OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oi~dhs

MAR 2 4 2015
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Jeh C. Johnson
Secretary

FROM:

John Roth
Inspector G

SUBJECT:

Investigation into Employee Complaints about
Management of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services' EB-5 Program

~~a~
eral

Attached is our report of the investigation on the allegations made against
Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas. I have also attached the written
statement he gave to our investigators. The report is furnished for whatever
action you consider appropriate.
This report resulted from employees within USCIS who stepped forward to tell
us what they witnessed. We will protect the confidentiality of these courageous
employees, who are protected from retaliation by the Whistleblower Protection
Act and whose identities are protected under the provisions of the Inspector
General Act. We hope that their actions will set an example for all potential
whistleblowers who look to the Office of Inspector General to give them a voice.
Should you have any questions regarding the report, please feel free to contact
me.

Attachments

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Table of Contents
Introduction and Summary .................................................................... 1
Background ........................................................................................... 8
USCIS .......................................................................................... 8
The EB-5 Program ........................................................................ 8
EB-5 Application and Petition Process .......................................... 9
EB-5 Adjudication Guidance ....................................................... 12
Results of Investigation ........................................................................ 15
LA Films Regional Center ............................................................ 15
Las Vegas Regional Center .......................................................... 29
Gulf Coast Funds Management Regional Center ......................... 38
Abbreviations ....................................................................................... 53

Appendixes
Appendix A: LA Films Timeline ................................................... 54
Appendix B: Gulf Coast Timeline ................................................ 59
Appendix C: Alejandro Mayorkas’ Statement ............................... 66

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Introduction and Summary
We undertook this investigation after receiving allegations from career U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) employees that Alejandro
Mayorkas, then-Director of USCIS and current Deputy Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was exerting improper influence in
the normal processing and adjudication of applications and petitions in a
program administered by USCIS. Specifically, we were told that Mr. Mayorkas
was in contact, outside the normal adjudication process, with specific
applicants and other stakeholders in the Employment-Based Fifth Preference
(EB-5) program, which gives residency preference to aliens who agree to invest
in the U.S. economy to create jobs for U.S. citizens. We were also told he was
exerting influence to give these individuals preference and access not available
to others.
The scope of our investigation was to determine whether Mr. Mayorkas engaged
in conduct that would lead a reasonable person to believe that specific
individuals or groups were given special access or consideration in the EB-5
program.
As a result of our inquiry, we found:
•

USCIS personnel, including Mr. Mayorkas, recognized the risks to the
EB-5 program if benefits were granted without transparency and were
not adjudicated according to statute, regulations, and existing USCIS
policy governing EB-5 matters. USCIS therefore took pains to ensure all
communications with stakeholders were properly documented and to
ensure the process for deciding on petitions and applications closely
followed statute, regulations, and established policy. Indeed, USCIS was
obligated by law to follow the procedures set forth in the regulations. We
found a number of instances in which Mr. Mayorkas declined to become
involved in certain matters, stating that he did not think it would be
appropriate for the Director to do so.

•

In three matters pending before USCIS, however, Mr. Mayorkas
communicated with stakeholders on substantive issues, outside of the
normal adjudicatory process, and intervened with the career USCIS staff
in ways that benefited the stakeholders. In each of these three
instances, but for Mr. Mayorkas’ intervention, the matter would have
been decided differently.

•

We were unable to determine Mr. Mayorkas’ motives for his actions. In
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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

each instance he recollected, Mr. Mayorkas asserted that he intervened
to improve the EB-5 process or to prevent error. As a result, he claimed
that he took a hands-on approach when a case warranted his personal
involvement. Mr. Mayorkas told us that his sole motivation for such
involvement was to strengthen the integrity of the program; he said he
had no interest in whether a particular application or petition was
approved.
•

Regardless of Mr. Mayorkas’ motives, his intervention in these matters
created significant resentment in USCIS. This resentment was not
isolated to career staff adjudicating within the EB-5 program, but
extended to senior managers and attorneys responsible for the broader
USCIS mission and programs.

•

The juxtaposition of Mr. Mayorkas’ communication with external
stakeholders on specific matters outside the normal procedures, coupled
with favorable action that deviated from the regulatory scheme designed
to ensure fairness and evenhandedness in adjudicating benefits, created
an appearance of favoritism and special access.

Employee Whistleblower Complaints and Other Sources of Information
We started this inquiry as a result of a whistleblower complaint in September,
2012. During the course of our work, we identified a significant number of
DHS employees—more than15—with varying levels of responsibility and
authority, including some very senior managers at USCIS and USCIS’ Office of
the Chief Counsel (OCC), who each had direct contact with Mr. Mayorkas and
were in a position to witness the events. Each conveyed the same factual
scenario: certain applicants and stakeholders received preferential access to
DHS leadership and preferential treatment in either the handling of their
application or petition or regarding the merits of the application or petition.
Other employees with whom we spoke did not have direct contact with Mr.
Mayorkas, but witnessed significant deviations from the normal process for
certain applicants. Many witnesses provided emails, written
contemporaneously with the events, to support their allegations of special
access and treatment.
The number and variety of witnesses is highly unusual. It is also quite
unusual that a significant percentage of the witnesses we interviewed would
talk to us only after being assured that their identities would remain

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

confidential. 1 Being a whistleblower is seen to be hazardous in the Federal
Government, and a typical investigation would have one or perhaps two. That
so many individuals were willing to step forward and tell us what happened is
evidence of deep resentment about Mr. Mayorkas’ actions related to the EB-5
program. These employees worked in both USCIS headquarters and the
California Service Center. Headquarters staff worked in Service Center
Operations (the unit that supervised the California Service Center), the
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), the EB-5 program office, in USCIS
leadership offices, and in OCC. The employees include current and retired
career and non-career members of the Senior Executive Service, attorneys, all
levels of supervisors, immigration officers, and those involved in fraud
detection and national security.
Their allegations were unequivocal: Mr. Mayorkas gave special access and
treatment to certain individuals and parties. They told us he created special
processes and revised existing policies in the EB-5 program to accommodate
specific parties. According to the employees, but for Mr. Mayorkas’ actions, the
career staff would have decided these matters differently. Employees felt
uncomfortable and pressured to comply with managers’ instructions that
appeared to have come from Mr. Mayorkas or those working directly for him.
Again, these comments were not from one or even a couple of disgruntled
employees with axes to grind; rather, these were individuals throughout the
ranks of USCIS, in different locations, engaged in different functions, with
different experience levels.
We looked to see whether the complaints stemmed from mere resentment
about Mr. Mayorkas wanting to change how USCIS operated. As the Director,
Mr. Mayorkas appeared to want to change the culture of USCIS. Employees
told us that he exhorted individuals to “get to yes.” To accomplish this
mission, he made a number of reassignments within the Senior Executive
Service corps, including within the EB-5 program. He restructured the EB-5
program, including relocating the processing center from California to
Washington, DC, and he instituted broad new rules that, in the minds of many
career USCIS employees, eased the ability of foreign investors to receive
residency status.
Each of these decisions was legitimately within his purview, and we take no
position as to the wisdom of any of these actions. However, the complaints we
We are obligated to protect whistleblowers from retaliation and have a duty under the
Inspector General Act to not disclose the identity of an employee without his or her consent,
unless we determine such disclosure is unavoidable. As a result, this report does not identify
any employee witnesses.
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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

heard were not simply policy-based disagreement over the direction Mr.
Mayorkas was taking USCIS. Rather, they centered on his actions that
appeared to give special access and special consideration to a small group of
applicants and stakeholders.
During the course of our investigation, we conducted approximately 50
interviews, including taking sworn statements, collected more than one million
official emails and related files (including the email files of Mr. Mayorkas and
other senior Department leaders), and analyzed more than 40,000 telephone
call records. 2 We made several attempts to interview key external EB-5
stakeholders, many of whom declined to speak with us. Upon completion of
our witness interviews and document review, we interviewed Mr. Mayorkas to
obtain his perspective on what we had found. After the interview, Mr.
Mayorkas provided a 32-page written statement and supporting exhibits. Mr.
Mayorkas’ written response is appended to this report. During our interview
with Mr. Mayorkas, we learned of additional material he had left behind at
USCIS headquarters; we also reviewed this material. We did all of this to gain
a clearer and more accurate view of the events and circumstances central to
this investigation. 3
Appearance of Favoritism and Special Access
We found that employees’ belief that Mr. Mayorkas favored certain politically
powerful EB-5 stakeholders was reasonable. In our view, Mr. Mayorkas
created this perception:
Mr. Mayorkas was in contact, outside of the normal adjudication process,
either directly or through senior DHS leadership, with a number of
We were unable to obtain records from Mr. Mayorkas’ office telephone, so we do not have
records of calls he may have made from or received in his office because the telephone system
at USCIS (private branch exchange) switches calls between users on local lines and allows all
users to share a certain number of external phone lines.
3 Although we are confident in the fidelity of the data we did acquire, we often found that the
“dataset” (i.e., email and like files associated with a user name) was incomplete for the time
period requested or simply did not exist. We also identified similar problems with Mr.
Mayorkas’ calendar. For example, employees provided copies of emails from Mr. Mayorkas that
we did not find when we searched Mr. Mayorkas’ email dataset. Our investigation did not
reveal that incomplete or missing datasets were the result of intentional efforts to delete them,
but rather a combination of circumstances indicating a broader issue of data retention within
the Department. For example, we encountered problems resulting from the migration between
old and new email systems, significant limitations in searching and acquiring data from older
tape backup systems, and inadequate component and departmental data retention policies
(both past and present) or poorly enforced policies.
2

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

applicants and other stakeholders having business before USCIS. This
method of communication violated established USCIS policy for handling
inquiries into the program. We do not have direct evidence of what Mr.
Mayorkas and these applicants and stakeholders discussed; some emails
suggest that the conversations were quite substantive. In Mr. Mayorkas’
testimony for his confirmation as Deputy Secretary, and in his interview
with us, he stated that he simply received information from a variety of
stakeholders and then acted on it to improve the program. With few
exceptions, the other parties to the conversations declined to speak with
us.
•

USCIS staff knew that Mr. Mayorkas was communicating with applicants
and other stakeholders outside established USCIS policy; they also
understood that these applicants were prominent or politically
connected.

•

After this communication, staff witnessed Mr. Mayorkas inserting himself
in unprecedented ways into an adjudicative process governed by statute,
regulation, and USCIS policy. As a result of his deviation from the
normal process, applicants and stakeholders with whom he had just
been in contact received a specific benefit.

Many employees concluded, not unreasonably, that the pressure exerted on
them was because the individuals involved were politically connected. As one
employee told us:
In January 2013 we received expedite requests for both Gulf
Coast Funds and Las Vegas Regional Centers. Both of these
requests made their way to Director Mayorkas and a whole
slew of top USCIS people were involved in making these
expedites happen. What is concerning is that we are very
inconsistent as just a few weeks later, in early February
2013, we received expedite requests from two additional
Regional Centers, Grand Canyon and Florida Equity and
Growth Fund. Upon receipt of these requests, [senior-level
USCIS management] forwards the request to the California
Service Center and simply asks the CSC to handle as they
deem appropriate. Why was there no commentary on the
validity of their request as was the case with Las Vegas?
Why did these not make their way to Director Mayorkas?
Why were we not as concerned with these requests as we
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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

were with Gulf Coast Funds and Las Vegas Regional
Centers?
Extraordinary Focus on a Handful of Matters
Mr. Mayorkas’ focus on a few applicants and stakeholders was particularly
troubling to employees, given the massive scope of his responsibilities as
Director of USCIS. The EB-5 program has hundreds of existing regional
centers and, in the three years in question, received more than 700
applications for regional centers. Yet, Mr. Mayorkas largely focused on only a
handful.
The EB-5 program itself was only a fraction of USCIS’ operations, comprising
only a few thousand adjudications out of a typical annual total of more than
five million. Notwithstanding his other duties, Mr. Mayorkas’ actions involving
a handful of applicants—going so far, for example, as to offer to personally
write a complex adjudicatory opinion—were seen by staff as evidence of special
access and special favors. One senior-level manager told us that “the
frequency of the interest shown by the Director's office in the AAO's EB-5
caseload escalated beyond any interest shown in other types of cases.”
Three Examples of Contact and Intervention
USCIS personnel consistently made allegations about the same three matters.
In each instance, Mr. Mayorkas was in contact with individuals perceived by
career USCIS employees to be politically powerful and intervened in the
adjudicative process in unprecedented ways to the stakeholders’ benefit. We
describe these three instances in more detail in the body of this report. To help
understand the facts, we have also included timelines for two of these matters
in appendixes.
•

LA Films Regional Center: Mr. Mayorkas ordered that a USCIS decision
to deny a proposal to fund a series of Sony movie projects in Los Angeles
be reversed after he was in contact with politically prominent
stakeholders associated with the venture. Mr. Mayorkas later created a
“deference review board,” staffed with individuals he handpicked, to
review a separate series of Time Warner movie projects. This board did
not previously exist and was never used again after it voted to reverse the
adjudicators’ proposed denials. Remarkably, there is no record of the
proceedings of this board.

•

Las Vegas Regional Center: At the request of Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid, Mr. Mayorkas intervened to allow expedited review of
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Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

investor petitions involved in funding a Las Vegas hotel and casino,
notwithstanding the career staff’s original decision not to do so. The
career staff noted that the purported urgency was of the applicant’s own
making and that the decision to expedite fell outside EB-5 program
guidelines. Nevertheless, Mr. Mayorkas pressured staff to expedite the
review. He also took the extraordinary step of requiring staff to brief
Senator Reid’s staff on a weekly basis for several months.
•

Gulf Coast Funds Management Regional Center: Mr. Mayorkas
intervened in an administrative appeal related to the denial of a regional
center’s application to receive EB-5 funding to manufacture electric cars
through investments in a company in which Terry McAuliffe was the
board chairman. This intervention was unprecedented and, because of
the political prominence of the individuals involved, as well as USCIS’
traditional deference to its administrative appeals process, staff perceived
it as politically motivated.

Mr. Mayorkas’ actions in these matters created a perception within the EB-5
program that certain individuals had special access and would receive special
consideration. It also lowered the morale of those involved.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Background
USCIS
Within DHS, USCIS is responsible for granting immigration and citizenship
benefits while ensuring the integrity of the U.S. immigration system.
USCIS is massive, comprising about 19,000 employees and contractors and
223 office locations. It supports dozens of different immigration benefit
programs affecting millions of individuals. In 2012, for example, USCIS
received more than six million requests to grant or adjust immigration status,
including almost 900,000 requests for naturalization and 1.2 million requests
for work authorization. According to its website, USCIS issues 6,100
Permanent Resident Cards (green cards) and naturalizes 3,200 civilians every
day.
The EB-5 program is one of five employment-based visa programs, which
include programs for skilled and professional workers. USCIS also administers
family based visas, humanitarian and refugee visas, and citizenship programs.
The EB-5 Program 4
In 1990, Congress created the USCIS Immigrant Investor Program, also known
as the EB-5 program, to stimulate the U.S. economy through job creation and
capital investment by foreign investors.
Through the EB-5 program, foreign investors may obtain lawful, permanent
residency in the United States for themselves, their spouses, and their minor
unmarried children by making a certain level of capital investment and
associated job creation or preservation. Three years later, the Departments of
Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1993 created the concept of the regional center pilot
program to pool investor money in a defined industry and geographic area to
promote economic growth. 5 U.S. citizens or foreign nationals can operate
regional centers, which can be any economic unit, public or private, engaged in

In December 2013, we published a report of an audit of the EB-5 program, which can be
found at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2014/OIG_14-19_Dec13.pdf. Much of the
description of the EB-5 program is derived from that audit report.
4

On August 3, 2012, Congress removed the word “pilot” from the regional center program’s
name; however, the program expiration date is currently September 30, 2015.
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the promotion of economic growth, improved regional productivity, job creation,
or increased domestic capital investment.
The EB-5 program requires that the foreign investor make a capital investment
of either $500,000 or $1 million, depending on whether or not the investment
is in a high-unemployment area, known as a Targeted Employment Area. The
foreign investors must invest the proper amount of capital in a business, called
a new commercial enterprise, which will create or preserve at least 10 full-time
jobs for qualifying U.S. workers, within two years of receiving conditional
permanent residency. There are two distinct EB-5 pathways for a foreign
investor to gain lawful permanent residency; each pathway differs in job
creation requirements:
1) The Basic Immigrant Investor Program requires the new commercial
enterprise to create or preserve only direct jobs that provide employment
opportunities for qualifying U.S. workers by the commercial enterprise in
which capital has been directly invested.
2) The Regional Center Program, formerly known as the Regional Center Pilot
Program, allows the foreign investor to fulfill the job creation requirement
through direct jobs or projections of jobs created indirectly. Jobs created
indirectly are the job opportunities that are predicted to occur because of
investments associated with the regional center. According to USCIS, as of
March 2, 2015, USCIS had approved approximately 641 regional centers.
Because the EB-5 program distributes a very significant benefit for a specific
public purpose, admittance to the program is controlled by a detailed statutory
and regulatory scheme. Title 8, Section 1153(b)(5) of the U.S. Code sets forth
the statutory requirements; USCIS has promulgated rules for eligibility in the
Code of Federal Regulations (8 CFR 204.6). The process for adjudicating these
Government benefits is in 8 CFR, Sections 103.2 to 103.10. USCIS is required
by law to follow those procedures in administering the program.
EB-5 Application and Petition Process
Regional Center Applications
Individuals or entities must file a Form I-924 application with USCIS to become
an approved regional center or to amend a previous approval. Once the
application is approved, USCIS requires the regional center to report
operational and financial data annually on a Form I-924A. The regional center
can only operate within a self-defined geographic area and within a self9

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Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

designated industry. USCIS documents show that regional centers generally
collect unregulated management and administrative fees between $25,000 and
$50,000 from each foreign investor. These fees include travel and marketing
expenses, legal fees, and sales commissions.
To support the application, a regional center must submit initial evidence
including:
1. A detailed map of the geographic area of the regional center;
2. An explanation of how 10 new full-time jobs will be created, directly or
indirectly, by each petitioner who will invest in the regional center,
including an economic analysis forecasting how jobs will be created that
includes a business plan;
3. A detailed description of promotional activities for the regional center;
4. A general prediction of the prospective impact of the capital investment
projects sponsored by the regional center; and,
5. A full description of the organization structure of the regional center.
If an I-924 application is denied, then a regional center may appeal to the
USCIS AAO, the office that, pursuant to regulation, is required to decide
appeals of unfavorable decisions issued by USCIS adjudicators.
Individual Immigrant Investor Petitions
Each foreign investor must file a Form I-526 petition to apply to the EB-5
program. If the Form I-526 petition is approved, the investor obtains
conditional permanent residency and has two years to fulfill the program
requirements of job creation and capital investment. At the end of the two-year
period, the investor must file a Form I-829 petition to demonstrate that the
investor has met all of the terms and conditions of the program. When
approved, the foreign investor becomes a legal permanent resident of the
United States and is no longer under the jurisdiction of the EB-5 program.
In addition to the Form I-526 petition, the individual investor must file initial
evidence to support the petition. Initial evidence includes:
1. Evidence that a petitioner has established a lawful business entity in the
United States under the law of the jurisdiction in which the company is
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located, or, if an investment was made, that the investment led to at least
a 40 percent increase in net worth of the business, the number of
employees, or both, such as articles of incorporation, partnership
agreement, stock purchase agreements, investment agreements, or
payroll records;
2. Evidence, if applicable, that the enterprise was established in a Targeted
Employment Area;
3. Evidence that a petitioner has invested or is investing the amount
required for the business locations, such as bank statements, evidence of
assets purchased, property transferred, or monies transferred;
4. Evidence that capital was obtained through lawful means, such as
foreign business registration records, tax records filed within the last five
years, evidence of other sources of capital, and certified copies of any
civil or criminal action against the petitioner in a court outside the
United States in the past 15 years;
5. Evidence that the enterprise will have at least 10 full-time employees,
such as tax records or Form I-9s or a business plan that shows that
such employees will be hired within the next two years; and
6. Evidence that the petitioner will be engaged in the management of the
enterprise, such as statement of position title and complete list of duties,
evidence that a petitioner is a corporate officer or holds a seat on the
board of directors, or, if the new enterprise is a new partnership,
evidence that the petitioner engages in either direct management or
policymaking activities.
If initial evidence originally provided by the petitioner does not establish
eligibility, then a USCIS adjudicator may issue a Request for Evidence (RFE) or
a Notice of Intent to Deny that give the petitioner adequate notice and sufficient
information to respond. If an I-526 petition is denied, the petitioner may
appeal to the AAO.

