and resilient system. The system is interconnected, and the integrated networks work together to maintain reliability through both wide-area interregional planning and coordinated system operations. The adequacy of the system is maintained by having the right combination and amount of resources and transmission to deal with unexpected facility outages or extreme weather events that increase system demand. Operating reliability is maintained in real time through highly coordinated operator actions across many operating companies. The system is also planned as many as 15 years in advance by performing highly detailed, complex, and data-intensive power system simulations. The resource mix of the BPS is changing in fundamental ways. Variable energy resources, especially wind and solar, are rapidly expanding and capturing the majority share of new capacity additions. Conventional generation (such as coal and nuclear) are retiring and have become economically marginalized. The balancing resource tends to be natural gas, as environmental rules and commodity economics tend to make oil-fired generation uneconomic. Developing hydroelectric resources, a major energy source in some parts of the country (such as the West), is extremely challenging. The confluence of the changing resource mix can fundamentally impact reliability in two major ways: 1. A balancing authority responsible for managing the balance of demand and resources through unit commitment. Forecasting may become capacity deficient and unable to serve firm load. Resources may not be available when needed, particularly those that have not secured onsite fuel. In that instance, manual load shedding may be required to maintain reliability. 2. Large, unanticipated voltage or frequency deviations during a disturbance, which can lead to uncontrolled, cascading instability. With no mass, moving parts, or inertia, increasing amounts of inverter-based resources (such as solar photovoltaic) present new risks to reliability, such as managing faster fault-clearing times, reduced oscillation dampening, and unexpected inverter action. The rapid changes occurring in the generation resource mix and technologies are altering the operational characteristics of the grid and will challenge system planners and operators to maintain reliability. More specifically:  Impact of Premature Retirements: Conventional units, such as coal plants, provide frequency support services as a function of their large spinning generators and governor-control settings, along with reactive support for voltage control. Power system operators use these services to plan tt NERC’s concerns about the reliability implications of the fast-evolving grid transformation underway were so strong that it chose to rename a set of key components of operational reliability from a term understood only by engineers and others directly involved in reliability, the term “ancillary services,” to the plainer English and self-defining, “essential reliability services.” uu ERS include frequency response, voltage support, and ramping. 64 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000368 and operate reliably under a variety of system conditions, generally without the concern of having too few of these services available. Coal-fired and nuclear generation have the added benefits of high availability rates, low forced outages, and secured onsite fuel. Many months of onsite fuel allow these units to operate in a manner independent of supply chain disruptions.  Replacement Resource Capability and Characteristics: As the generation resource mix evolves, the reliability of the electric grid depends on the operating characteristics of the replacement resources. Natural gas-fired units, variable generation, storage, and other resources can provide similar reliability services. However, as a practical matter, costs, market rules, or regulatory requirements (or lack thereof) can affect whether these resources are equipped and available to provide reliability services. To ensure reliability, new generator and load resources must maintain the balance between load and generation, especially during ramping periods. In addition, in some jurisdictions, substantial amounts of generation are now being added “behind the meter” (e.g., roof top solar), and these resources are invisible to system operators. Planning Reserve Margins In terms of the resource adequacy part of reliability, NERC reports that all regions project more than sufficient planning reserve margins. NERC and its regional reliability coordinators conduct ongoing analyses to assess resource adequacy as system conditions change over time. Figure 4.2. shows that planning reserve marginsvv exceed their respective regional targets despite the loss of traditional baseload capacity since 2002.230 The orange bars in the figure indicate regional or NERC-determined target reserve margins for resource adequacy, which in most cases are administratively set at 15 percent above the predicted peak load. The calculation of resources in most regions includes current VIEUowned generation and merchant plant capacity (modified by an expected forced outage rateww and reduced by expected retirements), planned capacity additions (with interconnection agreements and customer contracts), renewable generation (derated to expected capacity at peak load hour),xx contracted imports, energy efficiency, DR, and distributed generation (derated to expected capacity at peak hour). vv Forecasts of reserve margins may decline in the out-years of a projection because new resources such as power plants, demand response, and energy efficiency are not firm at the time the forecast is made. Because of the uncertainty associated with more distant years, NERC planning reserve margin determinations do not look out past 10 years. ww ISO-New England reports that the expected forced outage rate for generators in their regions have increased because power plants in the region are operating under more stressed conditions. Older power plants in each region are less reliable and go out of service more often as they age. https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/10/f18/08a-REthier.pdf xx Each ISO and RTO calculates the on-peak contribution of renewable resources as a function of historic resource performance. Land-based wind plants are assumed to deliver four to 14 percent of nameplate capacity during peak summer afternoon periods, and solar resources are assumed to deliver between 10 percent and 80 percent of nameplate capacity. Note, however, that as the level of PV penetration increases, the cumulative amount of PV generation on summer afternoons is moving net load peak hour later. 65 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000369 Figure 4.2. Five-Year Average Reserve Margins across Different Regions (2018–2022)231 All regions have reserve margins above resource adequacy targets. The types of resources available within a region affect the reserve margin calculation. Each type of resource has a different availability rate (based on past performance) that reflects the likelihood that it can be relied upon to be available at system peak. For instance, 1,000 MW of coal units with an on-peak availability rate of 90 percent would have a greater impact on the reserve margin than 1,000 MW of wind with an on-peak availability rate of 10 percent; in other words, the actual nameplate capacity totals underlying these reserve margin calculations are significantly higher than the reserve margins suggest. NERC and regional planning authorities are working to understand how common dependencies or failure modes, such as gas pipeline outages or a weather front affecting wind and solar performance across a wide area, could affect reserve margins. NERC and others are also studying how the on-peak hourly capacity factor (similar in concept to capacity valueyy) of VRE changes as a function of VRE penetration, as shown for solar in Figure 4.3. yy NERC defines capacity value as “the contribution of a power plant to the generation adequacy of the power system. It gives the amount of additional load that can be served in the system at the same reliability level due to the addition of the unit.” http://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/ivgtf/omalley-ieee-confidential.pdf 66 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000370 Figure 4.3. Historical Solar On-Peak Capacity Factors in ERCOT232 As increased solar penetration in ERCOT shifts the net peak load further into the evening, its net on-peak capacity factor diminishes. As the Department has previously noted, however, having an adequate planning reserve margin is necessary but not sufficient to ensure resource adequacy (see text box below): “Rules” to Enable Reliable Operation233 In December 2016, DOE articulated four consolidated “rules” that must be maintained to enable reliable operation. These include the following: 1. Power generation and transmission capacity must be sufficient to meet peak demand for electricity. The power grid must have sufficient capacity available to meet the demand for electricity. Because there are uncertainties in forecasting demand and the potential for generation and transmission outages, the total amount of capacity must exceed the expected level of demand by a given fraction, termed the reserve margin, often about 15 percent. 2. Power systems must have adequate flexibility to address variability and uncertainty in demand (load) and generation resources. The level of demand changes throughout the day and from season to season. This, and the addition of variable generation such as wind and solar, places a premium on having flexible generation capacity that can change its level of output to account for changes in demand and the amount of generation from variable resources (such as when the wind stops blowing or the sun goes down). 3. Power systems must be able to maintain steady frequency. 67 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000371 The power system uses what is called alternating current (AC), where the electricity reverses direction 60 times per second (60 hertz (Hz)). If this frequency of oscillation were to deviate significantly from 60 Hz, it could damage machines and electronics. Any mismatch between the supply and demand of electricity can cause this sort of deviation, and several mechanisms operating at different timescales are used to maintain a steady frequency. 4. Power systems must be able to maintain voltage within an acceptable range. In addition to maintaining a steady frequency, the electric grid must also deliver electricity at a given voltage. This voltage varies throughout the power grid, with transformers used to change voltages. Maintaining the correct voltage requires the management of “reactive power,” which is a property of AC electricity that allows power to flow. If the levels of reactive power are too high or too low, the voltage level can change, potentially even collapsing catastrophically. NERC notes that traditional calculations of resource adequacy based on capacity (such as the planning reserve margin) will need to change: Until recently, new generators have generally added significant energy capability along with the capacity they provide. With the advent of newer energy limited technologies replacing older ones (e.g., with emerging larger penetrations of variable generation), an assumption of energy adequacy cannot be made simply on the basis of capacity adequacy. Future-looking detailed probabilistic assessments of resource adequacy (energy, capacity and operability), transmission adequacy and congestion are increasingly becoming an essential requirement, consistent with the growing penetration of variable generation, and in the changing nonrenewable supply mix environment.234 4.1.1 Essential Reliability Services Reliable operation of the BPS requires a suite of Essential Reliability Services (ERS). One key ERS is the control of system frequency, a parameter which NERC explains as follows: Each Interconnection is actually a large machine, as every generator within the island is pulling in tandem with the others to supply electricity to all customers. This occurs as the rotation of electric generating units, nearly all in (steady-state) synchronism. The “speed” (of rotation) of the Interconnection is frequency, measured in cycles per second or Hertz (Hz). If the total Interconnection generation exceeds customer demand, frequency increases beyond the target value, typically 60 Hz, until energy balance is achieved. Conversely, if there is a temporary generation deficiency, frequency declines until balance is again restored at a point below the scheduled frequency.235 NERC further expands on the two main types of frequency control, Primary and Secondary:  Primary frequency control (immediate) comes from automatic generator governor response, load response, and other devices based on local (device-level) frequency-sensing control systems. In general, frequency response refers to the initial actions provided by the autonomous devices within an interconnection to arrest and stabilize frequency deviations, typically from the unexpected sudden loss of a generator or load. Primary frequency control is quick and automatic; it is not driven by any centralized control system, and it begins seconds after a system frequency event. Response to a frequency event can be provided by various sources, including generation resources, loads, and storage devices.  Secondary frequency control (seconds to minutes) and tertiary frequency control (ten minutes and longer) -- Secondary and tertiary control are the centralized, coordinated control of generation, demand response, and storage resources, and these controls are performed 68 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000372 by the system operator’s energy management system over minutes to hours to balance generation and load.236 In addition to frequency control, NERC provides definitions for two other ERS, ramping and voltage support: Ramping – Ramping is related to frequency, but more in an “operations as usual” sense rather than after an event. Changes in the amount of non-dispatchable resources, system constraints, load behaviors, and the generation mix can impact the ramp rates needed to keep the system in balance. Voltage – Voltage must be controlled to protect the system and move power where it is needed. This control tends to be more local in nature, such as at individual transmission substations, in sub-areas of lower-voltage transmission nodes and the distribution system. Ensuring sufficient voltage control and “stiffness” of the system is important both for normal operations and for events impacting normal operations (i.e., disturbances).237 If grid voltage levels fall too low, customers connected to distribution networks may see their devices “brown out” and stop working. An area that has inadequate voltage support is vulnerable to voltage collapse, so the system must be operated such that a single contingency would not result in voltage collapse or cascading outages. Generators provide voltage support by producing both real and reactive power. As FERC explains in its 2016 Reliability Primer: Power transferred along transmission lines consists of both “real” power and “reactive” power. The real power is the energy that is capable of performing work in electrical devices including industrial equipment, refrigerators, or toasters. Reactive power is needed to maintain the voltage as well as electric and magnetic fields in AC equipment, which includes air conditioners, motors, transmission lines, and other devices. Together, real power and reactive power comprise apparent power, which is measured in units of Volt-Amperes or kilo Volt-Amperes - kVA. Reactive power cannot be transmitted as far as real power and instead must be replenished locally. Moreover, a deficit in reactive power causes voltage to drop. This is seen when the lights dim as an electric motor starts. While reactive power consumed by facilities or devices tends to cause the voltage to drop, it can also be produced or injected into the system to increase voltage in what is often referred to as “voltage support.” This is accomplished in a variety of ways, including by adjusting the reactive power output of generators or by activating capacitor banks or other power electronic equipment. If reactive power is not supplied promptly and in sufficient quantity, voltages decline, and in extreme cases a “voltage collapse” may result.238 FERC Order No. 827, issued in June 2016, revised FERC’s pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement and pro forma Small Generator Interconnection Agreement to eliminate the previous exemption for wind generators from reactive power requirements, thereby requiring all newly interconnecting, non-synchronous generators—including new wind generators—to provide reactive power as a condition of interconnection to the transmission system. FERC wrote: We therefore conclude that improvements in technology, and the corresponding declining costs for newly interconnecting wind generators to provide reactive power, make it unjust, unreasonable and unduly discriminatory and preferential to exempt such non-synchronous generators from the reactive power requirement when other types of generators are not exempt. Further, requiring all newly interconnecting non-synchronous generators to design their Generating Facilities to maintain the required power factor range ensures they are subject to comparable requirements as other generators.239 69 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000373 FERC’s primary frequency response Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to require new large and small generators to install, maintain and operate equipment capable of providing primary frequency response as a condition of interconnection.240 NERC explains the various reserve products from which grid operators obtain these ERS:  Frequency-Responsive Reserve: On-line generation with headroom that has been tested and verified to be capable of providing droop […] In most cases, only portions of a, b and c in [Figure 4.4] qualify as Frequency Responsive Reserve.  Nonspinning Reserve: Operating Reserve capable of serving demand or Interruptible Demand that can be removed from the system, within 10 minutes. (This is c in [Figure 4.4])  Operating Reserve: That capability above firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, equipment forced and scheduled outages, and local area protection. (This is a+b+c+d+e in [Figure 4.4]).  Regulating Reserve: An amount of spinning reserve responsive to Automatic Generation Control, which is sufficient to provide normal regulating margin. (This is “a” in [Figure 4.4])  Replacement Reserve: (This is d+e in [Figure 4.4]). NOTE: Each NERC Region sets times for reserve restoration, typically in the 30–90 minute range. The default contingency reserve restoration period is 90 minutes after the disturbance recovery period.  Spinning Reserve: Unloaded, synchronized, resource, deployable in 10 minutes. (This is b in [Figure 4.4]). 241 Figure 4.4. NERC Definitions of Reserves Used to Provide ERS 242 Figure 4.5 shows how system frequency falls after a major generation loss. The decline in frequency is determined by the size of the generation loss event and the availability of frequency control reserves to respond. The frequency rebound that follows is due to automated primary frequency control measures 70 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000374 (governor response from generators and frequency-responsive DR from customer loads controlled by relays). Secondary frequency control may derive from many sources, including from local plant controls, from a centralized control system, or from instructions issued by balancing authorities. Tertiary frequency control refers to operator-initiated, off-line resources. If these frequency management measures don’t work, system frequency can keep dropping, resulting in under-frequency load shedding procedures. Figure 4.5. System Frequency after a Grid Event (Top) and How Frequency Control Mechanisms Work to Restore Frequency (Bottom)243 System operators have a number of levels of frequency control to manage a significant grid event. Not all generators can provide primary frequency control, as explained by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL): Some generators, including all current nuclear generators, most wind turbines in North America, as well as many new natural gas turbines do not provide governor response. Other generators, which may be capable of providing governor response, are sometimes operated in ways that prevent them from providing that response. For example, a generator operated 71 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000375 at its maximum capability cannot provide upward primary frequency control because it has no head room. Finally, some generators have additional controls […] that override the sustained delivery of governor response.244 NERC recognized several years ago that the changes affecting the grid—particularly retirement of traditional baseload capacity, increased generation from VRE, and greater use of DR and distributed generation—could create BPS reliability problems without careful study and management. In 2014, a task force under NERC’s direction identified ERS as the elemental reliability building blocks from supply and demand resources that are necessary to maintain grid reliability. NERC stated that: To meet the needs of the future Bulk Power System, maintaining sufficient ERS will include a mix of market approaches, technology enhancements, and reliability rules or other regulatory rule changes. While the solution sets will likely be different in various regions, it may be necessary for regulators to make appropriate adjustments to market rules and reliability standards that will ensure reliable operation of the BPS.245 Although NERC has requirements for balancing areas,zz it does not require that individual generators provide primary frequency response, which involves the automatic, autonomous, and rapid action of turbine governors or equivalent controls. Further, there is no mandatory compensation for primary frequency response, though FERC Order No. 755 provides for compensation for secondary frequency response.246 Because provision of primary frequency response may require a generator to operate at less than its full output (so it can increase power production if needed to manage frequency), standing prepared to provide frequency response services means that a generator may forgo some potential revenues. The reliability attributes discussed above are recognized as valuable, but regional procurement and compensation for these services varies across the centrally-organized markets. In vertically integrated regions that use bilaterally organized markets, it is generally the incumbent utility’s obligation to provide ERS; some interconnection agreements specify other generators’ reliability service obligations if any. 4.1.2 Inertia and Inertial Response PJM explains how conventional generators provide inertia: Due to electro-mechanical coupling, a generator's rotating mass provides kinetic energy to the grid (or absorbs it from the grid) in case of a frequency deviation to arrest frequency change and stabilize the electric system. The contribution of inertia is an inherent and crucial feature of rotating synchronous generators.247 
 Every operating conventional generator has mass that spins, including rotors, turbines and other masses connected to the shaft of the generator or motor. The rotating mass in each generator collectively provides inertia to help keep grid frequency at a relatively stable level, for example slowing the rate of frequency drop after a major grid event and giving other automatic controls time to act to restore frequency. Inertia also works to slow the spike in frequency that occurs after the loss of a large amount of load (for instance, if part of a city “blacks out” suddenly from a transmission or distribution failure). zz NERC Reliability Standard BAL-003-1.1 establishes requirements for balancing authorities, but does not include requirements for individual generator owners or operators. However, some ISOs/RTOs, including CAISO, ISO-NE, and PJM, have implemented operating requirements for individual generating resources within their regions. Regional Reliability Standard BAL-001-TRE-01 (Primary Frequency Response in the ERCOT Region) establishes requirements for the balancing authority, generator owners, and operators in ERCOT. 72 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000376 Recently, manufacturers have designed electronic controls for newer model wind turbines that can provide automatic generation control, primary frequency response and synthetic inertia. General Electric (GE) notes: A key difference between wind inertia and fast frequency response from other resources (batteries, PV, flywheels) is that wind turbines do not need to be pre-curtailed in order to provide synthetic inertial response. Wind inertia extracts some of the kinetic energy from the spinning rotor and uses it to provide increased power output within seconds.248 There has not yet been much analysis of how much primary frequency response will be needed as the composition of the grid changes, nor how best to complement primary frequency response from traditional sources, such as governors, with electronics-based synthetic inertia or non-governor-based forms of primary frequency response, such as storage or DR. These are substantive engineering questions that merit further study, particularly in a future with increasing VRE levels and decreasing rotating mass-based inertia.249 4.1.3 Energy Storage Energy storage will be critical in the future if higher levels of VRE are deployed on the grid and require additional balancing of energy supply and demand in real time. A few storage mechanisms such as pumped hydroelectric storage and thermal energy storage have been used for years to shift energy demand from peak to off-peak periods. A grid with higher levels of VRE and more dynamic customer loads will need more of the services that energy storage can provide by acting on both the supply and demand side, including energy, capacity, energy management, backup power, load leveling, and ERS, over periods from seconds to hours or days. However, the need for storage may not be as great for a grid more reliant on traditional baseload generation.250 DOE has been investing in energy storage technology development for two decades, and major private investment is now active in commercializing and the beginnings of early deployment of grid-level storage, including within microgrids.aaa The DOE Grid Energy Storage program notes that as energy storage technologies mature and become commercially viable, they will need to achieve the following:  Cost competitive energy storage technology—Achievement of this goal requires attention to factors such as life-cycle cost and performance (round-trip efficiency, energy density, cycle life, capacity fade, etc.) for energy storage technology as deployed. It is expected that early deployments will be in high value applications, but long term success requires further cost reductions and the ability to monetize revenues for all grid services that storage provides.  Validated reliability and safety— Validation of the safety, reliability, and performance of energy storage is essential for user confidence.  Equitable regulatory environment— Value propositions for supply-side grid storage depend on reducing institutional and regulatory hurdles to levels comparable with those of other grid resources.bbb 251 aaa Storage is an important component of most micro-grid designs reliant on VRE and is expected to play an essential role in helping customers and the BPS recover from extreme weather events (and should improve resilience and recovery following severe, high-impact events). bbb A recent FERC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks to identify and reduce such barriers for increased participation by energy storage in centrally-organized wholesale markets. 73 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000377  Industry acceptance—industry adoption requires manufacturers to have confidence that storage will deploy as expected, and deliver as predicted and promised.252 Table 4-1 details DOE analysis of how energy storage options can be used to provide grid-level services. Table 4-1. How Various Energy Storage Options Can Deliver Grid-Level Applications253 State policies are emerging to encourage further use of energy storage technologies for grid support and energy security. California has directed its utilities to acquire 500 MW of energy storage by 2020; Massachusetts has ordered its utilities to procure 200 MWh of energy storage by the end of 2019; New York’s legislators have proposed creation of an Energy Storage Deployment Program, with a 2030 procurement target; Maryland has adopted at 30 percent investment tax credit for storage facilities; and Nevada’s legislature has passed a storage incentivize. These programs are generally technology-neutral and will support the use of storage at the grid-level or behind the meter (on the customer’s premises).254 255 4.1.4 Transmission The transmission system is a vast engineered network that transmits electricity from generators to local substations for distribution to end-use consumers. As DOE’s Annual U.S. Transmission Data Review (2016) states, “Transmission planning activities are undertaken to enable future reliable and efficient utilization of transmission facilities by addressing, among other things, reliability concerns, constraints, and congestion.”256 Transmission reliability is maintained by enforcing operating procedures that ensure efficient system utilization, including preventing users from transmitting more power over a line than its 74 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000378 rated power capacity. Transmission congestion results from the inability to dispatch the lowest-cost generation resources due to transmission constraints. Transmission investments provide an array of benefits that include providing reliable electricity service to customers, relieving congestion, facilitating robust wholesale market competition, enabling a diverse and changing energy portfolio, and mitigating damage and limiting customer outages (resilience) during adverse conditions. Well-planned transmission investments also reduce total costs. SPP analyzed the costs and benefits of transmission projects from 2012–2014 and found that the planned $3.4 billion investment in transmission was expected to reduce customer cost by $12 billion.ccc This yielded an estimated benefit of $3.50 for every dollar invested in the region.257 A robust transmission system is needed to provide the flexibility that will enable the modern electric system to operate. Although much transmission has been built to enhance reliability and meet customer needs, continued investment and development will be needed to provide that flexibility. The challenge for building transmission continues to revolve around the three traditional steps involved, each of which can be time-consuming, involved, and complex: (1) demonstrating a need for the transmission project, also known as transmission planning, (2) determining who pays for the transmission project, also called cost allocation, and (3) state and Federal agency siting and permitting. FERC has taken steps to help with the first two, with reforms such as Order No. 1000, which remains a work in progress.258 259 260 261 262 Transmission planning entities, as well as regional state-based groups, are also contributing to improving these three necessary process steps. The current and past administrations, aided by various new Federal laws, have issued various Executive Orders and other initiatives to improve the processes involved in siting and permitting of transmission when Federal lands or waters are involved. All three transmission building steps can be time-intensive and complex; in particular, siting and permitting for large networks or long multi-state lines is challenging. 263 264 265 The second necessary step of cost-allocation can be time-consuming as well. For example, large overlay networks now being built in MISO (“Multi-Value Projects”)266 and SPP (“Highway/Byway Plan”)267 required several years of sensitive negotiations among states brokered by the respective Organization of MISO States and SPP Regional State Committee to determine the cost allocation of each large transmission buildout.268 269 ccc Nearly $12 billion in net present value benefits for consumers over the next 40 years, or around $800 for each person currently served by SPP, or $2,400 per each metered customer. 75 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000379 Figure 4.6. EEI Historical and Project Transmission Investment (Nominal Dollars) 270 Prudent and well planned transmission can reduce total system costs by reducing localized congestion that sometimes leads to high wholesale electricity prices at transmission-constrained nodes. Transmission investments in future years could increase as utilities and system operators seek to mitigate reliability impacts of plant closures and bring new generation to load centers. 4.1.5 System Requirements to Meet Higher Levels of VRE on the Grid Levels of wind and solar penetration—including distributed and utility-scale installations—have grown in recent years from 0.3 percent of total annual generation nationwide in 2002 to 6.9 percent in 2016.ddd 271 Various integration studies (see Appendix B:) have explored grid operations at higher levels of VRE penetration (ranging from 10 percent to 60 percent) and examined the technical challenges for grid operators.eee These challenges can generally be met at lower levels through a number of changes to grid operation, planning, and transmission expansion practices, and with other sources of grid flexibility. Solutions vary by region, depending on existing transmission constraints, generators, sources of flexibility, and institutions and markets – each of which comes with associated implementation costs and other consequences to address. Costs can change over time as technologies and markets evolve, or ddd AEO 2017 reference case indicates that this could grow to 17% by 2030. eee The studies (see Appendix B) that look into the distant future are exploratory only and represent initial investigations into how to implement high levels of VRE. They do not look into all the operational aspects of reliability due to the needed complex and computationally challenging modeling. Typical assumptions (sometimes implicit) include successful siting of (at times long multistate) transmission lines and new generation, sufficient new and existing economically viable conventional generation and other resources to support the VRE, institutional and market changes, and relevant grid modernization-type spending at both the transmission and distribution level. One study, for the ease of modeling, even assumes the nation’s 66 balancing authorities, including their governing boards and member states, would agree to one national joint dispatch). Some of these assumptions are non-trivial. These studies recognize that given enough time and money, power system engineers can make any resource and configuration reliable, as long as the laws of physics are not violated; whether the changes needed are indeed affordable, doable, and desirable may be a different question. Also, affordability was typically not in the scope of these studies. 76 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000380 as other enabling technologies such as storage mature. Grid operators and planners continually evaluate and determine how to maintain reliability as the resource mix changes and evolves. Figure 4.7. Location of the Existing Wind Fleet272 . Capacity(MW) 500 o' 1.000 1500 0 2.000 0' Most of the contiguous United States? wind power plants are installed in the center of the Nation, which has the best wind resources. Total penetration of VRE is increasing rapidly in several regions, and wind represents the majority of current installed VRE. Wind turbines have contributed more than one-third of the nearly 200,000 MW of total utility-scale generating capacity added since 2007, reflecting a combination of improved wind turbine technology and lower costs, increased access to transmission capacity, state-level RPS, and Federal tax credits and grants. Distribution of wind capacity across the contiguous United States is shown in Figure 4.7. Percentage wind generation by state is shown in Figure 4.8. In particularly windy hours, wind output in regions with signi?cant wind capacity can be very high. On May 16, 2017, the CAISO hit a new daily renewables record when the combination of wind, solar, hydro, and other renewables served nearly 42 percent of electricity demand; during peak renewables production (the 2:00 pm. hour), renewables supplied nearly 72 percent of electricity.273 In Texas, at the end of 2016, ERCOT had more than 17,600 MW of installed wind capacity and 566 MW of utility-scale solar capacity.274 ERCOT reached 50 percent wind penetration in the early morning on March 23, 2017, when load was below 29,000 at 5:00 pm. that afternoon, when peak load hit 45,391 MW, wind contributed about 30 percent to the energy needed to meet that peak.275 SPP recently set a new wind-penetration record of 52.1 percent on February 12, 2017, the highest across North American 276 277 333 On the other hand, there are times when wind generation can be low. For example, ERCOT reports that for 2016, wind generation was below 2,500 MW (approximately 15% of total operating wind capacity as of November 2016) for 17 percent of the year?s hours. 77 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000381 Figure 4.8 Wind Energy Share of Electric Generation by State, 2016278 2 9. 6% OK US. Total: 5.5% FL PR HI 6.(10% I 10% to <15% I 15% I0 (20% I 20% and higher One of the greatest barriers to widespread VRE adoption is the challenge of managing its variability and corresponding impacts on net load. Table 4-2 summarizes the characteristics of VRE, the challenges to integration, and how to mitigate those challenges. Table 4-2. Characteristics of VRE, Grid Integration Challenges, and Mitigation Options279 Wind Solar Potential Grid Integration Mitigation Options Characteristics Challenges Variability Generator output can In many power systems, suf?cient ?exibility exists to vary as underlying integrate additional variability, but this ?exibility may resource ?uctuates. not be fully accessible without changes to power system operations or other institutional factors increased ramping of generation and improved coordination across markets and balancing areas) (Lew et al. 2013). Uncertainty Generation cannot be Integration of advanced renewable supply forecasting predicted with perfect into dispatch and market operations has reduced accuracy (day-ahead, day uncertainties, improved scheduling of other resources of). to reduce reserves and fuel consumption, and enabled VRE to participate as dispatchable resources 78 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000382 Location speci?city Non- generation Low capacity factor Generation is more economical where highest-quality resources are available. Generators provide voltage support and frequency control in a different manner than traditional resources. Availability of the underlying energy resource limits the run- time of the plant. (IEA 2014; Lew et al. 2011). Examples: Xcel Energy, U.S. (Porter et al. 2012). Competitive Renewable Energy Zones in Texas are an example of an approach to quickly develop generation and transmission in coordination (18.5 GW and 3,600 miles were completed nine years after Competitive Renewable Energy Zones legislation was signed) to access wind resources in remote parts of the state. Grid code requirements are evolving in response to technological advances and anticipation of high VRE penetration levels. For example, ERCOT, which is a small interconnection and more vulnerable to frequency excursions, now requires wind generators to provide inertial response, which helps keep a system stable in the initial moments after a disturbance (Bird, Cochran, and Wang 2014). Capacity payments or markets, potentially tied to performance, could ensure suf?cient cost recovery. The potential for stranded assets is not unique to VRE and can occur whenever generation with lower marginal costs is added to the system. For example, low natural gas prices have reduced the market competitiveness of nuclear plants, contributing to recent retirements (Wernau and Richards 2014). Utility-scale wind and solar plants are more location-limited than some other generation types, so they may require transmission construction to be able to interconnect with the grid and secure deliverability to customer load centers. LBNL researchers state that power systems with large or growing amounts of VRE: [W]i l bene?t if the rest of the electricity system is ?exible able to respond to shifts in demand and VRE availability. VRE impacts and system costs will be driven lower as power systems transform to manage the unique characteristics that VRE resources introduce. Power systems that resist change as VRE penetrations increase will experience greater challenges in maintaining reliability and managing costs.280 Figure 4.9 shows a suite of options for integrating VRE effectively, spanning physical, operational, markets, load, and other means. However, proponents of dispatchable renewables (biomass, hydro, and geothermal) argue that other approaches should also be considered. Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability 79 U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000383 Figure 4.9. Ways To Integrate VRE, Arrayed by Type of Intervention and Cost (2014)281 Forecasting of VRE is a critical challenge to system operators to manage high-risk weather days. Specific issues include wind icing forecasts and weather fronts that result in low-level jet winds and other wind cut-out scenarios. Since long-term VRE forecasting is not practicable today, system operators will have to rethink outage scheduling if a region has high dependency on wind as a resource.282 FERC, NERC, and the RTO/ISOs have undertaken several initiatives to modify requirements for interconnecting VRE to improve grid reliability. These initiatives include early work to develop lowvoltage ride-through requirements for interconnecting wind and solar generation (which are included as a requirement for wind plant interconnection under the FERC open access transmission tariff), as well as California updating its solar photovoltaic (PV) distribution interconnection requirements to include smart inverters. Other nations have grid codes that require the provision of specific ERS for new VRE resources as a condition of interconnection. And FERC and several RTOs and ISOs have sought to remove barriers to participation in organized markets by DR resources that can deliver some ERS and provide benefits to consumers. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) offers a good example of managing the challenges of integrating VRE effectively using better operational and business practices. Wind generation capacity in BPA’s balancing authority area grew from 250 MW to 4,782 MW within a 10-year span, driven by state RPS requirements and Federal tax credits. Much of the wind generation is located along the Columbia River Gorge, connecting to the high-voltage transmission system serving the Federal Columbia River hydroelectric plants, so the wind fleet had little diversity and could swing output as much as 1,000 MW within an hour. BPA began charging for using hydropower to balance the wind generation (also called a balancing capacity rate and since adopted by FERC for other regions), and it set a penalty rate to encourage accurate wind production scheduling. Wind forecasting and scheduling practices and tools have since improved significantly.283 80 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000384 Because wind generation receives the PTC and has PPAs that encourage production regardless of system demand, it can be economical for wind to generate even when market prices are negative. As a result, generators that are “must-run” (either for statutory or reliability reasons) must compete with resources that will generate when prices are negative. Anticipating the growing challenges posed by the changing resource mix in the region, BPA worked with stakeholders to develop the Oversupply Management Protocol to displace generation in BPA’s balancing authority area and replace it with Federal hydroelectric generation that must run for endangered fish operations. Displaced generators are compensated for any costs that they incur, and BPA recovers these costs through rates to its wholesale customers.284 However, this over-supply situation combined with sustained low natural gas prices has continued to erode the price of wholesale power in the western wholesale market. Changes in the wholesale market may be necessary to better balance state priorities, maintain grid reliabilities, and appropriately compensate baseload and other flexible resources, such as hydropower, for the ERS they provide.285 The process of BPS consolidation and market cooperation among producers across a larger electric market and operational region has been shown to smooth out VRE output variability. MISO found that [T]here are significant benefits from the geographic diversity of wind generating facilities and the size of the MISO operating footprint. The large number of individual turbines and plants, spread across a large geographic area with dimensions in the hundreds of miles, results in statistical smoothing of production changes driven by local meteorological effects. Large changes in aggregate production are driven by large-scale meteorological phenomena such as weather fronts, and occur over longer timescales from many tens of minutes to several hours.286 4.1.6 Impact of VRE on Net Load More than 60 percent of all utility-scale electric generating capacity that came online in 2016 was from wind and solar technologies.287 In March 2017, wind and solar accounted for 10 percent of total U.S. electricity generation, up from 7 percent for the whole of 2016.288 The increase in VRE has altered grid operation in some regions and the way dispatchable generation and DR are used to protect the grid and meet loads. The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), a Federal power marketing agency, operates 8,000 MW of hydroelectric generation and three balancing areas in 15 states across the West. WAPA sums up the operational changes and challenges for grid managers facing VRE, variable loads, and a variety of generation types with differing capabilities and constraints: Generation operators, including VERs [Variable Energy Resources], must coordinate with their host Balancing Authority (BA) to ensure that their output continuously matches load. Generation is adjusted throughout the day to meet scheduled output and is made available to regulate moment variations intra-hour. For VERs when the wind drops off or clouds pass over a solar array, less energy may be produced than scheduled (over-scheduled/underproduced), and additional resources must be brought on-line to make up the difference. There is a cost associated to these added generation resources. Similarly, if VERs are producing more than what was scheduled, or if electrical demand is less than anticipated, other resources must be backed down to ensure resources and load are balanced. Not all generation is capable of responding. Traditional generation, like coal, is not capable of reacting quickly to changing needs and takes hours or days to reach full operating potential. Gas turbines can react fairly quickly, but only if the plants are not already producing at full rated generating capacity. Hydro generation, while being an ideal resource to help with VER 81 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000385 integration, is generally scheduled to meet reservoir requirements or provide for downstream water demands, including fish, wildlife, and other environmental mitigation requirements.289 To illustrate how VRE can increase the need for flexibility, Figure 4.10 demonstrates how VRE impacts system operations. The figure introduces the concept of “net load”—electricity demand minus VRE generation—which represents the demand that must be supplied by the conventional generation fleet if all VRE is to be utilized. The dark orange line in the graph represents total demand and shows the daily variability of demand on an hourly basis. The light blue area shows wind energy, and the yellow area shows solar energy. The dark blue line represents the demand (less VRE) that must be supplied by the remaining generators, assuming no curtailment of wind energy. The graph shows that often the output level of the remaining generators must change more quickly and be turned up or down inversely with VRE production. Figure 4.10. CAISO Load, Net Load, and Wind and Solar Output on Example Weekdays during 2014290 CAISO data show the effect of VRE on net load (total customer load minus wind and solar output) during representative days in the spring, summer, and fall. As the amount of VRE generation increases, daily net load decreases, and the impacts on net load become more acute in shoulder months. In regions with high penetration of VRE, sharper fluctuations in net load require increased flexibility (ramping up and down) from conventional sources. While the resulting ‘duck curve’ of daily net load has so far been limited to regions such as California and the Southwest where solar generation is highest, other regions such as the Carolinas are beginning to see similar net load patterns.291 82 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000386 What the Duck Curve Tells Us About Mariam a Green Grid292 Figure 4.11. The CAISO Duck Curve Typical Spring Day 28,000 ?6,000 74.000 22.000 20.000 Actual 3-hour rarrp [8.000 10 892- MW on dFebruary 1, 2016/ romp need ~13,000 MW in three hours Megawatts 10,000 ?.000 l?.000 10.000 l2cm Jan The electric grid and the requirements to manage it are The ISO created future scenarios of net load curves to illustrate these changing conditions. Net load is the difference between forecasted load and expected electricity production from variable generation resources. In certain times of the year, these curves produce a ?belly' appearance in the mid-afternoon that quickly ramps up to produce an ?arch? similar to the neck of a duck hence the industry moniker of ?The Duck Chart.? conditions emerge that will require speci?c operational capabilities: Short-steep ramps when the ISO must bring on or shut down generation resources to meet an increasing or decreasing electricity demand quickly, over a short period of time; Oversupply risk when more electricity is supplied than is needed to satisfy real-time electricity requirements; and Decreased frequency response when less resources are operating and available to automatically adjust electricity production to maintain grid reliability.? To ensure reliability under changing grid conditions, the ISO needs resources with ramping ?exibility and the ability to start and stop multiple times per day Addressing concerns about frequency response capabilities in times of low load and high renewable generation may require operating renewable generators such that they can increase power with automated frequency response capability. At some level of penetration of distributed PV, the collective amount of PV will shift the time of peak load net of solar generation away from its previous point to later in the evening when insolation (and therefore PV production) is lower, as shown by NERC in Figure 4.12. 83 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000387 Figure 4.12. Demand and Net Demand Shapes at Different Distributed Energy Resource Penetration Levels293 To date, RTOs and ISOs are working hard to integrate growing levels of VRE through extensive study, deliberate planning, and careful operations and adjustments. The Role of Technical Standards and Grid Codes for Effective VRE Integration Several types of standards apply to VRE and other generation. Interoperability standards define basic technical and engineering performance requirements, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 1547, which defines uniform requirements for the performance, operation, testing, safety, and maintenance of interconnection between distributed generation resources and the grid. Regulatory requirements such as FERC’s pro forma open access transmission tariff (including interconnection requirements) dictate further reliability and performance terms for generators. As the level of installed wind and solar generation has grown, early technical requirements and standards for wind and solar have required updates to ensure performance under disturbance conditions. The examples described below illustrate the need to evolve standards as the penetration of nonsynchronous generation increases.  In August 2016, the Blue Cut wildfire crossed a major transmission corridor in Southern California, resulting in 15 line faults. One of these faults caused the near-instantaneous loss of 84 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000388 1,200 MW of utility-scale PV in Southern California. Approximately 700 MW of this loss occurred when PV inverters tripped due to a “perceived, though incorrect, low system frequency condition.”294 Another 450 MW of this loss occurred when system voltage fell below the lowvoltage ride-through setting of the inverters—resulting in “momentary cessation.”295 The subsequent NERC disturbance report determined that 11 similar inverter events occurred between August 16, 2017 and February 6, 2017, and NERC made several recommendations with respect to inverter settings and standards that would prevent or mitigate these events.296  Australia’s Renewable Energy Target has achieved significant VRE use; 35 percent of South Australia’s generating capacity is wind-powered. On September 28, 2016, severe weather resulted in multiple faults on the South Australian transmission system. A number of faults in quick succession caused 456 MW of wind generation to trip off-line within approximately seven seconds as a result of a protection feature that disconnects or reduces wind turbine output when the number of low-voltage ride-through events in a specific time period exceeds a predefined limit.297 This loss of generation increased imports from the AC interconnector until protective relays activated, islanding South Australia. Unable to rapidly shed load to match the reduced supply, the islanded region experienced a blackout. The Australian Energy Market Operator’s report on the incident noted the role of changes in the fuel mix: a low amount of synchronous generation dispatched—and hence low inertia—at the time of the event resulted in a faster frequency change than had previously been experienced during separation events.298 The report produced a list of 19 recommendations, including changes to operating procedures, regulations, and performance standards.  The German Energiewende initiative encouraged high levels of wind and distribution-level solar installations, leading to over-generation and the need for VRE’ curtailment in some hours. The grid technical code in place at the time required PV inverters to immediately disconnect from the grid if system frequency increased from nominal 50 Hz to 50.2 Hz. However, Germany discovered that the combination of this technical code and the growing amount of distributionlevel PV capacity heightened the risk of some excess PV generation causing all PV capacity to disconnect simultaneously and create severe under-frequency conditions, potentially causing rolling blackouts and grid collapse.299 In response, Germany modified its standards to require inverter retrofits with different low-frequency performance requirements.300 4.1.7 Mapping Reliability Attributes to Generation Resources To assess its changing resource mix, PJM developed a matrix of reliability attributes needed to maintain reliable grid operation under its operating procedures (see Figure 4.13). Ultimately, a diverse generation portfolio is necessary to provide the reliability attributes discussed in this section. 85 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000389 Figure 4.13. Mapping Reliability Attributes Against Resources iii 301 Conventional generation sources—particularly hydroelectricity, combustion turbines (natural gas and oil), and steam turbines (oil, coal, and natural gas)—performed very well against most of PJM’s reliability requirements. Nuclear units are not optimized for significant flexibility or ramping capability, but do exhibit strong fuel assurancejjj attributes. Batteries and storage meet all flexibility requirements, and DR offers high flexibility and ramping management capability. Wind and solar are highly time dependent and do not offer fuel assurance on their own, but can offer good flexibility if they have the proper controls and contractual arrangements. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) summarizes how regional grid operators use centrallyorganized markets to procure specific reliability attributes from generators: iii Combined-cycle plants are included in the Natural Gas – Steam group. jjj Fuel assurance is the resource portfolio’s ability to access sufficient fuel to meet system needs and maintain reliability; aspects of fuel assurance include onsite fuel storage, as well as a generator’s access to sufficient fuel supplies through markets or bilateral contracts. 86 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000390 Ancillary Services in Centrally-Organized Markets302 [E]ach ISO also operates auction markets for spinning, non-spinning reserves, and regulation with uniform clearing prices, with additional performance payments for regulation. (ERCOT, however, does not offer performance payments). Table 2 [Figure 4.14 on the following page] presents some of the terminology and characteristics. The hour1y requirements for these services are set based on reliability standards and operational requirements that vary by ISO. The market designs generally co-optimize energy and reserves. Although ancillary service market designs can be complicated, the level of procurement typically only comprises less than 2% of total market volume. Ancillary service pricing is also used to signal short-tenn supply shortages. Because procurement of these ancillary services is allowed to be de?cient before load is curtailed, the failure to procure suf?cient reserves is often a ?rst indicator of supply shortage. Hence, the lSOs include administrative scarcity prices in the market designs. Such pricing allows ancillary service prices?along with energy prices, when opportunity costs are included?to increase during shortages to levels more consistent with the value of lost load than the energy market offer caps. These scarcity prices are established differently in each ISO. There are a number of recent initiatives to modify the ancillary service markets. CAISO and MISO have recently implemented types of ramping reserves, intended to increase the ramping range from committed resources available during real-time energy dispatch. Some ISOs, notably ERCOT, have also begun to develop designs for frequency-responsive and inertial response reserve markets. Two ancillary services?voltage support/reactive power and black start services?are not yet considered to have the appropriate characteristics for competitive markets and are thus compensated through cost-based rates. Figure 4.14 Selected Ancillary Service Market Design Characteristics Product name Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation up, Regulation Regulation up, Regulation down serVice Regulation down Performance Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulating Regulation-up Regulation mileage component service movement performance mileage mileage, up name (details in Regulationdown Regulation mileage Table 3-12) mileage down Day-ahead I procurement Real-time I I c/ I procurement Product name? Tenmlnute Spinning reserve SR Spinning reserve Spinning reserve Responsive Spinning reserve spinning reserve spinning reserve reserve Product name? Ten-minute non- Non-spinning Non- Supplemental Supplemental Non-spinning Non-spinning non-spinning spinning reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve and (T reserve (NSR) supplemental minute operating reserve reserve (TMOR) Forward (pre- 1 day-ahead) procurement Day-ahead I I I procurement Real-time I I procurement Continued on next page 87 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000391 Figure 4.15. Ancillary Service Products Exchanged in the Centrally Organized Markets, Listed by and Category of Ancillary Service Product name? Ramp Flexible romping ramp reserve capability product Ramp reserve? DAM and RTM PM and RTM [not when procured Voltage last opportunity Lost opportunity lost opportunity lost opportunity Compensation lost opportunity Provision payment control? cost and cost and fixed cost and AEP cost and AEP rate for cost for based on lost payment American tariff rate method method provision provision opportunity cost or mechanism Electric Power contract provision and (AEP) method capability Black start Paid standard Paid cost-based Receive revenue Receive cost- Not procured Procured Contracted through service block start rate rates based on 1 l0% based rate after through SPP through bi- reliability contracts payments or station- of annual black committing to 3- annual speci?c rate start costs year period competitive process Note: day-ahead market; RTM real-time market) Several flexibility options are available to grid operators, such as DR, fast-ramping natural gas generation, and energy storage. As stated in QER 1.2: A recent study of the value of fast-ramping gas for supporting variable renewables noted that, date FRF [fast ramping fossil] technologies have enabled RE [renewable energy] diffusion by providing reliable and dispatchable back-up capacity to hedge against variability of renewables and fast-reacting fossil technologies appear as highly complementary should be jointly installed to meet the goals of cutting emissions and ensuring a stable supply/3303 In addition to existing sources of ?exibility and reliability services, there is a growing understanding of the abilities of VRE to economically contribute to grid ?exibility and reliability through operational changes and advanced power electronics. Recent technology advancements now enable wind plants to provide nearly the full spectrum of ERS inertial control, primary frequency control, and automatic generation control). Similarly, for PV, CAISO, First Solar, and NREL recently demonstrated a First Solar 300 MW PV plant that provides active and reactive power controls, plant participation in automatic generation control, primary frequency control, ramp rate control, and voltage regulation.304 A recent NERC assessment on reliability in the BPS noted that DR can enhance system flexibility and reliability by providing, ?regulation, governor response, spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve, and supplemental operating reserve[. F]or example, ERCOT obtains half of its spinning reserves from DR and is considering a DR-based Fast Frequency Response Service that is positioned between inertia and governor response.?305 Consumer end uses?including building energy management systems, as well as water and space heating and cooling?can also serve as DR resources using load control and communicating technologies to ramp their consumption up or down in order to support VRE integration.306 Demand-side flexibility via ?smart charging? plug-in electric vehicles is another potential source of grid flexibility. This involves a utility or some other centralized entity remotely controlling the charging patterns of participating vehicles and/or charging stations. An aggregated fleet of vehicles or chargers can act as 3 DR resource, shifting load in response to price signals or operational needs; for example, vehicle charging could be shifted to the middle of the day to absorb high levels of solar generation and 88 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000392 shifted away from evening hours when solar generation disappears and system net load peaks. Research in this area is currently underway at the national laboratories.307 4.2 Diversity, Fuel Assurance, and Onsite Storage The April 14 memo raises the questions of whether the diversity of the generation resources in the electric system has diminished and whether this is a problem for grid reliability and resilience. In fact, when looked at nationally, the electric system is more diverse today than it was 20 years ago, although increased national diversity does not necessarily mean diversity has increased in all regions. A holistic view of reliability and risk management, however, must include both diversity and fuel assurance. 4.2.1 Fuel Diversity The U.S. generation mix has continually evolved as changes in technology, economics, government policy, and geopolitical forces affected the relative availability, economics, and feasibility of competing energy sources. PJM documents this evolution in Figure 4.16, which also displays a diversity index showing increasing diversity levels from about 2000 through 2014. PJM observes that, “government policy has played a major role in the development of generation resources, including policies that focused on energy security, jobs, environmental protection and conservation.”308 The chart shows how the mix of U.S. electricity use has moved in cycles for decades—how the generation share of hydroelectric facilities (most built with Federal funds during the 1930s and 1940s) declined as coal and natural gas grew (helped with funding from low-cost Federal land and mineral leases); how nuclear generation grew (aided by Federal policy and funding assistance) in the 1960s; how nuclear energy displaced hydroelectricity and natural gas-fired electricity in the 1970s; and how coal, nuclear, and natural gas-fired electricity have displaced oil-fired generation since the 1980s. Figure 4.16. Generation Mix and Various Economic and Policy Drivers Since 1949, Including Diversity Index309 89 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000393 Closely tracking the PJM trends, the national picture of the resource mix shows coal and oil being displaced by gas and VRE. In addition to this, Figure 4.17 shows how the national U.S. capacity and generation mix have become more diverse over time. Changes in capacity (top) have moved the resource mix toward a greater proportion of natural gas, wind, and solar, while coal and oil capacity have decreased. Energy generation trends for these resources (bottom) have tracked changes in capacity, with natural gas generation almost doubling in proportion. While nuclear capacity has decreased relative to other resources, the proportion of nuclear generation remains unchanged as capacity factors for nuclear units have increased Figure 4.17. Changes in U.S. Capacity (Top) and Generation (Bottom) Mix over Time (Left to Right: 2002, 2009, 2016)310 Coal 8% - - - Natural Gas (all) 23% I Natural Gas (CC) 20% I I, a? Natural Gas (CT) 40% 42% Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear 0% 0% Hydro 2% 2% 1% 3% Wind Solar Other a 19% 23% 34% The grid was, on average, more diverse in 2016 than in 2002 in terms of both capacity and generation. Diversity can be a useful tool for managing both reliability and financial risks. For the power system, developing and maintaining a portfolio of diverse generation, storage, and demand-side options can be useful for system planners and operators in creating optionality and hedging risks. Physical and financial risks can also be managed and hedged using reliability standards, operating rules, and financial markets and contracts. Better system diversity with greater use of domestic energy sources enhances U.S. energy security. However, greater fuel diversity does not always translate to increased system reliability. Risk, Reliability, and Fuel Diversity311 In a summary of the policy implications of the impacts of fuel diversity on risk and reliability, Devin Hartman of the Street Institute states that: Policymakers and regulators should recognize that fuel diversity is a poor proxy for valid policy objectives, like risk management and reliability. Speci?cally, a high level of fuel diversity does not necessarily mean that an electricity system manages risk ef?ciently or meets reliability needs. Conversely, policies or market-design changes intended to increase fuel diversity will not necessarily improve risk management or reliability. Fuel neutrality is essential for both monopoly-utility resource planning and competitive markets to manage risk and achieve reliability ef?ciently. Interventions to promote speci?c fuel types?such as 90 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000394 bailouts for coal and nuclear or mandates and subsidies for renewables—skew investment risk and can undermine incentives for reliability-enhancing behavior (e.g., a public intervention to finance pipeline expansion removes incentives for the private sector to invest in fuel security). Fuel-specific subsidies and mandates replace individual choice with collective choice. This one-size-fits-all approach to risk mitigation ignores variances in individuals’ risk tolerances, results in high-cost risk mitigation, and creates perverse incentives for market participants by transferring risk and costs from the private to the public sector. For regulators, attempts to achieve fuel diversity in market designs explicitly would likely result in inefficient and potentially discriminatory practices that are inconsistent with the Federal Power Act. The reliable performance of power generators varies across and within fuel types and changes with fluctuating conditions. This renders any attempt to value fuel diversity very complex. It would require extensive administrative judgment, expanding the potential for government failure. Ultimately, the central aim of market design should remain to procure specific reliability attributes at the least cost. 4.2.2 Fuel Assurance and Onsite Storage FERC uses the term fuel assurance to mean a generator’s access to sufficient fuel supplies through markets or bilateral contracts (and the degree to which those arrangements are firm). On the RTO/ISO level, fuel assurance refers to the regional resource portfolio’s ability to access sufficient fuel to meet system needs and maintain reliability.312 313 NERC’s 2017 State of Reliability report identified “lack of fuel” among the top ten causes of forced outages for 2014 and 2015.314 While lack of fuel is a relatively infrequent cause of generator outages, it can still have major repercussions when it does occur because system fuel supply chain disruptions can impact many generators during a single widespread fuel shortage event. Nuclear and coal plants typically have advantages associated with onsite fuel storage compared to natural gas. While having fuel onsite reduces the risk that a generator will be unable to operate when needed, every type of fuel and power generation source has known vulnerabilities that can compromise its ability to perform reliably. Valuation or regulation of onsite fuel storage varies across the Nation’s organized markets. Onsite fuel supplies can be required, incentivized, or not compensated—depending on the RTO/ISO in question. For example, some dual-fuel generators in the New York City region (NYISO Zone J) are required under local reliability rules to maintain onsite fuel to protect against the loss of gas supplies.315 Several markets have also attempted to incentivize firm and onsite fuel supplies by adding performance requirements to their capacity markets. In PJM and ISO-NE, these requirements were adopted after generator underperformance occurred during several instances of system stress between 2010 and 2014.kkk The incentives in these markets are designed to reward or penalize generators based upon how they respond to the system operator during performance events. According to Gordon van Welie, President and CEO of ISO-NE: We currently have a precarious operating situation in the winter time and we're worried about it becoming unsustainable beyond 2019… The reality is that we're really operating with a very slim operating margin during the winter time that may not cover these large contingencies that worry us.316 kkk These events included both situations in which natural gas power plants were unable to draw fuel from pipelines, as well as ones in which sufficient fuel was available but unit outages and/or start times inhibited operation. 91 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000395 Both programs remain in their infancy: ISO-NE’s takes effect in 2018, and PJM’s has only been active since 2016 (with a gradual phase-in through the 2019/2020 delivery year). In the interim, ISO-NE instituted a stopgap measure called the Winter Reliability Program, which compensates some dual-fuel generators for procuring onsite fuel.317 Outside of these regions, onsite fuel is not compensated or, in the case of VIEU, is incorporated into integrated resource planning (IRP) efforts. Other aspects of fuel assurance include having dual fuel capabilities and having low exposure to supply chain interruptions (including adequate, reliable infrastructure and sufficient contractual arrangements for fuel delivery). Natural Gas NERC refers to the “single point of disruption risk” as the increasing risk of fuel disruption that threatens generator availability. In a letter to Secretary Perry, NERC CEO Gerry Cauley observed that: Growing reliance on natural gas continues to raise reliability concerns regarding the ability of both gas and electric infrastructures to maintain the BPS reliability at acceptable levels. Many efforts have focused on the gas-electric interface and yet, insufficient progress has been made reconciling the planning approaches and operating practices (scheduling situation awareness, information sharing) between these two inter-linked sectors. Planning approaches, operational coordination, and regulatory partnerships are needed to assure fuel deliverability, availability, security (physical and cyber), and resilience to potential disruptions. Unfortunately, an approach not obvious in electricity markets today.318 Natural gas-fired generators have been described as relying on “just-in-time” fuel delivery.319 NERC, FERC, and several of the ISOs and RTOs have studied the gas-electric interactions and interdependence, which are most severe in the areas where natural gas generation is growing most quickly, but natural gas pipeline infrastructure is more constrained—particularly New England and California. NERC has concluded that: […] areas with a growing reliance on natural gas-fired generation are increasingly vulnerable to issues related to gas supply unavailability. Common-mode, single contingency-type disruptions to fuel supply and deliverability in areas with a high penetration of natural gasfired generation are reducing resource adequacy and potentially introducing localized risks to reliability. Not only can impacts to BPS reliability occur during the gas-load peaking winter season, but they can also manifest during the summer season when electric demand is high and natural gas facilities are out of service, which can lower the operational capacity and flow of the pipeline system.320 NERC recommends a number of planning and operational changes to address this challenge, including risk-based approaches to study the potential regional reliability implications of greater natural gas dependence; the potential for wide-spread, common-mode failure events such as interstate gas pipeline or supply source losses; regional mitigation strategies; better information-sharing and coordination between electric generators, gas suppliers, and pipeline operators; and ensuring the availability of more flexible resources for use to mitigate the added uncertainties associated with natural gas fuel risks.321 Natural gas storage is a way to reduce the just-in-time delivery problem. Natural gas is stored in depleted natural gas and oil fields, depleted natural aquifers, and salt caverns. Figure 4.18 shows natural gas storage facilities across the Nation. The ideal storage facilities are near major gas consumption centers, where storage can supplement gas pipelines to meet high demand levels and fill in deliveries in the event of any delivery disruptions. 92 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000396 Figure 4.18. Natural Gas Storage Facilities322 The United States has over 400 natural gas storage facilities; the majority are depleted natural gas fields used for storage, with salt domes concentrated in the Southeast and aquifer storage concentrated in Illinois and Indiana. Data presented at a recent testimony before FERC offers an interesting perspective on areas that depend on just-in-time energy. The data in Table 4-3 show a dozen states that depend on high levels of just-in-time imports, whether those imports are natural gas for in-area generation or transmissionenabled electricity imports. These areas may need greater planning and resilience measures to ensure fuel security, which may include some availability of petroleum-based fuels for units that can use them when natural gas may be difficult or expensive to source. 93 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000397 Table 4-3. Dependence on Imported Just-in-Time Energy for Electricity323 The leaks discovered at California’s Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility in October 2015 California illustrate another natural gas common failure mode problem, according to analysis completed by PJM: Analysis performed after the leak identified 17 nearby electric generators with a combined output of over 9,800 MW that relied on Aliso Canyon for fuel supply. Some of these generators are required for local reliability; however, without supply from Aliso Canyon, low pressure in gas pipelines could stop the flow of gas to the generators, leaving them unable to operate.324 The loss of Aliso Canyon gas storage field highlights the risk to the power grid from failures in the pipeline infrastructure. Electric market and regulatory changes in California resulting from this event include: expedited procurement of electric storage resources, enhanced gas-electric coordination, expanded demand response program and a constraint in the electric market that reflects gas limitations.325 After the 2014 Polar Vortex, when many gas-fired power plants were forced off-line due to natural gas production and delivery problems, inadequate gas supply contracts, and spiked natural gas prices, NERC recommended the following: Examine and review the natural gas supply issues encountered during the event. Industry should also work with gas suppliers, markets, and regulators to quickly identify issues with natural gas supply and transportation so that appropriate actions can be developed and implemented to allow generators to be able to secure firm supply and transportation at a reasonable rate.326 FERC has since promulgated orders to improve coordination between natural gas and power industry operations. While various electric and gas industry groups, including NERC, have had and continue coordination efforts, a significant amount of coordination remains unresolved. 94 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000398 Nuclear As NERC noted, low exposure to fuel supply issues is one of the fundamental necessities of a reliable BPS. Still, fuel availability does not always guarantee dependable performance, particularly during extreme weather events. In 2010, the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama was throttled back to 50 percent of its maximum output because the plant was unable to draw and return enough water (due to environmental regulations) to cool all three of its reactors.327 Nuclear generators have onsite fuel storage due to their 18-month or 24-month refueling cycles.328 During the Polar Vortex, some coal and nuclear plants had fuel onsite but failed to perform nonetheless. However, overall nuclear generators performed extremely well during the Polar Vortex, with an average capacity factor of 95 percent.329 Nuclear power plants tend to have a very high number of “days of burn” onsite relative to coal, as their refueling occurs in 18-month or 24-month cycles. During each refueling, about one-third of the core is replaced with new fuel. The new fuel arrives onsite between nine and five weeks prior to the planned refueling. However, even if there is a delay in the arrival of new fuel, the reactor could continue to operate for an additional three months before reaching 70 percent capacity and two more months beyond that (for a total of five months) before decreasing to 50 percent capacity. The fuel that is replaced during each refueling has typically been used in the reactor for four-and-a-half to six years before it is removed. Planned refueling outages are typically scheduled for the spring and fall and average 35 days.330 Coal A limited number of coal plants, including all plants that use lignite coal, are “mine-mouth” facilities that rely on dedicated, nearby coal mines. Otherwise, coal plants rely on rail, barge, or truck delivery of coal, and they maintain onsite coal stockpiles to accommodate both normal variance in deliveries and the possibility of a major supply disruption. Coal stockpiles have recently been slightly smaller than historical averages, while days of burn have increased slightly relative to historic averages from the 70–80-day range to the 85–100-day range (see Figure 4.19). lll 331 lll At an individual plant, stockpiles can be viewed in terms of days of burn. The days-of-burn calculation considers both the current stockpile level at a plant and its estimated consumption (burn) rates in coming months to approximate how many days the plant could run at historical levels before depleting its existing stockpile. 95 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000399 Figure 4.19. Coal Stocks and Days of Burn, January 2010–May 2017332 While bituminous coal stockpiles in tons have been slightly lower than historic averages in recent months, these stocks are expected to last relatively longer than historic average (measured in days of burn) due to lower capacity factors and expected lower fuel consumption in coal plants. Subbituminous coal stocks (not pictured) have increased in recent months relative to historic averages both in terms of tons and days of burn. For the winter of 2014, compared to 2013, coal-fueled generation provided 92 percent of increased generation, as shown in Figure 4.20. Although electricity demand was greater in 2014, natural gas generation decreased because natural gas was diverted to fuel residential heating needs and gas prices rose to greater than three times those of coal. 96 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000400 Figure 4.20. Electricity Generation Changes from 2013 to 2014 by Fuel Type Competition for natural gas between residential heating and power production caused a rise in natural gas prices in the early months of 2014. The high gas prices coupled with onsite coal storage led to a sharp increase in coal electricity production in those months compared to the winter of 2013. Coal plants can also experience delivery interruptions. In 2013, there were 166 power plants (172,000 MW of generating capacity) across the United States that used subbituminous coal from the Powder River Basin. During the winter of 2013–2014, BNSF Railway rationed and limited coal deliveries to many of these generators due to construction and other disruptions. Stockpiles fell from 25 percent to 40 percent below normal levels at coal plants across the Midwest, Central, and Texas regions; many plants feared that they might not be able to rebuild their inventories in time to meet winter electric demands.333 4.3 High-Risk Events and System Resilience The April 14 memo asks whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which not compensating resilience attributes could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. A resilience approach recognizes that while not all risks can be avoided, many risks can be managed to mitigate damage and expedite recovery. Some options to improve grid resilience may be risk-specific (e.g., to protect against flooding) or component-specific (to protect a transformer), while others are “threat-agnostic, providing system-wide resilience to a broad range of threats including those that cannot be anticipated” according to the Grid Modernization Lab Consortium (GMLC).334 As the fuel mix evolves and as threats change, there will be more ways that elements and regions of the BPS can fail. Causes of failure can include extreme weather events and cyber or physical attacks on grid infrastructure. 335 336 97 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000401 Extreme Weather Events In January and February 2014, the Nation was swept by the Polar Vortex as a band of very cold weather spread across much of the eastern United States, creating record-high winter peak electric demand for heating and equally high demand for natural gas for residential heating. While the Polar Vortex tested the integrity of electricity supply, grid operators generally met demand, even under these severe conditions. However, electricity and gas prices surged for many consumers as energy supplies were stressed. The extremely cold weather caused a variety of power system performance problems, including the loss of 35,000 MW of generation capacity across a wide stretch of the Nation, with 55 percent of the affected generation from natural gas plants, 26 percent coal plants and five percent nuclear.337 In PJM, one of the regions most affected by the event, 22 percent of generating capacity was in forced outage.338 Many natural gas-fired generators had their fuel supplies curtailed because they were buying gas on non-firm, interruptible contracts, or because demand was so high that pipelines implemented delivery restrictions to power plants located near major metropolitan areas. In the Northeast, after several days of extremely cold weather, some generators experienced fuel-gelling, where the natural gas froze in the fuel injectors and was unable to feed into the turbines.339 In Texas, a major source for natural gas production and a transport hub, several gas field production facilities froze up, as did some gas compressor stations along pipelines—shutting down gas feeds into and through pipelines that were to be shipped into New Mexico and elsewhere. This caused fuel shortages to the power plants served by those pipelines.340 Limited supplies led to natural gas price spikes across much of the country; in some areas, gas to produce electricity was more expensive than liquid fuel, even though the price of oil for generation rose to over $400 per barrel. 341 Many coal plants could not operate due to conveyor belts and coal piles freezing342, which—coupled with outages across other fuels and high electricity demand—led operators to call on older plants nearing the end of their useful lives. American Electric Power reported that it deployed 89 percent of its coal units scheduled for retirement in 2014 to meet demand during the Polar Vortex, and Southern Company reported using 75 percent of its coal units scheduled for closure.343 Using these retiring units enabled utilities to meet customer demand during a period when already limited natural gas resources were diverted from electricity production to meet residential heating needs.344 345 Once retired, however, these units will not be available for the next unseasonably cold winter. In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy caused large-scale flooding and wind damage in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast, as well as blizzard conditions in the central and southern Appalachians. Three nuclear reactors totaling 2,845 MW of capacity were shut down, and five operated at reduced levels due to disruptions in transmission infrastructure, reduced demand from distribution outages, and precautionary measures to protect equipment.346 The storm impacts significantly disrupted East Coast refining activity. Spectra Energy lost two natural gas compressor stations on its Texas Eastern Transmission pipeline in northern New Jersey due to the loss of commercial power and the failure of backup generation to operate as intended, which affected gas supply to upstream gas-fired power plants. New Jersey Natural Gas shut down part of its natural gas infrastructure serving Ocean and Monmouth counties, including Long Beach Island and the barrier islands from Bay Head to Seaside Park, with subsequent distribution line damages.347 Sandy also damaged solar PV installations in New Jersey, with storm surges causing $3 million of damage to ground-mounted PV systems and wind and lightning damage to rooftop PV systems.348 98 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000402 4.4 Enhancing Reliability and Resilience Recently, based on extensive information about the operational profiles of PJM resources, PJM assessed the capability of each generator type to provide different ERS.mmm PJM then built a series of hypothetical resource portfolios using different mixes of generation types to determine how well each portfolio performed at delivering sufficient reliability. PJM also considered the risk that each portfolio would fail to meet resource adequacy needs and thus cause reliability problems. After simulating many combinations and portfolios, the following conclusions were reached:  The expected near-term resource portfolio is among the highest-performing portfolios and is well equipped to provide the generator reliability attributes.  As the potential future resource mix moves in the direction of less coal and nuclear generation, generator reliability attributes of frequency response, reactive capability and fuel assurance decrease, but flexibility and ramping attributes increase.  A marked decrease in operational reliability was observed for portfolios with significantly increased amounts of wind and solar capacity (compared to the expected near-term resource portfolio), suggesting de facto performance-based upper bounds on the percent of system capacity from these resource types. Additionally, most portfolios with solar unforced capacity shares of 20 percent or greater were classified infeasible because they resulted in LOLE criterion violations at night. Nevertheless, PJM could maintain reliability with unprecedented levels of wind and solar resources, assuming a portfolio of other resources that provides a sufficient amount of reliability services.  Portfolios composed of up to 86 percent natural gas-fired resources maintained operational reliability. Thus, this analysis did not identify an upper bound for natural gas. However, additional risks, such as gas deliverability during polar vortex-type conditions and uncertainties associated with economics and public policy, were not fully captured in this analysis. Risks with respect to natural gas may lie not in capability to provide the generator reliability attributes but rather in these other uncertainties.  More diverse portfolios are not necessarily more reliable; rather, there are resource blends between the most diverse and least diverse portfolios which provide the most generator reliability attributes.349 [original footnotes omitted] Significantly, when PJM tested the most desirable portfolios (in terms of reliability) against a polar vortex event, only a third of those were resilient: Only 34 of the 98 portfolios which were classified as desirable were resilient when subjected to a polar vortex event. This sensitivity specifically captured the increased risk of natural gas delivery under extremely cold and high load conditions. The polar vortex sensitivity highlights the importance of resilience, which is not captured by the generator reliability attributes that were considered in this study.350 DOE, NERC, and industry stakeholders prepare for a variety of potential threats, including high-impact, low-frequency events, to improve resilience and recovery. Planning, practice, and coordination on an allhazards basis are as important for improving resilience as having a mix of resources and fuels available when a major grid disturbance occurs. A diverse resource portfolio could complement wholesale market products that recognize and compensate providers for the value of ERS on a technology-neutral basis. mmm The PJM study assumed firm gas supply contracts for natural gas-fired generators. 99 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000403 DOE’s Grid Modernization Initiative (GMI) works to better understand what resilience means for the power system and how to measure and achieve it. Transmission planning also supports grid reliability and resilience through interconnecting diverse resources, and it occurs at a variety of levels—ranging from individual utility system studies to regional and interconnection-wide studies. In 2009, DOE issued a series of grants to support interconnectionwide transmission planning. In 2011, FERC issued Order No. 1000, which (among other requirements) mandates regional transmission planning and interregional coordination. As noted in a recent study for the WIRES group: The analytical approaches applied to interregional [transmission] planning should look beyond “base cases” or “business-as-usual cases” and explicitly consider a broader range of plausible market conditions, system contingencies, and public policy environments to capture the short- and long-term flexibility benefits and insurance value that a more robust interregional transmission infrastructure can offer in terms of shielding customers from highcost outcomes. … we recommend that such futures be evaluated to identify transmission projects that address current needs but also provide the insurance and flexibility value to mitigate highcost outcomes across a range of uncertain but not implausible futures.351 Given the many problems that can affect different generation and fuel types, system-wide reliability and resilience can be supported by a diverse portfolio of generation resources that limit over-dependence on any single fuel or technology type, plus demand-side resources that reduce overall demand and better protect customers in the event of a widespread extreme event. 4.5 Reliability and Resilience Looking Forward Although the BPS is performing reliably today with the current mix of resources, technologies, and loads, the entire system remains volatile. Low customer demands and a flatter supply curve mean that many generators face continuing economic stress, retirements may continue, and utility-scale and customerside VRE additions (enabled by subsidies and mandates) will continue. These factors and the uncertainty about future conditions are making it harder for grid planners and operators to maintain today’s level of reliability. Any successful strategy to address BPS reliability and resilience going forward should include developing portfolios of resources that deliver both resource adequacy and ERS to advance reliable grid operations. Resource portfolios could be complemented with wholesale market and product designs that recognize and complement resource diversity by compensating providers for the value of ERS on a technologyneutral basis. More work is needed to define, quantify, and value resilience; Sandia National Laboratories has made efforts to do so, as shown in Figure 4.21. 100 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000404 Figure 4.21. Sandia National Laboratories’ Resilience Analysis Process 352 101 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000405 5 Wholesale Electricity Markets The wholesale electricity market issues outlined in the April 14 memo are central to the future of U.S. electricity markets and policy. At the same time, they are the subject of intense debate among stakeholders with differing regional and economic interests. Noting the wide range of opinion on these issues, DOE staff offer three general findings: 1) Changing circumstances are challenging centrally-organized wholesale markets. Flat demand growth, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels are creating stresses on wholesale electricity markets. The centrally-organized markets are successfully achieving reliable and economically efficient delivery of wholesale electricity in their short-term operations, but the changing circumstances portend potential long-term problems for centrally-organized and, to a lesser extent, bilateral markets. 2) New technologies with very low marginal costs, i.e. VRE, reduce wholesale prices, independent of— and in addition to—the effects of low natural gas prices. To the extent that additional development of such resources is driven by subsidies and mandates, their price suppressive effect might place undue economic pressure on revenues for traditional baseload (as well as non-baseload) resources and could require changes in market design.353 354 355 3) Markets need further work to address grid resilience. Market mechanisms are designed to incentivize individual resources rather than develop balanced portfolios. System operators are working toward recognizing, defining, and compensating for reliability- and resilience-enhancing resource attributes (on both the supply and demand side), but more work must be done. U.S. market structures vary widely, but despite substantial differences between markets, some patterns emerge and are worth addressing in response to the April 14 memo. 5.1 Evolution of U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets Until the 1970s, investor-owned electric utilities were vertically integrated (i.e., provided generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to their customers at regulated rates and with administratively determined profits). This concept was loosely referred to as the “regulatory 102 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000406 compact.”nnn Interspersed with VIEUs were—and still are—over 3,200 cooperatively owned electric utilities.ooo 356 In the 1920s, policymakers accepted the idea that non-utility companies might be able to generate electricity at equal or lower cost than VIEUs, to the benefit of electricity consumers.357 In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which introduced competition to the VIEU model and set the stage for later regulatory reform of the electricity industry.358 At the time, PURPA was largely an effort to curb the electricity industry’s reliance on high-cost natural gas and oil.ppp PURPA provided for “increased conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electric utilities, and equitable retail rates for electric consumers.” 359 It also made developing new generation resources easier—specifically renewable energy and cogeneration facilities.360 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 allowed FERC to approve “exempt wholesale generators,” using any fuel and any generation technology, to go into the generation business and sell electricity at competitive prices. The act also authorized FERC to order transmission owners to provide transmission service.361 Also in 1992, Congress enacted the PTC to incentivize VRE energy production, which Congress has extended and modified several times since.362 In 1996, FERC required transmission owners under its jurisdiction to provide open-access transmission to the interstate transmission grid through its landmark Order No. 888. Open access means charging all similarly situated parties the same rate (including, if applicable, what the utility would charge itself to use its transmission facilities) and providing service to all similarly situated parties under the same terms and conditions.363 This action by FERC greatly assisted the development of competition among wholesale power producers because it meant that utilities would find it difficult to limit access to their transmission facilities as a means of protecting their generation assets from competitors. FERC Order No. 2000 (issued in December 1999) promoted voluntary participation in RTO/ISOs by further clarifying both necessary characteristics of RTO/ISOs and benefits of such participation.364 Between 1998 and 2006, 23 states made changes to require their VIEUs to divest some or all of their generating assets and thus allow competition.365 Divestiture was pursued most aggressively by the states with high retail electricity prices (most of New England, New York, the Mid-Atlantic states, and nnn “The ‘state regulatory compact’ evolved as a concept ‘to characterize the set of mutual rights, obligations, and benefits that exist between the utility and society.’ It is not a binding agreement. Under this ‘compact,’ a utility typically is given exclusive access to a designated—or franchised—service territory and can recover its prudent costs (as determined by the regulator) plus a reasonable rate of return on its investments. In return, the utility must fulfill its service obligation of providing universal access service within its territory. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Appendix-Electricity%20System%20Overview.pdf ooo Most public power utilities are distribution-only; however, some are vertically integrated. Distribution-only cooperatives typically purchase all or some of their electricity at the wholesale level from generation and transmission cooperative utilities. ppp Also in 1978, the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act prohibited “(1) the use of natural gas or petroleum as a[n] energy source in any new electric power plant; and (2) construction of any new electric power plant without the capability to use coal or any alternate fuel as a primary energy source.” https://www.congress.gov/bill/95th-congress/house-bill/5146 The Fuel Use Act was mostly repealed in 1987, which “set the stage for a dramatic increase in the use of natural gas for electric generation and industrial processing.” https://www.eia.gov/oil gas/natural gas/analysis publications/ngmajorleg/repeal.html 103 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000407 California) with the hope that competition would bring lower retail consumer 366 Generating units that had been operating under cost-of?service regulation were sold to merchant plant owners or transferred to unregulated, investor-owned utility affiliates. This wave of restructuring did not sweep the entire Nation. In large areas?particularly the Southeast and the West, apart from the expanding Energy Imbalance Market?the wholesale electricity industry is still vertically integrated. In these areas, the wholesale market consists of bilateral transactions. Because restructuring did not take hold in all states, a range of organizational structures exist at the wholesale level in the United States today, as shown in Figure 5.1. States considered ?Partially Restructured? below have divested some generation and/or allowed a portion of customers to choose their energy provider. Figure 5.1. Utility Restructuring by State as of May 2017367 Fully Restructured Partially Restructured None 5.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets Today Over the past two decades, a diverse set of wholesale electricity markets has evolved in different regions of the United States. These wholesale markets can be divided into two broad categories. For the purposes of this section, regions of the country that have not joined are called traditional ??19 Whether this objective has been achieved is mixed in the literature. Availability rates for generation have improved significantly and, as predicted, as competition incentivized operators to run their units as efficiently as possible. Dispatch over the much broader footprints of also increases efficiency and thus reduces costs. PJM notes (July 26, 2017 written statement before Subcommittee on Energy, US. House Committee on Energy and Commerce) ?nearly $2 billion of annual savings to customers.? On the other hand, Borenstein?s 2015 review claims ?the electricity rate changes since restructuring have been driven more by exogenous factors - such as generation technology advances and natural gas price ?uctuations - than by the effects of restructuring.? See two meta-studies: Severin Borenstein and James Bushnell, "The US. