Policy Analysis on China’s Civil Society Organizations
First Quarter of 2018

Summary
Civil society organizations (CSOs) in China faced increasingly grim
circumstances in the first quarter of 2018. Whether looking at the direct impact of the
Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities
(FNGO Law)(《境外非政府组织境内管理法》) or the Charity Law(慈善法), control
and even suppression of CSOs grew on the concrete, operational level.
In the first quarter, the negative effect of the relevant laws, regulations, and
policies on CSOs is as clear as day. For example, the fates of FNGOs in the wake of
the FNGO Law has varied widely. Small-scale grassroots organizations in China
whose long-term funders have not yet been registered are unable to continue their
funded activities, bringing them to an impasse. At the same time, Jiangsu became the
first province in the country to enact local regulations on the Charity Law. This local
regulation has constrained individual fundraising due to lack of clarity from the
central government. In addition, there has been much talk of preferential tax policies
for charitable organizations, but no substantial progress on this front. The Religious
Affairs Regulations(《宗教事务条例》) went into effect on February 1, unequivocally
separating religious and charitable activities; on January 24 the Ministry of Civil
Affairs issued the Law on the Management of Civil Society Credit and
Information(《社会组织信用信息管理办法》), while the CSO “black list” system is
set to launch nationwide.
Looking at first quarter (Q1), it is clear that the pressure on CSOs, from the
central authorities down to local governments, has not abated. There have been
attacks on “illegal CSOs”; the shuttering of the Weibo and WeChat public accounts of
the popular Feminist Voices (女权之声); and the end of six months of “residential

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 surveillance at a designated location” (指定居所监视居住) for Human Rights
Campaign in China head Zhen Jianghua, followed by his formal arrest.
Judging from the trends in the first quarter, whether legal or practical, the winter
of Chinese civil society will not relent in 2018. The space for CSO activities will
shrink even more this year.

Impact of Laws and Policies on CSOs
At the legal level, the Chinese government is continuously strengthening its
supervision and control of CSOs. A series of laws and regulations related to CSOs,
including the FNGO Law, the Charity Law, the Religious Affairs Regulations, and the
Law on the Management of Civil Society Credit and Information, is having an
increasingly negative impact on Chinese CSOs.
I. Under Government Leadership, Organizations Hit by “Fire and Ice” of FNGO
Law(《境外法》)
Once the arrival of the Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental
Organizations’ Activities (FNGO Law) was an established fact, those in the civil
society profession focused most on the degree to which this law would be strictly
enforced and whether foreign NGOs of different types and purviews would be able to
carry out activities in China. Last year, the BBC reported that some FNGOs were
unable to carry out activities in China or to subsidize projects, and that they were
having difficulty registering.[1] These obstacles seem to have carried into this year. At
the same time, a portion of FNGOs have come under the official management of the
Ministry of Public Security through the registration process. Overall, in Q1 the fates
of FNGOs in the wake of the FNGO Law have varied widely, putting small-scale
grassroots organizations in a tight spot. Under the government’s leadership, different
organizations have been battered by the “fire and ice” brought by the FNGO Law.
The Chinese authorities have been actively promoting the FNGO Law through
propaganda and specialized training, making the general public ever more aware of
the law and successfully leading some FNGOs to comply. At the beginning of the
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 year, the provinces and autonomous regions of Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong,
Guangxi, Hainan, and Ningxia rolled public-facing materials to promote the FNGO
Law[2]; while municipalities with a relatively high concentration of registered FNGOs,
such as Beijing and Shanghai, held trainings on the annual reporting process. Also at
the beginning of the year, the offices of FNGO management at the Ministry of Public
Security ( 公安部境外非政府组织管理办公室) and the Beijing Municipal Public
Security Bureau jointly convened a forum for representatives from a portion of
FNGOs.[3] The vast majority of participants showed approval of the guidance and
assistance provided during the public security registration process, for example
thanking public security for helping them find an organization to be in charge of the
FNGO’s operations. Some of the organizations made suggestions as to the
standardization and convenience of the law, recommending more supporting policies
and services, clear deadlines on approval of annual plans and reports, and so on.
In contrast to the enthusiasm cultivated by the government, some FGNOs have
not yet been able to register and have suspended their activities in China, threatening
the existence of small, grassroots organizations that depend on foreign aid to stay
afloat. At the aforementioned forum, the American Heart Association’s Asia
representative said the group has had difficulty finding an organization in charge of
operations; a Ford Foundation representative proposed helping more small FNGOs
complete the registration process. This indicates the stringency of the FNGO Law.