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In fiscal year 2012, 6,041 immigrant investor petitions were filed in this
program, and USCIS granted 3,677 petitions for temporary residency. In that
same year, 736 alien investors were granted permanent residency status. 6
After two years, the petitioner may file a Form I-829, Petition by Entrepreneur to
Remove Conditions, to receive permanent resident status. Petitioners must
submit evidence with the I-829 petition, including:
1. Evidence of the commercial enterprise and evidence that the required
amount of investment was made, such as Federal tax returns and
audited financial statements;
2. Evidence that the enterprise was sustained during the period of
conditional permanent residence, such as invoices, bank statements,
and contracts; and
3. Evidence of the number of full-time employees, such as payroll records.
If an I-829 petition is denied, the petitioner does not have appeal rights and
deportation proceedings will commence. The petitioner may challenge the I829 denial during deportation proceedings.
EB-5 Adjudication Guidance
USCIS’ process for considering and adjudicating applications is governed by
regulations, which address how a petitioner may file for a benefit, who may
represent the petitioner in dealing with the Government, the processes of
agency decision-making, how to appeal an unfavorable decision, and other
matters.
On April 2, 2010, Mr. Mayorkas distributed a memorandum to provide
guidance to staff on avoiding or preventing situations that could give the
appearance of preferential treatment. According to the memo:
Each USCIS employee has the duty to act impartially in the
performance of his or her official duties. Any occurrence of
actual or perceived preferential treatment, e.g., treating
USCIS publishes wait times for the EB-5 program. As of January 2015, USCIS had the
following wait times for decision: I-526, 14.2 months; I-829, 12.3 months; I-924, 11.7 months.
https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processTimesDisplayInit.do
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similarly-situated applicants differently, can call into
question our ability to implement our Nation’s immigration
laws fairly, honestly and properly.
A USCIS employee could violate the prohibitions against
preferential treatment in a number of ways, by:
…
Meeting with certain stakeholders to the exclusion of
others …
Often the appearance of preferential treatment can be as
damaging to our Agency’s reputation as actual preferential
treatment; therefore, a USCIS employee should avoid matters
(e.g., cases or applications) if his or her participation may
cause a reasonable person to question the employee’s
impartiality. Should a question arise whether an employee’s
action(s) might be seen as providing preferential treatment,
the employee should discuss his or her concerns with a
supervisor or USCIS Ethics Officer before acting on the
matter….” [MOA-0003467]
In December 2009, soon after Mr. Mayorkas was confirmed as Director, USCIS
management instituted a policy that governed how USCIS personnel could
communicate with stakeholders, including applicants. The policy
reemphasized that “transparency in the administration of this program is
critical to its success.”
Because USCIS is responsible for administering an important Government
benefit pursuant to a specific regulatory regime, the policy required that
communication between USCIS and applicants and other stakeholders be
formalized and documented. This policy mandated that USCIS staff include in
the formal file “all case-specific written communication with external
stakeholders involving receipt of information relating to specific EB-5 Regional
Center Proposals or individual petitions.” In those “very limited instances
where oral communication takes place between USCIS staff and external
stakeholders regarding specific EB-5 cases, the conversation must either be
recorded, or detailed minutes of the session must be taken and included in the
record of proceeding.” [MOA-0003475]

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Additionally, because confusion can result from stakeholders receiving advice
and updates from multiple USCIS sources, the same policy established a
singular process for applicants and stakeholders to make inquiries.
Specifically, to ensure orderly and fair processing of communication from
stakeholders, all inquiries were to be made and tracked through an email
account set up for that purpose. Also, all contact, whether general or casespecific, with EB-5 stakeholders was to be through a central email account
created for that purpose, which could be tracked. In that way, there would be
a central record of the communication to and from petitioners and others with
an interest in specific cases. [MOA-0003475]

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Results of Investigation
LA Film Regional Center
Allegations Related to Reversing Adjudicators’ Decisions and Establishment of a
New Hearing Process
In early 2013, Mr. Mayorkas created an extraordinary and unprecedented
hearing process that many alleged resulted in preferential treatment to a
specific regional center. They also alleged that the process was established as
a result of improper personal access that Mr. Mayorkas gave to Tom Rosenfeld
and former Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell. Specifically, we received
allegations that Mr. Mayorkas established a Deference Review Board (DRB),
purportedly to ensure that foreign investor petitioners in similar situations
were treated equally, but in fact was intended to and gave preferential
treatment to a project of the Los Angeles Film Regional Center (LA Film
Regional Center) and its principal, Tom Rosenfeld. Many witnesses further
alleged that in 2011 there was similar preferential treatment because of
improper personal access when Mr. Mayorkas ordered the reversal of a decision
to deny more than 200 investor petitions.
LA Film Regional Center Approved
CanAm Enterprises LLC (CanAm) operates LA Film Regional Center and several
other regional centers, including the Philadelphia Industrial Development
Corporation (PIDC). Tom Rosenfeld is the President and CEO of CanAm. On
March 24, 2008, USCIS approved CanAm’s application for LA Film Regional
Center to be a designated regional center. The focus of the investment activity,
according to the application, would be the production of (1) motion pictures for
theatrical release; (2) motion pictures for direct to video or DVD release; (3)
television shows, segments, and series; and (4) made-for-television feature
movies. The LA Film Regional Center would provide loans for film projects. On
November 19, 2009, USCIS approved LA Film Regional Center’s amendment to
create the LA County Regional Center, which added nine industrial clusters—
agriculture and food processing, alternative energy, health services, higher
education, leasehold improvements, manufacturing and trade, technology,
tourism, and transportation—to LA Film’s already approved industries. As a
result of this amendment, the LA Film Regional Center became the LA County
Regional Center, referred to hereinafter as LA Films.

15

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

LA Films I – Lions Gate Entertainment
The first LA Films funding project (LA Films I) involved an investment in movie
projects produced by Lions Gate Entertainment (Lions Gate). In February
2009, USCIS approved most of the petitions from investors, who placed their
money in escrow and were granted conditional permanent residence status
(temporary residence status). However, LA Films never used a large portion of
the investors’ money because Lions Gate was not legally obligated to and
decided not to accept the funding from the EB-5 investors. Many of the
investors, whose I-526 petitions had been granted based on the LA Films I
business plan, would probably have their I-829 petitions for permanent
residence denied because they would not be able to demonstrate that any jobs
had been created. Many within USCIS understood that it was an error to have
approved this project relying on a “non-commitment letter” with Lions Gate in
which there were no assurances that the investors’ money would actually be
used. 7 [EM-0000328]
As a result, on August 27, 2010, LA Films requested that it be allowed to
amend its project proposal by substituting Time Warner for Lions Gate. (This
proposal was known as LA Films II.) On September 23, 2010, USCIS denied
the amendment. In doing so, USCIS determined that the amendment
constituted an impermissible material change and advised LA Films that the
investors would have to withdraw their petitions and submit new ones. USCIS
based its denial on a December 11, 2009, USCIS policy memorandum, which
required the resubmission of petitions when the proposed project underwent a
material change since its original submission. USCIS also questioned whether,
under the described plan, the investors’ money would be used for job creation.
LA Films III – Sony Pictures
In the spring and early summer of 2011, USCIS received more than 200
investor petitions proposing to invest in movies made by Sony Pictures. EB-5
officials saw the Sony project (LA Films III) as having the same problem as the
unsuccessful Lions Gate proposal: Sony was not obligated to accept the
investors’ money. The supporting documentation submitted with the petitions
showed that Sony provided a non-commitment letter. Additionally, there was
no proof of the source of the funds or that money would be spent in a Targeted

A non-commitment letter between a lender and a film company gives the film company the
option to accept the loan financing from the lender, but does not commit the film company to
accepting the money.

7

16

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Employment Area. 8 By June 2, 2011, the California Service Center had
prepared a draft denial of the petitions from the LA Films III investors because
the project did not meet the EB-5 program’s eligibility criteria. [EM-0000326,
332]
LA Films III Stakeholders Appeal Directly to Mr. Mayorkas
On June 13, 2011, Katherine Hennigan, the Senior Policy Director at the Los
Angeles Mayor’s Office of Economic & Business Policy, emailed Mr. Mayorkas
about the progress of the investor petitions involving the Sony project and
included a letter from the California Film Commission. Hennigan was
apparently unaware that USCIS had already prepared draft denial letters for
the LA Films III investor petitions. [EM-0000326, 333]
Mr. Mayorkas forwarded Hennigan’s email to senior EB-5 staff to follow up on
the issue, noting that “the EB-5 cases have an urgency” because of the time
sensitivity of the investment vehicles and job creation potential. Over the next
two weeks, Hennigan sent three follow-up emails to Mr. Mayorkas, which he
also forwarded to senior EB-5 staff. Other than Hennigan’s representation, we
found no evidence showing how or why Mr. Mayorkas determined these cases
were urgent compared to other pending investor petitions. According to Mr.
Mayorkas in his interview, he may not have known about the urgency of the
petitions other than what Hennigan wrote in her email. He also stated he did
not recall knowing Hennigan. 9 [EM-0000330, 335], [MOA-0004916-4917]
Senior EB-5 officials looked into the issues raised by Hennigan and, after
reviewing the status of the petitions, explained to Mr. Mayorkas that it did not
appear the individual investors were able to meet the EB-5 approval
requirements. They informed him that the California Service Center was
working with OCC to draft denial notices. On June 17, 2011, Mr. Mayorkas
asked to discuss the matter with senior staff, noting that he had previously
disagreed with some of EB-5 officials’ legal interpretations. On June 29, 2011,
Mr. Mayorkas wrote to senior USCIS headquarters officials that “I understand
from [a senior official] that [the petitions] may have some fatal deficiencies.” It
appears Mr. Mayorkas’ earlier concerns were satisfied because, according to a
July 7, 2011, email from a senior USCIS headquarters official, “Ali said to go
ahead and issue the denials without any further briefings or meetings.” On
8 By investing in a Targeted Employment Area an investor only has to invest $500,000 (rather
than $1,000,000 in other areas) to be eligible for temporary residence status.
9 We did not find any evidence that Mr. Mayorkas forwarded an email from Hennigan in which
she mentioned that she had met a mutual acquaintance from O’Melveny & Myers LLP, a law
firm where Mr. Mayorkas was a partner prior to becoming the Director of USCIS.

17

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

July 13, 2011, another senior official told staff to proceed with the LA Films III
denial. [EM-0000332, 339], [MOA-0003870, 4933]
Mr. Mayorkas Directs EB-5 Staff to Stop Denying All LA Films III Investor
Petitions
On July 15, 2011, Mr. Mayorkas, while on vacation, spoke by telephone with
former Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell, with whom he had previously
had dealings. 10 Within an hour of the Rendell phone call, Mr. Mayorkas
directed the California Service Center staff to reopen any LA Films III denials
and to stop processing any more LA Films III denials. Mr. Mayorkas’ decision
to reverse course was unexpected and surprised the California Service Center
staff. An urgent message, emailed that afternoon from USCIS headquarters to
the California Service Center and forwarded to Mr. Mayorkas, described the
situation: [EM-0000343], [MOA-00003871-3872, 4830-4837], [CAL-0000737]
We're in crisis mode—please see if these denials have gone
out. It wouldn't surprise me if they did because we gave you
the go ahead to do so. If they have, we need to reopen them
pending further review. Ali wants this to happen today, so at
the very least we need to send them an email telling them to
disregard the prior denial notices while we sort through this.
Feel free to give me a call, this is very urgent. [EM-0000343]
EB-5 officials could not understand the basis for the reversal because, in their
view, the denials had been based on regulations and an economist’s feedback.
For them, the Sony proposal had an almost identical funding scheme as the
Lions Gate project and therefore the same problem meeting EB-5 program
requirements. In the view of the EB-5 officials, the Sony project, if approved,
would suffer the same fate.
Mr. Mayorkas told us in his interview that he could not recall the basis of his
initial concerns about the LA Films III denial, but noted that the case involved
a “financing” issue. He said there would have been a discussion among senior
In 2010, while he was governor, Rendell had personally contacted Mr. Mayorkas about a
CanAm project, PIDC. On June 15, 2010, Governor Rendell wrote to Mr. Mayorkas asking for
support on three PIDC investments and expressing concerns about the processing of related
investor petitions. On August 2, 2010, Rendell sent a second letter to Mr. Mayorkas, and on
August 20, 2010, Mr. Mayorkas had a scheduled phone call with the Governor to address the
issues raised in the two letters. Shortly after Rendell left office in January 2011, Mr. Mayorkas
notified senior EB-5 staff that he had informed Rendell that USCIS would give fair and careful
consideration to some PIDC investor petitions.
10

18

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

management about the correct adjudicative action to take on the case. He told
us he did not recall the reason(s) he directed that the decisions be reversed,
but asserted that it was not as a result of a request from Rendell.
When asked about his phone conversation with Rendell, Mr. Mayorkas told us,
“The DHS Secretary's Office requested that I speak with Pennsylvania Governor
Edward Rendell and I obliged. Governor Rendell complained to me that the
agency's mishandling of the Aqua project EB-5 case was costing Pennsylvania
the investment of funds and the creation of jobs. I looked into the case with
my staff.”
Mr. Mayorkas did not provide any details about the July 15, 2011, phone call
or any notes from any other discussion with Rendell. We also found no
evidence of a 2011 request from the Secretary’s Office that Mr. Mayorkas speak
with Rendell. The only evidence that such a request may have been made was
in August 2010 when Rendell was still the governor of Pennsylvania.
That same evening (July 15, 2011), Mr. Mayorkas spoke with Tom Rosenfeld,
President and CEO of CanAm, by telephone about LA Films III. Rosenfeld
followed up the telephone call with an email, attaching a summary of the Sony
funding project and several USCIS documents sent to the petitioners.
Rosenfeld arranged to have the materials couriered to Mr. Mayorkas on July
18, 2011. In the email, he agreed to contact Mr. Mayorkas the following week.
On July 20, 2011, Rosenfeld emailed Mr. Mayorkas thanking him “for your
offer to call you.” Mr. Mayorkas responded, “I would not have the time to
review any materials before a call. I could participate in a call after 5:15 pm.”
On July 21, 2011, Rosenfeld thanked Mr. Mayorkas for taking the time to
discuss the Sony (LA Films III) project and Aqua project. On July 28, 2011,
Rosenfeld sent a third email to Mr. Mayorkas expressing his gratitude “for your
personal attention, time and sensitivity” to the Sony and Aqua projects. There
was at least one other call, on August 1, 2011, between the two, again about
what Rosenfeld described as his “urgent” concerns about the Sony and Aqua
projects. In response to Rosenfeld’s August 3, 2011, email thanking him for
his call on August 1, Mr. Mayorkas for the first time told Rosenfeld, “To clarify,
it is the EB-5 program as a whole that is a priority of ours, and not particular
projects.” Senior EB-5 officials were copied on this response to Rosenfeld, as
well as the chain of emails beginning with Rosenfeld’s July 21, 2011, email.
[EM-0000347, 349-350, 354-355]
When interviewed, Mr. Mayorkas said he did not recollect speaking with
Rosenfeld other than a conference call directed and arranged by the DHS
19

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Secretary’s Office. He did not provide a date for this call, and we found no
evidence of a 2011 call with Rosenfeld arranged by the Secretary’s Office.
Mr. Mayorkas’ contacts with Rosenfeld were against the advice of USCIS
counsel. Previously, in October 2010, OCC advised Mr. Mayorkas to cancel a
scheduled meeting with Rosenfeld and his attorneys, Ronald Klasko 11 and Ira
Kurzaban, because they had recently filed an action in Federal district court
against USCIS. 12 OCC also advised Mr. Mayorkas that it was inappropriate for
him to have contact with stakeholders, including Rosenfeld, who had filed suit
against USCIS. At the time of the contacts in the summer of 2011, the
litigation was still pending. In Mr. Mayorkas’ written statement, he indicated
that he did not recall being advised not to communicate directly with an
individual involved in litigation. [EM-0000999], [MOA-0004844-4845]
On August 23, 2011, Rosenfeld again attempted to contact Mr. Mayorkas. For
the first time, Mr. Mayorkas declined to speak with Rosenfeld. He responded to
Rosenfeld’s email, “It would be inappropriate for me to speak with you about
these pending matters at this time.” In his interview, Mr. Mayorkas said he
changed how he dealt with Rosenfeld either because USCIS was already aware
of the issues that needed to be addressed or the matter was in capable hands.
[EM-0000356]
Rosenfeld nevertheless found indirect ways to bring his concerns before Mr.
Mayorkas. Through an intermediary, he contacted John Emerson, 13 who has
been described in emails as Mr. Mayorkas’ “career advisor.” We found several
emails from as early as August 8, 2011, in which Emerson reached out to Mr.
Mayorkas inquiring about the Sony petitions. On September 1, 2011, Emerson
contacted Mr. Mayorkas, forwarding another email from Rosenfeld. In his reply
to Emerson, which he forwarded to OCC for follow-up, Mr. Mayorkas indicated
he was not involved in the adjudication of particular cases; however, there is a
record of three calls between Mr. Mayorkas’ personal cell phone and Emerson
that evening. [EM-0000352, 1019], [MOA-0004985]

11 Mr. Klasko also served as the chair of the EB-5 Committee of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association and was in direct contact with Mr. Mayorkas from 2011 through 2013 on
more than 20 occasions. He also represented EB-5 investors in the SLS Hotel and Casino case
discussed later in the report.
12 The attorneys filed a lawsuit against USCIS in the Central District of California on September
22, 2010, on behalf of investors in two CanAm regional centers, LA County Regional Center,
and PIDC, challenging USCIS’ material change policy.
13 The U.S. Senate confirmed Mr. Emerson as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany on August 1,
2013.

20

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Mr. Mayorkas told us that Emerson was an acquaintance from Los Angeles
who had contacted him about LA Films III and that he did not speak to
Emerson about the substance of the case. Mr. Mayorkas did not remember
calling Emerson from his personal cell phone the evening of September 1,
2011, but if he had, he said it could have been about something else because
“he was on a board with Emerson's wife.” We were unable to reconcile this
statement with our understanding that Mr. Mayorkas had relinquished all his
positions outside the Federal Government. 14
On September 1, 2011, Mr. Mayorkas participated in a conference call with
USCIS senior officials to discuss the LA Films III case. During this call, senior
EB-5 leadership told Mr. Mayorkas that he did not need to be involved in cases;
Mr. Mayorkas responded that he was involved because he had “no confidence
in the people administering the program.” [EM-0000359], [CAL-000787]
USCIS Approves LA Films III Investor Petitions Based on Email from Sony
By late October 2011, a USCIS senior official notified Mr. Mayorkas that they
were prepared to deny the LA Films III petitions because of the failure to receive
any assurances that the financing arrangement compelled Sony to accept the
investors’ money. [EM-0000364]
We were unable to determine the exact course of events between October 31,
2011, when USCIS was on the cusp of denying the petitions, and November 17,
2011, when USCIS deemed the financing acceptable, based on Sony’s
commitment to use the EB-5 investors’ financing.
On October 31, 2011, Rosenfeld left two telephone messages for Mr. Mayorkas.
Mr. Mayorkas, telling his senior staff it would be inappropriate for him to
return Rosenfeld’s calls, asked whether someone else should return the call. A
senior official agreed to call Rosenfeld, but was unsuccessful because of an
incorrect phone number. Mr. Mayorkas expressed disappointment that
Rosenfeld was not contacted that day. The next day, November 2, 2011, the
senior official contacted Rosenfeld, who began pressing the official for an
immediate decision. In addition to emails to the senior official, Rosenfeld, after
speaking with the senior official, left two voice messages requesting to speak
directly to Mr. Mayorkas. [EM-0000364, 368-369, 373, 379-380]
On May 21, 2009, Mr. Mayorkas informed the DHS Designated Agency Ethics Officer that he
no longer held positions with the American Bar Association, the California Commission on the
Fair Administration of Justice, and the Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science.
On June 13, 2012, Mr. Mayorkas submitted his OGE-278, Public Financial Disclosure Report,
for 2011 in which he reported holding no positions outside the Federal Government.
14

21

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

On November 10, 2011, in response to the voice messages from Rosenfeld
wanting to speak directly with Mr. Mayorkas about perceived processing
delays, Mr. Mayorkas again emailed his staff that it would not be appropriate
for him to speak with Rosenfeld. [EM-0000379-380]
The same day, November 10, 2011, counsel for Sony sent an email to USCIS
stating that Sony was committed to using the EB-5 investors’ funds for its
projects. One week later, based on the email from Sony, USCIS headquarters
sent instructions to EB-5 staff to approve all the pending investor petitions that
had been held up until Sony’s commitment could be established. [MOA0002166-68]
The process for approving the LA Films III petitions led some in USCIS to
question whether Rosenfeld had been given special consideration. One career
EB-5 official told us staff were forced “to go above and beyond for Tom
Rosenfeld,” reflecting their belief that Rosenfeld was receiving preferential
treatment. Another EB-5 official also believed the LA Films III petitions were
given preferential treatment, noting that other petitions with similar issues,
such as those from the South Dakota Regional Center, had been denied. A
third EB-5 official expressed to us concern that officials at USCIS accepted a
“mere email” as substantive evidence in response to a formal Request For
Evidence. That official also indicated that USCIS headquarters’ involvement in
these applications was "not normal."
LA Films IV – Time Warner
From late August 2012 to November 2012, Rosenfeld and others acting on
behalf of LA Films, including Rendell, began contacting Mr. Mayorkas, DHS
Chief of Staff Noah Kroloff, and a senior EB-5 official about the status of a new
set of 240 pending investor petitions in films made by Time Warner (LA Films
IV). The following is a summary of those contacts. A full recounting of the
various contacts is shown in the LA Films timeline in appendix A. [EM0000402, 404, 406], [MOA-0005051], [CAL-0001402]
In August 2012, Rosenfeld sent an email to a senior USCIS headquarters
official (with whom he previously had been in contact with about LA Films III)
about LA Films IV investor petitions. [EM-0000402]
On September 13, 2012, former Governor Rendell and Mr. Mayorkas spoke by
telephone. Like the earlier call between Rendell and Mr. Mayorkas, we were
22

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

unable to determine its substance and Mr. Mayorkas did not recall it. [EM0000404], [CAL-0001402]
In October 2012, Kroloff received an email through an intermediary about the
status of the LA Films IV petitions. In his response, Kroloff informed the
intermediary that he believed Mr. Mayorkas and Rendell had already spoken.
[EM-0000406]
Rosenfeld also attempted to contact Mr. Mayorkas directly during this time.
Mr. Mayorkas’ response was that he could not discuss a pending matter and
that it would not be appropriate to have case-specific discussions. [EM0001029], [MOA-0005051]
In late 2012, the California Service Center staff was poised to deny the LA
Films IV applications and was preparing documentation to that effect.
According to a senior EB-5 official, the denial of the petition was a “slam
dunk.” [MOA-0000658, 1855]
Specifically, an EB-5 official noted there were not enough specifics about the
projects Time Warner would complete; Time Warner had not committed to
borrowing the money; the job creation estimates were not sourced; there was
insufficient evidence that the Time Warner productions would result in more
jobs; the jobs created would be intermittent, temporary, or seasonal; and some
petitioners had problematic escrow agreements.
USCIS prepared and approved a “template,” essentially a draft denial decision
to be used as the model for the more than 240 pending investor petitions. By
January 18, 2013, the template had been reviewed and cleared at the staff
level. [EM-0000415-416]
However, in December 2012 or early January 2013, prior to the anticipated
denial decision, one Time Warner investor petition had been inadvertently
approved when a staff member mistakenly believed an economist had reviewed
the file as required when in fact it had not been reviewed.
Other EB-5 officials confirmed that approving the single petition was an error.
As one EB-5 official noted, “I don’t think [the staff member] made a deliberative
decision. [The staff member] was not on the specialization team and … did not
consult with the team. It appears that it was a simple mistake.” [EM-0000468]
When senior EB-5 officials discovered the error in approving the petition, they
began taking steps to revoke the decision. USCIS’ ability take such action was
23

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

established by law, and the authority to do so had been recognized by USCIS
as far back as 1997. Because the visa had not yet been issued, by January 23,
2013, USCIS officials were preparing the standard form used to correct such
an error. [EM-0000414]
Mr. Mayorkas Directs Establishment of a Deference Review Board
On January 18, 2013, Mr. Mayorkas was informed that Rosenfeld had left a
message to call him saying it was “urgent” and he would know the subject
matter. Sometime before January 25, 2013, Rosenfeld spoke to Mr. Mayorkas
by telephone raising the issue of the single granted petition and asking that as
a result, all the Time Warner petitions be granted. 15 According to a senior EB5 headquarters official who listened in on the call, Rosenfeld “was elevating
issues regarding deference to the Director.” In raising deference, Rosenfeld was
asserting that the single investor petition, which had been mistakenly
approved, should govern all subsequent investor petitions related to the
project. The senior official also told us that although Mr. Mayorkas said during
the call that he would not discuss the specifics of the case, he said “he would
look into the claim that USCIS was not adhering to the deference policy.”
Again, when asked, Mr. Mayorkas did not recollect this call; he only recalled
speaking with Rosenfeld on a conference call directed and arranged by the
Secretary’s Office. Rosenfeld declined to be interviewed. [EM-0000457, 1093]
Shortly after the call from Rosenfeld, on Friday, January 25, 2013, Mr.
Mayorkas sent an email to his EB-5 staff directing the immediate
establishment of a “decision board” 16 and a determination as to whether
USCIS’ deference policy needed to be revised. According to new policy outlined
in his email, whenever USCIS denied a petition in a matter in which a related
petition had been approved, USCIS would give the “impacted parties” “an
opportunity to be heard in person before the decision board.” Mr. Mayorkas
also identified a number of EB-5 experts who could comprise the board. He
directed that a “letter of notice and invitation to appear” be drafted by January
29, 2013, and sent to “parties impacted by recent reversals.” The email did not
identify any specific parties. [EM-0000422-423]
We did not find anyone in the EB-5 program who knew in advance Mr.
Mayorkas was going to issue this policy, and EB-5 headquarters staff viewed
OCC’s advice that Mr. Mayorkas not have contact with Rosenfeld was still in effect because
Rosenfeld still was a party in litigation against USCIS.
16 In his January 25, 2013, email, Mr. Mayorkas referred to the 2013 entity as a decision
board; the two senior officials in charge of holding the hearing referred to it as the DRB.
15