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of Restructuring,? May 2015, and James Bushnell, Erin T. Mansur, and Kevin Novan, ?Review of the Economics Literature on US Electricity Restructuring,? April 2017, for DOE, unpublished. 104 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC 000408 bilateral markets, while those that have are called centrally-organized markets. These regions are shown in Figure 5.2, with RTO/ISOs labeled and colored, and bilateral markets depicted in gray. Figure 5.2. The Seven RTOs or ISOs in the United States rrr 368 There are currently seven centrally-organized markets operating across the United States. The diversity of approaches to market organization and resource adequacy can be visualized along a spectrum, as shown in Figure 5.3—from VIEUs with minimal market organization on one end, to fully restructured markets without formal resource adequacy requirements on the other. Between vertically integrated and energy-only regions, there are diverse approaches to allocating the financial risk of generation investment and the responsibility to provide resource adequacy. rrr Map redrawn from FERC’s December 2016 website. 105 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000409 Figure 5.3. States and Regions along the Spectrum from Traditional to Fully Restructured Electric Markets369 In the Southeast and West, bilateral markets are dominated by VIEUs that operate under a regulated cost-of-service model. States in these regions retain strong control over electric utility resource decisions and oversee resource adequacy, and they consider non-market factors in their oversight of utility decisions through a utility’s IRP process. Once approved by state regulators, ratepayers guarantee the cost recovery of VIEU generation investments through retail rates (or merchant generators through long-term PPAs with utilities). Thus, the financial viability of these generators is not immediately exposed to the same price volatility that generators face in market-oriented regions. However, new resource decisions in VIEU regions are beginning to account for low natural gas prices, low load growth, and zero-marginal cost generation.sss Public power and rural cooperative utilities also have a significant presence in some regions. Utility asset ownership models can vary from vertically integrated to distribution-only. Merchant generators also operate within these regions, but most electricity is produced and delivered by the integrated utilities, with minimal additional spot transactions.370 In centrally-organized markets, generators offer electricity bids on a day-ahead and real-time basis. The RTO/ISO then pools these bids into a single supply curve and calculates the clearing price that matches supply to demand, considering transmission limitations for the next interval. This calculation yields a set of market-clearing prices, one for each location and time horizon. Centrally-organized markets also compensate resources that provide certain ERS through ancillary service markets. Furthermore, in some cases, RTO/ISOs provide supplemental revenues to generators that are dispatched out-of-market, such as ones that are needed to ensure local reliability. sss See, for example, 152 FERC ¶ 61,013 (Florida Power & Light Company) or Steve Wright, General Manager, Chelan County PUD, a vertically integrated utility in Washington, told DOE staff in a June 19, 2017, conversation that the relatively low wholesale prices traditionally seen in the Northwest due to an abundance of low-cost hydro are now further stressed by the export of surplus zero-marginal cost California rooftop solar, so much so that he is “finding it hard to even justify spending on energy efficiency in [his utility’s] integrated resource plan.” 106 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000410 RTOs/ISOs operate as a single balancing authority and achieve cost savings by procuring reserves and other ancillary services for the system. For example, MISO estimates that because it operates an ancillary service market across the entire region, spinning reserve requirements can be based upon the entire region’s needs rather than the sum of individual balancing authorities’ spinning reserve requirements. By operating the ancillary services market, MISO reduced its average spinning reserves requirement from 1,482 MW to 935 MW and saved almost $25 million per year for its members by freeing up generation from having to meet the reserve requirement.371 CAISO, MISO, and SPP retain aspects of the bilateral markets, particularly that states still oversee resource procurement and resource adequacy of their VIEUs, through the IRP process.372 California, MISO and SPP, as well as traditional bilateral market states, incorporate considerations other than shortterm economic efficiency into their resource choices, such as portfolio diversity, job retention or creation, environmental protection, and other factors. 5.2.1 Responsibility for Resource Adequacy and Capacity Some states require utilities to build new or subsidize specific power plants outside the RTO/ISO resource adequacy processes. Other centrally-organized markets (namely PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO) have implemented capacity markets as a mechanism to provide sufficient revenue for resources to ensure resource adequacy. In these markets, the system operator conducts an auction process, and wholesale customers procure resources (including generation, energy efficiency, DR, and transmission-enabled resource imports) to meet the electricity demands of their customers. These markets can be mandatory (PJM Interconnection and ISO New England); voluntary, where states can choose to operate under an IRP process and where load-serving entities can satisfy their requirements through a combination of the market and/or showing that they have rights to adequate capacity (MISO); or voluntarily backstopped by a mandatory process (NYISO). ERCOT does not have a formal resource adequacy requirement. 5.3 Challenges in Wholesale Electricity Markets Centrally-organized markets are now 15–20 years old, and their original designs (even with continual and evolving updates) are showing signs of strain from the pace of change now underway in the electricity industry. Many of these changes were not foreseen during the restructuring and wholesale market designs of the 1990s–2000s. Flat demand growth, flattened supply curves, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels are placing pressures on centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets, resulting in low average wholesale energy prices. These markets were designed when supply curves tilted sharply upward, demand grew over time, and capacity was not explicitly compensated to make up for insufficient revenues from an energy-only market. A 2014 FERC staff report notes: A failure to properly reflect in market prices the value of reliability to consumers and operator actions taken to ensure reliability can lead to inefficient prices in the energy and ancillary services markets leading to inefficient system utilization, and muted investment signals.373 107 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000411 The issue of revenue insufficiency and generator retirements in centrally-organized electricity markets is a complex topic, with causality difficult to assign beyond the individual asset/owner level.ttt Each plant has its own cost structure, and plant revenues can differ between neighboring nodes in a single market. Traditional, bilateral-only wholesale markets are not immune to these issues either, but may not be seeing them yet at the same scale as the three eastern RTO/ISOs that have a predominance of merchant generation. An issue that is more prevalent in these regions than in regions with bilateral markets is the PURPA “must-purchase obligation” that still applies to those regions. After Congress amended PURPA in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, many utilities in regions with centrally-organized wholesale markets have sought and received from FERC orders terminating their obligations.374 By contrast, utilities in regions with traditional, bilateral-only wholesale markets remain subject to the PURPA requirement to buy power from Qualifying Facilities (QFs) under PPAs, with up to 20-year terms and at rates that the applicable state regulator has determined reflect the purchasing utility’s avoided costs. In some instances, generation purchased from QFs has displaced utility-owned generation and thus reduced utility revenue. PURPA remains a subject of ongoing debate within the industry, as evidenced by a discussion during a FERC June 2016 Technical Conference.375 5.3.1 Revenue Insufficiency due to Market Structure: The Missing Money Problem In the mid-2000s it became apparent that merchant generators were failing to recover sufficient revenues through the energy-only markets to cover both their variable and fixed costs. The issue subsequently became known as the “missing money problem.”uuu In testimony before a 2014 FERC technical conference, David Patton, the independent market monitor for ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO, and NYISO, described the issue as stemming from overly-stringent planning reserve requirements: With reasonable assumptions about capacity cost and energy prices, [the one-day-in-tenyears] reliability standard implies a value of lost load of $100,000 to $200,000 per MWh. Hence, without substantially inflated shortage prices, energy-only markets cannot provide enough revenue to satisfy planning reserve requirements. Additional revenue is needed to satisfy these requirements, which is the “missing money” problem addressed by the capacity markets.376 William Hogan of Harvard University noted in 2005 that the missing money problem can also be attributed to price caps: The missing money problem arises when occasional market price increases are limited by administrative actions such as price caps. By preventing prices from reaching high levels during times of relative scarcity, these administrative actions reduce the payments that could be applied towards the fixed operating costs of existing generation plants and the investment costs of new plants.377 To mitigate the missing money problem, centrally-organized markets have, to varying degrees, utilized shortage pricing and capacity markets. ttt The market issues discussed in this section are most pertinent to a merchant generator operating within centrally-organized markets that are not subject to regulated rate recovery. uuu The first use of this term is attributed to Roy Shanker in his 2003 testimony before FERC. William W. Hogan, Harvard University, “’Energy Only’ Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy,” September 23, 2005 108 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000412 Shortage Pricing Shortage pricing, also referred to as scarcity pricing, seeks to ensure that energy market revenues reflect the value consumers place on reliability. It does this through administrative rules that raise prices above marginal costs during times of system stress. FERC has actively sought to improve the utilization of techniques like shortage pricing. In a 2014 analysis, FERC staff provided a useful overview of the rationale for shortage pricing: When the system operator is unable to meet system needs, it applies administrative pricing rules to ensure that costs, including the costs associated with the failure to meet minimum operating reserve requirements, are reflected in market prices. …Under such conditions, prices should rise, inducing performance of existing supply resources and encouraging load to reduce consumption so that the system operator would not need to administratively curtail load to maintain reliability. 378 All of the Nation’s RTO/ISOs currently employ shortage pricing to some degree; however, the designs are not uniform. FERC Order No. 831 raised energy offer caps in jurisdictional RTO/ISOs from $1,000 to $2,000/MWh.379 Conditions required to trigger shortage pricing vary from year to year. This variance could present challenges to market participants who require a threshold level of certainty to make an investment decision. Remarks by market monitors David Patton and Joe Bowring critique the practice of relying solely on shortage pricing: [David Patton:] Shortage pricing is not like a capacity market where you’re going to get a level of revenue that might fluctuate by 10 to 20 percent per year. With shortage pricing, you might get 10 years of revenue in one year and then the other nine years the generators are going to think they’re going bankrupt.380 [Joe Bowring]: What will happen if you go through eight years of very low revenues under scarcity pricing … and a significant number of units decide to retire because they can’t see into the future? They don’t know if [in] the ninth or 10th year there’s going to be $20 billion. They retire if the revenues aren’t adequate.381 Capacity Markets Four RTO/ISOs currently operate centralized capacity markets: ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM hold mandatory auctions, while MISO’s is voluntary. Capacity markets address the missing money problem by imposing resource adequacy requirements on load-serving entities (LSEs). Spees, Newell, and Pfeifenberger provide a useful overview of how this process works: A resource adequacy [requirement] requires LSEs to procure sufficient generation or demand-response capacity to serve their own customers’ coincident peak load plus a mandatory planning reserve margin. If each LSE procures their required capacity, then the system as a whole will be able to meet its planning reserve margin requirement and target resource adequacy level. … [Capacity] has value as a stand-alone commodity, the demand for which is driven by LSEs needing to meet their resource adequacy requirement.382 According to the authors, capacity market revenues should in theory ameliorate the missing money problem by providing “the incremental payment needed to recover their investment costs in addition to the operating profits earned through energy and ancillary service sales.”383 Figure 5.4 provides a useful illustration of how capacity payments are intended to close the missing money gap. 109 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000413 Figure 5.4. How Market Prices Allow Resource Costs to be Recovered in a Centrally-organized Wholesale Market384 Revenues from energy sold in the wholesale market pay for a generators' variable costs and some portion of fixed costs (indicated by green arrows). The unrecovered portion of fixed cost (missing money) is recovered through capacity market revenues (indicated by blue arrow). Some observers note that capacity markets may not provide sufficient revenues as originally intended. For example, the 2016 PJM Market Monitor’s report finds PJM’s markets can provide adequate revenue to support some existing capacity, but the outlook varies widely by technology, fuel choice, time interval, and location: Analysis of the total unit revenues of theoretical new entrant CTs and CCs for three representative locations shows that units that entered the PJM markets in 2007 have not covered their total costs, including the return on and of capital, on a cumulative basis through 2016. The analysis also shows that theoretical new entrant CTs and CCs that entered the PJM markets in 2012 have covered their total costs on a cumulative basis in the eastern PSEG [New Jersey] and BGE [Baltimore] zones but have not covered total costs in the western ComEd [Chicago] Zone. Energy market revenues were not sufficient to cover total costs in any scenario except the new entrant CC unit that went into operation in 2012 in BGE, which demonstrates the critical role of capacity market revenue in covering total costs.vvv 385 5.3.2 Revenue Insufficiency due to External Forces While RTO/ISOs have sought to address the missing money problem as previously defined, newer variants of it continue to permeate stakeholder discussions. Economist Severin Borenstein notes that the definition has expanded to include the supply curve impact of subsidies: Money has been going missing for many years, according to owners of power plants. They’ve used the term for more than a decade to refer to the fact that wholesale electricity markets have price caps (mostly between $1,000 and $10,000 per MWh) that constrain how vvv As part of the review of market performance, the market monitor analyzed the net revenues earned by CTs, NGCCs, coal, diesel, nuclear, solar, and wind generating units. 110 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000414 much sellers can make when supply is tight. Without that income, generators argue, it may not be profitable to build new capacity, or extend the life of existing capacity, that is needed to meet demand. More recently, the definition of missing money has been expanded to include the price impacts of subsidized or mandated renewables generation. In California, New York and many other states, wind and solar are pushing down wholesale prices and making continued operation of some nuclear and fossil fuel generation unprofitable. 386 Shifts in the Generation Supply Curve Changes in the Nation’s generation mix have generally reduced revenues for incumbent baseload generators in wholesale markets, as highlighted in QER 1.2: [P]rice suppression is occurring in RTO/ISO wholesale markets, with noticeable amounts of wind and solar generation (and low-cost gas generation). While passing on savings to consumers is desirable, in some regions, these low prices have put pressure on baseload units, particularly zero-carbon emissions nuclear generation.387 Put more specifically, shifts in market supply curves have lowered the infra-marginal rentswww earned by baseload generators. Crucially, this reduction has occurred because of changes along both axes of the supply curve. Along the horizontal (supply) axis, the entry of new resources has pushed the curve to the right, resulting in a lower clearing price at the same level of demand. Meanwhile, reductions in marginal fuel costs (vertical axis) have lowered the slope of the curve. The net effect of these changes—as illustrated by a simulated dispatch curve in ERCOT—is shown in Figure 5.5. www Infra-marginal rents are the differences between the market-clearing price and the submitted bid of each generator. Generators that bid less than the market-clearing price receive a payment equal to this difference. 111 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000415 Figure 5.5. Simulated ERCOT Dispatch Curvesxxx Changes in fuel costs and the supply mix have impacted market clearing prices, and thus lowered inframarginal rents for incumbent generators. Reductions in natural gas prices have clearly flattened the curve, reducing revenues for generation resources. The entry of new, near-zero marginal cost resources has also pushed the overall curve to the right. The entry of wind and solar resources is visible in lower left. Natural Gas and Incumbent Baseload The frequency with which natural gas sets the price of electricity has increased in many of the Nation’s markets. For example, 2017 could mark the first time in PJM’s history that gas is marginal for more intervals than coal (see Figure 5.6). This transition means that infra-marginal rents that were previously based on the marginal cost of coal resources have been supplanted by the marginal cost of natural gas resources. xxx EIA, analysis performed for DOE using EIA and ABB Ventyx software to show estimated plant-specific estimated production costs for July 15 of each year modeled, using then-current delivered energy prices (in 2009 $) within ERCOT and estimated, plant-specific heat rates to estimate plant-specific marginal costs of electricity production, June 2017 112 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000416 Figure 5.6. Type of Fuel Used in PJM (by Real-Time Marginal Units): 2004 through March 2017 388 Natural gas is rising as the marginal electricity generation source in PJM. The low price of natural gas has resulted in the competitive displacement of coal in many of the Nation’s markets. This trend is visible in Figure 5.7 by comparing the 2005 curve to the 2015 version. The interspersed nature of the coal and gas generators in the 2015 curve reflects that the two now compete for the same runtime. While gas had been a mid-merit source in previous years, it has become more of a baseload resource in recent years. The phenomenon is visible on a national level by examining the capacity factors of the respective technologies. Figure 5.7. Annual Average Capacity Factors of Coal and Natural Gas Generators 113 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000417 NGCC generators have seen a steady increase in fleet average capacity factor from 35% in 2005 to 56% in 2015; in that year, the NGCC fleet average eclipsed that of coal generators, which has declined from approximately 68% in 2010 to 55% in 2015.389 Negative Pricing Negative pricing events in electricity markets reflect a complex set of economic, reliability, environmental, and safety variables. The interaction of these variables differs depending on the region, season, and time in question, but negative pricing often reflects some combination of excess generation (often exacerbated by must-run requirements), transmission constraints, and economic factors. According to analysis from LBNL, negative pricing events have historically been rare at many major pricing hubs (less than two percent of total hours in real-time markets in 2016), and have had almost no impact on annual average day-ahead or real-time wholesale electricity prices. However, more frequent negative pricing has been observed in CAISO, and in constrained hubs that feature a relatively large amount of VRE and/or nuclear generation.390 In addition, PJM has observed that “prices go negative at nuclear units buses in approximately 2,176 hours – representing 14 percent of off-peak hours.”391 The term economic factors in this case serves as a catchall for those negative pricing events that are not the direct result of must-run requirements. EIA provides examples of why generators might choose to run, even if it means accepting negative prices: Technical and economic factors may drive power plant operators to run generators even when power supply outstrips demand. For example:  For technical and cost recovery reasons, nuclear plant operators try to continuously operate at full power.  Eligible generators can take a 2.2¢/kWh or $22/MWh[yyy] production tax credit (PTC) on electricity sold. This means that some generators may be willing to sell their output for as low as -$22/MWh to continue producing power. Typically, wind generators are the largest such group in any region.  There are maintenance and fuel-cost penalties when operators shut down and start up large steam turbine (usually fossil-fueled) plants as demand varies over a day or a week. These costs may be avoided if the generator sells at a loss to attract a buyer when demand is low.392 As EIA notes, the PTC can create an incentive for wind generators to bid at negative prices. If other generators located at nodes in the areas affected by negative prices are unable or unwilling to reduce output, they will have to pay the negative price for their output. That scenario has unfolded on some buses in PJM, as outlined in comments to DOE from PJM staff: Tax and subsidy policies have had an impact on the economics of certain types of generation. The Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit and renewable energy mandates have had the most significant impact on nuclear generation. Specifically, the nuclear and wind generation are competing to clear in the market during off-peak hours when wind resources are the strongest and load is reduced. In those off-peak hours, the production tax credit has created an incentive for renewable resources to bid negative prices as they must run in order to receive their payment from the federal treasury. Since 2014, PJM has seen prices go negative at nuclear unit buses in approximately 2,176 hours—representing 14 percent of off-peak hours.393 [footnotes omitted from original text] yyy While the PTC value was $23/MWh in 2016, this figure was based upon EIA’s interpretation of the PTC benefit at the time. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=8870 114 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000418 ERCOT’s market monitor identified 130 negative-priced hours for the entire system in 2016, an increase from 50 hours in 2015.394 Negative prices in ERCOT are now on the rise due to subsidized wind, as noted by William Hogan and Susan Pope in a recent study filed with the PUC of Texas by Calpine and NRG: Prior to the increase in wind and other intermittent capacity in the ISOs, negative prices sometimes occurred in the middle of the night, as load dropped and generators needed for operation the following day were pinned at their minimum loads. In contrast, the increasing incidence of negative prices in ERCOT is caused by the incentive of the owners of wind generation capacity receiving the PTC to continue to produce even when the locational price is negative.395 In addition to the PTC, VRE may also be incentivized to submit negative bids into markets by demand for RECs (to satisfy state environmental mandates and/or corporate sustainability goals). Conventional generators also face economic factors that lead them to submit negative bids. Existing nuclear plants in the United States, as well as some fossil units, may bid in during these periods to avoid costly start-ups and shutdowns.396 For example, steam turbine plants may choose not to cut back their production if they are not designed to cycle economically. Operational attributes can also create or exacerbate negative prices. For example, hydroelectric plants are limited in their ability to curtail output because of environmental and safety reasons. Flood control and wildlife regulations are two important reasons this can take place. As this winter’s record precipitation gave way to snowmelt this spring, CAISO found itself with an abundance of un-curtailed hydroelectricity that competed with solar generation.397 A similar dynamic played out in 2011 following significant precipitation in the Pacific Northwest, as shown in Figure 5.8.zzz zzz In Figure 5.8, Off-peak is 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. on Monday through Saturday and all hours on Sunday. Mid C is Mid-Columbia, COB is California-Oregon Border, and NOB is Nevada-Oregon Border. 115 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000419 Figure 5.8. Negative Northwest Off-Peak Daily Spot Prices ($/MWh) in 2011398 5.3.3 State Actions Impacting Wholesale Markets There is growing concern about the impact of state government intervention in wholesale markets, such as the creation of ZEC programs to keep nuclear plants in operation, as well as RPS and other state policy requirements. This concern was reflected in comments at the May 1–2, 2017 FERC Technical Conference on state policies in the three eastern wholesale markets:aaaa [Roy Shanker, independent consultant]: It is difficult to identify any element in the wholesale electric market (energy, capacity, ancillary services and transmission) that is not being directly and materially impacted by discriminatory mandates driven by state policy actions. Price taking energy and capacity offers linked to these mandates directly impact price formation. The intermittent nature of virtually all RPS resources requires material modification of dispatch and significant increases in flexible resources and associated ancillary services.399 [William Hogan, Harvard University]: The increasing impact of Federal and state policies to support particular technologies, raises questions about the viability of wholesale power markets.400 [Susan Tierney, Analysis Group]: These state policies can and often do affect the price of electricity in wholesale power markets, and the entry, exit and cost of operations of electric generating resources…there is no reason to expect that state decision makers will make aaaa The full transcript of (and all written statements from) this technical conference is available on FERC’s website. FERC Technical Conference, “Docket No. AD17-11-000”, May 1-2, 2017. 116 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000420 determinations that singularly focus on economic efficiency and the continued viability of wholesale capacity-market designs ahead of other all objectives… Already, we see that in a market that depends upon the flow of private capital and diversity in the asset mix, some suppliers of capacity resources (including demand-response and nuclear generation) have recently decided that the markets are not producing financial outcomes consistent with the requirements of private capital markets… I remain concerned that the current centralized wholesale capacity markets in PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE will not be sustainable, from an economic, financial and political point of view and in light of states’ policies and preferences.401 [Cliff Hamel, Navigant Consulting]: [P]roblems in the current centralized [capacity] market approach are fundamental.402 [Samuel Newell, The Brattle Group]: The centralized wholesale markets do not, however, and should not be expected to meet goals they were not designed to meet. Many states now have far-reaching carbon and clean energy goals. Yet today’s centralized energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets are mostly not designed to differentiate generation resources based on their unpriced carbon emissions or other unpriced attributes.403 [Lawrence Makovich, IHS Markit]: In summary, out-of-market interventions cause predictable distortions and consequences, including: 1. Reduced market-based cash flows for non-peaking generating resources, causing lower investment in electric generating production efficiency. 2. Uneconomic displacement of lower cost energy production causing a shift toward a less cost-effective fuel and technology mix and resulting in higher overall average electricity supply costs. 3. Less supply diversity causing more generation production cost and availability risk. 4. Premature retirements of low CO2 emitting resources, causing replacement with higher CO2 emitting resources that subvert market intervention policy goals.404 While this panel of economists commented on these effects on the wholesale markets resulting from state policies, members of a panel of state officials at the same FERC Technical Conference clearly said their states will continue to pursue their policies: [Jeffrey Bentz, New England States Committee on Electricity]: States aren't interested in having markets just for the sake of having markets…405 [Angela O’Connor, Department of Public Utilities of Massachusetts] […] what the legislature requires us to do we have to do…406 [Sarah Hofman, Vermont Public Service Board]: […] we cannot tell what our legislators [what to] do. And so they are going to have policies and it doesn't matter what anybody here or any place else says, they will have policies that set the stage for what the state wants and that's what legislators are for.[…] there is no question that state lawmakers will continue passing legislation that sets public policy. It is now our challenge to continue to work together to find effective ways to carry out those policies while also continuing to benefit from competitive wholesale markets.407 Tony Clark recently expressed similar views on the original policy assumptions behind the creation of centrally-organized wholesale markets: Affordable power was the goal. The current markets are still procuring affordable power but many state public policy makers no longer see that as the only goal. It is little wonder we hear some decry that the markets are not delivering what people want. It is because they were never designed for job creation, tax preservation, politically popular generation, or 117 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000421 anything other than reliable, affordable electricity. To the degree policy makers and elected officials have moved the goal posts, it is time to consider rational pathways forward.408 5.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets Looking Forward Changes in the centrally-organized markets must catch up to the broad technology-driven and policydriven electricity market dynamics identified in the April 14 memo. Overall, centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets are effective at driving energy prices toward suppliers’ short-run marginal costs. However, the revenue insufficiency problem has become more pronounced in recent years. Generator profitability could become a public policy concern if so much generation is financially challenged that the reliability or resilience of the BPS become threatened. New market structures may be necessary to reflect these market dynamics, particularly in an industry in which suppliers with high fixed capital costs and relatively low marginal costs often struggle to recover their long-run average costs. In addition, while markets as currently designed do not explicitly recognize or compensate system resilience, RTO/ISOs are considering ways to better support system resilience objectives in the same way that they explicitly recognized and administratively incorporated reliability standards into dispatch practices in the past. For example, the variety of problems that arose during the Polar Vortex (as discussed in Section 4) caused PJM and ISO-NE to change their capacity market rules to ensure generator performance during scarcity conditions.409 410 In summary, the debates surrounding wholesale markets are complex and multifaceted, but the institutions and the grid itself have historically proven flexible, strong, and able to adapt. Questions about revenue sufficiency and resilience must be addressed quickly, before the fast-moving evolution of our power system outpaces our ability to understand and manage it responsibly. 118 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000422 6 Affordability The April 14 memo asked whether the loss of coal, natural gas, nuclear, and hydroelectric baseload power is making the grid less affordable. There is no widely accepted metric for an “affordable” grid or an “affordable” electricity bill. DOE’s GMI defines affordability as “maintain[ing] reasonable costs to customers.”411 Typically, the meaning of “affordable” is contextual, i.e. dependent on the size of a consumer’s household budget. This indicator of energy affordability can be represented as energy burden, which is a household’s annual spending on energy as a percentage of its gross annual income.412 413 Because electricity is an important energy service, it can be broken out as “electricity burden.”bbbb In 2011, the median electricity burden for all households was four percent, but it averaged 8.3 percent for low-income households and 2.9 percent for non-low-income households.414 415 416 For low-income families, more spending on energy bills translates into less spending on other expenses, such as food, health care, and education.417 The limited increases in electricity rates suggest that electricity bills have not become less affordable for most customers. However, changes in cost allocation and rate designs could have disparate effects on bills for different groups of customers. For example, utilities raising fixed charges to counterbalance decreases in revenues from energy efficiency gains could disproportionately impact low-consumption customers, for whom fixed charges comprise a larger portion of the bill. Customers on fixed incomes and those who rely on electricityintensive medical devices may have an acute need to maintain affordability.418 Most states and utilities offer programs like concessionary rates for these customers, and ensuring affordability options for vulnerable customers remains a priority as electricity stakeholders explore market, regulatory, and rate reforms to accommodate an evolving grid. Low electricity prices can also boost businesses’ competitiveness and bring new economic activity to an area, as evidenced by companies locating electricity-intensive industrial facilities, such as server farms, to regions with low, stable electricity prices.419 420 421 422 Today, many businesses are more actively managing their energy costs by investing heavily in energy efficiency, energy management systems, solar PV installations, and direct PPAs with VRE providers.423 Industrial electricity prices are typically close to wholesale prices because providing electricity to high-voltage, high-use industrial customers is less expensive and more efficient than serving distribution-level customers.424 Thus, low wholesale electricity prices can allow businesses and industrial customers to thrive, support job growth, and drive economic development.425 6.1 Affordability of Generation Portfolios The affordability of a given generation portfolio is largely shaped by region- and state- specific market structures. Merchant investment decisions (where applicable) and regional resource availability (for example, NGCC has a lower levelized cost of electricity (LCOE, the per-MWh cost of building and operating assets over their lifetime) in the Gulf States where gas is abundant than it has in the North bbbb However, this is complicated by the fact that electricity usage varies significantly from region to region, so the electricity burden would be much higher in regions that use electricity for heating and cooling, as is common in the West and South. In addition to electricity, energy burden includes direct fuel use, such as natural gas or propane for cooking and heating, and can vary based on a household’s activities, appliances, and location. 119 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000423 Central states) contribute to regional variation in charges to end-users. 426 The Energy Information Administration estimated in the Annual Energy Outlook for 2017 that the BPS (generation and transmission) comprises roughly two-thirds of the total average price of electricity. Generation costs accounted for 57 percent of the average price of electricity in 2016, compared to distribution’s 32 percent and transmission’s 11 percent.427 In vertically integrated areas, state PUCs seek to avoid uneconomic outcomes and ensure affordable service to customers428 by requiring VIEUs to submit IRPs in which they consider least-cost, long-term plans for providing service including, among other things, LCOE.429 The IRP must also account for any additional state-mandated requirements such as energy efficiency resource standards or RPS.430 Notably, VIEU assets are usually guaranteed the recovery of investment and operational costs regardless of whether they would prove to be cost-competitive in a short-run marginal cost market environment.431 432 By contrast, in some of the centrally-organized markets (e.g., most of the states in PJM, ERCOT, all but two in ISO-NE, NYISO, and Illinois for MISO), the generation portfolio is determined by the wholesale market itself (subject to any generation and demand-side mandates) rather than a state-overseen IRP by the VIEU.cccc Merchant generators make investment decisions by comparing an asset’s expected lifetime costs with the expected revenues from any PPAs, financial incentives such as tax credits, and sales in wholesale energy and capacity markets. Lifetime costs considered by merchant generators include fixed investment costs and operational costs. 6.2 The Wholesale-Retail Disconnect Tracing the relationships between wholesale and retail prices is difficult because ratemaking practices vary widely from state to state, and there are many other contributing factors involved besides the wholesale cost of electricity.433 434 Retail rates include a variety of charges that are not included in the bulk electricity charges passed through by RTO/ISOs or VIEUs. These include components of the transmission costs not captured in the RTO prices (such as state-regulated transmission investments), payments that the distribution utility makes to merchant transmission suppliers, various fixed charges, customer service, state and local sales taxes and franchise fees, and public benefits charges.435 Retail electricity bills can also include additional costs to support state policy goals—such as RPS, energy efficiency resource standards, or programs to promote use of distributed energy resources, among others.436 Most utilities have undertaken substantial programs to modernize their distribution systems, and a significant subset have invested in infrastructure needed to integrate higher levels of distributed energy resources.437 Under established cost-of-service ratemaking principles, these costs are typically allocated to retail customers and periodically examined by regulators. The wholesale-retail electricity price disconnect means that, in most areas, the conventional generation retirements can affect wholesale rates but have little or no immediately visible impact on retail rates. cccc Many state, regional, and Federal policies can impact the expected profits for merchant generators, including environmental regulations; carbon trading programs; tax credits; and state procurements, mandates, or other mechanisms that take generation or demand-side resources out of markets available to merchants and/or subsidize those resources. 120 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000424 However, despite the difficulty in attributing retail price impacts to wholesale changes, considering the trends in both wholesale and retail prices can provide greater understanding of affordability. On average, national retail electricity rates have been roughly flat for more than a decade, and rates have closely followed the historical average since 1960.dddd 438 Retail rates in nominal dollars have been increasing at a low annual rate for approximately two decades, while the real retail price has stayed relatively constant over the last decade, as shown in Figure 6.1. From 2011 to 2016, nominal residential prices increased at an average of 1.9 percent annually, about the same rate as overall inflation.439 In 2016, the national average retail electricity price declined for the first time since 2002, with residential customers paying a national average of 12.55 cents/kWh. Figure 6.1. Average U.S. Residential Sector Retail Electricity Prices over Time440 dddd The use of national averages for this analysis provides a broad picture, but limits insight into regional and state-level impacts of BPS changes that may lead to higher-than-average retail rate increases among some customers and utilities. National averages mean little to subsets of ratepayers seeing significant retail rate increases or those who have faced consistently high bills. Even use of state-level retail averages can mask exceptions that greatly vary from the average. For example, California residents who live near the coast enjoy a temperate climate with limited need for cooling or heating. In contrast, those living inland see very hot summers that require high use of air conditioning and thus see high electric bills. A more thorough analysis would consider affordability and rate increases at a more granular level. 121 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000425 Average retail prices vary widely across states and regions, with New England, California and the MidAtlantic paying the highest rates.441 However, a comparison of electricity rates alone can be misleading; for instance, California’s average residential electricity rate is over 18 cents/kWh (one of the highest in the Nation), but due to low average residential consumption, the average California electricity bill is only $95/month, ranking it in the bottom third of the Nation. By comparison, Washington state has the lowest average retail rates in the Nation at less than nine cents/kWh (less than half the average rate in California), but because of higher consumption, residential customers in that state see average bills of $95/month, the same average electricity bill as in California.442 443 It is not yet clear what impact recent coal, nuclear, and natural gas plant retirements will have on customer bills in the future, nor how the continuing trend of retirements will affect the overall cost of the BPS, which will ultimately be borne by ratepayers. Natural gas generation has proven to be a strong competitor with coal and nuclear power because natural gas prices have fallen over the past decade. Wind and solar generation have also increased, and while their capital costs are much higher than those of natural gas (particularly if normalized by capacity factor), their marginal cost is nearly zero.444 Changes in the BPS since 2002—lower demand, lower natural gas prices, and growth in VRE—have reduced wholesale electricity prices, as shown in Figure 6.2.445 Figure 6.2. Average Wholesale Electric Costs/MWh Have Fallen between 2002 and 2016446 From 2002–2016, wholesale electricity prices have increasingly tracked natural gas prices, and as natural gas generation has increased over time, the differences in price between regions have also decreased (e.g., prices in NYISO and PJM are much closer in 2016 than in 2004). Figure 6.3 illustrates wholesale prices at electricity trading hubs, emphasizing 2016 prices on a regional basis as derived by FERC staff.eeee FERC notes in its 2016 State of the Markets report that prices were down in 2016 from 2015, and that prices in PJM were the lowest they have been since the RTO formed in 1999.447 eeee Derived by FERC staff from S&P Global Intelligence data. Prices are a simple average of day-ahead, on-peak physical prices. 122 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000426 Figure 6.3. Day-Ahead, On-Peak Wholesale Electric Prices Reach Near-Record Lows in 2016448 FERC’s most recent State of the Markets report shows that all areas of the United States are experiencing low wholesale electricity prices. In 2016, prices were highest in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest and were lowest in the Northwest. Historically, wholesale prices would show much more regional variation. The dollar values are average 2016 day-ahead on peak prices; the percentages indicate the change from 2015 to 2016. While wholesale electricity prices have tracked natural gas price trends, the impacts of other generation trends on affordability are less obvious.449 Because coal, hydro, and nuclear plants have historically had relatively stable and predictable fuel costs, these power plants have provided a valuable hedge against the price volatility of natural gas and oil. Today, nuclear, hydro, and VRE all serve as hedges against generation whose fuel cost is more volatile and represents a larger portion of the total delivered price (i.e. natural gas and oil). For example, the variable operating, maintenance, and fuel costs of hydroelectric and nuclear average just $5/MWh and $12/MWh, respectively, compared to $41/MWh for NGCC and $34/MWh for coal.450 Increasingly, VRE also performs a price stabilizing role—wind, solar PV, hydropower, and geothermal generation offer near zero-marginal-cost electricity. To the degree that VRE and nuclear can stabilize the short run cost of bulk power, those resources could also improve the month-to-month manageability of customer bills. Among the nine regions examined in this study, the CAISO+, Midwest, ERCOT, and Central regions have the most non-hydro VRE generation today. RPS compliance costs were found to total $2.6 billion in 123 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000427 2014, averaging $12/MWh for VRE and equating to 1.3 percent of average retail electricity bills.ffff 451 The actual effects of zero-marginal cost electricity on consumers’ bills is situational, and growth in VRE can drive additional costs, including transmission and integration costs.452 453 Because many utility-scale VRE plants are built in locations distant from load centers, they sometimes require major transmission additions to connect the remote generation to the rest of the grid and to load centers. Over the past five years, a portion of the 24,000 miles of new transmission built (about twice the number of miles added from 2006–2010) and $102 billion invested to strengthen the grid and interconnect new generation has been made to interconnect VRE.454 455 Transmission investments (regulated or merchant) can increase bulk power costs and therefore increase customers’ retail bills to the extent that they are not offset by savings attributable to access to lower-cost generation or reduced congestion costs. Higher levels of VRE penetration also require system integration services, such as additional ERS. It is unclear how the costs of these integration requirements will affect wholesale electricity costs as VRE penetrations continue to increase. In addition, as the PTC for wind generation expires and the ITC for residential solar PV installations reduces in the coming years, their costs relative to other resources will rise. However, declining wind and solar capital costs and higher productivity will likely somewhat offset these losses, albeit to an unknown degree.456 457 458 459 Finally, several states have created subsidies to favor or retain nuclear generation. If such subsidies are being funded by taxpayer dollars – like the PTC and ITC – rather than a charge to electricity customers, this will affect wholesale costs in some way, but will probably have little discernable effect on the customers’ retail electricity bills. However, if subsidies for power plant retention are funded as a direct charge to retail electricity customers, electricity bills could rise and affordability could decrease. Overall, ISOs and RTOs face many challenges that ultimately affect the allocation of transmission and integration costs when they make decisions on how to spread those costs among cost-causers, reliability and other service providers, and consumers, as well as decisions on how to keep cost allocation practices up to date as the generation mix, transmission capacity, and load evolves over time.460 461 462 463 6.3 Affordability Looking Forward There appears to be little near-term risk that natural gas prices will rise significantly and thereby reduce electricity affordability. However, natural gas is an extractive commodity traded internationally—prices are affected by policies impacting how the resource is produced, and prices show periodic regional, seasonal, or local price spikes, and even sustained price increases. It is reasonable to expect continuing regional differentials between natural gas delivered costs, reflecting differences in proximity to natural gas production fields, production costs, and deliverability (including the effects of pipeline or liquefied natural gas deliverability constraints). If natural gas prices rise, wholesale electricity costs are likely to rise in regions where natural gas remains the marginal fuel in a significant number of hours. This would be true for both RTO/ISO and non-RTO/ISO regions. It is unclear how rising natural gas prices and ffff Studies on RPS compliance costs do not fully capture the “all-in” costs that the ratepayer (and taxpayers) ultimately bear. These other costs are harder to measure, but may not be insignificant. They may be harder to quantify for many reasons, such as having multiple drivers behind those investments and various distribution-level grid modernization investments (e.g., smart meters and others that are touted to aid VRE integration). New transmission (other than the direct transmission interconnection charged to the renewable generation project and thus reflected in their PPA), as well as effects of VRE variability on the dispatchable fleet, are other examples of costs often not included in grid integration cost studies. Costs of various tax and other subsidies are also not counted. 124 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000428 additional VRE generation would affect the large-scale displacement of coal and nuclear generation, and ultimately, electricity affordability for affected consumers. The variety of generation portfolios operating throughout the U.S. lends itself to further study. To date, limited work has focused on the affordability of the BPS as a system or portfolio—relatively more attention has focused on retail electricity prices464 or the stand-alone cost of generation technologies (such as LCOE). Some research has focused on analysis of system-wide LCOE,465 but more can be done. Looking forward, another potential challenge to affordability is determining how the proliferation of distributed PV across much of the Nation is changing the cost structure for non-participating customers. A growing body of research considers whether and how distributed PV users continue to benefit from their grid connection for balancing services and energy storage, as well as how to reallocate utility energy, capital, and system costs and rates fairly among all users. Concerns about more customers installing distributed PV under net metering tariffs,gggg which potentially shifts costs and increases the burden on non-distributed PV customers, have caused multiple states to re-open their net metering tariff processes and, in some cases, implement new policies. However, some studies have quantified the retail rate impacts of net metering to all residential customers (i.e., participants and non-participants) and found that current and projected levels of net metering have very little impact, especially compared to broader drivers of retail rate increases in the electric industry.466 gggg According to the EIA, “net metering tariffs enable customers to use the electricity they generate in excess of their consumption at certain times to offset their use of electricity from the grid at other times. These tariffs are designed to encourage distributed renewable generation. These arrangements describe how an electric utility customer who installs a qualifying generator (typically a rooftop solar array, less often a small wind turbine, or a small combined heat-and-power system) will be compensated by their utility for the electricity they generate in excess of their consumption.” https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=6190 125 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000429 7 Policy Recommendations The April 14 memo asked staff to “not only analyze problems but also provide concrete policy recommendations and solutions.” To that end, DOE staff prepared a list of recommendations below. Some actions fit squarely within DOE’s authority, while others might fall to other government agencies or private organizations. Wholesale markets: FERC should expedite its efforts with states, RTO/ISOs, and other stakeholders to improve energy price formation in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets. After several years of fact finding and technical conferences, the record now supports energy price formation reform, such as the proposals laid out by PJM467 and others.468 Further, negative offers should be mitigated to the broadest extent possible. Valuation of Essential Reliability Services (ERS): Where feasible and within its statutory authority, FERC should study and make recommendations regarding efforts to require valuation of new and existing ERS by creating fuel-neutral markets and/or regulatory mechanisms that compensate grid participants for services that are necessary to support reliable grid operations. Pricing mechanisms or regulations should be fuel and technology neutral and centered on the reliability services provided. DOE should provide technical and policy support that strengthen and accelerate these efforts. Bulk Power System (BPS) resilience: DOE should support utility, grid operator, and consumer efforts to enhance system resilience. Transmission planning entities should conduct periodic disasterpreparedness exercises involving electric utilities, regional offices of Federal agencies, and state agencies. NERC should consider adding resilience components to its mission statement and develop a program to work with its member utilities to broaden their use of emerging ways to better incorporate resilience. RTOs and ISOs should further define criteria for resilience, identify how to include resilience in business practices, and examine resilience-related impacts of their resource mix. Promote Research and Development (R&D) of next-generation/21st century grid reliability and resilience tools: DOE should focus R&D efforts to enhance utility, grid operator, and consumer efforts to enhance system reliability and resilience. DOE R&D opportunities include the following activities:  Develop grid technical tools to facilitate new-generation technologies’ operations to support BPS reliability (e.g., by enabling technologies to provide ERS), and maximize use of the DOE national laboratories.  Expand cooperation on grid reliability across North America, including working with NERC to further enhance the reliability of our shared BPS through technical engagement with Mexico and Canada.  With the National Science Foundation, sponsor the development of new open-source software for the next-generation electric grid research community.  Focus R&D on improving VRE integration through grid modernization technologies that can increase grid operational flexibility and reliability through a variety of innovations in sensors and controls, storage technology, grid integration, and advanced power electronics. The Grid Modernization Initiative should also consider additional applications of high-performance computing for grid modeling to advance grid resilience. Support Federal and regional approaches to electricity workforce development and transition assistance: In partnership with other agencies and the private sector, DOE should facilitate programs 126 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000430 and regional approaches for electricity sector workforce development. Unemployed workers nearing but not yet eligible for retirement may have difficulty retraining after careers built on specialized skills that may be in declining demand. Where possible, Federal agencies should leverage existing government, nongovernment, labor, and industry workforce consortia. Energy dominance: Executive Order 13783 (Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth) outlined an approach to promote the clean and safe development of energy resources while at the same time minimizing regulatory barriers to energy production, economic growth, and job creation. The Order called for a rescission of certain energy and climate related policies, rescinded specific reports, and ordered the review of key environmental regulations. While DOE is not the main agency tasked in the Order, it should continue to prioritize energy dominance and implementing the Executive Order broadly and quickly. Infrastructure development: DOE and related Federal agencies should accelerate and reduce costs for the licensing, relicensing, and permitting of grid infrastructure such as nuclear, hydro, coal, advanced generation technologies, and transmission. DOE should review regulatory burdens for siting and permitting for generation and gas and electricity transmission infrastructure and should take actions to accelerate the process and reduce costs. Specific reforms could include the following:  Hydropower: Encourage FERC to revisit the current licensing and relicensing process and minimize regulatory burden, particularly for small projects and pumped storage.  Nuclear Power: Encourage the NRC to ensure the safety of existing and new nuclear facilities without unnecessarily adding to the operating costs and economic uncertainty of nuclear energy. Revisit nuclear safety rules under a risk-based approach.  Coal Generation: Encourage EPA to allow coal-fired power plants to improve efficiency and reliability without triggering new regulatory approvals and associated costs. In a regulatory environment that would allow for improvement of the existing fleet, DOE should pursue a targeted R&D portfolio aiming at increasing efficiency. Electric-gas coordination: Utilities, states, FERC, and DOE should support increased coordination between the electric and natural gas industries to address potential reliability and resilience concerns associated with organizational and infrastructure differences. DOE and FERC should support wellfunctioning commodity markets for natural gas by expeditiously processing liquefied natural gas export and cross-border natural gas pipeline applications. 127 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000431 8 Areas for Further Research DOE staff identified several research topics that are relevant to the April 14 memo and merit further indepth analysis. Some topics may be appropriate for offices within the Department, national laboratories, academia, other government agencies, or private organizations. Market structure and pricing  Study mechanisms for enabling equitable, value-based remuneration for desired grid attributes—such as ERS, fuel availability, high resilience, low emissions, flexibility, etc.—with alternative market and non-market structures. This research could assess potentially underrecognized contributions from baseload power plants, using fuel-neutral metrics and values relevant to analyze all resource options.  Evaluate ongoing capacity market reforms. Several of the Nation’s electricity markets use mandatory capacity markets to procure capacity for future years and ensure resource adequacy. The design of these constructs has been the subject of near-constant debate within the RTO/ISOs and before FERC. After undergoing substantial changes from 2014–2015, capacity markets have come under new scrutiny in light of recent actions by restructured states to preserve or promote certain resources or resource types and to further state policy goals.  Explore market operations in a higher VRE/low marginal cost system, and examine recent changes in energy price trends—including the drivers of wholesale electricity prices in the context of limited load growth—quantifying the relative contributions of fossil fuel prices. With significant amounts of near-zero marginal cost generation available, security-constrained economic dispatch of BPS based on marginal costs may not sufficiently compensate resources for all fixed and variable costs. Academic and other research should be expanded in this area, to include capacity market reforms and the role of capacity markets in a higher VRE/low marginal cost system. Reliability and resilience  Develop policy metrics and tools for evaluating BPS-wide provision of resilience and considering all aspects of the electricity system that contribute to resilience, including regional generation characteristics, imports and exports, fuel supply and storage, transmission capability, DR, electricity storage, inertia, and other factors that determine the ability of grid operators to provide reliable electricity supplies.  As PJM notes, “criteria for resilience are not explicitly defined or quantified today.”469 Each RTO/ISO should strive to explicitly define resilience on its system and conduct resource diversity assessments to more fully understand the resilience of different resource portfolios. Federal, state, and local work to define and support system-wide resilience is also needed.  EIA and NERC should examine ways to improve power generator fuel delivery data collection; additional data on fuel deliveries and potential disruptions would further improve forecasting necessary for electric reliability planning. 128 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000432 Cost and affordability  Estimate the bulk power system-wide costs of different generation mixes, also considering the sensitivity of system costs to various fuel price fluctuations. Further, examine the relationship between wholesale and retail electricity rates to understand the present disconnect.  On a regular basis, update the EIA analysis of subsidies and support for electricity production (most recently updated using FY 2013 data).470 Regulatory   Explore the potential for utilizing existing Federal authorities under the Federal Power Act and the DOE Organization Act, among others, to ensure system reliability and resilience. Explore costs and benefits of states applying cost-of-service regulation to specific at-risk plants that contribute to grid resilience. In centrally-organized wholesale markets, these resources may sometimes be unable to recoup all costs of generating electricity—especially capital investments that are needed to ensure long-term viability. 129 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000433 Appendix A: National and Regional Profiles 130 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC 000434 U.S. National Profile Retirements, 2002-201i - son 1mm 15? an? azun A VIEU 30 2002-2016 25 Retirements Energy Soumes Notes: (GW) Coal Capacity values are summer capacity. 20 Data for utility-scale resources only 15 Natural Gas (CC) MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas Natural Gas (CT) technologies: CC combined cycle, CT 10 Natural Gas (5T) combustion turbine, ST steam turbine. 5 Nuclear Ownership type: VIEU vertically Hydro integrated electric utility. Map includes Wind 2017 01 actual and 02-4 announced - retirements. Prices: Natural gas Henry 80% OII . . Solar Hub, Coal Central App., ElectrICIty PJM 60% Western Hub. Other 'Total Capacity Reduction calculation: 40% retired capacity (retired capacity 2016 209? operational capacity) 0 $25950 rices rea $20 $200 coal/gas electricity Coal 2002 2016 $15 $150 Capacity (MW) 884,930 1 ,056,710 Generation 3,860,853 4,085,765 $10 $100 $5550 Retirements by Energy'o rce,2002-2016 of Generators MW 80% Coal 531 59,392 60% Natural Gas 965 50,593 409? Nuclear 6 4,66? on 1,083 14,980 20% Hydro 140 283 Other (all other sources) 471 2,147 80% tam? Total Cap. Reduction? 11.1% 132,062 60% NERG Reserve Margn, 2 Target Actual 23 58% 40% 20% Total NERC Area 0% 7 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Depamt?myy U.S. National Profile Capacity Mix Generation Mix 2.25 1% '96 ?1 28% 1? 34% "El-1? Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Generation (million own) Coal 2.00 - Natural Gas (all) 1.75 Natural Gas (CC) 150 Natural Gas (CT) 125 I, Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear 1'00 Hydro 0-75 Wind 0.25 .1 . Solar o.oo 133m Other 2002 2009 2016 2002 2016 Capacity 8. Generation by En rgy Source, 2002 8. 2016 Capacity Generation 2002 2018 2002 2018 EnergySource GW GW thous. own thous. awn Coal 315.4 36% 270.1 26% 1,933.1 50% 1,240.1 30% NaturalGas 312.5 35% 447.0 42% 685.4 18% 1,380.3 34% Combined Cycle (CC) 106.1 12% 239.5 23% 387.7 10% 1,152.0 28% Combustion Turbine (CT) 103.4 12% 131.0 12% 98.8 3% 129.6 3% Steam Turbine (ST) 103.0 12% 76.4 7% 198.9 5% 98.6 2% Nuclear 98.7 11% 99.3 9% 780.1 20% 805.3 20% Hydro 79.4 9% 80.0 8% 264.3 7% 265.8 7% ??nd 44 0% 81.3 8% 10.4 0% 226.9 6% on 59.7 7% 36.4 3% 94.5 2% 23.9 1% Solar 0.4 0% 21.5 2% 0.6 0% 36.8 1% Other 14.6 2% 21.2 2% 92.5 2% 106.7 3% Total 884.9 100% 1,058.7 100% 3,880.9 100% 4,085.8 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Depamlscebimls New England Regional Profile Energy Sources Notes: Coal Capacityvalues are summer Natural Gas (CC) capacrty. Data for utility-scale resources only MW Natural Gas (CT) nameplate capacity). Natural 63561.) Natural gas technologies: Nuclear CC combined cycle, Retirements, 2002?2017 Hydro CT combustionturbine, Wind ST steam turbine. Ownership Oil type:V EU vertically Solar integrated electric utility. Map Other includes 2017 01 actual and 02-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas =A gon. Gates, Coal Central App., Electricity ISO-NE Mass Hub. ?Total %Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacitv/ (retired capacity+ 2016 operational capacity) 4 2m2?2016 Retirements 3 (GW) 2 1 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% $25 $250 Prices (real 20095) coal/gas electric'ty $20$2m $10510) $5 $50 100% 80% 60% 40% - 20% 100% 80% 60% Capacity (MW) 1 (71500 ()1.000 1.500 A .. 1 )2000 )2.500 Ownership A A Merchant 0 VIEU A .4. 2002 201 6 Capacity (MW) 28,338 32,303 Generation 124,613 108,802 Retirements by Energy urce,2002-2016 of Generators MW Coal 7 784 Natural Gas 14 837 Nuclear 1 612 Ol 74 1,808 Hydro 50 27 Other (all other sources) 45 140 Total Cap. Reduction' 1 1.5% 4,209 40% NERO Reserve 20% - Target Actual England 16.74% 20.32% 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Depa?nmvb?w New England Regional Profile 2002 Capacity ix Generation ix 16 14 12 1o enamoo 2M2 2009 2016 a ?All I I Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Capacity 8. Generation by En Energy Source Coal NaturalGas Combined Cycle (CC) Combustion Turbine (CT) Steam Turbine (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Total 2016 2002 rgy Source, 2002 8 2016 Capaclty 2002 28.3 100% 2016 GW 2.0 13.? 110.5 1.7 32100% 2002 thous. 18.8 44.8 35.6 5.4 33.9 6.2 0.0 11 1 0.0 9.8 124.6 Generation 2016 thous. 15% 2.8 2% 36% 5427% 32100% 108.8 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Depam My New York Regi Energy Sources Coal Natural Gas (CC) Natural Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro onal Profile Notes: Capacityvalues are summer capacity. Data for utility-scale resources only MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas technologies: CC combined cycle, CT combustion turbine, CurrertOwrerst'p Retied $49 Wind ST steam turbine. Ownership oil Vertically Solar integrated 9'95"? Map Retirements 2002?2017 Other includes 2017 Q1 actual and 02-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas =Transco ZS NY, Coal: Central App., Electricity NYISO NYC Zone J. ?Total %Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacity/ (retired capacity+ 2016 A operational capacity) 0 4 2002-2016 A A Retirements 3 (GW500 100% 1.000 1.500 2.000 80% 2.500 Owr Ish' 60% A Swim VIEU 40% 20% I A $255250 2009$) noes rea $20 $200 coal/gas electric?ty 2002 2016 $15 $150 Capacity (MW) 35,642 39,975 Generation 145,126 140,728 $10 $10) Retirements by Energy ource,2002-2016 100% of Generators MW 80% Goal 26 2,129 60% Natural Gas 37 1 ,202 40% Nuclear 0 0 200/ Ol 17 1,139 Hydro 13 15 100% WW Other (all othersources) 24 45 80% - apac'ty 0? Total%Cap.Reduction' 10.2% 4,529 60% -m A 40% NERC Reserve Margn,2 20% . Target Actual 0% . York 15.00% . 23.35% . 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Departmentobg?gw New York Regional Profile 2002 2009 2016 3 Ca I .paaty MIX 0%1% . Coal - Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Generation Wind Mix Oil Solar Other Data Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal - -- Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Capacity Generation by En - Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 Energy Source GW GW lhous. thous. Coal 4.1 12% 1.7 4% 23.2 16% 1.8 1% NaturalGas 14.1 40% 22.1 55% 43.0 30% 62.8 45% Combined Cycle 4.8 13% 9.0 23% 22.3 15% 43.9 31% Combustion Turbine (CTSteam Turbine (ST) 6.5 18% 9.5 24% 18.3 13% 12.7 9% Nuclear 5.0 14% 5.4 14% 39.6 27% 41.6 30% Hydro 4.1 12% 4.7 12% 25.0 17% 26.6 19% Wind 0Solar 0Other 0Total 35.6 100% 40.0 100% 145.1 100% 140.7 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U-S- Deparunemm Mid-Atlantic Regional Profile Retirements, 2002-2017 Ownersh'p A GE 4) A A Merchant . A VIEU . . I. .: :1 500 0 1,000 A I . Merchant I 20?) '2 22,500 2 002-2016 Retirements Energy Sources ?0?55: (6W1 Capacnty values are summer capacrty. Data Coal for utility-scale resources only(1+ MW Natura Gas (CC) nameplate capacrty). Natural gas Natural Gas (CT) technologies: CC combined cycle, CT 4 Natural 635 (ST) combustionturbine, ST=steam turbine. 2 Nuclear Ownership type: VIEU =vertically Hydro integrated electric utility. Map includes 100% Wind 2017 01 actual andQZ-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas 80% 5 M3, Coal Central App., Electricity: PJM olar 60% Other Western Hub. ?Total Capacny Reduction calculation: 40% retired capacity/(retired capacity+ 2016 operational capacity) 20% $25 $250 Total Capacity&Genera Prim (real 2009s] 2002 2016 $20 52m coal/gas elechic'ty $15 $150 5 MM Capacity (MW) 180,697 186,759 Generation 833,01 1 810,922 $10 $1a) $5 $50 Retirements by Energy . urce, 2002-2016 100% of Generators MW 8096 Coal 163 21,791 60% Natural Gas 152 6,315 40% Nuclear 0 0 20?/ Oil 173 5,326 Hydro 3 2 100% Other (all othersources) 95 224 80% Total Cap. Reduction" 15.3% 33,657 60% 40% 20% 0% 2CDZ Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Mid-Atlantic Regional Profile 2009 Capacity ix Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear 23% Hydro Generation 0% 0% Wind Mix 1% 1%1% Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, NorthAmerican Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 100 Capaaty; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan, ACC 000486   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 ACC 000487 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv ACC 000488 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Andrea Gaston Gill, Susan Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:05:00 PM Hello again,   My apologies for not being more specific. I see on the Commissioner’s registration the hotel information, however, are his accommodations covered by HEPG?   Sorry for the confusion.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Andrea Gaston Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:03 PM To: 'Gill, Susan' Cc: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon Susan,   I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Little’s participation in the HEPG Plenary Session, in particular, his accommodations. Your email mentions travel arrangements, but if I could get the specifics on the hotel that would be great. We are discussing the Commissioner’s travel and I would like to make sure I stay on track with the planning details.   Thank you.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   ACC 000489 From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54 AM To: Doug Little ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" ACC 000490 Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000491 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan Andrea Gaston Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:11:09 PM Hi Andrea,   Yes, HEPG will book and cover Commissioner Little’s hotel accommodations. We only include the name to the hotel on the reply form so that he will know where he is heading. Will that work with AZ’s policies?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 4:05 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hello again,   My apologies for not being more specific. I see on the Commissioner’s registration the hotel information, however, are his accommodations covered by HEPG?   Sorry for the confusion.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Andrea Gaston Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:03 PM To: 'Gill, Susan' Cc: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon Susan,   I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Little’s participation in the HEPG Plenary Session, in ACC 000492 particular, his accommodations. Your email mentions travel arrangements, but if I could get the specifics on the hotel that would be great. We are discussing the Commissioner’s travel and I would like to make sure I stay on track with the planning details.   Thank you.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54 AM To: Doug Little ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  ACC 000493 Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000494 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Andrea Gaston Gill, Susan Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:12:00 PM Susan,   Yes, that will work fine. I will wait for your update and any other information necessary for the Commissioner.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:11 PM To: Andrea Gaston Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hi Andrea,   Yes, HEPG will book and cover Commissioner Little’s hotel accommodations. We only include the name to the hotel on the reply form so that he will know where he is heading. Will that work with AZ’s policies?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 4:05 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hello again,   My apologies for not being more specific. I see on the Commissioner’s registration the hotel ACC 000495 information, however, are his accommodations covered by HEPG?   Sorry for the confusion.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Andrea Gaston Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:03 PM To: 'Gill, Susan' Cc: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon Susan,   I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Little’s participation in the HEPG Plenary Session, in particular, his accommodations. Your email mentions travel arrangements, but if I could get the specifics on the hotel that would be great. We are discussing the Commissioner’s travel and I would like to make sure I stay on track with the planning details.   Thank you.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54 AM To: Doug Little ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again? ACC 000496   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not ACC 000497 everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000498 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Andrea Gaston Gill, Susan Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Thursday, September 21, 2017 11:28:00 AM Good morning Susan,   I wanted to let you know that Commissioner Little will not be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session on October 12-13. The Commissioner sends his sincere regrets and appreciation for the invitation.   Thank you.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:11 PM To: Andrea Gaston Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hi Andrea,   Yes, HEPG will book and cover Commissioner Little’s hotel accommodations. We only include the name to the hotel on the reply form so that he will know where he is heading. Will that work with AZ’s policies?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 4:05 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hello again,   ACC 000499 My apologies for not being more specific. I see on the Commissioner’s registration the hotel information, however, are his accommodations covered by HEPG?   Sorry for the confusion.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Andrea Gaston Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:03 PM To: 'Gill, Susan' Cc: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon Susan,   I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Little’s participation in the HEPG Plenary Session, in particular, his accommodations. Your email mentions travel arrangements, but if I could get the specifics on the hotel that would be great. We are discussing the Commissioner’s travel and I would like to make sure I stay on track with the planning details.   Thank you.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54 AM To: Doug Little ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you ACC 000500 mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in ACC 000501 heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me. Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv ACC 000502 From: To: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan A Andrea Gaston RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Tuesday, September 26, 2017 10:48:47 AM Good afternoon, Andrea,   I understand that Commissioner Little will begin his appointment as  Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental and External Affairs in the DOE beginning next month. So that I may update our records, may I ask you to send me his new contact information if or once you have it?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:28 PM To: Gill, Susan A Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good morning Susan,   I wanted to let you know that Commissioner Little will not be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session on October 12-13. The Commissioner sends his sincere regrets and appreciation for the invitation.   Thank you.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:11 PM To: Andrea Gaston Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hi Andrea,   Yes, HEPG will book and cover Commissioner Little’s hotel accommodations. We only include the ACC 000503 name to the hotel on the reply form so that he will know where he is heading. Will that work with AZ’s policies?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 4:05 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hello again,   My apologies for not being more specific. I see on the Commissioner’s registration the hotel information, however, are his accommodations covered by HEPG?   Sorry for the confusion.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Andrea Gaston Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:03 PM To: 'Gill, Susan' Cc: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon Susan,   I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Little’s participation in the HEPG Plenary Session, in particular, his accommodations. Your email mentions travel arrangements, but if I could get the specifics on the hotel that would be great. We are discussing the Commissioner’s travel and I would like to make sure I stay on track with the planning details.   Thank you.   Best regards,   ACC 000504 Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54 AM To: Doug Little ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   ACC 000505 http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000506 To: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan A RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Thursday, September 28, 2017 9:25:31 AM Hello Susan,   I am still awaiting the Commissioner’s new contact information at the DOE, however, he did want me to go ahead and share his personal contact information with you. He also wanted me to pass along that he would love to remain involved with HEPG if deemed appropriate in his new position. The Commissioner said that he truly valued the relationship with HEPG and hopes to maintain the connection. Here is is cell phone and email:   d   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan A [mailto:susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2017 10:49 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon, Andrea,   I understand that Commissioner Little will begin his appointment as  Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental and External Affairs in the DOE beginning next month. So that I may update our records, may I ask you to send me his new contact information if or once you have it?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:28 PM To: Gill, Susan A Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good morning Susan, ACC 000507   I wanted to let you know that Commissioner Little will not be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session on October 12-13. The Commissioner sends his sincere regrets and appreciation for the invitation.   Thank you.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:11 PM To: Andrea Gaston Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hi Andrea,   Yes, HEPG will book and cover Commissioner Little’s hotel accommodations. We only include the name to the hotel on the reply form so that he will know where he is heading. Will that work with AZ’s policies?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 4:05 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hello again,   My apologies for not being more specific. I see on the Commissioner’s registration the hotel information, however, are his accommodations covered by HEPG?   Sorry for the confusion.   Andrea Gaston ACC 000508 Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Andrea Gaston Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:03 PM To: 'Gill, Susan' Cc: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon Susan,   I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Little’s participation in the HEPG Plenary Session, in particular, his accommodations. Your email mentions travel arrangements, but if I could get the specifics on the hotel that would be great. We are discussing the Commissioner’s travel and I would like to make sure I stay on track with the planning details.   Thank you.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54 AM To: Doug Little ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   ACC 000509 From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. ACC 000510 We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000511 From: To: Subject: Date: Andrea Gaston Gill, Susan A RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Thursday, September 28, 2017 9:26:00 AM Hello Susan,   I am still awaiting the Commissioner’s new contact information at the DOE, however, he did want me to go ahead and share his personal contact information with you. He also wanted me to pass along that he would love to remain involved with HEPG if deemed appropriate in his new position. The Commissioner said that he truly valued the relationship with HEPG and hopes to maintain the connection. Here is his cell phone and email:     Please let me know if you need anything else.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan A [mailto:susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2017 10:49 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon, Andrea,   I understand that Commissioner Little will begin his appointment as  Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental and External Affairs in the DOE beginning next month. So that I may update our records, may I ask you to send me his new contact information if or once you have it?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:28 PM To: Gill, Susan A ACC 000512 Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good morning Susan,   I wanted to let you know that Commissioner Little will not be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session on October 12-13. The Commissioner sends his sincere regrets and appreciation for the invitation.   Thank you.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:11 PM To: Andrea Gaston Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hi Andrea,   Yes, HEPG will book and cover Commissioner Little’s hotel accommodations. We only include the name to the hotel on the reply form so that he will know where he is heading. Will that work with AZ’s policies?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 4:05 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hello again,   My apologies for not being more specific. I see on the Commissioner’s registration the hotel information, however, are his accommodations covered by HEPG? ACC 000513   Sorry for the confusion.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Andrea Gaston Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:03 PM To: 'Gill, Susan' Cc: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon Susan,   I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Little’s participation in the HEPG Plenary Session, in particular, his accommodations. Your email mentions travel arrangements, but if I could get the specifics on the hotel that would be great. We are discussing the Commissioner’s travel and I would like to make sure I stay on track with the planning details.   Thank you.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54 AM To: Doug Little ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   ACC 000514 Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel ACC 000515 order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000516 From: To: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan A Andrea Gaston RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Thursday, September 28, 2017 11:18:56 AM Thank you very much, Andrea. I am sure that Bill Hogan, Ashley Brown et al will want to keep in touch with the Commissioner.   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2017 12:27 PM To: Gill, Susan A Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hello Susan,   I am still awaiting the Commissioner’s new contact information at the DOE, however, he did want me to go ahead and share his personal contact information with you. He also wanted me to pass along that he would love to remain involved with HEPG if deemed appropriate in his new position. The Commissioner said that he truly valued the relationship with HEPG and hopes to maintain the connection. Here is his cell phone and email:     Please let me know if you need anything else.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan A [mailto:susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2017 10:49 AM To: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon, Andrea, ACC 000517   I understand that Commissioner Little will begin his appointment as  Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental and External Affairs in the DOE beginning next month. So that I may update our records, may I ask you to send me his new contact information if or once you have it?   Best,   Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:28 PM To: Gill, Susan A Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good morning Susan,   I wanted to let you know that Commissioner Little will not be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session on October 12-13. The Commissioner sends his sincere regrets and appreciation for the invitation.   Thank you.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan_Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:11 PM To: Andrea Gaston Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hi Andrea,   Yes, HEPG will book and cover Commissioner Little’s hotel accommodations. We only include the name to the hotel on the reply form so that he will know where he is heading. Will that work with AZ’s policies?   Best,   ACC 000518 Susan   From: Andrea Gaston [mailto:AGaston@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 4:05 PM To: Gill, Susan Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Hello again,   My apologies for not being more specific. I see on the Commissioner’s registration the hotel information, however, are his accommodations covered by HEPG?   Sorry for the confusion.   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Andrea Gaston Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 1:03 PM To: 'Gill, Susan' Cc: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Good afternoon Susan,   I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Little’s participation in the HEPG Plenary Session, in particular, his accommodations. Your email mentions travel arrangements, but if I could get the specifics on the hotel that would be great. We are discussing the Commissioner’s travel and I would like to make sure I stay on track with the planning details.   Thank you.   Best regards,   Andrea Gaston Executive Aide to Commissioner Doug Little Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 ACC 000519 (602) 542-0745 agaston@azcc.gov   From: Gill, Susan [mailto:Susan Gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 10:54 AM To: Doug Little ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: RE: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Great, we are glad that you will come to Calgary.  The attachment did not come through; would you mind trying again?   Thanks,   Susan   From: Doug Little [mailto:dlittle@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 1:40 PM To: Gill, Susan ; Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Andrea Gaston Subject: Re: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13   Susan,   Looks like a terrific program…attached please find my registration.   Best regards,   Doug   ---------  Doug Little Commissioner   Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 (602) 542-0656   http://www.azcc.gov   This message, including any attachments, is the property of the Arizona Corporation Commission and is solely for the use of the individual or entity intended to receive it.  It may contain confidential and proprietary information and any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distr bution is prohibited.  If you are not the intended recipient(s) or if you have received this message in error, please contact the sender by reply email and permanently delete this message.   ACC 000520 From: "Gill, Susan" Date: Thursday, August 17, 2017 at 12:39 PM To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan" Subject: Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC 000521 State of Arizona Wm: To Record mama 30mm tremble Income? Ihemiano way. Travel Claim Cameron's roan 'fyouma Rem ?mutated roan myourmpamrrormlomm unmomuon. Indhentoihe Commission (Short Form) Brit-550m rum ram-mun. mmum system on a Iii-Mutual Comm Fun I mocoarormoce expensel I am Dunn am? I 1200 Wuhh Strut, Phoe?x AZ IEmplayee's Home Adam? and am Ema DI. Na Purpose or alm I Vahide ?l'ype: Du- D-I-I Dwr-I Din-9- Departure Arrival Overright Odometer Odomerer ?as 1 Rate Mum, Actual Mod Lodging omer Transporta- Travel Date Tum Haw From Trme Place Armed At Start End um I gum- cm Costs games non Costs 11242018 Pinon): Beach - - 1/2812018 Palm Beach Phoenix - - AIRFARE - - - - 843. Cl El Onnlo? say swim-Ice: Less Commute was: I CERTIFY the Bud wiihin his [raw claim for I pub": m. and In mister! an TOMS 1mm Abate . . 843 60 applicablo mall. lava. Inventions, grants and contacts. I lurther'CER?Tl'Y Mo and 4 Travel Polluy Ind no amount: clan-d npmsem ACTUAL WEE) mm under hand Mia the nun-prized sum buslmu. and that I am not remesthg any manna-ms not loud or not may expand-d. I travel Tad: mm ?mm adv-non an iuuod. I AGREE tho amount an be mum? any awry, wages or (and Mutant-mm duo in m. wrath?r lilac"! all was mom-5w. be rammed mu minth (E) Inbn Alls. 35-1910 . Grand ?8.00 Traveler?s Signature: Date: Total Travol Clalm (this Page) 3 643.60 AI mo WI arm. I the menses clam-ed were incurred {u anthem-d 3m? basin.? ad that are correct and proper chug-n. CERTIFY lunhor mos: emandiwu-ansaaium ar- fora via puuic pupa. an mm MI: I bus. lid I APPROVE the muses as outlined abovo {or mimbunmom. W: Nun: Swen/hora Siam Dds: mvamrrorur 10M '5 '1 Process Level I Pay Code WM 33: Pay Period End Date Pay on 523$" Eprect Accounting Unit 31?? Adivlty Acuvny Acct Category S?v/ 7 PD ON DATED 7 471 r? 612m MW AA RECORD monom- (- Ihehhu. Phoemx to West Palm Beach Tetal Paid: 2 Adults I 6 Wednesday January 24, 2018 Sunday January 28. 2018 I 5 11 3? ?ncom? Locazor Resematiun Name PHXIPBI wammberCMmew swws'rmteduovzs. 2017 Flight Depan Arrive Fm: Amount American leminm; Phoenix (PHX) Charlotte (CLT) uso $439.30 UBD 570 Jammy 24. 2018 07:30 AM January 24, 2018 0124 PM Travel Tune 2 5% 500?"? 5?58 1 Taxes a F009 mass Plane?rype 32i Seat 280 . 286 Texas S12LM LSD Amerlcan Charbtte (CH) West Palm Boach 1 784 January 24. 2018 02:25 PM January 24. 2015 04:16 PM ?39 IA Havel Time: I 51 Booking Cede: 7 Class ?002)an Plane Type -. 32'. - f? Ssal .240 . 24v - s? I . $511.20 USD Flight Depart ArriVe American Alvlinm West Palm Beach Charm (0LT) 2005 January 28, 20% 01:08 PM January 28, 2018 0&07 PM "naval Time: 1 59 Soaking Code . Econamy Plat? ?yes .321 See: . 27:: 27c Amerlcan Airiims Charlotte Phoenix (PHX) 1 932 January 28. 2015 05:45 PM January 26, 2018 08:33 PM 'I'ravcx lime 4 42 Booking Code 6139s -. Ewnmy wa'Mm - 3.2: See; 26': Receipt muse! NUMBER mmanr rum NUMBER FARE Mac/Gum TICKET 10w. . WWI) DUNN.NANCY Faun-mm mu Endorsements/Restrictions FLT TIME NOVALUEI Your trip is in 52 days. Airina Gunman Number: American Allan?:- Prioolhe'l?rip "tuber: 117-755754-7a Won ?ruled t? Phoenlx West Palm Beach West Palm Beach Phoenix Summary of Charges I Receipt Total price: $811.20 Passengers: Wed Jan 24 GI no 6.. Boyd Dun Tlcket Number.? uancy Dunn Ticket Numb_ Phoell'x West Palm Beach PM American Alrlnaa Fight :70 an 54m. I768 mm 05pm: Phoenlx Sky Harborlnl?l (PHX). Phoenix, AZ Arrive: M12 Douglas lull Alrpod (CU). Charlotte. NC Md: Cabin -AlrbusA321 1h ?lm layoverh Cha'lo?e 4:16 PM American Mllnes Flight 1784 1h 61m. 592 wins Depart: Charlotte Douglas Airport (0LT), Charlotte, NC Arrive: Palm Beach Iml Almost (FBI). Vlbs?l Pain Beach, FL Main Cabin - Almus A321 Purchase dams: Nov 25 2017 Payment meshed: Billng mm: Boyd Tlckat cost: $26300 Taxes lees $42.60 11m 2 Total price: $11.20 BM No Booldrm Foo Prices arein Udelars See heme hformatlon 10r add?ond fees that may apply. This Itinerary 81mm of Charges is your of?clal recalpl. Contact Informa?on Sun Jan 28 West Palm Beach ?r Phoenix Pal-.cu Amerimn Akllnes Flight 2005 PHX 1h 63m. 5&2 wiles Depart: PaIm Beach In! Mpurt (931), Wed Palm Beach, FL Arrive: Charlotte Douws Ira! szorl (CLU- Charlaue, NC Main Cabin - Airbus A321 2h 38m layover in Charlotte 5:45 PM - 8133 PM Flight 1932 4h 48m, 1788 maes Depat Charlotte Douglas ln? Airport (CU). 0mm. NC Antve: Phoe'ix Sky Harbor Nrpat (nor), mu, AZ Main Gabln - Nrbus A321 America! Airlines 1-800?433-7300 Con?rmation Number: Need Help? Sea ma'ecomaot methods Anne cm chmge. lese via?t you wine's We to youmght immion and chedoln low?on prior to each depature. Once ebu?rm?d, wine crango pemlm and Marimba; way. Most mm are non-cemv See your alum: full fare rules has. Ailing tickets? Mane changes oradus?u'nm are not altowed once pumhased. avalab?tyarenotguammedm?l puruhaaecL You will ba Issued electronic tickets. Remanbe! us bring a valid gammnI-isaued photo ID mm yen: in check-m. Nouns of Wand ?rms Passenger a?cket Information Boyd Dunn Fll?1t Seat Ilekni Number Phoenix CW6 346 Flam 570 (Cori-mm? m~mm em Ame?cun mm; High! 1784 (Bulimia W661 Pm Bach ?9 CW8 340 American Alfie: Hummus WM Chaxldte Phoenix 340 AmerIcmAinlnn Fight 1962 Sea: 11cm! Number Phoenix amaze 330 Ammlcan Aim Flight 570 (Comma 330 Mama Aillnas night 1734 MM West Pain Bach Charlotte 330 3mm Airings Flatt zoos (CO-?nned) Cha'tdte .. Phoenix 3313 AmaricmAklnuFl'm1m [Comm-ad) From: Mahoney, Jo?Ann Subject: Next Harvard Eiectricity Poiioy Group session postponed to Januaryr Date: Nov 7, 2012?, 9:17:41 AM To: Mahcney, Jo-Ann Cc: Gill, Susan A susan?qill@hksharvardedu Dear Commissioner, Our next Harvard Electricity Policy Group, which had originally been scheduled in December, wili be heid in Palm Beach, Florida on January 25-26, 2018. Bill Hogan is recuperating from hip surgery after an unfortunate accident; he wouid still have been under travel restriction in December. We wiil send out further information in the coming weeks and hope that your calendar will permit you to attend. Regards, Jo?Ann Week Jo-Ann Mahcney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 021 38 ?rm; 3&3. wean. ?Sex are?? ??hw ?11 ea 331-18 New we. 20 Viz?5?- ?2.50 \A?m - 3:37. 75? (256.1933 250% "r 501. en ,eo 5833?" gee. raw?:2 S?jo?x $43945 ?Sag?3% Your'trip is in 36 days. z-k w; Fm All?ne Con?mation Nunban Am Alrlnes- '15 zg M4 mp Nunher: 115497-3440 we: sat" [a Wena?hdm 2.7 . Summary of Charges 1 Receipt Phoenix West Palm Beach Wed 06362017 2mm Purchasadabe: Oct31.2017 Payment method: mead - Your '8 un Md. Mention meamrmum More Info Dun" Wanna ?mum 11.611!? 537 cm Ticket cost: $1 $.00 Taxes 8. lees $2.80 magmas Bow Dunn Ticket Number_ 11010315: 2 Nancy Dunn Tucket Number: Total prlce: W0 Wed Dec 6 Phoenn: ?a West Pm Beach Booking Fae - . PHX DFW 6.. 7.45AM 11mm ?in USdollara Amulwl Arline; Flight 549 amnmnues Seebaggoge Miormallonloradd?onalleas th . Depart: PhoenixSky Hamormumpommo. PhoenbgAZ ?mm? Anlve: Dallas/Fm Worth Airport (OM. Dallas. TX This itinerary includng Summary of Charges Man Cabin - Alrbus A321 18 your Iclal maelpt, 1h 24m layover In Dallas Airline Contact Inrformallon k. . mm Alrlhes Fight 2271 Mm Althea 2n say, 1101 mlles ?6 1-800-433-7300 Depaxt DuhalFon Worth Incl Airport (D-FW), Ma, TX 31mm Arm/a: Palm Beach Int! Airport (FBI), West Palm Beach. FL Oonlkmatlon Nunbel: Ma?n 0am - Boeing 737-800 - 1m AH'me schedules can Me. Please vish youalrlha?s webal'nelo (acclaim your?ght inlamallon Need Help? and check-In localon point-to each departure. . Once con?rmed. airline crane parables and regulations amply. Most llckus are m-refmdable. See your ailim?s hall fame was here. See me contact methods Mlneucloets are nmnabra Name changosa Were not allowed once purchased. Airfares and ?ght availability are not guaranteed until putwassd. You be bsusd electronic tlolcats. Emmet-ta a valld government-ma photo IDw?h you In check?h. Incorporated Terms Free camelatbn uni 11:29 PM on 11/01/2017 EDT. After that lime, madam] Mine camella?on andchange apply. Passenger Ticket Information ?3 Get Hammad Seats on American Airlines PM Seats W: Wad. Emil Hows. Select Flont. A133: a Widow. Vim-I Boyd Dunn FEgh?l Seat Ticket Nun?ber mm? Dallas 335 Ame?can Armor. Flight 549 (0311mm? Oaths West Palm Beach 295 mun Mm Flight 22?1 (Cw-hm Nancy Dunn th?t Scat Number Phoenix ?nals 33F Amenm Flam 5a.: (comm Odin: Pam Beach 29F Tell us what you think croweague? 012345678910 Your trip is in 38 days. Airline Oon?mu?on Number: American Muss:? Pnceune mum-nun - Con?rmation awaited West Palm Beach Philadelphia FriDac62D172T-dets Summary of Charges Receipt Tau mice. 91240 Your trip is unprotected. WW More info ?name's: Boyd Dunn 11am Number.? mm mm? Dec 8 West Paint Beach 4 Philadelphia American Airlines Flight 1869 2h ?mess ?is: Depart Paim Beach In? West Pam Beach, FL Arrive: Philadebhia int] Mpo? PA Maln Cabin - Airbus A320 Important Ahlne sauna can am. Please visit your airine?s website to mm?rm fight Woman and check-l1 iocwonp?onoeachdepanue. Onoocon?tmed. airline creme penalize and restrictions :pply. Most tickelsm mmetundabie. See mar?he?a iuli fare rules hora Airline item are rim-transfenabie. Nave Mes or am not aiiowed awe pumhmd. Mara: and ?ght avalabillty are not mused until pact-Bead. You Mi be hand amt t?tokeis. Ember to mm a valid govemmem-iamed photo in with you to duck-h. Notice of Incorporated Terms ?eece-mam mti11zOPMon11101/2017 EDT. Nta?that?me. standard airlne Watson 'andchangopam?asappiy Purchase date: Oct 31. 2017 paymem method: mum-arr: - nama: Boyd Tid Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 2:18 PM To: For changes to this itinerary, View on website oneTravel please call us 2417 at 1-800-425-4567 (-31 Print Itinerary .1 BOOking confirmation Terms and Conditions OneTravel Booking: 45035610 Booked on Sat, Sep 16, 2017 ht Detalis 0 Status: Check now Departing Flight Travel Time: 3h 01 WestietAir'ines Wed, Oct 11, 2017 FI'ght 1517 . . Airline Con?rmation: 1 Aircraft 73H Phoenix, Arizona BOEING 737 800 112 STD . SEATS PHX 05.25 pm Nonstop Coach Calgary, Alberta Seats Selected: Baggage Fees Visa Passport YYC 09-26 pm 07F - Con?rmed I 0 Wed, Oct 11, 2017 Exclusive OneTravel Savings! Add a Hotel and Save as much as $168 -92 3 Check airline Fare Rules. Most airlines charge baggage fees, check the Baggage Fees for complete details. Please verify traveler names below. Rules require traveler full Traveler Informa?on names match exactly with their Passport or Government issued photo 10. If you need to make a name change. please call 1-877- 674-1858 E-Ticket Number Traveler Name Requests Gender '1 Boyd William Dunn it! Male Special Service Meal Preference No Special Service Any meal Requested Disclaimer: All special requests, meal preferences, seat requests are not guaranteedYou must contact your airline to recon?rm that they have received this request and con?rmed it. Trave'er Global Travel Assist Classic $9 '95 Classic Call us 2417 and get help with the personal service you deserve. We i are ready to assist you globally with: v' Emergency Medical Assistanoe? 1/ Personal Concierge Assistance 14? Visa and Passport Assistance w" $50 Travel savings coupon and more! . i 3? Learn More .: This is not medical insurance. Payment for medical servrces is not included. watCher Flight Monitoring and Notification Service $2 99 Flight Watcher gathers all the information about your ?ight including delays, cancellations and gate or terminal changes, and sends them i directly to you! Atdgij?sigmmw 175 g-Lazitn?M?rs: i=2. Add a Hotel Calgary Check-in Date: Wed, Oct 11. Check-out Date: Wed, Oct 18, 2017 2017 $21-13 $22-47 . Compact $2050 $2154 $22-95 See More Cars Method: Credit Card ending in - Phone: Flight Price Details '1 Adqii'?ck?i" Paid Seats i PestlBOnking Charges Subtotal I I Taxes and Agency Fees (incl. Enhanced Seat Assignment) Flight Total Total ChargePlease Note: a All fares are quoted in USD $124?3 $16.42 . $5599 $191.35 53952 $22137 . Your credit card may be billed in multiple charges totaling the above amount. 