Case study: Suspending financial support -- the direct effect of the FNGO Law
on local grassroots organization

The Jiangsu Tongtian Working Group, founded on April 1, 2002, is a nonprofit
volunteer organization serving the gay community of Nanjing through a variety
of programs including community and culture building, health intervention, and
mental health support. Professor Zhang Beichuan of the Qingdao School of
Medicine provides support and advise to the organization, which receives
financial assistance from the Martin Trust via Qingdao’s “Friends Exchange”
program(《朋友通信》). Jiangsu Tongtian’s funder, Barry & Martin’s Trust, was
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 created by the British philanthropist Martin Gordon. The trust awards an annual
prize to a healthcare worker or medical treatment facility in recognition of
extraordinary contributions to addressing AIDS in China through education,
prevention, treatment, and care. This year, the Martin Trust suspended its
support for Jiangsu Tongtian. Mr. Martin himself wrote to Jiangsu Tongtian,
“You may be aware that the Law on Foreign NGO’s came into effect at the
beginning of this year, and this limits our ability to make grants in China, and
we have to go through various formalities.” Soon after, Jiangsu Tongtian issued
a statement on WeChat about its loss of funding, explaining that they are
currently unable to pay their rent and are in danger of folding. They also posted
a screenshot showing that the organization only has RMB 3761.69 in spare cash.
Jiangsu Tongtian has tried to find a way out of its predicament through
crowdfunding and activity fees.
II. Local Regulations on Charity Law(《慈善法》) Constrain Individual Fundraising,
Tax Preferences for Charities Still Unclear
After the Charity Law went into effect on September 1, 2016, Jiangsu became the
first—and thus far, only—province to treat the Charity Law as local regulation. On
December 2, 2017, at the 33rd congress of the 12th Jiangsu Provincial People’s
Congress Standing Committee, the Jiangsu Charity Ordinance (Ordinance) (《江苏省
慈善条例》)was passed into law. The Ordinance went into effect on March 1, 2018.
At a press conference, leading cadres stated that the province would lead the country
in legislating restrictions in individual fundraising (Ordinance Article 19).[4]
Aside from defining the scope of individual fundraising and guiding the target of
individual solicitation toward philanthropic organizations, the individual’s workplace,
and the local community (as opposed to indiscriminate solicitation of the public), an
explanatory document further points out that the Ordinance “stipulates that individual
fundraisers must take responsibility for the truthfulness of the information they
disseminate and must not fabricate or exaggerate their circumstances in order to
defraud donors. Radio stations, television channels, print publications, Internet service
providers, and mobile carriers are obligated to provide warnings of the risks posed by
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 individual fundraising campaigns. Mobile carriers which allow individuals to post
messages soliciting donations must provide a warning to remind recipients of the
message that it is an individual fundraising campaign and not a public donation drive.
At the same time, the Ordinance further stipulates that the above mentioned services
must assist individual fundraisers through broadcast messages, and must verify those
messages which it broadcasts on behalf of the individual.”[5]
Whether individual fundraising is charitable fundraising, and whether the former
should be regulated by the Charity Law, is one of the most controversial elements of
the legislation. Regarding the Ordinance’s standards for individual fundraising, Zhang
Gaorong, research director and assistant to the dean at the Beijing Normal University
China Philanthropy Research Institute, believes that “this has created conflicts
between local and national charity legislation.”

[4]

There are scholars who endorse the

regulation of individual fundraising, such as Jin Jinping, associate professor at the
Peking University Law School. She writes that there are numerous extant cases of
natural persons “soliciting donations” and that individual fundraising has already
turned into public donation campaigning, leading to marked misallocation of
resources, lack of clarity as to who has ownership rights of donations, difficulty
guaranteeing the goal for which contributions will be used, and challenges to
screening false information. Since the Charity Law clearly states that it makes no
adjustments to individual fundraising, it must be regulated through other applicable
laws. This has created difficulties for regulating individual fundraising.[6]
Once the first step toward regulating individual fundraising is taken at the
provincial level, other parts of the Charity Law in need of standardization or
clarification could be addressed at the municipal level. Among them, a major point
that has yet to reach a substantial breakthrough is the issue of tax preferences. At the
2018 Two Sessions, some National People’s Congress representatives proposed
clarifying charitable tax preferences and quickly bringing to completion supporting
policies in order to facilitate implementation in municipalities, emphasizing the effect
of tax preference levers on the growth of charitable organizations.[7] In the People’s
Daily, China Association of Social Security president and Renmin University