24

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

the establishment of a board as a dramatic change in direction. One EB-5
headquarters official told us that offering this relief to LA Films was
“extraordinary and unprecedented” and one that was not available to any other
regional center or investor. The official also complained about the “consistent
lack of transparency in these decisions.” There was significant confusion
among EB-5 staff as to what Mr. Mayorkas meant by “parties impacted by
recent reversals.” [EM-0000433, 452-453]
Other than the telephone call with Rosenfeld, we were unable to determine the
reason for the decision not to use the denial template to process the LA Films
IV investor petitions. Emails from senior EB-5 officials from the California
Service Center, Service Center Operations, and OCC, as well as those from Mr.
Mayorkas, reveal no discussion or explanation of any facts or events that would
have caused this abrupt change from planning to deny the petitions to holding
a hearing for the “impacted parties.” We interviewed all available senior EB-5
officials and none knew why Mr. Mayorkas decided to create a DRB and why it
was necessary to convene it immediately without first establishing policies and
procedures. Mr. Mayorkas told us that he may well have urged his staff to
convene a DRB to address the LA Films IV issues, but he had no specific
recollection of this.
In his written statement, Mr. Mayorkas said that the DRB was based on a
proposal developed in 2011. He referred to a May 19, 2011, USCIS press
release about some EB-5 proposals. We found no evidence that Mr. Mayorkas
or any other USCIS official referred to that proposal when developing the DRB
in 2013.
Moreover, the DRB Mr. Mayorkas established in January 2013 was quite
different from the 2011 proposal. According to the 2011 press release, the
proposed board would be composed of an economist and adjudicators,
supported by counsel, to render decisions on regional center applications. The
2013 DRB would be set up to hear issues of deference involving individual
petitioners unrelated to a regional center’s application. In addition, unlike the
2011 proposal, no adjudicators were assigned to the 2013 DRB. [EM-0000423]
Process and Timeline for Holding Deference Review Board Hearing
Mr. Mayorkas conveyed his desire for quick action, but EB-5 headquarters
officials believed Mr. Mayorkas’ timeline was unreasonable. Immediately after
he sent the email establishing the policy, senior officials in the OCC began
identifying key issues that needed to be addressed. For example, it was not
25

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

even clear to whom a notice or invitation could be sent. According to one
senior EB-5 official: [EM-0000422, 433, 472]
The real challenge however (setting aside any legal issues
that OCC will need to review) will be determining who will be
representing the investors before the board when the issue
involves a change at the [immigrant investor] stages. How
many representatives will be allowed to appear (do they have
to designate just one, or should we allow multiple so that
someone from the regional center as well as one or two
attorneys representing the investors may appear)? [EM0000426]
The EB-5 staff was also concerned about the process and lack of procedural
guidance. One official worried that if USCIS could not accommodate an
investor at a hearing, the investor could appeal the decision in Federal district
court, adding “I am really uncomfortable with creating a hearing process that is
not grounded in statute and [regulations] – we can be sued six ways til [sic]
Sunday.” [EM-0000438], [MOA-0005478]
Mr. Mayorkas continued to receive communications from third party
stakeholders regarding LA Films. On January 28, 2013, for example, Chief of
Staff Kroloff forwarded Mr. Mayorkas an email from Rendell, who wrote that
there had to be a decision by January 31 or the investment would be lost.
Kroloff asked Mr. Mayorkas, “What, if anything, would you like me to say back?
Or should I loop him with you directly?” We found no record of Mr. Mayorkas’
reply. [EM-0000450]
In a January 30, 2013, meeting with EB-5 headquarters staff, Mr. Mayorkas
directed that the DRB hear the LA Films IV case. Mr. Mayorkas also selected a
second case involving a Wisconsin Regional Center, although it was not clear to
the staff how or why he chose that case. 17 At the meeting, Mr. Mayorkas
directed that notices for the DRB hearing be sent to the LA Film Regional
Center the next day. One participant in the meeting said the meeting “left a
clear impression that the Director and [his chief of staff] wanted to
accommodate LA Films and Tom Rosenfeld.” The same participant told us Mr.
Mayorkas selected the case based on an interested party contacting him and
complained about the consistent lack of transparency in the decisions. The
17

The Wisconsin Regional Center case was never reviewed by the DRB because none of the
staff were able to identify any issues to review. There were no pending petitions and the time for
appeal had lapsed.
26

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

participant also noted that the relief being offered was extraordinary and
unprecedented. According to one email between two USCIS managers,
reflecting on the meeting, “The whole thing is unsettling. Hopefully we can
wash our hands soon.” [EM-0000451, 453]
As staff members were leaving the meeting, Mr. Mayorkas received a phone call
from Rosenfeld. During this call, Mr. Mayorkas told Rosenfeld about the
decision to give him a DRB hearing. An EB-5 official who overheard Mr.
Mayorkas taking a telephone call from Rosenfeld described this as
“uncomfortable” and added that “the appearance of impropriety” was
“overwhelming.” That official ultimately reported the appearance concern to a
supervisor, who consulted with an ethics official in USCIS. The ethics official,
who was told the facts as a hypothetical question but was not informed it
involved Mr. Mayorkas, told the EB-5 official that the conduct should be
reported to the Office of Inspector General or the Office of Special Counsel.
[EM-0000457], [MOA-0005073]
Although the EB-5 staff understood that Mr. Mayorkas wanted the DRB set up
immediately, his proposed timeline puzzled and troubled them. The staff
believed that, given the abrupt change in procedures this represented, they
needed some time to sort out the legal and logistical issues associated with a
DRB hearing. According to one official, “This really needs to slow down. OCC
had major comments and legal issues. I understand that Ali wants it
immediately, but at what cost?” Even in the week before the hearing for LA
Films IV was scheduled to take place, the EB-5 staff still did not know how the
process would work. One senior EB-5 manager wrote to another and
complained, “As far as I know we have no real plan in place for conducting this
Deference Review Board hearing.” Another staff member responded, “Ali made
it clear he wants the Board to meet on the week of the 11th. We need to throw
together a process, board members, and get people reviewing the issues related
to deference.” [EM-0000441, 463]
Deference Review Board Hearing and Directive to Give Deference to All LA Films
IV Investor Petitions
On Friday, March 15, 2013, the DRB met. The only external participants were
Rosenfeld, representing LA Films, a California-based private economist, and
two private attorneys from the EB-5 Committee of the American Immigration
Lawyers Association (one of whom, Dawn Lurie, had extensive dealings with
Mr. Mayorkas in the Gulf Coast Funds case discussed below). Although the
only issue was a decision about the investor petitions, no investors were
represented. According to USCIS policy and Federal regulation, the investors
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Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

could only be represented by individuals who had filed an appearance form.
The hearing was neither recorded nor transcribed, and we have no reliable
basis to determine exactly what took place at the hearing.
After the hearing, on March 21, 2013, the members of the DRB held a
teleconference with California Service Center staff who had recommended
denial of the petitions. The staff expressed their opposition to giving deference.
One adjudicator said:
I explained to the review board that we did not feel that the
project was creating new jobs, and that [LA Films IV] [was]
just using the money to replace other funds available to Time
Warner, including cash reserves and their $5 billion
revolving credit facility with Citibank. So the EB-5 money
was not really resulting in any new projects that would not
have otherwise been produced in the absence of EB-5
capital.
In the opinion of the California Service Center staff, the net effect of deference
was to improperly approve hundreds of investor petitions that would have been
otherwise denied, based on an error in approving a single earlier petition.
Nevertheless, on March 22, 2013, an EB-5 headquarters official sent a memo
to the California-based adjudicators, reflecting the decision of the DRB, which
directed the adjudicators to give deference to all LA Films IV investor petitions
based on the initial approval of the earlier petition. This was in effect a de facto
approval of the investor petitions as long as there were no national security
issues and each investor could demonstrate having the necessary funds to
invest. [MOA-0001749]
The directive was not well received. One official described the decision as
"incorrect" and the "wrong" application of the law and claimed that the
guidance outlined in the memo went "totally" against how these petitions were
normally processed. Another official wrote, “It appears that [the decision to
grant the initial single petition] was a simple mistake. And it is absurd to me
to accord deference to simple mistakes.” Others believed that, because
headquarters issued the directive only hours after the teleconference to the
California Service Center, headquarters had already made the decision. They
thought they had simply wasted their time on the conference call. [EM0000468]
After the decision to approve all the LA Films IV petitions, the adjudicators
were told that they had only two weeks to approve all 249 petitions. One staff
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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
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member described the situation as a “mad rush” to approve the LA Films IV
petitions.
Six weeks after the DRB hearing, a senior EB-5 official noted there was not yet
a formal DRB policy and that the entire policy consisted of a “bunch of emails.”
[EM-0000472]
To our knowledge, the March 15, 2013, DRB hearing is the only one USCIS
held.
USCIS Issues Deference Policy
On May 30, 2013, USCIS issued a comprehensive EB-5 policy memorandum
that included a deference policy:
Unless there is reason to believe that a prior adjudication
involved an objective mistake of fact or law, USCIS should
not reexamine determinations made earlier in the EB-5
process. Absent a material change in facts, fraud, or willful
misrepresentation, USCIS should not re-adjudicate prior
USCIS determinations that are subjective, such as whether
the business plan is comprehensive and credible or whether
an economic methodology estimating job creation is
reasonable.
Under this new policy, it is at least an open question whether the single initial
petition approved by mistake in LA Films IV would have received deference,
thereby compelling the granting of 249 other petitions regardless of whether
they met the requirements of the statute and regulations.
Las Vegas Regional Center
Allegation Related to SLS Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas
We also received allegations that Mr. Mayorkas gave special treatment to the
Las Vegas Regional Center (LVRC). USCIS employees complained that, in
January 2013, after speaking with U.S. Senator Harry Reid, Mr. Mayorkas
personally directed that USCIS expedite processing of investor petitions related
to the SLS Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas (SLS) even though, in the staff’s view,
there was no basis for expediting the petitions.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

LVRC Approved as a Regional Center
On September 29, 2009, the LVRC filed an application with USCIS for
recognition as a regional center. According to the proposal, the regional center
planned to focus its investments in new commercial enterprises in 10 industry
economic clusters: hotel, manufacturing, retail shopping centers, restaurant,
casino, general retail, office, medical office, assisted living/nursing home, and
sports and recreation centers. USCIS approved the application on May 27,
2010.
Requests to Expedite Processing of SLS Investor Petitions
On October 2, 2012, the first investor petition related to a proposal for about
230 investors to partially fund SLS, an LVRC project, arrived at USCIS. Other
investor petitions followed.
About two months after individual SLS investors started filing petitions, USCIS
began receiving congressional inquiries about the petitions. On December 5,
2012, a member of Senator Harry Reid’s staff emailed USCIS’ Office of
Legislative Affairs asking whether USCIS could expedite processing of the SLS
investor petitions. By granting expedited processing, SLS petitions would move
ahead of previously filed petitions. [MOA-0001773-1774]
Senator Reid’s staff member asserted that the SLS investor petitions needed
expedited processing because the terms of the bank financing for SLS required
that 10 percent of all visas for the project be approved by mid-January 2013.
Failure to do so would result in losing the financing for the project. At that
time, 25 investor petitions had been submitted, with an additional 205 to
follow. The staff member indicated that the project had already received a
number of local government permits for construction, at a cost of several
hundred thousand dollars, which would expire in January. The staff member
forwarded correspondence to USCIS from LVRC claiming that submission of
the SLS petitions had been delayed because of potential changes to USCIS’
policy on tenant occupancy. 18 [EM-0000509], [MOA-0001777]

On December 20, 2012, USCIS finalized new tenant occupancy guidance. Normally, USCIS
requires evidence from an investor that a specific amount of investment is connected to new
jobs created by prospective tenants of its commercial spaces. Under the revised guidance, the
investor would not have to connect a specific amount to new jobs, but would get credit for job
creation if it could demonstrate that the economic benefits of the project would remove “a
significant market-based constraint.”

18

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

In response to the request for expedited processing, a senior EB-5 official
commented that SLS should have followed established procedures and
submitted a request for expedited processing directly to USCIS, rather than
make the request through Congress. The official also noted that a formal
request should have been made to the Director of the California Service Center
who decides whether to grant such requests. [MOA-0001773]
The same EB-5 official questioned whether the SLS investor petitions met the
criteria for expedited processing. The official noted it would be difficult to grant
the request for expedited processing because SLS itself, not USCIS, had created
the urgency. Specifically, under the financing agreement SLS had with the
bank, it had to meet certain deadlines to receive financing. In May 2012, SLS
entered into an agreement under which it had to receive USCIS approval by
November 2012, with an option to extend the deadline to February 2013. The
first investors began sending petitions to USCIS in October 2012, only a month
before the initial deadline for financing.
This posed a problem for EB-5 staff because requests to expedite processing
are normally granted only in very rare circumstances, generally when USCIS’
action causes extreme hardship. 19 In analyzing the situation, an EB-5 official
wrote:
If they didn’t have investors lined up when they signed that
agreement, and they didn’t start filing individual investor
filings until October 2012, I think it is fair to say that USCIS
has not caused any of this to happen (i.e. long delays,
[tenant occupancy] holds, etc.) and therefore, how much do
we exercise our discretion to grant expedites when it appears
that it was their business/contractual agreements and
negotiations that lead to the issue? Why would you sign a
May 2012 document with a deadline to secure investors by
November 2012 if you don't have the investors? If you do,
then why did it take from May to October to get investors to
file 526's [sic]? I just think I would have a lot of questions as
to why we at USCIS should expedite something based on
19

According to the USCIS website, criteria for “expedite consideration” include severe financial
hardship to company or individual, an extreme emergent or humanitarian situation, nonprofit
status of requesting organization in furtherance of the cultural and social interests of the
United States, Department of Defense or National Interest Situation (the request must come
from an official U.S. Government entity and state that delay will be detrimental to the
Government), and USCIS error or compelling interest of USCIS.

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Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

what could possibly be argued a bad business
deal/negotiation? [MOA-0001773]
During the week of December 10, 2012, SLS officially submitted its request to
expedite processing of its investors’ petitions. On December 17, 2012, USCIS
denied the request. The denial of SLS’ request meant that USCIS would
process the SLS petitions normally, that is, in the order they were received.
On January 8, 2013, Mr. Mayorkas spoke by telephone with Senator Reid
during which, we were told, he made no guarantees, but promised the Senator
that USCIS would take a “fresh look” at the request to expedite processing. In
his interview, Mr. Mayorkas told us that, at the conclusion of the January 8
call, he might have said “we will look into it” and he believed that USCIS looked
into the matter. [EM-0000537], [MOA-0005958], [CAL-0001546]
After his call with Senator Reid, Mr. Mayorkas asked a senior headquarters
EB-5 official (whom he had just appointed to a leadership position) to look into
the issue. 20 Subsequently, this official emailed EB-5 personnel at the
California Service Center about their decision to deny the request to expedite
processing of the SLS petitions. The official was skeptical about the decision,
contending that the staff involved did not fully consider the potential economic
loss and the timing of the financing, concluding, “I guess I am a little surprised
that this request did not warrant expedited treatment.” [EM-0000748-749]
Historically, the EB-5 program did not grant requests for expedited processing
under circumstances like that of the SLS case. However, decisions whether to
grant such requests were not governed by regulation or statute. Normally, the
Director of the California Service Center had discretion to decide whether to
expedite processing of an individual petition, but it appears such requests were
rarely granted. One senior EB-5 official told Mr. Mayorkas that he did not
believe USCIS had granted any EB-5 expedite requests in the prior year. [EM0000592]
On January 22, 2013, staff at the California Service Center recommended to a
headquarters-level EB-5 official that the request for expedited processing again
be denied. According to the staff, SLS based its request solely on the delays in
filing the investors’ petitions, which threatened its arranged terms of financing.
20 In July 2012, Mr. Mayorkas announced his plans to create a new office at USCIS
headquarters for administration of the EB-5 program. EB-5 adjudications were transferred
from the California Service Center to a newly created headquarters office, later called the
Immigrant Investor Program Office. A USCIS senior official said that front office involvement in
creating this new EB-5 office in headquarters was unusual.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Staff members noted that EB-5 regulations did not require using this specific
investment vehicle and, in any event, its processing of the petitions was within
normal processing times. This echoed the reasoning behind USCIS’ denial of
the first expedite request. [EM-0000553]
In recommending against expedited processing, a staff member expressed
concern about a lack of resources, treating petitioners differently, and opening
up the floodgates to such requests. In an email, the staff member expressed
fear of an “inadvertent opening of the proverbial Pandora’s box,” in that
investors could structure their financing arrangements to ensure they received
expedited handling. Because the people representing EB-5 investors made up
a “small and tightly knit community,” the staff member thought they would
quickly figure out which financing arrangements would receive expedited
processing. According to this official, this would “set a precedent that we won’t
be able to sustain, the resources we will expend [to] adjudicate the requests
and possible fallout if we treat folks differently.” [EM-0000750]
Request by Executive Director of SelectUSA for Expedited Processing
On January 24, 2013, USCIS requested additional information from the SLS
investors who sought expedited processing, including copies of the financing
agreements and a better explanation as to how these petitions were different
from other EB-5 investor petitions.
Later that same day, USCIS received a letter from Steve Olson, the Executive
Director of SelectUSA, an initiative under the U.S. Department of Commerce, 21
requesting expedited processing of the SLS investor petitions. Olson wrote,
“[SLS] presented a comprehensive, shovel-ready hotel/casino development
plan, including sound financials … a track record of past successes of
casino/hotel developments, and compelling case utilizing EB-5 capital that will
conservatively create 8,600 jobs in Las Vegas.” He explained that not
adjudicating the investor petitions by February 4, 2013, could put the capital
at risk and derail the project. [EM-0000483]
Notably, the letter did not address the main concern of many EB-5 staff
members—that LVRC, SLS, and the investors had control over the timing of the
financing arrangements and that USCIS was still within its normal processing
times for the SLS investors. Nevertheless, a senior EB-5 official, in
21

The SelectUSA initiative was established on June 15, 2011, by President Obama, through
Executive Order 13577. According to Olson, it is a “government-wide initiative to attract and
retain investment in the American economy.”

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

recommending expedited processing of the SLS investor petitions, cited the
letter, calling the argument “very compelling.” [EM-0000482, 553]
To the staff’s knowledge, this was the first time that SelectUSA ever weighed in
on such an issue. Some staff members were suspicious about how the letter
had been issued and feared undue influence. One senior official noted that
Olson had worked with Mr. Mayorkas at the United States Attorney’s Office in
Los Angeles and at the law firm of O’Melveny & Myers LLP. Another staff
member noted in an email, “I don’t recall seeing these folks opine before and
wonder how they even know who to send this to. I fear we are entering a whole
new phase of yuck.” [EM-0000482]
Mr. Mayorkas believed the letter was evidence that the SLS petitions should be
expedited and disapproved of asking for more information from SLS before
making the determination to expedite. As he noted in a January 25, 2013,
email to senior EB-5 officials:
I mentioned to you the Department of Commerce letter,
which I believe underscores our need to develop expertise on
a fast/urgent track (the Department with the relevant
expertise believes that, contrary to our adjudication, the
expedite criteria have been met). I did not wish to get
involved in the case itself. Having now read your email, I am
surprised by our response. For example, the petitioner has
to present evidence of a request for an extension of time from
the funder, or an explanation of why such a request was not
submitted? Are we imposing that condition ourselves now?
I will defer to those with adjudications experience. I must
ask whether, based on the deal document and given the
Department of Commerce’s views, are we following the law
applicable to the standard of proof? [EM-0000485]
In deciding whether to grant the SLS request to expedite processing, a senior
EB-5 manager explained to Mr. Mayorkas in an email:
There is a genuine concern with the need to distinguish this
case from others. Given this community, we anticipate this
[request to] expedite will garner attention and that similar
requests will increase significantly. Additionally, folks are
already asking why some cases are being adjudicated before
theirs so a rigorous expedite protocol is perceived as
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Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

necessary for fairness and to defend against criticism. [EM0000593]
Mr. Mayorkas, in his written statement, indicated that he “became concerned
that USCIS's position was improper, a violation of its own expedite criteria, and
ultra vires insofar as USCIS was not adhering to the standard of proof to which
petitioners were to be held under the law.” He added, “USCIS's position was
detached from business reality.” In his interview, Mr. Mayorkas told us his
involvement in the SLS case was limited and “as needed” to resolve the broader
legal and policy issues that had arisen. He specifically cited as broader issues,
the standard of proof for “expedite criteria” and what expediting actually
meant. Mr. Mayorkas said, “Once those issues were resolved, my limited
involvement in the SLS case ended.” Mr. Mayorkas indicated to staff in an
email that granting the SLS expedite request meant that the SLS petitions
moved “to the front of the line.” [EM-0000487]
EB-5 program officials thought the decision to expedite processing was ill
advised. In an email among them, they vented their frustration with the
process, “There will be 200 of these? And we just give full deference to [the
Department of Commerce]? And now we have to explain ourselves to the
director? Will anyone ever deny an expedite again?” Additionally, the staff saw
little need to expedite the current SLS petitions because only a fraction of the
total number of SLS investors had filed their petitions. As of January 23,
2013, only 47 of the 230 investors had filed petitions. Nevertheless, a senior
official within USCIS directed that the request to expedite processing be
granted. [EM-0000482, 485], [MOA-0001258]
The EB-5 staff expressed concern that granting the SLS request to expedite its
investors’ petitions would make USCIS vulnerable to criticism of disparate
treatment. After the decision to expedite the SLS petitions, a senior official
observed that other EB-5 stakeholders were complaining about the preferential
treatment of SLS. For example, on June 9, 2013, the President of CMB
Regional Centers sent an email to an EB-5 official about the perceived
disparate treatment, noting it was “blatantly unfair” that SLS petitions were
processed faster than those for one of CMB’s projects, which were filed earlier.
The President of CMB asked the official to “look into who is getting favorable
treatment before it becomes an extreme political football.” [EM-0000593, 746]
Confusion about Expedited Processing
Even after USCIS granted SLS’ request for expedited processing, EB-5 staff
appeared to be confused about what expedited processing involved. Because
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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

such requests had been rarely granted, staff members were uncertain about
the steps to take. Some thought that requests to expedite could not be granted
until full security background checks of the applicants were completed. Others
were not certain whether granting the request meant shortcuts could be taken
during processing, including not conducting full security background checks.
[EM-0000592, 629-630]
On January 29, 2013, a senior EB-5 official argued that USCIS should not
grant SLS’ request for expedited processing because USCIS’ Threat Assessment
Branch had received “significant security/criminal suspicions regarding several
of the SLS petitioners.” [MOA-0001808]
In response to these concerns, Mr. Mayorkas clarified in an email:
I agree that to grant an expedite request means only that we
have agreed, based on some articulated and supported time
sensitivity, to review the case on an accelerated basis. It
does not mean or in any way suggest that we have rendered
any decision on the merits of the petition. If, for example, a
security issue arises that will take time to resolve, then—
regardless of whether we have agreed to expedited review—
we will take the time needed to resolve the security issue and
we will not act until we have achieved resolution.
I agree that we need to run enhanced security and integrity
checks. … I think we should review and discuss the
chronology to better understand the process and whether we
need to make adjustments system-wide. [EM-0000489]
The lack of an established process and the ad hoc decision-making in the SLS
case meant that some senior EB-5 officials were not even aware the request to
expedite had been granted.
Mr. Mayorkas Agrees to Weekly Briefings of Senator Reid’s Staff
We were told that, during a January 8, 2013, phone call with Senator Reid, Mr.
Mayorkas agreed to provide “regular” weekly updates on the status of the SLS
petitions. Staff described providing updates to members of Congress as
routine, but not “down to that level and degree” as with the SLS case.
According to one senior EB-5 official, from January through July 2013, they
were asked to provide weekly updates on the status of the SLS petitions to the
Office of Legislative Affairs; these updates purportedly went to Senator Reid’s
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Department of Homeland Security
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office. The same official said that processing the SLS petitions was “stressful”
because of the “undue pressure” from USCIS headquarters.
On January 31, 2013, Mr. Mayorkas had a teleconference with Senator Reid’s
staff. Afterward, Reid’s staff expressed appreciation to USCIS officials that Mr.
Mayorkas “took the time to call us personally, even though it was to deliver bad
news.” The “bad news” appeared to be that the substantive issues could not be
resolved by February 4, 2013. [EM-0000762]
Mr. Mayorkas stated in his interview that he did not recall agreeing to provide
Senator Reid with weekly updates on the status of the SLS petitions. When
told we had been informed that weekly updates had been provided for six
months, Mr. Mayorkas said that sounded “ridiculous.” More than three
months after the decision to expedite the SLS petitions, Mr. Mayorkas’ calendar
listed a meeting with Senator Reid on May 6, 2013, in which he was advised
that the “SLS expedite” was one of the topics. [CAL-0001675]