0 Some airlines may charge Baggage Fees. ACC000535 Your tickets are con?ned not your seat assignment didn't go through. Please scroll dam-the page and try again. Your trip is in 29 days. Airline Continuation Number: Delta Air Lima:? Prloollno ?ip Nam?: 11 6437-524-75 Con?rmation emailed to: Calgary, Canada Seattle Sun Ocl?152017 Your trip is unprotected. 100% Trip Protection Md trip insurance for 322.75Ipcraon Baggage and Personal Elan: 09/: 7/1? #01553 PM 10?? ?9 Wm Boyd mum mm Sun Oct 15 Calgary. Canada Seattle WC SEA A 1:15 PM ?2:1 3 PM Odin Air Lines Flight 5163 Operated by Delta Connection/Compass Airline 1h 4152 miles Depart: Calgary Int] Airport (YYC). Calgt?. Canasta Arrive: Seattle-Tacoma Ind Airport (SEA). Seattle, WA Economy Class - Embraer 175 Imponant Airline schedules can change. Please visit your airline?s website to reconfirm your flight hlorma?on and check-in location Mar to each departure. Once con?rmui, airline penalties and restridiuns apply. Most tickets are non-reiundabla See your a?rl'ne?s idl lam rules hen. Airline tickets are non-tansfamable Name changes or are rot allowed once purchased. Airfares and ?ight availability are not guaranteed until purchased. You will be issued electronic tickets. All travelers will need a valid passport and you may also need to show additional documentation at your destination and/or in connecting countries. Notice oi Incorporated Terms Free cancellation unti 11:29 PM on 09/18/201 7 EDT. Alter that time. standard airline cancellation and change penalties apply. Summary of Charges Receipt Total price: $146.79 Purchase date: Sep 16, 201 7 Payment method: Biling name: Boyd Dunn Ticket cost $88.03 Taxes fees 860.76 ?cleats: 1 Total price: Bonus: Prices are in US dollars See baggage information lor additional has: that may apply. This illnarary including Summ arv of Charrles is your of?cial receipt Airline Contact information Dana Alf Lines 1-800?221-1511 2 Domestic i Inlimbii?)" Nunlbu: Need Help? See more contact methods Passenger Ticket information Boyd William Dunn Fight Seat 'l :cke: Number Calgaw~ Seattle . - Choose :j-?vlla um; Flkji?t we: ACC000536 Sim/17. 2:23 3M Page 1 of 2 Room 0343 Folio PALLISER Cashier . 3391 133 9th Avenue SW, Page 3 1 of 1 Cal a Canada T2P 2M3 (50325524234 (403) 250-1250 Group Name Harvard Kennedy School of Governmei G.S.T. Registration 846543619 Harvard Kennedy School Mr Boyd Dunn UNKNOWN Arrival I 10-1 1-17 Departure 10-15-17 Description Additional Information Charges Credits I agree that my for this bill is nniwaived and 1 Je me porle personnellemenl reeponsahle du reglemant meITI'IatIOl?l Ol' reservatlons.? US at agree to be held personally liable In the evenl that lhe total de cetle note an cae ou la cempagnle. I'assoclalion ontcom 01' Fairmont Hotels St Resorts from: indicated person. company or aasoclation falls to payfnr no son rapr?senlent dealgn? en refusergll Ie paiemenl. any part at or the full amount of these charges. Overdue Lea comples an souffrance sonl aujele un inl?r?l do United States or Canad? 1 800. 441 1&14 balance sublecl to a surcharge at the rate of 1.5% per 1.5% per mole epres Lin mols. (18.00% par annee] Pour Information et reservations waltez notre web au month and one month. {13.00% perennum.) J'ai accept? Ia llvrelson du Journal The Sludge and Mallhave accepted dellvery of The Globe and Mall. Had j'avala refus?, j'aurals pu oblenlr un cr? 1 man comple ?ht-com 0? telephone-r au Hotels Fairmont de. refused, I would have been ellgible for a $1.00 (Man-Frl) de 1.00s parrnur [du Lundi au Vandredl) at de 2.00s Ia Etats?Unis ou Canada 1 800 441 1414 :11th ?ne (eat) credit to my account (m padlcipaung Samedl. (Dans les n?tels participants.) 0 8 8. Thank you for choosing to stay with Fairmont Hotels Resorts Merci d'avoir choisi les Hotels Fairmont OPTIONS DE DEPART SIMPLIFIE Afin de mieux vous servir, Fairmont vous offre dos options de depart simplifie?. D?part express Autres options de depart Si vous souhaitez profiter de Communiquez avec Ie service notre optmn D?part express! Royal pour Dbtenir '35 Options veuillez remplir tous les suivantes depart par telephone: - verification de la facture a i'avance services par courriel. champs a droite et d?pcser Ie formulaire dans la boite situ?e au comptcir de la reception. EASY DEPARTURE OPTIONS For your convenience, Fairmont offers you easy departure options. Express checkout Other departure options To take advantage of Contact Royal Service for: our Express Checkout - telephone checkout option, please complete advance folio review all information in the form - e-mail services at right and return to the drop-off box located at the Front Desk. Nom (en caracteres d'imprimerie) Name (please print) Chambre Room 0 J'autorise i'utilisation de ma carte de cr?dit pour payer ie montant total de mon compte. I authorize my entire account be processed through my credit card. Signature 1 Signature Date i Date Veuillez envoyer un exemplaire de mon relev? de compte a i?adresse de courriel ci?dessous Please send a copy of my account to the e-mail address below: Adresse de courriel E?mail address OWNER DRIVERS Datc:\0\ Received of: ELK :13; YOUR RECEIPT 118 BANFF AVE . BAMF, AB. T1L Ba - me sum or: PAID 403-762-4618 . . From: MT SALE To: WK: Server 000005 PAIGE Fairmont Hotels Resorl CabNo; __Dnver2450 6th AVE. SOUTH - SEATTLE - BUSINESS 292-0569 REF11: 00000017 St a ck . Batch it: 123 10/14?? 18:25:40 APPR 062110 _299 Reema Trace: 17 . VISA 3657 7130014 1 AMOUNT $34 ii?; 1 Van Latte 4.95 . APPRO ED 4 . 9 5 . CHASE VISA .. 4'95 GST g'gg AD: 1100000000310 I a TVR: 00 80 00 CASH 5.25 F8 00 Change Due 0.05 THANK YOU I MERCI FAIRMUNI PALLISER ELK 8? #247 . GST 11139445290 ASSOCIATED CAB ALLIED LIMOUSN 307-41 AVENLE NE CALGARY AB T2E 2N4 o" (403) 299-1111 CD Car#563 SALE MID. 4100233 I 'Gou. 3: C3 TED EV189233 00000011 Batch .1: 001 SEQ: 001001001011 ante?Q? . 10/1017 22023:; 1 APPR CODE: 06987D AMOUNT $40.00 00 - APPROVED - 001 CHASE VISA AID: 11000000003100 TVRRehab . THANK you I I .3J . T4 N4 Merchant ID INTLHAIRPORT TERMINAL ID 5 12358? Check 8834 Table 107 Server 94010 Julian Acct Num Expiry Date Card Type VISN Trans Type Trans Date .3 10/11/2017 Trans Time f: 4&33 PH Entry Mode swiped Auth :ode 092860_ Subfotal 20.36 TOTAL ?igaseezse; 85 I Agree to'pa,. Tia"ure '-ta1 amount as Authorize per tie qud [Ssuer Agreement. - Merchant CODY GST 139445290 Starbucks 24375 Tami CHK 3269 . . . AIRPOP. 9401 'w _1 . u. RdBm?l =11'17 DINT SE01 1 1 300A BAR 3 25 FIRST.RND-SFTBEV DIET COKE 1 v; .1 TAA 0.00 AMOUNT DU 0.89 IJBTOTAL - 18.75 TAX 1.020-?! 1 0" VGAosczu? UWE HHM 3% I 035? 00 um 201$ tilRi?URl RD CALGMY. AB T2h6k5 1 ONE 513-688 ?42% TERMINPL ID: 35335913 (1.356] TFIBI smr; N41 NO: 8151115 ?1 Purchase CHRSE VISA 0 Purchase $23.89 Tin $4.00 Total(CAD) $27.89 88 RPPROVED $30 RPPR CODE: 068840 MD: ?l F860 WR: MC: 3033 RC: 15-ocr-1? ?12;52:29 Cusllxum lioDV W119 COPE. r'rm rm Delaware lasieorthm THE BY WOLFGANG FUCK CALGARY INTERNATIONAL TERMINAL Tbl:63 Rof:80803 Chkz1o5043 Lauren-1008 11:23 am Fountaim Reguiar 3.00 Burger 18.75 >Sub Fries 1.00 Sub'l'otal 22.76 GET 1.14 Total 28.89 Total Due 23.80 Tell us about your experience by visitlng DeiawaraNorthLIstens.oom. State of Arizona lama; To Rem expenses related to simmer: travel for me of Mora. Maul reimbursemem will be mam ?ncomo if inm is no quaiuyng overnight my. Travel Claim Compiete lh? 5 form if you have a how trawl immense: and request reimbursmont Rahm the mmplatm form In your supervisor {or revlew and annotation. and then to the Comission (Short Fermi Omee for.w wil be made lhrnugh the payrol system on a biweekly basis Use the Cornimaian Form if needed for more expenm Ewbm I Boyd WV Dunn "Mae 5 i 0" Add?: 1200 Worst Washington Street, Phoenix A2 [Employee's Home Adm and can meyee?s 0L No. I Purpose oi Harvard Ene Group Vehicle Type; [3m Dir? [Jamal Um Departure Anivd Odometer Odomeler lines Rate 3mm Lam. Actual Meal Laying Other Transporta- Travel Date Time Place Bagged From Time Place Arrived At Sly Stan End Miles $3 4' Dn- Cogs SL5 Exgensec lion Cost; 5/31/2017 9:15 AM Sky Harbor 7:02 Logs! Airport - 3, L. 25_12 5090 ?/110_47- r. a 6/212017 B, 56.43 2.00 El El El Overnighi Stay Explamiim; Less Commute Mica: I in. minimumsacsons listed uihin this travel claim an: 'or a mid public purpose, and comm-m with 2! Totals from Above 82 55 52 no 110 47 walkable stamina. IM. appropriations. grunts and cm. lrunlm have and the '4 Travel Policy and the 3mm claimed mm ACTUAL QUALFIED amounts alder miles lacuna dining the memo Of?cial State Imam and that 1 am no! requesting my nimbummenu not allowed or not actually expended. If a trlvei T0133 from Other Page? tadvanoo was issued. the amount can be Whom from any salary. wages or travel nlmbulsmem are to me. Whether - . - (ARS. 35-192 Grand Totals . - . 3 32.55 - 3 52.00 110.47 06 4M Traveler?s Signatu re: Dale: I Total Travel Claim (this Page) 5 24502 As the travelers Supervisor. I CERTIFY the expenses cla?med'were incu - - 2 .. Sines: and that they are com and proper charges. I CERTIFY humor these axpend'nuosltransacums are for avvdid pibllc pupwe and are comment with al applicable stature; laws, approprialbrn grams and marinas. I APPROVE are an emant Supervisor?s Name EIN: Supomsor?s Signaiure Date: FOR AGENCY TRAVEL INPUT 0M.Y COMPANY 1 Batch ll (HRIS) Level I Description Pay Code - Expense Amount 93'; Pay Period End Date Pay Disi Exp Acct Accounting Uni Bi?? Activity Activity Acct Caiegory Aim kg 2 ~25 a 52:4 Mile r2 RD 3 0 a ?r 8'1. a: '5 - marque LOOGJ .OlhorMischaveE . . Travel Advame ?Jr WM 2 {Regina GAO [399th . As the Aocourg?gg representative. CERTIFY su?iciem ap-ampria?ons and modes are available for this expenditurenran to distribute lhese monies - Accounting Adminislnlor or Adninim?ve Samoa Dim Hm Agency Authorized Aocoumlng Signalure/ L, .. CREDIT RECEIPT DRIUER 00002916 r?001$ 1709 x31g1? 22: -23: 12 HTE I 1 Miles R1 14_37 TRIP 157? FHRE R1 $45_ 37. TIPS TOTHL: $50_45 UISH HUTHOR. 030000 HID: ENTRY CHIP HID: U00031010 HPPL. HHME: CHHSE UISH 0045 RC: ;5?r TID: DESCRIPTION: .-..- SIGHHTURE: RECEIPT OF FUNDS In HMOUNT OF THE TOTHL INDICBTED RGREES TU PFPFI 'Ipm - uulnnlu HGREEHENT w?vw J'.Ltk dHleL EHHIL: CITYOFBUSIUN.GUU 900 900 05f] 13AVHL 30d GITVA 10N 0 3 331d SOB 10 d3" "0 A 011V 895d 10 063539 JO SNOILIGNOO 80d xoano asvaava Lanai; uaonassva 33$ Leraoau unox SI SIHL Old 12/10 9900 LLAVWLS sn 39V99V8 SSEOXE l0 OPERATED BY 4 Inl?ua?_ PEI HE: Ticket It; 08 mp IIMERNATIEJNAL AIRPORT Qegister 1 989924708 . gimd?fHay 31 2301:! l. iab?SB AM 32,0? . 6511 1 Sons Pam'm Combo 5.99 WEE .-.. 60th Home Potato . EgEg?mbo Emcee 12 cl SUGAR - Hm I 11o: 1 CHIX EELTSCE map 7 .9 . 1 mm SUtht? 1? 5"9 Tax: TAX 1.4? AMUUM MID 2 1 .74 VISA 21.74 -?22860() Closed ?"31 Tota?: Cash: Change: 0.49 . - WE T0 YOUR PLEASE CONTACT 1-877-672-7467 0R TO SHARE YOUR EXPERIENCE. STOREID: V2.32 l???19 Song 523 -r0.74n-QI-l {:335: 53$ 3 8. Sr.? :23.3. dowrmuw I fr . I InVl T17..M.JJ ruff. I. nun/nu .ILI (um .nU dd.m> {NM/nun. #11..ng nub.? VI 1W0.UMU . 4 1i] nunu..Md nu nuiwuad #4chan .z :yu?uwn 001w ?ux-J wags/d ?vnw Ex}. gym. . Rec'e'ipt' Sjcabihc I ?Ht? Sjcabinc via Square Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 2:12 PM Reply-To: Sjcabinc via Square wrote: Commissioner, A utility has asked if you would like to be nominated to fill the vacancy left by Commissioner Stump on the Harvard Electric Policy Group (“HEPG”). The ACC has two seats and Commissioner Little currently fills the second seat. If appointed, you would need to attend 4 conferences/year in various parts of the country.  According to the utility, this is a very neutral forum to discuss federal energy issues and an excellent networking opportunity. HEPG was created in 1993 as part of the Kennedy School of Government to foster informed and open debate and to contribute to the wider public policy agenda affecting the electric sector.  Membership is by invitation only and includes electricity industry executives from public power and investorowned utilities, independent power producers, consumer advocates, regulators, energy officials from both state and federal governments, representatives of the environmental and financial communities, and academics. The utility will be sending some additional information so you can fully consider the opportunity. I think it would be an excellent venue for your work in federal affairs. EFF Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov ACC000565 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Gregory.Bernosky@aps.com Erin Ford Faulhaber Harvard Electric Policy Group Thursday, March 30, 2017 12:08:16 PM HEPG 3 10-12 draftagenda as of March 7.docx Storage - EPRI Kamath 161208.pptx ATT00001.txt Good afternoon Erin.  I’ve attached a few materials related to the Harvard Electric Policy Group (HEPG) for your review.  The first is the agenda for this week’s forum in Savannah, Georgia.  I had actually intended to go but got pretty sick Tuesday night and ended up cancelling.  You’ll see that the agenda has some interesting topics and speakers.    I could not find a batch of prior presentations but I did have one that I thought was particularly interesting from the last session which was held here in Phoenix.  It was from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and gives you a good sense of the topics and detail they cover, this particular one was about energy storage.  I’ve also included the link to the HEPG site, it is not particularly robust but gives you some information that may be helpful.  https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/   Finally, I did reach out to Ashley Brown, who is the Executive Director of HEPG.  He will have someone from his staff connect with your office to an extend an invitation for Commissioner Dunn to join.  You will likely hear from Jo-Ann Mahoney if not Ashley himself.   Thank you, please let me know if you have any questions.   Greg       GREGORY L. BERNOSKY Director, State Regulation & Compliance 400 North 5th Street, Phoenix, AZ 85004-3902, M.S. 9649 Tel 602 250 4849 Cell 602 809 3055 gregory.bernosky@aps.com  aps.com     ACC000566 Storage Trends and Challenges – Realizing the Benefits of a New Resource Haresh Kamath Senior Program Manager Electric Power Research Institute Harvard Electricity Policy Group December 8, 2016 © 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ACC000567 Introducing EPRI Independent Objective, scientifically based results address reliability, efficiency, affordability, health, safety and the environment Nonprofit Chartered to serve the public benefit Independent Nonprofit Collaborative Collaborative Bring together scientists, engineers, academic researchers, industry experts 2 © 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ACC000568 Energy Storage • Refrigeration transformed food supply by allowing preservation of a highly perishable product • Changed delivery mechanisms • Created new supply and demand patterns • Energy storage may similarly transform the electricity industry GE Monitor-Top refrigerator, c. 1927 3 Picture rom digital collection of Mike Manning, retrieved 31 Oct 2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Monitor refer.jpg © 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ACC000569 Moving beyond the hype AVISIBILITY The Gartner Hype Curve Peak of Inflated Expectations Microgrids Behind.the-Meter Plateau of Productivity Energy Storage Slope of Enlightenment Distribution Bulk Energy Energy Storage Storage Trough of Disillusionment Technology Trigger TIME Understanding the facts will help us to move beyond the peak of the hype cycle 4 ELECTRIC vows: 2016 Electnc Power Research Institute. Inc. All rights reserved. I The historical challenges are fading - Technical challenges - Performance - Life - Efficiency - Economic Challenges - High Costs - Small Value Streams . Regulatory Challenges - Lack of clear definition - Framework designed for existing grid IIAdvanced Technologies I?m Lower costs New Business Models ?tr-3. Its-x Regulatory Policy Action Rulings Spa igiil??ifiiffmx ACC000571 Transformation of the Power System Distribution Storage: Bulk Storage: Give operators more Provide peaking and control over power flow ramping service and increase grid ?exibility Customer-Sited Storage: Decouple loads from the grid, allowing load shaping Energy storage can play key roles across the grid :1:i2 203.121 1:123 emc Dame Qesearch rc I: EPEI l? arsu RC Energy Storage Installed Cost Summary: 2017 Install Cost 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 10hr Pumped ?Wm ??300? 10'" CAES CAES Bulk . so-sowlw, 6hr L'm'um Lead Acid ?3's 50-10mm, 4hr L-tmum Ion CAES 'd ?mm l1 Support 4hr Lead Acid Na 5 Twit?m} lo?n Lithium Ion Frequency ZOMW, 0.5hr zoMW, 0.25:? ?Whee' ape. .. Costs are for 2017 installation reference year only and assumes overnight installed costs. Suppliers and publicly available studies indicate continuing trend of cost decline for battery- based storage technologies, particularly lithium-ion. Installed costs exclude land costs, owners costs, contingency. Detailed list of inclusions and exclusions is provided in previous section. Average is not necessarily mid-point of the range ACC000573 The Difference a Year Makes 2x Energy 2x Power 60% less space Tesla PowerWall Tesla PowerWall 2 Announced April 30, 2015 Announced October 28, 2016 Power: 2 kW Power: 5 kW Energy Capacity: 6.4 Energy Capacity: 13.5 Weight: 214 Weight: 264 No Integrated Inverter Fully Integrated Inverter $3,500 $5,500 Installed Cost: ~$950/kW per hour of Installed Cost: ~$580/kW per hour of storage storage Images coutesyTesla Motors 2016 Electnc Power Research Institute, Inc. All reserved. I ACC000574 Addressing the Remaining Challenges to Storage and DG - Costs and performance factors of technology solutions must be better understood - Tools for understanding the value and grid im acts of storage and DG are eing eveloped - Ensuring that storage and DG technolog solutions are safe, secure, reliable, a fordable, and practical - Creating best practices for deployment, integration, operations, maintenance, and disposal - Integrating storage technology into utility planning and operations processes to improve reliability and reduce costs @2 2016 Electnc Power Research Institute. Inc ELECTRIC vows! All rights reserved RESEARC ACC000575 Together…Shaping the Future of Electricity For more information contact: Haresh Kamath, hkamath@epri.com 10 © 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ACC000576 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Erin Ford Faulhaber Boyd Dunn Fw: Harvard Electric Policy Group Thursday, March 30, 2017 12:31:13 PM HEPG 3 10-12 draftagenda as of March 7.docx Storage - EPRI Kamath 161208.pptx ATT00001.txt Commissioner, Greg sent some additional information regarding HEPG and the status of your participation below. I'll let you know as soon as we hear from the organization with your invite. Thanks! EFF Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov From: Gregory.Bernosky@aps.com Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 12:08 PM To: Erin Ford Faulhaber Subject: Harvard Electric Policy Group Good afternoon Erin. I’ve attached a few materials related to the Harvard Electric Policy Group (HEPG) for your review. The first is the agenda for this week’s forum in Savannah, Georgia. I had actually intended to go but got pretty sick Tuesday night and ended up cancelling. You’ll see that the agenda has some interesting topics and speakers. I could not find a batch of prior presentations but I did have one that I thought was particularly interesting from the last session which was held here in Phoenix. It was from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and gives you a good sense of the topics and detail they cover, this particular one was about energy storage. I’ve also included the link to the HEPG site, it is not particularly robust but gives you some information that may be helpful. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/ Finally, I did reach out to Ashley Brown, who is the Executive Director of HEPG. He will have someone from his staff connect with your office to an extend an invitation for Commissioner Dunn to join. You will likely hear from Jo-Ann Mahoney if not Ashley himself. Thank you, please let me know if you have any questions. ACC000577 Greg GREGORY L. BERNOSKY Director, State Regulation & Compliance 400 North 5th Street, Phoenix, AZ 85004-3902, M.S. 9649 Tel 602 250 4849 Cell 602 809 3055 gregory.bernosky@aps.com aps.com ACC000578 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GRO HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Mansion on Forsyth Park Savannah, Georgia THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, MARCH 30-31, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, March 30 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward? Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own. Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model. Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full-scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?” What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks? Jeffrey Burleson, Southern Company Ralph Cavanagh, Natural Resources Defense Council Karen Lefkowitz, PEPCO Abe Silverman, NRG Energy ACC000579 HEPG Draft Agenda, March 30-31,2017 Thursday, March 30 (cont’d) 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills? There are few, if any, resources used in electric generation that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise noneconomic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency? On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected? Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs? Alexandra Klass, University of Minnesota Law School Lawrence Makovich, IHS and Harvard Kennedy School Francis O’Sullivan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Molly Sherlock, Congressional Research Service 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception and Dinner ACC000580 HEPG Draft Agenda, March 30-31,2017 Friday, March 31 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now? In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan. Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP? Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways. The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of the new Trump Administration could change everything. Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives. The list of questions and possible futures is as dizzying as it is important. How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy? Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long-term policy direction? We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now? Doug Scott, Great Plains Institute Paul Sotkiewicz Michael Wara, Stanford Law School Jurgen Weiss, The Brattle Group 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000581 Storage Trends and Challenges – Realizing the Benefits of a New Resource Haresh Kamath Senior Program Manager Electric Power Research Institute Harvard Electricity Policy Group December 8, 2016 © 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ACC000582 Introducing EPRI Independent Objective, scientifically based results address reliability, efficiency, affordability, health, safety and the environment Nonprofit Chartered to serve the public benefit Independent Nonprofit Collaborative Collaborative Bring together scientists, engineers, academic researchers, industry experts 2 © 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ACC000583 Energy Storage • Refrigeration transformed food supply by allowing preservation of a highly perishable product • Changed delivery mechanisms • Created new supply and demand patterns • Energy storage may similarly transform the electricity industry GE Monitor-Top refrigerator, c. 1927 3 Picture rom digital collection of Mike Manning, retrieved 31 Oct 2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Monitor refer.jpg © 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ACC000584 Moving beyond the hype AVISIBILITY The Gartner Hype Curve Peak of Inflated Expectations Microgrids Behind.the-Meter Plateau of Productivity Energy Storage Slope of Enlightenment Distribution Bulk Energy Energy Storage Storage Trough of Disillusionment Technology Trigger TIME Understanding the facts will help us to move beyond the peak of the hype cycle 4 ELECTRIC vows: 2016 Electnc Power Research Institute. Inc. All rights reserved. I The historical challenges are fading - Technical challenges - Performance - Life - Efficiency - Economic Challenges - High Costs - Small Value Streams . Regulatory Challenges - Lack of clear definition - Framework designed for existing grid IIAdvanced Technologies I?m Lower costs New Business Models ?tr-3. Its-x Regulatory Policy Action Rulings Spa igiil??ifiiffmx ACC000586 Transformation of the Power System Distribution Storage: Bulk Storage: Give operators more Provide peaking and control over power flow ramping service and increase grid ?exibility Customer-Sited Storage: Decouple loads from the grid, allowing load shaping Energy storage can play key roles across the grid :1:i2 203.121 1:123 emc Dame Qesearch rc I: EPEI l? arsu RC Energy Storage Installed Cost Summary: 2017 Install Cost 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 10hr Pumped ?Wm ??300? 10'" CAES CAES Bulk . so-sowlw, 6hr L'm'um Lead Acid ?3's 50-10mm, 4hr L-tmum Ion CAES 'd ?mm l1 Support 4hr Lead Acid Na 5 Twit?m} lo?n Lithium Ion Frequency ZOMW, 0.5hr zoMW, 0.25:? ?Whee' ape. .. Costs are for 2017 installation reference year only and assumes overnight installed costs. Suppliers and publicly available studies indicate continuing trend of cost decline for battery- based storage technologies, particularly lithium-ion. Installed costs exclude land costs, owners costs, contingency. Detailed list of inclusions and exclusions is provided in previous section. Average is not necessarily mid-point of the range The Difference a Year Makes 2x Energy 2x Power 60% less space Tesla PowerWall Tesla PowerWall 2 Announced April 30, 2015 Announced October 28, 2016 Power: 2 kW Power: 5 kW Energy Capacity: 6.4 Energy Capacity: 13.5 Weight: 214 Weight: 264 No Integrated Inverter Fully Integrated Inverter $3,500 $5,500 Installed Cost: ~$950/kW per hour of Installed Cost: ~$580/kW per hour of storage storage Images coutesyTesla Motors 2016 Electnc Power Research Institute, Inc. All reserved. I ACC000589 Addressing the Remaining Challenges to Storage and DG - Costs and performance factors of technology solutions must be better understood - Tools for understanding the value and grid im acts of storage and DG are eing eveloped - Ensuring that storage and DG technolog solutions are safe, secure, reliable, a fordable, and practical - Creating best practices for deployment, integration, operations, maintenance, and disposal - Integrating storage technology into utility planning and operations processes to improve reliability and reduce costs @2 2016 Electnc Power Research Institute. Inc ELECTRIC vows! All rights reserved RESEARC ACC000590 Together…Shaping the Future of Electricity For more information contact: Haresh Kamath, hkamath@epri.com 10 © 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. ACC000591 --- NOTICE --This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain confidential, privileged or proprietary information. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original and any copy or printout. Unintended recipients are prohibited from making any other use of this e-mail. Although we have taken reasonable precautions to ensure no viruses are present in this e-mail, we accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from the use of this e-mail or attachments, or for any delay or errors or omissions in th e contents which result from e-mail transmission. ACC000592 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Boyd Dunn pmalony@azcc.gov Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in the South Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:13:58 AM Registration Form Comm - March 2017.docx Dear Commissioner Dunn, We would like to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, in Cambridge, MA. We are in the process of selecting panel topics for this meeting. We plan to convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening. An agenda will be distributed shortly. The meeting will take place at The Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School. Established in 1993, the Harvard Electricity Policy Group serves as a unique forum for discussion of electricity industry issues. Our regular participants include federal and state regulators, senior utility executives, academics, FERC staff, and leading representatives from throughout the sector. Our sessions are not-for-attribution and serve as a discourse space. We are led by Dr. William Hogan, Professor of Energy Policy, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Mr. Ashley Brown, HEPG Executive Director and former OH Commissioner. We hope that you would be able to join us at this upcoming session. We have travel assistance available and can arrange for hotel accommodations for you and reimburse reasonable travel expenses. If you can join us, kindly let me know if you will require lodging for the evenings of Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1. We will send a registration form once we have announced the panel topics, but wanted to be sure and let you know of the upcoming session for your calendar. If you should have any further questions, please feel free to contact me. Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390 Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills? There are few, if any, resources used in electric generations that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency. On balance what resources are ACC000593 most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected? Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs? Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward? Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own. Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model. Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?” What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks? EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now? In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan. Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP? Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways. The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of new Trump Administration could change everything. Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives. The list of questions and possible futures is dizzying as it is important. How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy? Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long term policy direction? We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now? ACC000594 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, MARCH 30-31, 2017 MANSION ON FORSYTH PARK SAVANNAH, GEORGIA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. ______ I would like to send my designee: Name Title Address Phone E-mail ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ HOTEL INFORMATION We have reserved a block of rooms at the Mansion on Forsyth Park for the evenings of Wednesday, March 29 and Thursday, March 30. Kindly let Jo-Ann Mahoney know if you will need hotel accommodations: jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu. Please note that the reservation deadline is March 2, 2017. The Mansion on Forsyth Park is located at 700 Drayton Street in Savannah, Georgia. (912) 238-5158 To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu ACC000595 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Boyd Dunn Patrick Maloney Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:15:36 AM Dear Commissioner Dunn,   We would like to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, in Cambridge, MA.  We are in the process of selecting panel topics for this meeting.  We plan to convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.  An agenda will be distributed shortly. The meeting will take place at The Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.   Established in 1993, the Harvard Electricity Policy Group serves as a unique forum for discussion of electricity industry issues.  Our regular participants include federal and state regulators, senior utility executives, academics, FERC staff, and leading representatives from throughout the sector.  Our sessions are not-for-attribution and serve as a discourse space.  We are led by Dr. William Hogan, Professor of Energy Policy, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Mr. Ashley Brown, HEPG Executive Director and former OH Commissioner.    We hope that you would be able to join us at this upcoming session.  We have travel assistance available and can arrange for hotel accommodations for you and reimburse reasonable travel expenses. If you can join us, kindly let me know if you will require lodging for the evenings of Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1.  We will send a registration form once we have announced the panel topics, but wanted to be sure and let you know of the upcoming session for your calendar.   If you should have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills?   There are few, if any, resources used in electric generations that do not benefit from subsidies ACC000596 of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency.  On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected?  Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs?   Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward?   Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own.  Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model.  Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?”  What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks?     EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now?   In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan.  Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP?  Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways.  The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of new Trump Administration could change everything.  Some states are going ahead on the original path ACC000597 envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives.  The list of questions and possible futures is dizzying as it is important.  How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy?  Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long term policy direction?  We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now?   ACC000598 From: To: Subject: Date: Erin Ford Faulhaber Patrick Maloney FW: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge Thursday, April 13, 2017 6:59:31 PM Would you please contact Jo-Ann and ask the following questions:   1.      Does this invite extend to staff or just Commissioner Dunn? 2.      What does travel assistance include and how can we go about booking his travel? 3.      Is there a draft agenda yet?   Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:16 AM To: Boyd Dunn Cc: Patrick Maloney Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Dear Commissioner Dunn,   We would like to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, in Cambridge, MA. We are in the process of selecting panel topics for this meeting. We plan to convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening. An agenda will be distributed shortly. The meeting will take place at The Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.   Established in 1993, the Harvard Electricity Policy Group serves as a unique forum for discussion of electricity industry issues. Our regular participants include federal and state regulators, senior utility executives, academics, FERC staff, and leading representatives from throughout the sector. Our sessions are not-for-attribution and serve as a discourse space. We are led by Dr. William Hogan, Professor of Energy Policy, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Mr. Ashley Brown, HEPG Executive Director and former OH Commissioner.   We hope that you would be able to join us at this upcoming session. We have travel assistance available and can arrange for hotel accommodations for you and reimburse reasonable travel expenses. If you can join us, kindly let me know if you will require lodging for the evenings of ACC000599 Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1. We will send a registration form once we have announced the panel topics, but wanted to be sure and let you know of the upcoming session for your calendar.   If you should have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills?   There are few, if any, resources used in electric generations that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency. On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected? Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs?   Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward?   Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own. Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model. Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?” What role, ACC000600 if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks?     EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now?   In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan. Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP? Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways. The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of new Trump Administration could change everything. Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives. The list of questions and possible futures is dizzying as it is important. How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy? Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long term policy direction? We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now?   ACC000601 From: To: Subject: Date: Patrick Maloney Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge Friday, April 14, 2017 8:46:00 AM Hello Jo-ann,   I have a few questions regarding the group session. Does this invitation extend to staff or just Commissioner Dunn? What does travel assistance include and how can we go about booking his travel? Is there a draft agenda yet?   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:16 AM To: Boyd Dunn Cc: Patrick Maloney Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Dear Commissioner Dunn,   We would like to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, in Cambridge, MA.  We are in the process of selecting panel topics for this meeting.  We plan to convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.  An agenda will be distributed shortly. The meeting will take place at The Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.   Established in 1993, the Harvard Electricity Policy Group serves as a unique forum for discussion of electricity industry issues.  Our regular participants include federal and state regulators, senior utility executives, academics, FERC staff, and leading representatives from throughout the sector.  Our sessions are not-for-attribution and serve as a discourse space.  We are led by Dr. William Hogan, Professor of Energy Policy, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Mr. Ashley Brown, HEPG Executive Director and former OH Commissioner.    We hope that you would be able to join us at this upcoming session.  We have travel assistance available and can arrange for hotel accommodations for you and reimburse reasonable travel expenses. If you can join us, kindly let me know if you will require lodging for the evenings of ACC000602 Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1.  We will send a registration form once we have announced the panel topics, but wanted to be sure and let you know of the upcoming session for your calendar.   If you should have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills?   There are few, if any, resources used in electric generations that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency.  On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected?  Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs?   Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward?   Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own.  Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model.  Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?”  What role, ACC000603 if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks?     EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now?   In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan.  Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP?  Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways.  The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of new Trump Administration could change everything.  Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives.  The list of questions and possible futures is dizzying as it is important.  How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy?  Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long term policy direction?  We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now?   ACC000604 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Tom Forese Invitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting Wednesday, May 3, 2017 2:21:12 PM Registration Form Commissioners- June 2017.docx Dear Commissioner Forese,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by Dr.  William Hogan.  The third panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390 REV and Beyond:  Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier.  From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding.  The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon.  In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options.  In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions.  Research on technology innovation is active both through private initiatives and public programs such as at APRPA-E in DOE.  What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future?  How do these technologies provide benefits and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences?  How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight?  How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? ACC000605 Ancillary Service Markets: Is There a Link Between Value and Price? Market reforms that have included recognition not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive.  How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that, perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues, and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any, are needed, and how should they and their underlying economics, be dealt with? Re-regulation Redux?  Or Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack.  The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation.  Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base, or contractual equivalents thereof.  ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, for more subsidized zero marginal cost generation. For non-renewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem.  Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring.  Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy?  Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity? ACC000606 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 THE CHARLES HOTEL CAMBRIDGE, MA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. LOGISTICS The conference will take place at The Charles Hotel (adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School, as the school is under construction.) The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennett Street, Cambridge. (617) 864-1200. HEPG will arrange lodging for commissioners in Cambridge and will provide hotel confirmation information. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu ACC000607 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Patrick Maloney RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge Monday, May 8, 2017 12:26:08 PM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx Hello Patrick,   Can you let me know if the Commissioner will be joining us?  Our draft agenda is attached.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 11:47 AM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Hello Jo-ann,   I have a few questions regarding the group session. Does this invitation extend to staff or just Commissioner Dunn? What does travel assistance include and how can we go about booking his travel? Is there a draft agenda yet?   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:16 AM To: Boyd Dunn Cc: Patrick Maloney ACC000608 Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Dear Commissioner Dunn,   We would like to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, in Cambridge, MA.  We are in the process of selecting panel topics for this meeting.  We plan to convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.  An agenda will be distributed shortly. The meeting will take place at The Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.   Established in 1993, the Harvard Electricity Policy Group serves as a unique forum for discussion of electricity industry issues.  Our regular participants include federal and state regulators, senior utility executives, academics, FERC staff, and leading representatives from throughout the sector.  Our sessions are not-for-attribution and serve as a discourse space.  We are led by Dr. William Hogan, Professor of Energy Policy, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Mr. Ashley Brown, HEPG Executive Director and former OH Commissioner.    We hope that you would be able to join us at this upcoming session.  We have travel assistance available and can arrange for hotel accommodations for you and reimburse reasonable travel expenses. If you can join us, kindly let me know if you will require lodging for the evenings of Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1.  We will send a registration form once we have announced the panel topics, but wanted to be sure and let you know of the upcoming session for your calendar.   If you should have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills?   There are few, if any, resources used in electric generations that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation ACC000609 mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency.  On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected?  Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs?   Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward?   Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own.  Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model.  Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?”  What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks?     EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now?   In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan.  Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP?  Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways.  The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of new Trump Administration could change everything.  Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives.  The list of questions and possible futures is dizzying as it is important.  How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the ACC000610 challenges of clean energy?  Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long term policy direction?  We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now?   ACC000611 HARVARD ELECTRICIT HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active both through private initiatives and public programs such as at APRPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000612 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2,2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Service Markets: Is There a Link Between Value and Price? Market reforms that have included recognition not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that, perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues, and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any are needed and how should they be dealt with? 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception and Dinner ACC000613 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2,2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base, or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, for more subsidized zero marginal cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000614 From: To: Subject: Date: Patrick Maloney Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge Monday, May 8, 2017 12:48:00 PM Hello Jo-Ann,   Commissioner Dunn will be attending. I will send you the flight information as soon as possible.   Thank you for being so responsive and helpful,   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Monday, May 08, 2017 12:26 PM To: Patrick Maloney Subject: RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Hello Patrick,   Can you let me know if the Commissioner will be joining us?  Our draft agenda is attached.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 11:47 AM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Hello Jo-ann, ACC000615   I have a few questions regarding the group session. Does this invitation extend to staff or just Commissioner Dunn? What does travel assistance include and how can we go about booking his travel? Is there a draft agenda yet?   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:16 AM To: Boyd Dunn Cc: Patrick Maloney Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Dear Commissioner Dunn,   We would like to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, in Cambridge, MA.  We are in the process of selecting panel topics for this meeting.  We plan to convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.  An agenda will be distributed shortly. The meeting will take place at The Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.   Established in 1993, the Harvard Electricity Policy Group serves as a unique forum for discussion of electricity industry issues.  Our regular participants include federal and state regulators, senior utility executives, academics, FERC staff, and leading representatives from throughout the sector.  Our sessions are not-for-attribution and serve as a discourse space.  We are led by Dr. William Hogan, Professor of Energy Policy, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Mr. Ashley Brown, HEPG Executive Director and former OH Commissioner.    We hope that you would be able to join us at this upcoming session.  We have travel assistance available and can arrange for hotel accommodations for you and reimburse reasonable travel expenses. If you can join us, kindly let me know if you will require lodging for the evenings of Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1.  We will send a registration form once we have announced the panel topics, but wanted to be sure and let you know of the upcoming session for your calendar.   ACC000616 If you should have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills?   There are few, if any, resources used in electric generations that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency.  On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected?  Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs?   Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward?   Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own.  Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model.  Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?”  What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How ACC000617 important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks?     EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now?   In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan.  Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP?  Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways.  The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of new Trump Administration could change everything.  Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives.  The list of questions and possible futures is dizzying as it is important.  How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy?  Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long term policy direction?  We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now?   ACC000618 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Boyd Dunn FW: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge Wednesday, May 10, 2017 11:10:00 AM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx Commissioner,   The Harvard Policy Draft Agenda is attached.   Patrick   From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Monday, May 08, 2017 12:26 PM To: Patrick Maloney Subject: RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Hello Patrick,   Can you let me know if the Commissioner will be joining us?  Our draft agenda is attached.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 11:47 AM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Hello Jo-ann,   I have a few questions regarding the group session. Does this invitation extend to staff or just Commissioner Dunn? What does travel assistance include and how can we go about booking his travel? Is there a draft agenda yet?   Thank you,   ACC000619 Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:16 AM To: Boyd Dunn Cc: Patrick Maloney Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Dear Commissioner Dunn,   We would like to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, in Cambridge, MA.  We are in the process of selecting panel topics for this meeting.  We plan to convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.  An agenda will be distributed shortly. The meeting will take place at The Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.   Established in 1993, the Harvard Electricity Policy Group serves as a unique forum for discussion of electricity industry issues.  Our regular participants include federal and state regulators, senior utility executives, academics, FERC staff, and leading representatives from throughout the sector.  Our sessions are not-for-attribution and serve as a discourse space.  We are led by Dr. William Hogan, Professor of Energy Policy, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Mr. Ashley Brown, HEPG Executive Director and former OH Commissioner.    We hope that you would be able to join us at this upcoming session.  We have travel assistance available and can arrange for hotel accommodations for you and reimburse reasonable travel expenses. If you can join us, kindly let me know if you will require lodging for the evenings of Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1.  We will send a registration form once we have announced the panel topics, but wanted to be sure and let you know of the upcoming session for your calendar.   If you should have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street ACC000620 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills?   There are few, if any, resources used in electric generations that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency.  On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected?  Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs?   Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward?   Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own.  Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model.  Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?”  What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks?     ACC000621 EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now?   In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan.  Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in the new world as it would unfold under the CPP?  Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways.  The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of new Trump Administration could change everything.  Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives.  The list of questions and possible futures is dizzying as it is important.  How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy?  Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long term policy direction?  We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now?   ACC000622 HARVARD ELECTRICIT HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active both through private initiatives and public programs such as at APRPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000623 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2,2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Service Markets: Is There a Link Between Value and Price? Market reforms that have included recognition not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that, perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues, and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any are needed and how should they be dealt with? 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception and Dinner ACC000624 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2,2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base, or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, for more subsidized zero marginal cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000625 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Erin Ford Faulhaber (EFordFaulhaber@azcc.gov) FW: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge Thursday, May 11, 2017 12:32:00 PM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx Attached is the Agenda.   From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Monday, May 08, 2017 12:26 PM To: Patrick Maloney Subject: RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Hello Patrick,   Can you let me know if the Commissioner will be joining us?  Our draft agenda is attached.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 11:47 AM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Hello Jo-ann,   I have a few questions regarding the group session. Does this invitation extend to staff or just Commissioner Dunn? What does travel assistance include and how can we go about booking his travel? Is there a draft agenda yet?   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705 ACC000626       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 11:16 AM To: Boyd Dunn Cc: Patrick Maloney Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Session in Cambridge   Dear Commissioner Dunn,   We would like to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, in Cambridge, MA.  We are in the process of selecting panel topics for this meeting.  We plan to convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.  An agenda will be distributed shortly. The meeting will take place at The Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.   Established in 1993, the Harvard Electricity Policy Group serves as a unique forum for discussion of electricity industry issues.  Our regular participants include federal and state regulators, senior utility executives, academics, FERC staff, and leading representatives from throughout the sector.  Our sessions are not-for-attribution and serve as a discourse space.  We are led by Dr. William Hogan, Professor of Energy Policy, at the Harvard Kennedy School, and Mr. Ashley Brown, HEPG Executive Director and former OH Commissioner.    We hope that you would be able to join us at this upcoming session.  We have travel assistance available and can arrange for hotel accommodations for you and reimburse reasonable travel expenses. If you can join us, kindly let me know if you will require lodging for the evenings of Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1.  We will send a registration form once we have announced the panel topics, but wanted to be sure and let you know of the upcoming session for your calendar.   If you should have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.   Best regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     ACC000627 Subsidies in Electricity Markets: Tilting at Windmills?   There are few, if any, resources used in electric generations that do not benefit from subsidies of one sort or another. Whether they be direct tax benefits, public funding, governmental guarantees, liability limitations, cross-subsidies built into tariffs and rates, or more subtle forms of subsidization such as unfairly differential regulatory burdens or risk mitigation mechanisms, subsidies of one sort or another pervade the electric energy market. How does the existence of these subsidies skew competition? How are these benefits used and/or exploited by their recipients? To what extent are the stated public objectives of the subsidy actually served? To what extent are otherwise non-economic assets made sustainable by the subsidies and at what cost, if any, to overall market efficiency.  On balance what resources are most benefited from the various forms of subsidies and which ones are most adversely affected?  Do competing subsidies level the playing field or simply raise overall costs?   Load Serving Entities and Utility Distribution Companies: Expanding or Shrinking Role Going Forward?   Trends regarding the future of end use suppliers (LSE’s and UDC’s) are diverging widely across the states. Some jurisdictions appear to be reducing their role to perhaps only wires providers, not even operating the systems they own.  Non-restructured states do not seem to be deviating in any appreciable way from a vertically integrated model.  Even some restructured states seem to be looking to some degree of re-verticalization. What is the appropriate role of a load serving entity or utility distribution company? To what degree, if any, should they be engaged in the generation business? If they do enter the generation space, should it be on a full scale basis, or simply to assure reliability or perhaps diversity of supply? Or should UDC’s focus on facilitating markets such as in New York’s “Reforming the Energy Vision?”  What role, if any, will LSE’s and UDCs play on the customer side of the meter, through programs such as distributed generation, storage, or demand side management/response of one form or another? Do such entities have to play more of a role than mere providers of the wires in order to remain financially viable and to attract and retain motivated personnel? How important is it that LSE’s and UDCs be enabled to assure reliability and/or diverse resource options? Is the market itself insufficient to meet those services on a cost effective basis? If LSE’s and UDCs play a role in the market beyond merely connecting suppliers and consumers, to what extent should the tariffs for non-wires services be unbundled and the risks be ring fenced so as to protect against socializing risks?     EPA Clean Power Plan Redux: What Now?   In the Houston meeting of October 2015, a topic was the final rule setting emission guidelines under the Clean Power Plan.  Then the questions focused on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed rules, and the legal vulnerabilities. How should electricity market participants respond in ACC000628 the new world as it would unfold under the CPP?  Now the world has changed, in then unexpected ways.  The stay by the Supreme Court was unprecedented, and the election of new Trump Administration could change everything.  Some states are going ahead on the original path envisioned under the CPP, others have stopped work, and others still are looking for alternatives.  The list of questions and possible futures is dizzying as it is important.  How should electricity market participants and regulators think anew about the tasks and opportunities of addressing the challenges of clean energy?  Is all this a fundamental change in direction, or a temporary diversion of a long term policy direction?  We return to the same topic, but in a different context. As before, the question is: What now?   ACC000629 HARVARD ELECTRICIT HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active both through private initiatives and public programs such as at APRPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000630 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2,2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Service Markets: Is There a Link Between Value and Price? Market reforms that have included recognition not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that, perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues, and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any are needed and how should they be dealt with? 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception and Dinner ACC000631 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2,2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base, or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, for more subsidized zero marginal cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000632 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Erin Ford Faulhaber Elijah Abinah Request for Background Material Thursday, May 11, 2017 12:35:00 PM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx Eli, Commissioner Dunn has joined the Harvard Electricity Policy Group and is preparing to attend the first quarterly meeting at the end of the month. I am preparing materials for him to review prior to attending. Do you know of any backgrounders that cover the topics in the attached agenda? I can start from scratch, but if you already have the information, it would make the job easier. Thanks! Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   ACC000633 HARVARD ELECTRICIT HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active both through private initiatives and public programs such as at APRPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000634 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2,2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Service Markets: Is There a Link Between Value and Price? Market reforms that have included recognition not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that, perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues, and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any are needed and how should they be dealt with? 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception and Dinner ACC000635 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2,2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base, or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, for more subsidized zero marginal cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000636 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Mahoney, Jo-Ann Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Wednesday, May 17, 2017 12:05:42 PM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx Dear Participants,   We have finalized the agenda for the next Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Charles Hotel in Cambridge on June 1-2, 2017.   (Attached.)  We look forward to having you with us.   We plan to host a conference reception and dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club on Thursday evening, June 1, and we hope that you will join us.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.  Kindly RSVP by May 22  to Susan Gill (susan gill@hks.harvard.edu) and indicate your preference of rack of lamb or sea bass for a main course.  (A vegetarian option is also available.)     Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000637 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active through both private initiatives and public programs such as at ARPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits, and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? Timothy Heidel, NRECA Christopher Irwin, U.S. Department of Energy Craig Miller, NRECA Alain Steven, Advanced Microgrid Solutions 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000638 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Services Markets: Is There a Link between Value and Price? Market reforms have included recognition, not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any, are needed, and how should they be dealt with? Stu Bresler, PJM Interconnection Keith Casey, California ISO Kelli Joseph, NRG Energy Tom Kaslow, First Light Power 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:30 pm Reception and Dinner Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy Street, Cambridge ACC000639 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or, Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, of more subsidized zero-marginal-cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity? Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics Jim Bushnell, UC Davis Steve Schleimer, Calpine Raja Sundararajan, American Electric Power 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000640 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Patrick Maloney HEPG Hotel Confirmation Friday, May 19, 2017 7:59:14 AM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx Dear Patrick,   We have arranged accommodations for Commissioner Dunn at the Sheraton Commander Hotel, arriving May 31 and departing on June 3.  The hotel is located at 16 Garden Street in Cambridge.  (617) 547-4800.  His confirmation number is 733403.  Please note that the conference will take place at the Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennet Street.  It is a lovely walk between the hotels through the Radcliffe quad.    Regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Waterbury, Jamie A [mailto:Jamie.A.Waterbury@maine.gov] Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 2:12 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: FW: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Good afternoon,   Commissioner Williamson will be arriving Wednesday evening, and leaving after the meeting on Friday.  Do you have a confirmation number for his hotel stay May 31 and June 1?  Please let me know.  Thanks.   Jamie   From: Williamson, Bruce Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2017 3:25 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Waterbury, Jamie A Subject: RE: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Jo-Ann,   ACC000641 It took just a second to fill it out, so here’s my registration.  Thanks again, Jo-Ann.     Dr. R Bruce Williamson Commissioner Maine Public Utilities Commission 101 Second Street, Hallowell, ME  04347 Mail:  18 SHS, Augusta, ME  04333-0018 Tel:  (207) 287- 3831           From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, April 28, 2017 3:28 PM To: Williamson, Bruce Subject: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Dear Commissioner Williamson,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 ACC000642 (617) 495-1390 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active through both private initiatives and public programs such as at ARPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits, and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? Timothy Heidel, NRECA Christopher Irwin, U.S. Department of Energy Craig Miller, NRECA Alain Steven, Advanced Microgrid Solutions 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000644 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Services Markets: Is There a Link between Value and Price? Market reforms have included recognition, not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any, are needed, and how should they be dealt with? Stu Bresler, PJM Interconnection Keith Casey, California ISO Kelli Joseph, NRG Energy Tom Kaslow, First Light Power 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:30 pm Reception and Dinner Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy Street, Cambridge ACC000645 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or, Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, of more subsidized zero-marginal-cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity? Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics Jim Bushnell, UC Davis Steve Schleimer, Calpine Raja Sundararajan, American Electric Power 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000646 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Erin Ford Faulhaber (EFordFaulhaber@azcc.gov) FW: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Friday, May 19, 2017 8:23:00 AM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx The final agenda is attached.   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Wednesday, May 17, 2017 12:06 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   Dear Participants,   We have finalized the agenda for the next Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Charles Hotel in Cambridge on June 1-2, 2017.   (Attached.)  We look forward to having you with us.   We plan to host a conference reception and dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club on Thursday evening, June 1, and we hope that you will join us.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.  Kindly RSVP by May 22  to Susan Gill (susan gill@hks.harvard.edu) and indicate your preference of rack of lamb or sea bass for a main course.  (A vegetarian option is also available.)     Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000647 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active through both private initiatives and public programs such as at ARPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits, and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? Timothy Heidel, NRECA Christopher Irwin, U.S. Department of Energy Craig Miller, NRECA Alain Steven, Advanced Microgrid Solutions 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000648 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Services Markets: Is There a Link between Value and Price? Market reforms have included recognition, not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any, are needed, and how should they be dealt with? Stu Bresler, PJM Interconnection Keith Casey, California ISO Kelli Joseph, NRG Energy Tom Kaslow, First Light Power 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:30 pm Reception and Dinner Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy Street, Cambridge ACC000649 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or, Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, of more subsidized zero-marginal-cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity? Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics Jim Bushnell, UC Davis Steve Schleimer, Calpine Raja Sundararajan, American Electric Power 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000650 From: To: Subject: Date: Erin Ford Faulhaber Patrick Maloney Re: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Friday, May 19, 2017 8:56:55 AM did he rsvp for dinner? Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov From: Patrick Maloney Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:23:58 AM To: Erin Ford Faulhaber Subject: FW: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   The final agenda is attached.   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Wednesday, May 17, 2017 12:06 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   Dear Participants,   We have finalized the agenda for the next Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Charles Hotel in Cambridge on June 1-2, 2017.   (Attached.)  We look forward to having you with us.   We plan to host a conference reception and dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club on Thursday evening, June 1, and we hope that you will join us.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.  Kindly RSVP by May 22  to Susan Gill (susan gill@hks.harvard.edu) and indicate your preference of rack of lamb or sea bass for a main course.  (A vegetarian option is also available.)     Best regards, Jo-Ann   ACC000651 Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000652 From: To: Subject: Date: Patrick Maloney Erin Ford Faulhaber RE: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Friday, May 19, 2017 8:58:00 AM Yes I RSVP’d him and Nancy yesterday and received confirmation this morning.   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:57 AM To: Patrick Maloney Subject: Re: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   did he rsvp for dinner?   Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   From: Patrick Maloney Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:23:58 AM To: Erin Ford Faulhaber Subject: FW: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   The final agenda is attached.   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Wednesday, May 17, 2017 12:06 PM ACC000653 To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   Dear Participants,   We have finalized the agenda for the next Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Charles Hotel in Cambridge on June 1-2, 2017.   (Attached.)  We look forward to having you with us.   We plan to host a conference reception and dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club on Thursday evening, June 1, and we hope that you will join us.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.  Kindly RSVP by May 22  to Susan Gill (susan gill@hks.harvard.edu) and indicate your preference of rack of lamb or sea bass for a main course.  (A vegetarian option is also available.)     Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000654 From: To: Subject: Date: Erin Ford Faulhaber Patrick Maloney Re: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Friday, May 19, 2017 8:58:33 AM Perfect. Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov From: Patrick Maloney Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:58:09 AM To: Erin Ford Faulhaber Subject: RE: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Yes I RSVP’d him and Nancy yesterday and received confirmation this morning.   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:57 AM To: Patrick Maloney Subject: Re: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   did he rsvp for dinner? Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   From: Patrick Maloney Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:23:58 AM ACC000655 To: Erin Ford Faulhaber Subject: FW: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation The final agenda is attached.   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Wednesday, May 17, 2017 12:06 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   Dear Participants,   We have finalized the agenda for the next Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Charles Hotel in Cambridge on June 1-2, 2017.   (Attached.)  We look forward to having you with us.   We plan to host a conference reception and dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club on Thursday evening, June 1, and we hope that you will join us.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.  Kindly RSVP by May 22  to Susan Gill (susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu) and indicate your preference of rack of lamb or sea bass for a main course.  (A vegetarian option is also available.)     Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000656 To: Subject: Date: Erin Ford Faulhaber RE: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Friday, May 19, 2017 8:59:19 AM     From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:59 AM To: Patrick Maloney Subject: Re: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   Perfect. Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   From: Patrick Maloney Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:58:09 AM To: Erin Ford Faulhaber Subject: RE: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation Yes I RSVP’d him and Nancy yesterday and received confirmation this morning.   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:57 AM To: Patrick Maloney Subject: Re: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   did he rsvp for dinner? Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn ACC000657 Arizona Corporation Commission Office: (602) 542-0837 Mobile: (480) 490-5801 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   From: Patrick Maloney Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 8:23:58 AM To: Erin Ford Faulhaber Subject: FW: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation The final agenda is attached.   Patrick Maloney Executive Assistant to Commissioner Boyd W. Dunn Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Wednesday, May 17, 2017 12:06 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: Harvard Electricity Policy Group Agenda and Dinner Invitation   Dear Participants,   We have finalized the agenda for the next Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Charles Hotel in Cambridge on June 1-2, 2017.   (Attached.)  We look forward to having you with us.   We plan to host a conference reception and dinner at the Harvard Faculty Club on Thursday evening, June 1, and we hope that you will join us.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.  Kindly RSVP by May 22  to Susan Gill (susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu) and indicate your preference of rack of lamb or sea bass for a main course.  (A vegetarian option is also available.)     Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000658 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Gill, Susan Mahoney, Jo-Ann Gill, Susan Invitation to HEPG Plenary Session, October 12-13 Thursday, August 17, 2017 12:39:15 PM Commissioners Registration Form - October 2017 fillable.pdf Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   We will provide more detailed descriptions and panel order next week.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me.   Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC000659 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Af?liation Address Phone E-mail I Will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. HOTEL INFORMATION The Fairmont PalliseI Hotel is located at 133 9th Ave Calgary, Alberta. Phone: (403) 262-1234 To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: ACC000660 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Erin Ford Faulhaber Fwd: HEPG Hotel Confirmation Tuesday, August 22, 2017 12:41:02 PM HEPG June 2017 draftagenda.docx ATT00001.htm Here is the email Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: From: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Date: May 19, 2017 at 7:59:09 AM MST To: "pmaloney@azcc.gov" Subject: HEPG Hotel Confirmation Dear Patrick,   We have arranged accommodations for Commissioner Dunn at the Sheraton Commander Hotel, arriving May 31 and departing on June 3.  The hotel is located at 16 Garden Street in Cambridge.  (617) 547-4800.  His confirmation number is 733403.  Please note that the conference will take place at the Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennet Street.  It is a lovely walk between the hotels through the Radcliffe quad.    Regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Waterbury, Jamie A [mailto:Jamie.A.Waterbury@maine.gov] Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 2:12 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: FW: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Good afternoon,   ACC000661 Commissioner Williamson will be arriving Wednesday evening, and leaving after the meeting on Friday.  Do you have a confirmation number for his hotel stay May 31 and June 1?  Please let me know.  Thanks.   Jamie   From: Williamson, Bruce Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2017 3:25 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Waterbury, Jamie A Subject: RE: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Jo-Ann,   It took just a second to fill it out, so here’s my registration.  Thanks again, Jo-Ann.     Dr. R Bruce Williamson Commissioner Maine Public Utilities Commission 101 Second Street, Hallowell, ME  04347 Mail:  18 SHS, Augusta, ME  04333-0018 Tel:  (207) 287- 3831           From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, April 28, 2017 3:28 PM To: Williamson, Bruce Subject: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Dear Commissioner Williamson,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on Thursday-Friday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging ACC000662 in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000663 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-SIXTH PLENARY SESSION The Charles Hotel Cambridge, Massachusetts THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JUNE 1-2, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, June 1 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. REV and Beyond: Looking Ahead to Technology Disruption Information constraints on efficient market animation are receding rapidly with advances at the technology frontier. From better, faster measurement, to optimization and control, the range of activities in electricity systems is expanding. The challenges for policy are either here or just over the horizon. In regulated states, system planning needs to evolve to include increasingly complex options. In competitive states, efficient market signals need to provide incentives compatible with the wider range of technology solutions. Research on technology innovation is active through both private initiatives and public programs such as at ARPA-E in DOE. What are the new technologies entering the market or that would be commercially available in the near future? How do these technologies provide benefits, and how would the system exploit these benefits and avoid unintended consequences? How much of the potential disruption is going to require new policies and regulatory oversight? How much do existing policies provide a barrier to innovation? Timothy Heidel, NRECA Christopher Irwin, U.S. Department of Energy Craig Miller, NRECA Alain Steven, Advanced Microgrid Solutions 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000664 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Thursday, June 1 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Ancillary Services Markets: Is There a Link between Value and Price? Market reforms have included recognition, not only of the value of ancillary services, but also that the market for such services can be quite competitive. How such services are compensated and how market participants can provide those services depends on the market rules. Since ancillary services markets were established, however, many things have changed, including the generation mix, emergence of demand response programs, and, of course, technology that can provide such services. These changes, as well as other circumstances, have led to concerns in some quarters that the compensation paid to ancillary service providers, in many cases, may not be adequately reflected in the prices being paid, and that perhaps some services were not being compensated at all. These concerns have led to debates within RTOs about how to address these issues and what rules, if any, require revision. What revisions, if any, are needed, and how should they be dealt with? Stu Bresler, PJM Interconnection Keith Casey, California ISO Kelli Joseph, NRG Energy Tom Kaslow, First Light Power 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 6:30 pm Reception and Dinner Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy Street, Cambridge ACC000665 HEPG Draft Agenda, June 1-2, 2017 Friday, June 2, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Re-regulation Redux? Or, Can We Sustain Competition? While competitive electricity markets have emerged over the last two decades, recent trends in policy, law, and technology have raised questions about their sustainability. The open, competitive market is under attack. The basic question we may be facing is whether we are evolving away from markets and back to regulation. Utilities have sought to transfer assets back under rate base or contractual equivalents thereof. ZECs and DECs are on the table in many jurisdictions. We have substantial growth, often with policy support, of more subsidized zero-marginal-cost generation. For nonrenewable IPPs, with no rate base options or public support to fall back on, there may well be a significant “missing money” problem. Some have even contended that there may be regulatory “takings” occurring. Is there a trend toward re-regulation, and, if so, is it good policy? Is it reversible? What measures, if any, should be put in place to restore/assure the sustainability of a competitive marketplace in electricity? Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics Jim Bushnell, UC Davis Steve Schleimer, Calpine Raja Sundararajan, American Electric Power 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000666 3:56:00 From: To: Subject: Date: Erin Ford Faulhaber Patrick Maloney Re: HEPG Hotel Confirmation Tuesday, August 22, 2017 12:43:25 PM Ok. Save it as a PDF without forwarding then email it to me as an attachment. Any word on the flight? Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov (602) 542-0837 Sent from my iPhone On Aug 22, 2017, at 12:41 PM, Patrick Maloney wrote: Here is the email Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: From: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Date: May 19, 2017 at 7:59:09 AM MST To: "pmaloney@azcc.gov" Subject: HEPG Hotel Confirmation Dear Patrick,   We have arranged accommodations for Commissioner Dunn at the Sheraton Commander Hotel, arriving May 31 and departing on June 3.  The hotel is located at 16 Garden Street in Cambridge.  (617) 547-4800.  His confirmation number is 733403.  Please note that the conference will take place at the Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennet Street.  It is a lovely walk between the hotels through the Radcliffe quad.    Regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 ACC000668 (617) 495-1390       From: Waterbury, Jamie A [mailto:Jamie.A.Waterbury@maine.gov] Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 2:12 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: FW: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Good afternoon,   Commissioner Williamson will be arriving Wednesday evening, and leaving after the meeting on Friday.  Do you have a confirmation number for his hotel stay May 31 and June 1?  Please let me know.  Thanks.   Jamie   From: Williamson, Bruce Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2017 3:25 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Waterbury, Jamie A Subject: RE: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Jo-Ann,   It took just a second to fill it out, so here’s my registration.  Thanks again, Jo-Ann.     Dr. R Bruce Williamson Commissioner Maine Public Utilities Commission 101 Second Street, Hallowell, ME  04347 Mail:  18 SHS, Augusta, ME  04333-0018 Tel:  (207) 287- 3831           From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, April 28, 2017 3:28 PM To: Williamson, Bruce Subject: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Dear Commissioner Williamson,   ACC000669 We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on ThursdayFriday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000670 From: To: Subject: Date: Erin Ford Faulhaber Patrick Maloney Re: HEPG Hotel Confirmation Tuesday, August 22, 2017 1:09:44 PM Please save the original as a PDF as soon as you can to the Harvard travel folder Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov (602) 542-0837 Sent from my iPhone On Aug 22, 2017, at 12:41 PM, Patrick Maloney wrote: Here is the email Sent from my iPhone Begin forwarded message: From: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Date: May 19, 2017 at 7:59:09 AM MST To: "pmaloney@azcc.gov" Subject: HEPG Hotel Confirmation Dear Patrick,   We have arranged accommodations for Commissioner Dunn at the Sheraton Commander Hotel, arriving May 31 and departing on June 3.  The hotel is located at 16 Garden Street in Cambridge.  (617) 547-4800.  His confirmation number is 733403.  Please note that the conference will take place at the Charles Hotel, adjacent to the Harvard Kennedy School.  The Charles Hotel is located at 1 Bennet Street.  It is a lovely walk between the hotels through the Radcliffe quad.    Regards, Jo-Ann Mahoney     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390 ACC000671       From: Waterbury, Jamie A [mailto:Jamie.A.Waterbury@maine.gov] Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 2:12 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: FW: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Good afternoon,   Commissioner Williamson will be arriving Wednesday evening, and leaving after the meeting on Friday.  Do you have a confirmation number for his hotel stay May 31 and June 1?  Please let me know.  Thanks.   Jamie   From: Williamson, Bruce Sent: Sunday, April 30, 2017 3:25 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Waterbury, Jamie A Subject: RE: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Jo-Ann,   It took just a second to fill it out, so here’s my registration.  Thanks again, Jo-Ann.     Dr. R Bruce Williamson Commissioner Maine Public Utilities Commission 101 Second Street, Hallowell, ME  04347 Mail:  18 SHS, Augusta, ME  04333-0018 Tel:  (207) 287- 3831           From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Friday, April 28, 2017 3:28 PM To: Williamson, Bruce Subject: nvitation to HEPG Cambridge June Meeting   Dear Commissioner Williamson,   We write to invite you to the next session of the Harvard Electricity Policy ACC000672 Group to be held here in Cambridge at the Charles Hotel on ThursdayFriday, June 1-2, 2017.  We are in the process of putting together the agenda. We plan to devote one panel to emerging grid operation technologies and market design.  Another panel will consider the distributive effects of differing carbon reduction methods:  who bears what share of the costs of alternative means of carbon reduction and which approaches are more socially regressive?  The third panel will focus on ancillary service markets and feature a presentation by William Hogan.  We will provide a draft agenda shortly.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday and adjourn at noon on Friday, and there will be a conference reception and dinner on Thursday evening.   We are prepared to provide assistance in the form of travel reimbursement and lodging in Cambridge.  If you plan to join us, kindly let us know if you will require hotel rooms for the evenings of both Wednesday, May 31 and Thursday, June 1 as soon as possible, as this is a busy time of year in the Boston-Cambridge area.    We hope that you will be with us in June.  Kindly return the registration form to our offices.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000673 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Patrick Maloney; Gill, Susan Receipt from Cambridge meeting lodging Wednesday, August 30, 2017 11:15:45 AM 20170830140826084.pdf Dear Patrick, We greatly appreciate that Commissioner Dunn was able to participate in our Cambridge meeting in June. I understand that you were looking for a copy of the receipt for his lodging, which was paid by the University.  Attached please find a copy of that folio. I apologize for the delay in getting this to you, as I have had some family matters to attend to. Best regards, Jo-Ann Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390 ACC000674 df"% a. a 451; SHERATON COMMANDER HOTEL 16 Garden Street Sheraton? Cambridge, MA 02138-3604 US i 6175474800 - 6172341302 Harvard Kennedy School . B311, Mailbox 84 Page Number 1 79 Kennedy Street AR Account 66012 Cambridge, MA 02138 Invoice Number 6064 United States Invoice Date .06~l4?2017 Attn: Jo?Ann Mahoney Date Description Charge Credit Balance 733403/Folio Boyd 347 Room Transient 329.00 Room State Tax 18.75 Room City Tax 19.74 Room Tax 9.05 Room Transient 329.00 OluJUle7 Room State Tax 18.75 Room City Tax 19.74 Room Tax 9.05 Room Transient 329.00 Room State Tax 18.75 Room City Tax 19.74 Room Tax 9.05 1,129.62 1,129.62 733404/Folio Douglas 234 Room Transient 329.00 Room State Tax 18.75 Room City Tax 19.74 Room Tax 9.05 Room Transient 329.00 Room State Tax . 18.75 Room City Tax 19.74 Room Tax 9.05 753.08 753.08 733405/Foli0 Robert 403 Room Transient 329.00 Room State Tax 18.75 Room City Tax 19.74 Room Tax 9.05 Ol?JUle7 Room Transient 329.00 Continue The Sheraton Commander Hotel is independently owned by Commander Properties. Inc. and Operated by Realty Associates under a iicense issued by The Sheraton LLC. From: To: Subject: Date: Patrick Maloney Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: Receipt from Cambridge meeting lodging Wednesday, August 30, 2017 11:17:00 AM Jo-Ann, Thank you for getting back to me. Family always comes first so I am sorry to hear something came up and you have absolutely no need to apologize to me. Best wishes, Patrick -----Original Message----From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:Jo-Ann_Mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Wednesday, August 30, 2017 11:16 AM To: Patrick Maloney ; Gill, Susan Subject: Receipt from Cambridge meeting lodging Dear Patrick, We greatly appreciate that Commissioner Dunn was able to participate in our Cambridge meeting in June. I understand that you were looking for a copy of the receipt for his lodging, which was paid by the University.  Attached please find a copy of that folio. I apologize for the delay in getting this to you, as I have had some family matters to attend to. Best regards, Jo-Ann Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390 ACC000676 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Gill, Susan Mahoney, Jo-Ann Gill, Susan Harvard Electricity Policy Group Calgary Invitation Friday, September 1, 2017 12:22:22 PM HEPG October 2017 draftagenda.docx Commissioners Registration Form - October 2017 fillable.pdf Dear Commissioner, On behalf of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, I would like to invite you to attend our eightyeighth plenary session to be held October 12-13 at the Fairmont Palliser Hotel in Calgary, Alberta. The panels will focus on the following topics:  1) Carbon emissions:  Does federal exit result in heightened pressure on states to act?  2)  Sustainable capacity markets:  attainable or oxymoron?  and 3) Market design implications of regional carbon adders  and how these interact when not everyone in the RTO region participates.   A draft agenda is attached.  The conference will convene at breakfast on Thursday, October 12 and adjourn by noon on October 13. We will be hosting a dinner at a historic Canadian site on Thursday evening. If you would like to participate, please return the attached Registration Form to me. We are able to provide travel assistance upon request; if this is the case, please let me know as soon as possible so that we may make the necessary arrangements. We hope that you will be able to attend. If you have any questions regarding HEPG or the plenary meeting, please do not hesitate to contact me. Best regards, Susan Gill Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC000677 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel Calgary, Alberta THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, October 12 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Pricing Carbon Emissions: The Promise and Pitfalls of Regional Approaches With the delay or demise of the Clean Power Plan, states and regions are stepping further into the development of policies intended to regulate or put a price on carbon emissions. The inherent nature of the climate problem means that emissions anywhere should have the same impact everywhere. With a national standard, a common price of carbon could blend seamlessly with bidbased economic dispatch in organized markets. With regional approaches, the different or even conflicting approaches could undermine both the intended climate policy and the operation of open and non-discriminatory markets. Power flows across the grid in ways that could confound carbon accounting. Issues of leakage and so-called resource shuffling arise that would not appear in a national program. Different approaches have been followed in the eastern RGGI and the Western Energy Imbalance Market. Proposed policies could confront challenges on the basis of undue discrimination. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? What do we know about the theory and the practice of regional power markets and varied carbon policies? How can organized markets best accommodate different carbon policies? How can we ensure that the climate solution is workable and working? 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion ACC000678 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Thursday, October 12 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Sustainable Capacity Markets: Too Much to Hope For? The thesis underlying capacity markets is that energy prices alone would be insufficient to attract the investment required to assure a reliable supply of capacity. While that theory, and/or the need for centralized capacity markets, is not universally accepted, it has been widely embraced. Recent policy discussions have seen additional arguments added to the rationale for capacity markets and their design. These go beyond simply attracting sufficient investment to assure supply, and include broader social and economic objectives, such as resource diversity, promotion of non-emitting resources, etc. Such considerations are very likely to affect not only the structure and economics of the capacity market, but also dispatch operations/protocols and the energy market itself. A number of critical questions are raised by these design questions: How can price signals continue to reflect value and products if there is dispatch interference due to fleet operations or subsidies? How can social contracts be integrated into the capacity market as a capacity resource without distortions? How can contracts be designed to ensure that the industry can compete on a level footing with some certainty related to market rules if legislation continues to shift? And how can consumers respond to shifting costs without undermining the house of cards? How will the fundamental transformation of distributed energy resources affect the foundations of capacity markets? What will prompt a rationalization of underlying reliability standards that give rise to the revenue disconnect? 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 5:30 pm Transportation provided to Equestrian Event, Reception and Dinner Spruce Meadows ACC000679 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Friday, October 13, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Carbon Emissions: Does Federal Exit Result In Heightened Pressure on States to Act? The Trump Administration posture and actions on climate change signal where the Federal Government will be for the next 3 plus years on carbon issues, subject to judicial review. That posture, of course, does not make the issue go away, but it seems likely to move the forum for seeking action away from Washington and more toward state capitals. A number of governors have already signaled their willingness to accept more of a role. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? Will the carbon focus be primarily on the power sector itself, or will transport and industrial emitters of carbon be affected? Will the focus be on resources, such as renewables or energy efficiency, or on more macro policies such as carbon tax or cap and trade? How cost effective is it for emissions reductions for states to pursue their own individual carbon policies? Will a state-by-state approach motivate a backlash by large businesses to pressure the Trump Administration to ease its stance? What will state regulators do and how effective will it be? 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000680 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Af?liation Address Phone E-mail I Will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. HOTEL INFORMATION The Fairmont PalliseI Hotel is located at 133 9th Ave Calgary, Alberta. Phone: (403) 262-1234 To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: ACC000681 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Gill, Susan Patrick Maloney RE: Calgary Agenda Thursday, September 14, 2017 11:27:06 AM HEPG October 2017 draftspeakeragenda.pdf Good afternoon, Patrick,   The current draft of the Agenda is attached.   