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 professor Zheng Gongcheng also called for enhancing the operability of tax
exemptions for charitable organizations.[8]
In sum, individual fundraising and the tax preference system are the hot-button
issues concerning the Charity Law in the beginning of 2018. Local governments are
guiding individuals to seek funding from charitable organizations and not directly
from the public. This will help charitable organizations to grow, but a public
fundraising culture has yet to be formed, and trust in charities themselves has yet to
be established. Local policy is not enough to resolve these issues. Alternatively, if tax
preferences can be quickly enacted in municipalities, they will spur the positive
growth of charitable organizations, and more enthusiastic members of the public will
invest in philanthropic undertakings.
III. Religious Affairs Regulations(《宗教事务条例》), Law on the Management of
Civil Society Credit and Information(《社会组织信用信息管理办法》) Augment
Regulation of NGO and Charitable Activity
The Religious Affairs Regulations are in effect as of February 1, 2018. The
Regulations limit the scope of religious activities and the conditions under which
religious organizations may accept contributions, while also requiring the strict
separation of public welfare activities and religious activities. In particular, the
Regulations stipulate:
Non-religious groups, non-religious schools, non-religious activity sites, or
non-designated temporary activity sites must not hold religious activities, must
not accept religious donations. Non-religious groups, non-religious schools,
and non-religious activity sites, must not carry out religious training and must
not organize citizens leaving the country to participate in religious training,
meetings, activities and so forth. (Article 41)

Public interest charitable activities must not be used to proselytize by any
organization or individual. (Article 56)

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 Religious groups, religious schools, and religious activity sites must not accept
donations from foreign organizations or individuals that have conditions
attached, and where the amount donated exceeds 100,000 RMB; it shall be
reported to the religious affairs department of the people’s governments at the
county level or above for review and approval. (Article 57)
With the CSO “black list” management law active nationwide, CSOs that
violate the law or break promises will come under strict supervision. From 2016, the
civil affairs bureaus in Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Shenyang have rolled out measures
to manage CSO suspect directories and lists of organizations in violation of law or
agreement. On January 24, 2018, the Ministry of Civil Affairs officially promulgated
the Law on the Management of Civil Society Credit and Information, stipulating three
consequences for CSOs listed as serious violators of the law or agreement: (1) no
access to incentives, such as the government purchasing service program; (2) the
organization and its leaders will be subject to close scrutiny; (3) the organization will
face a number of legal punishments. As of the end of Q1, three organizations have
been placed on the list of serious violators of the law or agreement, including the
Western Returned Scholars Association, the Haicang Charity Foundation, and the
Chinese Association for the Art of the Fan. Among them, the Ministry of Civil Affairs
subject the Western Returned Scholars Association to a three-month suspension of
activities as punishment for irregularities with regards to stated goals and professional
scope in fundraising, accepting donations, and utilizing property.[9]
Finally, in Q1 unregistered, unauthorized activities carried out under the name of
CSOs were still suspected of being illegal CSOs and came under attack. On February
6, 2018, the Ministry of Civil Affairs released a list of 179 suspect organizations.[10]
This round of investigation targeted activities carried out by organizations with
“Chinese” and “national” in their names, such as those posing as “Belt and Road”
strategic organizations. There is no information yet showing that this has affected the
ability of grassroots public welfare organizations to register under the existing laws.