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Gulf Coast Funds Management Regional Center
As with the other two matters, we received complaints from a number of USCIS
employees that the application for a politically connected regional center, Gulf
Coast Funds Management (Gulf Coast), received extraordinary treatment as a
result of Mr. Mayorkas’ intervention. 22 In this case, the intervention resulted
in the AAO, which decides on appeals of unfavorable decisions by USCIS
adjudicators, changing its decision on an appeal. [MOA-0004887]
Gulf Coast’s Application and First Amendment Request
On January 17, 2008, Gulf Coast filed an application with USCIS for
recognition as a regional center. According to its application, Gulf Coast
planned to focus foreign investments on three target industry economic
clusters in Mississippi and Louisiana: shipbuilding, food processing, and
manufacturing. On August 18, 2008, USCIS approved Gulf Coast’s application
to participate in the EB-5 program. 23
On May 7, 2009, Gulf Coast filed a request with USCIS to amend its original
application to include investments in the Gulf Coast Automotive Investment
Fund and Gulf Coast Fund I. According to the request, the Gulf Coast
Automotive Investment Fund would be used to construct and operate a hybrid
car manufacturing facility. On July 13, 2009, USCIS approved the requested
changes, noting in its written approval that Gulf Coast “shall continue to have
a geographical scope that includes the entire states of both Mississippi and
Louisiana as a Regional Center.”
Gulf Coast’s Second and Third Amendment Requests
On January 15, 2010, Gulf Coast filed a second amendment request with
USCIS. In its request, Gulf Coast sought to expand the geographic area of its
People outside of USCIS were also concerned about preferential treatment. On June 21,
2011, Mr. Mayorkas was informed USCIS received a public comment, “I would like to
respectfully submit that the Regional Centers themselves have not been given the type of
unprecedented access to USCIS officials as that of the ‘Law Lobby.’ I have concerns here and
they grow out of the varied interests within the EB-5 community. As a Regional Center
Principal, I believe the immigration attorneys are being, and have been granted unprecedented
access to the USCIS at all levels.” Dawn Lurie, then-counsel for Gulf Coast, was an active
member of the EB-5 Committee of the American Immigration Lawyers Association. Ronald
Klasko, who represented CanAm and Rosenfeld, was the chair of the EB-5 Committee from
2010-2013. Both had direct access to Mr. Mayorkas.
23 Throughout the time period of the events we reviewed, Anthony Rodham was listed as the
Chief Executive Officer of Gulf Coast.
22

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

investment footprint to include parts of Virginia. Gulf Coast also sought
approval to invest in GreenTech Automotive, Inc. (GTA), formerly known as
Hybrid Kinetic Automotive Corp. On February 18, 2010, USCIS denied the
request citing among other reasons that the proposed areas for the regional
center did not qualify as “a limited geographic area.”
On February 22, 2010, Gulf Coast filed a third amendment request with
USCIS, asking that its designation as a regional center be changed to expand
its industrial scope to include manufacturing, education and training, research
and development, and wholesale trade and to add Tennessee and the tobaccodependent counties of Virginia to its investment area. Gulf Coast planned to
offer investment "units” for a subscription price of $555,000 only to foreign
investors; $500,000 of the subscription price would be EB-5 investment. Gulf
Coast also proposed building a car manufacturing plant in Mississippi, a car
parts manufacturing plant in Virginia, and a warehouse in Tennessee, near the
Mississippi border.
USCIS Denies Gulf Coast’s Amendment Request
On August 11, 2010, USCIS denied Gulf Coast’s amendment application, based
on issues relating to geographic location, stock valuation, and investor roles.
Gulf Coast also wanted to provide investors with a guaranteed stock value of
$550,000 in 5 years, which conflicted with an EB-5 requirement to ensure that
the investor’s money is at risk. Additionally, USCIS adjudicators were
concerned about whether investors actually had a management role in the
project.
In interviews, several USCIS adjudicators expressed skepticism about Gulf
Coast’s hybrid vehicle project. According to one adjudicator, the consensus of
those involved was that the project did not appear to be “credible” because “it
claimed a ridiculous amount of jobs would be created.” Another adjudicator
described the project as “pie in the sky.” A third characterized it as “really not
so good of a project.”
In a June 7, 2010, email, one USCIS adjudicator highlighted a number of the
flaws with the project:
The projects lack adequate business plans and an economic
analysis showing the promotion of growth through increased
productivity, job creation and increased capital investment.
An updated economic analysis is needed to [sic] for the new
geographic areas and new kinds of businesses. The
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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

business plan submitted does not identify total costs of
development, number of investors, sources of other
financing, permits and licenses, etc… The amendment
proposal assumes all of the investment will be done in
targeted areas but provide no MSA information showing the
proposed areas actually are rural or high unemployment. …
The case is not approvable as filed. [MOA-0003502]
An email from a senior official discusses why that official agreed with the
decision to deny the Gulf Coast amendment:
The economic analysis is flawed because it mixes national
data with county-level data (compares apples to oranges),
and relies on estimated production levels for the project for
2019, nine years from now. This analysis did not use
"reasonable methodologies" in developing the job creation
estimates and the other estimated economic impacts that
will result from EB-5 capital investments through [Gulf
Coast] as required by the statutory and regulatory
framework. 24 [MOA-0000514, 3536]
Gulf Coast Begins Contacts with DHS and USCIS Leadership
Contacts with DHS and USCIS leadership began shortly before USCIS had
denied Gulf Coast’s third amendment request. The major contacts are
included in the body of this report. All the contacts we were able to find are
listed in the Gulf Coast timeline in appendix B.
On July 28, 2010, after Gulf Coast’s third request had been pending for five
months, Douglas Smith, Assistant Secretary for the Private Sector at DHS,
forwarded to Mr. Mayorkas an email from Terry McAuliffe, the chairman of
GTA. GTA was to be partially funded through Gulf Coast’s EB-5 investors.
McAuliffe’s email expressed his frustration with the USCIS approval process.
Mr. Mayorkas immediately forwarded Smith’s email to senior EB-5 officials

24 Career adjudicators continued to have reservations about the project. A written
analysis of Gulf Coast’s fourth amended application, which was filed a year later in
August 2012, concluded that “the business plan does not provide a detailed, credible
and verifiable expenditure plan that delineates how the EB-5 funds will be spent by
[GTA] in the job creating activities; In response to the [Notice of Intent to Deny], it is still
unclear how all of the EB-5 funds will be infused into the project.”

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Department of Homeland Security
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requesting that the case receive “prompt, full, and fair consideration” and not
to provide “any preferential treatment.” [EM-0000001, 266]
On August 11, 2010, the acting Director of the California Service Center
informed Gulf Coast that USCIS was denying its third amendment request. On
August 17, 2010, Assistant Secretary Smith forwarded another email from
McAuliffe to Mr. Mayorkas complaining about the merits of the decision. In
forwarding the email, Assistant Secretary Smith added, “… unless I am missing
something, this [denial] is just crazy.” 25 [EM-0000019]
On September 10, 2010, Gulf Coast filed a motion requesting that USCIS
reconsider the decision to deny the amendment request. On December 15,
2010, while the motion to reconsider was still pending, McAuliffe wrote a letter
to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano complaining about the denial of the Gulf
Coast amendment and requesting her assistance to get the amendment
approved and to expedite more than 200 investor petitions. USCIS was
instructed to prepare a response to McAuliffe’s letter for the Secretary. Over
the next few weeks, EB-5 staff drafted a memorandum for the Secretary and a
letter for her signature. [MOA-0003543]
We were unable to determine whether Mr. Mayorkas discussed this matter with
the Secretary. At Mr. Mayorkas’ request, staff prepared talking points for a
January 24, 2011, call he was to have with the Secretary to discuss the issues
raised in the McAuliffe letter. Although during his interview, Mr. Mayorkas
said he did not recall a phone call or conversation with the Secretary taking
place that day, he indicated in his written statement “my staff prepared …
talking points for a call I was to have with the Secretary…” [MOA-0004856]
USCIS Certifies Decision to Deny Amendment Request
On January 31, 2011, the California Service Center “certified” USCIS’ decision
to deny the amendment request to the AAO. Under EB-5 regulations, the
As reflected in the timeline in appendix B, McAuliffe, Chief of Staff Kroloff, and Assistant
Secretary Smith continued to communicate about the Gulf Coast application throughout 2010
and 2011. For example, Smith and McAuliffe (or a representative) were in contact by
telephone, email, or in person on July 28, 2010; August 18, 2010; (when Smith assures
McAuliffe he is “on it.”); November 5, 2010; March 4, 2011; May 11, 2011; (when Smith asks a
GTA representative for the file numbers, because Smith “wants to make sure it’s on top of the
pile”); August 15, 2011; August 30, 2011; and February 1, 2013. Likewise, McAuliffe and
Kroloff communicated about the Gulf Coast matter on January 20, 2011; June 20, 2011; June
22, 2011; June 24, 2011; August 22, 2011; August 24, 2011; and September 2, 2011. In some
instances, we have evidence the message was passed on to Mr. Mayorkas; in other instances
we do not.
25

41

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

decision must be certified in order to appeal an adverse decision to the AAO.
The bases of the decision to deny the amendment were:
(1) that the investors would have reduced management
rights; (2) that the purchase of stock undermined the
congressional intent to promote pooled investment; (3) that
the proposal to convert each membership unit to an
estimated price of $550,000 in common stock in five years
constituted an impermissible redemption agreement; and (4)
that the amendment did not propose investments in a
distinct, contiguous geographic region.
Meeting with Terry McAuliffe
On February 2, 2011, Mr. Mayorkas informed senior staff that the Secretary’s
office requested that he meet with McAuliffe the next day. 26 He told counsel,
because the case was still pending, he would not discuss it or provide
information. Instead, he said he would be in “listen-only mode.” Counsel
noted that although it would be better for him not to be involved in the
meeting, his planned approach would be appropriate. In his written statement,
Mr. Mayorkas asserted that he requested not to attend such a meeting, but
had nevertheless been asked to do so and, thus, intended to participate in
“listen-only mode.” [MOA-0004781]
On February 3, 2011, Mr. Mayorkas attended a meeting with McAuliffe. 27 Mr.
Mayorkas indicated during his interview that he did not bring anyone from
USCIS to the meeting because he did not want to get into substantive
discussions about the case. He also said he only shared with McAuliffe what
he had said at a national stakeholder engagement the day before. We found no
contemporaneous record of what was discussed at the meeting, and we were
26

According to its policy, USCIS can provide only limited information about matters affecting
third-party stakeholders. Because McAuliffe was not a principal of Gulf Coast—Gulf Coast
planned only to invest in his company, GTA—USCIS considered him a “third-party stakeholder”
in Gulf Coast’s application. Adjudicators are instructed to document and include in the case
file any information they receive about an application from anyone other than a principal or an
attorney for a regional center. USCIS will not disclose information about a case to someone
other than the affected party, including the party’s representative, unless the individual has on
file a completed Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Accredited Representative (Form G28). According to the most recent documented Form G-28, McAuliffe was not listed as an
accredited representative.
27 We were not able to determine who attended the meeting from the Secretary’s Office or any
other component of DHS. Mr. Mayorkas did not have any notes of the meeting.

42

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

unsuccessful in our attempts to interview McAuliffe. Mr. Mayorkas stated that
he left the meeting before it ended.
Although he asserted in his statement that he was in listen-only mode, Terry
McAuliffe believed Mr. Mayorkas promised an expedited review of the Gulf
Coast application. On June 20, 2011, four months after meeting with Mr.
Mayorkas, McAuliffe emailed Chief of Staff Kroloff, complaining that Mr.
Mayorkas had not followed through: “Unfortunately, we have heard nothing
from USCIS since our meeting four months ago. At that meeting, we were
promised by the Director that our application would receive an expedited
review, due to the fact that we had been given erroneous information by the
USCIS.” In reply to Kroloff, Mr. Mayorkas wrote, “I will check tomorrow. I won't
get into a back and forth at this point.” [EM-0000036, 315]
Mr. Mayorkas’ summary of the meeting, which he recounted in an email to his
staff and counsel the same afternoon, contradicts McAuliffe’s claim that he was
promised an expedited review. Consistent with this contemporaneous email,
Mr. Mayorkas told us that he made no promises during the meeting to expedite
the review of the Gulf Coast application and again noted he was in listen-only
mode. [MOA-0004782]
There appears to be at least one other direct contact between Mr. Mayorkas
and McAuliffe. On June 24, 2011, Kroloff emailed McAuliffe that Mr. Mayorkas
would be calling him shortly. About 30 minutes later on the same day, senior
USCIS personnel responded to a number of requests from Mr. Mayorkas for
information about the deficiencies with the Gulf Coast and the Virginia Center
for Foreign Investment (Virginia Center) applications. 28 During his interview,
Mr. Mayorkas did not specifically recollect a call to McAuliffe on this date, but
told us that McAuliffe called him a “handful of times” over the course of the
next two years. Mr. Mayorkas said he did not take notes during any of these
calls. In his written statement, Mr. Mayorkas recalled McAuliffe complaining to
him over the telephone one time, but was unable to provide the date. [EM0000318]
Mr. Mayorkas Personally Reviews the AAO’s Draft Decision on Gulf Coast’s
Appeal and Meets with Staff
On April 28, 2011, while the Gulf Coast amendments were pending, Gulf Coast counsel
submitted a separate regional center application on behalf of the Virginia Center for Foreign
Investment containing essentially the same proposal as Gulf Coast with the same managing
agent. This proposed regional center contained the same proposal as the denied Gulf Coast
amendment except that it reduced the geographic center to just Virginia. USCIS approved the
Virginia Center on July 21, 2011.

28

43

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

By July 12, 2011, the AAO had completed and was prepared to issue its final
decision on Gulf Coast’s appeal. The AAO decision would have denied Gulf
Coast’s appeal on three grounds: (1) providing the directors with common stock
was an impermissible redemption, meaning the investment would not be at
risk; (2) the investors did not have a sufficient managerial role, and (3) the
proposal did not encompass a single, contiguous region.
On July 12, 2011, Mr. Mayorkas told his staff that he wanted to review the
decision before the AAO issued it. Many EB-5 officials found this highly
unusual because past USCIS Directors typically had not scrutinized individual
decisions; they found this level of scrutiny unsettling. The staff told us that
they had not recalled Mr. Mayorkas, who became Director of USCIS in 2009,
previously request to review a decision before it was issued by the AAO. [MOA003614]
In the three weeks running up to his request to review the AAO decision, we
found evidence of at least six emails or phone calls, either directly or through
senior DHS officials, between Mr. Mayorkas and McAuliffe or counsel for Gulf
Coast. The number of contacts may be understated because we were unable to
obtain records of Mr. Mayorkas’ office telephone calls. We were also unable to
obtain any contemporaneous notes about what was discussed in any of the
phone calls; Mr. Mayorkas did not keep such notes and the non-government
parties declined to speak with us.
Some of the emails that Mr. Mayorkas received in this time period, purporting
to summarize telephone conversations, are quite detailed and reflect Mr.
Mayorkas’ substantive responses to specific issues. For example, on June 28,
2011, Dawn Lurie, counsel for Gulf Coast, sent an email to Mr. Mayorkas
confirming a telephone conversation they had that day. Lurie noted that
USCIS had issued multiple, serial Requests for Evidence (RFE) to address
specific concerns, rather than a single request. According to her email, she
believed the phone call with Mr. Mayorkas confirmed that USCIS would not
issue further RFEs and the Virginia Center application would be approved. In
his emailed response, Mr. Mayorkas corrected Lurie, but appears to have
invited adjudication outside of the regulatory process: [EM-0000170]
I appreciated our call yesterday and the time you took to
express your position in response to the RFE your client
received. The efficient processing of EB-5 petitions and
applications is very important to our agency. I do not believe
I represented that there will be “no additional requests
44

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

outside the scope of this [pending] RFE.” I have not analyzed
the case file. What I did express is my general view that the
serial issuance of RFEs does not seem fair unless everyone
understands at the outset that outstanding issues or
deficiencies are being addressed in serial fashion. I will
forward your e-mail as appropriate, and I will ask whether
there are any other issues to be addressed. If the response
is other than “no,” we can discuss the equities of the
situation that creates. [EM-0000169]
On July 20, 2011, the day before he met with EB-5 and AAO senior staff to
discuss the merits of the AAO’s draft decision, Mr. Mayorkas communicated
with Lurie by phone and email. In one email, Lurie wrote that she “spoke with
Terry last night and learned that we now have two investors who have
requested funds to be returned … We are expecting a mass exodus and
possible suit due to what the immigration firms in China, and our investors,
perceive as some act of bad faith on GCFM/GTA's part.” [EM-0000151]
Mr. Mayorkas replied by email, “I will be addressing your concerns with my
colleagues tomorrow afternoon. I look forward to being in touch after then.” In
response, Lurie wrote, “Terry has requested a meeting with you and the
Secretary. Right now the fund is in the process of returning the first of the
monies to investors who ‘want out.’ The entire project and the associated job
creation is in jeopardy. So, as you can imagine tensions are running high.” In
another email, Mr. Mayorkas then asked Lurie to call him at his private desk
line. We were unable to determine the substance of that call because Mr.
Mayorkas could not recollect it and counsel declined to be interviewed. [EM0000150]
In his statement, Mr. Mayorkas wrote:
The dire feedback from Ms. Lurie, the alarming internal
report I received on the case status, and my inability to
receive from within the agency a clear and comprehensive
understanding of what was going on led me to conclude that
my personal involvement in this case was necessary. I
engaged with [counsel for Gulf Coast] as needed to
understand the issues raised by the case. I consistently kept
my senior staff, including the attorneys, fully informed about
my communications with Ms. Lurie and at no point, as I
recall, did any of my staff raise a concern about those
communications.
45

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

On July 21, 2011, Mr. Mayorkas met with senior staff, including individuals
from Service Center Operations, the AAO, and OCC. Prior to the meeting, Mr.
Mayorkas had reviewed the draft AAO decision, as well as Gulf Coast’s
responses, to the RFEs on stock conversion and investors’ management
control.
Mr. Mayorkas’ opening remarks, as summarized in a participant’s
contemporaneous email (emphasis added), set the tenor of the meeting:
The Director stated that he believes that nothing is more
important to the United States at this time than the creation
of jobs for U.S. workers. This will inform how he views every
classification. So, if the regional center claims that it will
create jobs for U.S. workers, he will read the statute and the
[regulations] as generously as possible. For other
classifications, such as H-1 B, where there are statutory
provisions designed to ensure that U.S. workers are
protected, he will read the statute and [regulations] more
narrowly. The director noted several times that these cases
are affiliated with "people of influence" and "people with
money" and that he has several more of these on his radar. It
seemed clear to me that since "people of influence" have
raised other cases to him (or a higher authority at DHS or
the White House), the AAO will be requested to defend our
draft I-924 and EB-5 decisions to the Director in the future,
prior to issuance. [MOA-0007279]
In his interview, Mr. Mayorkas said he did not remember making the above
statement about people with influence or money. He said this statement
sounded “absurd” because neither the rich nor the poor deserve special
treatment or a wrong decision. He added that in deciding a case, he was
“impervious to pressure.”
During the meeting, Mr. Mayorkas told his staff that he did not agree with the
AAO's decision on the Gulf Coast case and argued against each of the three
bases for the AAO’s rejection of the application. Specifically, Mr. Mayorkas
believed as long as there was some management control, it satisfied the
regulations; that the money was at risk; and that the states did not have to be
contiguous. He did acknowledge that for the petition to suggest that the
geographic area in this case – Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee and Virginia –
to be a single area is "a sham." [MOA-0007281]
46

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Additionally, Mr. Mayorkas suggested that the appeal not be decided on and
that headquarters could simply tell the California Service Center employees
that the petitions should be adjudicated in line with his views. The
participants dissuaded him from doing so, asserting that such action would
essentially be a “directed decision,” a practice USCIS does not follow. Instead,
Mr. Mayorkas agreed the AAO would write the appeal decision. [MOA-0007282]
However, Mr. Mayorkas requested the AAO’s file, saying he would rewrite the
decision himself. He said he felt bad about asking the AAO to do more work.
The career staff involved in the adjudication process believed the request was
highly improper. One meeting participant said that “everyone froze” when Mr.
Mayorkas said, “Let me take it home and rewrite the report.” The participant
was “stunned” by Mr. Mayorkas’ suggestion, saying “the entire turn of events
made me extremely uncomfortable.” Another participant told us the request
made it appear that Mr. Mayorkas was dictating the results, which “looked
bad.” Ultimately, the participants dissuaded Mr. Mayorkas from rewriting the
decision himself. [MOA-0007280]
In an email summarizing the meeting, the same participant mentioned above
indicated there was agreement with Mr. Mayorkas’ point about management
control and tentative agreement with his other two points, but noted other
issues.
We found his arguments … helpful …We can agree to the
last point, and are tentatively in agreement to the first two
points … Frankly, I can’t say that we will be able to convince
ourselves to agree with his first points in writing, in which
case we know that we will have to go back to the table. He
agreed that none of this is decided and that we should feel
free to contact him with any questions … [MOA-0007279]
According to Mr. Mayorkas’ written statement, “the consensus reached by the
group was that the agency had erred in its prior adjudication in several
respects that were first forecast by career staff in the summary memorandum
provided to me in January.” Mr. Mayorkas told us he offered to rewrite the
AAO’s decision on Gulf Coast to help and to lighten the AAO’s load. He also
said, “the [AAO’s] decision was well written, but incorrect,” and he “thought
there was unanimity on the correct decision.”
A day after the meeting, another participant raised “lingering” concerns about
the issue of multiple unconnected geographic areas, to which Mr. Mayorkas
47