Best,   Susan   From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2017 5:23 PM To: Gill, Susan Subject: Calgary Agenda   Hello Susan,   Is there an agenda out for the conference in Calgary?   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC000682 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel Calgary, Alberta THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, October 12 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Pricing Carbon Emissions: The Promise and Pitfalls of Regional Approaches With the delay or demise of the Clean Power Plan, states and regions are stepping further into the development of policies intended to regulate or put a price on carbon emissions. The inherent nature of the climate problem means that emissions anywhere should have the same impact everywhere. With a national standard, a common price of carbon could blend seamlessly with bidbased economic dispatch in organized markets. With regional approaches, the different or even conflicting approaches could undermine both the intended climate policy and the operation of open and non-discriminatory markets. Power flows across the grid in ways that could confound carbon accounting. Issues of leakage and so-called resource shuffling arise that would not appear in a national program. Different approaches have been followed in the eastern RGGI and the Western Energy Imbalance Market. Proposed policies could confront challenges on the basis of undue discrimination. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? What do we know about the theory and the practice of regional power markets and varied carbon policies? How can organized markets best accommodate different carbon policies? How can we ensure that the climate solution is workable and working? Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric Kate Konschnik, Harvard Law School Sam Newell, Brattle Group Mark Rothleder, California ISO 10:30 am 10:45 am Coffee Break Discussion ACC000683 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Thursday, October 12 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Sustainable Capacity Markets: Too Much to Hope For? The thesis underlying capacity markets is that energy prices alone would be insufficient to attract the investment required to assure a reliable supply of capacity. While that theory, and/or the need for centralized capacity markets, is not universally accepted, it has been widely embraced. Recent policy discussions have seen additional arguments added to the rationale for capacity markets and their design. These go beyond simply attracting sufficient investment to assure supply, and include broader social and economic objectives, such as resource diversity, promotion of non-emitting resources, etc. Such considerations are very likely to affect not only the structure and economics of the capacity market, but also dispatch operations/protocols and the energy market itself. A number of critical questions are raised by these design questions: How can price signals continue to reflect value and products if there is dispatch interference due to fleet operations or subsidies? How can social contracts be integrated into the capacity market as a capacity resource without distortions? How can contracts be designed to ensure that the industry can compete on a level footing with some certainty related to market rules if legislation continues to shift? And how can consumers respond to shifting costs without undermining the house of cards? How will the fundamental transformation of distributed energy resources affect the foundations of capacity markets? What will prompt a rationalization of underlying reliability standards that give rise to the revenue disconnect? Moderator: Cheryl Terry, Alberta Electric System Operator Kenneth Anderson, Public Utility Commission of Texas David Brown, University of Alberta Marcy Cochlan, TransAlta Andrew Hartshorn, Acadia Energy Managers 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 5:30 pm Transportation provided to Equestrian Event, Reception and Dinner Spruce Meadows ACC000684 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Friday, October 13, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Carbon Emissions: Does Federal Exit Result In Heightened Pressure on States to Act? The Trump Administration posture and actions on climate change signal where the Federal Government will be for the next 3 plus years on carbon issues, subject to judicial review. That posture, of course, does not make the issue go away, but it seems likely to move the forum for seeking action away from Washington and more toward state capitals. A number of governors have already signaled their willingness to accept more of a role. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? Will the carbon focus be primarily on the power sector itself, or will transport and industrial emitters of carbon be affected? Will the focus be on resources, such as renewables or energy efficiency, or on more macro policies such as carbon tax or cap and trade? How cost effective is it for emissions reductions for states to pursue their own individual carbon policies? Will a state-by-state approach motivate a backlash by large businesses to pressure the Trump Administration to ease its stance? What will state regulators do and how effective will it be? James Holodak, National Grid Noah Long, Natural Resources Defense Council Doug Scott, Great Plains Institute tbd 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000685 From: To: Subject: Attachments: Boyd Dunn Erin Ford Faulhaber; Patrick Maloney Harvard Energy Group HEPG October 2017 draftspeakeragenda.pdf ACC000686 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel Calgary, Alberta THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, October 12 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Pricing Carbon Emissions: The Promise and Pitfalls of Regional Approaches With the delay or demise of the Clean Power Plan, states and regions are stepping further into the development of policies intended to regulate or put a price on carbon emissions. The inherent nature of the climate problem means that emissions anywhere should have the same impact everywhere. With a national standard, a common price of carbon could blend seamlessly with bidbased economic dispatch in organized markets. With regional approaches, the different or even conflicting approaches could undermine both the intended climate policy and the operation of open and non-discriminatory markets. Power flows across the grid in ways that could confound carbon accounting. Issues of leakage and so-called resource shuffling arise that would not appear in a national program. Different approaches have been followed in the eastern RGGI and the Western Energy Imbalance Market. Proposed policies could confront challenges on the basis of undue discrimination. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? What do we know about the theory and the practice of regional power markets and varied carbon policies? How can organized markets best accommodate different carbon policies? How can we ensure that the climate solution is workable and working? Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric Kate Konschnik, Harvard Law School Sam Newell, Brattle Group Mark Rothleder, California ISO 10:30 am 10:45 am Coffee Break Discussion ACC000687 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Thursday, October 12 (cont’d) 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Sustainable Capacity Markets: Too Much to Hope For? The thesis underlying capacity markets is that energy prices alone would be insufficient to attract the investment required to assure a reliable supply of capacity. While that theory, and/or the need for centralized capacity markets, is not universally accepted, it has been widely embraced. Recent policy discussions have seen additional arguments added to the rationale for capacity markets and their design. These go beyond simply attracting sufficient investment to assure supply, and include broader social and economic objectives, such as resource diversity, promotion of non-emitting resources, etc. Such considerations are very likely to affect not only the structure and economics of the capacity market, but also dispatch operations/protocols and the energy market itself. A number of critical questions are raised by these design questions: How can price signals continue to reflect value and products if there is dispatch interference due to fleet operations or subsidies? How can social contracts be integrated into the capacity market as a capacity resource without distortions? How can contracts be designed to ensure that the industry can compete on a level footing with some certainty related to market rules if legislation continues to shift? And how can consumers respond to shifting costs without undermining the house of cards? How will the fundamental transformation of distributed energy resources affect the foundations of capacity markets? What will prompt a rationalization of underlying reliability standards that give rise to the revenue disconnect? Moderator: Cheryl Terry, Alberta Electric System Operator Kenneth Anderson, Public Utility Commission of Texas David Brown, University of Alberta Marcy Cochlan, TransAlta Andrew Hartshorn, Acadia Energy Managers 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 5:30 pm Transportation provided to Equestrian Event, Reception and Dinner Spruce Meadows ACC000688 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Friday, October 13, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Carbon Emissions: Does Federal Exit Result In Heightened Pressure on States to Act? The Trump Administration posture and actions on climate change signal where the Federal Government will be for the next 3 plus years on carbon issues, subject to judicial review. That posture, of course, does not make the issue go away, but it seems likely to move the forum for seeking action away from Washington and more toward state capitals. A number of governors have already signaled their willingness to accept more of a role. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? Will the carbon focus be primarily on the power sector itself, or will transport and industrial emitters of carbon be affected? Will the focus be on resources, such as renewables or energy efficiency, or on more macro policies such as carbon tax or cap and trade? How cost effective is it for emissions reductions for states to pursue their own individual carbon policies? Will a state-by-state approach motivate a backlash by large businesses to pressure the Trump Administration to ease its stance? What will state regulators do and how effective will it be? James Holodak, National Grid Noah Long, Natural Resources Defense Council Doug Scott, Great Plains Institute tbd 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000689 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Erin Ford Faulhaber Boyd Dunn Update, Next Steps and Action Items Friday, September 22, 2017 11:31:16 AM 2017-09-21 Comments re Communications Plan.pdf PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL Contains Information Protected by Attorney-Client and Legislative Privileges Commissioner, I wanted to keep you in the loop on some of the ongoing issues here at the Commission. There are a few items that require your response. I have bolded those requests below. I hope you guys are having a blast! Master Meters: New docket was opened in your name this morning. I’ll follow up with a status update on staff’s efforts next week. Utilities and Safety would the Commission to direct staff to propose a plan for dealing with the issue at the October staff meeting. It will require a brief intro on the issue from you and some reasons for using staff resources to get this thing rolling. Are you ok with that? If so, I’ll ask the Chairman to put it on the agenda and get the materials ready for your review. Public Comment in San Tan: We have received over 100 complaints regarding Johnson Utilities and their service to the San Tan community. As I mentioned before you left, we recently received a request from community leaders to host a public comment on the matter. I know you expressed interest in the past about hosting such a session. I discussed the issue with staff. Eli is of the mindset that it should wait until the rate case. Both Andy and G believe that hosting public comment would be a good idea so long as you are prepared to listen to 2-3 hours of angry citizens. I think hosting comment now would be a good idea. The press has picked up on the complaints and the rate case is not due to be filed until December 31st. If you agree, I will reach out to the community leaders to discuss the topic and locations and then approach the individual offices so we can get it scheduled. Let me know what you think. New Filings in Burns Lawsuit: Several items have been filed since your departure including Burns’ replies in the special action, his response to the motion to stay the superior court proceedings, his response to APS’ motion to dismiss, and your reply in support of the motion to stay. I have saved copies of these pleadings in _BWD Documents under the “Burns Lawsuits” folder. I have sent a request to Sarah about the schedule for oral argument and will update you as soon as I have additional details. HEPG and Seattle Trips: Pat put the agendas for Calgary and Seattle in _BWD Documents under the “Upcoming Travel” folder. You are confirmed for Boeing and the Seattle Tour. He has the confirmation number for the Seattle hotel but is awaiting the ACC000690 hotel confirmation for Harvard. The confirmation for Seattle is also located in the Upcoming Travel folder and has been added to your calendar entry. Pat also Finally received an invoice form to send to HEPG for Boston Flight Reimbursement (Sent to HEPG on 09-21). He’ll be keeping an eye out on webmail for event invitations and if you see any in your inbox, just forward them along and we’ll take care of getting you RSVP’d. Press Inquiry: Holly received an inquiry on committee spending. The reporter was looking for an accounting of what has been spent from your committee budget. Pat and I reviewed the expenditures and put together a spreadsheet for Holly detailing the amounts spent from the committee budget to date along with rational for the expense. She will use this as a reference when she contacts the reporter. I would like to discuss how we can be more proactive with disseminating information about the events you attend and their purpose. Code of Ethics: We have scheduled a follow-up meeting with staff on the 26th. We will be discussing the structure for the code, confirming the known topics, identifying any additional research required, handing out drafting assignments, and setting the drafting/review schedule. Forests: The APS report is due November 16, 2017. Pat is floating dates with the other offices and it looks like it will be scheduled for Tuesday December 5th. CC&Ns: Pat and I met with staff earlier this week to finalize a strategy for the policy. Bob and Blessing from Utilities will be taking the lead in revising the draft policy to reflect your proposals. We should have a draft sometime next week and I will forward for your review. US/Mexico Commission: Tobin wants to join the US/Mexico Commission related to utilities. He has asked for the ACC to approve the $5000 annual fee to join. It be on the next staff meeting agenda. I’ll get some more details on the organization as we get closer to the date. APS Communications Plan: Staff and I agree that the communications plan was solid and addressed the issues that you raised at the staff meeting. Yesterday, several community advocacy groups and some environmental organizations filed comments requesting specific revisions related to accountability and periodic reporting during the transition process. I have attached that letter to this email. I have not had a chance to discuss the letter with staff, but please take a look and see if you believe any of the proposed revisions are worth exploring. I will send an update as soon as I speak with staff. Other Updates: I have a few updates that I would like to discuss over the phone when ACC000691 you have time. I’m flexible and will make myself available when it is convenient for you, just let me know. Nothing is super urgent. Thanks! Erin Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   ACC000692 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Patrick Maloney RE: 2018 HEPG Events Tuesday, September 26, 2017 8:02:47 AM HEPG October 2017 draftspeakeragenda.pdf Registration Form - October 2017 fillable.pdf Dear Patrick,   I apologize; I was out of the office with a death in my family when invitations for our upcoming meeting were issued.  I have made sure that our office has updated information so that the commissioner will regularly receive invitations to our sessions.    If he would be available, our next session will be held in Calgary at the Fairmont Palliser on October 12-13.  We would be happy to have the Commissioner join us.  The agenda and registration form are attached.  We could reimburse travel expenses and arrange hotel accomodations for Wednesday, October 11 and Thursday, October 12.  Our agenda and registration form are attached.  Kindly let me know if Commissioner Dunn can participate.   Our next session for this term will be held in Palm Beach, Florida on December 7-8.  We plan to hold a session in Washington DC on March 22-23, and to hold our 25th anniversary session in Cambridge on June 7-8.   Regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 5:23 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: 2018 HEPG Events   Hello Jo-Ann,   Hope all is well. I am reaching out to see if you know the HEPG Event Calendar for 2018?   Thank you,   ACC000693 Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542?3935 Cell: (602) 469?5705 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel Calgary, Alberta THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, October 12 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Pricing Carbon Emissions: The Promise and Pitfalls of Regional Approaches With the delay or demise of the Clean Power Plan, states and regions are stepping further into the development of policies intended to regulate or put a price on carbon emissions. The inherent nature of the climate problem means that emissions anywhere should have the same impact everywhere. With a national standard, a common price of carbon could blend seamlessly with bidbased economic dispatch in organized markets. With regional approaches, the different or even conflicting approaches could undermine both the intended climate policy and the operation of open and non-discriminatory markets. Power flows across the grid in ways that could confound carbon accounting. Issues of leakage and so-called resource shuffling arise that would not appear in a national program. Different approaches have been followed in the eastern RGGI and the Western Energy Imbalance Market. Proposed policies could confront challenges on the basis of undue discrimination. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? What do we know about the theory and the practice of regional power markets and varied carbon policies? How can organized markets best accommodate different carbon policies? How can we ensure that the climate solution is workable and working? Moderator: Arnie Quinn, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric Kate Konschnik, Harvard Law School Sam Newell, Brattle Group Don Tretheway, California ISO 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000695 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Thursday, October 12 (cont’d) 10:45 pm Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Sustainable Capacity Markets: Too Much to Hope For? The thesis underlying capacity markets is that energy prices alone would be insufficient to attract the investment required to assure a reliable supply of capacity. While that theory, and/or the need for centralized capacity markets, is not universally accepted, it has been widely embraced. Recent policy discussions have seen additional arguments added to the rationale for capacity markets and their design. These go beyond simply attracting sufficient investment to assure supply, and include broader social and economic objectives, such as resource diversity, promotion of non-emitting resources, etc. Such considerations are very likely to affect not only the structure and economics of the capacity market, but also dispatch operations/protocols and the energy market itself. A number of critical questions are raised by these design questions: How can price signals continue to reflect value and products if there is dispatch interference due to fleet operations or subsidies? How can social contracts be integrated into the capacity market as a capacity resource without distortions? How can contracts be designed to ensure that the industry can compete on a level footing with some certainty related to market rules if legislation continues to shift? And how can consumers respond to shifting costs without undermining the house of cards? How will the fundamental transformation of distributed energy resources affect the foundations of capacity markets? What will prompt a rationalization of underlying reliability standards that give rise to the revenue disconnect? Moderator: Cheryl Terry, Alberta Electric System Operator Kenneth Anderson, Public Utility Commission of Texas David Brown, University of Alberta Marcy Cochlan, TransAlta Andrew Hartshorn, Acadia Energy Managers 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 5:30 pm Transportation provided to Equestrian Event, Reception and Dinner Spruce Meadows ACC000696 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Friday, October 13, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Carbon Emissions: Does Federal Exit Result In Heightened Pressure on States to Act? The Trump Administration posture and actions on climate change signal where the Federal Government will be for the next 3 plus years on carbon issues, subject to judicial review. That posture, of course, does not make the issue go away, but it seems likely to move the forum for seeking action away from Washington and more toward state capitals. A number of governors have already signaled their willingness to accept more of a role. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? Will the carbon focus be primarily on the power sector itself, or will transport and industrial emitters of carbon be affected? Will the focus be on resources, such as renewables or energy efficiency, or on more macro policies such as carbon tax or cap and trade? How cost effective is it for emissions reductions for states to pursue their own individual carbon policies? Will a state-by-state approach motivate a backlash by large businesses to pressure the Trump Administration to ease its stance? What will state regulators do and how effective will it be? Moderator: Bruce Williamson, Maine Public Utilities Commission Ashley Brown, Harvard Kennedy School James Holodak, National Grid Noah Long, Natural Resources Defense Council Doug Scott, Great Plains Institute 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000697 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Af?liation Address Phone E-mail El YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. I I NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. El I would like to send my designee: Name Title Address Phone E?mail HOTEL INFORMATION \Ve have arranged for conference rates for \Vednesday evening, October 11 and Thursday, October 12 at the Fairmont Palliser in Calgary. Our room block consists of basic Fairmont Rooms at the rate of $199 Canadian. You may request an upgraded category of room at a higher rate; a limited number of these rooms Will be available. The rate per night in Canadian dollars: Deluxe Signature $259; Junior Suite $289; One Bedroom Suite $319; Fairmont Gold S349. To reserve your room please contact the Reservations department directly at (403) 260?1230 and mention the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and the Reservations ID. HARVARD1017. The reservations deadline is. September 12, 2017. You can also book through the link: To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: ACC000698 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: 2018 HEPG Events Tuesday, September 26, 2017 8:34:00 AM Calgary Registration Form - October 2017.pdf Hello Jo-Ann,   Commissioner Dunn would love to attend. I have attached his registration form. Is it possible to extend his stay through October 13th? If we have to pay for the extra day that’s absolutely fine, however it would be easier if we didn’t have to make a separate resevervation.     Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2017 8:02 AM To: Patrick Maloney Subject: RE: 2018 HEPG Events   Dear Patrick,   I apologize; I was out of the office with a death in my family when invitations for our upcoming meeting were issued.  I have made sure that our office has updated information so that the commissioner will regularly receive invitations to our sessions.    If he would be available, our next session will be held in Calgary at the Fairmont Palliser on October 12-13.  We would be happy to have the Commissioner join us.  The agenda and registration form are attached.  We could reimburse travel expenses and arrange hotel accomodations for Wednesday, October 11 and Thursday, October 12.  Our agenda and registration form are attached.  Kindly let me know if Commissioner Dunn can participate.   Our next session for this term will be held in Palm Beach, Florida on December 7-8.  We plan to hold a session in Washington DC on March 22-23, and to hold our 25th anniversary session in Cambridge on June 7-8.   Regards, Jo-Ann     ACC000699 Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 5:23 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: 2018 HEPG Events   Hello Jo-Ann,   Hope all is well. I am reaching out to see if you know the HEPG Event Calendar for 2018?   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC000700 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Boys w. Dunn Title Commissioner Af?liation Arizona Corporation Commission Address 1200 W. Washington St 2nd Floor Phoenix, AZ Phone 602-542-3935 E-mail pmaloney@azcc.gov YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. I I NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. El I would like to send my designee: Name Title Address Phone E?mail HOTEL INFORMATION \Ve have arranged for conference rates for \Vednesday evening, October 11 and Thursday, October 12 at the Fairmont Palliser in Calgary. Our room block consists of basic Fairmont Rooms at the rate of $199 Canadian. You may request an upgraded category of room at a higher rate; a limited number of these rooms Will be available. The rate per night in Canadian dollars: Deluxe Signature $259; Junior Suite $289; One Bedroom Suite $319; Fairmont Gold S349. To reserve your room please contact the Reservations department directly at (403) 260?1230 and mention the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and the Reservations ID. HARVARD1017. The reservations deadline is. September 12, 2017. You can also book through the link: To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: ACC000701 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Tom Forese Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Tuesday, September 26, 2017 9:43:16 AM HEPG October 2017 draftspeakeragenda.pdf Registration Form - October 2017 fillable.pdf Dear Commissioner Forese,   The Harvard Electricity Policy Group would like to invite you to  our next session to be held in Calgary at the Fairmont Palliser on October 12-13.  (Apologies for the late notice, as I was out for a family matter when the invitations were sent. ) The agenda and registration form are attached.  We could reimburse travel expenses and arrange hotel accomodations for Wednesday, October 11 and Thursday, October 12.  Our agenda and registration form are attached.  Kindly let me know if you would like to participate.   Our next session for this term will be held in Palm Beach, Florida on December 7-8.  We plan to hold a session in Washington DC on March 22-23, and to hold our 25th anniversary session in Cambridge on June 7-8.  We do hope to see you at some of those upcoming sessions.   Regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 5:23 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: 2018 HEPG Events   Hello Jo-Ann,   Hope all is well. I am reaching out to see if you know the HEPG Event Calendar for 2018?   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 ACC000702 Cell: (602) 469?5705 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION The Fairmont Palliser Hotel Calgary, Alberta THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, October 12 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Pricing Carbon Emissions: The Promise and Pitfalls of Regional Approaches With the delay or demise of the Clean Power Plan, states and regions are stepping further into the development of policies intended to regulate or put a price on carbon emissions. The inherent nature of the climate problem means that emissions anywhere should have the same impact everywhere. With a national standard, a common price of carbon could blend seamlessly with bidbased economic dispatch in organized markets. With regional approaches, the different or even conflicting approaches could undermine both the intended climate policy and the operation of open and non-discriminatory markets. Power flows across the grid in ways that could confound carbon accounting. Issues of leakage and so-called resource shuffling arise that would not appear in a national program. Different approaches have been followed in the eastern RGGI and the Western Energy Imbalance Market. Proposed policies could confront challenges on the basis of undue discrimination. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? What do we know about the theory and the practice of regional power markets and varied carbon policies? How can organized markets best accommodate different carbon policies? How can we ensure that the climate solution is workable and working? Moderator: Arnie Quinn, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric Kate Konschnik, Harvard Law School Sam Newell, Brattle Group Don Tretheway, California ISO 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000704 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Thursday, October 12 (cont’d) 10:45 pm Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:15 pm Session Two. Sustainable Capacity Markets: Too Much to Hope For? The thesis underlying capacity markets is that energy prices alone would be insufficient to attract the investment required to assure a reliable supply of capacity. While that theory, and/or the need for centralized capacity markets, is not universally accepted, it has been widely embraced. Recent policy discussions have seen additional arguments added to the rationale for capacity markets and their design. These go beyond simply attracting sufficient investment to assure supply, and include broader social and economic objectives, such as resource diversity, promotion of non-emitting resources, etc. Such considerations are very likely to affect not only the structure and economics of the capacity market, but also dispatch operations/protocols and the energy market itself. A number of critical questions are raised by these design questions: How can price signals continue to reflect value and products if there is dispatch interference due to fleet operations or subsidies? How can social contracts be integrated into the capacity market as a capacity resource without distortions? How can contracts be designed to ensure that the industry can compete on a level footing with some certainty related to market rules if legislation continues to shift? And how can consumers respond to shifting costs without undermining the house of cards? How will the fundamental transformation of distributed energy resources affect the foundations of capacity markets? What will prompt a rationalization of underlying reliability standards that give rise to the revenue disconnect? Moderator: Cheryl Terry, Alberta Electric System Operator Kenneth Anderson, Public Utility Commission of Texas David Brown, University of Alberta Marcy Cochlan, TransAlta Andrew Hartshorn, Acadia Energy Managers 2:45 pm Coffee Break 3:00 pm Discussion 4:15 pm Adjourn 5:30 pm Transportation provided to Equestrian Event, Reception and Dinner Spruce Meadows ACC000705 HEPG Draft Agenda, October 12-13, 2017 Friday, October 13, 2017 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. Carbon Emissions: Does Federal Exit Result In Heightened Pressure on States to Act? The Trump Administration posture and actions on climate change signal where the Federal Government will be for the next 3 plus years on carbon issues, subject to judicial review. That posture, of course, does not make the issue go away, but it seems likely to move the forum for seeking action away from Washington and more toward state capitals. A number of governors have already signaled their willingness to accept more of a role. What does this mean for state regulators and for legislators as they look at the power sector and its carbon footprint? What measures might environmental groups be advocating? Will the carbon focus be primarily on the power sector itself, or will transport and industrial emitters of carbon be affected? Will the focus be on resources, such as renewables or energy efficiency, or on more macro policies such as carbon tax or cap and trade? How cost effective is it for emissions reductions for states to pursue their own individual carbon policies? Will a state-by-state approach motivate a backlash by large businesses to pressure the Trump Administration to ease its stance? What will state regulators do and how effective will it be? Moderator: Bruce Williamson, Maine Public Utilities Commission Ashley Brown, Harvard Kennedy School James Holodak, National Grid Noah Long, Natural Resources Defense Council Doug Scott, Great Plains Institute 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000706 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12-13, 2017 THE FAIRMONT PALLISER CALGARY, ALBERTA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Af?liation Address Phone E-mail El YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. I I NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. El I would like to send my designee: Name Title Address Phone E?mail HOTEL INFORMATION \Ve have arranged for conference rates for \Vednesday evening, October 11 and Thursday, October 12 at the Fairmont Palliser in Calgary. Our room block consists of basic Fairmont Rooms at the rate of $199 Canadian. You may request an upgraded category of room at a higher rate; a limited number of these rooms Will be available. The rate per night in Canadian dollars: Deluxe Signature $259; Junior Suite $289; One Bedroom Suite $319; Fairmont Gold S349. To reserve your room please contact the Reservations department directly at (403) 260?1230 and mention the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and the Reservations ID. HARVARD1017. The reservations deadline is. September 12, 2017. You can also book through the link: To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form by Thursday, September 28 to: ACC000707 From: To: Subject: Date: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Patrick Maloney RE: 2018 HEPG Events Monday, October 9, 2017 11:58:06 AM Dear Patrick,   We have made a reservation for the Commissioner at the Fairmont Palliser, arriving 10/11 and departing on Saturday 10/14.  His confirmation number is:  34728516.   Best regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2017 11:35 AM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: 2018 HEPG Events   Hello Jo-Ann,   Commissioner Dunn would love to attend. I have attached his registration form. Is it possible to extend his stay through October 13th? If we have to pay for the extra day that’s absolutely fine, however it would be easier if we didn’t have to make a separate resevervation.     Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:jo-ann mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, September 26, 2017 8:02 AM ACC000708 To: Patrick Maloney Subject: RE: 2018 HEPG Events   Dear Patrick,   I apologize; I was out of the office with a death in my family when invitations for our upcoming meeting were issued.  I have made sure that our office has updated information so that the commissioner will regularly receive invitations to our sessions.    If he would be available, our next session will be held in Calgary at the Fairmont Palliser on October 12-13.  We would be happy to have the Commissioner join us.  The agenda and registration form are attached.  We could reimburse travel expenses and arrange hotel accomodations for Wednesday, October 11 and Thursday, October 12.  Our agenda and registration form are attached.  Kindly let me know if Commissioner Dunn can participate.   Our next session for this term will be held in Palm Beach, Florida on December 7-8.  We plan to hold a session in Washington DC on March 22-23, and to hold our 25th anniversary session in Cambridge on June 7-8.   Regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390       From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 5:23 PM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: 2018 HEPG Events   Hello Jo-Ann,   Hope all is well. I am reaching out to see if you know the HEPG Event Calendar for 2018?   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 ACC000709 Cell: (602) 469?5705 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Paul Walker Andy Tobin DOE Study, highlighted version Saturday, October 28, 2017 9:15:55 AM Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability 0.pdf -Paul Walker ConservAmerica ACC000711 Staff Report to the Secretary on Electricity Markets and Reliability August 2017 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000712 Table of Contents Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................ List of Figures...................................................................................................................................... List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1 2 Findings of This Study ............................................................................................................... 10 3 Power Plant Retirements .......................................................................................................... 15 3.1 Coal Plant Retirements ............................................................................................................... 20 3.2 Natural Gas Plant Retirements ................................................................................................... 24 3.3 Nuclear Plant Retirements .......................................................................................................... 27 3.4 Hydropower Retirements and Repowering ................................................................................ 34 3.5 Falling Natural Gas Prices............................................................................................................ 35 3.6 Environmental Regulations ......................................................................................................... 39 3.7 Growing VRE Deployment........................................................................................................... 47 3.8 Flattening Electricity Demand ..................................................................................................... 54 3.9 Power Plant Retirements Looking Forward ................................................................................ 57 4 Reliability and Resilience .......................................................................................................... 61 4.1 Assessing Challenges to Reliability.............................................................................................. 63 4.2 Diversity, Fuel Assurance, and Onsite Storage ........................................................................... 89 4.3 High-Risk Events and System Resilience ..................................................................................... 97 4.4 Enhancing Reliability and Resilience ........................................................................................... 99 4.5 Reliability and Resilience Looking Forward............................................................................... 100 5 Wholesale Electricity Markets ................................................................................................. 102 5.1 Evolution of U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets ....................................................................... 102 5.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets Today ........................................................................................ 104 5.3 Challenges in Wholesale Electricity Markets ............................................................................ 107 5.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets Looking Forward ...................................................................... 118 6 Affordability ........................................................................................................................... 119 6.1 Affordability of Generation Portfolios ...................................................................................... 119 6.2 The Wholesale-Retail Disconnect ............................................................................................. 120 6.3 Affordability Looking Forward .................................................................................................. 124 7 Policy Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 126 8 Areas for Further Research ..................................................................................................... 128 Appendix A: National and Regional Profiles ................................................................................... 130 Appendix B: VRE Integration Studies .............................................................................................. 151 Appendix C: Power Plant Cycling ................................................................................................... 154 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000713 List of Figures Figure 1.1. Regions Used in This Study ......................................................................................................... 4 Figure 1.2. Schematic of Typical Daily Load Curve Showing Base Load ........................................................ 6 Figure 3.1. Location of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and All Other Retirements, 2002–2016, ................... 15 Figure 3.2. Net Generation Capacity Additions and Retirements............................................................... 16 Figure 3.3. Retirements of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and Other Generating Units, 2002–2022 ............ 18 Figure 3.4. Retirements by Date, Location, Ownership, and Capacity ....................................................... 18 Figure 3.5. Operating Generation Capacity, Additions, Retirements, and Announced Retirements by Region for All Generation Types, January 2002–December 2022 .............................................................. 20 Figure 3.6. Location of the Existing Coal Fleet ............................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.7. Location of Coal Retirements, 2002–2016................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.8. U.S. Utility-Scale Coal-Fired Electric Generating Capacity Additions by Coal Type and Initial Operating Year .......................................................................................................................................... 22 Figure 3.9. Location of the Existing Natural Gas Fleet ................................................................................ 25 Figure 3.10. Capacity Additions of U.S. Utility-Scale Natural Gas-Fired Electricity Generation by Technology Type and Initial Operating Year ............................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.11. Natural Gas Fleet Capacity Factors ......................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.12. Location of Natural Gas Retirements ...................................................................................... 27 Figure 3.13. Location of the Existing Nuclear Fleet .................................................................................... 28 Figure 3.14. Location of Nuclear Power Plant Retirements: Closed, Announced, and Averted ................ 30 Figure 3.15. Nuclear Plant Retirements Compared to NRC Plant Operating License Terms .................... 33 Figure 3.16. Hydropower Plants in the United States by Capacity and Average Annual Runoff ................ 34 Figure 3.17. Conventional and Shale Natural Gas Production, 2007–2016................................................ 36 Figure 3.18. Wholesale Day-Ahead Electricity Prices vs. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Monthly Average) .................................................................................................................................................................... 37 Figure 3.19. Total Annual U.S. Natural Gas Generation, 1950–2016 ......................................................... 38 Figure 3.20. Heat Rates for Coal, Nuclear, and Natural Gas, 2002–2016 ................................................... 39 Figure 3.21. PJM Merit-Order Dispatch: Various Control Technologies ..................................................... 42 Figure 3.22. Changes in U.S. Coal Capacity, December 2014–April 2016 ................................................... 44 Figure 3.23. Average Coal Plant Capacity Factors, 2008–2014................................................................... 45 Figure 3.24. Projected and Actual Coal Retirements, 2008–2018 .............................................................. 46 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000714 Figure 3.25. VRE Generation by Fuel as Percentage of Total U.S. Generation, 2002–2016 ....................... 48 Figure 3.26. Cumulative U.S. Utility-Scale Wind and Hydroelectric Generation Capacity, 1915–December 2016 ............................................................................................................................................................ 48 Figure 3.27. Relationship between the PTC and Annual Wind Capacity Additions .................................... 50 Figure 3.28. VRE Penetration as a Percentage of 2016 Generation versus Retired Capacity since 2010 as a Percentage of Non-VRE Capacity ................................................................................................................ 51 Figure 3.29. Gross Domestic Product and Net Electricity Production, Historical (1950–2016) and Projected (2017–2027) ............................................................................................................................. 54 Figure 3.30. Estimated U.S. Energy Savings from Structural Changes in the Economy and Energy Efficiency, 1980–2016 ................................................................................................................................ 55 Figure 3.31. EIA Annual Electricity Sales 2000–2016 (terawatt-hours) and AEO Reference Case Electricity Sales Projections 2017–2030 ...................................................................................................................... 56 Figure 3.32. Baseload Capacity Additions and Retirements from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) ..................................................................................................................................................... 57 Figure 3.33. Modeled Projections for Natural Gas Price, Electricity Sales, and VRE Generation from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario) ................................................................................................. 58 Figure 3.34. NGCC Capacity Factors and Number of Starts, 1998–2016 .................................................... 59 Figure 4.1. System Operation Time Scales .................................................................................................. 62 Figure 4.2. Five-Year Average Reserve Margins across Different Regions (2018–2022) ............................ 66 Figure 4.3. Historical Solar On-Peak Capacity Factors in ERCOT................................................................. 67 Figure 4.4. NERC Definitions of Reserves Used to Provide ERS .................................................................. 70 Figure 4.5. System Frequency after a Grid Event (Top) and How Frequency Control Mechanisms Work to Restore Frequency (Bottom)....................................................................................................................... 71 Figure 4.6. EEI Historical and Project Transmission Investment (Nominal Dollars).................................... 76 Figure 4.7. Location of the Existing Wind Fleet .......................................................................................... 77 Figure 4.8 Wind Energy Share of Electric Generation by State, 2016......................................................... 78 Figure 4.9. Ways To Integrate VRE, Arrayed by Type of Intervention and Cost (2014) ............................. 80 Figure 4.10. CAISO Load, Net Load, and Wind and Solar Output on Example Weekdays during 2014 ...... 82 Figure 4.11. The CAISO Duck Curve ............................................................................................................ 83 Figure 4.12. Demand and Net Demand Shapes at Different Distributed Energy Resource Penetration Levels........................................................................................................................................................... 84 Figure 4.13. Mapping Reliability Attributes Against Resources ................................................................. 86 Figure 4.14 Selected Ancillary Service Market Design Characteristics ....................................................... 87 Figure 4.15. Ancillary Service Products Exchanged in the Centrally Organized Markets, Listed by RTO/ISO and Category of Ancillary Service ............................................................................................................... 88 Figure 4.16. Generation Mix and Various Economic and Policy Drivers Since 1949, Including Diversity Index............................................................................................................................................................ 89 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000715 Figure 4.17. Changes in U.S. Capacity (Top) and Generation (Bottom) Mix over Time (Left to Right: 2002, 2009, 2016) ................................................................................................................................................. 90 Figure 4.18. Natural Gas Storage Facilities ................................................................................................. 93 Figure 4.19. Coal Stocks and Days of Burn, January 2010–May 2017 ........................................................ 96 Figure 4.20. Electricity Generation Changes from 2013 to 2014 by Fuel Type .......................................... 97 Figure 4.21. Sandia National Laboratories’ Resilience Analysis Process................................................... 101 Figure 5.1. Utility Restructuring by State as of May 2017 ........................................................................ 104 Figure 5.2. The Seven RTOs or ISOs in the United States ......................................................................... 105 Figure 5.3. States and Regions along the Spectrum from Traditional to Fully Restructured Electric Markets ..................................................................................................................................................... 106 Figure 5.4. How Market Prices Allow Resource Costs to be Recovered in a Centrally-organized Wholesale Market....................................................................................................................................................... 110 Figure 5.5. Simulated ERCOT Dispatch Curves .......................................................................................... 112 Figure 5.6. Type of Fuel Used in PJM (by Real-Time Marginal Units): 2004 through March 2017 ........... 113 Figure 5.7. Annual Average Capacity Factors of Coal and Natural Gas Generators ................................. 113 Figure 5.8. Negative Northwest Off-Peak Daily Spot Prices ($/MWh) in 2011......................................... 116 Figure 6.1. Average U.S. Residential Sector Retail Electricity Prices over Time ....................................... 121 Figure 6.2. Average Wholesale Electric Costs/MWh Have Fallen between 2002 and 2016. ................... 122 Figure 6.3. Day-Ahead, On-Peak Wholesale Electric Prices Reach Near-Record Lows in 2016. ............... 123 Figure 8.1. Average Three-Year Capacity Factors for Retired U.S. Coal Plants ......................................... 155 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000716 List of Tables Table 3-1. Direct Employment and Income in Industries Related to Electric Power Supply, 2016 ............ 23 Table 3-2. Nuclear Plant Retirements, Announced Closures, and Plants Averted by State Action .......... 31 Table 3-3. Average Nuclear Costs by Plant Size and Operator Type, 2016................................................. 32 Table 3-4. Major Environmental Regulations Related to Coal, Natural Gas, and Nuclear Generation ...... 40 Table 3-5. Fiscal Year 2013 Electricity Production Subsidies and Support ................................................. 53 Table 4-1. How Various Energy Storage Options Can Deliver Grid-Level Applications .............................. 74 Table 4-2. Characteristics of VRE, Grid Integration Challenges, and Mitigation Options ........................... 78 Table 4-3. Dependence on Imported Just-in-Time Energy for Electricity ................................................... 94 Table B-1. VRE Integration Studies .......................................................................................................... 151 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000717 1 Introduction On April 14, 2017, Energy Secretary Rick Perry issued a memorandum requesting a study to examine electricity markets and reliability. With this document, Department of Energy (DOE) staff are delivering a study that seeks not only to evaluate the present status of the electricity system, but more importantly to exercise foresight to help ensure a system that is reliable, resilient, and affordable long into the future. Therefore, while carefully acknowledging history, this study focuses on the present trajectory of trends that are of particular concern in meeting those long-term goals. Specifically, the April 14 memo directed a study that explores the following three issues:  The evolution of wholesale electricity markets, including the extent to which Federal policy interventions and the changing nature of the electricity fuel mix are challenging the original policy assumptions that shaped the creation of those markets;  Whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes such as on-site fuel supply and other factors that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which this could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future; and  The extent to which continued regulatory burdens, as well as mandates and tax and subsidy policies, are responsible for forcing the premature retirement of baseload power plants. The U.S. electricity industry is facing unprecedented changes. Last year, for the first time in history, natural gas replaced coal as the leading source of electricity generation. In 2015, a record-high amount of generating capacity retired. Over the course of the last decade, overall growth in electricity consumption at the national level has stalled, while many generation sources—particularly natural gas, wind, and solar—frequently hit new record levels of penetration. The stakes are high around these issues because electricity is crucial to modern society and economic activity, and because of the physical and financial magnitude of the industry. As noted in the report, Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (QER 1.2): The United States has around 7,700 operating power plants1 that generate electricity from a variety of primary energy sources; 707,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines;2 more than 1 million rooftop solar installations;3 55,800 substations;4 6.5 million miles of local distribution lines;5 and 3,354 distribution utilities6 delivering electricity to 148.6 million customers. The total amount of money paid by end users end for electricity in 2015 was about $400 billion.7 This drives an $18.6 trillion U.S. gross domestic product and significantly influences global economic activity totaling roughly $80 trillion.8 Recognizing how vital electricity is to our society and the health of the U.S. economy, the April 14 memo asked staff to “provide concrete policy recommendations and solutions.” It also offered principles for policy formulation: “the Trump Administration will be guided by the principles of reliability, resilience, affordability, and fuel diversity—principles that underpin a thriving economy.” To that end, this report concludes by outlining policy recommendations to advance those principles. Section 2 of this study offers a summary of findings. Sections 3 through 6 provide the analytical framework, relevant data, and research. In addition, each of these sections concludes with a “looking forward” note, as many of the issues raised in the April 14 memo are of growing importance. Section 1 1 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000718 presents policy recommendations available—to DOE and others—to address the issues identified in this study. Section 8 outlines potential areas for further research. Data Used in This Study This study uses data collected by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) for the years 2002 through 2017, looking back before 2002 on a few specific issues. The 2002–2017 time range captures several important developments:  Centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets (Regional Transmission Operators [RTOs] and Independent System Operators [ISOs]) were in the early stages of implementation in 2002. Competition within centrally-organized markets among a large segment of merchant generation did not take effect until the mid-2000s. Three RTO/ISOs initiated mandatory capacity markets in 2006–2007: New York ISO (NYISO), PJM Interconnection (PJM), and ISO-New England (ISO-NE).  The emergence of a large amount of unconventional natural gas production—the shale revolution—started in 2006–2007. The consequent drop in natural gas prices began in 2009 under the combined impacts of low demand during the economic recession and a significant increase in supply.  The recession contributed to a significant drop in electricity demand in 2008, and it took several years for demand to return to 2008 levels. Although economic activity has picked up in recent years, electricity consumption and gross domestic product (GDP)—which grew together for decades—now appear less correlated as industries have become less energy-intensive and energy efficiency measures have taken full effect.  Several environmental regulations implemented under statutes enacted in the 1970s and 1990s, which raise capital and operating costs for affected power plants, had compliance deadlines in the period 2010–2017.  Driven in part by Federal and state policies, tax incentives, and mandates, significant quantities of variable renewable energy (VRE) resources—specifically wind and solar, and at levels high enough to alter traditional patterns of grid operation—began to impact certain areas around 2010.  Also around 2010, demand response emerged as a way for customers to compete in most centrally-organized wholesale markets. Because all of the above factors have emerged over the past 15 years—each affecting power supply and demand in different ways—looking at data since 2002 helps to reveal the impact and interactions of these changes. Additionally, EIA believes that the highly detailed EIA data used in this study (down to the level of individual generators) is most reliable for 2002 forward. Further, the data used for this study include power plant fuel conversions as retirements for the original fuel source. This study reports power (e.g. generation capacity) and energy (e.g. production or consumption over time) in megawatts (MW) and megawatt-hours (MWh), respectively (unless otherwise noted). Finally, all generation capacity figures reported in this study are net summer capacity as opposed to nameplate (unless otherwise noted). 2 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000719 Defining Regions The U.S. bulk power system (BPS) is a patchwork of different markets for electricity, shaped over time by technological changes, as well as state, regional, and Federal policies. This patchwork presents organizational and operational challenges, but its diversity also contributes to the system’s robustness. The U.S. power system in the lower 48 statesa is divided into three synchronized grids: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).b, 9 There are limited connections between the Eastern and Western Interconnections, and even fewer connections from ERCOT to the other grids. Issues confronting the BPS vary widely across regions. This study divides the lower 48 states into nine regions that represent either individual or groups of electric systems, known as balancing authority areas (see Figure 1.1). Within these regions, there are 66 balancing authorities (which can be as small as individual utilities or as large as a multi-state region). Using nine balancing authority-based regions for this analysis is a useful way of aggregating electricity data and revealing regional trends. a Both Alaska and Hawaii have unique islanded electric power systems that are not comparable to the rest of the Nation and thus are not included in this study. This is discussed in detail in a later section. b For most purposes, ERCOT can be considered electrically isolated from the other grids. ERCOT is also not subject to most elements of the Federal Power Act and therefore economic regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. A significant exception is Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversight and regulation of power system reliability, which does apply to ERCOT. 3 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000720 Figure 1.1. Regions Used in This Study10 Seven of the nine regions analyzed in this study correlate primarily or directly to the seven ISOs and RTOs in the United States that supply about two-thirds of electricity delivered to end-use customers:c  NE = ISO-NE  NY = NYISO  ERCOT = Electric Reliability Council of Texas  Mid-Atl = PJM  Midwest = Mid-Continent ISO (MISO)  Central = Southwest Power Pool (SPP)  CAISO+ = California ISO (plus smaller balancing areas in the state) The two remaining regions include numerous balancing authorities, all of which lie outside RTO/ISO service areas:  SE = Southeast  West = non-CAISO+ Western Interconnection. c The last four regions in this list include a few additional (mostly small) balancing authorities outside the formal ISO or RTO footprint. 4 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000721 Defining Baseload Generation This study defines baseload generation as power plants that are operated in baseload patterns—that is, plants that run at high, sustained output levels and high capacity factors, with limited cycling or ramping. While this definition includes most nuclear, coal, and natural gas steam generators, it is not a given that every nuclear, coal, or natural gas steam generator is operated as a baseload plant, or that other technologies cannot function as baseload plants (such as hydroelectric generators). In addition, this study uses the term conventional generation to mean coal, nuclear, and natural gas power plants, regardless of how they are operated.d Other organizations and publications use similar definitions. For example, PJM defines baseload generation as “those units which operate the great majority of hours of the year to meet load requirements.”11 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) offers an explanation as well: There is a distinction between baseload generation and the characteristics of generation providing reliable “baseload” power. Baseload is a term used to describe generation that falls at the bottom of the economic dispatch stack, meaning [those power plants] are the most economical to run. Coal and nuclear resources, by design, are designed for low cost O&M [operation and maintenance] and continuous operation […] However, it is not the economics nor the fuel type that make these resources attractive from a reliability perspective. Rather, these conventional steam-driven generation resources have low forced and maintenance outage hours traditionally and have low exposure to fuel supply chain issues. Therefore, “baseload” generation is not a requirement; however, having a portion of a resource fleet with high reliability characteristics, such as low forced and maintenance outage rates and low exposure to fuel supply chain issues, is one of the most fundamental necessities of a reliable BPS. These characteristics ensure that “baseload” generation is more resilient to disruptions.12 The electricity industry has traditionally referred to baseload generation as the power plants that are used to meet “base” load—the minimum level of electricity that customers demand around the clock, as illustrated in Figure 1.2. Large nuclear, coal, natural gas steam, and hydroelectric plants have historically been used for baseload generation.e Baseload plants generally have high capital costs but low fuel costs, and they tend to be fairly fuel efficient. Although the output level of these plants can be changed, they are most economic—in terms of cost per unit of electricity produced—when operated at near-full capacity at all times (although hydroelectric plants are more flexible). Traditional baseload units tend to have longer start-up and shut-down times and generally move (ramp) slowly between production levels to avoid damaging plant components with thermal stress or metal fatigue (see Appendix C on cycling). d QER 1.2 does not define the term baseload in its glossary. However, the report states in a caption on page 1-21 that “baseload is considered coal, nuclear, and natural gas combined-cycle plants.” e Other technologies that have traditionally operated as baseload include geothermal and biomass power plants. However, those technologies represent a relatively small portion of total U.S. electricity generation; while valuable for the grid reliability services they provide, they are not covered in this report. 5 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000722 Figure 1.2. Schematic of Typical Daily Load Curve Showing Base Load13 Intermediate or mid-merit plants are used to follow load, meeting daily variations in demand. Depending on the mix of generation resources available in different regions of the country and relative fuel prices, natural gas and/or coal units are typically used for load following. Short-duration demand peaks, which occur infrequently throughout the year, are generally met by natural gas units with high heat rates.f More recently, customer-provided demand response is helping to meet peak demand. Analysis in Section 3 shows that many of the power plants that retired between 2002 and 2016 were used for baseload generation in the past, but were no longer operating in that role at the time of retirement due to changes in electricity market dynamics. With the sustained drop in natural gas prices, for example, natural gas-fired combined-cycle (NGCC) plants are currently a less costly source of baseload generation than coal or nuclear power in many regions of the country. VRE resources such as wind and solar are beginning to serve more of minimum load, albeit at variable or intermittent output levels.g The proliferation of these sources has also led grid operators in some regions to place an increasing premium on flexible generation resources (e.g., NGCC units) that can help balance VRE variability by meeting base load and intermediate load, both of which are affected by a f According to EIA, “Heat rate is one measure of the efficiency of a generator or power plant that converts a fuel into heat and into electricity. The heat rate is the amount of energy used by an electrical generator or power plant to generate one kilowatthour (kWh) of electricity.” https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=107&t=3. g For the purposes of this study, wind and solar are referred to as VRE. Terms such as “non-dispatchable” and “intermittent” may also apply to these technologies, but for consistency, this study uses the term variable. In contrast, some renewables are dispatchable—that is, sources that can provide power to the grid within sub-hourly time scales to match demand during any 24hour period. Dispatchable renewables include sources such as biofuels, geothermal, and hydropower (with the caveat on hydropower that it may only be seasonally dispatchable in some cases). 6 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000723 changing net load profile.h These factors, among others, have collectively lessened the immediate need for traditional baseload resources in certain regions, but still speak to the need for baseload generation. Defining Premature Retirement The dictionary definition of premature is “happening … or performed before the proper, usual or intended time.”14 The Department does not have an official definition for the term “premature retirement”i with respect to power plants, as the term is highly subjective. Below are some of the prevailing viewpoints and associated meanings:  Power plant engineers may think a power plant retired prematurely if it has not yet run to the end of its nominal design life (for instance, approximately 40 years for post-1970 coal plants) or through the term of reasonable plant life extension modifications.  An RTO/ISO or reliability organization may think a power plant retirement is premature if its continued operation is still required to deliver Essential Reliability Services (ERS)j in that location (in which case the operator may delay retirement by designating it a “reliability-must-run” resource).  A policymaker or legislator may think a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the plant delivers benefits that the state or society values, such as emissions-free energy, local jobs, or maintaining local generation.  A mayor or employee may think a power plant is retiring prematurely if the retirement causes harms to the community and the individuals who work there.  A merchant competitor that built or acquired a power plant may think its plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the merchant has not been able to recover its investment in the plant through sales of energy and capacity or through other revenue streams.  A vertically integrated utility executive may think a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely if the utility has not yet fully recovered its rate-based capital investment in the plant and its return on that rate base.  Nuclear or hydroelectric plant owners and regulators may think a power plant has retired prematurely if it has not yet run through the full term of its operating license and/or license extension. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) hydro licenses run for up to 50 years with potential reauthorizations of 30–50 years, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nuclear operating licenses run for 40 years with potential 20-year extensions.  Electricity economists may think a power plant retired has prematurely if the plant was still able to sell electricity competitively against other energy sources but was required to close due to policy directives. On the other hand, economists may also think a power plant retired h “Net load” is the instantaneous difference between total customer electricity demand (load) and VRE generation. i QER 1.2—Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review—discussed “premature nuclear retirements” but did not explicitly define the term. For example, in Chapter 3, page 24, the report notes: “When analyzing the impacts of premature nuclear retirements on power generation in the state, a state of Illinois report considered a scenario in which 80 percent of the replacement generation was coal. Other analysis concludes that roughly 75 percent of the at-risk nuclear generation nationwide would be replaced with fossil generation, largely powered with natural gas.” [notes omitted, emphasis added] j See Section 4.1.1 for a discussion of ERS. 7 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000724 prematurely if the plant provided un-priced benefits to society that, if priced, would have made the plant profitable.  A long-term planner and risk manager may think a power plant has retired prematurely if it offered valuable diversity, reliability, resilience, and optionality benefits that are not yet fully recognized, valued, and/or compensated. Each of these viewpoints represents a valid perspective, particularly those of grid operators and other institutions responsible for reliability. While stakeholders may maintain that a power plant has been forced to retire prematurely based on one or more of the considerations above, the results of this study show that some observed power plant retirements were appropriate and consistent with markets as they are currently functioning. In other words, not every power plant retirement is cause for alarm. However, NERC is concerned with the trend of retirements as it relates to reliability and resilience. NERC wrote in response to the April 14 memo: As conventional resources prematurely retire, sufficient amounts of essential reliability services, such as frequency and voltage support, ramping capability, etc., must be replaced based on the configuration and needs of the system.15 [emphasis added] Given the difficulty in assigning a single definition to premature retirement, as well as the subjective nature of such a definition, this study does not attempt to determine whether any specific power plant retirements have been premature. Instead, this study assesses the various factors that contribute to power plant retirement trends. Topics Beyond the Scope of This Study This study does not directly address several topics for the following reasons:  Cybersecurity is a critical component to ensuring the reliable and resilient operation of the Nation’s energy infrastructure. Existing and emerging cybersecurity threats can affect any aspect of the electric sector, ranging from power plants, to transmission and distribution systems, to customers and end-use devices. The December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian electricity system and the 2012 Shamoon virus targeting the energy sector in Saudi Arabia, for example, were wake-up calls.16 DOE takes these threats seriously and is designated as the Federal Government’s lead SectorSpecific Agency for cybersecurity for the energy sector, which entails supporting the cyber protection of the Nation’s critical energy infrastructure.k However, while cybersecurity is a significant concern and top priority, it is not addressed in this report because it is the subject of an upcoming joint report between DOE and the Department of Homeland Security being prepared in response to Executive Order No. 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure.  Alaska and Hawaii: While the broad trends discussed in this report apply in Alaska and Hawaii as well as the lower 48 states, many of this study’s economic observations do not directly apply to the power plants in the Hawaii and Alaska power systems, as they are not large, interconnected energy markets, and utility system operators in the states face unique operational and fuel supply chain considerations. k For more information, visit DOE’s website on the Department’s cyber activities: https://www.energy.gov/national-securitysafety/cybersecurity. 8 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000725 The Hawaii and Alaska power systems are remote, vertically integrated systems with plant sizes that tend to fall below the size screens used in this study. The average generating unit sizes in Hawaii and Alaska are 18 MW and 5 MW, respectively, compared to an average unit size of 70 MW in the lower 48 states.17 Because neither state is interconnected with any of the major U.S. interconnections, or to any transmission or distribution network in Canada, utilities in both states must self-supply all ERS.l As a result, utilities in these isolated systems might consider different parameters for reliability in their system planning compared to utilities in the contiguous United States, who can obtain reliability services and products in real time through markets and bilateral transactions.18 Their experiences, however, may inform the efforts of utilities in the contiguous U.S. seeking to better manage rural systems and effectively integrate VRE and microgrids.  Geothermal, biomass, and combined heat and power plants are often operated as baseload plants, operating at a relatively stable level over a long period of time. However, because these types of plants are not as prevalent or widespread as gas, coal, and nuclear plants, this study did not perform detailed analyses of trends and closures for these technologies. l In 2014, an intertie to the Western Interconnection of British Columbia was proposed to the Alaska Energy Authority in order to bring power to Alaska. However, as of 2016, no further work on the project had been completed due to economic reasons. http://energy-alaska.wikidot.com/railbelt. 9 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000726 2 Findings of This Study This study identified several critical issues central to protecting the long-term reliability of the electric grid in accordance with the April 14 memo, which asked staff to explore: 1) The evolution of wholesale electricity markets, including the extent to which Federal policy interventions and the changing nature of the electricity fuel mix are challenging the original policy assumptions that shaped the creation of those markets. While centrally-organized markets have achieved reliable wholesale electricity delivery with economic efficiencies in their short-term operations, changing circumstances have challenged both centrally-organized and, to a lesser extent, vertically-integrated markets.m  To date, wholesale markets have withstood a number of stresses. While markets have evolved since their introduction, they are currently functioning as designed—to ensure reliability and minimize the short-term costs of wholesale electricity—despite pressures from flat demand growth, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels. The resulting low average wholesale energy prices, while beneficial for buyers of wholesale electricity, represent a critical juncture for many existing baseload generation resources and their role in preserving reliability and resilience.n  Market designs may be inadequate given potential future challenges. VRE—with near-zero marginal costs and if at high penetrations—will lower wholesale energy prices independent of effects of the current low natural gas prices. This would put additional economic pressure on revenues for traditional baseload (as well as non-baseload) resources, requiring careful consideration of continued market evolutions.  Markets need further study and reform to address future services essential to grid reliability and resilience. System operators are working toward recognizing, defining, and compensating for resource attributes that enhance reliability and resilience (on both the supply and demand side). However, further efforts should reflect the urgent need for clear definitions of reliabilityand resilience-enhancing attributes and should quickly establish the market means to value or the regulatory means to provide them. Evolving market conditions and the need to accommodate VRE have led to the increased flexible operation of generation and other grid resources. Some generation technologies originally designed to operate as baseload were not intended to operate flexibly, and in nuclear power’s case, do not have a regulatory regime that allows them to do so. m This study also refers to vertically integrated markets as bilateral markets. n Former FERC Commissioner Tony Clark summarizes today’s changing demands on centrally-organized markets: “Affordable power was the goal when markets were created. The current markets are still procuring affordable power, but many state public policy makers no longer see that as the only goal […] other public policy goals [include…] incenting in-state jobs, promoting ‘green’ energy or other politically favored resources, preserving carbon-free resources, and retaining substantial tax revenues to state and local government.” Clark goes on to say, “[Markets] were never designed for job creation, tax preservation, politically popular generation, or anything other than reliable, affordable electricity.” http://www.wbklaw.com/uploads/file/Articles-%20News/2017%20articles%20publications/Market%20Identity%20Crisis%20Fin al%20(7-14-17).pdf. 10 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000727  Generation from VRE can change widely over the course of a single day, which requires dispatchable power plants to be operated more nimbly. Additionally, in some areas of the country, there may be over-generation from VRE at some points in a day, which drives prices to almost zero yet requires quick-ramping assets when VRE subsides. Taken together, these trends have placed a premium on flexible output rather than the steady output of traditional baseload power plants. This flexibility is generally provided by generation resources. However, nongeneration sources of flexibility—such as flexible demand, increased transmission, and energy storage technologies—are being explored as ways to enhance system flexibility. Society places value on attributes of electricity provision beyond those compensated by the current design of the wholesale market.  Americans and their elected representatives value the various benefits specific power plants offer, such as jobs, community economic development, low emissions, local tax payments, resilience, energy security, or the national security benefits associated with a nuclear industrial base. Most of these benefits are not recognized or compensated by wholesale electricity markets, and this has given rise to a variety of state and private efforts that include keeping open or shutting down established baseload generators and incentivizing VRE generation. 2) Whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes such as onsite fuel supply and other factors that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which this could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. Markets recognize and compensate reliability, and must evolve to continue to compensate reliability, but more work is needed to address resilience.  Reliable and affordable electricity is essential to the modern economy, including the manufacturing, services, and financial sectors. NERC’s most recent annual State of Reliability report concludes that during 2016, the “bulk power system reliability remained within defined performance objectives to provide an Adequate Level of Reliability (ALR).”o NERC reached the same conclusion for 2013–2015. However, in a May 2017 letter to the Secretary of Energy, NERC pressed the importance of reliability issues that require attention, including maintaining ERS as conventional generation retires and ensuring flexibility and sufficient transmission to supplement and offset VRE.19 These issues are indicative of the technological and institutional changes that are now affecting the electricity sector, and dealing with these issues will require new levels of coordination and collaboration among the sector’s many constituencies. Presently, BPS reliability is adequate despite the retirement of a portion of baseload capacity and unique regional hurdles posed by the changing resource mix.  Fuel assurance is a growing consideration for the electricity system. Maintaining onsite fuel resources is one way to improve fuel assurance, but most generation technologies have experienced fuel deliverability challenges in the past. While coal facilities typically store enough o NERC defines ALR as “the state that the design, planning, and operation of the Bulk Electric System (BES) will achieve when the [five] listed Reliability Performance Objectives are met.” These objectives are detailed at http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Resources/Documents/Adequate Level of Reliability Definition (Informational Filing).pdf. 11 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000728 fuel onsite to last for 30 days or more, extreme cold can lead to frozen fuel stockpiles and disruption in train deliveries. Natural gas is delivered by pipeline as needed. The NERC letter to DOE emphasized ensuring natural gas fuel supply and mitigating delivery vulnerabilities. Capacity challenges on existing pipelines combined with the difficulty in some areas of siting and constructing new natural gas pipelines, along with competing uses for natural gas such as for home heating, have created supply constraints in the past. Supply constraints can create increased price risk and, in extreme cases, could impact reliability.p  Recent severe weather events have demonstrated the need to improve system resilience. The range of potential disruptive events is broad, and the system needs to be designed to handle high-impact, low probability events. This makes it very challenging to develop cost-effective programs to improve resilience at the regional, state, or utility levels. Planning, practice, and coordination on an all-hazards basis and having a mix of resources and fuels available when a major disturbance occurs are both essential to fast response. Work still remains to identify facilities that merit hardening; stage periodic exercises and drills so that governmental agencies and utilities are prepared for emergencies; and ensure that wholesale electricity markets are designed to recognize and incentivize investments that would achieve or enhance resiliencerelated objectives.  Significant progress is already being made to understand what is needed to maintain power system reliability under changing market conditions, but more work is needed to understand what can be done to maintain resilience in a variety of conditions as the grid changes over the coming years. Further, low natural gas prices are driving greater use of natural gas for electricity generation, which has made exposure to natural gas price risk related to availability a growing concern in several regions. There are tradeoffs between multiple desirable attributes of the grid. For example, within power systems, it may be the case that a more reliable and resilient system is more costly than the least-cost system that a centrally-organized wholesale market is intended to deliver. Similarly, policies that seek to deliver more jobs, reduce pollution, or reduce risk may require more upfront investment at an initially higher cost to society as a whole than a least-cost system. It is important that policymakers have a clear understanding of the true costs and benefits of services to the grid, as well as an understanding of the tradeoffs between desirable attributes like reliability, flexibility, and affordability. p Indeed, ISO-NE has repeatedly expressed that reliability and resilience concerns are not being adequately addressed by the New England region on natural gas. 12 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000729 3) The extent to which continued regulatory burdens, as well as mandates and tax and subsidy policies, are responsible for forcing the premature retirement of baseload power plants. The recent and unprecedented rise of natural gas as a top electricity generation resource, the increase in VRE penetration, the flattening of electricity demand growth, and a host of policy issues?regulations, mandates, and subsidies at the state and Federal levels?have negatively impacted traditional baseload generation, particularly coal and nuclear power plants. Between 2002 and 2016, 132,000 MW of generation capacity retired?representing about 15 percent of the total 2002 installed base?and 390,500 MW of new capacity was added. While power plants retire for a variety of reasons, several factors have contributed to recent retirements and continuing pressure for additional retirements. The biggest contributor to coal and nuclear plant retirements has been the advantaged economics of natural gas-fired generation. 0 Low-cost, abundant natural gas and the development of highly-efficient NGCC plants resulted in a new baseload competitor to the existing coal, nuclear, and hydroelectric plants. In 2016, natural gas was the largest source of electricity generation in the United States?overtaking coal for the ?rst time since data collection began.20 The increased use of natural gas in the electric sector has resulted in sustained low wholesale market prices that reduce the profitability of other generation resources important to the grid. The fact that new, high-efficiency natural gas plants can be built relatively quickly, compared to coal and nuclear power, also helped to grow gas-fired generation. Production costs of coal and nuclear plants remained somewhat flat, while the new and existing, more flexible, and relatively lower-operating cost natural gas plants drove down wholesale market prices to the point that some formerly profitable nuclear and coal facilities began operating at a loss. The development of abundant, domestic natural gas made possible by the shale revolution also has produced significant value for consumers and the economy overall. Another factor contributing to the retirement of power plants is low growth in electricity demand. 0 Growth of total electricity use has slowed from averaging 2.5 percent annually in the late 19905, to averaging 1.0 percent annually from 2000 to 2008, to remaining roughly flat since then.21 Changes in electricity demand?particularly the apparent decoupling of economic output and electricity demand?have been driven in part by energy efficiency policies. The combination of slow growth in electricity demand and the 390,500 MW of capacity additions from 2002 to 2016 made significant amounts of older, higher-cost capacity redundant. Dispatch of VRE has negatively impacted the economics of baseload plants. 0 Since 2007, the contribution to total generation from wind and solar has grown quickly, accelerated by government policies and mandates. State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) have been the largest contributor?associated with 60 percent of VRE growth since 2000? followed by Federal tax credits and government research (which contributed to the dramatic drop in wind and solar technology costs). Because these resources have lower variable operating costs than traditional baseload generators, they are dispatched ?rst and displace baseload resources when they are available. 0 Participants on a panel of economists at a May 2017 FERC technical conference cited state-level RPS and Federal tax credits for VRE as examples of wholesale market impacts and distortions. 13 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000730 Competition from resources that benefit from such policiesq reduces revenues for traditional baseload power plants by lowering the wholesale electric prices they receive and by displacing a portion of their output. Investments required for regulatory compliance have also negatively impacted baseload plant economics, and the peak in baseload plant retirements (2015) correlated with deadlines for power plant regulations as well as strong signals of future regulation.  A suite of environmental regulations scheduled for implementation between 2011 and 2022 has had varying degrees of effects on the cost of generation. For example, the largest number of coal plant retirements occurred in 2015—the deadline for coal and oil plants to add pollution control equipment for Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (MATS) compliance. In the same year, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized its Clean Power Plan, which, if fully implemented, would place additional pressure on coal-fired generation. Nuclear power plants also face regulatory costs—principally the Cooling Water Intake Rule. Three nuclear plants that announced closure (Oyster Creek, Diablo Canyon, and Indian Point) have cited disputes with their respective states, who implement the rule, as among the reasons for plant retirement. Ultimately, the continued closure of traditional baseload power plants calls for a comprehensive strategy for long-term reliability and resilience. States and regions are accepting increased risks that could affect the future reliability and resilience of electricity delivery for consumers in their regions. Hydropower, nuclear, coal, and natural gas power plants provide ERS and fuel assurance critical to system resilience. A continual comprehensive regional and national review is needed to determine how a portfolio of domestic energy resources can be developed to ensure grid reliability and resilience. q These same economists also cited other “out-of-market” interventions as distorting efficient price formation in wholesale markets, such as recently enacted and pending state laws that provide support to existing nuclear units. During the economist’s panel discussion at the FERC May 2017 technical conference, the phrase “subsidies beget subsidies” was used. 14 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000731 3 Power Plant Retirements A combination of factors is causing power plant retirements, including low natural gas prices, wholesale competition, low customer demand growth, regulation-driven cost increases, and the growth of VRE. As Figure 3.1 shows, the types, magnitude, and timing of conventional power plant retirements vary regionally. Figure 3.1. Location of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and All Other Retirements, 2002-20163 A. A . I ?68 A .34, .Coal . NG CC NG CT Capacrty (MW) I NG ST 1 500 Ownership I Nuclear 1 000 A Merchant Other VIEU 2 1,500 0 To understand observed power plant capacity retirements, it is useful to begin with an examination of historical capacity additions. From 1950 to 2015, capacity additions of different generation technologies tended to come in waves that were largely in?uenced by policy, fuel costs, and technology development (see Figure 3.2). Coal expansion was highest from 1950 to 1990, nuclear power was widely deployed in the 19705 and 19805, natural gas capacity additions peaked in the early 20005 and continue through today, and VRE has grown rapidly over the last decade.5 VIEU stands for vertically integrated electric utilities. 5 Not depicted: prior to the 19505, hydropower was a large source of generation capacity additions, the vast majority of which is still operational today. 15 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000732 Figure 3.2. Net Generation Capacity Additions and Retirements t23 Power plant retirements have accelerated since 2011, and retirement trends vary significantly by generation source. For instance, the current wave of nuclear plant retirements only occurred over the last five years.u Some of the nuclear units now closing are doing so because of state policy pressure (as with California’s Diablo Canyon, New Jersey’s Oyster Creek, and New York’s Indian Point), and some have had maintenance issues that were too costly to fix. However, most plants are closing or threatening closure because–given the economics in some regions—they have become unable to compete against primarily low-cost, gas-fired generation and, to a lesser extent, subsidized and mandated VRE in a low electricity demand environment. The design of traditional baseload power plants assumed operations primarily at a constant output level with limited cycling (see Appendix C).24 As the electricity system continues to evolve and market conditions change, these plants are increasingly being moved into load-following operations, or are t Acronyms: Clean Air Act (CAA), Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992), Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), Investment Tax Credit (ITC), Production Tax Credit (PTC). u However, we note that 29 U.S. nuclear power plants retired from 1974 through 2001, including 13 power plants in the commercial utility nuclear fleet sized at 700 MW or larger. These plants retired for a variety of reasons, including damage (Fort St. Vrain), safety or operational difficulties (Three Mile Island 2, Zion 1 & 2, Millstone 1), costly safety requirements (Humboldt Bay), and state or utility policy choices (Rancho Seco, Trojan, Indian Point 1). This study only looks at the nuclear units in operation in 2002 and beyond. 16 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000733 required to more frequently adjust the load and the on/off dispatch of their units. The extra costs incurred to do so can affect a retirement decision. QER 1.2 discusses these issues: Currently, the changing electricity sector is causing the closure of many coal and nuclear plants in a shift from recent trends. From 2000 through 2009, power plant retirements were dominated by natural gas steam turbines. Over the past 6 years (2010–2015), power plant retirements were dominated by coal plants (37 GW), which accounted for over 52 percent of recently retired power plant capacity. Over the next 5 years (between 2016 and 2020), 34.4 GW of summer capacity is planned to be retired, and 79 percent of this planned retirement capacity are coal and natural gas plants (49 percent and 30 percent, respectively). The next largest set of planned retirements are nuclear plants (15 percent).25 Retirements typically can be tied to the units’ inability to compete economically, but the factors complicating a given plant’s economics can be numerous and can compound each other. Currently, these factors include low wholesale electricity prices (driven by competing generators with low marginal costs, as well as subsidies); higher operating costs from unit age or lower efficiency; and looming capital needs, including compliance with safety and/or environmental regulations; among others. Further, minimal growth in electricity demand has compounded the impact of VRE policy; in an era of low-cost natural gas and increasing levels of state-mandated renewable generation—for example, a 20-percent share of wind and solar by 2020—lack of demand growth means natural gas and new VRE added to meet state mandates compete with existing conventional generation to satisfy a static level of demand. A review of coal, nuclear, and natural gas retirements to date shows that power plant retirements reflect regional patterns of generation development, state policies, and differences in market structure across regions. However, national patterns also emerge—Figure 3.3 shows that a significant amount of capacity (the highest on record) retired in 2015, coinciding with the MATS compliance deadline (which applied to coal- and oil-fired units across the country) as well as the finalization of the Clean Power Plan rule. 17 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000734 Figure 3.3. Retirements of Coal, Natural Gas, Nuclear, and Other Generating Units, 2002-202226 Capacity (MW) 25,000 Announced 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 Retirement Year I Coal Nuclear I Other Figure 3.4 highlights retirement trends by ownership type merchant vs. VIEU) and time period. Merchant plants accounted for nearly 70 percent of retired capacity during the period 2002?2010 (depicted as triangles below; note how most of the triangles are purple and dark blue). VIEU plants tended to retire later (depicted as circles below; note how most of the circles are light blue and green). The merchant vs. VIEU comparison indicates that market structure is a signi?cant factor in power plant retirements, particularly the timing of retirements. Figure 3.4. Retirements by Date, Location, Ownership, and Capacity27 Capacity (MVP 90 I Retired 2002 to 2006 I Retired 2007 to 2010 0 50? Ownership I Retired 2011 to 2015 lg A Mam?: I Retired 2016to March 2017 2 0 VIEU 18 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy The data displayed in Figure 3.4 is categorized into four time frames because a variety of economic trends and regulatory events occurred throughout the period 2002–2017:  During the period 2002–2006 (shown in purple), VIEU plants retired or sold many of their generating assets to third parties through state-initiated processes collectively known as restructuring. During the late 1990s, many states passed legislation initiating restructuring concurrent with the creation of several RTOs and ISOs. The majority of retirements occurring during this period were smaller, older merchant power plants in restructured areas including California, Texas, the Northeast, and the mid-Atlantic region.  The period 2007–2010 (shown in dark blue) saw early growth of subsidized utility-scale wind generation; the economic recession from 2008 through 2011; and the start of the shale revolution in 2006–2007, with natural gas prices starting a downward trend. Also in this time frame was the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Massachusetts v. EPA, finding that the EPA has the authority to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), opening the door to further regulation under the Clean Air Act.28 Older, less fuel efficient natural gas-fired plants retired early in this period, but the fall in natural gas prices starting in 2009 also began to force the shutdown of smaller, older coal and oil plants in 2009.  In the period 2011–2015 (shown in light blue), low natural gas prices proved to be a longlasting rather than a short-term phenomenon. The compliance deadline for MATS converged with tightening pollution limits in sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) trading programs. Many of the coal and oil retirements in this period were plants whose owners chose to shut down a plant rather than invest in costly environmental remediation measures. Further, the EPA’s final Clean Power Plan rule was finalized during this time.v This period had the most power plant retirements, with a marked increase in California, the mid-Atlantic, Midwest, and Southeast. During this period, it also became clear that a portion of the customer electricity demand lost from the recession was not going to reappear in the near term, which meant that electricity demand would not support the higher-cost plants that occupied higher positions on the supply curve.  