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 Impact on Specific CSOs and Activists
In addition to the repercussions of laws and policies on CSOs, the relevant
authorities have not stopped targeting specific CSOs and activists. Whether legal,
regulatory, or operational, these actions once again demonstrate that the pressure
CSOs face is not unidirectional. Possible restrictions and pressures include: the
inability to register, punishment for violating the law, being added to the “black list,”
having one’s WeChat and Weibo accounts shut down, and activists being slandered,
detained, arrested, or even convicted and sentenced.
This quarter, the public watched as the Weibo and WeChat public accounts of the
popular group Feminist Voices were shut down one after the other. The shutdowns
happened the day after International Women’s Day. Weibo and WeChat said the
shutdowns were for “spreading sensitive and non-regulation content” and “in
accordance with the relevant laws, regulations, and policies.” Feminist Voices
rejected this vague explanation and issued a statement emphasizing that they had
never posted any content in violation of the law and regulations, and announcing that
they would pursue legal means to recover their accounts. In an interview, Li Sipan
who is a feminist said the shutdowns did not appear to be the work of one company,
since their accounts on multiple platforms had been wiped out.[11] After the incident,
“Coollabs.cn” called Feminist Voices “running dogs of the West who have betrayed
China for their own benefit” because they had received funding from the Ford
Foundation (which at the time had already registered in accordance with the FNGO
Law). A lawyer for Feminist Voices issued a warning to Coollabs.cn.
The reputations and human rights of individual civil society activists are also
under threat. In 2015, the Feminist Five (女权五姐妹) were detained for over 30 days
on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.” The procuratorate rejected
the case and did not authorize any arrests, on the grounds of insufficient evidence.
The case of the Feminist Five was widely viewed as a case of political pressure
applied to the feminist movement and to civil society. Yet in the middle of March
2018, one of the Five who had been detained, Zheng Churan, was publicly shamed
online. One of the arguments against her was the legal fact that she had been
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 criminally detained but had not mentioned that the evidence was insufficient. This
shows that public slander has become yet another tool to put political pressure on
social activists. In the current political environment, there is no guarantee of the
personal safety of activists. March 29, 2018 marked three months since Zhen
Jianghua, head of the FNGO Human Rights Campaign in China and a former social
worker “in the system,” had been placed under “residential surveillance at a
designated location.” He was soon formally arrested for “inciting subversion of state
power.” Zhen has not been able to see his lawyer for over six months. The lawyer has
gone to the detention center multiple times asking to see Zhen, but was told no such
person was there.

Conclusion
Whether one looks at the FNGO Law and the Charity Law, or at the drafting and
implemention of the Religious Affairs Regulations and the Civil Society Credit and
Information Law, one can see that the Chinese government is working through
regulations step-by-step to totally and “precisely” manage and control CSOs and the
public welfare and charitable actions run by NGOs, as well as to legally limit the
scope of public welfare and charitable actions. A massive amount of these actions are
now extremely constrained, to the point that any CSO activity may be labeled “illegal.”
At the level of practice, the suppression of CSOs is nothing new. Whether it is the
shutdown of Feminist Voices or the slandering and arrest of activists, this is certainly
not the first quarter in which such attacks have occurred. However, judging from the
trends in Q1, the winter of Chinese civil society will not relent in 2018, and CSOs
will face increasing difficulties.

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 References
1.

"Six Months After Start of China's New NGO Law, Foreign Organizations at
an Impasse." BBC Chinese, July 7, 2017.

2.

"Popularizing the Law through Propaganda: Those Masterstrokes of
Publicizing the Law." January 17, 2018.

3.

"Tell It Like It Is: FNGO Representative Talks About the Management Law."
FNGO Affairs Service Platform, January 26, 2018.

4.

Li Chao, "In March 2018, Jiangsu Will Be First Province to Implement Local
Regulation of Charity Law." China Youth Daily, December 5, 2017.

5.

Wang Hongxiang, "Understanding Jiangsu's Charity Regulations." Website of
the Standing Committee of the Jiangsu Provincial People's Congress,
December 18, 2017.

6.

Jin Jinping, "Legal Regulation of Online Donation Collection After
Implemention of Charity Law." Fudan University Journal of Social Sciences
2017, 59:4, p. 162-172.

7.

Zheng Chao, "National People's Congress Representative Tan Jieqing: Move
Forward with Tax Preferences for Charities." China Society News, March 19,
2018.

8.

Zheng Gongcheng, "Create a Better Environment for Charities." People's
Daily, April 2, 2018.

9.

He Guoke, "Experts: Civil Society Organizations Added to List of
Promise-Breakers, Consequences Worse Than Any Punishment." WeChat
public account of Civil Society Management Bureau, Ministry of Civil
Affairs, March 26, 2018.

10.

Huo Mu, "Comment: What's to Be Done About All These Illegal 'Chinese'
Civil Society Organizations?" February 10, 2018.

11.

Yang Fan, "'Feminist Voices' Weibo, WeChat Accounts Shut Down." March
13, 2018.

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