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

responded, “the issue is by no means settled.” A senior USCIS attorney also
indicated having difficulty understanding Mr. Mayorkas’ interpretation of the
other two issues in the case. [MOA-0007272-7273]
The AAO’s Draft Decision on Gulf Coast’s Appeal is Revised
After the meeting, over the next few weeks, EB-5 staff debated and discussed
the issues of management control and whether the Gulf Coast stock
redemption plan caused the funds to be at risk. Several drafts of a revised
AAO decision were circulated.
During this same period, there was a flurry of contacts with USCIS involving
the principals and counsel for both Gulf Coast and GTA. On August 10, 2011,
Mr. Mayorkas forwarded an email from Lurie to senior staff asking about the
status of the Gulf Coast case and an RFE. Several days later, Mr. Mayorkas
forwarded an email from a senior DHS official to his staff with a list of pending
GTA investor petitions. On August 22, 2011, within an hour of receiving an
email from Chief of Staff Kroloff, Mr. Mayorkas emailed his staff asking whether
an RFE had been issued on the Gulf Coast case. [EM-0000101, 107, 116],
[MOA-0003653, 7415]
On August 24, 2011, adjudicating officials issued an RFE to Gulf Coast
requesting additional information about the stock redemption plan. On August
30, 2011, Gulf Coast responded to the RFE. On the same day, Mr. Mayorkas
responded to an email from Assistant Secretary Smith, who had forwarded an
email from McAuliffe indicating that the RFE had been filed, that “this case is
proceeding through the normal channel and receiving due attention.” [EM0000076] [MOA-7456]
On August 31, 2011, Mr. Mayorkas and senior officials from the AAO had a
teleconference to discuss the AAO’s proposed final decision on Gulf Coast,
which had findings that were contrary to the draft AAO decision. The AAO’s
opinion now concluded that the investments were at risk and that there was
sufficient managerial control. A contemporaneous email set the tone of the
discussion:
The director asked whether we believe the investment is at
risk. I started to talk about the different kinds of risk
described in the regs (loss and gain) but he immediately cut
me off and said that he is not really interested at that level
(i.e., how the investment is at risk), just whether the AAO
has determined that it is at risk. The Director advised us
48

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

that he would be "hunkering down" with USCIS staff in the
future on two specific issues: EB5 and Kazarian.
The Director then asked whether the investment is at risk,
"yes or no." I answered "yes." Then he asked whether we
have come to this determination on our own or whether we
have come to this determination because we feel pressured.
I didn't answer. [A USCIS manager] started to respond that
this has been an unusual case and then started to discuss
some of our concerns about the legitimacy of the entire
enterprise. While valid, the director does not want to hear
about our suspicions without documentation to confirm
there is something shady, so I am afraid I jumped in and
admitted that we didn't have derogatory evidence that
would preclude approval. Then the director again asked
something very close to this, (I can't remember the exact
phrase): “did you come to the determination that there is
risk of your own free will? Yes or no?” I said “yes.” [MOA0007628]
A “Consensus” Decision?
Mr. Mayorkas, in both his written statement and during his interview, stated
that the group had reached a consensus with regard to the issues involved in
the Gulf Coast appeal. In a technical sense, that may be true, but it overlooks
the corrosive and destabilizing nature of Mr. Mayorkas’ intervention on
technical adjudicative matters. This was the first time that Mr. Mayorkas, or to
our knowledge any other USCIS Director, had ever reviewed the merits of or
intervened in an AAO decision. The effect of such high level involvement, as
the above email and the employees’ interviews reflect, muzzled the candid
discussion and healthy back-and-forth typically done in resolving complex
issues. The chilling effect of such intervention was particularly pronounced
when, as in this case, USCIS staff understood that the stakeholders were
politically influential. One official told us that one of the main participants was
“reduced to tears” as a result of this meeting with Mr. Mayorkas.
During the course of our review, we found that a number of staff members
described Mr. Mayorkas’ communication and management style as very
aggressive. He was described as “smart, charismatic, and persuasive,” but
encounters with him were also described as “uncomfortable, aggressive,
unusual, and unsettling.” One staff member said Mr. Mayorkas was “full of
emotion, impulsive, volatile, and tenacious.” Another high-ranking USCIS
49

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

official told us that employees were afraid to speak up in the meetings because
if they had a different view, Mr. Mayorkas would “cut them up, take them
apart, or put them in their place.” Another high-level employee said that Mr.
Mayorkas’ modus operandi would be to eliminate those who disagreed with him
from the group or future discussions. This same individual participated in
meetings in which, because of the way Mr. Mayorkas ran the meeting and
communicated his views, “it would be clear to me that others disagreed but
were apprehensive about speaking up.” Another high-ranking official described
going to a meeting with Mr. Mayorkas as feeling like “going into the lion’s den
to justify our existence as a Christian” and said, “That scenario always comes
to a predicable end.” [MOA-0007974]
We also observed this fear of speaking up in the LA Films case. In preparing to
raise a list of objections developed by different operational components at a
January 31, 2013, meeting to discuss setting up the DRB, one senior official
wrote, “I just want to make sure the pain of delivering potentially unwelcomed
news is shared and bourne [sic] by the appropriate parties.” After the meeting,
this official noted “Ali insists that the notices go out tomorrow … OCC said
nothing about their significant objections so I stayed quiet.” [MOA 0006909,
6927]
The AAO Issues Final Decision on Gulf Coast’s Appeal
On September 2, 2011, the AAO issued its final decision, finding there was
sufficient management control and the investments were at risk, but denying
the appeal because the project was not in a contiguous geographical area.
Even though it denied Gulf Coast’s appeal, management control and
investment risk were no longer issues. The Virginia Center, which USCIS had
approved in July 2011, was essentially the same as Gulf Coast, except that it
included only Virginia. Therefore, because it did not have the same
geographical issue, the resolution of the management control and investment
risk issues in the Gulf Coast case cleared the way for approval of the Virginia
Center’s investor petitions.
USCIS Adjudicates Individual Investor Petitions for the Virginia Center
The Virginia Center issues were resolved, but individual investor petitions
needed to be processed. Investor petitions had been pending while USCIS
decided the overarching issues of the qualifying investment. Over the next 18
months, DHS leadership and Mr. Mayorkas continued to be contacted by
interested parties. Nearly every time Mr. Mayorkas was contacted, he
50

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

forwarded the communication on to others in USCIS. Often, Mr. Mayorkas
replied to the sender that he was not involved in adjudicating individual cases.
Nevertheless, Mr. Mayorkas expressed his desire to continue to oversee the
Gulf Coast matter. For instance, Mr. Mayorkas is notified on September 13,
2011, that a team is preparing “a ‘roadmap’ to share with adjudicators laying
out how these cases [Gulf Coast] should be reviewed in light of the AAO
decision” and asked if the roadmap should be shared with him. Mr. Mayorkas
replied that he would “like the opportunity” and was “available tomorrow” for
this review.” [MOA-0003713]
In addition, USCIS headquarters’ constant inquiries and requests for updates
on specific investor petitions affected staff. In interviews, staff said they began
to feel pressure to expedite the petitions and that headquarters was exerting
more scrutiny on their decisions. Moreover, some staff described being
pressured by the front office to use special handling procedures for these
investors, which one employee described as “unusual [and] inappropriate.”
One supervisor directed that the cases be “fast tracked” and “expedited”
because they were “of interest to counsel and HQ.” Email inquiries from Lurie
to Mr. Mayorkas and Assistant Secretary Smith were forwarded directly to
USCIS staff, strengthening the perception of added scrutiny. Staff attempting
to process and adjudicate the petitions understood that DHS leadership and
the applicants were communicating, which lent to a feeling among some that
Gulf Coast was “wired in” with politically connected individuals. [MOA0004076, 4086]
Mr. Mayorkas Does Not Intervene in Gulf Coast’s Fourth Amendment Request
On August 6, 2012, Gulf Coast filed its fourth amendment request, seeking to
include additional industry categories (ship and boat building, food
manufacturing, manufacturing, automobile manufacturing, and motor vehicle
parts manufacturing); change the administrative personnel of the regional
center; and change its economic analysis and underlying business plan to use
a specific economic model to establish indirect job creation.
The staff, in analyzing the amendment request, continued to have significant
doubts about the validity of the project. According to a written analysis of the
fourth amendment request, “the business plan does not provide a detailed,
credible and verifiable expenditure plan that delineates how the EB-5 funds
will be spent by [GTA] in the job creating activities; In response to the [Notice of
Intent to Deny], it is still unclear how all of the EB-5 funds will be infused into
the project.” In an email response to a request from Mr. Mayorkas, one USCIS
51

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

staff member summarized the continuing economic issues with Gulf Coast,
including an incomplete business plan, insufficient economic impact analysis,
and lack of support for estimating direct employment. [EM-0000251], [MOA0000514]
In early 2013, the new counsel for Gulf Coast and Assistant Secretary Smith
attempted to personally involve Mr. Mayorkas in continuing issues related to
Gulf Coast investor petitions. Mr. Mayorkas refused to do so, writing in an
email to Smith, “I cannot weigh in. It is not appropriate for me to do so. The
attorney sent an email to me and I responded that I could not weigh in, but
that I would forward her email to the appropriate individual. I will do the same
here.” Nevertheless, as with the LA Films petitions, staff understood these
applications were getting high-level attention. For example, on January 29,
2013, Anthony Rodham, the Chief Executive Officer of Gulf Coast, emailed Mr.
Mayorkas about delays in processing petitions. Mr. Mayorkas forwarded the
email to the staff with a “high importance” designation. [EM-0000245, 884]
USCIS approved Gulf Coast’s fourth amendment request on February 12,
2014.

52

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Abbreviations
AAO
CFR
DRB

DHS
EB-5
GTA
LVRC
OCC
PIDC
RFE
USCIS

Administrative Appeals Office
Code of Federal Regulations
Deference Review Board

Department of Homeland Security
Employment-Based Fifth Preference Program

GreenTech Automotive, Inc.
Las Vegas Regional Center
Office of the Chief Counsel

Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation

Request for Evidence

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

53

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Appendix A – LA Films Timeline
Date
02/04/08
03/24/08
11/12/09
11/19/09
08/16/10

08/27/10

09/09/10
09/23/10

05/19/11

05/26/11
06/02/11
06/13/11

06/13/11

Event
CanAm files application to establish LA Films as a
regional center
USCIS approves initial regional center (I-924)
application for motion pictures and TV
LA Films submits request to amend designation
by adding nine industries
USCIS approves amended request
LA Films submits another request to amend the
regional center designation to include a new
project from Time Warner and loan by LA County
Regional Center limited partnership to Time
Warner under LA Films III
LA Films submits request to amend proposal to
obtain USCIS’ concurrence that changing
investment from Lions Gate to Sony or Time
Warner is not a material change
USCIS approves request to amend filed on
08/16/10 (LA Films III)
USCIS denies 08/27/10 request to change
investment from Lions Gate to Sony or Time
Warner because change of investment to another
company is a material change
LA Films submits request to amend regional
center designation to include Time Warner project
(Note: this project was approved on August 29,
2013)
California Film Commission contacts California
Service Center asking for investor petitions to be
handled expeditiously
EB-5 staff prepares proposal to deny 200 LA
Films’ investor (I-526) petitions
Katherine Hennigan, Senior Policy Director at LA
Mayor’s office, emails Mr. Mayorkas about Sony
investor petitions; he responds that he will bring
it to the attention of his staff right away
Mr. Mayorkas forwards email to USCIS senior

Document

EM-0000325
EM-0000326
EM0000332-333
EM-0000330
54

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

06/17/11
06/17/11

06/17/11
06/20/11
06/28/11

06/29/11
06/29/11
07/07/11
07/13/11
07/15/11
07/15/11
07/15/11
07/20/11
07/21/11

official, stating cases having urgency because of
time sensitivity of investment vehicles and job
creation potential
Hennigan sends follow up email to Mr. Mayorkas,
who responds he will make an inquiry. Email is
forwarded to senior staff
Senior EB-5 official informs Mr. Mayorkas that
there is no confusion about industry standards
and that staff will brief the senior official after
OCC clears the denial notices and before the
denial notices are sent
Mr. Mayorkas responds to the senior official that
he would like to discuss
Hennigan emails Mr. Mayorkas mentioning she
ran into a mutual acquaintance from O’Melveny &
Myers LLP
Hennigan sends follow-up email to Mr. Mayorkas
asking for update, which he forwards to senior
USCIS officials. Mr. Mayorkas tells Hennigan
that he has brought the issue to the attention of
his colleagues
Senior official provides Mr. Mayorkas the denial
notice drafted in collaboration with OCC
Mr. Mayorkas acknowledges to a senior attorney
that he understands that there may be some
“fatal deficiencies” with the LA Films application
Senior official indicates, “Ali said to go ahead and
issue the denials without any further briefings
and meetings.”
Adjudicators told to process LA Films III denials
Mr. Mayorkas has phone call with former
Governor Rendell in the early afternoon
Within an hour of Rendell phone call, Mr.
Mayorkas directs staff to reopen any denials and
stop any other denials
Rosenfeld and Mr. Mayorkas have phone call later
in the day
Rosenfeld and Mr. Mayorkas have telephone call,
which includes discussion of LA Films
Rosenfeld sends follow-up email to Mr. Mayorkas

EM-0000332,
335
EM-0000332

EM-0000332
EM-0000335

MOA00049164917
EM-0000344
EM-0000339
MOA0004933
MOA0003870
CAL0000737
EM-0000343,
EM-0000349
EM-0000347
EM-0000350,
355
EM-0000355
55

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

07/28/11
08/01/11
08/03/11
08/03/11
08/08/11
08/12/11
08/23/11
08/23/11
08/26/11
09/01/11
09/01/11

09/01/11
10/31/11
11/01/11
11/01/11

thanking him for taking time to discuss concerns
about the Sony project and one other. Mr.
Mayorkas response indicates he will follow up
Rosenfeld emails Mr. Mayorkas thanking him for
personal attention, time, and sensitivity to Sony
Mr. Mayorkas and Rosenfeld have phone call
Rosenfeld sends email thanking Mr. Mayorkas for
his call on August 1
Mr. Mayorkas responds to Rosenfeld, noting that
EB-5 program as a whole is his priority and not
particular projects
Emerson (described as Mr. Mayorkas’ career
advisor) emails Mr. Mayorkas about LA Films
Rosenfeld emails Mr. Mayorkas regarding status
of LA Films
Rosenfeld emails Mr. Mayorkas, who responds
that it would be inappropriate for him to speak
with Rosenfeld about pending matters
Mr. Mayorkas tells senior official that he wants to
discuss the LA Films decision
Senior official informs staff that Mr. Mayorkas
wants a meeting early the next week on LA Films
Emerson emails Mr. Mayorkas to obtain a status
update on the LA Films
Mr. Mayorkas responds to Emerson, stating he is
focused on improving the administration of the
EB-5 program and not involved in the
adjudication of particular cases. Mr. Mayorkas
forwards to a senior official
Phone company records indicate three phone
calls of 2, 1, and 4 minutes occur between Mr.
Mayorkas and Emerson
Rosenfeld leaves two phone messages for Mr.
Mayorkas regarding LA Films; Mr. Mayorkas asks
senior official to return call for him
Mr. Mayorkas communicates his disappointment
when senior official is unable to contact Rosenfeld
that day
Mr. Mayorkas informs senior staff that he does
not intend to be involved in adjudications but

EM-0000354
EM-0000354
EM-0000354
EM-0000354
EM-0000352,
1019
EM-0000354
EM-0000356
EM-0000358
EM-0000359
EM-0000360
EM-0000360

EM-0000364
EM0000368-369
EM-0000371
56

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

11/03/11

11/08/11
11/10/11
11/10/11

11/10/11

11/17/11

11/17/11
08/25/12

09/13/12
10/19/12

10/19/12

only to understand issues from a policy
perspective
Senior official reports to Mr. Mayorkas the results
of conversation with Rosenfeld and recommends
against departing from established adjudicative
procedures
Rosenfeld emails senior staff member about the
need to decide on Sony by the next day
Rosenfeld leaves phone message asking to speak
directly with Mr. Mayorkas; message is forwarded
to senior staff
Rosenfeld leaves another voicemail wanting to
speak directly with Mr. Mayorkas; Mr. Mayorkas
reiterates it would not be appropriate for
Rosenfeld to speak with him
Sony contacts USCIS indicating it still plans to
borrow under the loan agreement and is
committed to matching the EB-5 funds per the
program guidelines
Senior staff member who had discussed issues
with Rosenfeld recuses self from reviewing draft
memo to adjudicators allowing California Service
Center to process LA Films petitions
Memo is issued to adjudicators allowing them to
process LA Films petitions
Rosenfeld contacts senior EB-5 staff member
about LA Films IV (Time Warner) and discusses
the issue of slate financing and 240 investor
petitions
Rendell and Mr. Mayorkas have phone call
regarding the Sony project and 240 outstanding
investor petitions
Chief of Staff Kroloff forwards to Mr. Mayorkas a
third party email sent on behalf of Rosenfeld. Mr.
Mayorkas tells Kroloff that USCIS will not review
Rosenfeld’s case independent of program-wide
efforts
Kroloff copies Mr. Mayorkas on email reply to
third party, indicating he believes Mr. Mayorkas
and Governor Rendell have already spoken about
LA Films IV; Mr. Mayorkas replies that it would

EM-0000373

EM-0000374
EM-0000380
EM-0000379

EM-0000389

EM-0000383

EM-0000402

EM-0000404
EM-0000406

EM-0000406,
1029

57

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

11/15/12 &
11/16/12
December
2012
01/17/13
01/18/13

01/25/13
01/28/13
01/30/13
03/15/13
03/21/13

03/22/13

not be appropriate to have case-specific
communications
Rosenfeld emails Mr. Mayorkas about LA Films;
Mr. Mayorkas responds that he cannot speak
about a pending matter
USCIS staff prepares to material to deny the LA
Films IV petitions
Staff email informs Mr. Mayorkas that that OCC
has approved the template that will be used to
deny the LA Films IV petitions
Rosenfeld leaves a phone message for Mr.
Mayorkas, stating that Mr. Mayorkas “knows the
subject;” Mr. Mayorkas takes a phone call with
Rosenfeld; Rosenfeld raises the issue of deference
Mr. Mayorkas send email to EB-5 staff,
establishing a decision board (DRB); he directs
that staff draft invitations to appear by 1/29/13
Kroloff forwards Rendell email to Mr. Mayorkas
about the need for a decision in LA Films by
1/31/13
At the conclusion of a senior staff meeting to
discuss the DRB, Mr. Mayorkas takes Rosenfeld
phone call
DRB meets to determine whether to give
deference to initial mistaken approval of one
petition to subsequent petitions
Headquarters conducts teleconference with
California Service Center adjudicators who advise
not to give deference to initial single mistaken
approval
Headquarters directs California Service Center to
grant 249 investor petitions

EM-0000408;
MOA0005051
EM-0000416
EM-0000457,
1093
EM0000422-423
EM-0000450
EM-0000451

MOA0001749

58

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Appendix B – Gulf Coast Timeline
Date
Event
01/17/08 Gulf Coast files application to become a regional
center
08/18/08 USCIS approves application
05/07/09 Gulf Coast requests to amend application, intending
to build hybrid cars
07/13/09 USCIS approves amendments to the application
Late 2009 First investor petitions filed
01/15/10 Gulf Coast files second amended request to expand
Gulf Coast’s geographic footprint to include Virginia
02/18/10 USCIS denies the amendment because region is not
contiguous
02/22/10 Gulf Coast files third amendment request, asking to
change nature of investment, and to include
Tennessee and Virginia
07/28/10 Assistant Secretary Smith forwards Terry McAuliffe’s
email to Mr. Mayorkas, expressing frustration at
USCIS approval process. Mr. Mayorkas requests
senior staff to look into issue, writing “I want to
make sure that we are providing customer service
consistent with our standards but that we are not
providing any preferential treatment. Please address
as appropriate.”