In 2016 and going forward (shown in green), power plant retirements are and may continue to be driven by continued economic challenges in the form of market dynamics and compliance costs of regulations, as well as operational pressures from a changing resource mix. Figure 3.5 shows generation capacity, additions, retirements, announced retirements, and demand responsew as a percentage of 2002 total installed net summer capacity in each region. The graphic shows that in every region except CAISO+, the proportion of retirements between 2002 and 2016 (in v Although the Clean Power Plan was later stayed by the Supreme Court, the investment uncertainty around the time of the final rule made reinvestment in coal technology a difficult decision for plant owners. https://www.iaee.org/ej/ejexec/EJ391 ExecSum Morris.pdf. w Demand response is “a voluntary program offered by independent system operators/regional transmission organizations, local utility service providers, or third parties, which compensate end-use (retail) customers for reducing and/or changing the pattern of their electricity use (load) over a defined period of time, when requested or automatically instructed to do so during periods of high power prices or when the reliability of the grid is threatened.” https://energy.gov/epsa/quadrennial-energyreview-second-installment. 19 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000736 orange) is 20 percent or less of the total installed capacity available in 2002 (in red, orange, and light blue). The figure also shows that the amount of new capacity added (dark blue) exceeds the combined amounts of capacity retired (in red) and planned for retirement (in orange) in every region over the study period.x Figure 3.5. Operating Generation Capacity, Additions, Retirements, and Announced Retirements by Region for All Generation Types, January 2002–December 202229 3.1 Coal Plant Retirements There were approximately 306,000 MW30 of coal-fired power plants in the United States at the start of 2002 and 270,000 MW31 at the end of 2016, representing a net retirement of approximately 36,000 MW (about 12 percent) of coal capacity. The remaining fleet of coal-fired generators covers most of the lower 48 states, with the exception of the Northeast, Northwest, and California, as shown in Figure 3.6. x While the graphic includes currently planned additions in EIA’s data, this figure does not show generation (megawatt-hour) or technology type, and most of planned and added capacity (megawatt) comes from new natural gas and VRE sources that do not meet the NERC baseload characteristic discussed earlier. 20 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000737 Figure 3.6. Location of the Existing Coal Fleet Capacity (MW) - 1 500 Ownership 0 1.000 A Merchant (Q :3 21.500 0 VIEU EIA reports that: Coal-?red electricity generators accounted for 25% of operating electricity generating capacity in the United States and generated about 30% of US. electricity in 2016. Most coal- ?red capacity was built between 1950 and 1990, and the capacity-weighted average age of operating coal facilities is 39 years.32 More than 90 percent of the coal consumed in the United States is used for power generation.33 Coal energy production peaked in 2007 and has been declining since. No new coal plants have been built for domestic utility electricity production since 201434 because new coal plants are more expensive to build and operate than natural gas-fired plantsf?15 Further, as Figure 3.7 shows, coal retirements span many regions. Figure 3.7. Location of Coal Retirements, 2002?201636 . Capacity (MW) 0 50 . E) 500 Ownership A 2' 1.000 A Merchant ,1 21,500 0 VIEU 21 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000738 Between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,000 MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet. The age of coal plants is an important factor. As Figure 3.8 shows, the vast majority of coal-fired capacity was built before 1990, with the average of the fleet built in the mid to late 1970s.37 According to the Congressional Research Service, the service life of coal-fired generators reportedly “averages between 35 and 50 years, and varies according to boiler type, maintenance practices, and the type of coal burned, among other factors.”38 Figure 3.8. U.S. Utility-Scale Coal-Fired Electric Generating Capacity Additions by Coal Type and Initial Operating Year39 40 Between 2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,000 MW of generation capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet.41 EIA reported that coal-fired power plants made up more than 80 percent of the 18,000 MW of electric generating capacity that retired in 2015, and that the retiring units “tended to be older and smaller in capacity than the coal generation fleet that continues to operate.”42 An analysis of coal plant and other data indicates several important trends and attributes:  About 70 percent of the plants that retired between 2010 and 2016 had a capacity factor of less than 50 percent in the year prior to retirement, and about half of the future planned retirements operated below a 50 percent capacity factor in 2016.43  While none of the units that retired between 2010 and 2016 had significant SO2 control equipment installed, more than half of the future announced retirements have SO2 control.  The average size of planned retirements (380 MW) exceeds the average size of recent retirements (218 MW), indicating that future retirements will be generally larger than previous ones.44 22 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000739 Retired plants are older than the remaining fleet. The coal units that retired in 2015 were mainly built between 1950 and 1970, and the average age of those retired units was 54 years. The remaining coal fleet is relatively younger, with an average age of 38 years in 2016.45 In summary, until quite recently, the coal plants that have retired were smaller, older, had higher heat rates, and therefore were dispatched less often and ran at lower capacity factors. Most of the earliest coal retirements were merchant-owned units in the Northeast and Midwest that were more exposed to competition from other generators and fuel types, while VIEU-owned plants in the Southeast and elsewhere experienced a longer period of protection from low market prices. Workforce Impacts of Coal Plant Retirements and Shifts in Coal Production Falling demand for coal due to coal plant retirements and capacity factor reductions, a regional shift in coal production, and automation in mining have led to a reduction in coal production jobs. Between 2011 and September 2016, increased mechanization and a shift to western coal resulted in a loss of 36,000 coal mining jobs, of which nearly 90 percent were in Appalachia.46 As shown in Table 3-1, more than 80 percent of the coal jobs in the United States support electricity production.47 The oil and gas extraction sector is not subdivided and includes many non-power uses. About 35 percent of the natural gas and roughly one percent of petroleum jobs in the United States support electricity production.48 Growth in some energy sectors, such as solar energy deployment, supported new jobs, but they vary regionally and often do not correlate well with concurrent job losses in sectors such as coal mining or power plant operations. Job growth in other energy sectors and regions cannot sufficiently offset job losses in the coal sector without adequate training, salary adjustments, or transition assistance. Table 3-1. Direct Employment and Income in Industries Related to Electric Power Supply, 201649 Industry Sector/Subsector Jobs Percent Related to Average Annual Electricity Industry Income Electric power generation 191 ,000 100% $1 13,000 Electric power transmission and 292,000 100% $99,000 distribution Electric power total 483,000 100% $104,000 Coal miningV 55,000 ~80% $82,000 Oil and gas-extractionz 377,000 ~35% of gas, of oil $118,000 Mining and extraction total 432,000 Unknown $113,000 Includes supporting North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry categories. 1 Includes supporting NAICS industry categories. 23 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC000740 Coal Plant Closure Considerations50 In September 2016, Ed Malley of Power Magazine noted: The primary recent drivers of coal plant retirement announcements include low natural gas prices and new environmental regulations—especially the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS), Clean Water Act Section 316(b), and the Coal Combustion Residuals rule. Other contributing factors include more competitive markets and a variety of regional and state-level policies involving renewables and carbon pricing. Most of the power plants being closed today were built in the 1940s to 1960s, before the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970. Many have minimal air pollution controls, use once-through cooling water, and sluice wet coal ash to ponds. Scrubbers, closed-loop cooling, and dry ash handling are current requirements, or will be phased in over the next few years. Because much of the older capacity tends to be smaller units less than 300 megawatts (MW), which are not economical to retrofit, they are therefore retired. Many closures coincided with the MATS deadlines in 2015 and 2016, at a time when natural gas prices were at historic lows. Now that the MATS deadlines have passed, additional companies are announcing closures, including Dynegy (5,000 MW) and DTE Energy (2,100 MW). Economics, renewable energy mandates, and reduced demand for electricity are driving these additional closures. Power plant closure activity began on the East and West Coasts in oil-fired plants because of the high cost of fuel. Closures are now occurring in the coal belts, the Upper Midwest, and the Southeast. There are even some coal-fired plant closures in Western states. 3.2 Natural Gas Plant Retirements In recent years, the story of natural gas for electricity generation has been one of overall growth rather than decline. However, many natural gas plants have retired since 2002. Natural gas plants are located across the lower 48 states, and are concentrated around major population centers, as shown in Figure 3.9. According to EIA: In 2016, natural gas-fired generators accounted for 42% of the operating electricity generating capacity in the United States. Natural gas provided 34% of total electricity generation in 2016, surpassing coal to become the leading generation source. The increase in natural gas generation since 2005 is primarily a result of the continued costcompetitiveness of natural gas relative to coal.51 24 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000741 Figure 3.9. Location of the Existing Natural Gas Fleet52 . . Fuel Type Capacity (MW500 Ownership (.1 I NG ST 1,000 A Merchant 21.500 OVIEU NGCC units accounted for 54 percent of the 447,000 MW of total U.S. natural gas-powered generator capacity in 2016. Combined-cycle generators have been a popular technology choice since the 19905 and made up a large share of the capacity added between 2000 and 2005. Some other types of natural gas-?red technology, such as combustion turbines (CTs, representing about 28 percent of total natural gas-powered generator capacity) and steam turbines 17 percent), generally only run during hours when electricity demand is high. The capacity-weighted average age of U.S. natural gas power plants is 22 years, which is less than hydro (64 years), coal (39 years), and nuclear (36 years). The improved efficiency of NGCC plants has led to them being used to a greater degree as baseload generation and increased the overall generation from natural gas. Figure 3.10 shows the initial operating years for the three types of natural gas-?red capacity additions (and their respective share of total natural gas generation in 2016). 25 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000742 Figure 3.10. Capacity Additions of U.S. Utility-Scale Natural Gas-Fired Electricity Generation by Technology Type and Initial Operating Year53 Figure 3.11 shows total natural gas-fired net generation and how the capacity factors of these plants vary by technology over the period 2011–2016. Although NGSTs were originally built principally for baseload use, since the early 2000s, they have been displaced in the dispatch merit order by more efficient NGCC plants designed for greater flexibility. As shown in Figure 3.11, NGST units operate at significantly lower capacity factors than NGCC units. Figure 3.11. Natural Gas Fleet Capacity Factors54 The States of California, Texas, New York, and Florida all had more than 20,000 MW of natural gas-fired capacity at the end of 2016. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) reports that, due to the flexibility, efficiency, and cost competitiveness of NGCC power plants, grid operators have been dispatching NGCC plants more frequently as baseload generators.55 In consequence, the average capacity factor for all NGCC plants has grown from about 40 percent in 2008 to roughly 56 percent in 2016, surpassing that of coal.56 26 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000743 Figure 3.12. Location of Natural Gas RetirementsCapacity (MW500 Ownership c: I NG ST 1,000 A Merchant A 0 21,500 0 VIEU 4? 0 Figure 3.12 shows the retirements of natural gas plants between 2002 and 2016. The ERCOT and CAISO markets have presented difficulties for merchant natural gas (depicted as triangles above; note the concentration of merchant retirements in California and Texas). EIA reported in 2011 that between 2000 and 2010, 33,000 MW of natural gas-?red generation retired (72 percent steam turbines), with an average age at retirement of 48 years and with significantly higher heat rates than the average NGCC.58 3.3 Nuclear Plant Retirements The current operating nuclear power ?eet consists of approximately 54,000 MW of generating capacity in regulated markets and approximately 45,000 MW in restructured electricity markets.59 This represents nine percent of total U.S. utility-scale generation capacity in 2017 and 20 percent of U.S. electric generation in 2016. EIA reports that nuclear plants have higher capacity factors than any other electric generation technology, averaging more than 90 percent (nearly full capacity, full time) over the past ?ve years. The plants refuel every 18 to 24 months.60 27 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000744 Figure 3.13. Location of the Existing Nuclear Fleet61 The first of these units went online in 1969, and the capacity-weighted average age of the nuclear fleet is 37 years old.62 Almost all of the operating plants have received approval to conduct at least one capacity uprate; through 2016, these uprates to the existing fleet have contributed more than 7,000 MW of additional nuclear capacity.63 In addition to capital investments for capacity uprates, nuclear owners make significant capital investments to replace aging components to qualify for license renewal, as well as a suite of additional security and safety investments to comply with new regulations following 9/11 and the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. The United States has the world’s largest nuclear reactor fleet. Nuclear power plants contribute about 60 percent of total U.S. emissions-free generation.64 Located in 60 power plants, the 99 active nuclear reactors provide almost half a million jobs and contribute more than $60 billion to the U.S. GDP.65 Nuclear energy is viewed as a key strategic asset for the United States, and continued U.S. leadership in the global nuclear energy market has important nonproliferation and safety ramifications to national security interests.66 As noted recently by Prof. Michael Webber of the University of Texas: While the environmental and reliability impacts of the [nuclear plant] closures are wellunderstood, what many don't realize is that these closures also pose long-term risks to our national security. As the nuclear power industry declines, it discourages the development of our most important anti-proliferation asset: a bunch of smart nuclear scientists and engineers….The loss of expertise from a declining domestic nuclear workforce makes it hard for Americans to conduct the inspections that help keep the world safe from nuclear weapons.67 Of the 99 active nuclear units, 51 are owned by VIEUs, which rely on regulated cost-of-service ratemaking. This form of ratemaking provides a stable source of cost recovery assuming reasonably prudent operation and management by the utility. The continued operation of these units depends on decisions by their ratemaking authorities: state regulators; state governments; city councils; cooperative boards; Federal entities; and state regulatory bodies. If these plants become less competitive, authorities may decide to close nuclear units on economic grounds. Authorities can also decide to close nuclear units on grounds other than economics—for example, proximity to the New York City 28 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000745 metropolitan area (36 miles) has been cited as an additional concern in the continued operation of the Indian Point nuclear plant. Twenty-eight nuclear plants are now merchant plants that were spun off by VIEUs to affiliates under state electric restructuring efforts in the early 2000s. All of these merchant nuclear units operate in centrally-organized wholesale markets. Many of the units were spun off to exploit high locational marginal prices (LMPs) in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets in the days of high natural gas prices.aa In New York and Illinois, Clean Energy Standards and associated Zero Emission Credits (ZEC) for nuclear plants are being used to help maintain the economic viability and continued operations of nuclear plants, in part to help meet the states’ GHG-limiting goals. Modeled after existing RPS and Renewable Energy Certificates (REC), these ZEC payments68 69 have been established to direct additional funds to existing nuclear power plants that are no longer cost-competitive. Currently, only New York and Illinois have Clean Energy Standard programs, and these programs are being litigated in the courts. A recent Idaho National Laboratory report observes that70  There is an industrywide systemic economic and financial challenge to operating nuclear power plants in centrally organized markets;  Given the confluence of market factors in combination with market structure in centrally organized markets, a significant number of operating nuclear plants have negative cash flow positions today;  Given current trends, these market factors are unlikely to change significantly over the next five years;  Retirement of nuclear plants before their operating licenses expire is caused primarily by lower revenues as opposed to higher operating costs, as wholesale electricity prices have precipitously fallen over the last several years;  The magnitude of the gap between operating revenues and operating costs is in the range of $5–$15 per megawatt-hour (MWh). For a 1,000 MW nuclear unit, approximately every $5/MWh of gap represents about $40 million in annual negative cash flow;  Without action to enhance revenue (e.g., New York ZEC payments), more nuclear plants will face retirements before the end of their operating license in the future.71 Figure 3.14 shows the nuclear reactors that have announced retirement, those that have closed, and those whose closure has been averted by state action. Between 2002 and 2016, 4,666 MW of nuclear generating capacity was announced for retirement, or approximately 4.7 percent of the U.S. total.72 aa Profits from high wholesale prices are not available to utility cost-of-service regulated units because their revenues are set by state regulators to recover operating costs and provide a target return on invested capital. 29 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000746 Figure 3.14. Location of Nuclear Power Plant Retirements: Closed, Announced, and Averted 73 As shown in Table 3-2, another eight reactors representing 7,167 MW of nuclear capacity (7.2 percent of U.S. nuclear capacity and 0.6 percent of total U.S. generating capacity74) have announced retirement plans since 2016. This does not include seven reactors that averted early retirement through state action. 30 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000747 Table 3-2. Nuclear Plant Retirements, Announced Closures, and Plants Averted by State Action75 76 77 As Table 3-2 shows, Indian Point is the only announced closure that lists state policy as the sole reason for retirement. 12 of the 16 plant closure announcements refer to unfavorable market conditions as the driver for plant retirement. Four of the five nuclear power plants (six reactors) that have shut down since 2013 were single-unit plants. Of the 11 nuclear power plants (15 reactors) that have announced 31 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000748 intentions to close—including the five plants (seven reactors) in New York and Illinois that will remain open as a result of state action—four are dual-unit plants and seven are single-unit plants. Table 3-3 shows the range of nuclear plant average costs in 2016 (in $/MWh). The data indicates that single-unit plants are more costly than multi-unit plants, and that operators who own only one nuclear plant have higher costs than those who own a fleet of plants. This is largely because some operating costs, such as security, do not scale linearly with plant size. As a result, single-unit or smaller plants are more expensive, and thus more likely to be retired prior to the end of their license terms. Table 3-3. Average Nuclear Costs by Plant Size and Operator Type, 201678 A nuclear plant fully exposed to low wholesale energy prices can earn additional revenues in three other ways: it may receive capacity payments if it is located in a centrally-organized market with a capacity payment scheme (New York, New England, MISO, and PJM), it can earn revenues for providing reliability products such as frequency response,bb or it may receive ZEC or similar subsidy payments from its host state. If a nuclear plant is owned by a VIEU, its regulators may allow it to continue collecting capital recovery from its ratepayers even though the utility is effectively paying more to run the nuclear unit than it would cost to buy the same energy and capacity under a bilateral contract or spot market purchases. However, as long as natural gas prices stay low and there is an oversupply of energy in many hours, the typical nuclear plant may not be profitable. Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates that 34 of the Nation’s 60 nuclear plants are losing money.79 Not all nuclear power plants close due to unfavorable economics alone. For example, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) has decided to shut down its dual-unit Diablo canyon plant in California due to several factors, including changes in state policy (California is moving to 50 percent RPS by 2040), new environmental regulations (replace once-through cooling system at an estimated cost of $8–$12 billion), local opposition to the NRC relicensing extension application, and uncertainty about future loads to be bb See Section 4.1.1 for the technical definition of frequency. 32 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000749 served by the regulated utility (specifically, community choice aggregation, which allows for third-party retail suppliers). The NRC’s nuclear relicensing program is another factor affecting the future of U.S. nuclear power generation. The NRC issues initial reactor operating licenses covering a 40-year term, but those licenses have been routinely extended. Of the 99 operating nuclear reactors in the United States, 84 have been approved to operate for 60 years, while another nine are currently under review.80 However, based on the current and potential license extensions to 60 years, only three units (Comanche Peak Unit 2 and Watts Bar Units 1 and 2) will still be operating after 2050, unless subsequent license extensions—out to 80 years—are submitted and approved. Two utilities have already announced plans to seek subsequent license renewal for two plants.81 Extended nuclear plant operations often entail major capital upgrades of plant equipment. According to DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program, the required capital costs for equipment upgrades drive the total cost for extension; these costs vary by plant. DOE estimates that it requires $500 million to $1 billion per plant of additional capital expenditures to operate a plant for an additional 20 years.82 These routine maintenance and equipment replacements would be required in this time frame regardless of the licensing process.83 Figure 3.15 shows a comparison of license duration to planned closure date. As depicted, most decisions to retire have come well before the expiration of the plant’s license. A few of the plants shown in the figure (indicated by a box around the plant name) were able to avert closure as a result of state actions. Figure 3.15. Nuclear Plant Retirements Compared to NRC Plant Operating License Terms84 85 86 33 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000750 3.4 Hydropower Retirements and Repowering In 2015, the U.S. hydropower fleet included 2,198 active power generation plants with a total capacity of 79,600 MW and 42 pumped-storage hydropower plants totaling 21,600 MW.87 As of 2016, hydropower accounted for more than six percent of net U.S. power sector electricity generation, nearly nine percent of U.S. electric generating capacity, and 97 percent of U.S. utility-scale electrical storage capacity.88 Hydropower is currently the largest source of renewable generation, providing nearly 44 percent of all U.S. renewable energy in 2016.89 90 Half of U.S. hydro capacity is located in the States of Washington, California, and Oregon. The hydropower fleet is the oldest in the U.S. -- as stated in QER 1.2, “About half the U.S. hydroelectric fleet is over 50 years old since many large dams were built between the 1940s and 1960s,”91 and the average hydroelectric facility has been operating for 64 years. However, with routine maintenance and refurbishment of turbines and electrical equipment, the expected life of a hydropower facility is likely to be 100 years or more.92 Hydropower is a varied resource. Forty-eight states (see Figure 3.16) have hydropower facilities, led by California, Oregon, and Washington. Ownership of hydropower plants is highly diverse, split across a wide range of private and public entities. Approximately 50 percent of hydropower capacity is owned by the Federal Government—the three main Federal agencies authorized by Congress to own and operate hydropower plants are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Other public ownership includes public utility districts, irrigation districts, states, and rural cooperatives, whose hydropower resources consist of about 24 percent of the total installed capacity. Private owners—including VIEUs, merchant power producers, and industrial companies— control the remaining 25 percent of total installed capacity.93 Figure 3.16. Hydropower Plants in the United States by Capacity and Average Annual Runoff94 34 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000751 While some hydropower plants are operated as baseload resources, many also support the dynamic behavior of grid operations by offering a full range of ancillary services, including load following, spinning and non-spinning reserve, and voltage and frequency support. This flexibility has historically complimented other traditional forms of baseload generation, such as coal and nuclear. The majority of hydropower capacity is operated as either peaking or run-of-river. Peaking plants shift or delay water releases used for generation to higher value times of the day, contingent on a project’s storage capability and the regulatory requirements governing its operation. While peaking plants have usable storage from a project’s reservoir, run-of-river facilities have little to no ability to store water, and generation only changes based on the natural variability of flows, though even these types of facilities are capable of providing a number of ERS. In some regions, hydropower assets have been operated in more flexible modes in recent years as VRE penetration increases.95 At the beginning of 2011, hydropower plants comprised 24 of the 25 oldest operating power facilities in the United States, with 72 percent of facilities older than 60 years.96 However, significant capital investment toward modernizing and upgrading the existing fleet is consistently taking place to maintain reliability and, at times, uprate the capacity of existing facilities. From 2007 to 2016, the industry invested at least $8.7 billion in refurbishments, replacements, and upgrades to hydropower plants at 143 hydropower facilities, including $1.2 billion and 34 plants in 2016 alone.97 This often includes equipment upgrades, turbine efficiency improvements, and modifications that ensure environmental protection and mitigation as part of relicensing terms. Most of the recent hydropower capacity additions in the United States have come from unit upgrades or additions to existing projects.98 While FERC does receive appropriations from Congress to defray operating costs, these appropriations are recovered completely through annual charges and administrative fees.99 EIA public reports indicate that 1,376 MW (of the total 79,985 MW of U.S. hydroelectric capacity) retired between 2002 and 2017—in most cases as part of repowering projects in which the retired turbine generators were replaced with new equipment. Fifty-two relatively small-scale hydroelectric generators representing 283 MW of generation capacity were retired without replacement.100 3.5 Falling Natural Gas Prices Shale gas development has significantly expanded the availability of natural gas and lowered its cost across the United States and the world.101 Before the widespread use of horizontal drilling techniques in the past decade, U.S. natural gas prices averaged more than $7 per million British thermal unit (MMBtu) between 2003 and 2008, and approached $14/MMBtu in several short periods (including in 2005 after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reduced production and delivery from Gulf of Mexico sources).102 Hydraulic fracturing practices spread and made previously inaccessible gas sources economic, causing natural gas prices to fall, averaging less than $3.20/MMBtu between 2012 and 2016.103 35 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000752 Figure 3.17. Conventional and Shale Natural Gas Production, 2007–2016104 Wholesale electricity prices generally tracked natural gas prices for the study period, as shown in Figure 3.18. This is likely because gas-fired mid-merit and peaker power plants have been the marginal generators following load in many hours of the day, and their short-run marginal costs are driven by natural gas prices.105 Thus, natural gas plants and gas prices have been the largest single driver of spot electricity prices. 36 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000753 Figure 3.18. Wholesale Day-Ahead Electricity Prices vs. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Monthly Average)106 The price of natural gas is a key factor in the prices generators offer in the bid-based RTO/ISO wholesale electricity markets. It is also a factor in the prices set in bilateral power sales, including in the nonRTO/ISO regions such as the Southeast. Consequently, wholesale and bilateral transaction prices are often driven by natural gas prices across large parts of the U.S. power market.cc On one hand, wholesale electricity prices have become increasingly exposed to potential volatility in natural gas delivered prices. On the other hand, the Nation has realized significant economic benefits from the shale revolution— falling natural gas prices between 2007 and 2013 generated an estimated net economic benefit of $48 billion per year over this period.107 Natural gas-fired generation has grown nearly continuously since the late 1980s (see Figure 3.19) for several key reasons. These plants have low capital costs and are, in general, relatively less expensive than some competing technologies.108 They are also much less land-intensive than many other types of generation, and thus often can be more easily sited in urban areas near electric demand.109 Similarly, natural gas pipelines can be built more quickly than electric transmission lines (in most states) because they have a comparatively streamlined permitting process, which often has made it easier for a plant developer to build a new gas-fired plant near a large electric load than to build a power plant farther away and transmit its electricity to large load centers by wire.dd cc When natural gas prices were high, this situation yielded large profits to the then lower-cost coal and nuclear power producers. However, as gas prices and therefore wholesale and bilateral contract power prices have declined, the situation has reversed, and many coal and nuclear plants have been losing money. dd Interstate natural gas pipelines can often be built more quickly than transmission lines because the pipeline owners, once granted a FERC-issued certificate of public convenience and necessity, have eminent domain power under section 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act and the procedures set forth under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 71A). By contrast, electric transmission developers are dependent on states to grant eminent domain authorization. 37 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000754 Figure 3.19. Total Annual U.S. Natural Gas Generation, 1950–2016110 The two main types of natural gas generators (NGCCs and CTs) offer distinct operational advantages. NGCC generators are very efficient and have significantly higher capacity factors than single111 (simple) cycle natural gas CTs, which contribute primarily to meeting peak load and may only operate for a few hours a year.112 A CT’s short start-up time and fast ramp rate make it the most responsive component for ensuring enough capacity exists to meet demand during the highest-peak demand hours of the year and help maintain grid reliability, absent affordable grid-scale storage. For this reason, CT capacity factors are usually lowee (generally below 10 percent).113 CTs can go from cold start-up to 100 percent output in seven to 11 minutes; in contrast, coal-fired units ramp on the order of hours, and doing so incurs increased operations and maintenance costs.114 NGCC ramp rates fall somewhere in between, and some NGCC units can ramp to full-rated power in less than 30 minutes.115 This flexibility makes NGCCs and CTs useful in complementing VRE because their flexibility allows these plants to match changes in solar or wind output. Until recently, most NGCC units were used for intermediate and peak loads rather than baseload. However, because natural gas prices have been low for a sustained period, and because NGCC plants retain some of the flexible characteristics of CTs and operate at a higher efficiency and lower cost, these units often are now used for baseload power. As a result, some coal plants have been pushed higher on the merit order, which reduces their average capacity factors, negatively impacts their economics, and can ultimately lead to retirements. ee Some states rely on CTs more regularly than other locations; most notably, Texas, Louisiana, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island all have CT capacity factors greater than 20 percent. https://energy.gov/epsa/downloads/electricitygeneration-baseline-report. 38 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000755 On top of low fuel prices, natural gas-fired power plants have become more fuel efficient over the study period. Figure 3.20 shows how the fuel energy usage per unit of electricity generation of the fleet of generators has changed from 2002 to 2016 for each fuel type. The natural gas fleet has become increasingly efficient (i.e., achieved a lower heat rate) as old steam electric plants have retired and many new, highly efficient NGCC plants have been built and operated at high utilization rates.116 Figure 3.20. Heat Rates for Coal, Nuclear, and Natural Gas, 2002–2016117 3.6 Environmental Regulations A suite of environmental regulations affecting the electricity generation sector had implementation deadlines between 2011 and 2021, stemming from statutes enacted between 1970 and 1990. These regulations have had disparate effects on the costs of various power generation technologies. While the cost of environmental regulations has been significant for coal-fired power plants in particular, the evidence reviewed below indicates that regulations were not the sole cause of observed coal retirements, but were certainly a contributing factor. Following are two key takeaways: 1. Timing suggests that regulations had an impact on retirements. Of the 59,392 MW of coal-fired power plants that retired between 2002 and 2016, approximately 48,800 MW or 82 percent of that capacity retired in the period 2012–2016, when significant environmental regulations would have affected the invest-or-retire decision. This left 270,000 MW of coal-fired capacity on the grid (down from 315,000 MW in 2002), which produced 30 percent118 of total 2016 U.S. electricity output (down from 50 percent in 2002). 2. Many of the coal plants that retired were no longer “baseload.” Due to low natural gas prices and abundant natural gas generation capacity additions, most of the coal plants that retired between 2011 and 2015 (when the environmental regulations took effect) had not been operating in their intended baseload fashion for several years.119 39 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000756 All nuclear power plants are affected by regulations pertaining to safety, security, and upgrades required for license renewal. In addition, nuclear plants are affected by the Cooling Water Intake Rule, and some announced closures have cited, among other reasons, state requirements to modify cooling water systems as a reason for retirement.120 121 Hydropower plants are also affected by other environmental regulations and unique licensing processes. Table 3-4 summarizes major environmental regulations finalized after 2011 affecting coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants. Table 3-4. Major Environmental Regulations Related to Coal, Natural Gas, and Nuclear Generation Name Year Year (3) Authorizing Major Provisions Generation Finalized" Implemented Statute"I Sources Affected Cooling Water 2001 Phase II: Clean Water . Promulgated under 316(b) of the Clean Coal Intake Rulem (Phase 1), 2014?2018123 Act Water Act. New sources regulated under Gas 2003 Phase I and existing sources regulated Nuclear (revised under Phase II. Phase 1). States consider requirements for power 2014 plants on a case-by-case basis.124 (Phase II) Requires controls to reduce mortality to ?sh and other aquatic organisms. Cross-State Air 2011 Phase 1: 2015 Clean Air Act We Cross?State Air Pollution Rule Coal Pollution Phase 2: 2017 replaced the Clean Air Interstate Rule Gas Rule?? starting on January 1, 2015, and requires states to reduce power plant emissions of SO: and that contribute to ozone emissions and ?ne particle pollution in other states?s Steam Electric 1974; 1982; 2015 40 CFR 423 Established limitations on the discharge of Coal Ef?uent policy update is toxic and other chemical pollutants and Gas Limitations updates in stayed while thermal discharges from existing and new Guide ine3127 1977, EPA reviews steam electric power plants, as well as 1978, rule pretreatment standards. 1980. The 2015 update sets the ?rst Federal 1982. and limits on levels of toxic metals that can be 2015 discharged. New Source 1980; 1980; 2002 Clean Air Act Affects stationary sources of air pollutants. Coal Review"" policy updates under Requires that a new or modi?ed power Gas updates in court plant obtain a pre-construction permit to 1996 and challenge ensure, among other things, that modern 2002 pollution control equipment is installed. Requirements differ depending on whether or not the plant is located in an area that '7 Dates shown here reflect the date of publication in the Federal Register. 38 For regulations only. hh The New Source Review (NSR) program affects most new and modi?ed power plants and manufacturing facilities. Determining when a facility is making a modification that triggers NSR has been a subject of debate. Attempts have been made over decades to update NSR?the latest in 2002. More information can be found at: and 40 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000757 meets the requirements under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Mercury and Air 2012 2015-2016 Clean Air Act Establishes emissions limits for mercury, Coal Toxics arsenic, acid gases, and other toxic Standards128 pollutants from coal? and oil-?red power plants.129 Utilities had until April 2015 to comply with the standards with many plants receiving a 1-year extension. Coal 2015 2015-2018i Resource Addresses groundwater contamination Coal Combustion Conservation risks from coal combustion residuals Residuals and ?coal ash') disposal in unlined land?lls and Rule'? Recovery Act surface impoundments by establishing national standards for disposal. Regional Haze 1999; Revised state Clean Air Act Requires states to develop long-te[m Coal Rule policy plans due in strategies, including enforceable measures revisions 2021 to improve visibility in 156 national parks in 2017 and wilderness areas. Aims at returning visibility to natural conditions by 2064. Carbon 2015 Under EPA Clean Air Act Carbon Pollution Standards established Coal Pollution review C02 emission standards for new fossil fuel- Gas Standards and ?red generators under Clean Air Act Clean Power section 111(b). Plan131 . The Clean Power Plan, promulgated under section 1 1 1(d) of the Clean Air Act, establishes CO: emission standards for existing power plants. The collective impact of this suite of regulations required owners to weigh the cost implications of a variety of compliance options for their plants, and to also look closely at whether their market prospects (expected production costs and capital needs, relative coal and natural gas fuel costs, competition from other generators, technology availability, and customer demand levels) or regulatory regime would allow recovery of those costs in future operating years. Most of these rules were litigated and delayed?the Clean Power Plan, for example, currently is stayed and ultimately may be rescinded, but uncertainty about its implementation nonetheless affected plant owners? compliance and retirement planning. In 2011, looking at then-current energy market prospects and fuel prices, it appeared that many power plants would be affected by these environmental regulations. Fitch Ratings estimated that 51,000 MW of coal units (smaller than 200 MW each, with a capacity-weighted average age of nearly 50 years) were at risk for retirement, particularly those operating in restructured electricity markets with no recourse to regulated cost recovery.132 In 2011 and 2012, electric industry projections of likely regulation-induced retirements that focused on the many unknowns associated with pending environmental regulations sometimes showed a very large number of retirements. These unknowns included how stringent environment remediation requirements would be; what remediation technology and strategies might satisfy those requirements; how close together the compliance deadlines would fall; and the implications for regional reliability, The Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act 5.612, passed in December 2016, authorizes states to create their own permitting programs for coal combustion residuals disposal, subject to EPA approval. The act specifies that states may adopt alternative standards that are ?at least as protective" as national standards. EPA has not yet issued guidelines or regulations by which state permitting programs can be approved. 41 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC000758 energy production costs, and retail energy rates if too many power plants were to close rather than invest in remediation. Environmental regulations generally increase power plant operating costs by requiring plant owners to install capital equipment that controls plant emissions. The electrical load from equipment such as SO2 scrubbers (“parasitic load”) may also reduce the plant’s net generation available for sale on the grid. Increased operating costs push the compliant plant farther out on the energy supply (dispatch) curve and can cause it to be dispatched less frequently than it would have without the emissions controls, as shown in Figure 3.21 using coal as an example. Figure 3.21. PJM Merit-Order Dispatch: Various Control Technologies133 This figure shows power plants separated by technology type for PJM, in “merit order”, i.e., based on their marginal cost of generation, in the year 2012. The vertical lines represent various levels of load. The diamonds represent marginal costs (sum of fuel and variable operating and maintenance costs) for one subcritical pulverized coal plant with no control technology and that same plant with variations of two select pollution control technologies that reduce acid gas pollution. In principal, all the plants left of a vertical line operate at the level of demand represented by that line. (In reality, transmission constraints and reliability considerations can change that significantly.) As a plant moves to the right on the curve it will tend to operate less due to the increase in marginal cost. Control technologies key: dry FGD = dry flue gas desulfurization; three types of DSI (hydrated lime, trona, and sodium bicarbonate) = dry sorbent injection. Another control technology not shown that is used to reduce acid gas emissions is wet flue gas desulfurization. Technology key: Renew = other renewables not including hydropower or wind power; Water = hydropower; LOil = light oil-fired power plants; HOil = heavy oil-fired power plants; Nuc = nuclear power. 42 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000759 3.6.1 Coal Plants and Environmental Regulation Existing coal-fired power plants must not only comply with all Federal requirements related to emissions and water use, wastewater treatment, and solid waste management, but also with any additional applicable state regulations.134 Cost impacts of these regulations varied. The EPA reported that a typical coal-fueled unit with a capacity of 700 MW could incur incremental operating and maintenance costs ranging from $287 million to $351 million to install a scrubber, from $116 million to $137 million to install a selective catalytic reduction unit, and from $97 million to $114 million to install a baghouse (fabric filter). Fitch estimated the lifetime costs and reduced cash flow associated with environmental retrofits at $1,700–$1,900 per kilowatt (kW) for a 100 MW plant burning bituminous coal, as compared with a range of $1,200–$1,300/kW for a 500 MW plant.135 These costs are on par with those of constructing a new typical (i.e., subcritical) coal plant of similar size during this same time period (averaging $1,361/kW).136 Reported planned retirements from that time suggest that approximately 27,000 MW or 8.5 percent of 2011 coal-fired capacity was rendered uneconomic under the combination of regulatory compliance costs, little demand growth, and falling natural gas prices.137 The MATS rule was potentially the most expensive and immediate of the suite of pending regulations, with a compliance deadline of April 2015 (later extended to April 2016 for some plants). Further, owners of coal facilities were dealing with MATS compliance in combination with the cost of imminent additional regulations of CO2, along with other GHGs. EIA reported that by the end of 2012, 64 percent of the U.S. coal generating capacity in the electric power sector already had the appropriate environmental control equipment (most reported using flue gas desulfurization) to comply with the MATS rule and operate past 2016; another six percent planned to add control equipment; 10 percent had announced plans to retire; and the other 20.4 percent still had to decide whether, how, and when to upgrade or retire their plants.138 The dominant MATS compliance strategy among coal-fired plant owners was to install activated carbon injection (Figure 3.22), which averaged a relatively modest $5.8 million per generator from 2015 to 2016. EIA estimates that “operators invested at least $6.1 billion from 2014 to 2016 to comply with MATS or other environmental regulations.”139 In its rulemaking, EPA estimated an annualized cost of $9.6 billion in 2015, declining to $7.4 billion annually in 2030.140 43 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000760 Figure 3.22. Changes in U.S. Coal Capacity, December 2014–April 2016141 The retrofit-or-retire decision for owners is also impacted by EPA's New Source Review (NSR) regulations that can affect owners’ ability to enhance plant efficiency due to the delay, cost, and uncertainty associated with obtaining an NSR permit. The NSR permitting program requires stationary sources of air pollution—including factories, industrial boilers, and power plants—to get permits before construction starts, whether the unit is being newly built or modified.142 This is an important concern for owners considering retrofitting an existing power plant with carbon capture equipment to reduce CO2 emissions, or adding new components to improve operating efficiency. These upgrades could trigger the NSR requirements of the Clean Air Act because they would constitute a “physical change,” or lead to a designation of the change as a “major modification,” subjecting the unit to NSR permitting requirements. The uncertainty stemming from NSR creates an unnecessary burden that discourages rather than encourages installation of CO2 emission control equipment and investments in efficiency because of the additional expenditures and delays associated with the permitting process.143 144 Ironically, the uncertainty surrounding NSR requirements has led to a significant lack of investment in plant and efficiency upgrades, which would otherwise lead to more efficient power generation, benefits to grid management, and reduced environmental impacts. EPA has acknowledged these burdens and has made attempts to reform the rules to improve and streamline NSR: As applied to existing power plants and refineries, EPA concludes that the NSR program has impeded or resulted in the cancellation of projects which would maintain and improve reliability, efficiency and safety of existing energy capacity. Such discouragement results in lost capacity, as well as lost opportunities to improve energy efficiency and reduce air pollution.145 The NSR program distinguished between “routine maintenance and repair” of existing facilities—which would be allowed—and more “substantial modification” of existing facilities, which would put the facilities over the threshold and thus require them to meet new emissions standards. Environmentalists argued that owners of electric generation and industrial plants were building virtually new facilities from the inside out by exploiting the “routine maintenance and repair” exclusion from NSR. EPA changed its interpretation in the 1990s to a more rigorous standard, culminating in numerous enforcement-related lawsuits beginning in the late 1990s.146 44 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000761 By the late 2000s, some older coal units operating without pollution controls were no longer operating as baseload units, having operational capacity factors estimated at 47 percent to 56 percent.147 As Figure 3.23 shows, rather than acting as baseload units at high capacity factors, these older units (with an average capacity of 109 MW) were operating at falling capacity factors. The units that retired in 2014 had an average capacity factor of 13 percent in 2013. Figure 3.23. Average Coal Plant Capacity Factors, 2008–2014148 Coal plant capacity factors generally fell from 2008 through 2014, with plants that retired in 2014 operating at much lower capacity factors than all coal plants. Some owners delayed their retirement announcements and retrofit decisions in order to see how the regulation litigation challenges played out, in case a late court ruling made compliance unnecessary, signifying that the cost of complying with those regulations was a factor in their retirement decisions. Others delayed closing uneconomic plants to see if enough other plants retired, in hopes that the resulting shift in market dynamics and prices might render the unretired plants profitable again.149 Figure 3.24 shows total U.S. coal capacity from 2008 through mid-2016 and projections through mid-2018. While there was a fall in coal plant capacity in 2015 associated with the MATS compliance deadline, EIA finds that fewer coal facilities retired in 2015 and the first half of 2016 than EIA had projected ahead of the compliance deadline. Specifically, in 2015 and until the April 2016 extended MATS deadline, about 20,000 MW of coal capacity retired and another 9,000 MW of coal capacity converted to natural gas, while EIA projected 50,000 MW of retirements between 2013 and 2020, with the majority retiring in 2015 in response to MATS.150 However, EIA’s projection also included other factors that can drive retirement decisions, such as the Clean Power Plan. 45 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000762 Figure 3.24. Projected and Actual Coal Retirements, 2008–2018151 Fewer coal plants retired in 2015–2016 than projected. 3.6.2 Natural Gas Plants and Environmental Regulation Because natural gas emits far less air pollution than coal-fired power plants,152 the regulatory burden and cost to natural gas-fired power plants is much lower than for coal plants. ERCOT’s December 2014 analysis estimated that the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)jj and the Cooling Water Intake Rule would impose moderate compliance costs on natural gas-fired power plants.153 Specifically, ERCOT estimated costs of $0.10–$2.75/MWh for CSAPR and $0.10–$0.50/MWh for the Cooling Water Intake Rule. The large majority of natural gas plants that have retired are NGSTs, which are less efficient than the newer NGCCs.154 From 2002 to 2016, there was a steady stream of NGST retirements, some of which may be linked to decisions about the cost effectiveness of retrofit upgrades. However, during the period 2014–2016, 23,500 MW of new natural gas capacity was added, nearly double the total natural gas capacity that was retired as part of the transition from NGST units to more efficient NGCC units.155 NGCC plants have replaced NGST plants for baseload use and natural gas combustion turbines have been built for peak power demand. 3.6.3 Nuclear Plants and Environmental Regulation The principal environmental regulation affecting nuclear power plants is the Cooling Water Intake Rule, which applies to all types of power plants but is most challenging for nuclear plants. A revised version of the Cooling Water Intake Rule has been in effect since 2003. The rule was promulgated to protect aquatic life. States may decide how to implement the rule, such as by requiring a nuclear (or other) plant to invest in a closed-loop cooling system to replace once-through ocean or waterway cooling. Three of the nuclear plants that have announced closures (Oyster Creek in New Jersey, Diablo Canyon in jj Finalized in 2011 and effective in 2015. 46 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000763 California, and Indian Point in New York) have cited disputes with their respective states over cooling water rule compliance among the reasons for plant retirement. 156 157 The Administrative Consent Order between Exelon and New Jersey establishing Oyster Creek’s 2019 retirement specifically mentions Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act as part of the state’s justification in requiring the construction of cooling towers if the plant were to operate for the full duration of its license extension.158 Nuclear plants are also affected by other regulatory factors and fees that are not imposed on other types of power plants. Recent examples include major safety reviews following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant failures in 2011. A recent study found that the rising regulatory costs of nuclear energy— which approach $60 million per year—exceed the profit margins of many of these plants.159 3.6.4 Hydropower Plants and Environmental Regulation As authorized under the Federal Power Act, FERC issues licenses to non-Federal hydropower projects, which comprise roughly 50 percent of existing U.S. hydropower capacity. The FERC regulatory framework involves numerous participants, such as Federal and state resource agencies; nongovernmental organizations; state, local, and tribal entities; and the public. Because of the complexity of the regulatory processes and numerous agencies involved, hydropower licensing timelines often are cited as being among the lengthiest and costliest for energy projects in the United States. A DOE analysis looking at the development timelines of 29 projects that came online from 2005 to 2013 found that the median project took over 15 years from application to operation.160 For wind and solar, the average permitting time is two to four years.161 A few hydroelectric power plants have not sought relicensing due to concerns over the cost of meeting mandatory environmental requirements imposed by Federal and state resource agencies. Capital upgrade requirements can include capacity uprates (initiated by the plant owner rather than a regulator), dam safety upgrades, or environmental improvements.162 3.7 Growing VRE Deployment Wind and solar PV—collectively, VRE—have constituted the vast majority of the VRE deployed in recent years. Wind first surpassed 1 percent of total U.S. generation in 2008, while total solar generation reached that threshold in 2015.kk Figure 3.25 shows trends in penetration—as a percentage of total generation—for wind, solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, and biomass power plants in the United States since 2001. Total end-use demand served by wind generation tripled from 1.5 percent in 2008 to 4.5 percent in 2013. Total renewable generation has now exceeded 14 percent of the U.S. total, with hydro and wind comprising the largest components. kk While annual variation in water availability affects conventional hydroelectric output from year to year, hydro generally has been consistent between 6 percent and 8 percent of total generation since 2001. https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec7 6.pdf. 47 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000764 Figure 3.25. VRE Generation by Fuel as Percentage of Total U.S. Generation, 2002–2016163 At the end of 2016, U.S. installed wind capacity surpassed that of hydro for the first time (see Figure 3.26).164 165 However, given the hydro fleet’s higher average capacity factors and the above-normal precipitation on the West Coast so far this year, hydro generation will likely once again exceed wind generation in 2017, though the gap continues to narrow. Figure 3.26. Cumulative U.S. Utility-Scale Wind and Hydroelectric Generation Capacity, 1915– December 2016166 3.7.1 Technology and Policy Drivers for Deployment The deployment of wind and solar power has been spurred by a combination of technology cost declines; state RPS; private sector sustainability goals; consumer choice; Federal and state incentives; 48 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000765 transmission expansion—such as the Texas Competitive Renewable Energy Zone project—to reach highquality resource areas; and Federal and state environmental, air quality, and GHG emissions reductions policies. RPS—now in 29 states and the District of Columbia, covering 55 percent of total U.S. retail electricity sales—have also been substantial drivers of VRE growth, as they are associated with 60 percent of renewable generation growth since 2000.167 Though wind has historically been the largest beneficiary of RPS policies, more RPS-driven solar than wind was added in 2015.168 RPS also create a market for RECs. RECs represent some of the environmental attributes of renewable generation that can be bought, sold, and applied to meet certain state RPS plans, and they create an additional subsidy to renewable generation. Technologies typically experience cost reductions as their deployment grows due to technology improvement and increasing economies of scale. Lower investment costs, in turn, spur further deployment—since 2009, solar PV installed system costs have fallen approximately 60 percent on a per kilowatt basis for residential and commercial systems (from $7.06/WDC to $2.93/WDC for residential and from $5.23/WDC to $2.13/WDC for commercial) and 70 percent for utility-scale systems (from $4.46/WDC to $1.42/WDC).169 However, other factors can interrupt this general trend; for example, increases in warranty costs and the prices of commodities such as steel and fiberglass (among other factors) drove wind turbine installed system costs on a per-megawatt basis to double between 2000 and 2008 (though these costs went on to decline by 40 percent since 2010).170 Importantly, these capital cost trends do not account for technology improvements that improve performance and economics. For wind, improvements in turbine technologies and taller towers have resulted in increased capacity factors. For example, in 2015, capacity factors averaged 25.8 percent for wind projects built from 1998–2003 and averaged 41.2 percent for wind projects built in 2014.171 Similarly, for utility-scale PV, optimized system design—including use of single-axis tracking and increasing inverter loading ratios—partially contributes to capacity factors increasing from 21 percent for 2010 vintage projects to 26.7 percent for 2014 vintage projects in 2015. In addition to research and development (R&D)—which is aimed at reducing technology costs through innovation—the investment tax credit (ITC) and PTC, as well as state-level RPS, have driven expansion of VRE, particularly wind and solar. Figure 3.27 shows the substantial increase in wind capacity since 1998 during the period when a PTC has been in effect. It also suggests the wind industry’s tendency to increase investments in years when the tax credit was due to expire and its extension was uncertain. The current PTC is scheduled to be phased out after 2019.172 The solar ITC—currently at 30 percent—will be reduced after 2021 to its statutory level of 10 percent for commercial and industrial projects, and will be phased out completely for residential projects.173 49 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000766 Figure 3.27. Relationship between the PTC and Annual Wind Capacity Additions The PTC has accelerated wind project deployment significantly—between 2000 and 2013, cumulative wind capacity grew from less than 5,000 MW to more than 60,000 MW—though capacity additions noticeably track the PTC expiration and extension schedule. Similarly, the dramatic decrease in wind capacity additions during PTC expiration years underscore the notion that credits are driving deployment, rather than market decisions. For example, during the PTC expiration “cliff” in 2013, new builds counted for 1 MW of added capacity. After renewal of the PTC, new capacity jumped to 5 MW.174 This change occurred in the absence of any change in state RPS requirements. A panel of economists at a May 2017 FERC technical conference cited state-level RPS and Federal tax credits for VRE as examples of market-distorting subsidies and mandates. These policies reduce revenues for traditional baseload power plants by lowering the wholesale electric prices they receive and by displacing a portion of their output. To date, however, the data do not show a widespread relationship between VRE penetration and baseload retirements, as shown in Figure 3.28.175 50 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000767 Figure 3.28. VRE Penetration as a Percentage of 2016 Generation versus Retired Capacity since 2010 as a Percentage of Non-VRE Capacity176 While concerns exist about the impact of widespread deployment of renewable energy on the retirement of coal and nuclear power plants, the data do not suggest a correlation. Subsidies Federal and state governments use subsidies, mandates, and prohibitions to affect how public and private entities behave. Subsidies make the favored behavior or product more appealing relative to other competing products by accelerating its development (as with R&D and direct construction expenditures), lowering its ultimate cost to the consumer (as with tax incentives, low lease payments or grants), or making the product better known and more appealing (customer education, ratings, and marketing). In contrast to subsidies, mandates and prohibitions create absolute requirements for the user for whether and how much of the targeted product to consume. The Federal Government has always used a variety of subsidies to support a myriad of public and private sector goals. Over the long term, subsidies are spent on different technologies at different times, reflecting differing societal priorities and technology maturities. Early subsidies included Federal construction of hydroelectric dams and multi-purpose water management projects beginning in the 1930s. Energy R&D spending began in the 1950s with the passage of the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, with major Federal investments in the commercialization of nuclear electricity. R&D investments 51 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000768 increased sharply after the oil price shocks and energy crisis in the 1970s, and renewable energy R&D supported VRE. Accurately accounting for energy subsidies and expenditures is highly dependent on the scope and time period of the analysis. For example, some tax incentives may affect energy industries but are not specific energy-related measures, such as Section 199 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which allows tax deductions for domestic manufacturing. Natural gas producers, along with many other types of manufacturers, have been able to take advantage of this tax incentive even though it was not an energyspecific measure. This is just one example of the difficulty in examining energy-related subsidies and expenditures both from Federal and non-Federal sources, many of which may not be directly comparable.ll As a snapshot of Federal subsidies and support for electricity generating technologies for a given year, Table 3-5 shows electricity production subsidies and support that includes breakouts by direct expenditures, tax expenditures, R&D, and other Federal programs, compiled by EIA for Fiscal Year 2013. Although this data has not been compiled for every year, the 2013 data can be instructive. For example, VRE technologies received a majority of Federal support that year relative to other technologies, particularly reflecting the technical maturity of VRE relative to conventional technologies. ll For a longer discussion on energy subsidies and various reports examining energy subsidies, see https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 52 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000769 Table 3-5. Fiscal Year 2013 Electricity Production Subsidies and Support177 Similarly, it is important to note how these particular results are driven by the unique nature of a given year. For example, the large direct expenditures for wind and solar overwhelmingly arise due to the Treasury 1603 program enabled by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which allowed one-time cash grants to eligible renewable generators in lieu of tax credits. This was only available to generators who began construction in 2009–2011, and as such is no longer a direct expenditure. There is no complete multi-year assessment available that describes and analyzes the Federal subsidies and support provided to different generation technologies over time. Continued examination of Federal subsidies and support, and provision of this information to the public, can better inform the decisions made by Federal, state, and local entities. Workforce Impacts of Growing VRE Deployment As the electricity system changes, so do the types of jobs, skills needed, and education or training required. The evolving demands of the grid are creating new opportunities in information and communication technologies and in the deployment of new generation, including natural gas and VRE. Job growth has been strong in the VRE sector, and the solar and wind workforce increased by 25 and 32 percent, respectively, in 2016.178 DOE’s 2017 U.S. Energy and Employment Report found that the solar and wind industries provide 373,000 and 101,000 jobs, respectively, across the Nation.179 Veterans 53 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000770 comprise a higher percentage of employees in the electricity industry compared to other industries, and in 2015, the solar industry provided nearly 17,000 jobs for veterans in manufacturing, installation, and project management.180 3.8 Flattening Electricity Demand Between 1970 and 2005, total U.S. electricity generation to meet customer demand grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.7 percent.181 But since 2005, generation growth has stalled with a CAGR of only 0.05 percent from 2005 to 2015, even as the Nation’s GDP grew by 1.3 percent per year over the same period.182 Electricity demand historically had risen with economic growth (real GDP), but the two began decoupling around 2000, as shown in Figure 3.29. EIA attributes this decline in the demand growth rate to a variety of factors, including the cumulative impact of energy efficiency programs, standards, and codes; technology improvements in appliances, lighting, and other end-use equipment; and broader structural changes, such as a shift toward less electricity-intensive industries and slower population growth.183 Figure 3.29. Gross Domestic Product and Net Electricity Production, Historical (1950–2016) and Projected (2017–2027)184 185 186 187 Figure 3.30 shows one analysis of how efficiency improvements, coupled with structural changes in the economy, have led to flattening energy use in recent years. Overall, there has been significant progress across the U.S. economy in improving the value of goods and services produced per unit input of energy. For example, electricity productivity in the industrial sector—measured in dollars of economic output per kilowatt-hour of electricity input—nearly doubled between 1990 and 2014. The noticeable dip in both GDP and net electricity generation in 2008–2009 reflects the U.S. recession, which lowered electricity usage enough to affect power plant economics and prompt some plant closures.188 54 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000771 Figure 3.30. Estimated U.S. Energy Savings from Structural Changes in the Economy and Energy Efficiency, 1980–2016189 190 The U.S. economy has made significant progress in improving the value of goods and services produced per unit input of energy, through both energy efficiency and structural changes to the U.S. economy. Figure 3.31 shows more broadly the impact of these changes on the EIA's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) Reference case electricity sales forecast for various years. Each AEO forecast is made assuming that laws and regulations in effect at the time of the projection will continue unchanged through the projection period, unless scheduled end dates for those laws and regulations are within that period. The objective is to provide a “business-as-usual case;” no assumptions about new policies are included. Over the past several decades, new Federal and state policies, market forces, and broader economic factors have contributed to lowering levels of electricity consumption compared to what was expected to occur in absence of any new policy, as shown by the comparison of historical Reference case projections to actual U.S. electricity sales (shown as dotted lines in Figure 3.31). 55 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000772 Figure 3.31. EIA Annual Electricity Sales 2000–2016 (terawatt-hours) and AEO Reference Case Electricity Sales Projections 2017–2030191 A changing policy and market environment since 2000 has made it challenging to accurately forecast electricity demand. TWh is terawatt-hours. As stated in QER 1.2: Currently, about 90 percent of residential, 60 percent of commercial, and 30 percent of industrial energy consumption are used in appliances and equipment that are subject to Federal minimum efficiency standards implemented, and periodically updated, by the Department of Energy. Between 2009 and 2030, these cost-effective standards are projected to save consumers more than $545 billion in utility costs, reduce energy consumption by 40.8 quads, and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by over 2.26 billion metric tons.192 There are two significant impacts from the growth in energy efficiency. First, suppliers can no longer expect robust demand growth. Second, because customers are buying less electricity, the market price of electricity clears lower on the electricity supply curve (all else equal). Thus, higher-cost power plants that might have been dispatched and earned revenues in a higher-demand market are dispatched less frequently and earn less revenue due to increased energy efficiency. nn The report, Economic and Market Challenges Facing the U.S. Nuclear Commercial Fleet, produced by Idaho National Laboratory and the Center for Advanced Energy Studies (September 2016), attributes low electricity market prices to “low natural gas prices, low demand growth, increased penetration of renewable generation, and negative electricity market prices.” 56 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000773 3.9 Power Plant Retirements Looking Forward While recognizing the difficulty in making any long-range forecast, it is useful to examine modeled scenarios to understand how the factors affecting retirements are expected to evolve. Figure 3.32 shows the announced and modeled coal, NGCC, and nuclear retirements and additions from 2017 through 2030 in EIA’s AEO 2017. This shows that coal retirements are projected to continue in the near term— with 37,800 MW projected to retire between 2017 and 2022—and taper off in the longer term, with another 4,400 MW of retirements between 2023 and 2030. Announced nuclear retirements in the near term account for most projected retirements, with an additional 3,000 MW of modeled unplanned retirements in the period 2019–2020 due to market conditions and uncertainty. A modest number of NGCC plants are also expected to retire in the near term in this modeled scenario. Figure 3.32. Baseload Capacity Additions and Retirements from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario)193 Three factors impacting the economic conditions of baseload generators that are modeled in the AEO— natural gas price, electricity sales, and VRE generation—are shown in Figure 3.33 below. In general, there is a mixed outlook for these factors as they affect baseload generators: 1. Natural gas prices for the electric power sector are modeled to rise modestly, increasing 30 percent over 2017 levels by 2022 and rising more slowly thereafter. While this may provide some upward pressure on electricity prices, natural gas prices are notoriously challenging to predict. 2. Electricity continues to grow at a slow rate—modeled at 0.8 percent CAGR through 2030. 3. Over the same period, VRE generation is modeled to approximately double to 600 terawatthours by 2030. The majority of this growth occurs by 2024 and slows thereafter, reflecting the expiration and stepdown of the PTC and ITC in 2020 and 2022, respectively. Based on these trends, unless natural gas prices or electricity demand rise significantly faster than projected, the economic conditions of baseload generators are not projected to change significantly in the near term. 57 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000774 Figure 3.33. Modeled Projections for Natural Gas Price, Electricity Sales, and VRE Generation from EIA AEO 2017 (No Clean Power Plan Scenario)194 VRE generation includes wind, utility-scale PV, and distributed PV. MCf is million cubic feet While the financial strains on existing coal, nuclear, and even older natural gas plants have been real and significant, the role of conventional resources continues to evolve. PJM notes the changing nature of baseload: “Baseload” can generally be thought of as those units which operate the great majority of hours of the year to meet load requirements. Given the reduction in gas prices, we have seen a noticeable inversion in the types of units which clear in the market in the off-peak hours and thus fit the traditional notion of “baseload.” Specifically, due to low energy prices and the overall efficiency of the units, combined cycle natural gas units are dispatched as baseload with coal units more often being cycled and thus dispatched in what has traditionally been deemed “mid-merit” units.195 EIA staff analyzed NGCC unit dispatch trends over time, from 1998 to 2016.196 NGCC plant operation closely follows natural gas prices—when prices were high in the mid-2000s, the number of NGCC starts (when the plant goes from zero output into production) increased as the capacity factor decreased, confirming that these plants were used more in load-following mode rather than baseload-operation mode. Capacity factor has been rising steadily and starts have fallen since about 2010, indicating that NGCC units are being used in more hours at higher capacity factors—i.e., in baseload-type operation (see Figure 3.34). 58 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000775 Figure 3.34. NGCC Capacity Factors and Number of Starts, 1998–2016 Decreased starts and increased capacity factors indicate that NGCC plants are increasingly used for baseload-type operation. Market conditions will continue to be dynamic, such as with the scheduled phasing out of the wind PTC and solar ITC. Trends in natural gas prices and efficiency gains would also need to be thoroughly examined and accurately forecast in order to get a clearer picture of expected retirements over the coming years. In the event present market, policy, and technology conditions continue, the retirement of coal and nuclear facilities is likely to continue, as well as new builds of natural gas and VRE capacity. Going forward, coal and natural gas generators will continue to monitor several EPA rules:  The Steam Electric Effluent Limitation Guidelines have been postponed until EPA completes review of the rule finalized in 2015.197 EPA recently completed an extended public comment period of the rule and comments are currently being reviewed.198 Based on the 2015 finalized rule, EPA estimated industry-wide costs at approximately $480 million per year,199 although industry groups such as the Utility Water Act Group dispute this estimate.oo 200  The Cooling Water Intake Rule for existing sources is currently being phased in. Regions have been given authority to consider requirements for power plants on a case-by-case basis. EPA estimated an annualized post-tax final rule cost of $147.6 million for electric generators.201 However, due to the flexibility allotted to the regional permit directors, the compliance timeline and costs are unclear.  While MATS and CSAPR have affected plant decisions to retrofit or retire in the recent past, most of the capital investment for MATS and CSAPR compliance has already occurred (see Table 3-4). In the future, generators will continue to have smaller operating and maintenance costs associated with MATS. For example, based on generator survey responses, ERCOT estimates an average operating and maintenance cost for MATS of $0.75/MWh,202 which is approximately oo According to a petition submitted by the Utility Water Act Group, selected individual compliance cost estimates from its members included: $308 million (Dynegy), $200 million (NRG Energy), and $400–$500 million (American Electric Power). 59 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000776 3 percent of the average monthly day-ahead wholesale electricity price (approximately $23.5/MWh) for the ERCOT North Hub from 2015 to 2016.203  The Coal Combustion Residuals Rule, prompted by a 2008 coal ash spill, is currently being implemented.204 EPA estimated the annualized cost of the rule to be $509–$735 million for coalfired electric utilities.205  The Regional Haze Rule, which currently requires states to submit state plans for compliance by 2021, is expected to mainly affect Western states (the rule aims to improve visibility in national parks, which are located primarily in Western states). It also includes a provision allowing power plants that are already complying with CSAPR (eastern half of the United States206) to substitute their compliance status for compliance with the Regional Haze Rule.207 208  In 2015, EPA finalized New Source Performance Standards, entitled Carbon Pollution Standards, which set CO2 emission limits for new generators.pp These standards are currently under legal challenge.  The Clean Power Plan rule to reduce CO2 emissions from existing power plants was promulgated by EPA in 2015 for effect in 2022 for existing plants, but those rules are under review by EPA— which may initiate actions to rescind them—and by the courts. Several large coal plants built after 1970 with capacities greater than 1,000 MW have announced plans to retire in the next few years. These plants have already made the capital investments needed to comply with MATS, indicating that MATS itself is not the single forcing factor in these retirement decisions. Although these plants were designed to operate around the clock, low wholesale electric prices tied to natural gas were a significant driver that caused them to operate at lower capacity factors. As Rhodium Group analyst John Larsen states: The wider market dynamics are more concerning for coal…. For a power plant to make money today, it must be able to ramp up and down to coincide with the variable levels of renewable generation coming online. That makes combined cycle natural gas plants profitable, even at lower prices. [But] coal plants have relatively high and fixed operating costs and are relatively inflexible. They make their money by running full-out.209 While there have been significantly fewer retirements of hydropower generation than coal or nuclear, this does not mean that hydropower operators are immune to the same market and regulatory forces that have affected other baseload plants. Depressed prices and costly regulatory barriers decrease the margins on all hydroelectric facilities and, in some cases, cause economic stress.210 A certain amount of new development continues, primarily through powering existing non-powered dams and installing hydropower in conduits and other constructed waterways. Two hundred and forty-two new hydropower projects, with a total capacity of 3,250 MW, were in the U.S. development pipeline at the end of 2016, including 93 MW under construction. At least nine projects (225 MW) reached commercial operation in 2016.211 pp Under current market conditions, these standards were not expected to affect new build decisions because economic conditions were already unfavorable for building new coal units. For example, EIA’s 2015 AEO, which does not include the Clean Air Act 111(b) carbon standards for new coal plants, builds only a very small amount (roughly 400 MW) of new coal capacity by 2040 beyond what is already planned. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf. 60 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000777 4 Reliability and Resilience The April 14 memo expressed concerns over whether the erosion of baseload power is compromising a reliable and resilient grid. It also asked whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which that could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. Indeed, a recent National Academies study indicates that there is a growing emphasis within the industry on grid resilience.212 In this chapter, we address those issues, starting with the question of whether grid reliability has been lessened by the retirement of baseload and other coal, nuclear, and natural gas power plants over the past 15 years. The Department staff offer three general findings: 1) A diverse portfolio of generation resources and well-planned transmission investments are critical to meeting regional reliability objectives. A resource portfolio approach is necessary to ensure ERS, fuel assurance, and flexibility capabilities are available. Conventional generation sources, in particular hydropower, combustion turbines, and steam turbines, are currently the chief providers of these attributes. 2) One of the greatest challenges to integrating VRE lies in managing its effects (variability, uncertainty, location specificity, non-synchronous generation, and low capacity factor) on grid operations and planning. Lack of long-term forecasting, for example, increases risks when scheduling planned generation outages and managing severe weather events. 3) There are tradeoffs between multiple desirable attributes for the electric grid. A more reliable and resilient system may be more costly than the least-cost system. Consumer life, safety and health are dependent on a reliable and resilient electric grid, making the grid a national security asset. Infrastructure hardening213 and grid recovery and restoration strategies require advanced planning and investment. Reliability NERC defines BPS reliability as a function of adequacy and operating reliability. In this context, NERC defines adequacy as, “the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the electricity customers at all times, taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system components.” Operating reliability is defined as, “the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances to system stability or unanticipated loss of system components.”qq 214 Reliability operates in different time scales. Long-term reliability is closer to resource adequacy: it is the business of ensuring that there will be enough resources available to serve customers’ load several years qq Both components of reliability are needed. Adequacy, often called “resource adequacy,” is much easier to model and thus forecast for the future, particularly a decade or two out. Most longer-term studies, such as by DOE and its national laboratories, largely look at this one aspect of reliability (with some consideration of operational reliability aspects as well). Operational reliability, in contrast, is very difficult (both in data needed and computational complexity) to completely model and thus forecast in definitive terms many years out. 61 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000778 out plus a reserve margin (typically 15 percent). Short-term reliability ensures that there will be enough capacity to meet demand over the next few hours. Maintaining short-term reliability has grown more complex in light of higher levels of VRE, evolving customer electricity usage patterns, and the wider use of 15-minute load metering and customer time-of-use rates. However, grid operators have kept up with these factors by developing new information technology and analysis capabilities, such as more sophisticated wind and solar forecasting tools. Figure 4.1. illustrates the timescale for different grid events. Events on very short timescales, such as frequency regulation, match second-by-second generation and demand. Medium-term activities and factors include day-ahead and day-of energy markets, security-constrained economic dispatch,rr contingency analysis, asset availability, relay and other equipment operations, and operator action. Longer-term activities and factors include system planning, capacity markets, interconnection rules, reliability standards, and energy market designs. Grid operators must thoroughly consider all these timescales and their associated events in ensuring short-term through long-term reliability. Figure 4.1. System Operation Time Scales215 Planning to maintain system reliability depends on managing (potentially) multiple events in varying time scales. NERC’s CEO Gerry Cauley spoke to the Energy Secretary’s concerns by describing the current reliability issues. As a common thread in each of our Reliability Assessments, the most pressing reliability issues in North America are:  As conventional resources prematurely retire, sufficient amounts of essential reliability services, such as frequency and voltage support, ramping capability, etc., must be replaced based on the configuration and needs of the system. 
  Resource flexibility is needed to supplement and offset the variable characteristics of solar and wind generation. 
  Higher reliance on natural gas exposes electric generation to fuel supply and delivery vulnerabilities, particularly during extreme weather conditions. Maintaining fuel diversity and security provides best assurance for resilience. Premature retirements rr “Security-constrained economic dispatch [of power plants] is an area-wide optimization process designed to meet electricity demand at the lowest cost, given the operational and reliability limitations of the area’s generation fleet and transmission system.” https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/final ED 03 01 07 rev2.pdf. 62 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000779 of fuel secure baseload generating stations reduces resilience to fuel supply disruptions. 
  Because the system was designed with large, central-station generation as the primary source of electricity, significant amounts of new transmission may be needed to support renewable resources located far from load centers.216 To make risk-informed decisions about how to maintain and protect BPS reliability, NERC has often stressed the need to study evolving market, technology, policy, and regulatory factors, as well as to understand how they are affecting “fuel supply, generation and transmission infrastructure planning, operations and investment decisions.”217 Resilience NERC uses the infrastructure resilience definition that the National Infrastructure Advisory Council developed in 2010: “Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.”218 Examples of events that test a system’s resilience include severe natural events (wildfires, hurricanes, floods, droughts, and earthquakes) and coordinated, extensive physical and cyber-attacks and geomagnetic disturbances. Resilience is typically achieved through hardening or recovery. Hardening refers to physically changing infrastructure to make it less susceptible to damage. Hardening improves the durability and stability of energy infrastructure, making it better able to withstand the impacts of hurricanes, weather events or attacks. Recovery, by contrast, refers to the ability of an energy facility to recover quickly from damage to any of its components or to any of the external systems on which it depends – typically through storage and redundancy. Recovery measures do not prevent damage; rather, they enable energy systems to continue operating despite damage, and/or they promote a rapid return to normal operations when damages/outages occur. Advanced planning for contingencies, interagency coordination, and training exercises enable an effective restoration process. BPS reliability is adequate219 today despite the retirement of 11 percent of the generating capacity available in 2002, as significant additions from natural gas, wind, and solar have come online since then. Overall, at the end of 2016, the system had more dispatchable capacity capable of operating at high utilization rates than it did in 2002.220 The composition of the BPS and its requirements, however, are changing, so simple extrapolation of previous reliability trends is not prudent. In this chapter, we review current system reliability and resilience, look at how power plant operations are changing with the evolving generation mix, and evaluate potential reliability and resilience issues. 4.1 Assessing Challenges to Reliability NERC is the primary entity responsible for ensuring BPS reliability,ss and collaborates with FERC to ensure compliance. Over the last several years, NERC has consistently highlighted how the power ss NERC is the designated “electric reliability organization” under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, monitoring reliability for all lower 48 states and, under special agreement, portions of the Canadian and Mexican grids. 63 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000780 sector’s rapid transformation may require new approaches to reliability measurement and planning in order to ensure continued reliability.tt 221 222 223 224 225 NERC believes BPS reliability is adequate as measured by various metrics,226 but is undertaking various initiatives to address potential reliability challenges posed by the changing generation mix. For example, NERC created an Essential Reliability Services Working Group to draw attention to the need to maintain these servicesuu as the resource mix evolves.227 NERC also created the Integration of Variable Generation Task Force and the Distributed Energy Resources Task Force to address the reliability implications of increasing levels of distributed generation.228 NERC’s position on the reliability implications of the evolving resource mix is best summarized in its recent communication with DOE (see text box below). NERC: How the Changing Resource Mix Affects Reliability229 The North American BPS is designed to be a highly reliable, robust, and resilient system. The system is interconnected, and the integrated networks work together to maintain reliability through both wide-area interregional planning and coordinated system operations. The adequacy of the system is maintained by having the right combination and amount of resources and transmission to deal with unexpected facility outages or extreme weather events that increase system demand. Operating reliability is maintained in real time through highly coordinated operator actions across many operating companies. The system is also planned as many as 15 years in advance by performing highly detailed, complex, and data-intensive power system simulations. The resource mix of the BPS is changing in fundamental ways. Variable energy resources, especially wind and solar, are rapidly expanding and capturing the majority share of new capacity additions. Conventional generation (such as coal and nuclear) are retiring and have become economically marginalized. The balancing resource tends to be natural gas, as environmental rules and commodity economics tend to make oil-fired generation uneconomic. Developing hydroelectric resources, a major energy source in some parts of the country (such as the West), is extremely challenging. The confluence of the changing resource mix can fundamentally impact reliability in two major ways: 1. A balancing authority responsible for managing the balance of demand and resources through unit commitment. Forecasting may become capacity deficient and unable to serve firm load. Resources may not be available when needed, particularly those that have not secured onsite fuel. In that instance, manual load shedding may be required to maintain reliability. 2. Large, unanticipated voltage or frequency deviations during a disturbance, which can lead to uncontrolled, cascading instability. With no mass, moving parts, or inertia, increasing amounts of inverter-based resources (such as solar photovoltaic) present new risks to reliability, such as managing faster fault-clearing times, reduced oscillation dampening, and unexpected inverter action. The rapid changes occurring in the generation resource mix and technologies are altering the operational characteristics of the grid and will challenge system planners and operators to maintain reliability. More specifically:  Impact of Premature Retirements: Conventional units, such as coal plants, provide frequency support services as a function of their large spinning generators and governor-control settings, along with reactive support for voltage control. Power system operators use these services to plan tt NERC’s concerns about the reliability implications of the fast-evolving grid transformation underway were so strong that it chose to rename a set of key components of operational reliability from a term understood only by engineers and others directly involved in reliability, the term “ancillary services,” to the plainer English and self-defining, “essential reliability services.” uu ERS include frequency response, voltage support, and ramping. 64 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000781 and operate reliably under a variety of system conditions, generally without the concern of having too few of these services available. Coal-fired and nuclear generation have the added benefits of high availability rates, low forced outages, and secured onsite fuel. Many months of onsite fuel allow these units to operate in a manner independent of supply chain disruptions.  Replacement Resource Capability and Characteristics: As the generation resource mix evolves, the reliability of the electric grid depends on the operating characteristics of the replacement resources. Natural gas-fired units, variable generation, storage, and other resources can provide similar reliability services. However, as a practical matter, costs, market rules, or regulatory requirements (or lack thereof) can affect whether these resources are equipped and available to provide reliability services. To ensure reliability, new generator and load resources must maintain the balance between load and generation, especially during ramping periods. In addition, in some jurisdictions, substantial amounts of generation are now being added “behind the meter” (e.g., roof top solar), and these resources are invisible to system operators. Planning Reserve Margins In terms of the resource adequacy part of reliability, NERC reports that all regions project more than sufficient planning reserve margins. NERC and its regional reliability coordinators conduct ongoing analyses to assess resource adequacy as system conditions change over time. Figure 4.2. shows that planning reserve marginsvv exceed their respective regional targets despite the loss of traditional baseload capacity since 2002.230 The orange bars in the figure indicate regional or NERC-determined target reserve margins for resource adequacy, which in most cases are administratively set at 15 percent above the predicted peak load. The calculation of resources in most regions includes current VIEUowned generation and merchant plant capacity (modified by an expected forced outage rateww and reduced by expected retirements), planned capacity additions (with interconnection agreements and customer contracts), renewable generation (derated to expected capacity at peak load hour),xx contracted imports, energy efficiency, DR, and distributed generation (derated to expected capacity at peak hour). vv Forecasts of reserve margins may decline in the out-years of a projection because new resources such as power plants, demand response, and energy efficiency are not firm at the time the forecast is made. Because of the uncertainty associated with more distant years, NERC planning reserve margin determinations do not look out past 10 years. ww ISO-New England reports that the expected forced outage rate for generators in their regions have increased because power plants in the region are operating under more stressed conditions. Older power plants in each region are less reliable and go out of service more often as they age. https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/10/f18/08a-REthier.pdf xx Each ISO and RTO calculates the on-peak contribution of renewable resources as a function of historic resource performance. Land-based wind plants are assumed to deliver four to 14 percent of nameplate capacity during peak summer afternoon periods, and solar resources are assumed to deliver between 10 percent and 80 percent of nameplate capacity. Note, however, that as the level of PV penetration increases, the cumulative amount of PV generation on summer afternoons is moving net load peak hour later. 65 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000782 Figure 4.2. Five-Year Average Reserve Margins across Different Regions (2018–2022)231 All regions have reserve margins above resource adequacy targets. The types of resources available within a region affect the reserve margin calculation. Each type of resource has a different availability rate (based on past performance) that reflects the likelihood that it can be relied upon to be available at system peak. For instance, 1,000 MW of coal units with an on-peak availability rate of 90 percent would have a greater impact on the reserve margin than 1,000 MW of wind with an on-peak availability rate of 10 percent; in other words, the actual nameplate capacity totals underlying these reserve margin calculations are significantly higher than the reserve margins suggest. NERC and regional planning authorities are working to understand how common dependencies or failure modes, such as gas pipeline outages or a weather front affecting wind and solar performance across a wide area, could affect reserve margins. NERC and others are also studying how the on-peak hourly capacity factor (similar in concept to capacity valueyy) of VRE changes as a function of VRE penetration, as shown for solar in Figure 4.3. yy NERC defines capacity value as “the contribution of a power plant to the generation adequacy of the power system. It gives the amount of additional load that can be served in the system at the same reliability level due to the addition of the unit.” http://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/ivgtf/omalley-ieee-confidential.pdf 66 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000783 Figure 4.3. Historical Solar On-Peak Capacity Factors in ERCOT232 As increased solar penetration in ERCOT shifts the net peak load further into the evening, its net on-peak capacity factor diminishes. As the Department has previously noted, however, having an adequate planning reserve margin is necessary but not sufficient to ensure resource adequacy (see text box below): “Rules” to Enable Reliable Operation233 In December 2016, DOE articulated four consolidated “rules” that must be maintained to enable reliable operation. These include the following: 1. Power generation and transmission capacity must be sufficient to meet peak demand for electricity. The power grid must have sufficient capacity available to meet the demand for electricity. Because there are uncertainties in forecasting demand and the potential for generation and transmission outages, the total amount of capacity must exceed the expected level of demand by a given fraction, termed the reserve margin, often about 15 percent. 2. Power systems must have adequate flexibility to address variability and uncertainty in demand (load) and generation resources. The level of demand changes throughout the day and from season to season. This, and the addition of variable generation such as wind and solar, places a premium on having flexible generation capacity that can change its level of output to account for changes in demand and the amount of generation from variable resources (such as when the wind stops blowing or the sun goes down). 3. Power systems must be able to maintain steady frequency. 67 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000784 The power system uses what is called alternating current (AC), where the electricity reverses direction 60 times per second (60 hertz (Hz)). If this frequency of oscillation were to deviate significantly from 60 Hz, it could damage machines and electronics. Any mismatch between the supply and demand of electricity can cause this sort of deviation, and several mechanisms operating at different timescales are used to maintain a steady frequency. 4. Power systems must be able to maintain voltage within an acceptable range. In addition to maintaining a steady frequency, the electric grid must also deliver electricity at a given voltage. This voltage varies throughout the power grid, with transformers used to change voltages. Maintaining the correct voltage requires the management of “reactive power,” which is a property of AC electricity that allows power to flow. If the levels of reactive power are too high or too low, the voltage level can change, potentially even collapsing catastrophically. NERC notes that traditional calculations of resource adequacy based on capacity (such as the planning reserve margin) will need to change: Until recently, new generators have generally added significant energy capability along with the capacity they provide. With the advent of newer energy limited technologies replacing older ones (e.g., with emerging larger penetrations of variable generation), an assumption of energy adequacy cannot be made simply on the basis of capacity adequacy. Future-looking detailed probabilistic assessments of resource adequacy (energy, capacity and operability), transmission adequacy and congestion are increasingly becoming an essential requirement, consistent with the growing penetration of variable generation, and in the changing nonrenewable supply mix environment.234 4.1.1 Essential Reliability Services Reliable operation of the BPS requires a suite of Essential Reliability Services (ERS). One key ERS is the control of system frequency, a parameter which NERC explains as follows: Each Interconnection is actually a large machine, as every generator within the island is pulling in tandem with the others to supply electricity to all customers. This occurs as the rotation of electric generating units, nearly all in (steady-state) synchronism. The “speed” (of rotation) of the Interconnection is frequency, measured in cycles per second or Hertz (Hz). If the total Interconnection generation exceeds customer demand, frequency increases beyond the target value, typically 60 Hz, until energy balance is achieved. Conversely, if there is a temporary generation deficiency, frequency declines until balance is again restored at a point below the scheduled frequency.235 NERC further expands on the two main types of frequency control, Primary and Secondary:  Primary frequency control (immediate) comes from automatic generator governor response, load response, and other devices based on local (device-level) frequency-sensing control systems. In general, frequency response refers to the initial actions provided by the autonomous devices within an interconnection to arrest and stabilize frequency deviations, typically from the unexpected sudden loss of a generator or load. Primary frequency control is quick and automatic; it is not driven by any centralized control system, and it begins seconds after a system frequency event. Response to a frequency event can be provided by various sources, including generation resources, loads, and storage devices.  Secondary frequency control (seconds to minutes) and tertiary frequency control (ten minutes and longer) -- Secondary and tertiary control are the centralized, coordinated control of generation, demand response, and storage resources, and these controls are performed 68 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000785 by the system operator’s energy management system over minutes to hours to balance generation and load.236 In addition to frequency control, NERC provides definitions for two other ERS, ramping and voltage support: Ramping – Ramping is related to frequency, but more in an “operations as usual” sense rather than after an event. Changes in the amount of non-dispatchable resources, system constraints, load behaviors, and the generation mix can impact the ramp rates needed to keep the system in balance. Voltage – Voltage must be controlled to protect the system and move power where it is needed. This control tends to be more local in nature, such as at individual transmission substations, in sub-areas of lower-voltage transmission nodes and the distribution system. Ensuring sufficient voltage control and “stiffness” of the system is important both for normal operations and for events impacting normal operations (i.e., disturbances).237 If grid voltage levels fall too low, customers connected to distribution networks may see their devices “brown out” and stop working. An area that has inadequate voltage support is vulnerable to voltage collapse, so the system must be operated such that a single contingency would not result in voltage collapse or cascading outages. Generators provide voltage support by producing both real and reactive power. As FERC explains in its 2016 Reliability Primer: Power transferred along transmission lines consists of both “real” power and “reactive” power. The real power is the energy that is capable of performing work in electrical devices including industrial equipment, refrigerators, or toasters. Reactive power is needed to maintain the voltage as well as electric and magnetic fields in AC equipment, which includes air conditioners, motors, transmission lines, and other devices. Together, real power and reactive power comprise apparent power, which is measured in units of Volt-Amperes or kilo Volt-Amperes - kVA. Reactive power cannot be transmitted as far as real power and instead must be replenished locally. Moreover, a deficit in reactive power causes voltage to drop. This is seen when the lights dim as an electric motor starts. While reactive power consumed by facilities or devices tends to cause the voltage to drop, it can also be produced or injected into the system to increase voltage in what is often referred to as “voltage support.” This is accomplished in a variety of ways, including by adjusting the reactive power output of generators or by activating capacitor banks or other power electronic equipment. If reactive power is not supplied promptly and in sufficient quantity, voltages decline, and in extreme cases a “voltage collapse” may result.238 FERC Order No. 827, issued in June 2016, revised FERC’s pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement and pro forma Small Generator Interconnection Agreement to eliminate the previous exemption for wind generators from reactive power requirements, thereby requiring all newly interconnecting, non-synchronous generators—including new wind generators—to provide reactive power as a condition of interconnection to the transmission system. FERC wrote: We therefore conclude that improvements in technology, and the corresponding declining costs for newly interconnecting wind generators to provide reactive power, make it unjust, unreasonable and unduly discriminatory and preferential to exempt such non-synchronous generators from the reactive power requirement when other types of generators are not exempt. Further, requiring all newly interconnecting non-synchronous generators to design their Generating Facilities to maintain the required power factor range ensures they are subject to comparable requirements as other generators.239 69 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000786 FERC’s primary frequency response Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposes to require new large and small generators to install, maintain and operate equipment capable of providing primary frequency response as a condition of interconnection.240 NERC explains the various reserve products from which grid operators obtain these ERS:  Frequency-Responsive Reserve: On-line generation with headroom that has been tested and verified to be capable of providing droop […] In most cases, only portions of a, b and c in [Figure 4.4] qualify as Frequency Responsive Reserve.  Nonspinning Reserve: Operating Reserve capable of serving demand or Interruptible Demand that can be removed from the system, within 10 minutes. (This is c in [Figure 4.4])  Operating Reserve: That capability above firm system demand required to provide for regulation, load forecasting error, equipment forced and scheduled outages, and local area protection. (This is a+b+c+d+e in [Figure 4.4]).  Regulating Reserve: An amount of spinning reserve responsive to Automatic Generation Control, which is sufficient to provide normal regulating margin. (This is “a” in [Figure 4.4])  Replacement Reserve: (This is d+e in [Figure 4.4]). NOTE: Each NERC Region sets times for reserve restoration, typically in the 30–90 minute range. The default contingency reserve restoration period is 90 minutes after the disturbance recovery period.  Spinning Reserve: Unloaded, synchronized, resource, deployable in 10 minutes. (This is b in [Figure 4.4]). 241 Figure 4.4. NERC Definitions of Reserves Used to Provide ERS 242 Figure 4.5 shows how system frequency falls after a major generation loss. The decline in frequency is determined by the size of the generation loss event and the availability of frequency control reserves to respond. The frequency rebound that follows is due to automated primary frequency control measures 70 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000787 (governor response from generators and frequency-responsive DR from customer loads controlled by relays). Secondary frequency control may derive from many sources, including from local plant controls, from a centralized control system, or from instructions issued by balancing authorities. Tertiary frequency control refers to operator-initiated, off-line resources. If these frequency management measures don’t work, system frequency can keep dropping, resulting in under-frequency load shedding procedures. Figure 4.5. System Frequency after a Grid Event (Top) and How Frequency Control Mechanisms Work to Restore Frequency (Bottom)243 System operators have a number of levels of frequency control to manage a significant grid event. Not all generators can provide primary frequency control, as explained by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL): Some generators, including all current nuclear generators, most wind turbines in North America, as well as many new natural gas turbines do not provide governor response. Other generators, which may be capable of providing governor response, are sometimes operated in ways that prevent them from providing that response. For example, a generator operated 71 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000788 at its maximum capability cannot provide upward primary frequency control because it has no head room. Finally, some generators have additional controls […] that override the sustained delivery of governor response.244 NERC recognized several years ago that the changes affecting the grid—particularly retirement of traditional baseload capacity, increased generation from VRE, and greater use of DR and distributed generation—could create BPS reliability problems without careful study and management. In 2014, a task force under NERC’s direction identified ERS as the elemental reliability building blocks from supply and demand resources that are necessary to maintain grid reliability. NERC stated that: To meet the needs of the future Bulk Power System, maintaining sufficient ERS will include a mix of market approaches, technology enhancements, and reliability rules or other regulatory rule changes. While the solution sets will likely be different in various regions, it may be necessary for regulators to make appropriate adjustments to market rules and reliability standards that will ensure reliable operation of the BPS.245 Although NERC has requirements for balancing areas,zz it does not require that individual generators provide primary frequency response, which involves the automatic, autonomous, and rapid action of turbine governors or equivalent controls. Further, there is no mandatory compensation for primary frequency response, though FERC Order No. 755 provides for compensation for secondary frequency response.246 Because provision of primary frequency response may require a generator to operate at less than its full output (so it can increase power production if needed to manage frequency), standing prepared to provide frequency response services means that a generator may forgo some potential revenues. The reliability attributes discussed above are recognized as valuable, but regional procurement and compensation for these services varies across the centrally-organized markets. In vertically integrated regions that use bilaterally organized markets, it is generally the incumbent utility’s obligation to provide ERS; some interconnection agreements specify other generators’ reliability service obligations if any. 4.1.2 Inertia and Inertial Response PJM explains how conventional generators provide inertia: Due to electro-mechanical coupling, a generator's rotating mass provides kinetic energy to the grid (or absorbs it from the grid) in case of a frequency deviation to arrest frequency change and stabilize the electric system. The contribution of inertia is an inherent and crucial feature of rotating synchronous generators.247 