08/11/10
08/17/10

08/18/10
09/10/10
11/05/10

Assistant Secretary Smith separately replies to
McAuliffe and says he will “dig down on this” and “be
in touch”
USCIS denies amendment based on issues with
geographic location, stock valuation, and investor
roles
Assistant Secretary Smith forwards McAuliffe email
complaining about the merits of the August 11
decision to Mr. Mayorkas, writing “unless I am
missing something, this [denial] is just crazy.”
McAuliffe complains to Smith, who replies he’s “on
it.”
Gulf Coast files motion requesting reconsideration of
third amendment filed on February 22, 2010
McAuliffe emails Smith to determine status

Document

EM0000001

EM0000264

EM0000019
EM0000268
EM59

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

12/15/10 McAuliffe sends letter to Secretary Napolitano asking
her to reverse the decision to deny the Gulf Coast
amendment and asks for help expediting the
adjudication of more than 200 investor petitions
12/27/10 USCIS is instructed to prepare response to McAuliffe
letter for the Secretary’s signature
01/20/11 Chief of Staff Kroloff emails McAuliffe and requests a
call
01/24/11 Staff prepares talking points for Mr. Mayorkas to use
for telephone call with the Secretary regarding Gulf
Coast
01/24/11 Gulf Coast counsel asks senior official about Mr.
Mayorkas’ meeting with Secretary Napolitano
01/25/11 Mr. Mayorkas meets with staff to discuss Gulf Coast
issues
01/28/11 California Service Center Director issues decision
denying Gulf Coast amendment and “certifies”
decision to the AAO
01/28/11 Courtesy copy of Gulf Coast decision is provided to
Gulf Coast counsel
02/03/11 Mr. Mayorkas meets with McAuliffe
03/04/11 McAuliffe and Smith meet at GTA office
04/28/11 Gulf Coast counsel files application for Virginia
Center with same proposal as Gulf Coast
amendment
05/11/11 GTA representative asks Smith for status of Virginia
Center application; Smith asks for file number
because he wants “to make sure it is on the top of
the pile”
05/26/11 Smith emails Mr. Mayorkas regarding the status of
the Virginia Center petition; Mr. Mayorkas forwards
Smith’s email to senior USCIS official
06/09/11 Senior official orders staff to expedite Virginia Center
petition based on filing history
06/17/11 RFE sent to Virginia Center; senior official notifies
Mr. Mayorkas that RFE has been issued
06/20/11 McAuliffe emails Kroloff, writing that Mr. Mayorkas

0000269
MOA0003549
MOA0003546
EM0000314
MOA0003558,
4851-4859
MOA0001933
MOA0003558,
4858

MOA0001932
MOA0004782
EM0000915

EM0000203,
274
EM0000202203
EM0000201
EM0000201
EM60

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

06/21/11

06/22/11
06/24/11
06/24/11
06/27/11
06/28/11

06/28/11

06/29/11
07/07/11

promised expedited review four months ago; Mr.
Mayorkas responds to Kroloff that he will check on
it, but will not “get into in a back and forth at this
point”
Mr. Mayorkas emails Smith that he is having
someone assess the RFE and they are considering
the matter with urgency given the history, including
USCIS’ communications shortfall
Kroloff emails McAuliffe, writing that the issue is
“on track” and asking if he wants to have a call with
Mr. Mayorkas
Kroloff emails McAuliffe, indicating that Mr.
Mayorkas will be calling him shortly
Mr. Mayorkas begins to raise policy issues with
senior staff about June 17 RFE
Gulf Coast counsel and Mr. Mayorkas have
telephone conversation regarding RFE sent to the
Virginia Center
Gulf Coast counsel emails Mr. Mayorkas and raises
questions about RFE-related issues discussed by
telephone; Mr. Mayorkas replies that she did not
accurately represent what he said about additional
requests; he forwards the email to senior staff
Gulf Coast counsel sends a second email a half hour
later to Mr. Mayorkas with a list of outstanding
petitions; Mr. Mayorkas promises to follow up and
forwards email to senior staff, noting “as indicated”
Mr. Mayorkas receives from staff substantive reply
about the merits of the Gulf Coast application
Gulf Coast emails Mr. Mayorkas warning of possible
investor lawsuits because of delays in petition
approvals; Mr. Mayorkas indicates he will follow up
and forwards email to senior staff, directing them to
“address with appropriate urgency”

07/12/11 The AAO completes its final decision to deny the
Gulf Coast amendment (certified in January 2011)
but cannot issue because Mr. Mayorkas wants to
read it
07/13/11 Senior official emails other senior staff to inquire
about status of Virginia Center RFE, writing “we

0000036,
280
EM0000040
EM0000317
EM0000318
EM0001075
EM0000169,
188
EM0000168170, 187189
EM0000193194
EM0000193
MOA00036073608;
EM0000175176
MOA0003613 3614
MOA0003615
61

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

07/20/11
07/20/11
07/21/11
07/21/11

08/03/11
08/06/12
08/10/11

08/15/11

need to monitor and provide updates to the front
office” and asking to be notified when they receive
the RFE response
Mr. Mayorkas responds to Gulf Coast counsel’s
email inquiry, stating that he will be addressing Gulf
Coast’s concerns with staff the next day
Mr. Mayorkas asks Gulf Coast counsel to call him
later that day and provides the number for his
private desk line
Virginia Center application approved
Mr. Mayorkas chairs internal meeting, indicating he
disagrees with the AAO and offering to write the
opinion himself; Mr. Mayorkas tells senior staff to
send email to California Service Center stating that
all issues are decided and Gulf Coast investor
petitions should be adjudicated in line with his
views; staff convinces Mr. Mayorkas to allow the
AAO to issue the decision.
Very senior official contacts the AAO wanting to see
the revised decision before it goes out
Gulf Coast files fourth amendment request
Gulf Coast emails Mr. Mayorkas asking about status
of Gulf Coast and the Virginia Center RFE; Mr.
Mayorkas forwards the email to senior staff for
handling as they deem appropriate
Mr. Mayorkas forwards Smith’s email about pending
Gulf Coast investor petitions to senior official

08/16/11 Mr. Mayorkas indicates to senior official that he
wants to speak directly with the AAO adjudicator
who wrote specific section of the decision, “the
sooner the better”
08/22/11 Kroloff forwards McAuliffe email to Mr. Mayorkas in
which McAuliffe requests a meeting with the
Secretary and Mr. Mayorkas
08/22/11 Mr. Mayorkas speaks with the AAO chief, who then
urges the staff to issue the RFE as soon as possible
08/23/11 Senior staff member remarks, “this [RFE] is
consuming an inordinate amount of the Director’s
time,” and the next day writes, “I do not want to

EM0000151
EM0000150
MOA00072797280

MOA0007285
EM0000101,
104
EM0000107;
MOA0003653
MOA0007340
EM0000116
MOA0007415
MOA0007419,
7422
62

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

08/23/11

08/24/11
08/24/11
08/30/11

have to explain a delay to him at this point”
Mr. Mayorkas responds to Kroloff’s August 22 email
that Gulf Coast will receive “an analysis of the
perceived deficiency” and have an opportunity to
address it
Kroloff gives status update to McAuliffe, promising
“expeditious” review if there is any error in USCIS’
analysis
USCIS faxes the RFE to Gulf Coast counsel and
mails hard copy
Gulf Coast counsel submits response to the RFE

08/30/11 Smith forwards email from McAuliffe to Kroloff
complaining about the RFE and continuing inquiries
by USCIS; Mr. Mayorkas replies to Smith that the
“case is proceeding through the normal channel and
receiving due attention”
08/31/11 Mr. Mayorkas chairs an internal teleconference with
the AAO to discuss the revised decision
09/02/11 The AAO issues the final decision denying Gulf
Coast’s amendment because it is not geographically
contiguous, but rules favorably on management
control and investment risk
09/02/11 McAuliffe sends email to Mr. Mayorkas and Kroloff,
writing that investors continue to withdraw because
of USCIS delays
09/02/11 Gulf Coast counsel emails Mr. Mayorkas asking for
an update on the AAO case and the RFEs; Mr.
Mayorkas asks staff to reach out to counsel when
the decision is finished.
09/02/11 In response to Kroloff’s suggestion, Mr. Mayorkas
tells Kroloff he will not call McAuliffe to notify him
that a favorable decision is expected that day, noting
he is “focused on programmatic improvements and
not specific cases”
09/12/11 Gulf Coast counsel sends email to USCIS staff
requesting an update and including a list of pending
investor petitions; counsel then forwards the same
email to Mr. Mayorkas for an update, noting that
“Terry has a call with the Secretary tonight;” Mr.
Mayorkas responds he is aware of the time

EM0000119
EM0000320
MOA0003665
MOA0007456
EM0000076

MOA0007628

EM0000321
EM0000082
EM0000079

EM000002728, 65-66

63

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

sensitivity
09/14/11 Staff inform Mr. Mayorkas that they are working on
a road map for adjudicators in light of the AAO’s
decision; Mr. Mayorkas indicates that he would like
to review the road map
09/19/11 Counsel emails Mr. Mayorkas for update on investor
petitions, which he forwards to senior staff asking
for update
09/21/11 Gulf Coast counsel begins to contact adjudicator
directly
09/21/11 Gulf Coast counsel copies Mr. Mayorkas on an email
to an adjudicator about a substantive issue; Mr.
Mayorkas is advised not to respond
09/22/11 An attorney consulting for GTA emails Mr. Mayorkas
complaining of delays; Mr. Mayorkas tells counsel he
will forward the email “as appropriate.”
11/16/12 McAuliffe calls Mr. Mayorkas
11/19/12
12/04/12

12/05/12

12/05/12
12/14/12
01/10/13
01/23/13

EM0000059
EM0000026
MOA0003725,
3723
EM0000035
EM0000061-62

MOA0005542
USCIS Threat Assessment Branch begins to raise
EMnational security concerns with senior officials about 0000218Gulf Coast investors
219
New Gulf Coast counsel emails McAuliffe about
EMmeeting Mr. Mayorkas at a public EB-5 outreach
0000890event, writing that she discussed adjudication delays 891
in Gulf Coast investor petitions with Mr. Mayorkas
who said he would look into the issue
McAuliffe forwards an email from a GTA executive to EMMr. Mayorkas complaining about USCIS delays; Mr. 0000223Mayorkas forwards it to staff “for handling however
225
you deem appropriate”
Attorney for I-829 petitioner sends email to the
EMUSCIS Ombudsman at Smith’s suggestion
0000304
Gulf Coast counsel contacts the USCIS Ombudsman EMabout the outstanding RFE
0000298
USCIS Ombudsman meets with Mr. Mayorkas and
EMthen informs Gulf Coast counsel that Mr. Mayorkas
0000297
is aware of the issues
Gulf Coast counsel calls Mr. Mayorkas, and follows
EMup with an email to Mr. Mayorkas and a senior
0000231
USCIS official about the delay and merits of specific
64

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

01/29/13

01/31/13
02/01/13
02/04/13

petitions; Mr. Mayorkas informs counsel, “I would
not engage in a discussion of a particular case or
cases”
Anthony Rodham emails Mr. Mayorkas about delays
in processing EB-5 petitions; Mr. Mayorkas
forwards the email to staff with a “high importance”
designation
Gulf Coast counsel requests a meeting with Mr.
Mayorkas, who declines to meet with her and
forwards email to staff
Smith forwards Gulf Coast counsel email to Mr.
Mayorkas, complaining about delays; Mr. Mayorkas
forwards to staff.
McAuliffe calls Mr. Mayorkas

02/07/13 USCIS Threat Assessment Branch places hold on
processing any Gulf Coast investor petitions
02/18/13 Mr. Mayorkas receives call on government-issued
Blackberry phone from a phone belonging to Terry
McAuliffe
05/23/13 Fraud Detection and National Security releases hold
on petitions
02/12/14 Gulf Coast’s fourth amendment is approved

EM0000245
EM0000237
EM0000252
MOA0005542
EM0001076
MOA0005542
MOA0001458

65

 Statement of Alejandro N. Mayorkas
to
Thank you for the invitation to provide a written statement. I welcome the opportunity
created an
explain in further detail how the allegations that I provided preferential treatment and
appearance ofimpropriety are entirely unfounded.
for
I have had the privilege of serving our Nation for approximately 17 years. I served
Central
nearly 12 years as a federal prosecutor in the United States Attorney's Office for the
In
August
District of California, including almost three years as the United States Attorney.
or of
2009, I was unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate and became the Direct
four
than
more
for
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services("USCIS"), a post I held
tment to
years. Throughout my government service I have been uncompromising in my commi
of
USCIS,
or
Direct
the
excellence and to integrity. At no time during my service, including as
did that commitment wane.
gation,
I understand that you and your team have done a great deal of work in this investi
that
hope
I
ses.
including your review of numerous documents and interview of numerous witnes
you complete
the narrative responses below and the attached documentation prove helpful as
epth interview
in-d
your investigation. They supplement the information I provided to you in my
on December 5, 2014.
against me is
I respectfully submit that a complete and total repudiation ofthe allegations
the only correct and just conclusion.
ions have
I am aware that there may be pressure in cases such as this, where the allegat
an
take such approach
become a matter of public controversy, to find something to criticize. To
that is properly
in this case would be fundamentally unfair. I did not engage in any conduct
subject to such criticism. The final record should so reflect.
I have organized this submission to address the following topics:
when I started,
• My leadership approach as Director, the challenges facing the agency
challenges;
and the significant structural reforms I instituted to address those
cations as a whole and
• The realities ofthe agency's inconsistent and unreliable adjudi
legal, policy, and
how individual cases provided the means to consider broader
process issues at the program level;
EB-5 program in particular
• The significant shortcomings in the administration ofthe
address the unique
and the far-reaching programmatic changes that I instituted to
complexities ofthe program; and
• Responses to the specific questions and issues raised in your
mail.

December 9,2014 e-

detail on these or any other
If you have any follow up questions or would like additional
of the utmost importance to me.
topics, please do not hesitate to reach out to me. This matter is

66

 My Actions as Director of USCIS Typified My Hands-on Leadership Aparoach.
I am and always have been ahands-on leader, and this was certainly true of my
a topleadership as the Director of USCIS. Shortly after becoming the Director I commissioned
ensure that
to-bottom review ofthe agency. I felt very strongly that this review was necessary to
and
the agency's priorities were appropriately aligned and that its organizational structure
was an
allocation ofresources reflected the priorities. What I found as a result ofthis review
executing
agency filled with dedicated public servants but one that faced significant challenges
n with
tensio
in
its mission. These challenges included(1)prioritizing case processing time goals
policies
the critical needs of national security and program integrity;(2)inconsistent adjudication
of
gnment
misali
ental
and the inconsistent application of adjudication policies; and(3)a fundam
the agency's organizational structure.
I undertook substantial efforts to address these challenges. First and foremost, I stated
detection. I
clearly and consistently that the agency's top priority was national security and fraud
resources to
also made significant structural changes to the agency's organization to realign
reflect this and other priorities, including:
• Creating the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate("FDNS")to
's
appropriately prioritize its critical mission, embed it throughout the agency
uently
adjudicative processes, and give it a vital seat at the leadership table and conseq
a voice in policy and other agency decisions;
Operations
• Separating the Domestic Operations Directorate into the Service Center
greater
e
Directorate("SLOPS")and the Field Operations Directorate to achiev
efficiency in our delivery ofimmigration services;
prioritize and
• Creating the free-standing Office ofPerformance and Quality to help
historic
focus on the quality of our adjudications rather than on less-important
metrics;
and unity to
• Creating the Management Directorate to bring greater cohesion
greater oversight
spur
management functions and decisions across the agency and to
and accountability; and
information and views
• Creating the Office ofPublic Engagement to openly exchange
with stakeholders and the public at large.
nel changes and decisions to
In connection with these and other structural changes, I made person
to and in the service ofthe
ensure a meritocracy, to place the best people in the roles most suited
ty was paramount. The
agency's responsibilities, and to reflect an organization where integri
rarely is -- but I made them in my
changes were not met with unanimous approval -- such change
steadfast commitment to the best interests ofthe agency I served.
improvement. I held
I believe openness and accountability help drive progress and
ent of management
regular formal meetings with senior leadership to discuss the alignm
to discuss issues of concern. I also
responsibilities and resources and with component leadership
2

67

 s,
routinely discussed issues informally with my staff. My leadership approach was, and remain
will
premised on the belief that a work environment that fosters open dialogue and collaboration
generate the best ideas, greater accountability, and a shared commitment to excellence.
USCIS Adjudications Often Fell Short Of Fulfilling the Agency's Mission.
When I became Director the most common complaint from the public about the agency
was that it rendered inconsistent adjudications and failed to adhere to the law. This complaint
essential
concerned me profoundly. Rendering case adjudications lawfully and consistently is an
aspect of impartial government. Throughout my government service I have been guided by the
words of Justice Sutherland in United States v. Berger, 295 U.S. 88(1935), that the sovereign's
"obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all." The agency
favor,
consequently has an obligation to adjudicate cases in adherence to the law, without fear or
ed.
approv
is
such that a case that should be denied is denied and a case that should be approved
This is a matter of enforcing the law.
At USCIS I found that a lack of clear and consistent policies contributed to inconsistent
I
and, at times, incorrect adjudications. As part of my top-to-bottom review ofthe agency
to
failing
we
were
only
not
discovered that the agency's operations were so decentralized that
despite
apply agency policies consistently, but we also had different policies from office to office
agency
USCIS's obligation to enforce a single set oflaws. I cannot overstate the impact ofthis
in court
ted
failure on me as a public servant. For nearly 12 years as a federal prosecutor I advoca
ence in
or otherwise represented the United States and, in that capacity, I stood with great confid
juries.
and
courts
to
how I was applying the law and in the legal and factual positions I presented
upsetting
Not to have that same confidence in the work we were performing at USCIS was most
agency's
and unacceptable. I ordered a Policy Review that entailed(1)collecting all ofthe
s and
immigration policy pronouncements,(2)reviewing them to eliminate inconsistencie
g an agencycreatin
of
s
y
proces
length
deviations from what the law required, and(3)starting the
ry and regulatory
wide Policy Manual to achieve adherence to a single, controlling federal statuto
leadership in the
framework. I also created the Senior Policy Council, which included all senior
collaboration
and
discussion of significant policy issues consistent with the culture ofinclusivity
necessary to ensure
that I emphasized. And I rolled up my sleeves and jumped into cases when
that the agency was enforcing the law as Congress intended.
r, learned about
USCIS is an adjudicative body and the principal way that I, as the Directo
ual cases. I became
policy and legal issues facing the agency was through my review ofindivid
or otherwise important
involved in individual cases to the extent they presented complex, novel,
agency's broader
issues that needed my personal attention to resolve, clarify, or shape the
included cases that
policies and procedures. These cases were extraordinarily varied. They
ofthe efficiency of our
raised difficult questions oflaw or policy, cases that raised questions
y the business, family,
processes, and cases that raised questions whether we understood properl
. My personal
or humanitarian realities that the agency's work is designed to address
t issues for the agency
of
difficul
involvement was thus driven by my role as the ultimate arbiter
ng fair, efficient, and
and as the person responsible for ensuring that the agency was utilizi
the agency's mission.
effective adjudicative processes that were consistent with the law and

K~

68

 I took ahands-on approach with the cases that warranted my personal involvement. This
and
was my approach regardless ofthe program implicated by the case, EB-5 or otherwise,
ng
agency
regardless ofthe parties involved. I learned ofthese cases from varied sources, includi
other
personnel who brought the cases to my attention, media reports, Members of Congress,
nature
the
government officials, and the public. The depth of my involvement corresponded to
on the
and complexity ofthe issue presented and what was necessary to resolve it. Depending
staff,
my
with
ly
case, I would,for example, meet repeatedly on a matter and discuss it intense
communicate with counsel on a case, immerse myselfin the law and relevant agency
gain a
pronouncements, and speak with outside experts and members ofthe private sector to
as
different perspective. I was involved in scores of cases, of all types, throughout my tenure
l
persona
my
d
require
that
Director. Just a few examples of cases outside of the EB-5 arena
involvement are:
from
• International adoption cases: I learned through a variety of channels, including
tly
frequen
Members of Congress, that the processing ofinternational adoption cases
suffered from lengthy delays, often after adoptive parents had already met, been
in
matched with, and fallen in love with their children. Through my involvement
-particular cases I made my view clear that the agency -- and the entire government
tarian
humani
the
with
owed aduty to process these cases at a pace commensurate
urgency they presented. As a matter of systemic response, our handling of
l
international adoption cases improved during my tenure as Director. My persona
ng:
involvement in particular international adoptions cases included the followi
o Senator Mary Landrieu brought to my attention that cases involving
Guatemalan children had been languishing in the system for years, with
children declining in mental and physical health in poorly resourced
orphanages while their adoptive American parents yearned to bring them
home. In one case I remember clearly, the American adoptive parents had
moved to Guatemala for several years to be with their child as much as
e of
possible until one ofthe parents had to return to the United States becaus
the
financial need. I learned from Senator Landrieu that neither USCIS nor
their
to
Department of State maintained a list to track these adoption cases
ately
completion, an omission I viewed as extremely problematic. I immedi
work
and
State
of
created a USCIS task force to liaise with the Department
ed,
with the Government of Guatemala. I also became personally involv
break
and
there
s
official
traveling to Guatemala three times to meet with
my trips. I
through logjams and visiting one ofthe orphanages during one of
r with the
spoke with American adoptive parents. As a result, USCIS,togethe
and,
cases
on
State Department, created a tracking list for Guatamalan adopti
to the best of
during my tenure, the number of unresolved cases dropped from,
r is even
numbe
(The
my recollection, more than 180 cases to fewer than 30.
smaller now according to my recent meeting with the Guatemalan
appearance
Ambassador.) I did not provide preferential treatment or create an
justice was
of impropriety in any ofthese cases. I did my job to ensure that
done.

4

69

 o Senator Charles Grassley bought an international adoption case to my
attention and raised concerns about government ineffectiveness that was
causing the child and the American adoptive family undue haxdship. He
asked that I get personally involved in the case and, given the gravity ofthe
issue, I responded that I would:
Thanks to the Director for listening to the Senator today [and] for
making assurances that he would dive into this case.
(November 10, 2009 e-mail from the Senator's staff to my staff.)
I looked into the case and discussed it with my staff. We agreed that the
Senator's concerns were well-founded. USCIS resolved the case swiftly and
the child was united with the adoptive family. I did not provide preferential
treatment to the child in the case or to the American adoptive family, nor did I
create an appearance ofimpropriety. In fact, Senator Grassley thanked me for
my personal involvement in the case, both in a telephone call and in a
subsequent letter:
Also,thanks again for your assistance on international adoption cases,
ofIowa. Your
particularly the case for Mr. and Mrs.
ant difference in
a
signific
make
will
personal attention to this matter
the lives of a special family. Also, I know your agency is working
hard to improve the situation for children affected by the earthquake in
Haiti. Please don't hesitate to contact me if I can be ofservice as the
process for future adoptions in this devastated counhy are developed.
(January 28, 20101etter from Senator Grassley to me.)
I have attached a copy ofthe above-quoted correspondence and other related
correspondence at Tab 1.

Cases involving the exercise ofdiscretion on behalfofthe needy: I received a call
she
one day from a reporter for a leading national newspaper who informed me that
and
ill
was going to write a story about the agency's mistreatment oftwo chronically
of
disabled children from Africa. I asked the reporter to allow me a brief amount
n
childre
the
time to look into the case. I quickly learned that(1)USCIS had granted
children
deferred action or parole (I do not recall the precise form ofrelied;(2)the
l for
Hospita
an
Samarit
had been receiving free medical attention at the local Good
treatment;
more than one year, and the hospital had committed to continuing this free
giving the
and(3)USCIS had decided to not renew the relief and had issued a letter
days to
30
family, including the two chronically ill and wheelchair-bound children,
tely with my
leave the country and return to Africa. I discussed this matter immedia
considered
We
staff, including the agency's local leadership handling the matter.
r it was just
whether relief should be renewed for the children and, even if not, whethe
their plans,
of
all
make
and compassionate to provide the family with only 30 days to
gather their
accommodate the ill and disabled children's medical and other needs,
5

70

 belongings, and leave our country for Africa. We made the decision to renew the
humanitarian relieffor the children. This case provided a vehicle to recognize and
better understand the realities that the vulnerable confront when they appear before us
and the impact each and every aspect of our decisions can have on them. The USCIS
, commended me for exercising true leadership
counsel on the case,
through my personal involvement. I did not provide preferential treatment or create
an appearance ofimpropriety. I did my job to ensure that justice was done.
National security cases: My colleagues presented to me a case in litigation in which
we could not disclose the national security-sensitive information that bolstered our
denial of citizenship to an individual with a dated criminal record. My colleagues,
including counsel, advised me that we had to grant the individual citizenship given
that we did not have adequate public evidence to present at trial and risked notjust an
on
unfavorable verdict but the imposition of attorney's fees as a penalty for our litigati
of
ing
deserv
was
ual
of a very weak evidentiary case. I did not think the individ
I
citizenship and did not agree with the assessment ofthe strength ofour case at trial.
try
discussed the case and the evidence repeatedly with my colleagues and offered to
to
d
the case myself. In the end, the decision was made to have our counsel procee
trial. We won, and citizenship was properly denied. I did not provide preferential
treatment or create an appearance ofimpropriety. I did my job to ensure that justice
was done.
that
• Cases implicating our business processes: Intel, one ofthe large companies
to
al
propos
submitted business visa applications to us, informed me that it had a
s
improve the processing of business visa applications. I met with company official
discuss
to
on
occasi
and counsel, along with other USCIS personnel, on more than one
ny
the proposal, which involved bundling multiple applications from the same compa
Doing
r.
togethe
ated
together so that certain common issues of fact could be adjudic
set of
so would obviate the need to have different adjudicators review the very same
been the
facts at different times and possibly render inconsistent decisions (as had
analyzing
After
case previously and about which we had received many complaints).
not provide
Intel's proposal with my colleagues, we instituted it on a pilot basis. I did
and
with
g
meetin
preferential treatment or create an appearance of impropriety by
agency's
considering Intel's approach, but rather focused on how to improve our
operations.
• Administrative appeals decisions:
agency was
o My leadership team was well aware of my concern for how our
s
administering the EB-5 program. I included the Administrative Appeal
In late
Office in discussions ofthe issues and our efforts to resolve them.
invited
December 2011,the Administrative Appeals Office reached out and
certified
my office to engage in a pending appeal that the adjudicators had
given the complex or novel issues involved:

D

71

 As you are well aware the Victorville EB-5 case resulted in both a
CSC decision being certified to the AAO and litigation in federal
court. We are operating under a DOJ deadline to decide the case
before us before next Monday, and are ready to issue a decision. After
working with an economist on the issues, we are affirming the CSC
Director's May,2011 decision to terminate the regional center's
designation. The only alternative would have been to remand the case
back to CSC, but we saw no legitimate need to prolong the case.
Given Ali's recent concerns around EB-5 issues, do you want to see
the decision before we issue it?

replied:
Hi

,

Please leave a copy ofthe decision on my chair. I'll be in tomorrow.
Thanks
I have attached a copy ofthe December 13-14, 2011 e-mail exchange between
Administrative Appeals Office, and
, at Tab 2.
later forwarded to
which
o In another instance, Iread afront-page newspaper article about the agency's
decision to deny a performing arts visa for a music group's failure to meet the
eligibility requirement of being "culturally unique." USCIS had determined
that the group's music was not culturally unique because it did not originate
from one single culture but instead was a blend of different cultures. To the
best of my recollection, the music group was a Jewish klezmer band. I
reviewed the law, conferred with my colleagues, and together we determined
that the definition of"culturally unique" could and should embrace multicultural elements in the performing arts. As a result, USCIS published a
precedential administrative appeals decision stating that the definition of
"culturally unique" encompasses multi-cultural elements.
ment in
As these few examples make clear(and there are many, many more), my involve
agency and
a case was triggered by the issue presented and whether it was of significance to the
status. In all
its mission, not by the particular parties involved and certainly not their wealth or
that best served
cases, I worked collaboratively with my USCIS colleagues to reach the outcome
the law,the program's purpose, and our agency's responsibilities.

7

72

 The Administration of the EB-5 Program Faced Enormous Challenges.
My involvement with EB-5 cases proceeded in the same way. I became involved in an
EB-5 case when it raised a legal, policy, or process issue of programmatic significance. The EB5 program differed, however,from other programs because ofthe magnitude ofthe problems the
agency had in administering the program. No other program presented as many complaints
(from all quarters) and challenges as the EB-5 program, which necessitated more frequent and in
depth involvement on my part.
The EB-5 program is the most complex program USCIS administers and it is unlike any
other the agency handles. It does not primarily involve an immigration-related adjudication but
instead requires complicated business and economic analysis and expertise. An EB-5
adjudication requires determinations whether, among other eligibility criteria, the requisite
amount of capital is invested in a new commercial enterprise, whether the capital is lawfully
sourced, and whether it is "at risk"; whether the business project's plans are sufficiently detailed
and the plan is viable; whether the econometric models used to estimate future job creation are
sound and reasonable; and, whether those models demonstrate job creation as required by statute.
Moreover,the EB-5 program's unique business and economic aspects created a complex
adjudicative process at USCIS. Unlike traditional immigration applications that involve a single
application and review, the EB-5 process involves different stages ofagency review depending
on the life cycle ofthe EB-5 business enterprise and the stage of its development. For example,
the agency is often first asked to review an EB-5 petition to approve the EB-5 business proposal
and business plans. The petition is supported by many legal and econometric analyses. Unlike
traditional immigration applications that are a few pages in length, EB-5 submissions can
consume thousands of pages. If the business proposals and plans are approved, numerous
foreign investor applications follow, and their applications require separate and distinct
economic and forensic review. Each investor, once approved, submits another application to
USCIS within two years and, at that point, the agency must adjudicate whether the number of
legally-required jobs have been created or are likely to be created within a reasonable period of
time.
The complex business and economic issues raised by the adjudication ofEB-5 cases were
The
not covered in the typical immigration training that USCIS provided to its adjudicators.
to
aspire
agency's adjudicators are dedicated, talented, and hard-working individuals who
agency,
execute their responsibilities ably. But unlike every other program administered by the
analyze
and
nd
the EB-5 program requires that adjudicators have the expertise to understa
, loan
business plans and proposals and legal and business documents such as financing contracts
financial
ted
complica
other
agreements, redemption agreements, stock purchase agreements, and
assess
instruments. The EB-5 program requires that adjudicators also have the expertise to
in
involved
flows
output
and
econometric models and economic analyses that include input
my
In
assessing future job creation. Our adjudicators simply did not have this expertise.
e position
opinion, the agency did not treat the adjudicators fairly by placing them in the untenabl
issues.
legal
of having to adjudicate cases involving such complex business, economic, and
program when I
It is also important to understand the under-developed state ofthe EB-5
nine
arrived at USCIS in August 2009. At that time, the program had approximately

73

 te law
adjudicators on staff. The agency did not have meaningful economic, business, or corpora
did
nt
an
applica
center,
l
experience to support the adjudicators. To apply to start a new regiona
. The
not have to even file a form; an informal letter correspondence could initiate the process
also
were
nts
applica
EB-5
agency's national security and fraud detection screenings for
inadequate.
r
The fee structure the agency had in place for the EB-5 program when I became Directo
ly
prompt
I
rs.
in 2009 was inexcusable and provided an unwarranted windfall to wealthy investo
acted to correct that inequity. Despite the fact that in 2007, USCIS had raised its other
application fees by an average of approximately 86%,and notwithstanding the fact that EB-5
cases were the most challenging, time-consuming, and therefore expensive applications the
in
agency handled, the agency did not charge the regional center petitioners any fee whatsoever
that
ded
2009. I directed that a fee study be conducted and, as a result, our impartial study conclu
the fee for a regional center application fee should be $6,230 -- the highest fee the agency
tions.
charged, commensurate with the complexity and time-consuming nature ofthese applica
We began to charge the new fee upon promulgation ofthe new fee rule in 2010.
In 2009,the agency's EB-5 adjudication policy was similarly under-developed and
and those
inadequate. Policy was found across a number of memoranda issued over the years
program.
the
in
arose
tly
frequen
memoranda did not address many ofthe significant issues that
business
and
Our policy guidance had also not yet been strengthened by the input of economists
ely long
experts. As a result, the agency's administration ofthe EB-5 program suffered extrem
tration
adminis
s
delays and inconsistent and incorrect adjudications. Complaints about USCIS'
EB-5
ofthe program were legion. I encountered outraged stakeholders from all corners. The
both
of
ss
Congre
program was the one that received the most complaints from Members of
m we
parties (substantially outpacing inquiries and complaints about any other progra
int letters,
compla
wrote
levels
administered). Government partners at the federal, state, and local
our abysmal
demanded meetings, and spoke out in public about what they perceived to be
ng. And I
administration ofthe program. Critical media accounts of our work were mounti
domestic capital
encountered all of these issues at the worst possible economic time, when the
infusion of capital
markets were unusually dry, unemployment was high, and the need for the
the EB-5
from foreign investors and the consequent creation ofjobs for U.S. workers made
program extremely important.
I Instituted Programmatic Change To Realign the EB-5 Program With

its Mission.

receiving about the
The number and tenor of the complaints and reports that USCIS was
program as I could. I
EB-5 program compelled me to study and learn as much about the EB-5
nda,read treatises and
studied the applicable statutes and regulations and our policy memora
advisers, and engaged
articles about the program, consulted with the government's economic
developers were facing
with stakeholders. I learned that EB-5 projects were collapsing, project
economic and legal
lawsuits, investors were withdrawing funds, and the program faced other
ns -- when they finally
problems. I recognized that a material number of our agency's decisio
g ofthe law. Once I
issued -- were often poorly reasoned and not based on a proper readin
ners and the country, I
understood that the program was consistently failing both the petitio
opine abstractly about the best
became directly involved in addressing its problems. Rather than
for the resolution ofthe issues that
way to proceed, I became involved in cases that were vehicles

74

 plagued our administration ofthe EB-5 program. I did this in order to repair the program and
solve its problems, not to benefit or burden any particular petitioner. My involvement led to
progress
approvals and denials alike, depending on the facts and the law. And I made substantial
toward solving the program's problems.
On December 3, 2012, after a series of significant reforms and the infusion of expertise
and resources, I publicly announced the realignment ofthe EB-5 program. I created a new
The
program office at DHS Headquarters that was devoted exclusively to EB-5 adjudications.
new program office, which officially opened on May 6,2013, was to be staffed primarily with
GSofficers who have economic, business, and legal backgrounds and expertise, and with new,
new
141eve1 economists who have the subject matter expertise to evaluate EB-5 petitions. The
program office was also to include staffing increases for FDNS personnel in the intelligence and
officer categories. The consolidation ofthe program into one office created a collaborative
USCIS's
workspace in which experts from a variety of agency components,including FDNS and
ations
adjudic
EB-5
Office of Chief Counsel, would be available to provide support and advice to
office,
of
officers and economists in the most effective manner possible. I hired a new leader the
at the SES level, who had expertise in combating financial fraud.
ng
The agency's responsibilities to uphold the integrity ofthe immigration system,includi
ls.
in the EB-5 program, increasingly involve inter-agency dialogue, coordination, and protoco
met
I
on,
attenti
Indeed, when the problems of administering the EB-5 program first came to my
assistance
with an Assistant Secretary of the Department of Commerce to seek that Department's
way to
direct
one
was
in administering the program. My realignment ofthe EB-5 program office
facilitate and enhance this sort ofinter-agency collaboration as well.
ating EB-5
I also spearheaded the effort to improve guidance on the standards for adjudic
USCIS issued
cases in order to increase transparency and predictability. Under my leadership,
m. Most
both operational and policy memoranda to guide adjudicators in the EB-5 progra
policy
significantly, on May 30, 2013, USCIS published a comprehensive 27-page EB-5
that our agency had
memorandum. (See Tab 3.) It marked the first time in the program's history
final policy
a single inclusive policy document to guide its work in the EB-5 program. The
hed three
memorandum was the result of a multi-year, iterative process in which we publis
ncement
comme
in
the
successive draft versions for public comment. I was personally involved
ensure its rapid
ofthis effort, having drafted the first iteration ofthe policy memorandum to
publication in response to the urgency ofthe situation.
for the program.
The publication ofthe EB-5 policy memorandum was a seminal event
range of statutory and
For the first time our adjudicators and the public had clear guidance on the
predictable and
regulatory criteria, which facilitated our ability to make adjudications more
andum also eliminated
thereby address along-running concern in the program. The memor
which did not advance our
certain procedural requirements that had developed over the years but
was a streamlined
administration ofthe program and were not required by law. The result
ity requirements
eligibil
core
process that allowed us to focus our resources on adjudicating the
and on ensuring the integrity ofthe program.
EB-5 program was
The external reaction to the steps the agency took to improve the
ized the uniqueness ofthis
extremely positive. Members of Congress from both parties recogn
10

75

 program and applauded the important step ofrealigning the program in a dedicated office staffed
with appropriate expertise. A wide range of stakeholders -- from the business community to
state and local officials to developers who leverage the program as an important source of capital
-- also praised our substantial efforts.
As will often be the case with any significant realignment in a large organization, some
staff embraced the changes and others did not. The realignment entailed personnel changes,
including the installation of new program leadership, a new model for the profile ofEB-5
adjudicators, and the realignment offraud detection and national security responsibilities directly
to FDNS headquarters. Such operational change is always challenging, but it was a critical part
of my leadership ofthis program in particular and the well-being ofthe agency as a whole. ,
Notwithstanding the predictable opposition the required changes would receive, I did not shrink
from making them.
My Personal Involvement in EB-5 Cases Was Dedicated To Ensuring the Program's
Inte ri
I have never provided preferential treatment in any case, EB-5 or otherwise. As with all
to
cases, I became involved in an EB-5 case when it came to my attention and served as a vehicle
my
consider a broader legal, policy, or process issue. The parties involved had no bearing on
was
petition
or
tion
interest in a case, and I had no interest in whether a particular applica
hen the
approved or denied. My sole motivation for involvement in any EB-5 case was to strengt
t
integrity ofthe program by ensuring that the agency was utilizing a fair, effective, and efficien
ion
motivat
process in accordance with the law and in furtherance ofthe program's purpose. That
ce
existed regardless ofthe stakeholder's identity. My judgments were guided by strict adheren
law.
to the law; it was my paramount responsibility to ensure that we enforced the
s
To be clear, I did not adjudicate EB-5 cases. I did not review applications and petition
d
standar
the
or
execute
and all the supporting evidence, conduct the requisite security checks,
ed or
operating procedures that adjudicators perform. However, if a case presented an unsettl
my
with
r
togethe
issues
those
d
difficult legal, policy, or process issue, I addressed and resolve
because I
colleagues. As part ofthat process I brought people within the agency to the table
ve and
wanted the benefit of multiple perspectives and it was my ethic to foster an inclusi
sought
also
collaborative process and working environment. When useful or necessary I
stakeholder
opinions and feedback from individuals outside the agency, associations, or large
a more
was
d
resulte
gatherings to gain the benefit oftheir different points of view. What
occurred. If during
rigorous consideration of programmatic issues than would otherwise have
it. Ifthe agency
that process the agency became aware that it had erred in a case, we corrected
execute our statutory
became aware ofthe need for legal or policy clarifications or revisions to
obligations more rigorously, we made them.
as the need
The frequency of my personal involvement in EB-5 cases changed over time,
with the introduction of
for my direct involvement was at first intense and eventually diminished
the first two years as
new personnel and implementation of other programmatic changes. In
ofthe program
Director my attention to EB-5 cases grew as the administrative shortcomings
ded with complaints
became clearer to me. It was during this time that the agency was bombar
ct adjudications. Many
about deficiencies in program administration and inconsistent and incorre
11

76

 ofthe communications that appear to be the focus ofthis investigation fall within the heart of
this time period, when I found it necessary to intervene personally to drive change and improve a
gravely flawed program. But once I had implemented significant structural and personnel
changes to the program, which culminated in the complete programmatic realignment announced
in late 2012, my personal involvement decreased significantly. What had changed was not the
identity ofthe petitioners -- which never mattered to me -- but the need for my personal
involvement.
When I was involved I was an open book. My general practice when a stakeholder
contacted me directly was to acknowledge receipt and to inform the Service's senior leadership,
either by copying USCIS supervisors and attorneys directly into e-mail communications with
stakeholders or by forwarding the communications immediately afterwards. I consistently
sought input, counsel, and guidance from senior leadership, including USCIS attorneys, on how
to handle communications with various constituencies and was instinctively and consistently
open and forthcoming about those communications. I was also mindful ofthe need to avoid
even the appearance of undue influence over the adjudicative process and addressed that issue
squarely and responsibly. I avoided direct contact with adjudicators on case-specific matters and
relied upon my senior staff to handle any necessary communications with adjudicators. In the
one instance that I can recall when a representative copied me into an e-mail chain with an
adjudicator, I immediately recognized the potential appearance issue and sought guidance from
senior leadership on how to handle the communication,then followed the advice I received not
,
,
to respond. (See September 21,2011 e-mail exchange between
, and me regarding the Gulf Coast EB-5 case, attached at Tab 4.) I did not operate
in secret or in the shadows when communicating with stakeholders. I was open and consultative
with my colleagues about those communications. The USCIS attorneys whom I consistently
copied or consulted did not, as I recall, advise me to proceed differently, nor did others.
More broadly speaking, I also made a concerted effort to increase the transparency of
USCIS, which had been criticized for years as unduly insular. I created the Office of Public
Engagement to facilitate direct and transparent dialogue with external stakeholders. I also made
senior staff and myself available for public engagement in a variety of settings, ranging from the
"Conversation with the Director" series, which were in-person focus groups open to the first 25
or so people who registered, to national stakeholder engagements with sometimes more than
1,000 in-person and telephonic attendees in total. I also drove the practice of posting USCIS
May 30,
draft policies for public comment online; the three successive drafts of what became the
public
Such
2013 EB-5 policy memorandum went through this public comment process.
engagement was in keeping with my leadership approach emphasizing openness and
accountability.
Ultimately, my role as Director was to act as the final quality assurance officer to
EB-5
strengthen the integrity ofthe EB-5 program and to ensure that the agency adjudicated
I
When
possible.
cases in accordance with the law and in the most effective and efficient way
program, it
discovered that the agency was'not meeting its responsibilities with respect to this
ting
collabora
cases,
in
was my duty to act. I did so by researching the law, becoming involved
hosting
with agency personnel and other enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory agencies,
a
creating
by
tly,
significan
public engagements and speaking with outside parties, and most
in place.
dedicated EB-5 program office with new expertise and more enhanced processes
12

77

 Throughout, my involvement was in accord with and upheld all legal, regulatory, and ethical
requirements and guidelines.
Specific Tonics Raised by the Office of Inspector General
1.

Details of my involvement in the following regional center cases and reasons
for such involvement: Gulf Coast/GreenTech Automotive; SLS Las Vegas;
and LA Films and Aqua Project P.A.(CanAm Enterprises).

GulfCoast/GreenTech Automotive
My involvement with the Gulf Coast/GreenTech Automotive case was consistent with
of
my general approach to all cases, EB-5 and otherwise: it was limited to the consideration the
as
them
to
refer
(I
TA"
broader legal and policy issues raised by the case. With respect to "GC/G
red
one entity here), the broader issues included, among others, when capital should be conside
with
vetted
and
ed
discuss
I
which
"at risk" and how to define a "limited geographic area," issues
was
point
senior leadership from a programmatic standpoint. As the record makes clear, at no
case.
my involvement premised on the involvement of Terry McAuliffe or any other party to the
any
prompt
Indeed, when the case first came to my attention Mr. McAuliffe's name did not
personal involvement on my part. At that time the case presented no more than the all-toothus the
typical complaints of processing delays that did not necessarily require my attention, and
case did not receive it.
To the best of my recollection, my involvement with GC/GTA was as follows:
• I first became aware of GC/GTA in mid-2010 when Ireceived an e-mail from
Office of Communications,reporting that Mr. McAuliffe had
il
complained of USCIS processing delays for an EB-5 application. Because this e-ma
e-mail to
focused on processing delays, all I did was forward
:
, and
,
,
,for the heads up. I am notifying our colleagues for
Thank you,
handling as appropriate.
(I have attached a copy ofthis June 7, 2010 e-mail chain at Tab 5.)
Private Sector,
• On July 28,2010, Douglas Smith,the DHS Assistant Secretary for
I
forwarded another complaint by Mr. McAuliffe of undue processing delays.
and
and
,
,
forwarded Mr. Smith's e-mail to
wrote:
,
just
Douglas Smith,the Assistant Secretary for Private Sector in DHS,
me in
forwarded to me the attached regarding an EB-5 petition(he called
am
I
so)[.]
advance a minute ago and indicated that he would be doing
so that they have visibility. I want to make sure that
and
copying
13

78

 we are providing customer service consistent with our standards but that we
are not providing any preferential treatment. Please address as appropriate.
Thanks very much. Ali
responded to my initial e-mail, my reply reflected my vigilance in
After
being open and seeking counsel's advice as to how best to proceed:
. As long as this case receives prompt, full, and fair
Thank you,
consideration -- as we wish for all cases -- that is great. I would like to know
ofthe decision only so that I may inform our colleagues at DHS,as long as
concurs that is appropriate.
Thanks. Ali
(I have attached a copy ofthis July 28-29, 2010 e-mail chain at Tab 6.)
• In early 2011 I received a request for information from the DHS Secretary's Office
regarding the GC/GTA matter. The Secretary had received a letter from Mr.
McAuliffe complaining of USCIS's handling ofthe case. In response to the
Secretary's request, my staff prepared a summary memorandum for me to send to the
Secretary, talking points for a call I was to have with the Secretary, and a draft
response letter from the Secretary to Mr. McAuliffe for my review. Of note, the
talking points indicated that:
o USCIS now believed that it had interpreted its regulations too narrowly in
denying the application;
o Certain issues, including what the agency had deemed an impermissible
redemption agreement and insufficient management agreement,"may be
surmountable"; and
o A separate proposal for a Virginia regional center "could be approvable."
(I have attached a copy ofthe relevant documents at Tab 7.) The potential path
-- are
forward suggested in these talking points -- which others developed and wrote
precisely how certain issues in the GC/GTA matter were resolved several months
later.
and ethical advice,
• On February 2, 2011, consistent with my practice of seeking legal
Office that I
ry's
Secreta
about a request from the DHS
I e-mailed
I had
attend a meeting the following day with Mr. McAuliffe. I indicated that
been
previously requested not to attend such a meeting but that I had nevertheless
mode:
-only
asked to do so and, under the circumstances, intended to attend in listen
ffe
I have been requested by S1's office to join a meeting with Terry McAuli
not met
about the EB-5 program. I believe Mr. McAuliffe, whom I have
Previously
us.
with
g
before, has an interest in particular cases that are pendin
14

79

 I requested that I notjoin such a meeting given the pendency ofthe cases.
now have been asked to join the meeting. I will not discuss the cases or
provide information about them. I will be in listen-only mode. May I,
though, inform him only that our agency representatives recently had a
discussion with the attorney of record?
Thank you. Ali
affirmed that I was proceeding in the best way possible:
Thanks Ali. While it would have been better, as you note below, for you not
to be involved in this type of meeting —given the current situation —what you
outline below is the most appropriate course of action. I do not see any harm
in indicating that the agency has been in touch with the regional center's
attorney ofrecord and that that will remain the avenue for any agency
communications on this matter.
(I have attached a copy ofthis February 2, 2011 e-mail exchange at Tab 8.)
On February 3,2011,I met with Mr. McAuliffe and others at the request ofthe
Secretary's Office. In keeping with my intent and the advice of counsel, I did not
only
speak about the specifics ofthe EB-5 case pending before the agency and shared
d
what I had said at a national stakeholder engagement the day before. (I have attache
and
a copy of my February 3, 2011 e-mail to
at Tab 9.)
d
I
attende
g
that
meetin
memorializing the portion ofthe
check
• Several months later, on May 26,2011, I received a request from Mr. Smith to
on a GC/GTA case that he characterized as "in a black hole." I directed an inquiry
and learned from career staff that:
into the case status through
o This case had a tortured history;
o An appeal had been self-certified to the Administrative Appeals Office
d
("AAO")by the USCIS career adjudications staff under a regulation reserve
(8
for cases "involv[ing] an unusually complex or novel issue oflaw or fact"
C.F.R. Section 103.4(a)(1)); and
, one ofthe career staff who
o In connection with this case,
worked on the EB-5 program, had to "talk[] the ISO [Immigration Service
24, 2011
Officer] off ofthe ledge." (I have attached a copy of a May 26-June
using this language on
e-mail chain that includes an e-mail from
June 17, 2011, at Tab 10.)
sms of our
At a time when my visibility ofthe mounting complaints and critici
il spoke to a
e-ma
administration ofthe EB-5 program was increasing,
broken process.
outside counsel
• Around the same time I also received complaints from Dawn Lurie,
to a lawsuit
for GC/GTA,that USCIS processing delays had the potential to lead
15