 Every operating conventional generator has mass that spins, including rotors, turbines and other masses connected to the shaft of the generator or motor. The rotating mass in each generator collectively provides inertia to help keep grid frequency at a relatively stable level, for example slowing the rate of frequency drop after a major grid event and giving other automatic controls time to act to restore frequency. Inertia also works to slow the spike in frequency that occurs after the loss of a large amount of load (for instance, if part of a city “blacks out” suddenly from a transmission or distribution failure). zz NERC Reliability Standard BAL-003-1.1 establishes requirements for balancing authorities, but does not include requirements for individual generator owners or operators. However, some ISOs/RTOs, including CAISO, ISO-NE, and PJM, have implemented operating requirements for individual generating resources within their regions. Regional Reliability Standard BAL-001-TRE-01 (Primary Frequency Response in the ERCOT Region) establishes requirements for the balancing authority, generator owners, and operators in ERCOT. 72 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000789 Recently, manufacturers have designed electronic controls for newer model wind turbines that can provide automatic generation control, primary frequency response and synthetic inertia. General Electric (GE) notes: A key difference between wind inertia and fast frequency response from other resources (batteries, PV, flywheels) is that wind turbines do not need to be pre-curtailed in order to provide synthetic inertial response. Wind inertia extracts some of the kinetic energy from the spinning rotor and uses it to provide increased power output within seconds.248 There has not yet been much analysis of how much primary frequency response will be needed as the composition of the grid changes, nor how best to complement primary frequency response from traditional sources, such as governors, with electronics-based synthetic inertia or non-governor-based forms of primary frequency response, such as storage or DR. These are substantive engineering questions that merit further study, particularly in a future with increasing VRE levels and decreasing rotating mass-based inertia.249 4.1.3 Energy Storage Energy storage will be critical in the future if higher levels of VRE are deployed on the grid and require additional balancing of energy supply and demand in real time. A few storage mechanisms such as pumped hydroelectric storage and thermal energy storage have been used for years to shift energy demand from peak to off-peak periods. A grid with higher levels of VRE and more dynamic customer loads will need more of the services that energy storage can provide by acting on both the supply and demand side, including energy, capacity, energy management, backup power, load leveling, and ERS, over periods from seconds to hours or days. However, the need for storage may not be as great for a grid more reliant on traditional baseload generation.250 DOE has been investing in energy storage technology development for two decades, and major private investment is now active in commercializing and the beginnings of early deployment of grid-level storage, including within microgrids.aaa The DOE Grid Energy Storage program notes that as energy storage technologies mature and become commercially viable, they will need to achieve the following:  Cost competitive energy storage technology—Achievement of this goal requires attention to factors such as life-cycle cost and performance (round-trip efficiency, energy density, cycle life, capacity fade, etc.) for energy storage technology as deployed. It is expected that early deployments will be in high value applications, but long term success requires further cost reductions and the ability to monetize revenues for all grid services that storage provides.  Validated reliability and safety— Validation of the safety, reliability, and performance of energy storage is essential for user confidence.  Equitable regulatory environment— Value propositions for supply-side grid storage depend on reducing institutional and regulatory hurdles to levels comparable with those of other grid resources.bbb 251 aaa Storage is an important component of most micro-grid designs reliant on VRE and is expected to play an essential role in helping customers and the BPS recover from extreme weather events (and should improve resilience and recovery following severe, high-impact events). bbb A recent FERC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks to identify and reduce such barriers for increased participation by energy storage in centrally-organized wholesale markets. 73 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000790  Industry acceptance—industry adoption requires manufacturers to have confidence that storage will deploy as expected, and deliver as predicted and promised.252 Table 4-1 details DOE analysis of how energy storage options can be used to provide grid-level services. Table 4-1. How Various Energy Storage Options Can Deliver Grid-Level Applications253 State policies are emerging to encourage further use of energy storage technologies for grid support and energy security. California has directed its utilities to acquire 500 MW of energy storage by 2020; Massachusetts has ordered its utilities to procure 200 MWh of energy storage by the end of 2019; New York’s legislators have proposed creation of an Energy Storage Deployment Program, with a 2030 procurement target; Maryland has adopted at 30 percent investment tax credit for storage facilities; and Nevada’s legislature has passed a storage incentivize. These programs are generally technology-neutral and will support the use of storage at the grid-level or behind the meter (on the customer’s premises).254 255 4.1.4 Transmission The transmission system is a vast engineered network that transmits electricity from generators to local substations for distribution to end-use consumers. As DOE’s Annual U.S. Transmission Data Review (2016) states, “Transmission planning activities are undertaken to enable future reliable and efficient utilization of transmission facilities by addressing, among other things, reliability concerns, constraints, and congestion.”256 Transmission reliability is maintained by enforcing operating procedures that ensure efficient system utilization, including preventing users from transmitting more power over a line than its 74 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000791 rated power capacity. Transmission congestion results from the inability to dispatch the lowest-cost generation resources due to transmission constraints. Transmission investments provide an array of benefits that include providing reliable electricity service to customers, relieving congestion, facilitating robust wholesale market competition, enabling a diverse and changing energy portfolio, and mitigating damage and limiting customer outages (resilience) during adverse conditions. Well-planned transmission investments also reduce total costs. SPP analyzed the costs and benefits of transmission projects from 2012–2014 and found that the planned $3.4 billion investment in transmission was expected to reduce customer cost by $12 billion.ccc This yielded an estimated benefit of $3.50 for every dollar invested in the region.257 A robust transmission system is needed to provide the flexibility that will enable the modern electric system to operate. Although much transmission has been built to enhance reliability and meet customer needs, continued investment and development will be needed to provide that flexibility. The challenge for building transmission continues to revolve around the three traditional steps involved, each of which can be time-consuming, involved, and complex: (1) demonstrating a need for the transmission project, also known as transmission planning, (2) determining who pays for the transmission project, also called cost allocation, and (3) state and Federal agency siting and permitting. FERC has taken steps to help with the first two, with reforms such as Order No. 1000, which remains a work in progress.258 259 260 261 262 Transmission planning entities, as well as regional state-based groups, are also contributing to improving these three necessary process steps. The current and past administrations, aided by various new Federal laws, have issued various Executive Orders and other initiatives to improve the processes involved in siting and permitting of transmission when Federal lands or waters are involved. All three transmission building steps can be time-intensive and complex; in particular, siting and permitting for large networks or long multi-state lines is challenging. 263 264 265 The second necessary step of cost-allocation can be time-consuming as well. For example, large overlay networks now being built in MISO (“Multi-Value Projects”)266 and SPP (“Highway/Byway Plan”)267 required several years of sensitive negotiations among states brokered by the respective Organization of MISO States and SPP Regional State Committee to determine the cost allocation of each large transmission buildout.268 269 ccc Nearly $12 billion in net present value benefits for consumers over the next 40 years, or around $800 for each person currently served by SPP, or $2,400 per each metered customer. 75 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000792 Figure 4.6. EEI Historical and Project Transmission Investment (Nominal Dollars) 270 Prudent and well planned transmission can reduce total system costs by reducing localized congestion that sometimes leads to high wholesale electricity prices at transmission-constrained nodes. Transmission investments in future years could increase as utilities and system operators seek to mitigate reliability impacts of plant closures and bring new generation to load centers. 4.1.5 System Requirements to Meet Higher Levels of VRE on the Grid Levels of wind and solar penetration—including distributed and utility-scale installations—have grown in recent years from 0.3 percent of total annual generation nationwide in 2002 to 6.9 percent in 2016.ddd 271 Various integration studies (see Appendix B:) have explored grid operations at higher levels of VRE penetration (ranging from 10 percent to 60 percent) and examined the technical challenges for grid operators.eee These challenges can generally be met at lower levels through a number of changes to grid operation, planning, and transmission expansion practices, and with other sources of grid flexibility. Solutions vary by region, depending on existing transmission constraints, generators, sources of flexibility, and institutions and markets – each of which comes with associated implementation costs and other consequences to address. Costs can change over time as technologies and markets evolve, or ddd AEO 2017 reference case indicates that this could grow to 17% by 2030. eee The studies (see Appendix B) that look into the distant future are exploratory only and represent initial investigations into how to implement high levels of VRE. They do not look into all the operational aspects of reliability due to the needed complex and computationally challenging modeling. Typical assumptions (sometimes implicit) include successful siting of (at times long multistate) transmission lines and new generation, sufficient new and existing economically viable conventional generation and other resources to support the VRE, institutional and market changes, and relevant grid modernization-type spending at both the transmission and distribution level. One study, for the ease of modeling, even assumes the nation’s 66 balancing authorities, including their governing boards and member states, would agree to one national joint dispatch). Some of these assumptions are non-trivial. These studies recognize that given enough time and money, power system engineers can make any resource and configuration reliable, as long as the laws of physics are not violated; whether the changes needed are indeed affordable, doable, and desirable may be a different question. Also, affordability was typically not in the scope of these studies. 76 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000793 as other enabling technologies such as storage mature. Grid operators and planners continually evaluate and determine how to maintain reliability as the resource mix changes and evolves. Figure 4.7. Location of the Existing Wind Fleet272 . - - . .. . Capacity (MW) 500 0 - 1,000 1.500 . 2.000 0? Most of the contiguous United States? wind power plants are installed in the center of the Nation, which has the best wind resources. Total penetration of VRE is increasing rapidly in several regions, and wind represents the majority of current installed VRE. Wind turbines have contributed more than one-third of the nearly 200,000 MW of total utility-scale generating capacity added since 2007, reflecting a combination of improved wind turbine technology and lower costs, increased access to transmission capacity, state-level RPS, and Federal tax credits and grants. Distribution of wind capacity across the contiguous United States is shown in Figure 4.7. Percentage wind generation by state is shown in Figure 4.8. In particularly windy hours, wind output in regions with significant wind capacity can be very high. On May 16, 2017, the CAISO hit a new daily renewables record when the combination of wind, solar, hydro, and other renewables served nearly 42 percent of electricity demand; during peak renewables production (the 2:00 pm. hour), renewables supplied nearly 72 percent of electricity.273 In Texas, at the end of 2016, ERCOT had more than 17,600 MW of installed wind capacity and 566 MW of utility-scale solar capacity.274 ERCOT reached 50 percent wind penetration in the early morning on March 23, 2017, when load was below 29,000 at 5:00 pm. that afternoon, when peak load hit 45,391 MW, wind contributed about 30 percent to the energy needed to meet that peak.275 SPP recently set a new wind-penetration record of 52.1 percent on February 12, 2017, the highest across North American RTOs?gg 276 277 389 On the other hand, there are times when wind generation can be low. For example, ERCOT reports that for 2016, wind generation was below 2,500 MW (approximately 15% of total operating wind capacity as of November 2016) for 17 percent of the year?s hours. 13533. 77 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC000794 Figure 4.8 Wind Energy Share of Electric Generation by State, 2016278 MA 0.7% 5.7% 243% ?i US. Total: 5.5% FL PR HI 6.<10% I 10% to <15% I 15% to <20% I 20% and higher One of the greatest barriers to widespread VRE adoption is the challenge of managing its variability and corresponding impacts on net load. Table 4-2 summarizes the characteristics of VRE, the challenges to integration, and how to mitigate those challenges. Table 4-2. Characteristics of VRE, Grid Integration Challenges, and Mitigation Options279 Wind Solar Potential Grid Integration Mitigation Options Characteristics Challenges Variability Generator output can In many power systems, suf?cient ?exibility exists to vary as underlying integrate additional variability, but this ?exibility may resource ?uctuates. not be fully accessible without changes to power system operations or other institutional factors increased ramping of generation and improved coordination across markets and balancing areas) (Lew et al. 2013). Uncertainty Generation cannot be Integration of advanced renewable supply forecasting predicted with perfect into dispatch and market operations has reduced accuracy (day-ahead, day uncertainties, improved scheduling of other resources of). to reduce reserves and fuel consumption, and enabled VRE to participate as dispatchable resources 78 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC000795 Location specificity Non- generation Low capacity factor Generation is more economical where highest-quality resources are available. Generators provide voltage support and frequency control in a different manner than traditional resources. Availability of the underlying energy resource limits the run- time of the plant. (IEA 2014; Lew et al. 2011). Examples: Xcel Energy, U.S. (Porter et al. 2012). Competitive Renewable Energy Zones in Texas are an example of an approach to quickly develop generation and transmission in coordination (18.5 GW and 3,600 miles were completed nine years after Competitive Renewable Energy Zones legislation was signed) to access wind resources in remote parts of the state. Grid code requirements are evolving in response to technological advances and anticipation of high VRE penetration levels. For example, ERCOT, which is a small interconnection and more vulnerable to frequency excursions, now requires wind generators to provide inertial response, which helps keep a system stable in the initial moments after a disturbance (Bird, Cochran, and Wang 2014). Capacity payments or markets, potentially tied to performance, could ensure suf?cient cost recovery. The potential for stranded assets is not unique to VRE and can occur whenever generation with lower marginal costs is added to the system. For example, low natural gas prices have reduced the market competitiveness of nuclear plants, contributing to recent retirements (Wemau and Richards 2014). Utility-scale wind and solar plants are more location-limited than some other generation types, so they may require transmission construction to be able to interconnect with the grid and secure deliverability to customer load centers. LBNL researchers state that power systems with large or growing amounts of VRE: [W]i l bene?t if the rest of the electricity system is ?exible able to respond to shifts in demand and VRE availability. VRE impacts and system costs will be driven lower as power systems transform to manage the unique characteristics that VRE resources introduce. Power systems that resist change as VRE penetrations increase will experience greater challenges in maintaining reliability and managing costs.280 Figure 4.9 shows a suite of options for integrating VRE effectively, spanning physical, operational, markets, load, and other means. However, proponents of dispatchable renewables (biomass, hydro, and geothermal) argue that other approaches should also be considered. Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability 79 US. Department of Energy ACC000796 Figure 4.9. Ways To Integrate VRE, Arrayed by Type of Intervention and Cost (2014)281 Forecasting of VRE is a critical challenge to system operators to manage high-risk weather days. Specific issues include wind icing forecasts and weather fronts that result in low-level jet winds and other wind cut-out scenarios. Since long-term VRE forecasting is not practicable today, system operators will have to rethink outage scheduling if a region has high dependency on wind as a resource.282 FERC, NERC, and the RTO/ISOs have undertaken several initiatives to modify requirements for interconnecting VRE to improve grid reliability. These initiatives include early work to develop lowvoltage ride-through requirements for interconnecting wind and solar generation (which are included as a requirement for wind plant interconnection under the FERC open access transmission tariff), as well as California updating its solar photovoltaic (PV) distribution interconnection requirements to include smart inverters. Other nations have grid codes that require the provision of specific ERS for new VRE resources as a condition of interconnection. And FERC and several RTOs and ISOs have sought to remove barriers to participation in organized markets by DR resources that can deliver some ERS and provide benefits to consumers. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) offers a good example of managing the challenges of integrating VRE effectively using better operational and business practices. Wind generation capacity in BPA’s balancing authority area grew from 250 MW to 4,782 MW within a 10-year span, driven by state RPS requirements and Federal tax credits. Much of the wind generation is located along the Columbia River Gorge, connecting to the high-voltage transmission system serving the Federal Columbia River hydroelectric plants, so the wind fleet had little diversity and could swing output as much as 1,000 MW within an hour. BPA began charging for using hydropower to balance the wind generation (also called a balancing capacity rate and since adopted by FERC for other regions), and it set a penalty rate to encourage accurate wind production scheduling. Wind forecasting and scheduling practices and tools have since improved significantly.283 80 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000797 Because wind generation receives the PTC and has PPAs that encourage production regardless of system demand, it can be economical for wind to generate even when market prices are negative. As a result, generators that are “must-run” (either for statutory or reliability reasons) must compete with resources that will generate when prices are negative. Anticipating the growing challenges posed by the changing resource mix in the region, BPA worked with stakeholders to develop the Oversupply Management Protocol to displace generation in BPA’s balancing authority area and replace it with Federal hydroelectric generation that must run for endangered fish operations. Displaced generators are compensated for any costs that they incur, and BPA recovers these costs through rates to its wholesale customers.284 However, this over-supply situation combined with sustained low natural gas prices has continued to erode the price of wholesale power in the western wholesale market. Changes in the wholesale market may be necessary to better balance state priorities, maintain grid reliabilities, and appropriately compensate baseload and other flexible resources, such as hydropower, for the ERS they provide.285 The process of BPS consolidation and market cooperation among producers across a larger electric market and operational region has been shown to smooth out VRE output variability. MISO found that [T]here are significant benefits from the geographic diversity of wind generating facilities and the size of the MISO operating footprint. The large number of individual turbines and plants, spread across a large geographic area with dimensions in the hundreds of miles, results in statistical smoothing of production changes driven by local meteorological effects. Large changes in aggregate production are driven by large-scale meteorological phenomena such as weather fronts, and occur over longer timescales from many tens of minutes to several hours.286 4.1.6 Impact of VRE on Net Load More than 60 percent of all utility-scale electric generating capacity that came online in 2016 was from wind and solar technologies.287 In March 2017, wind and solar accounted for 10 percent of total U.S. electricity generation, up from 7 percent for the whole of 2016.288 The increase in VRE has altered grid operation in some regions and the way dispatchable generation and DR are used to protect the grid and meet loads. The Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), a Federal power marketing agency, operates 8,000 MW of hydroelectric generation and three balancing areas in 15 states across the West. WAPA sums up the operational changes and challenges for grid managers facing VRE, variable loads, and a variety of generation types with differing capabilities and constraints: Generation operators, including VERs [Variable Energy Resources], must coordinate with their host Balancing Authority (BA) to ensure that their output continuously matches load. Generation is adjusted throughout the day to meet scheduled output and is made available to regulate moment variations intra-hour. For VERs when the wind drops off or clouds pass over a solar array, less energy may be produced than scheduled (over-scheduled/underproduced), and additional resources must be brought on-line to make up the difference. There is a cost associated to these added generation resources. Similarly, if VERs are producing more than what was scheduled, or if electrical demand is less than anticipated, other resources must be backed down to ensure resources and load are balanced. Not all generation is capable of responding. Traditional generation, like coal, is not capable of reacting quickly to changing needs and takes hours or days to reach full operating potential. Gas turbines can react fairly quickly, but only if the plants are not already producing at full rated generating capacity. Hydro generation, while being an ideal resource to help with VER 81 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000798 integration, is generally scheduled to meet reservoir requirements or provide for downstream water demands, including fish, wildlife, and other environmental mitigation requirements.289 To illustrate how VRE can increase the need for flexibility, Figure 4.10 demonstrates how VRE impacts system operations. The figure introduces the concept of “net load”—electricity demand minus VRE generation—which represents the demand that must be supplied by the conventional generation fleet if all VRE is to be utilized. The dark orange line in the graph represents total demand and shows the daily variability of demand on an hourly basis. The light blue area shows wind energy, and the yellow area shows solar energy. The dark blue line represents the demand (less VRE) that must be supplied by the remaining generators, assuming no curtailment of wind energy. The graph shows that often the output level of the remaining generators must change more quickly and be turned up or down inversely with VRE production. Figure 4.10. CAISO Load, Net Load, and Wind and Solar Output on Example Weekdays during 2014290 CAISO data show the effect of VRE on net load (total customer load minus wind and solar output) during representative days in the spring, summer, and fall. As the amount of VRE generation increases, daily net load decreases, and the impacts on net load become more acute in shoulder months. In regions with high penetration of VRE, sharper fluctuations in net load require increased flexibility (ramping up and down) from conventional sources. While the resulting ‘duck curve’ of daily net load has so far been limited to regions such as California and the Southwest where solar generation is highest, other regions such as the Carolinas are beginning to see similar net load patterns.291 82 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000799 What the Duck Curve Tells Us About Managing a Green Grid292 Figure 4.11. The CAISO Duck Curve Typical Spring Day 28.000 ?6.000 74.000 22.000 5 20.000 2 genial 3-hour rarm 19.000 910392 MW on dFeblualy 1, 2016/ 10.000 romp need ~13,000 MW ?.000 in three hours I2.0oo over generation 10.000 I . . l2cm 3am 6am 9am The electric grid and the requirements to manage it are The ISO created future scenarios of net load curves to illustrate these changing conditions. Net load is the difference between forecasted load and expected electricity production from variable generation resources. In certain times of the year, these curves produce a ?belly? appearance in the mid-afternoon that quickly ramps up to produce an ?arch? similar to the neck of a duck hence the industry moniker of ?The Duck Chart.? conditions emerge that will require speci?c operational capabilities: Short-steep ramps when the ISO must bring on or shut down generation resources to meet an increasing or decreasing electricity demand quickly, over a short period of time; Oversupply risk when more electricity is supplied than is needed to satisfy real-time electricity requirements; and Decreased frequency response - when less resources are operating and available to automatically adjust electricity production to maintain grid reliability.? To ensure reliability under changing grid conditions, the ISO needs resources with ramping ?exibility and the ability to start and stop multiple times per day Addressing concerns about frequency response capabilities in times of low load and high renewable generation may require operating renewable generators such that they can increase power with automated frequency response capability. At some level of penetration of distributed PV, the collective amount of PV will shift the time of peak load net of solar generation away from its previous point to later in the evening when insolation (and therefore PV production) is lower, as shown by NERC in Figure 4.12. 83 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC000800 Figure 4.12. Demand and Net Demand Shapes at Different Distributed Energy Resource Penetration Levels293 To date, RTOs and ISOs are working hard to integrate growing levels of VRE through extensive study, deliberate planning, and careful operations and adjustments. The Role of Technical Standards and Grid Codes for Effective VRE Integration Several types of standards apply to VRE and other generation. Interoperability standards define basic technical and engineering performance requirements, such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 1547, which defines uniform requirements for the performance, operation, testing, safety, and maintenance of interconnection between distributed generation resources and the grid. Regulatory requirements such as FERC’s pro forma open access transmission tariff (including interconnection requirements) dictate further reliability and performance terms for generators. As the level of installed wind and solar generation has grown, early technical requirements and standards for wind and solar have required updates to ensure performance under disturbance conditions. The examples described below illustrate the need to evolve standards as the penetration of nonsynchronous generation increases.  In August 2016, the Blue Cut wildfire crossed a major transmission corridor in Southern California, resulting in 15 line faults. One of these faults caused the near-instantaneous loss of 84 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000801 1,200 MW of utility-scale PV in Southern California. Approximately 700 MW of this loss occurred when PV inverters tripped due to a “perceived, though incorrect, low system frequency condition.”294 Another 450 MW of this loss occurred when system voltage fell below the lowvoltage ride-through setting of the inverters—resulting in “momentary cessation.”295 The subsequent NERC disturbance report determined that 11 similar inverter events occurred between August 16, 2017 and February 6, 2017, and NERC made several recommendations with respect to inverter settings and standards that would prevent or mitigate these events.296  Australia’s Renewable Energy Target has achieved significant VRE use; 35 percent of South Australia’s generating capacity is wind-powered. On September 28, 2016, severe weather resulted in multiple faults on the South Australian transmission system. A number of faults in quick succession caused 456 MW of wind generation to trip off-line within approximately seven seconds as a result of a protection feature that disconnects or reduces wind turbine output when the number of low-voltage ride-through events in a specific time period exceeds a predefined limit.297 This loss of generation increased imports from the AC interconnector until protective relays activated, islanding South Australia. Unable to rapidly shed load to match the reduced supply, the islanded region experienced a blackout. The Australian Energy Market Operator’s report on the incident noted the role of changes in the fuel mix: a low amount of synchronous generation dispatched—and hence low inertia—at the time of the event resulted in a faster frequency change than had previously been experienced during separation events.298 The report produced a list of 19 recommendations, including changes to operating procedures, regulations, and performance standards.  The German Energiewende initiative encouraged high levels of wind and distribution-level solar installations, leading to over-generation and the need for VRE’ curtailment in some hours. The grid technical code in place at the time required PV inverters to immediately disconnect from the grid if system frequency increased from nominal 50 Hz to 50.2 Hz. However, Germany discovered that the combination of this technical code and the growing amount of distributionlevel PV capacity heightened the risk of some excess PV generation causing all PV capacity to disconnect simultaneously and create severe under-frequency conditions, potentially causing rolling blackouts and grid collapse.299 In response, Germany modified its standards to require inverter retrofits with different low-frequency performance requirements.300 4.1.7 Mapping Reliability Attributes to Generation Resources To assess its changing resource mix, PJM developed a matrix of reliability attributes needed to maintain reliable grid operation under its operating procedures (see Figure 4.13). Ultimately, a diverse generation portfolio is necessary to provide the reliability attributes discussed in this section. 85 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000802 Figure 4.13. Mapping Reliability Attributes Against Resources iii 301 Conventional generation sources—particularly hydroelectricity, combustion turbines (natural gas and oil), and steam turbines (oil, coal, and natural gas)—performed very well against most of PJM’s reliability requirements. Nuclear units are not optimized for significant flexibility or ramping capability, but do exhibit strong fuel assurancejjj attributes. Batteries and storage meet all flexibility requirements, and DR offers high flexibility and ramping management capability. Wind and solar are highly time dependent and do not offer fuel assurance on their own, but can offer good flexibility if they have the proper controls and contractual arrangements. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) summarizes how regional grid operators use centrallyorganized markets to procure specific reliability attributes from generators: iii Combined-cycle plants are included in the Natural Gas – Steam group. jjj Fuel assurance is the resource portfolio’s ability to access sufficient fuel to meet system needs and maintain reliability; aspects of fuel assurance include onsite fuel storage, as well as a generator’s access to sufficient fuel supplies through markets or bilateral contracts. 86 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000803 Ancillary Services in Centrally-Organized Markets3?2 [E]ach ISO also operates auction markets for spinning, non-spinning reserves, and regulation with uniform clearing prices, with additional performance payments for regulation. (ERCOT, however, does not offer performance payments). Table 2 [Figure 4.14 on the following page] presents some of the terminology and characteristics. The hourly requirements for these services are set based on reliability standards and operational requirements that vary by ISO. The market designs generally co-optimize energy and reserves. Although ancillary service market designs can be complicated, the level of procurement typically only comprises less than 2% of total market volume. Ancillary service pricing is also used to signal short-term supply shortages. Because procurement of these ancillary services is allowed to be de?cient before load is curtailed, the failure to procure suf?cient reserves is often a ?rst indicator of supply shortage. Hence, the lSOs include administrative scarcity prices in the market designs. Such pricing allows ancillary service prices?along with energy prices, when opportunity costs are included?to increase during shortages to levels more consistent with the value of lost load than the energy market offer caps. These scarcity prices are established differently in each ISO. There are a number of recent initiatives to modify the ancillary service markets. CAISO and MISO have recently implemented types of ramping reserves, intended to increase the ramping range from committed resources available during real-time energy dispatch. Some lSOs, notably ERCOT, have also begun to develop designs for frequency-responsive and inertial response reserve markets. Two ancillary services?voltage support/reactive power and black start services?are not yet considered to have the appropriate characteris?cs for competitive markets and are thus compensated through cost-based rates. Figure 4.14 Selected Ancillary Service Market Design Characteristics Product name Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation up, Regulation Regulation up, Regulation down serVice Regulation down Performance Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulating Regulation-up Regulation mileage component service movement pertormance mileage mileage, up name (details in Regulation-down Regulation mileage Table 3-l 2) mileage down Day-ahead I I I procurement Real-time I I I I procurement Product name? Tenmlnute Spinning reserve SR Spinning reserve Spinning reserve Responsive Spinning reserve spinning reserve spinning reserve reserve Product name? Temninule non- Non-spinning Non- Supplemental Supplemental Non-spinning Non-spinning non-spinning spinning reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve reserve and (T Thirty- reserve (NSR) supplemental minute operating reserve reserve (TMOR) Forward (pre- day-ahead) procurement Day-ahead I I I .1 I procurement Real-ti me I I procurement Continued on next page 87 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy Figure 4.15. Ancillary Service Products Exchanged in the Centrally Organized Markets, Listed by RTOIISO and Category of Ancillary Service Product name? Ramp Flexible ramping ramp reserve capability product Ramp reserve? DAM and RTM FM and RTM (not when procured DAM) Voltage lost opportunity lost opportunity lost opportunity last opportunity Compensation lost opportunity Provision payment control? cost and cost and fixed cost and AEP cost and AEP rate for cost for based on lost payment American tariff rate method method provision provision opportunity cost or mechanism Electric Power contract provision and (AEP) method capability Block start Paid standard Paid cost-based Receive revenue Receive cost- Not procured Procured Contracted through service black start rate rates based on l0% based rate after through SPP through bi- reliability contracts payments or station- of annual black committing to 3- annual speci?c rate start costs year period competitive process Note: day-ahead market; RTM real-time market) Several flexibility options are available to grid operators, such as DR, fast-ramping natural gas generation, and energy storage. As stated in QER 1.2: A recent study of the value of fast-ramping gas for supporting variable renewables noted that, date FRF [fast ramping fossil] technologies have enabled RE [renewable energy] diffusion by providing reliable and dispatchable back-up capacity to hedge against variability of renewables and fast-reacting fossil technologies appear as highly complementary should be jointly installed to meet the goals of cutting emissions and ensuring a stable supply.'303 In addition to existing sources of flexibility and reliability services, there is a growing understanding of the abilities of VRE to economically contribute to grid flexibility and reliability through operational changes and advanced power electronics. Recent technology advancements now enable wind plants to provide nearly the full spectrum of ERS inertial control, primary frequency control, and automatic generation control). Similarly, for PV, CAISO, First Solar, and NREL recently demonstrated a First Solar 300 MW PV plant that provides active and reactive power controls, plant participation in automatic generation control, primary frequency control, ramp rate control, and voltage regulation.304 A recent NERC assessment on reliability in the BPS noted that DR can enhance system ?exibility and reliability by providing, ?regulation, governor response, spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve, and supplemental operating reserve[. Flor example, ERCOT obtains half of its spinning reserves from DR and is considering a DR-based Fast Frequency Response Service that is positioned between inertia and governor response.?305 Consumer end uses?including building energy management systems, as well as water and space heating and cooling?can also serve as DR resources using load control and communicating technologies to ramp their consumption up or down in order to support VRE integration.306 Demand-side flexibility via ?smart charging? plug-in electric vehicles is another potential source of grid ?exibility. This involves a utility or some other centralized entity remotely controlling the charging patterns of participating vehicles and/or charging stations. An aggregated fleet of vehicles or chargers can act as 3 DR resource, shifting load in response to price signals or operational needs; for example, vehicle charging could be shifted to the middle ofthe day to absorb high levels of solar generation and 88 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy shifted away from evening hours when solar generation disappears and system net load peaks. Research in this area is currently underway at the national laboratories.307 4.2 Diversity, Fuel Assurance, and Onsite Storage The April 14 memo raises the questions of whether the diversity of the generation resources in the electric system has diminished and whether this is a problem for grid reliability and resilience. In fact, when looked at nationally, the electric system is more diverse today than it was 20 years ago, although increased national diversity does not necessarily mean diversity has increased in all regions. A holistic view of reliability and risk management, however, must include both diversity and fuel assurance. 4.2.1 Fuel Diversity The U.S. generation mix has continually evolved as changes in technology, economics, government policy, and geopolitical forces affected the relative availability, economics, and feasibility of competing energy sources. PJM documents this evolution in Figure 4.16, which also displays a diversity index showing increasing diversity levels from about 2000 through 2014. PJM observes that, “government policy has played a major role in the development of generation resources, including policies that focused on energy security, jobs, environmental protection and conservation.”308 The chart shows how the mix of U.S. electricity use has moved in cycles for decades—how the generation share of hydroelectric facilities (most built with Federal funds during the 1930s and 1940s) declined as coal and natural gas grew (helped with funding from low-cost Federal land and mineral leases); how nuclear generation grew (aided by Federal policy and funding assistance) in the 1960s; how nuclear energy displaced hydroelectricity and natural gas-fired electricity in the 1970s; and how coal, nuclear, and natural gas-fired electricity have displaced oil-fired generation since the 1980s. Figure 4.16. Generation Mix and Various Economic and Policy Drivers Since 1949, Including Diversity Index309 89 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000806 Closely tracking the PJM trends, the national picture of the resource mix shows coal and oil being displaced by gas and VRE. In addition to this, Figure 4.17 shows how the national U.S. capacity and generation mix have become more diverse over time. Changes in capacity (top) have moved the resource mix toward a greater proportion of natural gas, wind, and solar, while coal and oil capacity have decreased. Energy generation trends for these resources (bottom) have tracked changes in capacity, with natural gas generation almost doubling in proportion. While nuclear capacity has decreased relative to other resources, the proportion of nuclear generation remains unchanged as capacity factors for nuclear units have increased Figure 4.17. Changes in U.S. Capacity (Top) and Generation (Bottom) Mix over Time (Left to Right: 2002, 2009, 2016)310 Coal - - - Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other 19% 23% The grid was, on average, more diverse in 2016 than in 2002 in terms of both capacity and generation. Diversity can be a useful tool for managing both reliability and financial risks. For the power system, developing and maintaining a portfolio of diverse generation, storage, and demand-side options can be useful for system planners and operators in creating optionality and hedging risks. Physical and financial risks can also be managed and hedged using reliability standards, operating rules, and financial markets and contracts. Better system diversity with greater use of domestic energy sources enhances U.S. energy security. However, greater fuel diversity does not always translate to increased system reliability. Risk, Reliability, and Fuel Diversity311 In a summary of the policy implications of the impacts of fuel diversity on risk and reliability, Devin Hartman of the Street Institute states that: Policymakers and regulators should recognize that fuel diversity is a poor proxy for valid policy objectives, like risk management and reliability. Speci?cally, a high level of fuel diversity does not necessarily mean that an electricity system manages risk ef?ciently or meets reliability needs. Conversely, policies or market-design changes intended to increase fuel diversity will not necessarily improve risk management or reliability. Fuel neutrality is essential for both monopoly-utility resource planning and competitive markets to manage risk and achieve reliability ef?ciently. Interventions to promote speci?c fuel types?such as 90 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy bailouts for coal and nuclear or mandates and subsidies for renewables—skew investment risk and can undermine incentives for reliability-enhancing behavior (e.g., a public intervention to finance pipeline expansion removes incentives for the private sector to invest in fuel security). Fuel-specific subsidies and mandates replace individual choice with collective choice. This one-size-fits-all approach to risk mitigation ignores variances in individuals’ risk tolerances, results in high-cost risk mitigation, and creates perverse incentives for market participants by transferring risk and costs from the private to the public sector. For regulators, attempts to achieve fuel diversity in market designs explicitly would likely result in inefficient and potentially discriminatory practices that are inconsistent with the Federal Power Act. The reliable performance of power generators varies across and within fuel types and changes with fluctuating conditions. This renders any attempt to value fuel diversity very complex. It would require extensive administrative judgment, expanding the potential for government failure. Ultimately, the central aim of market design should remain to procure specific reliability attributes at the least cost. 4.2.2 Fuel Assurance and Onsite Storage FERC uses the term fuel assurance to mean a generator’s access to sufficient fuel supplies through markets or bilateral contracts (and the degree to which those arrangements are firm). On the RTO/ISO level, fuel assurance refers to the regional resource portfolio’s ability to access sufficient fuel to meet system needs and maintain reliability.312 313 NERC’s 2017 State of Reliability report identified “lack of fuel” among the top ten causes of forced outages for 2014 and 2015.314 While lack of fuel is a relatively infrequent cause of generator outages, it can still have major repercussions when it does occur because system fuel supply chain disruptions can impact many generators during a single widespread fuel shortage event. Nuclear and coal plants typically have advantages associated with onsite fuel storage compared to natural gas. While having fuel onsite reduces the risk that a generator will be unable to operate when needed, every type of fuel and power generation source has known vulnerabilities that can compromise its ability to perform reliably. Valuation or regulation of onsite fuel storage varies across the Nation’s organized markets. Onsite fuel supplies can be required, incentivized, or not compensated—depending on the RTO/ISO in question. For example, some dual-fuel generators in the New York City region (NYISO Zone J) are required under local reliability rules to maintain onsite fuel to protect against the loss of gas supplies.315 Several markets have also attempted to incentivize firm and onsite fuel supplies by adding performance requirements to their capacity markets. In PJM and ISO-NE, these requirements were adopted after generator underperformance occurred during several instances of system stress between 2010 and 2014.kkk The incentives in these markets are designed to reward or penalize generators based upon how they respond to the system operator during performance events. According to Gordon van Welie, President and CEO of ISO-NE: We currently have a precarious operating situation in the winter time and we're worried about it becoming unsustainable beyond 2019… The reality is that we're really operating with a very slim operating margin during the winter time that may not cover these large contingencies that worry us.316 kkk These events included both situations in which natural gas power plants were unable to draw fuel from pipelines, as well as ones in which sufficient fuel was available but unit outages and/or start times inhibited operation. 91 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000808 Both programs remain in their infancy: ISO-NE’s takes effect in 2018, and PJM’s has only been active since 2016 (with a gradual phase-in through the 2019/2020 delivery year). In the interim, ISO-NE instituted a stopgap measure called the Winter Reliability Program, which compensates some dual-fuel generators for procuring onsite fuel.317 Outside of these regions, onsite fuel is not compensated or, in the case of VIEU, is incorporated into integrated resource planning (IRP) efforts. Other aspects of fuel assurance include having dual fuel capabilities and having low exposure to supply chain interruptions (including adequate, reliable infrastructure and sufficient contractual arrangements for fuel delivery). Natural Gas NERC refers to the “single point of disruption risk” as the increasing risk of fuel disruption that threatens generator availability. In a letter to Secretary Perry, NERC CEO Gerry Cauley observed that: Growing reliance on natural gas continues to raise reliability concerns regarding the ability of both gas and electric infrastructures to maintain the BPS reliability at acceptable levels. Many efforts have focused on the gas-electric interface and yet, insufficient progress has been made reconciling the planning approaches and operating practices (scheduling situation awareness, information sharing) between these two inter-linked sectors. Planning approaches, operational coordination, and regulatory partnerships are needed to assure fuel deliverability, availability, security (physical and cyber), and resilience to potential disruptions. Unfortunately, an approach not obvious in electricity markets today.318 Natural gas-fired generators have been described as relying on “just-in-time” fuel delivery.319 NERC, FERC, and several of the ISOs and RTOs have studied the gas-electric interactions and interdependence, which are most severe in the areas where natural gas generation is growing most quickly, but natural gas pipeline infrastructure is more constrained—particularly New England and California. NERC has concluded that: […] areas with a growing reliance on natural gas-fired generation are increasingly vulnerable to issues related to gas supply unavailability. Common-mode, single contingency-type disruptions to fuel supply and deliverability in areas with a high penetration of natural gasfired generation are reducing resource adequacy and potentially introducing localized risks to reliability. Not only can impacts to BPS reliability occur during the gas-load peaking winter season, but they can also manifest during the summer season when electric demand is high and natural gas facilities are out of service, which can lower the operational capacity and flow of the pipeline system.320 NERC recommends a number of planning and operational changes to address this challenge, including risk-based approaches to study the potential regional reliability implications of greater natural gas dependence; the potential for wide-spread, common-mode failure events such as interstate gas pipeline or supply source losses; regional mitigation strategies; better information-sharing and coordination between electric generators, gas suppliers, and pipeline operators; and ensuring the availability of more flexible resources for use to mitigate the added uncertainties associated with natural gas fuel risks.321 Natural gas storage is a way to reduce the just-in-time delivery problem. Natural gas is stored in depleted natural gas and oil fields, depleted natural aquifers, and salt caverns. Figure 4.18 shows natural gas storage facilities across the Nation. The ideal storage facilities are near major gas consumption centers, where storage can supplement gas pipelines to meet high demand levels and fill in deliveries in the event of any delivery disruptions. 92 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000809 Figure 4.18. Natural Gas Storage Facilities322 The United States has over 400 natural gas storage facilities; the majority are depleted natural gas fields used for storage, with salt domes concentrated in the Southeast and aquifer storage concentrated in Illinois and Indiana. Data presented at a recent testimony before FERC offers an interesting perspective on areas that depend on just-in-time energy. The data in Table 4-3 show a dozen states that depend on high levels of just-in-time imports, whether those imports are natural gas for in-area generation or transmissionenabled electricity imports. These areas may need greater planning and resilience measures to ensure fuel security, which may include some availability of petroleum-based fuels for units that can use them when natural gas may be difficult or expensive to source. 93 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000810 Table 4-3. Dependence on Imported Just-in-Time Energy for Electricity323 The leaks discovered at California’s Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility in October 2015 California illustrate another natural gas common failure mode problem, according to analysis completed by PJM: Analysis performed after the leak identified 17 nearby electric generators with a combined output of over 9,800 MW that relied on Aliso Canyon for fuel supply. Some of these generators are required for local reliability; however, without supply from Aliso Canyon, low pressure in gas pipelines could stop the flow of gas to the generators, leaving them unable to operate.324 The loss of Aliso Canyon gas storage field highlights the risk to the power grid from failures in the pipeline infrastructure. Electric market and regulatory changes in California resulting from this event include: expedited procurement of electric storage resources, enhanced gas-electric coordination, expanded demand response program and a constraint in the electric market that reflects gas limitations.325 After the 2014 Polar Vortex, when many gas-fired power plants were forced off-line due to natural gas production and delivery problems, inadequate gas supply contracts, and spiked natural gas prices, NERC recommended the following: Examine and review the natural gas supply issues encountered during the event. Industry should also work with gas suppliers, markets, and regulators to quickly identify issues with natural gas supply and transportation so that appropriate actions can be developed and implemented to allow generators to be able to secure firm supply and transportation at a reasonable rate.326 FERC has since promulgated orders to improve coordination between natural gas and power industry operations. While various electric and gas industry groups, including NERC, have had and continue coordination efforts, a significant amount of coordination remains unresolved. 94 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000811 Nuclear As NERC noted, low exposure to fuel supply issues is one of the fundamental necessities of a reliable BPS. Still, fuel availability does not always guarantee dependable performance, particularly during extreme weather events. In 2010, the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama was throttled back to 50 percent of its maximum output because the plant was unable to draw and return enough water (due to environmental regulations) to cool all three of its reactors.327 Nuclear generators have onsite fuel storage due to their 18-month or 24-month refueling cycles.328 During the Polar Vortex, some coal and nuclear plants had fuel onsite but failed to perform nonetheless. However, overall nuclear generators performed extremely well during the Polar Vortex, with an average capacity factor of 95 percent.329 Nuclear power plants tend to have a very high number of “days of burn” onsite relative to coal, as their refueling occurs in 18-month or 24-month cycles. During each refueling, about one-third of the core is replaced with new fuel. The new fuel arrives onsite between nine and five weeks prior to the planned refueling. However, even if there is a delay in the arrival of new fuel, the reactor could continue to operate for an additional three months before reaching 70 percent capacity and two more months beyond that (for a total of five months) before decreasing to 50 percent capacity. The fuel that is replaced during each refueling has typically been used in the reactor for four-and-a-half to six years before it is removed. Planned refueling outages are typically scheduled for the spring and fall and average 35 days.330 Coal A limited number of coal plants, including all plants that use lignite coal, are “mine-mouth” facilities that rely on dedicated, nearby coal mines. Otherwise, coal plants rely on rail, barge, or truck delivery of coal, and they maintain onsite coal stockpiles to accommodate both normal variance in deliveries and the possibility of a major supply disruption. Coal stockpiles have recently been slightly smaller than historical averages, while days of burn have increased slightly relative to historic averages from the 70–80-day range to the 85–100-day range (see Figure 4.19). lll 331 lll At an individual plant, stockpiles can be viewed in terms of days of burn. The days-of-burn calculation considers both the current stockpile level at a plant and its estimated consumption (burn) rates in coming months to approximate how many days the plant could run at historical levels before depleting its existing stockpile. 95 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000812 Figure 4.19. Coal Stocks and Days of Burn, January 2010–May 2017332 While bituminous coal stockpiles in tons have been slightly lower than historic averages in recent months, these stocks are expected to last relatively longer than historic average (measured in days of burn) due to lower capacity factors and expected lower fuel consumption in coal plants. Subbituminous coal stocks (not pictured) have increased in recent months relative to historic averages both in terms of tons and days of burn. For the winter of 2014, compared to 2013, coal-fueled generation provided 92 percent of increased generation, as shown in Figure 4.20. Although electricity demand was greater in 2014, natural gas generation decreased because natural gas was diverted to fuel residential heating needs and gas prices rose to greater than three times those of coal. 96 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000813 Figure 4.20. Electricity Generation Changes from 2013 to 2014 by Fuel Type Competition for natural gas between residential heating and power production caused a rise in natural gas prices in the early months of 2014. The high gas prices coupled with onsite coal storage led to a sharp increase in coal electricity production in those months compared to the winter of 2013. Coal plants can also experience delivery interruptions. In 2013, there were 166 power plants (172,000 MW of generating capacity) across the United States that used subbituminous coal from the Powder River Basin. During the winter of 2013–2014, BNSF Railway rationed and limited coal deliveries to many of these generators due to construction and other disruptions. Stockpiles fell from 25 percent to 40 percent below normal levels at coal plants across the Midwest, Central, and Texas regions; many plants feared that they might not be able to rebuild their inventories in time to meet winter electric demands.333 4.3 High-Risk Events and System Resilience The April 14 memo asks whether wholesale energy and capacity markets are adequately compensating attributes that strengthen grid resilience and, if not, the extent to which not compensating resilience attributes could affect grid reliability and resilience in the future. A resilience approach recognizes that while not all risks can be avoided, many risks can be managed to mitigate damage and expedite recovery. Some options to improve grid resilience may be risk-specific (e.g., to protect against flooding) or component-specific (to protect a transformer), while others are “threat-agnostic, providing system-wide resilience to a broad range of threats including those that cannot be anticipated” according to the Grid Modernization Lab Consortium (GMLC).334 As the fuel mix evolves and as threats change, there will be more ways that elements and regions of the BPS can fail. Causes of failure can include extreme weather events and cyber or physical attacks on grid infrastructure. 335 336 97 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000814 Extreme Weather Events In January and February 2014, the Nation was swept by the Polar Vortex as a band of very cold weather spread across much of the eastern United States, creating record-high winter peak electric demand for heating and equally high demand for natural gas for residential heating. While the Polar Vortex tested the integrity of electricity supply, grid operators generally met demand, even under these severe conditions. However, electricity and gas prices surged for many consumers as energy supplies were stressed. The extremely cold weather caused a variety of power system performance problems, including the loss of 35,000 MW of generation capacity across a wide stretch of the Nation, with 55 percent of the affected generation from natural gas plants, 26 percent coal plants and five percent nuclear.337 In PJM, one of the regions most affected by the event, 22 percent of generating capacity was in forced outage.338 Many natural gas-fired generators had their fuel supplies curtailed because they were buying gas on non-firm, interruptible contracts, or because demand was so high that pipelines implemented delivery restrictions to power plants located near major metropolitan areas. In the Northeast, after several days of extremely cold weather, some generators experienced fuel-gelling, where the natural gas froze in the fuel injectors and was unable to feed into the turbines.339 In Texas, a major source for natural gas production and a transport hub, several gas field production facilities froze up, as did some gas compressor stations along pipelines—shutting down gas feeds into and through pipelines that were to be shipped into New Mexico and elsewhere. This caused fuel shortages to the power plants served by those pipelines.340 Limited supplies led to natural gas price spikes across much of the country; in some areas, gas to produce electricity was more expensive than liquid fuel, even though the price of oil for generation rose to over $400 per barrel. 341 Many coal plants could not operate due to conveyor belts and coal piles freezing342, which—coupled with outages across other fuels and high electricity demand—led operators to call on older plants nearing the end of their useful lives. American Electric Power reported that it deployed 89 percent of its coal units scheduled for retirement in 2014 to meet demand during the Polar Vortex, and Southern Company reported using 75 percent of its coal units scheduled for closure.343 Using these retiring units enabled utilities to meet customer demand during a period when already limited natural gas resources were diverted from electricity production to meet residential heating needs.344 345 Once retired, however, these units will not be available for the next unseasonably cold winter. In October 2012, Superstorm Sandy caused large-scale flooding and wind damage in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast, as well as blizzard conditions in the central and southern Appalachians. Three nuclear reactors totaling 2,845 MW of capacity were shut down, and five operated at reduced levels due to disruptions in transmission infrastructure, reduced demand from distribution outages, and precautionary measures to protect equipment.346 The storm impacts significantly disrupted East Coast refining activity. Spectra Energy lost two natural gas compressor stations on its Texas Eastern Transmission pipeline in northern New Jersey due to the loss of commercial power and the failure of backup generation to operate as intended, which affected gas supply to upstream gas-fired power plants. New Jersey Natural Gas shut down part of its natural gas infrastructure serving Ocean and Monmouth counties, including Long Beach Island and the barrier islands from Bay Head to Seaside Park, with subsequent distribution line damages.347 Sandy also damaged solar PV installations in New Jersey, with storm surges causing $3 million of damage to ground-mounted PV systems and wind and lightning damage to rooftop PV systems.348 98 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000815 4.4 Enhancing Reliability and Resilience Recently, based on extensive information about the operational profiles of PJM resources, PJM assessed the capability of each generator type to provide different ERS.mmm PJM then built a series of hypothetical resource portfolios using different mixes of generation types to determine how well each portfolio performed at delivering sufficient reliability. PJM also considered the risk that each portfolio would fail to meet resource adequacy needs and thus cause reliability problems. After simulating many combinations and portfolios, the following conclusions were reached:  The expected near-term resource portfolio is among the highest-performing portfolios and is well equipped to provide the generator reliability attributes.  As the potential future resource mix moves in the direction of less coal and nuclear generation, generator reliability attributes of frequency response, reactive capability and fuel assurance decrease, but flexibility and ramping attributes increase.  A marked decrease in operational reliability was observed for portfolios with significantly increased amounts of wind and solar capacity (compared to the expected near-term resource portfolio), suggesting de facto performance-based upper bounds on the percent of system capacity from these resource types. Additionally, most portfolios with solar unforced capacity shares of 20 percent or greater were classified infeasible because they resulted in LOLE criterion violations at night. Nevertheless, PJM could maintain reliability with unprecedented levels of wind and solar resources, assuming a portfolio of other resources that provides a sufficient amount of reliability services.  Portfolios composed of up to 86 percent natural gas-fired resources maintained operational reliability. Thus, this analysis did not identify an upper bound for natural gas. However, additional risks, such as gas deliverability during polar vortex-type conditions and uncertainties associated with economics and public policy, were not fully captured in this analysis. Risks with respect to natural gas may lie not in capability to provide the generator reliability attributes but rather in these other uncertainties.  More diverse portfolios are not necessarily more reliable; rather, there are resource blends between the most diverse and least diverse portfolios which provide the most generator reliability attributes.349 [original footnotes omitted] Significantly, when PJM tested the most desirable portfolios (in terms of reliability) against a polar vortex event, only a third of those were resilient: Only 34 of the 98 portfolios which were classified as desirable were resilient when subjected to a polar vortex event. This sensitivity specifically captured the increased risk of natural gas delivery under extremely cold and high load conditions. The polar vortex sensitivity highlights the importance of resilience, which is not captured by the generator reliability attributes that were considered in this study.350 DOE, NERC, and industry stakeholders prepare for a variety of potential threats, including high-impact, low-frequency events, to improve resilience and recovery. Planning, practice, and coordination on an allhazards basis are as important for improving resilience as having a mix of resources and fuels available when a major grid disturbance occurs. A diverse resource portfolio could complement wholesale market products that recognize and compensate providers for the value of ERS on a technology-neutral basis. mmm The PJM study assumed firm gas supply contracts for natural gas-fired generators. 99 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000816 DOE’s Grid Modernization Initiative (GMI) works to better understand what resilience means for the power system and how to measure and achieve it. Transmission planning also supports grid reliability and resilience through interconnecting diverse resources, and it occurs at a variety of levels—ranging from individual utility system studies to regional and interconnection-wide studies. In 2009, DOE issued a series of grants to support interconnectionwide transmission planning. In 2011, FERC issued Order No. 1000, which (among other requirements) mandates regional transmission planning and interregional coordination. As noted in a recent study for the WIRES group: The analytical approaches applied to interregional [transmission] planning should look beyond “base cases” or “business-as-usual cases” and explicitly consider a broader range of plausible market conditions, system contingencies, and public policy environments to capture the short- and long-term flexibility benefits and insurance value that a more robust interregional transmission infrastructure can offer in terms of shielding customers from highcost outcomes. … we recommend that such futures be evaluated to identify transmission projects that address current needs but also provide the insurance and flexibility value to mitigate highcost outcomes across a range of uncertain but not implausible futures.351 Given the many problems that can affect different generation and fuel types, system-wide reliability and resilience can be supported by a diverse portfolio of generation resources that limit over-dependence on any single fuel or technology type, plus demand-side resources that reduce overall demand and better protect customers in the event of a widespread extreme event. 4.5 Reliability and Resilience Looking Forward Although the BPS is performing reliably today with the current mix of resources, technologies, and loads, the entire system remains volatile. Low customer demands and a flatter supply curve mean that many generators face continuing economic stress, retirements may continue, and utility-scale and customerside VRE additions (enabled by subsidies and mandates) will continue. These factors and the uncertainty about future conditions are making it harder for grid planners and operators to maintain today’s level of reliability. Any successful strategy to address BPS reliability and resilience going forward should include developing portfolios of resources that deliver both resource adequacy and ERS to advance reliable grid operations. Resource portfolios could be complemented with wholesale market and product designs that recognize and complement resource diversity by compensating providers for the value of ERS on a technologyneutral basis. More work is needed to define, quantify, and value resilience; Sandia National Laboratories has made efforts to do so, as shown in Figure 4.21. 100 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000817 Figure 4.21. Sandia National Laboratories’ Resilience Analysis Process 352 101 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000818 5 Wholesale Electricity Markets The wholesale electricity market issues outlined in the April 14 memo are central to the future of U.S. electricity markets and policy. At the same time, they are the subject of intense debate among stakeholders with differing regional and economic interests. Noting the wide range of opinion on these issues, DOE staff offer three general findings: 1) Changing circumstances are challenging centrally-organized wholesale markets. Flat demand growth, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels are creating stresses on wholesale electricity markets. The centrally-organized markets are successfully achieving reliable and economically efficient delivery of wholesale electricity in their short-term operations, but the changing circumstances portend potential long-term problems for centrally-organized and, to a lesser extent, bilateral markets. 2) New technologies with very low marginal costs, i.e. VRE, reduce wholesale prices, independent of— and in addition to—the effects of low natural gas prices. To the extent that additional development of such resources is driven by subsidies and mandates, their price suppressive effect might place undue economic pressure on revenues for traditional baseload (as well as non-baseload) resources and could require changes in market design.353 354 355 3) Markets need further work to address grid resilience. Market mechanisms are designed to incentivize individual resources rather than develop balanced portfolios. System operators are working toward recognizing, defining, and compensating for reliability- and resilience-enhancing resource attributes (on both the supply and demand side), but more work must be done. U.S. market structures vary widely, but despite substantial differences between markets, some patterns emerge and are worth addressing in response to the April 14 memo. 5.1 Evolution of U.S. Wholesale Electricity Markets Until the 1970s, investor-owned electric utilities were vertically integrated (i.e., provided generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to their customers at regulated rates and with administratively determined profits). This concept was loosely referred to as the “regulatory 102 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000819 compact.”nnn Interspersed with VIEUs were—and still are—over 3,200 cooperatively owned electric utilities.ooo 356 In the 1920s, policymakers accepted the idea that non-utility companies might be able to generate electricity at equal or lower cost than VIEUs, to the benefit of electricity consumers.357 In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), which introduced competition to the VIEU model and set the stage for later regulatory reform of the electricity industry.358 At the time, PURPA was largely an effort to curb the electricity industry’s reliance on high-cost natural gas and oil.ppp PURPA provided for “increased conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electric utilities, and equitable retail rates for electric consumers.” 359 It also made developing new generation resources easier—specifically renewable energy and cogeneration facilities.360 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 allowed FERC to approve “exempt wholesale generators,” using any fuel and any generation technology, to go into the generation business and sell electricity at competitive prices. The act also authorized FERC to order transmission owners to provide transmission service.361 Also in 1992, Congress enacted the PTC to incentivize VRE energy production, which Congress has extended and modified several times since.362 In 1996, FERC required transmission owners under its jurisdiction to provide open-access transmission to the interstate transmission grid through its landmark Order No. 888. Open access means charging all similarly situated parties the same rate (including, if applicable, what the utility would charge itself to use its transmission facilities) and providing service to all similarly situated parties under the same terms and conditions.363 This action by FERC greatly assisted the development of competition among wholesale power producers because it meant that utilities would find it difficult to limit access to their transmission facilities as a means of protecting their generation assets from competitors. FERC Order No. 2000 (issued in December 1999) promoted voluntary participation in RTO/ISOs by further clarifying both necessary characteristics of RTO/ISOs and benefits of such participation.364 Between 1998 and 2006, 23 states made changes to require their VIEUs to divest some or all of their generating assets and thus allow competition.365 Divestiture was pursued most aggressively by the states with high retail electricity prices (most of New England, New York, the Mid-Atlantic states, and nnn “The ‘state regulatory compact’ evolved as a concept ‘to characterize the set of mutual rights, obligations, and benefits that exist between the utility and society.’ It is not a binding agreement. Under this ‘compact,’ a utility typically is given exclusive access to a designated—or franchised—service territory and can recover its prudent costs (as determined by the regulator) plus a reasonable rate of return on its investments. In return, the utility must fulfill its service obligation of providing universal access service within its territory. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Appendix-Electricity%20System%20Overview.pdf ooo Most public power utilities are distribution-only; however, some are vertically integrated. Distribution-only cooperatives typically purchase all or some of their electricity at the wholesale level from generation and transmission cooperative utilities. ppp Also in 1978, the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act prohibited “(1) the use of natural gas or petroleum as a[n] energy source in any new electric power plant; and (2) construction of any new electric power plant without the capability to use coal or any alternate fuel as a primary energy source.” https://www.congress.gov/bill/95th-congress/house-bill/5146 The Fuel Use Act was mostly repealed in 1987, which “set the stage for a dramatic increase in the use of natural gas for electric generation and industrial processing.” https://www.eia.gov/oil gas/natural gas/analysis publications/ngmajorleg/repeal.html 103 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000820 California) with the hope that competition would bring lower retail consumer 366 Generating units that had been operating under cost-of-service regulation were sold to merchant plant owners or transferred to unregulated, investor-owned utility affiliates. This wave of restructuring did not sweep the entire Nation. In large areas?particularly the Southeast and the West, apart from the expanding Energy Imbalance Market?the wholesale electricity industry is still vertically integrated. In these areas, the wholesale market consists of bilateral transactions. Because restructuring did not take hold in all states, a range of organizational structures exist at the wholesale level in the United States today, as shown in Figure 5.1. States considered ?Partially Restructured? below have divested some generation and/or allowed a portion of customers to choose their energy provider. Figure 5.1. Utility Restructuring by State as of May 2017367 Fully Restructured Partially Restructured None 5.2 Wholesale Electricity Markets Today Over the past two decades, a diverse set of wholesale electricity markets has evolved in different regions of the United States. These wholesale markets can be divided into two broad categories. For the purposes of this section, regions of the country that have not joined are called traditional (m Whether this objective has been achieved is mixed in the literature. Availability rates for generation have improved significantly and, as predicted, as competition incentivized operators to run their units as efficiently as possible. Dispatch over the much broader footprints of also increases efficiency and thus reduces costs. PJM notes (July 26, 2017 written statement before Subcommittee on Energy, U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce) ?nearly $2 billion of annual savings to customers." On the other hand, Borenstein?s 2015 review claims ?the electricity rate changes since restructuring have been driven more by exogenous factors - such as generation technology advances and natural gas price fluctuations - than by the effects of restructuring." See two meta?studies: Severin Borenstein and James Bushnell, ?The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of Restructuring,? May 2015, and James Bushnell, Erin T. Mansur, and Kevin Novan, ?Review of the Economics Literature on US Electricity Restructuring,? April 2017, for DOE, unpublished. 104 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000821 bilateral markets, while those that have are called centrally-organized markets. These regions are shown in Figure 5.2, with RTO/ISOs labeled and colored, and bilateral markets depicted in gray. Figure 5.2. The Seven RTOs or ISOs in the United States rrr 368 There are currently seven centrally-organized markets operating across the United States. The diversity of approaches to market organization and resource adequacy can be visualized along a spectrum, as shown in Figure 5.3—from VIEUs with minimal market organization on one end, to fully restructured markets without formal resource adequacy requirements on the other. Between vertically integrated and energy-only regions, there are diverse approaches to allocating the financial risk of generation investment and the responsibility to provide resource adequacy. rrr Map redrawn from FERC’s December 2016 website. 105 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000822 Figure 5.3. States and Regions along the Spectrum from Traditional to Fully Restructured Electric Markets369 In the Southeast and West, bilateral markets are dominated by VIEUs that operate under a regulated cost-of-service model. States in these regions retain strong control over electric utility resource decisions and oversee resource adequacy, and they consider non-market factors in their oversight of utility decisions through a utility’s IRP process. Once approved by state regulators, ratepayers guarantee the cost recovery of VIEU generation investments through retail rates (or merchant generators through long-term PPAs with utilities). Thus, the financial viability of these generators is not immediately exposed to the same price volatility that generators face in market-oriented regions. However, new resource decisions in VIEU regions are beginning to account for low natural gas prices, low load growth, and zero-marginal cost generation.sss Public power and rural cooperative utilities also have a significant presence in some regions. Utility asset ownership models can vary from vertically integrated to distribution-only. Merchant generators also operate within these regions, but most electricity is produced and delivered by the integrated utilities, with minimal additional spot transactions.370 In centrally-organized markets, generators offer electricity bids on a day-ahead and real-time basis. The RTO/ISO then pools these bids into a single supply curve and calculates the clearing price that matches supply to demand, considering transmission limitations for the next interval. This calculation yields a set of market-clearing prices, one for each location and time horizon. Centrally-organized markets also compensate resources that provide certain ERS through ancillary service markets. Furthermore, in some cases, RTO/ISOs provide supplemental revenues to generators that are dispatched out-of-market, such as ones that are needed to ensure local reliability. sss See, for example, 152 FERC ¶ 61,013 (Florida Power & Light Company) or Steve Wright, General Manager, Chelan County PUD, a vertically integrated utility in Washington, told DOE staff in a June 19, 2017, conversation that the relatively low wholesale prices traditionally seen in the Northwest due to an abundance of low-cost hydro are now further stressed by the export of surplus zero-marginal cost California rooftop solar, so much so that he is “finding it hard to even justify spending on energy efficiency in [his utility’s] integrated resource plan.” 106 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000823 RTOs/ISOs operate as a single balancing authority and achieve cost savings by procuring reserves and other ancillary services for the system. For example, MISO estimates that because it operates an ancillary service market across the entire region, spinning reserve requirements can be based upon the entire region’s needs rather than the sum of individual balancing authorities’ spinning reserve requirements. By operating the ancillary services market, MISO reduced its average spinning reserves requirement from 1,482 MW to 935 MW and saved almost $25 million per year for its members by freeing up generation from having to meet the reserve requirement.371 CAISO, MISO, and SPP retain aspects of the bilateral markets, particularly that states still oversee resource procurement and resource adequacy of their VIEUs, through the IRP process.372 California, MISO and SPP, as well as traditional bilateral market states, incorporate considerations other than shortterm economic efficiency into their resource choices, such as portfolio diversity, job retention or creation, environmental protection, and other factors. 5.2.1 Responsibility for Resource Adequacy and Capacity Some states require utilities to build new or subsidize specific power plants outside the RTO/ISO resource adequacy processes. Other centrally-organized markets (namely PJM, ISO-NE, and NYISO) have implemented capacity markets as a mechanism to provide sufficient revenue for resources to ensure resource adequacy. In these markets, the system operator conducts an auction process, and wholesale customers procure resources (including generation, energy efficiency, DR, and transmission-enabled resource imports) to meet the electricity demands of their customers. These markets can be mandatory (PJM Interconnection and ISO New England); voluntary, where states can choose to operate under an IRP process and where load-serving entities can satisfy their requirements through a combination of the market and/or showing that they have rights to adequate capacity (MISO); or voluntarily backstopped by a mandatory process (NYISO). ERCOT does not have a formal resource adequacy requirement. 5.3 Challenges in Wholesale Electricity Markets Centrally-organized markets are now 15–20 years old, and their original designs (even with continual and evolving updates) are showing signs of strain from the pace of change now underway in the electricity industry. Many of these changes were not foreseen during the restructuring and wholesale market designs of the 1990s–2000s. Flat demand growth, flattened supply curves, Federal and state policy interventions, and the massive economic shift in the relative economics of natural gas compared to other fuels are placing pressures on centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets, resulting in low average wholesale energy prices. These markets were designed when supply curves tilted sharply upward, demand grew over time, and capacity was not explicitly compensated to make up for insufficient revenues from an energy-only market. A 2014 FERC staff report notes: A failure to properly reflect in market prices the value of reliability to consumers and operator actions taken to ensure reliability can lead to inefficient prices in the energy and ancillary services markets leading to inefficient system utilization, and muted investment signals.373 107 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000824 The issue of revenue insufficiency and generator retirements in centrally-organized electricity markets is a complex topic, with causality difficult to assign beyond the individual asset/owner level.ttt Each plant has its own cost structure, and plant revenues can differ between neighboring nodes in a single market. Traditional, bilateral-only wholesale markets are not immune to these issues either, but may not be seeing them yet at the same scale as the three eastern RTO/ISOs that have a predominance of merchant generation. An issue that is more prevalent in these regions than in regions with bilateral markets is the PURPA “must-purchase obligation” that still applies to those regions. After Congress amended PURPA in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, many utilities in regions with centrally-organized wholesale markets have sought and received from FERC orders terminating their obligations.374 By contrast, utilities in regions with traditional, bilateral-only wholesale markets remain subject to the PURPA requirement to buy power from Qualifying Facilities (QFs) under PPAs, with up to 20-year terms and at rates that the applicable state regulator has determined reflect the purchasing utility’s avoided costs. In some instances, generation purchased from QFs has displaced utility-owned generation and thus reduced utility revenue. PURPA remains a subject of ongoing debate within the industry, as evidenced by a discussion during a FERC June 2016 Technical Conference.375 5.3.1 Revenue Insufficiency due to Market Structure: The Missing Money Problem In the mid-2000s it became apparent that merchant generators were failing to recover sufficient revenues through the energy-only markets to cover both their variable and fixed costs. The issue subsequently became known as the “missing money problem.”uuu In testimony before a 2014 FERC technical conference, David Patton, the independent market monitor for ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO, and NYISO, described the issue as stemming from overly-stringent planning reserve requirements: With reasonable assumptions about capacity cost and energy prices, [the one-day-in-tenyears] reliability standard implies a value of lost load of $100,000 to $200,000 per MWh. Hence, without substantially inflated shortage prices, energy-only markets cannot provide enough revenue to satisfy planning reserve requirements. Additional revenue is needed to satisfy these requirements, which is the “missing money” problem addressed by the capacity markets.376 William Hogan of Harvard University noted in 2005 that the missing money problem can also be attributed to price caps: The missing money problem arises when occasional market price increases are limited by administrative actions such as price caps. By preventing prices from reaching high levels during times of relative scarcity, these administrative actions reduce the payments that could be applied towards the fixed operating costs of existing generation plants and the investment costs of new plants.377 To mitigate the missing money problem, centrally-organized markets have, to varying degrees, utilized shortage pricing and capacity markets. ttt The market issues discussed in this section are most pertinent to a merchant generator operating within centrally-organized markets that are not subject to regulated rate recovery. uuu The first use of this term is attributed to Roy Shanker in his 2003 testimony before FERC. William W. Hogan, Harvard University, “’Energy Only’ Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy,” September 23, 2005 108 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000825 Shortage Pricing Shortage pricing, also referred to as scarcity pricing, seeks to ensure that energy market revenues reflect the value consumers place on reliability. It does this through administrative rules that raise prices above marginal costs during times of system stress. FERC has actively sought to improve the utilization of techniques like shortage pricing. In a 2014 analysis, FERC staff provided a useful overview of the rationale for shortage pricing: When the system operator is unable to meet system needs, it applies administrative pricing rules to ensure that costs, including the costs associated with the failure to meet minimum operating reserve requirements, are reflected in market prices. …Under such conditions, prices should rise, inducing performance of existing supply resources and encouraging load to reduce consumption so that the system operator would not need to administratively curtail load to maintain reliability. 378 All of the Nation’s RTO/ISOs currently employ shortage pricing to some degree; however, the designs are not uniform. FERC Order No. 831 raised energy offer caps in jurisdictional RTO/ISOs from $1,000 to $2,000/MWh.379 Conditions required to trigger shortage pricing vary from year to year. This variance could present challenges to market participants who require a threshold level of certainty to make an investment decision. Remarks by market monitors David Patton and Joe Bowring critique the practice of relying solely on shortage pricing: [David Patton:] Shortage pricing is not like a capacity market where you’re going to get a level of revenue that might fluctuate by 10 to 20 percent per year. With shortage pricing, you might get 10 years of revenue in one year and then the other nine years the generators are going to think they’re going bankrupt.380 [Joe Bowring]: What will happen if you go through eight years of very low revenues under scarcity pricing … and a significant number of units decide to retire because they can’t see into the future? They don’t know if [in] the ninth or 10th year there’s going to be $20 billion. They retire if the revenues aren’t adequate.381 Capacity Markets Four RTO/ISOs currently operate centralized capacity markets: ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM hold mandatory auctions, while MISO’s is voluntary. Capacity markets address the missing money problem by imposing resource adequacy requirements on load-serving entities (LSEs). Spees, Newell, and Pfeifenberger provide a useful overview of how this process works: A resource adequacy [requirement] requires LSEs to procure sufficient generation or demand-response capacity to serve their own customers’ coincident peak load plus a mandatory planning reserve margin. If each LSE procures their required capacity, then the system as a whole will be able to meet its planning reserve margin requirement and target resource adequacy level. … [Capacity] has value as a stand-alone commodity, the demand for which is driven by LSEs needing to meet their resource adequacy requirement.382 According to the authors, capacity market revenues should in theory ameliorate the missing money problem by providing “the incremental payment needed to recover their investment costs in addition to the operating profits earned through energy and ancillary service sales.”383 Figure 5.4 provides a useful illustration of how capacity payments are intended to close the missing money gap. 109 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000826 Figure 5.4. How Market Prices Allow Resource Costs to be Recovered in a Centrally-organized Wholesale Market384 Revenues from energy sold in the wholesale market pay for a generators' variable costs and some portion of fixed costs (indicated by green arrows). The unrecovered portion of fixed cost (missing money) is recovered through capacity market revenues (indicated by blue arrow). Some observers note that capacity markets may not provide sufficient revenues as originally intended. For example, the 2016 PJM Market Monitor’s report finds PJM’s markets can provide adequate revenue to support some existing capacity, but the outlook varies widely by technology, fuel choice, time interval, and location: Analysis of the total unit revenues of theoretical new entrant CTs and CCs for three representative locations shows that units that entered the PJM markets in 2007 have not covered their total costs, including the return on and of capital, on a cumulative basis through 2016. The analysis also shows that theoretical new entrant CTs and CCs that entered the PJM markets in 2012 have covered their total costs on a cumulative basis in the eastern PSEG [New Jersey] and BGE [Baltimore] zones but have not covered total costs in the western ComEd [Chicago] Zone. Energy market revenues were not sufficient to cover total costs in any scenario except the new entrant CC unit that went into operation in 2012 in BGE, which demonstrates the critical role of capacity market revenue in covering total costs.vvv 385 5.3.2 Revenue Insufficiency due to External Forces While RTO/ISOs have sought to address the missing money problem as previously defined, newer variants of it continue to permeate stakeholder discussions. Economist Severin Borenstein notes that the definition has expanded to include the supply curve impact of subsidies: Money has been going missing for many years, according to owners of power plants. They’ve used the term for more than a decade to refer to the fact that wholesale electricity markets have price caps (mostly between $1,000 and $10,000 per MWh) that constrain how vvv As part of the review of market performance, the market monitor analyzed the net revenues earned by CTs, NGCCs, coal, diesel, nuclear, solar, and wind generating units. 110 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000827 much sellers can make when supply is tight. Without that income, generators argue, it may not be profitable to build new capacity, or extend the life of existing capacity, that is needed to meet demand. More recently, the definition of missing money has been expanded to include the price impacts of subsidized or mandated renewables generation. In California, New York and many other states, wind and solar are pushing down wholesale prices and making continued operation of some nuclear and fossil fuel generation unprofitable. 386 Shifts in the Generation Supply Curve Changes in the Nation’s generation mix have generally reduced revenues for incumbent baseload generators in wholesale markets, as highlighted in QER 1.2: [P]rice suppression is occurring in RTO/ISO wholesale markets, with noticeable amounts of wind and solar generation (and low-cost gas generation). While passing on savings to consumers is desirable, in some regions, these low prices have put pressure on baseload units, particularly zero-carbon emissions nuclear generation.387 Put more specifically, shifts in market supply curves have lowered the infra-marginal rentswww earned by baseload generators. Crucially, this reduction has occurred because of changes along both axes of the supply curve. Along the horizontal (supply) axis, the entry of new resources has pushed the curve to the right, resulting in a lower clearing price at the same level of demand. Meanwhile, reductions in marginal fuel costs (vertical axis) have lowered the slope of the curve. The net effect of these changes—as illustrated by a simulated dispatch curve in ERCOT—is shown in Figure 5.5. www Infra-marginal rents are the differences between the market-clearing price and the submitted bid of each generator. Generators that bid less than the market-clearing price receive a payment equal to this difference. 111 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000828 Figure 5.5. Simulated ERCOT Dispatch Curvesxxx Changes in fuel costs and the supply mix have impacted market clearing prices, and thus lowered inframarginal rents for incumbent generators. Reductions in natural gas prices have clearly flattened the curve, reducing revenues for generation resources. The entry of new, near-zero marginal cost resources has also pushed the overall curve to the right. The entry of wind and solar resources is visible in lower left. Natural Gas and Incumbent Baseload The frequency with which natural gas sets the price of electricity has increased in many of the Nation’s markets. For example, 2017 could mark the first time in PJM’s history that gas is marginal for more intervals than coal (see Figure 5.6). This transition means that infra-marginal rents that were previously based on the marginal cost of coal resources have been supplanted by the marginal cost of natural gas resources. xxx EIA, analysis performed for DOE using EIA and ABB Ventyx software to show estimated plant-specific estimated production costs for July 15 of each year modeled, using then-current delivered energy prices (in 2009 $) within ERCOT and estimated, plant-specific heat rates to estimate plant-specific marginal costs of electricity production, June 2017 112 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000829 Figure 5.6. Type of Fuel Used in PJM (by Real-Time Marginal Units): 2004 through March 2017 388 Natural gas is rising as the marginal electricity generation source in PJM. The low price of natural gas has resulted in the competitive displacement of coal in many of the Nation’s markets. This trend is visible in Figure 5.7 by comparing the 2005 curve to the 2015 version. The interspersed nature of the coal and gas generators in the 2015 curve reflects that the two now compete for the same runtime. While gas had been a mid-merit source in previous years, it has become more of a baseload resource in recent years. The phenomenon is visible on a national level by examining the capacity factors of the respective technologies. Figure 5.7. Annual Average Capacity Factors of Coal and Natural Gas Generators 113 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000830 NGCC generators have seen a steady increase in fleet average capacity factor from 35% in 2005 to 56% in 2015; in that year, the NGCC fleet average eclipsed that of coal generators, which has declined from approximately 68% in 2010 to 55% in 2015.389 Negative Pricing Negative pricing events in electricity markets reflect a complex set of economic, reliability, environmental, and safety variables. The interaction of these variables differs depending on the region, season, and time in question, but negative pricing often reflects some combination of excess generation (often exacerbated by must-run requirements), transmission constraints, and economic factors. According to analysis from LBNL, negative pricing events have historically been rare at many major pricing hubs (less than two percent of total hours in real-time markets in 2016), and have had almost no impact on annual average day-ahead or real-time wholesale electricity prices. However, more frequent negative pricing has been observed in CAISO, and in constrained hubs that feature a relatively large amount of VRE and/or nuclear generation.390 In addition, PJM has observed that “prices go negative at nuclear units buses in approximately 2,176 hours – representing 14 percent of off-peak hours.”391 The term economic factors in this case serves as a catchall for those negative pricing events that are not the direct result of must-run requirements. EIA provides examples of why generators might choose to run, even if it means accepting negative prices: Technical and economic factors may drive power plant operators to run generators even when power supply outstrips demand. For example:  For technical and cost recovery reasons, nuclear plant operators try to continuously operate at full power.  Eligible generators can take a 2.2¢/kWh or $22/MWh[yyy] production tax credit (PTC) on electricity sold. This means that some generators may be willing to sell their output for as low as -$22/MWh to continue producing power. Typically, wind generators are the largest such group in any region.  There are maintenance and fuel-cost penalties when operators shut down and start up large steam turbine (usually fossil-fueled) plants as demand varies over a day or a week. These costs may be avoided if the generator sells at a loss to attract a buyer when demand is low.392 As EIA notes, the PTC can create an incentive for wind generators to bid at negative prices. If other generators located at nodes in the areas affected by negative prices are unable or unwilling to reduce output, they will have to pay the negative price for their output. That scenario has unfolded on some buses in PJM, as outlined in comments to DOE from PJM staff: Tax and subsidy policies have had an impact on the economics of certain types of generation. The Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit and renewable energy mandates have had the most significant impact on nuclear generation. Specifically, the nuclear and wind generation are competing to clear in the market during off-peak hours when wind resources are the strongest and load is reduced. In those off-peak hours, the production tax credit has created an incentive for renewable resources to bid negative prices as they must run in order to receive their payment from the federal treasury. Since 2014, PJM has seen prices go negative at nuclear unit buses in approximately 2,176 hours—representing 14 percent of off-peak hours.393 [footnotes omitted from original text] yyy While the PTC value was $23/MWh in 2016, this figure was based upon EIA’s interpretation of the PTC benefit at the time. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=8870 114 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000831 ERCOT’s market monitor identified 130 negative-priced hours for the entire system in 2016, an increase from 50 hours in 2015.394 Negative prices in ERCOT are now on the rise due to subsidized wind, as noted by William Hogan and Susan Pope in a recent study filed with the PUC of Texas by Calpine and NRG: Prior to the increase in wind and other intermittent capacity in the ISOs, negative prices sometimes occurred in the middle of the night, as load dropped and generators needed for operation the following day were pinned at their minimum loads. In contrast, the increasing incidence of negative prices in ERCOT is caused by the incentive of the owners of wind generation capacity receiving the PTC to continue to produce even when the locational price is negative.395 In addition to the PTC, VRE may also be incentivized to submit negative bids into markets by demand for RECs (to satisfy state environmental mandates and/or corporate sustainability goals). Conventional generators also face economic factors that lead them to submit negative bids. Existing nuclear plants in the United States, as well as some fossil units, may bid in during these periods to avoid costly start-ups and shutdowns.396 For example, steam turbine plants may choose not to cut back their production if they are not designed to cycle economically. Operational attributes can also create or exacerbate negative prices. For example, hydroelectric plants are limited in their ability to curtail output because of environmental and safety reasons. Flood control and wildlife regulations are two important reasons this can take place. As this winter’s record precipitation gave way to snowmelt this spring, CAISO found itself with an abundance of un-curtailed hydroelectricity that competed with solar generation.397 A similar dynamic played out in 2011 following significant precipitation in the Pacific Northwest, as shown in Figure 5.8.zzz zzz In Figure 5.8, Off-peak is 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. on Monday through Saturday and all hours on Sunday. Mid C is Mid-Columbia, COB is California-Oregon Border, and NOB is Nevada-Oregon Border. 115 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000832 Figure 5.8. Negative Northwest Off-Peak Daily Spot Prices ($/MWh) in 2011398 5.3.3 State Actions Impacting Wholesale Markets There is growing concern about the impact of state government intervention in wholesale markets, such as the creation of ZEC programs to keep nuclear plants in operation, as well as RPS and other state policy requirements. This concern was reflected in comments at the May 1–2, 2017 FERC Technical Conference on state policies in the three eastern wholesale markets:aaaa [Roy Shanker, independent consultant]: It is difficult to identify any element in the wholesale electric market (energy, capacity, ancillary services and transmission) that is not being directly and materially impacted by discriminatory mandates driven by state policy actions. Price taking energy and capacity offers linked to these mandates directly impact price formation. The intermittent nature of virtually all RPS resources requires material modification of dispatch and significant increases in flexible resources and associated ancillary services.399 [William Hogan, Harvard University]: The increasing impact of Federal and state policies to support particular technologies, raises questions about the viability of wholesale power markets.400 [Susan Tierney, Analysis Group]: These state policies can and often do affect the price of electricity in wholesale power markets, and the entry, exit and cost of operations of electric generating resources…there is no reason to expect that state decision makers will make aaaa The full transcript of (and all written statements from) this technical conference is available on FERC’s website. FERC Technical Conference, “Docket No. AD17-11-000”, May 1-2, 2017. 116 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000833 determinations that singularly focus on economic efficiency and the continued viability of wholesale capacity-market designs ahead of other all objectives… Already, we see that in a market that depends upon the flow of private capital and diversity in the asset mix, some suppliers of capacity resources (including demand-response and nuclear generation) have recently decided that the markets are not producing financial outcomes consistent with the requirements of private capital markets… I remain concerned that the current centralized wholesale capacity markets in PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE will not be sustainable, from an economic, financial and political point of view and in light of states’ policies and preferences.401 [Cliff Hamel, Navigant Consulting]: [P]roblems in the current centralized [capacity] market approach are fundamental.402 [Samuel Newell, The Brattle Group]: The centralized wholesale markets do not, however, and should not be expected to meet goals they were not designed to meet. Many states now have far-reaching carbon and clean energy goals. Yet today’s centralized energy, ancillary services, and capacity markets are mostly not designed to differentiate generation resources based on their unpriced carbon emissions or other unpriced attributes.403 [Lawrence Makovich, IHS Markit]: In summary, out-of-market interventions cause predictable distortions and consequences, including: 1. Reduced market-based cash flows for non-peaking generating resources, causing lower investment in electric generating production efficiency. 2. Uneconomic displacement of lower cost energy production causing a shift toward a less cost-effective fuel and technology mix and resulting in higher overall average electricity supply costs. 3. Less supply diversity causing more generation production cost and availability risk. 4. Premature retirements of low CO2 emitting resources, causing replacement with higher CO2 emitting resources that subvert market intervention policy goals.404 While this panel of economists commented on these effects on the wholesale markets resulting from state policies, members of a panel of state officials at the same FERC Technical Conference clearly said their states will continue to pursue their policies: [Jeffrey Bentz, New England States Committee on Electricity]: States aren't interested in having markets just for the sake of having markets…405 [Angela O’Connor, Department of Public Utilities of Massachusetts] […] what the legislature requires us to do we have to do…406 [Sarah Hofman, Vermont Public Service Board]: […] we cannot tell what our legislators [what to] do. And so they are going to have policies and it doesn't matter what anybody here or any place else says, they will have policies that set the stage for what the state wants and that's what legislators are for.[…] there is no question that state lawmakers will continue passing legislation that sets public policy. It is now our challenge to continue to work together to find effective ways to carry out those policies while also continuing to benefit from competitive wholesale markets.407 Tony Clark recently expressed similar views on the original policy assumptions behind the creation of centrally-organized wholesale markets: Affordable power was the goal. The current markets are still procuring affordable power but many state public policy makers no longer see that as the only goal. It is little wonder we hear some decry that the markets are not delivering what people want. It is because they were never designed for job creation, tax preservation, politically popular generation, or 117 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000834 anything other than reliable, affordable electricity. To the degree policy makers and elected officials have moved the goal posts, it is time to consider rational pathways forward.408 5.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets Looking Forward Changes in the centrally-organized markets must catch up to the broad technology-driven and policydriven electricity market dynamics identified in the April 14 memo. Overall, centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets are effective at driving energy prices toward suppliers’ short-run marginal costs. However, the revenue insufficiency problem has become more pronounced in recent years. Generator profitability could become a public policy concern if so much generation is financially challenged that the reliability or resilience of the BPS become threatened. New market structures may be necessary to reflect these market dynamics, particularly in an industry in which suppliers with high fixed capital costs and relatively low marginal costs often struggle to recover their long-run average costs. In addition, while markets as currently designed do not explicitly recognize or compensate system resilience, RTO/ISOs are considering ways to better support system resilience objectives in the same way that they explicitly recognized and administratively incorporated reliability standards into dispatch practices in the past. For example, the variety of problems that arose during the Polar Vortex (as discussed in Section 4) caused PJM and ISO-NE to change their capacity market rules to ensure generator performance during scarcity conditions.409 410 In summary, the debates surrounding wholesale markets are complex and multifaceted, but the institutions and the grid itself have historically proven flexible, strong, and able to adapt. Questions about revenue sufficiency and resilience must be addressed quickly, before the fast-moving evolution of our power system outpaces our ability to understand and manage it responsibly. 118 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000835 6 Affordability The April 14 memo asked whether the loss of coal, natural gas, nuclear, and hydroelectric baseload power is making the grid less affordable. There is no widely accepted metric for an “affordable” grid or an “affordable” electricity bill. DOE’s GMI defines affordability as “maintain[ing] reasonable costs to customers.”411 Typically, the meaning of “affordable” is contextual, i.e. dependent on the size of a consumer’s household budget. This indicator of energy affordability can be represented as energy burden, which is a household’s annual spending on energy as a percentage of its gross annual income.412 413 Because electricity is an important energy service, it can be broken out as “electricity burden.”bbbb In 2011, the median electricity burden for all households was four percent, but it averaged 8.3 percent for low-income households and 2.9 percent for non-low-income households.414 415 416 For low-income families, more spending on energy bills translates into less spending on other expenses, such as food, health care, and education.417 The limited increases in electricity rates suggest that electricity bills have not become less affordable for most customers. However, changes in cost allocation and rate designs could have disparate effects on bills for different groups of customers. For example, utilities raising fixed charges to counterbalance decreases in revenues from energy efficiency gains could disproportionately impact low-consumption customers, for whom fixed charges comprise a larger portion of the bill. Customers on fixed incomes and those who rely on electricityintensive medical devices may have an acute need to maintain affordability.418 Most states and utilities offer programs like concessionary rates for these customers, and ensuring affordability options for vulnerable customers remains a priority as electricity stakeholders explore market, regulatory, and rate reforms to accommodate an evolving grid. Low electricity prices can also boost businesses’ competitiveness and bring new economic activity to an area, as evidenced by companies locating electricity-intensive industrial facilities, such as server farms, to regions with low, stable electricity prices.419 420 421 422 Today, many businesses are more actively managing their energy costs by investing heavily in energy efficiency, energy management systems, solar PV installations, and direct PPAs with VRE providers.423 Industrial electricity prices are typically close to wholesale prices because providing electricity to high-voltage, high-use industrial customers is less expensive and more efficient than serving distribution-level customers.424 Thus, low wholesale electricity prices can allow businesses and industrial customers to thrive, support job growth, and drive economic development.425 6.1 Affordability of Generation Portfolios The affordability of a given generation portfolio is largely shaped by region- and state- specific market structures. Merchant investment decisions (where applicable) and regional resource availability (for example, NGCC has a lower levelized cost of electricity (LCOE, the per-MWh cost of building and operating assets over their lifetime) in the Gulf States where gas is abundant than it has in the North bbbb However, this is complicated by the fact that electricity usage varies significantly from region to region, so the electricity burden would be much higher in regions that use electricity for heating and cooling, as is common in the West and South. In addition to electricity, energy burden includes direct fuel use, such as natural gas or propane for cooking and heating, and can vary based on a household’s activities, appliances, and location. 119 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC000836 Central states) contribute to regional variation in charges to end-users. 426 The Energy Information Administration estimated in the Annual Energy Outlook for 2017 that the BPS (generation and transmission) comprises roughly two-thirds of the total average price of electricity. Generation costs accounted for 57 percent of the average price of electricity in 2016, compared to distribution’s 32 percent and transmission’s 11 percent.427 In vertically integrated areas, state PUCs seek to avoid uneconomic outcomes and ensure affordable service to customers428 by requiring VIEUs to submit IRPs in which they consider least-cost, long-term plans for providing service including, among other things, LCOE.429 The IRP must also account for any additional state-mandated requirements such as energy efficiency resource standards or RPS.430 Notably, VIEU assets are usually guaranteed the recovery of investment and operational costs regardless of whether they would prove to be cost-competitive in a short-run marginal cost market environment.431 432 By contrast, in some of the centrally-organized markets (e.g., most of the states in PJM, ERCOT, all but two in ISO-NE, NYISO, and Illinois for MISO), the generation portfolio is determined by the wholesale market itself (subject to any generation and demand-side mandates) rather than a state-overseen IRP by the VIEU.cccc Merchant generators make investment decisions by comparing an asset’s expected lifetime costs with the expected revenues from any PPAs, financial incentives such as tax credits, and sales in wholesale energy and capacity markets. Lifetime costs considered by merchant generators include fixed investment costs and operational costs. 6.2 The Wholesale-Retail Disconnect Tracing the relationships between wholesale and retail prices is difficult because ratemaking practices vary widely from state to state, and there are many other contributing factors involved besides the wholesale cost of electricity.433 434 Retail rates include a variety of charges that are not included in the bulk electricity charges passed through by RTO/ISOs or VIEUs. These include components of the transmission costs not captured in the RTO prices (such as state-regulated transmission investments), payments that the distribution utility makes to merchant transmission suppliers, various fixed charges, customer service, state and local sales taxes and franchise fees, and public benefits charges.435 Retail electricity bills can also include additional costs to support state policy goals—such as RPS, energy efficiency resource standards, or programs to promote use of distributed energy resources, among others.436 Most utilities have undertaken substantial programs to modernize their distribution systems, and a significant subset have invested in infrastructure needed to integrate higher levels of distributed energy resources.437 Under established cost-of-service ratemaking principles, these costs are typically allocated to retail customers and periodically examined by regulators. The wholesale-retail electricity price disconnect means that, in most areas, the conventional generation retirements can affect wholesale rates but have little or no immediately visible impact on retail rates. cccc Many state, regional, and Federal policies can impact the expected profits for merchant generators, including environmental regulations; carbon trading programs; tax credits; and state procurements, mandates, or other mechanisms that take generation or demand-side resources out of markets available to merchants and/or subsidize those resources. 120 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000837 However, despite the difficulty in attributing retail price impacts to wholesale changes, considering the trends in both wholesale and retail prices can provide greater understanding of affordability. On average, national retail electricity rates have been roughly flat for more than a decade, and rates have closely followed the historical average since 1960.dddd 438 Retail rates in nominal dollars have been increasing at a low annual rate for approximately two decades, while the real retail price has stayed relatively constant over the last decade, as shown in Figure 6.1. From 2011 to 2016, nominal residential prices increased at an average of 1.9 percent annually, about the same rate as overall inflation.439 In 2016, the national average retail electricity price declined for the first time since 2002, with residential customers paying a national average of 12.55 cents/kWh. Figure 6.1. Average U.S. Residential Sector Retail Electricity Prices over Time440 dddd The use of national averages for this analysis provides a broad picture, but limits insight into regional and state-level impacts of BPS changes that may lead to higher-than-average retail rate increases among some customers and utilities. National averages mean little to subsets of ratepayers seeing significant retail rate increases or those who have faced consistently high bills. Even use of state-level retail averages can mask exceptions that greatly vary from the average. For example, California residents who live near the coast enjoy a temperate climate with limited need for cooling or heating. In contrast, those living inland see very hot summers that require high use of air conditioning and thus see high electric bills. A more thorough analysis would consider affordability and rate increases at a more granular level. 121 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC000838 Average retail prices vary widely across states and regions, with New England, California and the MidAtlantic paying the highest rates.441 However, a comparison of electricity rates alone can be misleading; for instance, California’s average residential electricity rate is over 18 cents/kWh (one of the highest in the Nation), but due to low average residential consumption, the average California electricity bill is only $95/month, ranking it in the bottom third of the Nation. By comparison, Washington state has the lowest average retail rates in the Nation at less than nine cents/kWh (less than half the average rate in California), but because of higher consumption, residential customers in that state see average bills of $95/month, the same average electricity bill as in California.442 443 It is not yet clear what impact recent coal, nuclear, and natural gas plant retirements will have on customer bills in the future, nor how the continuing trend of retirements will affect the overall cost of the BPS, which will ultimately be borne by ratepayers. Natural gas generation has proven to be a strong competitor with coal and nuclear power because natural gas prices have fallen over the past decade. Wind and solar generation have also increased, and while their capital costs are much higher than those of natural gas (particularly if normalized by capacity factor), their marginal cost is nearly zero.444 Changes in the BPS since 2002—lower demand, lower natural gas prices, and growth in VRE—have reduced wholesale electricity prices, as shown in Figure 6.2.445 Figure 6.2. Average Wholesale Electric Costs/MWh Have Fallen between 2002 and 2016446 From 2002–2016, wholesale electricity prices have increasingly tracked natural gas prices, and as natural gas generation has increased over time, the differences in price between regions have also decreased (e.g., prices in NYISO and PJM are much closer in 2016 than in 2004). Figure 6.3 illustrates wholesale prices at electricity trading hubs, emphasizing 2016 prices on a regional basis as derived by FERC staff.eeee FERC notes in its 2016 State of the Markets report that prices were down in 2016 from 2015, and that prices in PJM were the lowest they have been since the RTO formed in 1999.447 eeee Derived by FERC staff from S&P Global Intelligence data. Prices are a simple average of day-ahead, on-peak physical prices. 122 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000839 Figure 6.3. Day-Ahead, On-Peak Wholesale Electric Prices Reach Near-Record Lows in 2016448 FERC’s most recent State of the Markets report shows that all areas of the United States are experiencing low wholesale electricity prices. In 2016, prices were highest in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest and were lowest in the Northwest. Historically, wholesale prices would show much more regional variation. The dollar values are average 2016 day-ahead on peak prices; the percentages indicate the change from 2015 to 2016. While wholesale electricity prices have tracked natural gas price trends, the impacts of other generation trends on affordability are less obvious.449 Because coal, hydro, and nuclear plants have historically had relatively stable and predictable fuel costs, these power plants have provided a valuable hedge against the price volatility of natural gas and oil. Today, nuclear, hydro, and VRE all serve as hedges against generation whose fuel cost is more volatile and represents a larger portion of the total delivered price (i.e. natural gas and oil). For example, the variable operating, maintenance, and fuel costs of hydroelectric and nuclear average just $5/MWh and $12/MWh, respectively, compared to $41/MWh for NGCC and $34/MWh for coal.450 Increasingly, VRE also performs a price stabilizing role—wind, solar PV, hydropower, and geothermal generation offer near zero-marginal-cost electricity. To the degree that VRE and nuclear can stabilize the short run cost of bulk power, those resources could also improve the month-to-month manageability of customer bills. Among the nine regions examined in this study, the CAISO+, Midwest, ERCOT, and Central regions have the most non-hydro VRE generation today. RPS compliance costs were found to total $2.6 billion in 123 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC000840 2014, averaging $12/MWh for VRE and equating to 1.3 percent of average retail electricity bills.ffff 451 The actual effects of zero-marginal cost electricity on consumers’ bills is situational, and growth in VRE can drive additional costs, including transmission and integration costs.452 453 Because many utility-scale VRE plants are built in locations distant from load centers, they sometimes require major transmission additions to connect the remote generation to the rest of the grid and to load centers. Over the past five years, a portion of the 24,000 miles of new transmission built (about twice the number of miles added from 2006–2010) and $102 billion invested to strengthen the grid and interconnect new generation has been made to interconnect VRE.454 455 Transmission investments (regulated or merchant) can increase bulk power costs and therefore increase customers’ retail bills to the extent that they are not offset by savings attributable to access to lower-cost generation or reduced congestion costs. Higher levels of VRE penetration also require system integration services, such as additional ERS. It is unclear how the costs of these integration requirements will affect wholesale electricity costs as VRE penetrations continue to increase. In addition, as the PTC for wind generation expires and the ITC for residential solar PV installations reduces in the coming years, their costs relative to other resources will rise. However, declining wind and solar capital costs and higher productivity will likely somewhat offset these losses, albeit to an unknown degree.456 457 458 459 Finally, several states have created subsidies to favor or retain nuclear generation. If such subsidies are being funded by taxpayer dollars – like the PTC and ITC – rather than a charge to electricity customers, this will affect wholesale costs in some way, but will probably have little discernable effect on the customers’ retail electricity bills. However, if subsidies for power plant retention are funded as a direct charge to retail electricity customers, electricity bills could rise and affordability could decrease. Overall, ISOs and RTOs face many challenges that ultimately affect the allocation of transmission and integration costs when they make decisions on how to spread those costs among cost-causers, reliability and other service providers, and consumers, as well as decisions on how to keep cost allocation practices up to date as the generation mix, transmission capacity, and load evolves over time.460 461 462 463 6.3 Affordability Looking Forward There appears to be little near-term risk that natural gas prices will rise significantly and thereby reduce electricity affordability. However, natural gas is an extractive commodity traded internationally—prices are affected by policies impacting how the resource is produced, and prices show periodic regional, seasonal, or local price spikes, and even sustained price increases. It is reasonable to expect continuing regional differentials between natural gas delivered costs, reflecting differences in proximity to natural gas production fields, production costs, and deliverability (including the effects of pipeline or liquefied natural gas deliverability constraints). If natural gas prices rise, wholesale electricity costs are likely to rise in regions where natural gas remains the marginal fuel in a significant number of hours. This would be true for both RTO/ISO and non-RTO/ISO regions. It is unclear how rising natural gas prices and ffff Studies on RPS compliance costs do not fully capture the “all-in” costs that the ratepayer (and taxpayers) ultimately bear. These other costs are harder to measure, but may not be insignificant. They may be harder to quantify for many reasons, such as having multiple drivers behind those investments and various distribution-level grid modernization investments (e.g., smart meters and others that are touted to aid VRE integration). New transmission (other than the direct transmission interconnection charged to the renewable generation project and thus reflected in their PPA), as well as effects of VRE variability on the dispatchable fleet, are other examples of costs often not included in grid integration cost studies. Costs of various tax and other subsidies are also not counted. 124 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000841 additional VRE generation would affect the large-scale displacement of coal and nuclear generation, and ultimately, electricity affordability for affected consumers. The variety of generation portfolios operating throughout the U.S. lends itself to further study. To date, limited work has focused on the affordability of the BPS as a system or portfolio—relatively more attention has focused on retail electricity prices464 or the stand-alone cost of generation technologies (such as LCOE). Some research has focused on analysis of system-wide LCOE,465 but more can be done. Looking forward, another potential challenge to affordability is determining how the proliferation of distributed PV across much of the Nation is changing the cost structure for non-participating customers. A growing body of research considers whether and how distributed PV users continue to benefit from their grid connection for balancing services and energy storage, as well as how to reallocate utility energy, capital, and system costs and rates fairly among all users. Concerns about more customers installing distributed PV under net metering tariffs,gggg which potentially shifts costs and increases the burden on non-distributed PV customers, have caused multiple states to re-open their net metering tariff processes and, in some cases, implement new policies. However, some studies have quantified the retail rate impacts of net metering to all residential customers (i.e., participants and non-participants) and found that current and projected levels of net metering have very little impact, especially compared to broader drivers of retail rate increases in the electric industry.466 gggg According to the EIA, “net metering tariffs enable customers to use the electricity they generate in excess of their consumption at certain times to offset their use of electricity from the grid at other times. These tariffs are designed to encourage distributed renewable generation. These arrangements describe how an electric utility customer who installs a qualifying generator (typically a rooftop solar array, less often a small wind turbine, or a small combined heat-and-power system) will be compensated by their utility for the electricity they generate in excess of their consumption.” https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=6190 125 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC000842 7 Policy Recommendations The April 14 memo asked staff to “not only analyze problems but also provide concrete policy recommendations and solutions.” To that end, DOE staff prepared a list of recommendations below. Some actions fit squarely within DOE’s authority, while others might fall to other government agencies or private organizations. Wholesale markets: FERC should expedite its efforts with states, RTO/ISOs, and other stakeholders to improve energy price formation in centrally-organized wholesale electricity markets. After several years of fact finding and technical conferences, the record now supports energy price formation reform, such as the proposals laid out by PJM467 and others.468 Further, negative offers should be mitigated to the broadest extent possible. Valuation of Essential Reliability Services (ERS): Where feasible and within its statutory authority, FERC should study and make recommendations regarding efforts to require valuation of new and existing ERS by creating fuel-neutral markets and/or regulatory mechanisms that compensate grid participants for services that are necessary to support reliable grid operations. Pricing mechanisms or regulations should be fuel and technology neutral and centered on the reliability services provided. DOE should provide technical and policy support that strengthen and accelerate these efforts. Bulk Power System (BPS) resilience: DOE should support utility, grid operator, and consumer efforts to enhance system resilience. Transmission planning entities should conduct periodic disasterpreparedness exercises involving electric utilities, regional offices of Federal agencies, and state agencies. NERC should consider adding resilience components to its mission statement and develop a program to work with its member utilities to broaden their use of emerging ways to better incorporate resilience. RTOs and ISOs should further define criteria for resilience, identify how to include resilience in business practices, and examine resilience-related impacts of their resource mix. Promote Research and Development (R&D) of next-generation/21st century grid reliability and resilience tools: DOE should focus R&D efforts to enhance utility, grid operator, and consumer efforts to enhance system reliability and resilience. DOE R&D opportunities include the following activities:  Develop grid technical tools to facilitate new-generation technologies’ operations to support BPS reliability (e.g., by enabling technologies to provide ERS), and maximize use of the DOE national laboratories.  Expand cooperation on grid reliability across North America, including working with NERC to further enhance the reliability of our shared BPS through technical engagement with Mexico and Canada.  With the National Science Foundation, sponsor the development of new open-source software for the next-generation electric grid research community.  Focus R&D on improving VRE integration through grid modernization technologies that can increase grid operational flexibility and reliability through a variety of innovations in sensors and controls, storage technology, grid integration, and advanced power electronics. The Grid Modernization Initiative should also consider additional applications of high-performance computing for grid modeling to advance grid resilience. Support Federal and regional approaches to electricity workforce development and transition assistance: In partnership with other agencies and the private sector, DOE should facilitate programs 126 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000843 and regional approaches for electricity sector workforce development. Unemployed workers nearing but not yet eligible for retirement may have difficulty retraining after careers built on specialized skills that may be in declining demand. Where possible, Federal agencies should leverage existing government, nongovernment, labor, and industry workforce consortia. Energy dominance: Executive Order 13783 (Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth) outlined an approach to promote the clean and safe development of energy resources while at the same time minimizing regulatory barriers to energy production, economic growth, and job creation. The Order called for a rescission of certain energy and climate related policies, rescinded specific reports, and ordered the review of key environmental regulations. While DOE is not the main agency tasked in the Order, it should continue to prioritize energy dominance and implementing the Executive Order broadly and quickly. Infrastructure development: DOE and related Federal agencies should accelerate and reduce costs for the licensing, relicensing, and permitting of grid infrastructure such as nuclear, hydro, coal, advanced generation technologies, and transmission. DOE should review regulatory burdens for siting and permitting for generation and gas and electricity transmission infrastructure and should take actions to accelerate the process and reduce costs. Specific reforms could include the following:  Hydropower: Encourage FERC to revisit the current licensing and relicensing process and minimize regulatory burden, particularly for small projects and pumped storage.  Nuclear Power: Encourage the NRC to ensure the safety of existing and new nuclear facilities without unnecessarily adding to the operating costs and economic uncertainty of nuclear energy. Revisit nuclear safety rules under a risk-based approach.  Coal Generation: Encourage EPA to allow coal-fired power plants to improve efficiency and reliability without triggering new regulatory approvals and associated costs. In a regulatory environment that would allow for improvement of the existing fleet, DOE should pursue a targeted R&D portfolio aiming at increasing efficiency. Electric-gas coordination: Utilities, states, FERC, and DOE should support increased coordination between the electric and natural gas industries to address potential reliability and resilience concerns associated with organizational and infrastructure differences. DOE and FERC should support wellfunctioning commodity markets for natural gas by expeditiously processing liquefied natural gas export and cross-border natural gas pipeline applications. 127 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Study U.S. Department of Energy ACC000844 8 Areas for Further Research DOE staff identified several research topics that are relevant to the April 14 memo and merit further indepth analysis. Some topics may be appropriate for offices within the Department, national laboratories, academia, other government agencies, or private organizations. Market structure and pricing  Study mechanisms for enabling equitable, value-based remuneration for desired grid attributes—such as ERS, fuel availability, high resilience, low emissions, flexibility, etc.—with alternative market and non-market structures. This research could assess potentially underrecognized contributions from baseload power plants, using fuel-neutral metrics and values relevant to analyze all resource options.  Evaluate ongoing capacity market reforms. Several of the Nation’s electricity markets use mandatory capacity markets to procure capacity for future years and ensure resource adequacy. The design of these constructs has been the subject of near-constant debate within the RTO/ISOs and before FERC. After undergoing substantial changes from 2014–2015, capacity markets have come under new scrutiny in light of recent actions by restructured states to preserve or promote certain resources or resource types and to further state policy goals.  Explore market operations in a higher VRE/low marginal cost system, and examine recent changes in energy price trends—including the drivers of wholesale electricity prices in the context of limited load growth—quantifying the relative contributions of fossil fuel prices. With significant amounts of near-zero marginal cost generation available, security-constrained economic dispatch of BPS based on marginal costs may not sufficiently compensate resources for all fixed and variable costs. Academic and other research should be expanded in this area, to include capacity market reforms and the role of capacity markets in a higher VRE/low marginal cost system. Reliability and resilience  Develop policy metrics and tools for evaluating BPS-wide provision of resilience and considering all aspects of the electricity system that contribute to resilience, including regional generation characteristics, imports and exports, fuel supply and storage, transmission capability, DR, electricity storage, inertia, and other factors that determine the ability of grid operators to provide reliable electricity supplies.  As PJM notes, “criteria for resilience are not explicitly defined or quantified today.”469 Each RTO/ISO should strive to explicitly define resilience on its system and conduct resource diversity assessments to more fully understand the resilience of different resource portfolios. Federal, state, and local work to define and support system-wide resilience is also needed.  EIA and NERC should examine ways to improve power generator fuel delivery data collection; additional data on fuel deliveries and potential disruptions would further improve forecasting necessary for electric reliability planning. 128 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000845 Cost and affordability  Estimate the bulk power system-wide costs of different generation mixes, also considering the sensitivity of system costs to various fuel price fluctuations. Further, examine the relationship between wholesale and retail electricity rates to understand the present disconnect.  On a regular basis, update the EIA analysis of subsidies and support for electricity production (most recently updated using FY 2013 data).470 Regulatory   Explore the potential for utilizing existing Federal authorities under the Federal Power Act and the DOE Organization Act, among others, to ensure system reliability and resilience. Explore costs and benefits of states applying cost-of-service regulation to specific at-risk plants that contribute to grid resilience. In centrally-organized wholesale markets, these resources may sometimes be unable to recoup all costs of generating electricity—especially capital investments that are needed to ensure long-term viability. 129 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000846 Appendix A: National and Regional Profiles 130 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000847 U.S. National Profile ., Retirements, 2002-2017 ?A?.s A . . 0 Mimi2.000 32.5? AW OVIEU 30 2002-2016 Retirements Energy Sources Notes: 25 (GW) Capacity values are summer capacity. Coal 20 Data for utility-scale resources only 15 Natural Gas (CC) MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas Natural Gas (CT) technologies: CC combined cycle, CT 10 Natural Gas (ST) combustion turbine, ST steam turbine. 5 Nuclear Ownership type: VIEU vertically Hydro integrated electric utility. Map includes Wind 2017 Q1 actual and 02-4 announced 80% 0? retirements. Prices: Natural gas Henry Solar Hub, Coal Central App., Electricity PJM Western Hub. ?Total Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacity (retired capacity 2016 operational capacity) 40% 20% $25 5250 Prices I 20095) rea $20 $200 coal/gas electricity 2002 2016 $15 $150 Btu Capacity (MW) 884,930 1 056.710 Generation 3,860,853 4,085,765 $10 $100 . 35 55? by Energy . rce,2002-2016 of Generators MW 80% Coal 531 59,392 60% Natural Gas 965 50,593 409? Nuclear 6 466? on 1,033 14,980 20% Hydro 140 283 Other (all other sources) 471 2147 80% Total Cap. Reduction? 11.1% 132,062 60% 40% NERO Reserve Margn,2 I 9, Target Actual 2? Total NERC Area 23 53% 0% 7 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000848 U.S. National Profile 2002 C3 [>8th 0% ix "391 Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Generation 0% 00/ 0 Wind - 2% No . MIX 0% 1%2% Oll Solar Other Data Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal - Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other 2002 2009 2016 2002 2039 2016 Capacity 8. Generation by En 2 Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 EnergySource GW GW thous.GWh thous. own Coal 315.4 36% 270.1 26% 1,933.1 50% 1,240.1 30% NaturalGas 312.5 35% 447.0 42% 685.4 18% 1,380.3 34% Combined Cycle (CC) 106.1 12% 239.5 23% 387.7 10% 1,152.0 28% Combustion Turbine (CT) 103.4 12% 131.0 12% 98.8 3% 129.6 3% Steam Turbine (ST) 103.0 12% 76.4 7% 198.9 5% 98.6 2% Nuclear 98.7 11% 99.3 9% 780.1 20% 805.3 20% Hydro 79.4 9% 80.0 8% 264.3 7% 265.8 7% ??nd 4.4 0% 81.3 8% 10.4 0% 226.9 6% on 59.7 7% 36.4 3% 94.5 2% 23.9 1% Solar 0.4 0% 21.5 2% 0.6 0% 36.8 1% Other 14.6 2% 21.2 2% 92.5 2% 106.7 3% Total 884.9 100% 1,056.7 100% 3,860.9 100% 4,085.8 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000849 New England Regional Profile Energy Sources C0 Na Na ?Na Nudear Notes: Capacityvalues are summer capacity. Data for utility-scale resources only MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas technologies: CC combined cycle, dro CT combustion turbine, nd ST steam turbine. Ownership type:V EU vertically integrated electric utility. Map Retirements, 2002?2017 al tural Gas (CC) tu ral Gas (CT) tural Gas (ST) 2002 28,338 124,613 7 Capacity (MW) - 1 Ti 500 1.000 1.500 )2000 if )2.500 Ownership A Merchant 0 vreu 2016 32,303 108,802 7 (8)113; includes 2017 01 actual and 02-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas =A gon. Gates, Coal Central App., Electricity ISO-NE Mass Hub. ?Total Capacity Reduction A calculation: retired capacitv/ (retired capacity+ 2016 operational capacity) 4 2m2-2016 Retirements . A 3 (6W) 2 I: 1 5. AA 100% A 80% 60% 40% 20% $25 $250 . Prices (real 20095) $20 32m coal/gas electric?ty $15 $190 Capacity (MW) Generation (GWl'l) $10 51m 555?? Retirements by Energy 100% 80% Coal 60% Natural Gas Nuclear 40% - 20?/ 0' Hydro 100% Other (all other sources) 80% Total Cap. Reduction' urce,2002-2016 of Generators 7 14 1 74 50 45 11.5% 784 837 61 2 1 ,808 27 140 4,209 60% 40% - Reserve Margin, 20% Target Actual 0?7 England 16.74% 20.32% 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US Department of Energy ACC000850 New England Regional Profile 2002 Capacity ix 0% Generation ix 16 14 12 10 thosoo 2002 2016 Capacity Generation by En rgy Source, 2002 8. 2016 5 a new 5 II I Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal - Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Energy Source Coal NaturalGas Combined Cycle (CC) Combustion Turbine (CT) Steam Turbine (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Total 2002 0.0 1.5 28.3 Capaclty 10100% 2016 GW 2.0 130.5 1.7 32100% 2002 thous. 6% 18.8 44.8 35.6 5.4 33.9 6.2 0.0 11 1 0.0 9.8 124.6 Generation 2016 thous. 15% 2.6 2% 36% 5427% 32100% 108.8 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy New York Regional Profile Energy Sources Coal Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Notes: Capacityvalues are summer capacity Data for utility- scale resources only MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas technologies. CC: combined cycle, CT: combustion turbine Currertmers?o Retied $09 Wind ST: steam turbine. Ownership 0? type:V EU vertically Solar integrated electric Map 2w_2017 0th includes 2017 0.1 actual and 0.2-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas =Transco 26 NY, Coal Central App, Electricity NYISO NYC Zone J. "Total 96 Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacity/ (retired capacity+ 2016 A operational capacity) 0 4 2&22-2016 A A Retirements 3 (GW1.000 1.500 A 2.000 80% 2.500 0mm @0 60% A Herd-ant OVIEU 40% 20% $25 $250 Total Capacity& Generat - Prices (real 2009$) $20 $2a) coal/gas electric'ty 2002 2016 $15 $150 Capacity(MW) 35,642 39,975 Generation 145,126 140,728 $10 51(1) 35 $50 Retirements by Energy . urce, 2002-2016 100% of Generators IIW 80% Coal 26 2,129 60% Natural Gas 37 1 ,202 40% Nuclear 0 0 200/ Ol 17 1,139 Hydro 13 15 100% WW Other (all other sources?my Total% Cap. ReductIon? 10.2% 4,529 GWA A . 40% - NERO Reserve Margn, 2 20% Target Actual 0% . York 15.00% 23.35% . ZWZ 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy Capacity Mix 0%1% 0%1% New York Regional Profile 2W2 2009 2016 Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Generation Wind Mix Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Veloc1ty Suite. NorthAmerican Electric Reliability Corporation(NERC) 25 7o C03. 60 Natural Gas (all) 20 I Natural Gas (CC) 50 Natural Gas (CT) 15 4O Natural Gas (ST) X- Nuclear 10 30 Hydro 20 Wind 5 Oil 10 Solar Other 2002 2009 2016 2002 2009 2016 Capacity Generation by En - rgy Source,2002& 2016 Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 Energy Source 6w cw thous.GWh thous.GWh Coal Natural Gas 14.1 40% 22.1 55% 43.0 30% 62.8 45% Combined Cyde (CC) 4.8 13% 9.0 23% 22.3 15% 43.9 31% Conbustion Turbine (CTSteam Turbine (ST) 6.5 18% 9.5 24% 18.3 13% 12.7 9% Nuclear 5.0 14% 5.4 14% 39.6 27% 41.6 30% Hydro 4.1 12% 4.7 12% 25.0 17% 26.6 19% Wind 0Solar 0Other 0Total 35.6 100% 40.0 100% 145.1 100% 140.7 100% U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability ACC000853 Mid-Atlantic Regional Profile Retirements, 2002?2017 Ownersh?p A K) A A Merchant A VIEU 0 Capacity (MW) . 1 I: 500 1,000 If Merchant :1 23m Ib'yo T. 2 2,500 10 Retirements Energy Sources Notes: 8 (GW) I Capacny values are summer capacity. Data 03 for utility-scale resources on y(1+ MW 6 Natural Gas (CC) nameplate capaCIty). Natural gas 4 Natural technologies: CC combined cycle, CT Natural Gas (ST) combustion turbine, ST steam turbine. 2 Nuclear Ownership type: VIEU =vertica ly Hydro integrated electric utility. Map includes 100% Wind 2017 01 actual and 02-4 announced Oil retirements. Prices: Natural gas 80% M3, Coal Central App., Electricity= PJM Solar 60% Other estern . . . *Total Capacny Reduction calculation: 40% retired capacity/ (retired capacity 2016 operational capacity) 20% $25 $250 Total Capacity&Gonera (real 20095] $20 52m coal/gas electric?ty 2002 2016 $155150 Capacity (MW) 180,697 186,759 Generation 833,011 810,922 $10 $10) 7 7 $5 $50 Retirements by Energy . urce, 2002-2016 100% of Generators MW 8096 Coal 163 21,791 60% Natural Gas 152 6,315 40% Nuclear 0 200/ Oil 173 5.326 0 Hydro 3 2 100% Other (all other sources) 95 224 80% Total Cap. Reduction? 15.3% 33,057 60% 40% NERO Reserve Margn,2 20% Target Actual PJM 16.50% 31.11ZWB 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC000854 Mid-Atlantic Regional Profile 2002 2009 Capacity Mix Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Natural Nuclear Hydro Generation 0% 0% Wind Mix 1% 1%1% Oil Solar Other Data Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric ReliabilityCorporation (NERC) 100 Capaaty(GW) 600 Coal - Natural Gas(all) 80 - 500 5 Natural . 400 Natural 60 - Natural Gas (81) I n" 300 - Nuclear 4o ?Hydro 200 ?Wind 20 l' 100 solar ?0ther Capacity 8. Generation by En :rgy Source, 20028 2016 Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 Energy Source GW GW thous.GWh thous.GWh Coal 85.9 48% 63.1 34% 508.5 61% 271.6 33% Natural Gas 41.9 23% 57.2 36% 38.7 5% 212.9 26% Combined Cycle (CC) 12.8 7% 33.6 18% 23.3 3% 181.1 22% Combusion Turbine (CD 23.3 13% 25.4 14% 10.1 1% 19.4 2% Steam Turbine (STNuclear 32.6 18% 33.8 18% 255.9 31% 278.8 34% Hydro 218.9 2% Oil 14.8 8% 7.2 4% 11.7 1% 2.7 0% Solar 0Other 2.6 1% 3.1 2% 11.3 1% 14.7 2% Total 180.7 100% 186.8 100% 833.0 100% 810.9 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000855 Southeast Regional Profile Retirements, 2002-2017 0 Energy Sources Coal . 0 Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) A Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear 9? . 0 '0 o?0? Hydro - A A OD Wind Oil 0 Solar Other ?0 2002-2016 Retirements (GWI I 10 8 6 4 2 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 25 $250 Prices (real 20095] $205211) coal/gas electric?ty 3mm 3 15 $15) 5 10 SIG) $5 $50 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% Capacity (ny) 500 1.000 1.500 :2000 . 2.500 Ownership A Merchant VIEU Notes: Capacrty values are summer capacrty. Data for utility-scale resources only MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas technologies: CC combined cycle, CT combustion turbine, ST: steam turbine. Ownership type: VIEU =vertica ly integrated electric utility. Map includes 2017 01 actual and 024 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas =Transco Z4, Coal Central App., Electricity Into Southern. ?Total Capacrty Reduction calculation: retired capacity/ (retired capacity 2016 operational capacity) 2002 2016 Capacity (MW) 181,535 209,753 Generation 824,381 886.610 Retirements by Energy . urce, 2002-2016 of Generators MW Coal 120 16.588 Natural Gas 126 5,140 Nuclear 1 860 Oil 100 4,371 Hydro 5 3 Other (all other sources) 22 206 Total Cap. Reduction 1 1.5% 27,1 09 NERC Reserve Ilargn,2i Target Actud SERCIFRCC 15.00% 2002-31.912002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000856 Southeast Regional Profile 2002 2009 Capacity Mix Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind 3%o%3% Oil Solar Other I Data Sources: II U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 120 500 Coal Natural Gas all 100 400 . Natural Gas (C8) 80 .00- 60 3? Nuclear 200 Hydro 40 'f 4 Wind 20 100 0 ?ne-i; Capacity&Generation by Enrgy Source.2002&2016 Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 EnergySource GW GW thous.GWh thous.GWh Coal 70.5 39% 54.6 26% 420.1 51% 221.7 25% Natural Gas 550 30% 98.7 47% 101.6 12% 375.8 42% Combined Cycle (CC) 18.4 10% 59.6 28% 65.9 8% 334.0 38% Combustion Turbine (CT) 31.2 17% 33.8 16% 18.0 2% 26.2 3% Steam Turbine (ST) 5.4 3% 5.3 3% 17.8 2% 15.6 2% Nuclear 27.5 15% 28.9 14% 217.2 26% 231.9 26% Hydro 1 1.6 6% 1 1.7 6% 28.0 3% 26.9 3% Wind 0Oil 14.0 8% 7.9 4% 36.3 4% 3.6 0% Solar 0Other 3.0 2% 4.6 2% 21.2 3% 22.4 3% Total 181.5 100% 209.8 100% 824.4 100% 886.6 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Department 0? Energy ACC000857 Midwest Regional Profile Energy Sources NoteS: Retirements, 2002-2517" L. - - Coal Capacityvalue: are summerl ,0 0 capacity. Data or uti ity-sca . . Natural Gas (CC) resources only MW . A Natural Gas (CT) nameplate capacity). . Natural 6'35 (ST) Natural gas technologies: . Nuclear CC: combined cycle, 0 .. 0 1 Hydro CT combustion turbine, .. 68 32> Wind ST steam turbine. Ownership 0 . 0 . 0 9-.) 0? type2VIEU vertically a Solar integrated electric utility. Map . - o. 0 Other includes 2017 01 actual and . 0' . 0 A 3 02-4 announced retirements. . - Prices: Natural gas Chicago, 0 - . '5 Coal Powder River Basin, . . ?9 AA Electricity=M SO Illinois Hub. . 0 ?Total 96 Capacity Reduction . 8 0 calculation: retired capacity/ '0 (retired capacity+2016 ca 9 0? operational capacity) . 10 2002-2016 Retirements 8 (GW1001.000 60% 1,500 Ownership 40% 1 2,000 8 Merchant VIEU 2 0? A 2,500 $25 $250 Total Capacity& Genera Prices (real 2009s) $20 $2m coal/gas elech'ic'ty 2002 2016 $15 $150 SIMM Capacity (MW) 163,917 187,957 Generation 710,131 744,323 $10$1m $5550 Retirements by Energy . urce, 2002-2016 100% - of Generators MW 80% Coal 151 11,815 60% Natural Gas 178 7,277 40% Nuclear 1 566 20?/ Cl 323 1,412 Hydro 17 15 100% Other (all other sources) 56 213 80% Total Cap. Reduction? 10.2% 21,297 60% 40% NERC Reserve Margin, 2 20% Target Actual MISO 15.20% 18.092002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000858 Midwest Regional Profile 2002 Ca padty ix 0 0% 0% Generation . 0% 0% IX \1 19% 27% Generation (thousand Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 100 600 Coal - -- Natural Gas (all) 80 500 Natural Gas (CC) 400 Natural Gas (CT) 60 Natural Gas (ST) 300 Nuclear 4o Hydro 2m - WInd 20 ?orr 100 Solar . . . . Run-F-Fa? Other 2002 2009 2016 2002 2039 2016 CapacIty&Generatlon by Enrgy Source, 20028. 2016 Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 EnergySource GW ow thous.GWh thous.GWh Coal 47% Natural Gas 58.3 36% 73.1 39% 101.2 14% 204.0 27% Combined Cycle (CC) 16.7 10% 30.0 16% 43.0 6% 143.7 19% Combustion Turbine (CT) 20.5 12% 26.9 14% 1 1.3 2% 29.8 4% Steam Turbine (ST) 21.2 13% 16.1 9% 46.9 7% 30.5 4% Nuclear 12.8 8% 12.9 7% 104.3 15% 99.7 13% Hydro 2Wind 0.8 0% 16.3 9% 1.9 0% 49Solar 0Other 2.5 2% 4.3 2% 16.0 2% 20.2 3% Total 163.9 100% 188.0 100% 710.1 100% 744.3 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Central Regional Profile Energy Sources Coal Natural Gas (CC) Notes: Capacityvalues are summer capacity. Data for utility?scale resources only MW Retirements, 2002-2017 Capacity (MW) 1 Natural Gas (CT) nameplate capacity). 500 Natural Gas (5T) Natural gas technologies: 1'900 - Nuclear cc: combined cycle, Hydro CT combustion turbine, 2900 Wind ST steam turbine. Ownership 2?00 Oil type:VIEU vertically Ownership Solar integrated electric utility. Map A Merchant includes 2017 01 actualand Other announced retirements. 0 Prices: Natural gas Henry Cunertm . Hub, Coal Powder River Basin, Electricity=SPP South Hub. ?Total 96 Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacity/(retired capacity+ 2016 operational capacity) . 2002-2016 0 9" a Retirements . C30 3 16W) . 06; 1 100% 0 .. 80% 60% 40% 20% $25 $250 2009$) rea $20 $2m coal/gas elechic?ty 2002 2016 $15 $150 Capacity (MW) 55,948 80,672 Generation 237,790 264,354 10 51(1) Retirements by Energy urce,2002-2016 100% of Generators MW 80% Coal 22 1,749 60% Natural Gas 107 1 ,678 40% Nuclear Hydro 0 0 100% Other (all other sources) 7 44 80% Total Cap. Reduction? 4.9% 4,167 60% 40% NERO Reserve Margin, 2 I 20% Target Actual SPP 12.00% 27.16% 0% I I I I 2002 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000860 Central Regional Profile 2002 2009 0% 3% 1% Capacity ix 39% Generation 2016 2% 1% Generation (thousand Coal Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal - -- Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro 10 Wind on 5 Solar Other 2002 2009 2016 2002 2016 Capacity 8. Generation by En rgy Source, 20028. 2016 Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 Energy Source GW GW thous. thous. Coal 24.3 43% 24.8 31% 161.7 68% 121.9 46% Natural Gas 2.0 39% 31.4 39% 41.1 17% 61.7 23% Combined Cycle (CC) 4.9 9% 9.7 12% 15.8 7% 44.3 17% Combustion Turbine (CT) 5.3 9% 10.8 13% 4.3 2% 6.9 3% Steam Turbine (81) 11.8 21% 10.9 14% 21.1 9% 10.4 4% Nuclear 2.4 4% 1.9 2% 19.2 8% 17.6 7% Hydro 4.5 8% 4.5 6% 12.4 5% 13.2 5% ??nd 0.2 0% 15.5 19% 0.7 0% 47Solar 0Other 0Total 55.9 100% 80.7 100% 237.8 100% 264.4 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000861 ERCOT Regional Profile Retirements2002-2016 Retirements (GW) 100% 80% 60% 40% - 20% $25 $25) Prices (real 2009$) $2o$2m coal/gas electric'ty Coal Elec. $153150 - $105103 $5$50 - 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 1001000 1500 AM 2,500 A Mad-1 Merchant 85% A (t Merrhant 85% -, Energy Sources N?te$f Coal Capacrty values are summer capacrty. Data for utility-scale resources only(1+ MW nameplate capacity). Natural gas technologies: CC combined cycle, CT combustion turbine, ST =steam turbine. Ownership type: VIEU vertically Natural Gas (CC) Natural Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro integrated electric utility. Map includes Wind 2017 C11 actual and 02-4 announced Oil retirements. Prices: Natural gas Houston Solar Ship Channel, Coal Powder River Basin. Electricity ERCOT North Hub. Other ?Total Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacity /(retired capacity 2016 operational capacity) 2002 201 6 Capacity (MW) 80,762 101,310 Generation 312,059 382,003 Retirements by Energy . urce, 2002-2016 of Generators MW Coal 3 363 Natural Gas 155 14,894 Nuclear 0 0 Ol 10 17 Hydro 6 26 Other (all other sources) 23 234 Total Cap. Reduction? 13.3% 15,534 NERC Reserve Margin, 2 Target Actual ERCOT 13.75% 17.45ZWZ Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000862 ERCOT Regional Profile 2002 2009 2016 C8 98th Coal - Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Generation 1% 0% 0% Wind Mix 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% Oil Solar 0% Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL I I Energy, ABB Energy Velocrty 33% 43% Suite, North American Electric 53% 49% Reliability Corporation(NERC) 70 Capacity(GW) 250 Generation (thousand Coal 60 Natural Gas (all) 200 Natural 50 Natural 40 150 Natural Nuclear 30 100 MM, Hydro 20 Wind 50 Oil 10 Solar Other Capacity Generation 2002 2016 2002 2016 EnercySource GW ow thous.GWh thous.GWh Coal 25% NaturalGas 58.6 73% 56.9 56% 164.1 53% 186.2 49% Combined Cycle (CC) 23.3 29% 36.7 36% 101.6 33% 163.7 43% Combustion Turbine (CT) 5.2 6% 6.4 6% 17.7 6% 14.6 4% Steam Turbine (ST) 30.1 37% 13.8 14% 44.7 14% 7.9 2% Nuclear 4.7 6% 5.0 5% 35.6 11% 42.1 11% Hydro 0Wind 1.0 1% 18.8 19% 2.4 1% 52Solar 0Other 0Total 80.8 100% 101.3 100% 312.1 100% 382.0 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC000863 West Regional Profile Energy Sources Notes: Coal Capacityvalues are summer Natural Gas (CC) capacity. Data for utility-scale resources only MW Natural Gas (CT) nameplate capacity). Natural 635 (ST) Natural gas technologies: Nuclear CC combined cycle, Hydro CT combustion turbine, Wind steam turbine. Ownership 0" type:VIEU vertically Solar integrated electric utility. Map Other includes 2017 01 actual and 02-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas NW Sumas, Coal Powder River Basrn, Mid- Columbia. 'Total Capacity Reduction calculation: retired capacity (retired capacity+ 2016 operational capacity) 4 2032-2016 Retirements 3 (GW) 2 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% $25 $250 Prices (real 20095) $20 $200 coal/gas electricity $15 $150 $10 $1m 35 $50 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability Retirements, 2002-2017 . p. @g 0 Capacity (MW) 1 500 7 1.000 1 1.500 2.000 2.500 Ownership A Merchant VIEU 2002 2016 Capacity (MW) 99,795 138,238 Generation 452,765 7 524,861 Retirements by Energy . urce, 2002-2016 of Generators IIW Coal 29 2,292 Natural Gas 81 1 ,900 Nuclear 0 0 GI 70 141 Hydro 38 171 Other (all other sources) 48 180 Total Cap. Reduction? 3.3% 4,083 NERC Reserve Margn,2l Target Actual WECC 15.90% 26.80% US. Department of Energy ACC000864 West Regional Profile 2002 2009 Capacity Mix 1% 0% 0% Generation ix 0% 0% 0% 1% Capacity Generation by En Coal - Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal - -- Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Capacity 2002 Energy Source GW Coal 28.6 29% NaturalGas 21.1 21% Combined Cycle (CC) 109 11% Combustion Turbine (CT) 6.7 7% Steam Turbine (ST) 3.5 3% Nuclear 4.8 5% Hydro Solar 0.0 0% Other 0.8 1% Total 99.8 100% 201 6 GW 29.3 41.8 28.6 10.7 2.5 5.1 42 6 13.6 0.4 3.8 1.6 1382 21100% 2002 thous. 199.9 58.4 44.9 5.2 8.3 39.9 148 1 1.4 0.8 0.0 4.3 452.8 Generation 2016 thous. 44% 161.3 31% 13% 121.8 23% 10% 1104236100% 524.9 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Regional Profile Energy Sources Notesr Retirements, 2002-2017 Coal Capacityvalues are summer capacity. Data for utility-scale 1 Nat? ra: Gas (CC) resources only MW Natura Gas (CT) nameplate capacity). 0 Natural 635 (ST) Natural gas technologies: 1 Nuclear CC combined cycle, Hydro CT combustionturbine, Wind ST steam turbine. Ownership Oil type:V EU vertically Solar integrated electric utility. Map 0th includes 2017 0.1 actual and 6 02-4 announced retirements. Prices: Natural gas SoCal Border, Electricity CAISO 51315. *Total Capacity Reduction calculation: retired 0 capacity (retired capacity+ A 2016 operational capacity) T523111: VIEU A A 2&32-2016 Capaciy (MW) A i Retirements - 1 . a 3 (GW) 1 500 A 1.000 2 1,500 2,000 1 12,500 0 100% (2mm Retied 0mm 0 80% 60% Merchan 659/. 40% 20% $25 $250 Total Capacity& Generat' Prices (real 2009$l $20 $200 gas electric?ty 2002 2016 $15 $150 Capacity(MW) 54,022 74,431 Generation 203,028 208,137 $10 51(1) $5 $50 . Retirements by Energy urce, 2002-2016 100% of Generators IIW 80% Coal 7 1,855 60% Natural Gas 1 1 1 1 1,272 40% Nuclear 2 2,150 200/ Ol 12 315 Hydro 7 26 100% Other (all other sources) 146 832 80% Total Cap. Reduction? 18.1% 16,450 60% 40% NERO Reserve Marg?n, 2 20% Target Actual CAISO 19.50% 24.40% 0% 2032 2009 2016 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000866 Regional Profile 2002 Capacity Mix Generation Mix 2002 2009 2016 Coal - Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Data Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), SNL Energy, ABB Energy Velocity Suite, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Coal - -- Natural Gas (all) Natural Gas (CC) Natural Gas (CT) Natural Gas (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Capacity Generation by En - Energy Source Coal NaturalGas Combined Cycle (CC) Combustion Turbine (CT) Steam Turbine (ST) Nuclear Hydro Wind Oil Solar Other Total 2002 GW 3.6 31.6 7.2 6.2 18.3 4.3 8 3 1.7 0.8 0.4 3.3 54.0 2016 GW 1.9 40.9 19.9 11.4 9.6 2.2 8 0 6.0 0.4 11.2 3.7 74100% 2002 lhous. 26.0 89.2 33.6 22.7 32.9 34.4 26 1 3.8 2.0 0.6 21.0 203.0 Generation 2016 thous. 13% 8.7 4% 44% 98.8 47% 17% 78.3 38% 11% 16.4 8% 16% 4.0 2% 17% 1814.4 7% 1% 0.1 0% 0% 21.5 10% 10% 21 .2 10% 100% 208.1 100% Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy Appendix B: VRE Integration Studies Numerous technical studies on electricity systems in most regions of the Nation have concluded that significantly higher levels of VRE can be successfully integrated without compromising resource Demonstrating resource adequacy is essential, but achieving the modeled levels of VRE penetration requires a full consideration of ?all-in? costs, land use, siting, and other environmental impacts; sustainable economics for non-wind and solar resources; for some studies, required changes at the distribution level; wholesale market design and organizational changes; spending on relevant transmission and distribution grid modernization activities; and ensuring all aspects of operational These caveats are non-trivial, as they would be for any substantial major changes in the electric power system. Table B-1. VRE Integration Studies 47? Study Title United States 50% NREL 2012 Renewable Electricity Futures Study Western 33% NREL 2013 Western Wind and Solar Integration Study: Phase 2 Interconnection 33% GE Energy 2014 Western Wind and Solar Integration Study Phase 3 Frequency Response and Transient Stability 33% GE Energy 2015 Western Wind and Solar Integration Study Phase 3A: Low Levels of Generation 35% E3 and NREL 2015 Western Interconnection Flexibility Assessment 52% REL 2015 Renewable Electricity Futures: Operational Analysis of the Western Interconnection at Very High Renewable Penetrations CAISO 12% CAISO 2010 Integration of Renewable Resources at 20% RPS 50%? GE Energy 2011 California ISO Frequency Response Study 37% E3 2014 Investigating a Higher Renewables Portfolio Standard in California ?hm However, these studies (particularly those examining high VRE levels) may often assume (or ignore) modeled conditions that could be difficult and/or costly to achieve in practice, such as a large transmission buildout that may face siting or other obstacles, ability of non-wind and solar plants to remain financially viable and thus available, institutional changes, or, for one study, of all three interconnections. ii Operational reliability (which includes ensuring a set of ERS are maintained to help the electric system react to sudden stability disruptions or unanticipated losses of system components in real-time) is just as important as the resource adequacy aspect of BPS reliability. But modeling all needed aspects of operational reliability is very difficult computationally, and so not usually examined in its totality in these studies. For example, NREL in its Renewable Electricity Futures Study states, ?The study did not conduct a full reliability analysis, which would include sub-hourly, stability, and AC power ?ow analysis.? In fact, page of that study qualitatively concludes ?Additional challenges to power system planning and operation would arise in a high renewable electricity future, including management of low-demand periods.? 1 51 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000868 West ERCOT Eastern Interconnection Central Central and Southeast Southeast Mid-Atlantic Midwest New York New England 152 45% 35% 17% 30% 18%. 17% 9% 47%? 17% 47% 30% 25%? 30% 40% 40% 60%? 20% 7% 30% 21% 50% 37%? 12% 15% 24% NREL GE Energy LBNL, ANL, NREL Xcel Energy Navigant, Sandia, PNNL Idaho Power Portland General Electric PacifiCorp GE Energy Brattle EnerNex GE Energy NREL EnerNex et al. Charles River Associates SPP EPRI and LCG PNNL GE Energy Navigant GE Energy Northern States Power NYISO NYISO GE Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability 2016 2010 2013 2011 2011 2014 2014 2017 2008 2013 2011 2013 2016 2010 2010 2016 2011 2014 2014 2016 2014 2015 2010 2016 2010 Low?Carbon Grid Study Western Wind and Solar Integration Study: Phase 1 Integrating Solar PV in Utility System Operations Wind Induced Coal Plant Cycling Costs and the Implications of Wind Curtailment for Public Service of Colorado Large-Scale Solar Integration Study Solar Integration Study Report 2013 Integrated Resource Plan: Appendix PGE Wind Integration Study Phase 4 201 7 Integrated Resource Plan Analysis of Wind Generation Impact on ERCOT Ancillary Services Requirements Exploring Natural Gas and Renewables in ERCOT Part II: Future Generation Scenarios for Texas Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study Eastern Frequency Response Study Eastern Renewable Generation Integration Study Nebraska Statewide Wind Integration Study SPP WITF Wind Integration Study 2016 Wind Integration Study DOE: Integrating Midwest Wind Energy into Southeast Electricity Markets Duke Energy Photovoltaic Integration Study: Carolinas Service Areas PIM Renewable Integration Study Virginia Solar Pathways Project: Study 2 Solar PV Generation System Integration Impacts Minnesota Renewable Energy Integration and Transmission Study 2015 Resource Plan: Appendix Renewable Energy Growing Wind: Final Report of the YISO 2010 Wind Generation Study Solar Impact on Grid Operations-An Initial Assessment New England Wind Integration Study US. Department of Energy AC0000869 Hawaii 20% NREL and GE 2013 Hawaii Solar Integration Study Energy Notes: VRE penetration listed as percentage of annual energy MWH, not MW), except where marked indicates instantaneous penetration, indicates VRE nameplate as percentage of peak load); VRE includes only wind and solar. 153 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability US. Department of Energy ACC000870 Appendix C: Power Plant Cycling Traditional baseload power plants were designed to operate primarily at constant output levels with limited cycling.472 As the electricity system continues to evolve and market conditions change, these plants are increasingly following load or being required to more frequently adjust the load and the on/off dispatch of their units. The extra costs incurred to do so can affect a plant’s retirement decision. Every time a power plant is turned off and on, the boiler, steam lines, turbine, and auxiliary components go through unavoidably large thermal and pressure stresses, which cause damage.473 This damage is made worse for high-temperature components by the phenomenon called creep-fatigue interaction. While cycling-related increases in failure rates may not be noted immediately, critical components will eventually start to fail. Shorter component life expectancies will result in higher plant equivalent forced outage ratesjjjj and/or higher capital and maintenance costs to replace components at or near the end of their service lives.474 In addition, it may result in shortened overall plant life. How soon these detrimental effects will occur depends on the amount of creep damage present and the specific types and frequency of the cycling. Several VRE integration studies, including those performed by NREL and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council, have recognized that high penetration of VRE into the wholesale electricity markets could increase cycling of conventional power plants.475 Today, coal unit cycling does occur with current levels of wind and solar.kkkk 476 477 478 The retirement of many of the older, smaller coal-fired units that have provided cycling operation in the past will require more flexibility in the remaining coal fleet through improved technologies.479 General Electric has also studied the effects of cycling on power plant maintenance and operations and observes the following:  Wear-and-tear cycling costs can increase with the changing power portfolio or fuel prices.  These costs are generator-specific. They can impact financial viability of generators.  Incorporating cycling costs into commitment and dispatch decisions can change these decisions.  Solar and wind generation resources have different impacts on cycling.  Operational and/or physical changes to coal/gas plants can increase flexibility. Retrofits have the potential to increase overall profitability. 480 The cycling issues described above have similar impacts on gas-fired steam and older, combined-cycle generators. Some coal and NGCC units can (and have) made capital investments to improve their cycling performance to remain competitive.481 jjjj NERC defines equivalent forced outage rates as “the probability that a unit will not meet its demand periods for generating requirements because of forced outages or deratings.” http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/Pages/SummerVsWinterEFORdRates.aspx kkkk “Existing thermal generation plants are being forced to cycle more with the addition of intermittent wind generation and low variable cost base-load generation.” http://www.energy-tech.com/ram/article 65131bb2-42d0-11e6-8c80e729cc172758.html 154 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000871 Existing U.S. nuclear power plants were designed with a similar goal of operations at a set generation output, and—with few exceptions—they were not designed with flexible operation modes. Fuel is loaded in 18-month or 24-month cycles, thus keeping the marginal cost of operation low. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission prohibits nuclear power plant control systems from interfacing or being automatically controlled from grid network control systems,482 so what limited load following is allowed must be scheduled from one to three days in advance and is in small increments of power output.483 Nuclear units receive no benefit to load following or ramping, as they do not save on fuel costs. Like fossil plants, ramping a nuclear plant will also result in more wear and tear due to thermal gradients and mechanical stresses and will likely increase capital expenditures. Less restrictive, but still carefully controlled, nuclear load following is permitted and utilized in other countries, such as France, for which nuclear has a higher percentage of electricity output on the system. A review of the literature about coal plant cycling by Argonne National Laboratory484 reports that coal plant heat rates increase with plant age, while plant availability decreases. Cycling and load following exacerbate the effects of plant aging and reduce component life.485 These operational patterns impose higher costs (including maintenance and fuel costs), as well as lower capacity factors (Figure 8.1).llll Figure 8.1. Average Three-Year Capacity Factors for Retired U.S. Coal Plants486 Plants that have retired since 2010 tended to have lower average capacity factors. llll A lower capacity factor means fixed costs are spread over fewer operating hours (i.e. megawatt-hours), which in turn means higher unit costs ($/megawatt-hour). 155 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000872 Endnotes 1 “Frequently Asked Questions: How Many Power Plants Are There in the United States?,” Energy Information Administration, accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=65&t=2, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 2 Ellen Flynn Giles and Kathy L. Brown, eds., 2015 UDI Directory of Electric Power Producers and Distributors: 123rd Edition of the Electrical World Directory (New York, NY: Platts, 2014), vi–vii, https://www.platts.com/im.platts.content/downloads/udi/eppd/eppddir.pdf, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 3 Julia Pyper, “The US Solar Market Is Now 1 Million Installations Strong,” Greentech Media, April 21, 2016, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-U.S.-Solar-Market-Now-One-Million-Installations-Strong, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 4 “Electric Substations,” Platts, generated March 6, 2009, http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/ProductsServices/Products/gismetadata/substatn.pdf quoted Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 5 Ellen Flynn Giles and Kathy L. Brown, eds., 2015 UDI Directory of Electric Power Producers and Distributors: 123rd Edition of the Electrical World Directory (New York, NY: Platts, 2014), vi–vii, https://www.platts.com/im.platts.content/downloads/udi/eppd/eppddir.pdf, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 6 Ellen Flynn Giles and Kathy L. Brown, eds., 2015 UDI Directory of Electric Power Producers and Distributors: 123rd Edition of the Electrical World Directory (New York, NY: Platts, 2014), vi, https://www.platts.com/im.platts.content/downloads/udi/eppd/eppddir.pdf, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 7 “Electric Power Sales, Revenue, and Energy Efficiency Form EIA-861 Detailed Data Files,” Energy Information Administration, last modified October 6, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/, as quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 8 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Entire Dataset, by Country Groups, GDP, Current Prices (International Monetary Fund, April 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/download.aspx, quoted in Department of Energy (DOE), Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of The Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: DOE, January 2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review-Second%20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf. 9 Sara Hoff, “U.S. Electric System Is Made Up of Interconnections and Balancing Authorities,” Today In Energy, Energy Information Administration, July 20, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27152. 10 EIA, Internal Analysis, June 2017. 156 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000873 11 PJM Interconnection, “PJM Provides the Following Documents and Information for the Department’s Consideration as It Prepares Its Report in Response to the Secretary’s Memorandum of April 14, 2017,” sent by PJM Interconnection to the Department of Energy, May 3, 2017. 12 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), “Synopsis of NERC Reliability Assessments, the Changing Resource Mix, and the Impacts of Conventional Generation Retirements,” unpublished materials submitted to the Department of Energy, May 9, 2017. 13 Adapted from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Reliability Primer (Washington, DC: FERC, December 2016), 15, https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2016/reliability-primer.pdf. 14 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “premature,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/premature. 15 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), “Synopsis of NERC Reliability Assessments, the Changing Resource Mix, and the Impacts of Conventional Generation Retirements,” unpublished materials submitted to the Department of Energy, May 9, 2017. 16 SANS Industrial Control Systems and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid: Defense Use Case (Washington, DC: E-ISAC, March 2016), https://ics.sans.org/media/EISAC SANS Ukraine DUC 5.pdf. 17 “Form EIA-860m: Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory,” Energy Information Administration, March 2017, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/. 18 Energy Information Administration, “Alaska State Profile and Energy Estimates,” October 2016, https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=AK. 19 Gerry Cauley (President and CEO, North American Electric Reliability Corporation), letter to Energy Secretary Rick Perry, May 9, 2017. 20 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Monthly Energy Review (Washington, DC: EIA, June 2017), DOE/EIA-0035(2017/6), Table 7.2a, https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#electricity. 21 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Monthly Energy Review (Washington, DC: EIA, June 2017), DOE/EIA-0035(2017/6), Table 7.6, https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#electricity. 22 “Form EIA-860m: Preliminary Monthly Electric Generator Inventory,” Energy Information Administration, March 2017, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/, and internal analysis, June 2017. 23 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Electric Power Monthly (Washington, DC: EIA, June 2017). https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/. 24 N. 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Hogan, “Transmission Benefits and Cost Allocation,” May 2011, https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan Trans Cost 053111.pdf. Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability 179 U.S. Department of Energy ACC000896 462 Energy Reliability Council of Texas, “Analysis of Transmission Alternatives for Competitive Renewable Energy Zones in Texas,” December 2006, http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2006/ATTCH A CREZ Analysis Report.pdf 463 Jeffrey S. Dennis, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), “Transmission Cost Allocation and ‘Beneficiary Pays,’” January 2015, International Energy Agency ESAP and CEER Expert Workshop IV, https://www.iea.org/media/workshops/2015/esapworkshopiv/Dennis.pdf. 464 Jess Jiang, “The Price of Electricity In Your State,” National Public Radio, October 28, 2011. 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Accessed August, 2017. https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/the-u-s-electric-grids-cost-in-2-charts/ 466 Galen Barbose, Putting the Potential Rate Impacts of Distributed Solar into Context (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Energy Analysis and Impacts Division, January 2017), LBNL-1007060, https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/lbnl-1007060.pdf. 467 PJM Interconnection, Energy Price Formation and Valuing Flexibility (PJM Interconnection, June 2017), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170615-energy-market-price-formation.ashx. 468 Midcontinent Independent System Operator Energy, “Extended Locational Marginal Pricing (ELMP),” November 2011, https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/Strategic%20Initiatives/ELMP%20FAQs.pdf. 469 PJM Interconnection, PJM’s Evolving Resource Mix and System Reliability (PJM Interconnection, March 2017), 6, http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170330-pjms-evolving-resource-mix-and-systemreliability.ashx. 470 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington, DC: EIA, March 2015), xix, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 471 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, internal analysis for the Department of Energy, June 2017. 472 N. Kumar, P. Besuner, S. Lefton, D. Agan, and D. Hilleman, Power Plant Cycling Costs (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, April 2012), iv, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55433.pdf. 473 The National Coal Council, Reliable & Resilient, The Value of Our Existing Coal Fleet: An Assessment of Measures to Improve Reliability and Efficiency While Reducing Emissions (Washington, DC: National Coal Council, May 2014), 3, http://www.nationalcoalcouncil.org/reports/1407/NCCValueExistingCoalFleet.pdf. 474 N. Kumar, P. Besuner, S. Lefton, D. Agan, and D. Hilleman, Power Plant Cycling Costs (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, April 2012), iv, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55433.pdf. 475 N. Kumar, P. Besuner, S. Lefton, D. Agan, and D. Hilleman, Power Plant Cycling Costs (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, April 2012), iv, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55433.pdf. 476 Steven A. Lefton and Douglas Hilleman, “Make Your Plant Ready for Cycling Operations,” Power Magazine, August 1, 2011, http://www.powermag.com/make-your-plant-ready-for-cycling-operations/. 477 Nikhil Kumar, “Should You Care about Power Plant Cycling?,” Intertek (blog), http://www.intertek.com/blog/2012-12-26power-plant-cycling/. 478 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Fossil Fleet Transition with Fuel Changes and Large Scale Variable Renewable Integration (Palo Alto, CA: EPRI, March 2015), https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002006517/. 479 The National Coal Council, Reliable & Resilient, The Value of Our Existing Coal Fleet: An Assessment of Measures to Improve Reliability and Efficiency While Reducing Emissions (Washington, DC: National Coal Council, May 2014), 3, http://www.nationalcoalcouncil.org/reports/1407/NCCValueExistingCoalFleet.pdf. 480 Debra Lew, “Coal/Gas Plant Cycling: Costs, Causes, Impacts” (presented at Harvard Electricity Policy Group, March 11, 2016), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2016/March%202016/Lew%20Presentation.pdf. 481 NREL, “Power Plant Cycling Costs”, April 2012, Accessed August 2017, https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/55433.pdf 482 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, input to Department of Energy request for information, “Addressing Policy and Logistical Challenges to Smart Grid Implementation,” 75 Fed. Reg. 180,57006–57011 (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-09-17/html/2010-23251.htm. 483 D. T. Ingersoll, C. Colbert, Z. Houghton, R. Snuggerud, J. W. Gaston, and M. Empey, “Integrating Nuclear and Renewables,” Nuclear Engineering International Magazine, February 1, 2016, http://www.neimagazine.com/features/featureintegratingnuclear-and-renewables-4795860/. 180 U.S. Department of Energy Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability ACC000897 484 Dave Schmalzer, An Analysis of the Power Plant Cycling Phenomena, May 29, 2017 draft (Argonne National Laboratory, forthcoming). 485 Revis James, Stephen Hesler, and John Bistline, Fossil Fleet Transition with Fuel Changes and Large Scale Variable Renewable Integration (Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute, September 2015), DOE-EPRI-OE0000614, 4-38–4-39, https://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/1224949. 486 Energy Information Administration (EIA): "Monthly Update to Annual Electric Generator Report," March 2017, https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860m/; and internal analysis, June 2017 181 Staff Report on Electricity Markets and Reliability U.S. Department of Energy ACC000898 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Mahoney, Jo-Ann Gill, Susan A Next Harvard Electricity Policy Group session postponed to January Tuesday, November 7, 2017 9:17:40 AM Dear Commissioner,   Our next Harvard Electricity Policy Group, which had originally been scheduled in December, will be held in Palm Beach, Florida on January 25-26, 2018.   Bill Hogan is recuperating from hip surgery after an unfortunate accident; he would still have been under travel restriction in December.    We will send out further information in the coming weeks and hope that your calendar will permit you to attend.   Regards, Jo-Ann     Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000899 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Justin Olson Justin Olson; Ryan McCarthy Fwd: FW: Arizona Energy Strategy Notes & Action Items Monday, November 20, 2017 5:54:43 PM 2017.05.18 RESA press release re O"Connor paper.pdf RESA PROactive White Paper.pdf ---------- Forwarded message ---------From: "White, Lyn H." Date: Nov 17, 2017 4:45 PM Subject: FW: Arizona Energy Strategy Notes & Action Items To: "jolson2001@gmail.com" Cc: Here is the papers I was referring to.   Lyn Harry White Director Governmental Affairs CLARK HILL PLC 480.684.1116 (direct) LEGAL NOTICE: This e-mail, along with any attachment(s), is considered confidential and may be legally privileged. If you have received it in error, please notify us immediately by reply e-mail and then delete this message from your system. Please do not copy it or use it for any purposes, or disclose its contents to any other person. Thank you for your cooperation. ACC000900 Com prehensiveanalysisfindsconsum ersin com petitiveelectricity m arketsfarebetterthan ratepayersserved bym onopolyutilities Pricesin stateswithcom petitiveretailm arketshavetrendeddownwardwhilepricesunderm onopoly regulation haverisen ‘inexorably’ O verthepasttw odecadesconsum ershavefared dem onstrably betterinthe14 U .S .jurisdictionsw ith com petitiveretailelectricity m arketsofferingconsum ersachoiceam ongretailenergy suppliers,anew w hitepaperconcludes. Em ployingfactualdatacom piled by theU .S .Energy Inform ationAdm inistration,thepaperprovidesa com prehensivehistoricalanalysisoftheperform anceofretailelectricity choiceversusm onopoly regulationtoconcludethatconsum ersw ithchoicehavedisproportionately benefited interm sofprice, investm entand efficiency.T hepaperalsofindsthatm onopoly regulationis“ inherently inhospitable” to thependingw aveofinnovationthatprom isestoem pow erconsum ersand propeltheU .S .electricity sectorintoa21st century cleanenergy future. T hew hitepaper,R ES T R U CT U R IN G R ECHAR GED – T heS uperiorP erform anceofCom petitiveElectricity M arkets2008-2016,w asprepared by P hilipR .O ’Connor,P h.D.,form erchairm anoftheIllinois Com m erceCom m ission,onbehalfoftheR etailEnergy S upply Association. “ W eighted averagepricesinthegroupof35 m onopoly stateshaveriseninexorably.By contrast,inthe 14 com petitivem arkets,com m ercialand industrialw eightedaveragepriceshavetrended significantly dow nw ard asresidentialpriceshaveflattened, ” saidO ’Connor.“ Giventhedem onstrably superior perform anceofretailchoicem arkets,acom ingsecond w aveofretailelectricity m arketrestructuring hasbegun,asevidenced by ongoingdebatesinN evada,California,N ebraska,M ichiganand elsew here.” A LL-S ECTO R W EIG H TED AVERA G E PRICE TREN D S D IVERG E 2008-16 CH O ICE S TA TE PRICES TREN D D O W N – M O N O PO LY PRICES TREN D U P “ Consum ersw antand expectchoices, ” said R ES A P residentDarrinP fannenstiel.“ Itm akeslittlesenseto clingtoam onopoly regulatory m odelforelectricity thatisavestigeof19thcentury econom icthinking and abarriertotheefficientclean-energy econom y thatconsum ersand policym akersseektoem brace.” ACC000901 T hefullreportcanbeaccessed onR ES A’sw ebsitehere. Dr.O ’Connorw illbeavailabletospeakw ithnew sm ediarepresentativesaboutthew hitepaperand answ erquestionsinaconferencecallat1 pm Easterntoday. T heR etailEnergy S upply Associationisabroad and diversegroupofretailenergy suppliersw hoshare thecom m onvisionthatcom petitiveretailenergy m arketsdeliveram oreefficient,custom er-oriented outcom ethantheregulated utility structure.Form oreinform ation,visitw w w .resausa.org. Forim m ediaterelease,M ay 18,2017 M ediacontact:BryanL ee,bryan9lee@ gm ail.com ,301-717-2988 ### ACC000902 Restructuring Recharged The Superior Performance of Competitive Electricity Markets 2008-2016 Philip R. O?Connor, April 2017 I 35A Retail Energy Supply Association ACC000903 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 OVERVIEW 5 NOTE ON DATA SOURCES 5 SECTION 1: PRELUDE TO COMPETITIVE RESTRUCTURING 1975-1995 Converging Conditions—Energy Price Surges & Stagflation From Regulation to Markets in Network Industries 5 SECTION 2: THE TRANSITION TO COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 1996-2008 Federal Electricity Restructuring Policy Precursors to Competitive Electricity Reform in the States Principles & Implementation of Retail Electricity Choice The Transitional Decade 1998-2007 9 SECTION 3: COMPETITION VS MONOPOLY IN THE FLAT-LOAD ERA 2008-2016 The Foundations of the Electricity Monopoly Model Changing Conditions in the Electricity Industry Growth of Customer Choice Price Trend Divergence in the Flat-Load Era Price Volatility Attracting Capital Generation Effectiveness Resource Adequacy Capacity Factors Generation Potency The Results of Customer Choice—As Favorable as Intended 13 SECTION 4: COMPETITIVE INNOVATION The Innovative Nature of the Electricity Industry Modern Monopoly Is Inhospitable to Innovation Innovation Is Central to Choice Markets 23 SECTION 5: UNSUSTAINABLE MONOPOLY 26 New Converging Conditions 1. The Flat-Load Era 2. Generation “Dys-Economics” 3. Digital Customer Sovereignty Utility Delivery Operations Data Analysis Customer Energy Management Service Innovation SECTION 6: THE PATH TO REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING The Next Wave of Restructuring Has Begun Five Dimensions of the Next Wave of Competitive Restructuring 31 2 ACC000904 ABOUT THE AUTHOR 35 ENDNOTES 36 LISTING OF FIGURES Figure 1: Energy Commodity Price Trends Figure 2: CPI, Bond, Mortgage Rate Trends Figure 3: 14 Customer Choice Jurisdictions Figure 4: Residential Switching Activity by Year Figure 5: C&I Switching Activity by Year Figure 6: Percentage of Load Switched in the 14 Competitive Jurisdictions Figure 7: Residential Weighted Average Percentage Price Change, 2008-2016 Figure 8: Commercial Weighted Average Percentage Price Change, 2008-2016 Figure 9: Industrial Weighted Average Percentage Price Change, 2008-2016 Figure 10: All-Sector Weighted Average Percentage Price Change, 2008-2016 Figure 11: Nominal Weighted Average Percentage Price Change by Customer Class in Choice and Monopoly States, 2008-2016 Figure 12: Inflation-Adjusted Weighted Average Percentage Price Change by Customer Class in Choice and Monopoly States, 2008-2016 Figure 13: State Ranking—Residential Price Percentage Change, 2008-2016 Figure 14: State Ranking—Commercial Price Percentage Change, 2008-2016 Figure 15: State Ranking—Industrial Price Percentage Change, 2008-2016 Figure 16: State Ranking—All-Sector Price Percentage Change, 2008-2016 Figure 17: “Effectiveness” Ratios, ‘97-’16 [Summer Capacity (∆%)]/[Consumption (∆%)] Figure 18: Change in Resource Adequacy Factors, 1997, 2008 and 2016 [Generation Output/Consumption] Figure 19: Change in Capacity Factors, 1997, 2008 and 2016 Figure 20: “Potency” Ratios, 1997-2016 [Generation Output (∆%)]/[Consumption (∆%)] Figure 21: GDP & Electricity Usage Correlations by EIA Figure 22: State Ranking – Consumption Percentage Change 2008-2016 Figure 23: Generation % by Energy Type in the 14 Competitive Jurisdictions, 2008 – 2016 Figure 24: Generation % by Energy Type in the 35 Monopoly States, 2008 – 2016 Figure 25: Generation Percentages by Source in the Lower 49 Jurisdictions, 1990-2016 22 22 22 27 27 28 28 28 LISTING OF TABLES Table 1: Timeline of Federal Deregulation of Major Network Industries Table 2: Major Federal Electricity Restructuring Policies, 1978-2012 Table 3: Principles & Implementation of Retail Choice, 1995-2007 Table 4: Key Conditions in the Electricity Industry Table 5: Retail Price Volatility Matrix, 1997–2016 Table 6: Innovative Pricing, Products & Services in Choice Markets Table 7: Five Dimensions of Restructuring 8 10 12 14 21 25 33 6 7 13 15 15 16 16 17 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 21 3 ACC000905 INTRODUCTION plants under monopoly regulation receive their investment plus a rate of return regardless of the performance of the power plant. The efficiencies gained by power plants in competitive markets therefore produced not only economic but environmental gains. It’s been a solid two decades since state and federal policymakers began taking steps to end the traditional monopoly regulatory approach to determining electricity prices for consumers. Twenty years ago federal regulators adopted rules promoting competition in regional wholesale electricity markets and the first states adopted programs to promote competition in retail electricity markets. As our authors note, the compelling disparity between competition and monopoly regulation is setting the stage for a second round of electricity restructuring as states once again confront the fact that monopoly regulation is not ideal because it serves the interests of utility investors over the interests of electricity customers. So this has become a driving force for states to consider a competitive market in favor of the state’s citizens. Providing considerable historical context, our study’s author observes that traditional monopoly regulation served the nation well for about a century. But beginning in the 1970s the monopoly fabric started to fray. The resulting sweeping regulatory reforms of the railroad, trucking and telecommunications industries set the stage for similar reforms introducing competitive market forces into the energy sector. But perhaps the stronger driving force behind this pending second wave of competitive electric industry restructuring is the panoply of consumer-empowering technological innovations that promise to further transform the way consumers use electricity and interact with their electricity provider. These technologies will prosper in competitive states where monopoly barriers to entry have been removed. These reforms congealed in the 1990s with considerable momentum nationally for competition in electricity—that is until the well-intentioned but poorly-conceived market restructuring in California imploded. This prompted a number of states to reconsider opening their retail markets to competition. To their credit more than a dozen states and the District of Columbia persevered, adopting electricity market restructuring programs that avoided the pitfalls of California and benefited the interests of consumers and the overall economy and the environment. This trend will be driven further in competitive markets as competing suppliers vying for customers innovate to differentiate themselves from their competitors. Real-time pricing complemented by state-of-the-art meters and thermostats will empower customers as never before. Monopoly regulation is inherently inhospitable to this wave of innovation, our author points out. As the study explains, we now have a strong data set of two decades’ experience with two sets of states: • Those that adopted competitive reforms promoting market forces in the electricity sector, and The bottom line is that consumers want and expect choices. They have them in nearly every other area of their lives. That is why there is a dizzying array of colorful options as we walk down the aisle of our neighborhood grocery store. That’s why automobiles come in numerous and customizable configurations and colors, and why we have innumerable telecommunications options beyond the old black rotary phone that prevailed under monopoly regulation. Competition is at the heart of our economy and way of life everywhere—except electricity. • Those that chose to maintain the traditional regulated monopoly approach. The data are compelling, showing that consumers are considerably better off with competition than monopoly regulation: • Electricity prices in states with competitive retail markets have trended downward while prices have risen in states with monopoly regulation. As we prepare to soon enter the third decade of the 21st century, it makes little sense to cling to a monopoly regulatory model for electricity that is a vestige of 19th century economic thinking and a barrier to the efficient clean-energy economy that consumers and policymakers seek to embrace. • Power plant investment in competitive markets is tempered by market forces, while in monopoly states new plant investments are made on the backs of captive ratepayers who are on the hook financially if the investment proves to be a poor economic decision. • The power plants in competitive markets tend to operate more efficiently, because they are dependent on returns from the marketplace. In contrast, power Darrin Pfannenstiel President Retail Energy Supply Association 4 ACC000906 OVERVIEW • Fair stranded-cost compensation for utilities exiting monopoly supply; As retail electricity competition in the United States reaches two decades since its commencement, a second wave of electricity industry restructuring is gathering force. The incompatibility of the traditional vertical monopoly model with new, converging conditions makes forward-looking reforms a necessity. • Neutrality in the treatment of distributed energy resources; and • The opportunity for new entrants and utilities to provide innovative products and services to customers in a competitive environment. • The allocation of electricity generation and business risks to consumers in regulated monopoly states leads to inefficient consumer and investor decisions which have led to overall increases in electricity prices relative to choice states. NOTE ON DATA SOURCES There are two key sources of the electricity industry data used in the preparation of the illustrations in this paper. Figures 4, 5 and 6 draw on information from the annual report on competitive electricity accounts and loads issued by DNV GL, the authoritative industry information firm. Figures 7 through 25 rely of data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.1 • The electric industry has endured a decade of flat-load and there is no end in sight. •G eneration dys-economics have rendered obsolete the traditional verities of power plant investment based on a belief in predictable fuel prices, technology trends and consumer preferences. Digital customer sovereignty is overpowering the idea that customers are merely “ratepayers” who can be easily categorized and limited to a few restrictive pricing, product and service offerings that lack innovation and the ability to empower customers in today’s digital environment. There is compelling evidence of the superior economic performance since 2008 of the 14 competitive retail jurisdictions, when compared to the 35 monopoly states: SECTION 1: PRELUDE TO COMPETITIVE RESTRUCTURING 1975-1995 The first wave of competitive electricity industry restructuring in the late 1990s was preceded by a tsunami of regulatory reform in telecommunications, transportation and energy network industries. A bipartisan movement commencing in the late 1970s revised regulatory policies to embrace change rather than to resist fundamental shifts in technology, consumer attitudes and economic relationships. Policy reforms at the federal and state levels provided a model for the introduction of competition and customer choice into the electricity sector. • Prices in competitive states have trended downward while in monopoly states prices have been rising, producing a double-digit gap in average price changes when adjusted for inflation. • Competitive markets have attracted investment in generation at rates comparable to monopoly states. The movement from regulation and central planning to competitive markets in energy was intimately connected to global conditions—especially the international petroleum market and the Cold War. The struggle between socialist central planning ideology and capitalist free market philosophy provided context and language for what would become the debate over the merits of economic regulation versus competitive market structures in the energy sector on the domestic front. • Competitive states increased production well above changes in load, while in monopoly states production has declined relative to load growth. • Power plants in competitive states have higher capacity factors than plants in monopoly states and are taking better advantage of low natural gas prices. The impending second wave of restructuring in monopoly states will be characterized by: • The unbundling of delivery and power supply rates; Converging Conditions—Energy Price Surges & Stagflation A cataclysmic harbinger of things to come was the oil embargo following the Yom Kippur War in late 1973. For • The devolution of power plants from utility rate base to competitive status; 5 ACC000907 nearly a decade afterward, US. public policy was hostage to the ?energy crisis.?2 In a succession of presidential messages and addresses between 1971 and 1980, Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter anticipated and responded to the original 1973-74 embargo and the disruption following the 1979 Iranian revolution.3 Dramatic increases in oil and other fuel prices in domestic and international markets initially precipitated well-inten- tioned yet often misbegotten policies, producing adverse unintended results. Energy price increases were both a cause and a result of broader economic trends, the most signi?cant of which were high interest and in?ation rates. Figure 1: Energy Commodity Price Trends Events in the 1 9705 caused unprecedented energy prices The oil price surges in the 19705 were accompanied by corresponding dramatic price increases in coal and natural gas. As shown in Figure 1, in?ation-adjusted prices for raw fuels were at historic, economic shock?inducing levels. Further, natural gas was in short supply for industrial processes and for winter home heating. There were long lines at gasoline service stations and rationing not seen since World War II. Electricity prices were driven up as fuel prices rose. Coal prices experienced a different dynamic as Western surface mining began to take market share, eventually pushing coal prices downward. $200 . . .. . 9/11/01 Attacks FmancualCnsus Shale Revolution OilEmbargoes $150 $100 $50 A 0 Coal Price (2016 $/Short Ton) U.S. Natural Gas Average Citygate Price (2016 Dollars per 10,000 Cubic Feet) Cushing, OK WTI Average Oil Spot Price FOB (2016 Barrel) Steep increases in energy prices reverberated across the economy, interacting with other conditions and policies. Figure 2 shows the steep rise in in?ation and the cost of money from the mid-19705 and into the early 19805. There was an especially pernicious impact on the electric City Average Price Electricity (2016 ?Uranium Weighted Average Price (2016 industry, which was in the midst of a major power plant construction program. Utility borrowing costs and bond yields tracked closely with general in?ation, government bond yields and home mortgage interest rates. ACC000908 Figure 2: CPI, Bond, Mortgage Rate Trends Energy shocks contributed to extraordinary high costs of funds 18% - -- 16.64% MajorUtIlIty 16% Generation Construction 14% Period 12CPI Nominal Year-to-Year Change Corporate Utilities Bond Average Percent Yield From Regulation to Markets in Network Industries The dividing line between success and failure of policies aimed at addressing the troubles that emerged in the 19705 is that more regulation failed, while reliance on market forces generally yielded favorable results. It has been nearly four decades since the 1978-1982 ?deregulation? of airlines, railroad, interstate trucking and intercity bus service. While each of these transportation segments had its own historical path, all were intimately connected. Their respective regulatory structures had evolved out of the seminal experience of railroad regulation inaugurated in the late 19th century. The logic and procedures of railroad regulation were extended to other modes of transportation, in every case becoming inexorably more bureaucratized and byzantine. Regulated network industries facing changed conditions have often asked regulators to reinforce the boundaries of their protected markets. For example, potential competitors or even customers seeking alternatives have been subjected to regulatory proceedings characterized by delay and expense that often resulted in prohibition or onerous conditions. Incumbent players often opted for ?small ball? regulatory accommodations aimed at relieving the pressure 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Financial Crisis 2014 2015 2016 2 2011 2012 2013 U5. Generic Govt. 10-Year Yield Percent to Maturity Average 30-Year Mortgage Rate of external conditions. For example, incumbent utilities have requested ?exibility in providing customized pricing for certain large customers with the ability to shift production to other locales, or to self?build rather than buy service or goods from the regulated industry. Other customers would keep paying higher prices and might be required to make up for the price reduction for favored customers. While accommodation measures delay the day of reckoning, they share the central ?aw of adherence to a regulatory model that is out of step with new conditions. Preserva- tionist measures to shield monopolies from the impact of external conditions, which routinely fall short, serve to inform customers, policymakers, regulators and incumbents of the need for fundamental reform. Albro Martin, in his de?nitive 1992 economic history of the railroads,4 described the problem of the highly prescriptive and rigid railroad model that had evolved for network industries: The view of regulatory agencies is static; life, in or out of the regulated enterprises, is dynamic. Change?subtle, gradual, and, one hopes, prepared for?is the actuality. Commissions act as though nothing changes until they rule. What is more accurate is that everything changes while the effective forces ACC000909 in society are chained to the mast, and, as the poet says, we are left with a sense of loss. This has always hampered economic growth in America, especially when the vitality of critical underlying services is concerned. An Unbroken Line of Federal Regulatory Reform Table 1 shows the sequence of federal policies that unshackled American consumers and large elements of the economy from complex regulatory rigidities that had The movement toward competitive markets in regulated network industries also extended to oil, telecommunications and then gradually to natural gas. developed for over a century. At the same time, there also was signi?cant liberalization of economic regulation and cartel?style pricing in ?nancial services.5 TABLE 1: TIMELINE OF FEDERAL DEREGULATION OF MAJOR NETWORK INDUSTRIES Industry Policy Airlines Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 Railroads Railroad Revitalization Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 Railroads Staggers Rail Act of 1980 Interstate Motor Carrier Act of 1980 Trucking Oil Executive Order 12287: Decontrol of Crude Oil and Re?ned Petroleum Products? January 1981 Intercity Bus Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 Telephone 1982 Modi?ed Final Judgment Consent Decree in antitrust suit United States vs. Telecommunications Telecommunications Act of 1996 Natural Gas Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 Natural Gas 1985 FERC Order 436 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 Natural gas 1992 FERC Order 636 Key Features Airfare deregulation, liberalization of market entry and exit, emphasis on safety, eventual dissolution of Civil Aeronautics Board. Set guidelines for eased regulation, greater pricing freedom, implemented Conrail. Pricing freedom unless lack of competition and effective elimination of collective ratemaking, access to rail networks of competing carriers. Freedom from bureau pricing, liberalized route entry and exit. Ended price controls on domestic crude and re?ned products. Created zones of price freedom, liberalized enlIy and exit and route determination, allowed federal pre-emption. Set a schedule for separation of long distance and local exchange service and 1984 break-up of Modemized regulation under Communications Act of 1934 by moving from an emphasis on accommodating monopoly to fostering competition by liberalizing entry and exit and pricing oversight in voice and data transmission and in cable television. Aimed at alleviating shortages, set new maximum lawful prices for new production, and reduced barriers between intra- and interstate markets. Pipelines would provide non-discriminatory transport of customer-owned gas at prices negotiated with producers Wellhead price decontrol. Mandated unbundling of pipeline gas commodity and transport services, essentially ending gas merchant sales; full nondiscriminatory access including storage. The central reality is that American public policy has been on a journey toward an increased reliance on market forces and customer choice. The magnitude of the changes in regulatory policy is evident in the reduction of the percentage of GDP burdened by price regulation—from nearly 12% in 1975 to less than 3% in 2006.6 services to customers in ways that regulation could not accommodate. For example, airline deregulation propelled development of vastly improved jet engine turbines for better fuel efficiency, laying the foundation for the scaling up of turbine technologies to compete in electric power production. Thus, as a free market in fuels produced massive quantities of low-priced natural gas that could be moved over an open-access pipeline network, large and efficient natural gas turbines were there to compete against coal-fired boilers. What remains of prescriptive price regulation is now a vestige of simpler times. Electricity is the main outlier, accounting for a large portion of the remaining scope of government price regulation. As regulatory reform in network industries matured in the two decades following the late 1970s, it was time to address the obvious question—What about electricity? Network industries that were pushed into the world of competition and customer sovereignty interacted with one another to accelerate change. The market demanded greater efficiency and more rapid innovation in providing The central reality is that American public policy has been on a journey toward an increased reliance on market forces and customer choice. The magnitude of the changes in regulatory policy is evident in the reduction of the percentage of G.DP burdened by price regulation—from nearly 12% in 1975 to less than 3% in 2006. SECTION 2: THE TRANSITION TO COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 1996-2008 time, to purchase power from qualifying facilities (QF) that satisfied various conditions. While the primary aim of the QF provision was to encourage the use of such resources as biomass and small hydro, the key result was to produce practical evidence that the modern grid could accommodate generation sources that were neither owned nor operated by traditional monopoly utilities. It was inevitable that electricity, the most ubiquitous and foundational network industry, would experience the competition debate. The successful reform experience in other network industries naturally led to consideration of how market principles could be applied to electricity.7 Federal electricity restructuring policy developed incrementally, focused on the wholesale (sale for resale) and bulk-transmission segments of the industry. Meanwhile, the traditional regulatory division of labor was left in place, with retail supply and delivery under state jurisdiction. Legislation at the state level to allow retail electricity supply competition, starting in the late 1990s, was preceded by more than a decade of questioning, discussion and debate.8 The movement to electric retail choice was neither precipitous nor incautious. State and federal governments have their own spheres of regulatory authority over electricity, as has been the case with natural gas and telecommunications. The full flowering of retail competition and customer choice has required complementary reforms at both levels.9 Table 2 shows the sequence of Congressional and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) actions affecting the wholesale electric generation industry through 2012. The stepwise federal approach gradually provided for market-based pricing of wholesale electricity transactions, open-access transmission free of discrimination and preferences, and development of competitive markets for ancillary services and demand-side resources. Federal regulators created a framework for the establishment of large, regionally-organized competitive markets for capacity and energy, which are also known as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). Federal Electricity Restructuring Policy Congress passed the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) during the same flurry of reform activity that modernized regulation of airlines, railroads, trucking and started the reform process in the natural gas industry. PURPA required electric utilities, which were almost universally vertically integrated monopolies at that 9 ACC000911 TABLE 2: MAJOR FEDERAL ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING POLICIES 1978-2012 Industry Key features Public Utility Regulatory Utilities required to purchase power from non?utility generators at state?set avoided cost. Goals were Policies Act (PURPA) 1978 greater ef?ciency in energy production through cogeneration and through electricity and gas conservation by consumers. Clean Air Act Amendments Tradable allowances for coal-?red power plants to meet gradually-declining sulfur-dioxide emission limits; 1990 created a national market model for electricity industry environmental compliance. Energy Policy Act Created new class of independent power producers, Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWG), exempt from of 1992 various restrictions under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUCHA) renewable electricity production tax credit. FERC Electricity Mega Although withdrawn, provided the theoretical basis for competitive wholesale electricity with open-access NOPR (1995) transmission and the mitigation of market power due to generator control of transmission and provisions for stranded cost recovery by incumbent utilities affected by competitive restructuring. FERC Order 888 (1996) Promoted wholesale electricity competition through open-access nondiscriminatory transmission access and stranded cost recovery. FERC Order 889 (1996) Created the Open-Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) for users to electronically arrange for open-access transmission services. FERC Order 2000 (1999) Established principles for Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), independence from market participants, geography, authority over dispatch and short-term reliability and other grid operations. FERC Order 2003 (2003) Provided standardization of generator interconnection agreements and procedures. Energy Policy Act Repealed Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, easing obstacles to mergers, other restructuring; of 2005 renewable electricity production tax credit; required net metering offer by public utilities; Department of Energy (DOE) to designate National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors. FERC Order 674 (2006) Conditions for market-based wholesale rates for public utilities. FERC Order 890 (2006) Set standards of conduct to prevent undue discrimination and preferences in open-access transmission. FERC Order 697 (2007) Provided for market?based pricing of transmission ancillary services. American Recovery Grants for accelerated smart grid and advanced meter deployment; renewable production tax credits. Reinvestment Act of 2009 FERC Order 745 (2011) Established standards and compensation for demand response by customers in RTOs. FERC Order 1000 (2011) Standards for RTO transmission planning and cost allocation. Over three decades, federal policymakers and regulators deliver greater value to customers and society than does were adopting new policies promoting market forces that traditional regulation. 10 ACC000912 Over three decades, federal policy makers and regulators were adopting new policies promoting market forces that deliver greater value to customers and society than traditional regulation. Precursors to Competitive Electricity Reform in the States As pressures on the traditional vertical monopoly increased in the late 1980s and through the 1990s, there were incremental accommodations by state regulators. However, these accommodations kept in place the traditional principle that most business risk associated with electricity generation would continue to rest on the shoulders of consumers. Regulatory modifications included fuel adjustment clauses, special “economic development” rates to retain at-risk load, and including in rates the costs of construction work in progress (CWIP).10 came to completion, significant rate increase requests engendered resistance. • Political and environmental activism became a major force in the consideration of utility issues by state legislatures and regulatory commissions. • Prices surged in response to the fuel and economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s, creating disadvantages in retention of manufacturing and otherwise inhibiting job creation. There were significant differences in electricity rates between adjacent states and even within states across different utility service territories. By the mid-1990s, there was a substantial body of opinion among academics, state and federal policymakers, energy regulators, utility managers, investors, and business consumer organizations that there was a strong case for electricity competition at the customer level. The general influence of regulatory reform in other sectors was being felt in electricity. Conditions were upsetting the universal acceptance of the vertically integrated monopoly structure and operation of the electricity supply and delivery industry. • Utility commissions disallowed large amounts of investment in newly-finished power plants for inclusion in utility rates for recovery from consumers. Long-developing dissatisfaction with the performance of the monopoly model reached critical mass. The dysfunctional relationship between real-world conditions and a regulatory regime designed under quite different historical conditions became impossible to ignore. Specific conditions, which converged in more pronounced ways in California, Texas and in the states in the northeastern quadrant of the country, were incompatible with the methods of traditional monopoly regulation. Such factors included: Principles & Implementation of Retail Electricity Choice As some states considered competition at the retail level, stakeholders had the benefit of experience of competitive reform in other sectors. It had been demonstrated that a monopoly model was no longer necessary for a well-functioning network industry. • Growth in electricity consumption had slowed considerably compared to the historical pattern. Strong demand growth had been a pillar of the industry’s ability to rapidly expand the network while achieving lower per-unit pricing. The principles and methods of implementation listed in Table 3 were applied in a variety of ways by different states, reflecting local utility, consumer and political conditions. In every case, the adoption of electricity retail choice was a largely collaborative process aimed at attaining substantial stakeholder agreement.11 • As large-scale power plant construction projects that had suffered extended delays and budget overruns 11 ACC000913 TABLE 3 - PRINCIPLES IMPLEMENTATION OF RETAIL CHOICE 1995-2007 Principle Implementations Supply competition and freedom Generators, wires utilities and marketers joined Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) regulated of pricing and customized pricing by FERC to participate in capacity and energy markets; service terms Competitive suppliers not subject to pricing tariffs; Customers allowed to join buying groups. Delivery network open access to prevent discrimination and preference for af?liated generation Adaptive industry and utility reorganization for ef?ciency and ?exibility ?Stranded cost? recovery for Traditional bundled service rates were separated into supply- and cost-based delivery components; Nondiscrimination rules were put in place and terms and conditions for all users were standardized; Electronic data interchange protocols between competitive suppliers and delivery utilities were set. Regulatory rules and procedures for utilities to form holding companies, merge, divest and spin off generation were simpli?ed and accelerated. Utilities were allowed to impose non-bypassable charges on delivery service to reasonably above-market power plant utility compensate utilities for power plant investment approved under traditional regulation that has investment proven uneconomic. Transition period to assure a smooth change from vertical monopoly service to customer going last; choice Customer eligibility for choice phased in, with larger customers going ?rst and residential customers Incumbent bundled rate freezes extended for set periods to hold harmless smaller customers; Stranded cost charges would end on a set date. In just a few years, about two dozen states adopted policies aimed at opening electricity to retail competition. The movement was interrupted by the 2000?2001 California ?energy crisis? resulting from a uniquely ill-designed and poorly-implemented market construct. While the direct effects were con?ned to certain Western states, the and political fallout was national. Two things are worth noting. First, no other state adopted California?s poorly?conceived practice of mandated reliance on a day-ahead energy-only market for procurement of utility supplies for residential and other small customers. This market design did not allow for hedged or ?xed-price transactions between counterparties.12 Second, California regulators and policymakers took precisely the wrong actions in the face of supposed supply shortages and price manipulation made possible by the poor program design. They exacerbated the situation by failing to adhere to prescribed transition rules and then locked in long?term contracts at high prices with state?backed power purchases. The repercussions of these decisions are still being felt today. Despite California, in the end, 14 jurisdictions (13 states and the District of Columbia) persevered for nearly two decades in implementing retail customer choice. These 14 markets, shown in the map in Figure 3, account for one-third of U5. electricity power production and consumption. Several other states?including California, Michigan, Arizona, Oregon, Nevada and Montana?allow limited portions of total load to be served competitively at retail, while denying the great majority of customers a choice of supplier.13 These hybrid states are regulated largely under the traditional monopoly model and are treated accordingly in this paper. Fourteen jurisdictions persevered for nearly two decades in implementing retail customer choice. These 14 markets account for one-third of U.S. electricity power production and consumption. FIGURE 3: 14 Customer Choice Jurisdictions These 14 jurisdictions (13 states plus Washington, DC.) each have enabled Retail Choice for nearly all customers. These jurisdictions represent nearly 1/3 of all electricity consumption in the Continental US. Traditional States - Competitive Jurisdictions The Transitional Decade 1998-2007 Each of the 14 competitive jurisdictions proceeded at different speeds and in different ways during the transi- tional decade. By 2007, phase-ins of customer class eligibility and the collection of stranded-cost charges had reached their prescribed end points in most states. The transitional decade witnessed a cautious, stepwise approach that set the stage for ongoing evolution and growth in competitive retail markets. Regulation would continue to adapt to this new model. By 2008, in competitively restructured states: 0 Most utility generation had been divested to unaf?liated ?rms or devolved to competitive generation af?liates, resulting in nearly half of all productive capacity in the country being owned and operated by a diverse array of non-utility companies; 0 Utilities had been compensated for ?stranded? investment in uneconomic generation; 0 Large numbers of retail suppliers were offering competi- tively priced supply; 0 Millions of customers, especially in the commercial and industrial classes, had embraced supplier choice; 0 Nearly a majority of consumption in the 14 customer choice markets was satis?ed by non?utility suppliers; 0 Default service programs, mainly for residential and small business customers not choosing an alternative 13 supplier, were functioning well, providing competitively priced supply, usually procured by utilities in the market and divorced from traditional rate-of?return price regulation; and Billions of dollars in new generation investment was made at similar paces in both monopoly and competitive states. SECTION 3: COMPETITION vs MONOPOLY IN THE FLAT- LOAD ERA 2008-2016 The ?at-load era commenced just as electricity retail choice was completing its transitional decade. There has been little to no growth in electricity demand since 2008. The customer choice model is demonstrating its superiority in coping with new conditions, including ?at load. The discontinuities between 215t century real-world conditions and those that were predicates for vertically integrated monopoly electricity regulation in the 20th century, have accelerated, expanded and deepened. The Foundations of the Electricity Monopoly Model Regulatory frameworks arise out of historical circumstances. Customarily prescribed by law, regulatory missions evolve within the con?nes of the principles upon which they are founded. As conditions drift from the initial circumstances, regulation can operate to hinder rather than to facilitate the operation of the industry to deliver bene?ts to consumers. Over time, electricity regulation began to focus more on ritual than results. It became increasingly characterized by resistance to change and institutional protection rather than leveraging change to enable added value for consumers. Understandably, electricity regulation shared much of the underlying philosophy and policy objectives of railroad regulation that developed in the 19th century:14 0 Avoid the wasteful duplication of capital. There was no need for competing networks of wires and capital? intensive central station power plants. 0 Provide greater certainty for investment by assuring a protected geographic market, especially since the technology of the day made electricity a largely local business. 0 Facilitate dramatic increases in technical, operational and ?nancial ef?ciencies by providing for rapid ACC00091 5 expansion of the wires network, scaling up of power plants and consolidation in a fragmented early-stage industry. 0 Protect customers from unfairly discriminatory pricing and service terms by monopoly providers. For much of the 20th century, the local electricity utility monopoly, conceived of as a vertically integrated business, from generation to the consumer meter, and even beyond, was spectacularly successful. The accrued bene?ts for the American people during this time frame virtually defy calculation. Changing Conditions in the Electricity Industry The success of traditional vertically integrated monopoly depended largely on conditions that were favorable to success. Things have changed so dramatically that in the 215t century conditions are nearly the opposite of those that prevailed when the monopoly system was born. Table 4 juxtaposes key conditions that prevailed for many decades and those that have developed since the 19705. For much of the 20th century, the local electricity utility monopoly, conceived of as a vertically integrated business, from generation to the consumer meter, and even beyond, was spectacularly successful. The accrued bene?ts for the American people during this time frame virtually defy calculation. But things have changed so dramatically that in the let century conditions are nearly the opposite of those that prevailed in the 19th century when the monopoly system was born. TABLE 4: KEY CONDITIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 20th Century Certainties 215t Century Dynamics Load Rapid load growth and network expansion, high Slow/?at load growth, mature network, correlation between load and GDP, load grows faster weak relationship between load and GDP, than costs. ?xed costs spread over static sales. Generation Reliable expectation that the larger and more capital Natural gas price, ?exibility and environ- intensive a central station power plant, the lower are mental advantages edge out coal. life-time fuel costs and greater the ef?ciency. Distributed resources and renewables gain market share. Pricing Volumetric rates based on average costs aimed at Global competition, ability of ?rms to shift recovery of a ?revenue requirement? do not convey operations and attract load in ?at market accurate cost-of-service or market-price signals. creates demand for market-sensitive prices. Network Delivery wires network designed as a oneway system Wires system is re-conceptualized, to deliver power from central stations to load centers digitized and operated as a platform for and customers. transactions among buyers and sellers. Customers Captive customers have few alternatives and little Customers seek more tailored services and ability to affect utility supply behavior or pricing. Customer contact, billing and others services are exclusive domain of the local utility. lnforrnation from meters limited and restricted. 14 pricing for all services, including energy. Smart meters produce enormous amounts of valuable real-time data. Suppliers must be sensitive to consumer expectations. The evidence is accumulating in two broad areas—pricing and innovation—that competitive markets are delivering tangible benefits to all classes of customers. Meanwhile, traditional monopoly is stuck in a cycle of increasing prices to compensate for flat load, thus further dampening load growth and forcing prices up even more. The rigid rules inherent in monopoly regulation also frustrate creativity and modernization. Figure 5: C&I Switching Ac vity by Year More than 3 million C&I accounts are now served by non u lity suppliers 3,500,000 3,030,633 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,000,000 1.500,000 1,579,327 1,000,000 500,000 Growth of Customer Choice 463,351 0 As shown in Figure 4, millions of residential retail 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 electricity customer accounts are served with competitively sourced market-priced power Figure 5 shows that between 2003 and 2008, the number supply. Between 2003 and 2008, the number of residential of C&I customers served by non-utility suppliers grew accounts served by non-utility providers more than tripled 240%, from 436,000 to nearly 1.6 million. Competitive from about 2.3 million to 7.1 million. C&I accounts nearly doubled again between 2008 and Competitive accounts more than doubled again in the 2013. In each of the four years, 2013-2016, competitive ensuing years. In the most recent four years, 2013-2016, C&I accounts averaged more than 2.9 million, exceeding 3 competitively served residential accounts averaged more million in 2016. C&I customers that have elected to take than 16.4 million annually. utility default service are billed at “rates” derived from market-based purchases in the competitive wholesale Residential and small business customers taking utility market. default service are supplied with market-priced power procured in a competitive market. “Rate of return” pricing is a thing of the past in competitive retail jurisdictions. Figure 4: Residen al Switching Ac vity by Year The number of switched residen al accounts has grown seven fold between 2003 and 2016 18,000,000 16,000,000 14,000,000 In 2016, 72.3% of load eligible to switch in the 14 customer choice markets was served competitively with retail pricing and products by non-utility suppliers. Most of the remaining load in the 14 markets, a little less than one-third of total eligible load in those jurisdictions, is served with marketpriced supply procured in the competitive wholesale market by wires utilities acting as 16,495,293 default providers. The nature of utility default service is often misunderstood or mischaracterized as the equivalent of traditional utility “rate of return” tariffed service under the monopoly model utility provided prior to restructuring. It is significantly different in several ways: 12,000,000 10,000,000 8,000,000 7,095,426 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 2,270,938 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Commercial and industrial customers have embraced the opportunity to do business with competitive retail electricity suppliers. Consumers are responding as they did when other network industry service providers in natural gas, telecommunications and all forms of transportation were allowed to vigorously compete and innovate. • Wires-only utilities that provide default service to non-choosing residential and small business customers generally do not earn a profit from providing the marketpriced supply; • Customers eligible for default service are generally free to switch from the utility and to choose service from a competitive supplier; and 15 ACC000917 • Default service supply is customarily procured through forward purchases made in a competitive market. whereas a local wires delivery network still can be largely regarded as a natural monopoly. In competitive electricity markets, customers are in a similar position as they are in with other services and products. Figure 6 shows the upward trend in residential and C&I retail load served by non-utility suppliers.15 Figure 6: Percentage of Load Switched in the 14 Compe ve Jurisdic ons The great majority of eligible load in the choice jurisdic ons is served by compe ve suppliers 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0 85.1% 55.3% 28.4% 20.9% 72.3% 44.7% 49.1% 24.4% 6.3% 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Switched C&I/Eligible C&I Percent Switched Total/Eligible Total Percent The difference in risk allocation between monopoly and choice regimes is being manifested most clearly in the divergent electricity price trends during the flat-load era since 2008. Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 show stunningly different price trends in the competitive jurisdictions compared to the monopoly states from 2008 through 2016. Weighted average prices in the group of 35 monopoly states have risen inexorably. By contrast, in the 14 competitive markets, commercial and industrial weighted average prices have trended significantly downward as residential prices have flattened. Switched Residen al/Eligible Residen al Percent Price Trend Divergence in the Flat-Load Era The fundamental difference between traditional monopoly regulation and customer choice in electricity is in the allocation of risk. Under monopoly regulation, customers bear much of the technology, fuel and sales volume risk for investment in generation assets. In retail choice jurisdictions, while customers continue to share business risk with the local wires utility, power producers and supply intermediaries are largely at risk for changes in power market conditions, including fuel prices and technology disruption. The generation and supply sectors have the characteristics of a competitive industry, Figure 7: Residen al Weighted Average Percentage Price Change, Choice vs. Monopoly States, 2008-2016 20% 16.16% 15% 17.84% 18.20% 13.70% 11.28% 10% 4.07% 5% 4.51% 7.94% 3.21% 0 0.31% 0.51% 2009 2010 2.50% 5% 4.14% 3.62% 0.84% 2.14% 10% 2008 2011 Monopoly States (35) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Customer Choice Jurisdic ons (14) Weighted average prices in the group of 35 monopoly states have risen inexorably. By contrast, in the 14 competitive markets, commercial and industrial weighted average prices have trended significantly downward as residential prices have flattened. 16 ACC000918 Figure 8: Commercial Weighted Average Percentage Price Change, Choice vs. Monopoly States, 2008-2016 Figure 10: All-Sector Weighted Average Percentage Price Change, Choice vs. Monopoly States, 2008-2016 20% 20% 15.23% 15% 14.27% 10.35% 10% 5.98% 2.79% 0 5% 12.29% 7.50% 5% 5.46% 8.58% 15% 10.01% 14.03% 13.86% 13.54% 2009 2010 2011 2012 Monopoly States (35) 2013 2014 2015 2016 15% 11.96% 10% 9.88% 8.94% 1.58% 1.37% 4.05% 8.60% 4.04% 5% 8.76% 6.65% 14.69% 12.34% 15% 18.43% 20% 17.74% 17.70% 21.66% 25% 2008 2009 3.02% 8.44% 3.36% 4.63% 2010 5.08% 9.22% 6.24% 8.00% 10.16% 2008 2009 2010 2011 Monopoly States (35) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Customer Choice Jurisdicons (14) Customer Choice Jurisdicons (14) Figure 9: Industrial Weighted Average Percentage Price Change, Choice vs. Monopoly States, 2008-2016 0 15% 14.95% 4.03% 10% 20% 10% 3.86% 0 9.40% 5% 6.75% 5% 5% 5.41% 15.19% 11.75% 10% 3.17% 10% 2008 15.13% 15% 2011 Monopoly States (35) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Customer Choice Jurisdicons (14) Advocates for the monopoly model sometimes promote the notion that residential, small-business and non-profit customers such as schools are disadvantaged by choice. The assertion is that large commercial and industrial customers will reap the bulk of the benefits and that competitive suppliers will “cherry pick.” However, the data show that prices for residential customers in competitive retail markets have been on a favorable track alongside the benefits that have accrued to C&I customers. While percentage changes in price differ among the customer classes in both the monopoly and choice states, this is due in part to the greater volumes and more constant demand characteristics of larger customers. Additionally, the costs of delivery services allocable to residential and small business customers constitute a greater share of total price. Figures 11 and 12 show the aggregate nominal and inflation-adjusted percentage changes in weighted average prices of delivered supply for the groups of 14 choice jurisdictions and the 35 monopoly states from 2008 through 2016. 17 ACC000919 Traditional regulation sets supply prices on the basis of past capital investment and current costs of operation, with little regard for the actual economic value of the product. In competitive markets, supply prices are set by the dynamics of supply and demand. Figure 11: Nominal Weighted Average Percentage Price Change by Customer Class, Choice vs. Monopoly States, 2008-2016 20% 15% 10% 5% 0 -5% -10% -15% -20% -25% 18.20% 14.95% 12.29% 8.60% Compe ve States (14) 0.84% The problem for consumers served by monopoly utilities in the flat-load era is not merely one of poor risk allocation. Traditional regulation necessarily sends inaccurate price signals. Because traditional rate setting is in great part retrospective, prices will tend to be set too high in periods of surplus in order to recover investment in power plants that are producing less power than anticipated. Similarly, traditional regulation distorts price signals, including setting prices too low in periods of impending shortage and too high in periods of surplus. This upside-down pricing is resulting in rising prices in monopoly states at the same time customers are restraining their electricity consumption from the grid. In choice jurisdictions, all customers have a clear line of sight to the economic value of electricity in wholesale markets. Price signals constitute some of the most valuable information for all stakeholders in a market. Accurate and timely price signals elicit efficient consumer and investor decisions. Poor price information encourages inefficient behavior. Monopoly States (35) 8.00% 13.54% 21.66% All Sectors Residen al Commercial Industrial Figure 12: Infla on-Adjusted Weighted Average Percentage Price Change by Customer Class, Choice vs. Monopoly States, 2008-2016 10% 5% 0% -5% -10% -15% -20% -25% -30% -35% Compe ve States (14) 2.55% 5.44% 0.17% 3.12% Monopoly States (35) 10.04% 17.93% 22.88% 30.12% All Sectors Residen al Commercial The divergence in weighted average price trends between monopoly states and competitive markets is a widespread phenomenon. The price trends shown in the preceding illustrations are not the result of a few large monopoly states or competitive states skewing the numbers. Figures 13, 14, 15 and 16 show the state-by-state rankings for all states in the contiguous United States for percentage changes in average nominal prices for the three main customer classes and for all customer sectors. Competitive states dominate the lower end of the spectrum in each of the four customer class rankings. Industrial The divergence in price trends between the group of states that have incorporated competitive markets and the group that has remained under monopoly regulation is neither accidental nor aberrational. It is a function of entirely different public policies that prescribe quite different ways in which supply prices are set and risks are borne.16 18 ACC000920 Figure 13: State Ranking Residential Price Percentage Change 2008-2016 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 0 Hull -10% -20% 59?: 8:25 - Competitive Jurisdictions (14) - Monopoly States (3 5) Figure 14: State Ranking Commercial Price Percentage Change 2008-2016 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 0 -20% -30% ggagoeg?s0; µcompetitive - µtraditional<0). If the P-Value is less than α=0.05 we reject the Null Hypothesis (Ho) in favor of the Alternative Hypothesis (H1) with 95% confidence. 17 The Effectiveness ratio assumes a positive value for consumption growth in a group of states since 1997. Only Kentucky, Maine, Ohio, Oregon and Washington State have seen load decline in 2016 compared to 1997. 18 Scholarly and academic literature has been accumulating that wholesale and retail electricity consumption is beneficial. For example, see Steve Cicala, “Imperfect Market versus Imperfect Regulation in U.S. Electricity Generation,” National Bureau of Economic Research No. 23053, January, 2017; Agustin J. Ros, “An Economic Assessment of Electricity Demand in the United States Using Utility-Specific Panel Data and the Impact of Retail Competition on Prices,” The Energy Journal, 38(4), 2017 (International Association of Energy Economics); Xuejuan Su, “Have Customers Benefited from Electricity Retail Competition?” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 47(2), 146-182, 2015. 19 Looking forward, despite low electricity prices in PJM, the largest competitive wholesale market, S&P Global Market Intelligence reported in March 2017 that its affiliated S&P Ratings has “…pointed to some 15,000 MW of new gas-fired capacity to come online in PJM Interconnection by 2019…” 20 For an analysis of the relative performance of choice and monopoly models see Philip R. O’Connor and Erin O’Connell-Diaz, “Evolution of the Revolution The Sustained Success of Retail Electricity Competition,” July 2015, COMPETE Coalition, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2015/Massey_ Evolution%20of%20Revolution.pdf 21 Sam Insull was a marketing as well as financial and engineering genius. One of his techniques for building load was to have Chicago Edison trucks go into neighborhoods and distribute free electric irons to homemakers to replace the heavy “sad irons” that had to be heated on stove tops. 22 The essence of the natural monopoly theory is that in cases in which capital costs are high and incremental operating costs are low, a single supplier may bring cost efficiencies that would not be realized if capital investment were being replicated. Limits on entry avoids the sort of “ruinous competition” that caused so much turmoil in the 19th century railroad industry and contributed to several financial panics. 23 The contrasting approaches of monopoly regimes and choice markets to elicit demand response commitments from customers can be seen by comparing the adjacent RTOs of PJM and MISO. PJM, in which most customers of its member utilities have choice, has a fully formed demand response program across its large regional footprint that is highly interactive with market prices. MISO, in which only a small percentage of customer have market access, does not have a, RTO-based program, relying instead on traditional interruptible and other demand control programs of individual utilities. Customers in the ComEd area in northern Illinois committed more than 1,000 MW of the 7,800 MW of total demand reduction commitments to PJM for 2016-17. The entire state of Michigan, with load roughly equal to that of ComEd, committed 771 MW in 2016. See “2016 Demand Response Operations Markets Activities Report: March 2017,” 5-6 at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/dsr/2016-demand-response-activity-report. ashx and the Michigan Public Service Commission’s data on demand response, p12 at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/energy/Michigan_EGEAS_ Report__01_31_2017_550217_7.pdf 24 37 ACC000939 A thoughtful and provocative report The Brattle Group presents a “counter narrative” to the death-spiral scenario. While largely in accord with the description of the converging conditions in this paper, the report sets out how electricity consumption could double between 2015 and 2050 if the heating and transportation sectors were to go 100% electric and how other transformations in technology and the economy also provide important growth opportunities for utilities. See “Electrification: Emerging Opportunities for Utility Growth,” Jügen Weiss, Ryan Hledik, Michael Hagerty and Will Gorman (The Brattle Group, January 2017). 25 The thrilling stories of the leaders of the electricity revolution a century ago are the story of American modernization, prosperity and improvement in the quality of life. See Insull: The Rise and Fall of a Billionaire Utility Tycoon (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962), John F. Wasik, The Merchant of Power: San Insull, Thomas Edison and the Creation of the Modern Metropolis (Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2006), Jill Jones, Empires of Light: Edison, Tesla, Westinghouse, and the Race to Electrify the World (Random House, New York, 2003) and Howard L. Platt, Electric City: Energy and the Growth of the Chicago Area, 1880-1930 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003). 26 USEPA June 2014 Fact Sheet https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/20140602fs-important-numbers-clean-power-plan.pdf 27 Although installed nuclear capacity has remained at just about 100,000 MW since the mid-1990, production has increased considerably, from about 673 billion kWh in 1995 to about 800 billion in 2016 due to an increase in capacity factor from 77.4% in 1995 to 92% in 2016. https://www.eia.gov/ totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec8_3.pdf 28 Texas is unique among competitive jurisdictions in not having a capacity auction mechanism. ERCOT operates an energy-only market combined with bilateral wholesale contracts between generators supplier to attract investment in generation and to maintain adequate reserve margins. Adjustments have been made over the years. Customers generally enter into fixed-price power supply contracts. 29 The U.S. Department of Energy has reported on operation results examined in case reviews of Smart Grid programs funded by federal grants at https:// www.smartgrid.gov/files/EAC-Sept-24-2014.pdf 30 See EIA Electric Monthly Update for February 2015 https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/archive/april2015/ 31 For a discussion of voltage optimization and peak load reduction benefits of Smart Grid, see a U.S. Department of Energy report, “Voltage and Power Optimization Saves Energy and Reduces Peak Power” at https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/Voltage-Power-Optimization-Saves-Energy-Reduces-Peak-Power.pdf 32 Casinos and other large users in Nevada, frustrated by the obstacles to power market access and to renewables and by high exit fees, successfully advocated a customer choice ballot proposition. Constitutional amendments in Nevada must be approved in two consecutive general elections, meaning that the proposition approved by voters in November 2016 will be on the ballot once again in November 2018. In the meantime, however, the legislature could reduce obstacle to customer choice in place under the current competition law. An executive order by the Governor (# 2017-03) designated Nevada’s Lieutenant Governor to chair a study group on electricity choice http://gov.nv.gov/News-and-Media/Executive-Orders/2017/EO_-2017-03-Order-Establishing-the-Governor_s-Committee-on-Energy-Choice/ 33 On February 8, 2017, the Nevada PUC decided that “In response to the voters overwhelming support of the Energy Choice Initiative and the move toward a competitive marketplace for energy, the Commission denies NPC’s request to acquire South Point…” see paragraph 106 at 59 of the PDF of order at http://pucweb1.state.nv.us/PDF/AxImages/DOCKETS_2015_THRU_PRESENT/2016-7/18652.pdf 34 Arizona, Oregon and Virginia all enacted competitive restructuring law during the first wave, but aggressive monopoly utility opposition to customer choice has resulted in onerous conditions that frustrate market access. 35 H.F. No. 2248, if enacted into law, would allow customers in Minnesota taking service at or above 69kV to procure some or all of their supply in market starting in January 2020. The residential rate increase to allow for a discount to retain at-risk industrial load is a classic admission that the regulated monopoly rates are above market and that the business risk falls on captive customers (http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-power-residential-customers-face-6-5-percent-rate-increase/415823804/) 36 Indicative of discontent among Wisconsin industrial customers is a July 2016 newspaper op-ed by a steel company executive (http://archive.jsonline.com/ news/opinion/time-to-restore-competitive-electricity-prices-b99757278z1-385887411.html). 37 In Missouri, HB 439 would permit C&I customers to purchase renewable power supplies in the market. Companies including Walmart, Target, General Mills and General Motors have written to the Missouri House and Senate leadership in support of HB439 (http://midwestenergynews.com/2017/02/07/ wal-mart-other-companies-back-missouri-bill-to-allow-power-purchase-agreements/). 38 See the agenda for the August 2016 Indiana Chamber Energy Management Conference at http://www.indianachamber.com/index.php/indiana-conference-on-energy-management-conference-materials and the relevant materials at http://www.indianachamber.com/images/media/2016_conferences/ energy/materials/5B_O’Connor_Morey.pdf 39 For commentary on the overall results of non-volumetric rate design requests, see https://www.nrdc.org/experts/samantha-williams/theyre-ba-ack-fixedfee-hikes-still-getting-nixed 40 Samantha Williams of the Natural Resources Defense Council reported on the mixed results of utility requests for non-volumetric rates at https://www. nrdc.org/experts/samantha-williams/theyre-ba-ack-fixed-fee-hikes-still-getting-nixed, February 2017. 41 38 ACC000940 39 Retail Energy Supply Association From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Mahoney, Jo-Ann Gill, Susan A Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group 2018 sessions Wednesday, December 6, 2017 10:09:11 AM Commissioners HEPG January 2018 fillable registration form.pdf Dear Commissioner,   We look forward to holding the next plenary session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group on Thursday-Friday, January 25-26, 2018  in Palm Beach, Florida.   Our sessions will focus on “Grid Resilience: A problem in search of a solution, or a solution in search of a problem; “ Demand Charges: Can they be internalized in dynamic pricing without diluting efficient price signals;”  and “ELMP Redux:  What to do when locational prices are not enough.”  (Topic descriptions below.)  The order of the panels have not yet been set.  The meeting will convene on Thursday morning at breakfast and adjourn at lunch on Friday.  An agenda with speakers in place is forthcoming.   Kindly return your registration form to Susan Gill in our office (susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu).   This meeting will take place at the Eau Palm Beach hotel.  We are able to provide travel assistance and accommodations for Wednesday evening, January 24 and Thursday, January 25.  We are prepared to make reservations;  travel expenses will be reimbursed after the event. The deadline for lodging requests is: December 15, 2017.   Kindly let me know directly if you will need accommodations on either or both evenings.     We plan to hold two other sessions in the Spring semester.  We will hold a meeting on March 2223,2018 in Washington, DC at the Four Seasons Georgetown, and we plan to celebrate the twentyfifth anniversary of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group at the newly renovated Harvard Kennedy School in Cambridge on June 7-8, 2018.  Please mark your calendars for these events.   We hope that you will be able to join us in Florida in January.   Best regards,   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     GRID RESILIENCE: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem?      The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird.  The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value ACC000943 assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency?   What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments?  Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market?   DEMAND CHARGES: Can They be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals?  Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers.  Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal  has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it.  Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals?  Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions?      ELMP REDUX:  What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States.  Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch.  Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true.  In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution.  The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution.  There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations.  The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR.   What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem?  What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal?  What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research?  How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms?   ACC000944 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 EAU PALM BEACH RESORT PALM BEACH, FLORIDA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Deadline: December 15 ACC000945 Subject: Date: Attachments: FW: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group 2018 sessions Wednesday, December 6, 2017 10:11:24 AM Commissioners HEPG January 2018 fillable registration form.pdf     From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 06, 2017 10:09 AM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Gill, Susan A Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group 2018 sessions   Dear Commissioner,   We look forward to holding the next plenary session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group on Thursday-Friday, January 25-26, 2018  in Palm Beach, Florida.   Our sessions will focus on “Grid Resilience: A problem in search of a solution, or a solution in search of a problem; “ Demand Charges: Can they be internalized in dynamic pricing without diluting efficient price signals;”  and “ELMP Redux:  What to do when locational prices are not enough.”  (Topic descriptions below.)  The order of the panels have not yet been set.  The meeting will convene on Thursday morning at breakfast and adjourn at lunch on Friday.  An agenda with speakers in place is forthcoming.   Kindly return your registration form to Susan Gill in our office (susan gill@hks.harvard.edu).   This meeting will take place at the Eau Palm Beach hotel.  We are able to provide travel assistance and accommodations for Wednesday evening, January 24 and Thursday, January 25.  We are prepared to make reservations;  travel expenses will be reimbursed after the event. The deadline for lodging requests is: December 15, 2017.   Kindly let me know directly if you will need accommodations on either or both evenings.     We plan to hold two other sessions in the Spring semester.  We will hold a meeting on March 2223,2018 in Washington, DC at the Four Seasons Georgetown, and we plan to celebrate the twentyfifth anniversary of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group at the newly renovated Harvard Kennedy School in Cambridge on June 7-8, 2018.  Please mark your calendars for these events.   We hope that you will be able to join us in Florida in January.   Best regards,   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000946   GRID RESILIENCE: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem?      The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird.  The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency?   What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments?  Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market?   DEMAND CHARGES: Can They be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals?  Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers.  Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal  has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it.  Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals?  Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions?      ELMP REDUX:  What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States.  Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch.  Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true.  In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution.  The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution.  There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations.  The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR.   What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem?  What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal?  What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research?  How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? ACC000947 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 EAU PALM BEACH RESORT PALM BEACH, FLORIDA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Deadline: December 15 ACC000948 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Boyd Dunn FW: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group 2018 sessions Wednesday, December 6, 2017 10:12:00 AM Commissioners HEPG January 2018 fillable registration form.pdf Hello Commissioner,   The Palm Beach Invitation has been sent out.     Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 06, 2017 10:09 AM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Gill, Susan A Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group 2018 sessions   Dear Commissioner,   We look forward to holding the next plenary session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group on Thursday-Friday, January 25-26, 2018  in Palm Beach, Florida.   Our sessions will focus on “Grid Resilience: A problem in search of a solution, or a solution in search of a problem; “ Demand Charges: Can they be internalized in dynamic pricing without diluting efficient price signals;”  and “ELMP Redux:  What to do when locational prices are not enough.”  (Topic descriptions below.)  The order of the panels have not yet been set.  The meeting will convene on Thursday morning at breakfast and adjourn at lunch on Friday.  An agenda with speakers in place is forthcoming.   Kindly return your registration form to Susan Gill in our office (susan gill@hks.harvard.edu).   This meeting will take place at the Eau Palm Beach hotel.  We are able to provide travel assistance and accommodations for Wednesday evening, January 24 and Thursday, January 25.  We are prepared to make reservations;  travel expenses will be reimbursed after the event. The deadline for lodging requests is: December 15, 2017.   Kindly let me know directly if you will need accommodations on either or both evenings.     We plan to hold two other sessions in the Spring semester.  We will hold a meeting on March 2223,2018 in Washington, DC at the Four Seasons Georgetown, and we plan to celebrate the twentyfifth anniversary of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group at the newly renovated Harvard Kennedy School in Cambridge on June 7-8, 2018.  Please mark your calendars for these events.   ACC000949 We hope that you will be able to join us in Florida in January.   Best regards,   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390     GRID RESILIENCE: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem?      The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird.  The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency?   What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments?  Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market?   DEMAND CHARGES: Can They be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals?  Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers.  Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal  has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it.  Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals?  Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions?      ELMP REDUX:  What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States.  Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the ACC000950 economic dispatch.  Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true.  In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution.  The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution.  There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations.  The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR.   What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem?  What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal?  What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research?  How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms?   ACC000951 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 EAU PALM BEACH RESORT PALM BEACH, FLORIDA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Deadline: December 15 ACC000952 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Mahoney, Jo-Ann Palm Beach Thursday, December 21, 2017 10:00:00 AM Commissioners HEPG January 2018 fillable registration form.pdf Hi Jo-Ann,   I was not sure if I sent this already, the past week has been quiet hectic.   Thank you, call if you have any questions,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC000953 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 EAU PALM BEACH RESORT PALM BEACH, FLORIDA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Boyd Dunn Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 Phone E-mail 602-542-3935 pmaloney@azcc.gov __________________________________ ✔ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Deadline: December 15 ACC000954 Subject: Date: Attachments: FW: Palm Beach Friday, December 29, 2017 12:33:31 PM Commissioners HEPG January 2018 fillable registration form.pdf     From: Patrick Maloney Sent: Thursday, December 21, 2017 10:00 AM To: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: Palm Beach   Hi Jo-Ann,   I was not sure if I sent this already, the past week has been quiet hectic.   Thank you, call if you have any questions,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC000955 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 EAU PALM BEACH RESORT PALM BEACH, FLORIDA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Boyd Dunn Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 Phone E-mail 602-542-3935 pmaloney@azcc.gov __________________________________ ✔ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Deadline: December 15 ACC000956 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Gill, Susan A FW: Palm Beach Friday, December 29, 2017 12:34:00 PM Commissioners HEPG January 2018 fillable registration form.pdf Hi Susan,   I wasn’t sure if either of you had received this, I had tried sending it.   Thank you,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705       From: Patrick Maloney Sent: Thursday, December 21, 2017 10:00 AM To: 'Mahoney, Jo-Ann' Subject: Palm Beach   Hi Jo-Ann,   I was not sure if I sent this already, the past week has been quiet hectic.   Thank you, call if you have any questions,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC000957 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 EAU PALM BEACH RESORT PALM BEACH, FLORIDA TO: HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Boyd Dunn Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 Phone E-mail 602-542-3935 pmaloney@azcc.gov __________________________________ ✔ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Deadline: December 15 ACC000958 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Gill, Susan A Patrick Maloney Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: Palm Beach Tuesday, January 2, 2018 12:41:59 PM HEPG January 2018 draftagenda.pdf Hi Patrick,   Happy New Year to you as well.   The draft agenda just became available this morning; I have attached a copy.    We are still working on hotel arrangements but will update you as soon as possible.   Best,   Susan   From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 12:00 PM To: Gill, Susan A Subject: Palm Beach   Hello Susan,   Hope you had a wonderful New Year and Holiday Season! I was hoping to get some more information on the HEPG Palm Beach Conference, I filled out Commissioner Dunn’s registration form and was curious if the hotel information and draft agenda were available yet?   Thank you so much,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC000959 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000960 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000961 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000962 Subject: Date: Attachments: FW: Palm Beach Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:06:41 PM HEPG January 2018 draftagenda.pdf     From: Gill, Susan A [mailto:susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 12:42 PM To: Patrick Maloney Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Palm Beach   Hi Patrick,   Happy New Year to you as well.   The draft agenda just became available this morning; I have attached a copy.    We are still working on hotel arrangements but will update you as soon as possible.   Best,   Susan   From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 12:00 PM To: Gill, Susan A Subject: Palm Beach   Hello Susan,   Hope you had a wonderful New Year and Holiday Season! I was hoping to get some more information on the HEPG Palm Beach Conference, I filled out Commissioner Dunn’s registration form and was curious if the hotel information and draft agenda were available yet?   Thank you so much,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC000963 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000964 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000965 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000966 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Erin Ford Faulhaber (EFordFaulhaber@azcc.gov) FW: Palm Beach Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:07:00 PM HEPG January 2018 draftagenda.pdf Attached is HEPG Palm Beach Draft Agenda.   From: Gill, Susan A [mailto:susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 12:42 PM To: Patrick Maloney Cc: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Subject: RE: Palm Beach   Hi Patrick,   Happy New Year to you as well.   The draft agenda just became available this morning; I have attached a copy.    We are still working on hotel arrangements but will update you as soon as possible.   Best,   Susan   From: Patrick Maloney [mailto:PMaloney@azcc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 12:00 PM To: Gill, Susan A Subject: Palm Beach   Hello Susan,   Hope you had a wonderful New Year and Holiday Season! I was hoping to get some more information on the HEPG Palm Beach Conference, I filled out Commissioner Dunn’s registration form and was curious if the hotel information and draft agenda were available yet?   Thank you so much,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC000967 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000968 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000969 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000970 Date: Attachments: Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:09:15 PM HEPG January 2018 draftagenda.pdf Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   ACC000971 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000972 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000973 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000974 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Erin Ford Faulhaber Elijah Abinah Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:13:00 PM HEPG January 2018 draftagenda.pdf Eli, Commissioner Dunn will be attending the quarterly Harvard Electricity Policy Group meeting at the end of the month. See agenda attached. Historically, he has been called upon to comment or ask questions of the panelists following the presentation. I would like to gather some informal background information (~20 to 30 pages of material per topic) for him to review in preparation for the meeting. He likes to have a knowledge base prior to the meeting so he can participate. Please let me know if there is anyone in utilities who can point me to the relevant sources. Thank you! Erin Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   ACC000975 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000976 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000977 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000978 Date: Attachments: Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:13:52 PM HEPG January 2018 draftagenda.pdf Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   ACC000979 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000980 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000981 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000982 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Erin Ford Faulhaber Boyd Dunn Patrick Maloney January HEPG Agenda Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:16:20 PM HEPG January 2018 draftagenda.pdf Commissioner, Pat is in the process of confirming your travel arrangements with Harvard. In the meantime, we have received the draft agenda for the January HEPG meeting. See attached. I have reached out to Eli to get background information on each topic for your review in preparation for the meeting. We will keep you posted. Thanks! EFF Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   ACC000983 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000984 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000985 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000986 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Mahoney, Jo-Ann Gill, Susan A HEPG January Agenda Wednesday, January 3, 2018 3:49:29 PM HEPG January 2018 draftagenda.pdf Happy New Year!   As we brace for the storm here in Cambridge, we look forward to your participation in the upcoming Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Eau Palm Beach on January 25-26, 2018.  Our conference agenda is attached.   Dress for the meeting in Florida will be business casual.   Looking forward to seeing you later in the month,  Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390   ACC000987 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 DRAFT AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, Alison Silverstein Consulting 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000988 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Moderator: Travis Kavulla, Montana Public Service Commission Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:00 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000989 HEPG Draft Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Moderator: Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000990 From: To: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan A Tom Forese HEPG Palm Beach Reception and Dinner Invitation Friday, January 12, 2018 2:49:09 PM   Dear HEPG participants,   We look forward to seeing you at the Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Eau Palm Beach on Thursday, January 25 – Friday, January 26, 2018.  We will hold the conference reception and dinner on property on Thursday evening, January 25.  Dinner will be prepared by Chef Manlee Siu of Angle Restaurant.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.    Kindly RSVP by Thursday, January 18 using the link below. If you or your guest have any dietary restrictions, please let us know.   https://goo.gl/forms/MrE65ZaRiNb2IgYH2   Regards,   Susan   Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC000991 From: To: Subject: Date: Gill, Susan A Patrick Maloney; Boyd Dunn HEPG Palm Beach Reception and Dinner Invitation Friday, January 12, 2018 2:53:08 PM   Dear HEPG participants,   We look forward to seeing you at the Harvard Electricity Policy Group session to be held at the Eau Palm Beach on Thursday, January 25 – Friday, January 26, 2018.  We will hold the conference reception and dinner on property on Thursday evening, January 25.  Dinner will be prepared by Chef Manlee Siu of Angle Restaurant.  You are welcome to bring a guest who is travelling with you.    Kindly RSVP by Thursday, January 18 using the link below. If you or your guest have any dietary restrictions, please let us know.   https://goo.gl/forms/MrE65ZaRiNb2IgYH2   Regards,   Susan   Susan Gill Program Coordinator Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government Harvard Kennedy School Weil Hall 79 JFK St, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel: 617.495-9379; Fax 617.496.0063 Website Twitter Facebook Listserv   ACC000992 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Patrick Maloney Gill, Susan A HEPG Hotel Confirmation Monday, January 15, 2018 6:03:34 AM HEPG January 2018 agenda.pdf Dear Patrick, We look forward to Commissioner Dunn being with us in Florida next week for the HEPG conference.  We have made a reservation for him at the Eau Palm Beach for two nights, arriving Wednesday 1/24 and departing on Friday 1/26.  His confirmation number is 514990.  The hotel is located at 100 South Ocean Avenue in Manalapan, Florida (the Palm Beach area).   Please do not hesitate to contact me (e-mail is best) if you should have any questions. Best regards, Jo-Ann Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390 ACC000993 HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP HARVARD ELECTRICITY POLICY GROUP EIGHTY-NINTH PLENARY SESSION Eau Palm Beach Hotel Palm Beach, Florida THURSDAY AND FRIDAY, JANUARY 25-26, 2018 AGENDA Thursday, January 25, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session One. Grid Resilience: A Problem in Search of a Solution, or a Solution in Search of a Problem? The Department of Energy directed FERC to conduct an inquiry into whether pricing for power plants should reflect “the value” such plants provide to the resilience of the gird. The Department’s underlying assumption is that the inability of many coal and nuclear plants to be economically competitive with alternative energy sources poses a threat to the resiliency of the nation’s grid. Is that assumption correct? If “value” pricing is deployed for pricing purposes, what is the value assessment based on? Cost-based regulation? Administrative determinations? How do the intended beneficiaries of the proposed policy contribute to grid resiliency? What are the criteria for determining eligibility for resiliency payments? Are markets simply unable to assure resiliency? Is there something lacking in ISO planning that risks the resiliency of the grid? If policy moves down the path of resource preferences, how might that be implemented to least distort the market? Moderator: Joseph Kelliher, NextEra Energy Benjamin Hobbs, Johns Hopkins University David Hunger, Charles River Associates John Shelk, Electric Power Supply Association Alison Silverstein, Alison Silverstein Consulting 10:30 am Coffee Break ACC000994 HEPG Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Thursday, January 25 (cont’d) 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Lunch 1:00 pm Session Two. Demand Charges: Can they be Internalized in Dynamic Pricing Without Diluting Efficient Price Signals? Demand charges have long been a feature of tariffs for commercial and industrial customers. Some jurisdictions are either applying, or contemplating applying, significant demand charges to residential customers as well. The goal has been to send discrete price signals to consumers to reduce their peak demand, and, hopefully, to reduce overall system capacity and capital spending requirements. Demand tariff provisions, of course, were put in place to complement retail energy prices that have, historically, not reflected real time costs, and, therefore, failed to provide meaningful price signals to end users regarding peak demand and the costs associated with it. Does the prospect of dynamic pricing better reflecting the prices in the energy market obviate the need for demand price signals? Do meaningful dynamic prices internalize demand costs? Or will demand charges play a critical role in providing price signals to end users? If demand charges were to be replaced by dynamic variable prices, would that further exacerbate the problems associated with a pricing regime where most fixed costs are recovered through variable rates, a flaw that leads to net metering subsidies and other price distortions? Moderator: Travis Kavulla, Montana Public Service Commission Ahmad Faruqui, The Brattle Group John Hughes, ELCON Carl Linvill, Regulatory Assistance Project Branko Terzic, Berkeley Research Group 2:30 pm Coffee Break 2:45 pm Discussion 4:00 pm Adjourn 6:30 pm Reception, The Courtyard Lawn Dinner, Angle Restaurant, Eau Palm Beach ACC000995 HEPG Agenda, January 25-26, 2018 Friday, January 26, 2018 8:30 am Breakfast and Informal Discussion 9:00 am Session Three. ELMP REDUX: What to Do When Locational Prices are Not Enough? The bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch model with locational prices provides the foundation of electricity market design in the organized markets in the United States. Under certain regularity assumptions, the model has the property that the locational marginal prices support the economic dispatch. Faced with these prices, no market participant has an incentive to deviate from the economic dispatch. As is well known, the regularity assumptions are only approximately true. In theory, unit commitment and other lumpy decisions can create a situation where no set of locational prices alone can fully support the solution. The extended locational marginal price (ELMP) models incorporate accompanying uplift payments to restore the support for the economic solution. There are many variants, and accumulating experience from different implementations. The subject achieved renewed interest in the PJM “Proposed Enhancements to Energy Price Formation” offered as a main pillar of the response to the DOE NOPR. What are the critical elements of the ELMP pricing problem? What approximations are available to approach the theoretical ideal? What new insights have been gained by practical experience and the continuing research? How do the models integrate with other proposed pricing reforms? Moderator: Joseph Bowring, Monitoring Analytics Ross Baldick, University of Texas Austin Jeff Bladen, Midcontinent Independent System Operator Hung-po Chao, PJM Interconnection Paul Gribik, Pacific Gas & Electric 10:30 am Coffee Break 10:45 am Discussion 12:00 pm Adjourn ACC000996 From: To: Subject: Date: Erin Ford Faulhaber Elijah Abinah RE: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG Thursday, January 18, 2018 5:52:00 PM Eli, I’m gathering the information for Commissioner Dunn to review for HEPG next week. I would like to get the material together tomorrow so he can review it this weekend. Has your team had a chance to gather some background material? Thanks! Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:14 PM To: Elijah Abinah Subject: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG   Eli, Commissioner Dunn will be attending the quarterly Harvard Electricity Policy Group meeting at the end of the month. See agenda attached. Historically, he has been called upon to comment or ask questions of the panelists following the presentation. I would like to gather some informal background information (~20 to 30 pages of material per topic) for him to review in preparation for the meeting. He likes to have a knowledge base prior to the meeting so he can participate. Please let me know if there is anyone in utilities who can point me to the relevant sources. Thank you! Erin Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: 602-542-0837 ACC000997 efordfaulhaber@ azcc. gov From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Elijah Abinah Erin Ford Faulhaber Ranelle Paladino; Del Smith; James Armstrong RE: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG Thursday, January 18, 2018 5:54:32 PM I ask Ranelle to get the information to you by COB tomorrow     From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Thursday, January 18, 2018 5:53 PM To: Elijah Abinah Subject: RE: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG   Eli, I’m gathering the information for Commissioner Dunn to review for HEPG next week. I would like to get the material together tomorrow so he can review it this weekend. Has your team had a chance to gather some background material? Thanks! Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:14 PM To: Elijah Abinah Subject: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG   Eli, Commissioner Dunn will be attending the quarterly Harvard Electricity Policy Group meeting at the end of the month. See agenda attached. Historically, he has been called upon to comment or ask questions of the panelists following the presentation. I would like to gather some informal background information (~20 to 30 pages of material per topic) for him to review in preparation for the meeting. He likes to have a knowledge base prior to the meeting so he can participate. Please let me know if there is anyone in utilities who can point me to the relevant sources. ACC000999 Thank you! Erin Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   ACC001000 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Erin Ford Faulhaber Elijah Abinah Ranelle Paladino; Del Smith; James Armstrong RE: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG Thursday, January 18, 2018 6:39:00 PM Thank you!   Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   From: Elijah Abinah Sent: Thursday, January 18, 2018 5:55 PM To: Erin Ford Faulhaber Cc: Ranelle Paladino ; Del Smith ; James Armstrong Subject: RE: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG   I ask Ranelle to get the information to you by COB tomorrow     From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Thursday, January 18, 2018 5:53 PM To: Elijah Abinah Subject: RE: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG   Eli,   I’m gathering the information for Commissioner Dunn to review for HEPG next week. I would like to get the material together tomorrow so he can review it this weekend. Has your team had a chance to gather some background material?   Thanks!   Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   From: Erin Ford Faulhaber Sent: Tuesday, January 2, 2018 2:14 PM To: Elijah Abinah Subject: Preparing Commissioner Dunn for HEPG ACC001001   Eli,   Commissioner Dunn will be attending the quarterly Harvard Electricity Policy Group meeting at the end of the month. See agenda attached.   Historically, he has been called upon to comment or ask questions of the panelists following the presentation. I would like to gather some informal background information (~20 to 30 pages of material per topic) for him to review in preparation for the meeting. He likes to have a knowledge base prior to the meeting so he can participate.   Please let me know if there is anyone in utilities who can point me to the relevant sources.   Thank you! Erin   Erin Ford Faulhaber Policy Advisor to Commissioner Boyd Dunn Arizona Corporation Commission Office: 602-542-0837 efordfaulhaber@azcc.gov   ACC001002 To: Subject: Date: Mahoney, Jo-Ann RE: HEPG Hotel Confirmation Friday, January 19, 2018 10:01:03 AM     From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Monday, January 15, 2018 6:03 AM To: Patrick Maloney Cc: Gill, Susan A Subject: HEPG Hotel Confirmation   Dear Patrick,   We look forward to Commissioner Dunn being with us in Florida next week for the HEPG conference.  We have made a reservation for him at the Eau Palm Beach for two nights, arriving Wednesday 1/24 and departing on Friday 1/26.  His confirmation number is 514990.  The hotel is located at 100 South Ocean Avenue in Manalapan, Florida (the Palm Beach area).     Please do not hesitate to contact me (e-mail is best) if you should have any questions.   Best regards, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390 ACC001003 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG Ninety-First Plenary Session Harvard Kennedy School Thursday and Friday, June 7-8, 2018 Cambridge, MA TO: Harvard Electricity Policy Group John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Registration deadline: May 7 ACC001004 3:57: 15 ACCOO1 005 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Patrick Maloney Gill, Susan A Commissioner Dunn Attendance June 6th Conference Tuesday, May 1, 2018 1:22:00 PM HEPG Cambridge Commissioners Fillable Registration.pdf Hi Susan,   Commissioner Boyd Dunn will be attending with his wife Nancy. He was hoping to get accommodations from Wednesday June 6th to Saturday June 9th for himself and his wife. Please let me know if that works.   Thank you so much,   Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935   ACC001006 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG Ninety-First Plenary Session Harvard Kennedy School Thursday and Friday, June 7-8, 2018 Cambridge, MA TO: Harvard Electricity Policy Group John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Boyd Dunn Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 Phone E-mail 602-542-3935 pmaloney@azcc.gov __________________________________ ✔ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Registration deadline: May 7 ACC001007 From: To: Subject: Date: Patrick Maloney Boyd Dunn RE: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Cambridge session Tuesday, May 1, 2018 3:04:00 PM Hi Commissioner,   I sent in your Harvard Form as well as booked your hotel and conference fee for Boise.   Thank you, Patrick   From: Boyd Dunn Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2018 1:17 PM To: Patrick Maloney Cc: Erin Ford Faulhaber Subject: Fwd: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Cambridge session   Patrick,   Please affirm my attendance for the upcoming Harvard Committee meeting. I have already scheduled air travel from Boise on Wed June 6 with a return flight to Phoenix on Sat June 9. I will need hotel accommodations for Nancy and myself for those 3 days.   Thanks, Boyd   Sent from my iPad Begin forwarded message: From: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Date: May 1, 2018 at 2:04:11 PM EDT To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan A" Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Cambridge session Dear Commissioner,   We would like to invite you to attend the upcoming session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 7-8 here in Cambridge.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday, June 7 and adjourn by noon on Friday, June 8.  We plan to focus our discussions on Thursday on retail competition and the current implementation challenges of FERC Order 1000.  On Friday morning, we will turn our attention to a retrospective panel that looks toward the future of electricity markets, 25 years after the passage of the Energy Policy Act.    On Thursday evening, we will host ACC001008 a dinner at Harvard’s Fogg Art Museum.       We can offer lodging in Harvard Square and have travel funds available, upon request.  Kindly let us know by Monday, May 7 at noon, if you would be available to join us.   We look forward to hearing from you.   Sincerely, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390         ACC001009 From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments: Lynn Jahnke Mahoney, Jo-Ann Reply: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Cambridge session Tuesday, May 8, 2018 2:51:00 PM image001.png With regrets Commissioner Bob Burns is unable to attend.   Lynn Jahnke Executive Aide to Commissioner Bob Burns Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street, Phoenix, AZ 85007 Phone: 602-542-3682 / Email: LJahnke@azcc.gov   From: Mahoney, Jo-Ann [mailto:jo-ann_mahoney@hks.harvard.edu] Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2018 11:04 AM To: Mahoney, Jo-Ann Cc: Gill, Susan A Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Cambridge session   Dear Commissioner,   We would like to invite you to attend the upcoming session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 7-8 here in Cambridge.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday, June 7 and adjourn by noon on Friday, June 8.  We plan to focus our discussions on Thursday on retail competition and the current implementation challenges of FERC Order 1000.  On Friday morning, we will turn our attention to a retrospective panel that looks toward the future of electricity markets, 25 years after the passage of the Energy Policy Act.    On Thursday evening, we will host a dinner at Harvard’s Fogg Art Museum.       We can offer lodging in Harvard Square and have travel funds available, upon request.  Kindly let us know by Monday, May 7 at noon, if you would be available to join us.   We look forward to hearing from you.   Sincerely, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 ACC001010 (617) 495-1390 ACCOO1011 From: To: Cc: Subject: Date: Attachments: BDunn@azcc.gov Patrick Maloney Erin Ford Faulhaber Fwd: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Cambridge session Tuesday, May 15, 2018 3:56:32 PM HEPG Cambridge Commissioners Fillable Registration.pdf ATT00001.htm Patrick, Please affirm my attendance for the upcoming Harvard Committee meeting. I have already scheduled air travel from Boise on Wed June 6 with a return flight to Phoenix on Sat June 9. I will need hotel accommodations for Nancy and myself for those 3 days. Thanks, Boyd Sent from my iPad Begin forwarded message: From: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Date: May 1, 2018 at 2:04:11 PM EDT To: "Mahoney, Jo-Ann" Cc: "Gill, Susan A" Subject: Invitation to Harvard Electricity Policy Group Cambridge session Dear Commissioner,   We would like to invite you to attend the upcoming session of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group to be held on Thursday-Friday, June 7-8 here in Cambridge.  The meeting will convene at breakfast on Thursday, June 7 and adjourn by noon on Friday, June 8.  We plan to focus our discussions on Thursday on retail competition and the current implementation challenges of FERC Order 1000.  On Friday morning, we will turn our attention to a retrospective panel that looks toward the future of electricity markets, 25 years after the passage of the Energy Policy Act.    On Thursday evening, we will host a dinner at Harvard’s Fogg Art Museum.       We can offer lodging in Harvard Square and have travel funds available, upon request.  Kindly let us know by Monday, May 7 at noon, if you would be available to join us.   We look forward to hearing from you.   Sincerely, Jo-Ann   Jo-Ann Mahoney ACC001013 Project Director, Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG) Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street, Box 84 Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-1390         ACC001014 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG Ninety-First Plenary Session Harvard Kennedy School Thursday and Friday, June 7-8, 2018 Cambridge, MA TO: Harvard Electricity Policy Group John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Phone E-mail __________________________________ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Registration deadline: May 7 ACC001015 3:57: 17 ACCOO1 016 Date: Attachments: Tuesday, May 15, 2018 3:56:50 PM HEPG Cambridge Commissioners Fillable Registration.pdf     Patrick Maloney Deputy Policy Advisor Office: (602) 542-3935 Cell: (602) 469-5705   ACC001017 REGISTRATION FORM HEPG Ninety-First Plenary Session Harvard Kennedy School Thursday and Friday, June 7-8, 2018 Cambridge, MA TO: Harvard Electricity Policy Group John F. Kennedy School of Government FROM: Name Title Affiliation Address Boyd Dunn Commissioner Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington St. Phoenix, AZ 85007 Phone E-mail 602-542-3935 pmaloney@azcc.gov __________________________________ ✔ ______YES, I will be able to attend the HEPG Plenary Session. ______ NO, I will not be able to attend the meeting. To register for the session, please e-mail this reply form to: susan_gill@hks.harvard.edu Registration deadline: May 7 ACC001018