80

 against the regional center and to investors requesting the withdrawal offunds. These
complaints came at the very same time that government and public attention on the
EB-5 program grew significantly as an avenue to introduce investment into the
United States, create jobs for U.S. workers, and spur the economy. The dire feedback
from Ms. Lurie, the alarming internal report I received on the case status, and my
inability to receive from within the agency a clear and comprehensive understanding
of what was going on led me to conclude that my personal involvement in this case
was necessary. I engaged with Ms. Lurie as needed to understand the issues raised by
the case. I consistently kept my senior staff, including the attorneys, fully informed
about my communications with Ms. Lurie and at no point, as I recall, did any of my
staff raise a concern about those communications.
In mid-July 2011 I received a draft ofthe AAO opinion in the appeal that the
adjudicators had self-certified for review because ofthe complex or novel issues of
fact or law. On its face the draft opinion presented the sort of broader legal and
policy issues that prompted my involvement in a particular case. I called a meeting
that included senior leadership ofthe EB-5 program,including USCIS attorney
, and representatives ofthe AAO to discuss the issues presented.by the case.
The consensus reached by the group was that the agency had erred in its prior
adjudication in several respects that were first forecast by career staff in the summary
memorandum provided to me in January. One ofthose errors was the erroneous
finding that the capital was not "at risk" under the terms ofthe stock conversion
agreement, as the existence ofthat agreement did not guarantee that a market would
exist for any stock, regardless of whether it was converted to common or preferred
shares. Indeed, the issue of when capital should be considered "at risk" was of such
programmatic importance that it was included in the new May 30,2013 EB-5 Policy
Memorandum to provide guidance in future cases.
From my inquiries in the meeting with staff and subsequently, I determined that the
agency imprudently(and possibly unlawfully) had defined a "limited geographic
area" as imposing a contiguity requirement when that contiguity requirement was not
found in any statute or regulation. The agency had created the contiguity requirement
by merely adding it to its Form I-924, Application for Regional Center Under the
Immigrant Investor Pilot Program("Describe the geographic area ofthe regional
center. Note: This area must be contiguous."). In other words,the agency had added
an eligibility requirement without undergoing formal rulemaking.
• Once these broader legal and policy issues were resolved, I did not need to and
g with
therefore did not engage to the same degree on the GC/GTA matter, includin
respect to communications with Ms. Lurie or others. As I previously described
an eabove, a few months later -- on September 21,2011 -- Ms. Lurie copied me into
was
response
, a USCIS adjudicator. My immediate
mail chain with
on how to avoid
, and
,
to seek counsel from
any appearance of impropriety:
I am cc'd on this message. Should I respond or not, and if so, with what
message? Thank you. Ali
16

81

 responded:
You should not have been copied and should not respond.
Two minutes later I responded:
Will do.
(See Tab 4.) As indicated, I followed the advice of
communication.

to ignore the

• Complaints about the continued adjudication delays in this case continued into 2013
and I rebuffed efforts to become involved. These efforts included outreach from
Palma Yanni, Simone Williams, Anthony Rodham, and Mr. McAuliffe. (I have
attached a copy of illustrative e-mails at Tab 11.)
• In or around early 2013, I read a report bearing on integrity issues in the case and
promptly transmitted the report to FDNS.
• To the best of my recollection, I had no other involvement in the GC/GTA case, nor
do I know the final results of any of its applications or petitions pending before the
agency. I do know that Terry McAuliffe and others continued to complain into 2013
about our handling ofthe case (I describe below the inflammatory words I received
from Mr. McAuliffe in 2013)..
SLS Las Ve as
to
My involvement with the SLS Las Vegas Regional Center("SLS") was also limited
e
expedit
resolving a programmatic issue raised by this case, which involved when to grant an
request and what the effect of an expedite was. The record makes clear that(1)I became
to my
involved only when the broader policy issues regarding expedite requests were raised
d.
attention, and (2)I did not remain involved in the case once those issues were resolve
:

To the best of my recollection, my involvement in the SLS matter was as follows

that did not
• In late 2012, I received an inquiry about acase-specific processing issue
e-mail to
the
ed
forward
require my attention. In keeping with my general practice, I
senior leadership for appropriate handling:
,
Fyi, for handling as you deem appropriate.
Thank you. Ali
(I have attached a copy of my November 26,2012 e-mail to

at Tab 12.)

g to its
• In early 2013, I learned from senior staff that USCIS was not adherin
time the
this
published and long-standing expedite criteria. I believe that around
and his staff
agency and I also received communications from Senator Harry Reid
17

82

 expressing concerns about the same problem. I looked into the issue and learned the
following:
o The agency had established criteria that, if met, would enable an applicant or
petitioner to have its case moved up in line for adjudication. The criteria
pertained to an application or petition in any visa program and were based on
a showing of good cause as follows: severe financial loss to company or
individual; extreme emergent situation; humanitarian situation; nonprofit
status of requesting organization in furtherance of the cultural and social
interests ofthe United States; Department of Defense or National Interest
Situation; USCIS error; or compelling interest of USCIS. (See
www.uscis.Gov/forms/expedite-criteria.)
o The petitioner in SLS sought expedited consideration based on the fact that it
was confronting the expiration of its financing loan.
o USCIS was taking the position that the petitioner had to first prove that it had
sought an extension of its financing loan or present reasons to USCIS why it
could not do so before USCIS would be satisfied that one ofthe expedite
criteria had been met.
• I became concerned that USCIS's position was improper, a violation of its own
d of
expedite criteria, and ultra vices insofar as USCIS was not adhering to the standar
ned
concer
proofto which petitioners were to be held under the law. I also became
that USCIS's position was detached from business reality (as I explained in greater
ed:
detail during my interview). As my e-mail to a group of senior USCIS staff provid
,I mentioned to you the Department of Commerce letter, which I read,
because it underscores our need to develop expertise on a fast/urgent track
(the Department with the relevant expertise believes that, contrary to our
adjudication, the expedite criteria have been met). I did not wish to get
ed by our
involved in the case itself Having now read your email, I am surpris
t for
response. For example, the petitioner has to present evidence of a reques
request
a
such
why
of
an extension oftime from the fonder, or an explanation
I will
was not submitted? Are we imposing that condition ourselves now?
on the
defer to those with adjudications experience. I must ask whether, based
we
deal document and given the Department of Commerce's view, are
each of
following the law applicable to the standard of proof? I would like
your views.
Thanks. Ali
(I have attached a copy of my January 25, 2013 e-mail to a group
staff at Tab 13.1

of USCIS senior

18

83

 In an e-mail a minute later, upon receiving case-specific information that I did not
request or need in order to address the broader legal and policy issues that had been
brought to my attention, I wrote:
Please drop me from the case-specific chain. Adding
Office of Legislative Affairs,] to the extent a legislative inquiry is
involved.
Thanks. Ali
(I have attached a copy ofthis January 25, 2013 e-mail to a group of USCIS senior
staff at Tab 14.)
• I also learned that there was disagreement and confusion within USCIS as to what it
meant for a case to be expedited. This was disconcerting given that the agency's
expedite criteria had been in operation for a considerable period oftime and applied
to all visa programs. One view, which proved to be the minority view, was that an
expedited case meant that the adjudication itself was expedited and that, therefore, all
security checks had to be performed before the expedite decision could be made. The
competing, majority view was that an expedited case meant only that the case moved
y
up in the line to be adjudicated but that the adjudication itself, including all securit
checks, was performed as usual. After receiving the viewpoints of a number of
individuals I responded as follows:
I agree that to grant an expedite request means only that we have agreed,
based on some articulated and supported time sensitivity, to review the case
on an accelerated basis. It does not mean or in any way suggest that we have
y
rendered any decision on the merits ofthe petition. If, for example, a securit
we
r
whethe
issue arises that will take time to resolve, then — regardless of
the
have agreed to expedited review — we will take the time needed to resolve
ion.
resolut
security issue and we will not act until we have achieved
I agree that we need to run enhanced security and integrity checks.
a
From my review of the chronology outlined below,I am concerned that
and
process breakdown occurred in this case. I think we should review
need
discuss the chronology to better understand the process and whether we
to make adjustments system-wide. I look forward to discussing.
Thank you again.
Ali
(I have attached a copy of my January 30, 2013 e-mail and relevant
at Tab 15.)

e-mail exchanges

legal and policy
• I was involved in the SLS case as needed to resolve the broader
applicable to the
proof
of
d
issues that had arisen, specifically the issues ofthe standar
ed. Once those
expedite criteria and, distinctly, what it meant for a case to be expedit
ended.
issues were resolved, my limited involvement in the SLS case
19

84

 LA Films and Aqua Project P.A.(CanAm Enterprises
To the best of my recollection, my involvement in each ofthese two cases was very
been
limited. I would note that my recollection ofthese two cases is quite vague and has not
my
refreshed to supplement the few e-mails shown to me during my interview. To the best of
recollection:
• The Aqua Project P.A. came to my attention first. The DHS Secretary's Office
requested that I speak with Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell and I obliged.
Governor Rendell complained to me that the agency's mishandling ofthe Aqua
Project EB-5 case was costing Pennsylvania the investment offunds and the creation
ofjobs. I looked into the case with my staff.
o I believe the issue presented by this case was whether the movement of water
through pipes could be classified as part ofthe transportation industry. While
my and my staff's instincts were that it should not be classified as such, state
or local authorities submitted a letter to USCIS classifying that activity as
falling within the purview ofthe relevant transportation authority. We
debated whether, in adhering to the standard of proof and other relevant law
that guided our adjudications, we were required to defer to the state or local
authority governing the activity at issue. I believe, though I am not certain,
that we determined that we were obligated to do so.
With respect to LA Films, I received a number of calls from public officials,
ng of
including officials from the City of Los Angeles, complaining about our handli
the case. They accused USCIS of being ignorant of how financing in the film
law,
industry worked and consequently misinterpreting facts and misapplying the
ment
thereby costing the City of Los Angeles the infusion ofmuch-needed invest
ed for
arrang
office
ry's
Secreta
dollars and preventing the creation ofjobs. The DHS
others,
and
me to join a conference call with Department personnel, Tom Rosenfeld,
ed.
describ
just
I
ints
which I did. In that call I heard again the compla
,

o I recall speaking with

I recall expressing concerns on a few
nts and
occasions about our ability to interpret complex film financing docume
the fact that our position in the case struck me as analytically weak.
need to
o I recall receiving messages from Mr. Rosenfeld expressing an urgent
occasion
speak with me. I do not recall whether I spoke with him on any
ed and
other than in the conference call that the DHS Secretary's office arrang
and the
that I referenced above. If I had, I would have reported that fact,
substance of any communication,to my staff.
nt
o I believe, although I am not certain, that there were differe
Films case.

phases of the LA

20

85

 o I recall that the LA Films case went before the Decision Board under the
, whom I had selected to lead the effort of
leadership of
building the new EB-5 program office in headquarters. The issue of our
failure to adhere to our own deference policy arose in the LA Films case, and I
may well have urged my staff to convene the Decision Board to address that
issue in the case, although I have no specific recollection of doing so.
reported to me that the proceeding was very effective. I did not
participate in the Decision Board proceeding or adjudication and do not recall
its outcome. I describe the intent and use ofthe Decision Board generally in
greater detail later in this statement.
2.

Details of communications with Dawn Lurie, Tom Rosenfeld, Ron Klasko,
and Terry McAuliffe, each of whom were either involved in litigation against
the agency or had cases pending before the agency. Reasons for the
communications with these individuals/entities.

As a general matter, it is important to keep in mind that my communications with Dawn
d
Lurie, Tom Rosenfeld, and Terry McAuliffe were very difficult and unpleasant. They occurre
of
in my capacity as the Director of USCIS because the agency was failing in its administration
sound
e
promot
,
the EB-5 program, including failing to enforce the law, adhere to its own policies
honor its
policy, understand business facts and realities, correctly apply economic principles, and
failures
of
these
borne
own representations. My communications with these individuals were
with the
and, candidly, compelled because of our agency's complacency in curing these failures
ment
urgency that was incumbent upon a responsible, dutiful, and high-performing govern
agency.
I would have much preferred not to have had to listen to individual stakeholders'
ly address
complaints, sometimes caustic and high-volume, about how we were failing to correct
not
could
I
complex issues oflaw, policy, or fact. Yet I engaged because it was necessary.
correctly.
allow the agency to fail in its responsibility to enforce the law and adjudicate cases
petitioner.
or
nt
applica
This guiding principle was true regardless ofthe identity or stature ofthe
ensuring that it
I worked incredibly hard to build that ethic in USCIS,and I devoted my time to
prevailed in the cases that were brought to my attention.
Dawn Lurie
the GC/GTA
I have detailed above the context in which I engaged with Ms. Lurie about
USCIS
the
ng
includi
matter. I discussed Ms. Lurie's inquiries and concerns with my staff,
raised by the case, and at
attorneys, considered and addressed the broad legal and policy issues
Ms. Lurie for the reasons I
times responded to Ms. Lurie on the agency's behalf. I engaged with
failure to adjudicate the
have previously cited, including the agency's acknowledgement of its
a clear and comprehensive
GC/GTA case correctly and the agency's inability to provide me with
Ms. Lurie typified the
understanding ofthe issues and the case status. My communications with
and in part as I have
care I took to engage appropriately with stakeholders. For example,
previously described:
• I focused on the broad policy'and legal issues:
21

86

 I do not believe I represented that there will be no "additional requests outside
the scope ofthis [pending] RFE." I have not analyzed the case file. What I
did express is my general view that the serial issuance ofRFEs does not seem
fair unless everyone understands at the outset that outstanding issues or
deficiencies are being addressed in serial fashion.
(I have attached a copy of my June 28, 2011 e-mail to Ms. Lurie at Tab 16).
• I was mindful of and vigilantly protected against the appearance of undue influence.
, two USCIS attorneys
and
A June 28, 2011 e-mail I sent to
with whom I systematically shared and consulted about my communications with Ms.
Lurie, is but one example:
,
has spoken with you about the fact.that Dawn Lurie
I understand that
contacted me about the Virginia EB-5 case. I am forwarding to you now her
follow-up email to me,along with my brief response. I defer to you as to
what should or should not be shared with SCOPS,as we are all mindful of the
need to ensure that our adjudicators do not feel any pressure in their
adjudication ofthese (or any)cases.
I will forward to you another e-mail from Dawn that I received this morning
as well.
Thank you very much. Ali
(I have attached a copy ofthis June 28, 2011 e-mail, which I also forwarded to
, at Tab 17.)
• I was transparent, open, and consultative with senior leadership, including the USCIS
attorneys, regarding my communications. The record is clear that I systematically
shared my communications with Ms. Lurie with senior USCIS leadership, including
the USCIS attorneys, and discussed those communications with them.
21,
• I sought advice on potential appearance issues, as exemplified by the September
, and
,
2011 e-mail exchange I initiated with
as previously
,
after Ms. Lurie copied me into an e-mail chain with
described. (See Tab 4.)
When it was necessary forme to communicate with Ms. Lurie in the service ofthe agency's
d with
obligations, I did so; when it was not, I did not. I was open and transparent and consulte
issues they
my leadership staff about those communications and the important legal or policy
to proceed
leaders
involved. Not once do I recall being advised by the USCIS attorneys or other
differently.

22

87

 Tom Rosenfeld
As I have previously described and to the best of my recollection, the DHS Secretary's
office directed and arranged for me to join a conference call with Department personnel, Mr.
Rosenfeld, and others (possibly including Governor Rendell)regarding the LA Films case. I
joined the call and listened to the complaints from Mr. Rosenfeld and others regarding USCIS's
mishandling ofthe case. I was open and transparent and consulted with my leadership staff
about the conference call.
I recall receiving messages from Mr. Rosenfeld expressing an urgent need to speak with
me. I do not recall whether I spoke with him on any occasion other than in the conference call
directed and arranged by the DHS Secretary's office. I do not recall whether I received any
letters from Mr. Rosenfeld or otherwise communicated with him about LA Films, the Aqua
Project, or any other matter. It is possible, although I have no specific recollection of it
occurring, that I met Mr. Rosenfeld at a public EB-5 program stakeholder engagements in which
I and other USCIS leaders participated. If I had any other communications with Mr. Rosenfeld
in addition to the conference call in which Mr. Rosenfeld and others participated, I would have
been equally open, transparent, and consultative with my leadership staff about them and the
issues they presented.
Ronald Klasko
For much of my tenure as Director, Ronald Klasko was the Chair ofthe EB-5 Committee
ofthe American Immigration Lawyers Association("AILA"). AILA was one ofthe most
significant stakeholders of USCIS. Its membership consisted of more than 10,000 immigration
lawyers across the country who interacted with our agency on a daily basis. AILA was one of
the most vigilant critics of USCIS's performance as a government agency.
I do not recall communicating with Mr. Klasko about a specific case. When Mr. Klasko
reached out to me on the SLS matter, I declined to communicate with him about case-specific
matters:
Ron,
We were pleased to answer process questions in our call with the Senator's office
yesterday. We cannot speak with you about the case.
Thank you for your understanding.
Ali
on which
(I have attached a copy of my February 1, 2013 e-mail exchange with Mr. Klasko,
of USCIS are copied, at Tab 18.)
and
with him on
I engaged with Mr. Klasko in a number of public settings. First, I engaged
Other USCIS
EB-5 programmatic issues during my periodic meetings with AILA leadership.
nt in my broader
leaders attended those meetings. In addition, Mr. Klasko was an active participa
in public
and varied public engagements on the EB-5 program. I hosted or participated
"Conversations
conference calls, in-person stakeholder events(with public call-in access), and
and hundreds
person
with the Director" that involved approximately 25-30 people attending in
23

88

 in
more participating by phone. USCIS staffjoined me in these engagements as well. Often
ask
these engagements Mr. Klasko would raise legal, policy, or process issues or concerns and
law.
ble
applica
ng
the
questions. I found him to be an expert on the EB-5 program, includi
I also recall engaging with Mr. Klasko when we published for public comment a draft of
,
the proposed EB-5 policy memorandum. USCIS received comments from a variety of sources
me a
including the AILA EB-5 committee, and the Office ofPublic Engagement prepared for
actual
of
the
matrix of the public comments. After reviewing the matrix, I requested a copy
comments themselves and read each one. I also recall reading position papers that AILA
se I
prepared on various EB-5 subjects. I reached out to Mr. Klasko, whose subject matter experti
EBrespected, to better my understanding ofthe views and positions that expressed by the AILA
and
law
ng
the
enforci
5 Committee. I did so in the service of ensuring that USCIS was
promulgating sound supporting policies. I was open,transparent, and consultative with my
leadership staff about my engagement with Mr. Klasko, which I found to be of value.
I should note that, as a general matter, some within USCIS (including some within
of Public
USCIS leadership) resisted engaging with the public, resisted my creation ofthe Office
policy
draft
our
Engagement, and resisted the practice I began of posting for public comment
with
memoranda. They preferred the insularity that USCIS had exhibited for years. I, along
ss.
openne
and
rency
transpa
many others, did not agree, and I led the agency in the direction of
Mr.
of
We benefited and learned from robust engagement with the public, including the input
Klasko and others.
Terry McAuliffe
I did not engage with Mr. McAuliffe on substantive issues at any point in time.
me to
• I previously described the meeting that the DHS Secretary's office directed
counsel.
attend with Mr. McAuliffe and others and about which I sought the advice of
about
• On December 5, 2012, Mr. McAuliffe sent an e-mail to me to complain
to
e-mail
the
ded
USCIS's handling ofthe GC/GTA case. I forwar
:
and
copying

,

,
For handling however you deem appropriate. I am adding
given the reference to contacts with members of Congress. I am adding
due to a reference to contact with the Secretary's office.
Thanks. Ali
(I have attached a copy ofthis December 5, 2012 e-mail chain at Tab 19.)
messages from
• I recall that over the course of many months I received several voice
case. The
Mr. McAuliffe complaining about USCIS's handling ofthe GC/GTA
I played for
that
e
messages were caustic. I remember in particular one voice messag
occasion on
, as it was laced with expletives at a high volume. I recall one
which Mr. McAuliffe complained to me directly over the telephone.
24

89

 In or around January 2013,I happened to walk by Mr. McAuliffe in a large crowd
and, as we walked by each other he said words to the effect of,"your agency is killing
the project."
I do not recall whether I had any other communications with Mr. McAuliffe. I do recall
admonishing Douglas Smith, Assistant Secretary ofthe DHS Private Sector office, for having
(See,
communications with Mr. McAuliffe when those communications were not appropriate.
"I
tion,
admoni
my
s
include
e.g., Apri15, 2013 e-mail exchange with Mr. Smith -- which
he
recommend that you cease communications with Mr. McAuliffe on USCIS matters in which
has an interest" -- attached at Tab 20).
More than two years after the GC/GTA case first rose to my attention, the complaints
from Mr. McAuliffe and others persisted. The complaints and my responses were open,
ys.
transparent, and in consultation with my leadership staff, including the USCIS attorne
3.

Criteria used to engage or disengage with stakeholders or petitioners on a
particular case.

While I am not aware of any written criteria that applied to my engagement or
11, 2009
disengagement with stakeholders or petitioners on a particular case (the December
his
to
d
directe
that you referenced in my interview was
memorandum from
of access.
personnel in the field), the foundational principle of my engagement was equality
by counsel or
nted
represe
Whether a case involved an individual or entity that was rich or poor,
novel, complex,
pro se, powerful or voiceless, I became engaged when I was needed to address a
or otherwise important legal, policy, or process issue.
on a
Stakeholders and petitioners used a variety of avenues to engage with the agency
agency personnel;
matter or issue. For example, they communicated with adjudicators and other
or
the Department
they reached out to the USCIS Ombudsman,the DHS Private Sector Office,
ofthe Department;
of Commerce; they communicated with the Secretary or Deputy Secretary
rs of the press.
membe
to
they communicated with Members of Congress; and they reached out
warranted my
Cases were presented to me through these varied channels. When an issue
warranted my
involvement, I engaged as I have previously described; when it no longer
in the first instance, I did not
involvement, I disengaged; when it did not warrant my involvement
engage.
because I wanted to
I took on the responsibility of engaging when necessary. I did so not
ints of how poorly our agency
but because I needed to. It was not easy or pleasant to hear compla
broken we were in our
was performing, how we were failing to apply the law correctly, how
of our work, especially in
processes, and how incompetent we were in the performance ofsome
because I was obligated
our administration ofthe EB-5 program. I engaged in particular matters
to ensure that the agency I led acted lawfully and justly.

25

90

 4.

Explanation and/or reason for personally drafting the new EB-5 policy
memorandum. Explanation and/or reason for not utilizing or involving the
Chief, USCIS Office of Strategy and Policy.

the USCIS Office of
The topic above suggests something that is not true, that
Policy and Strategy was somehow deprived ofinvolvement in the drafting and development of
the new EB-5 policy memorandum. That is false.
I identified our dire need for a new, single, overarching EB-5 policy memorandum that
was comprehensive and that effectively governed our administration ofthe EB-5 program. I
drafted the first draft ofthe new memorandum for one simple reason: it was important, we
needed it done right, and we needed it done urgently. Regrettably, I had developed more
expertise in the governing law and the policy issues in the EB-5 program than had the
with whom I interacted. In addition, I
Office ofPolicy and Strategy or
was frustrated with the quality and pace ofthe development ofsome important policy
pronouncements from the Office of Policy and Strategy. For approximately two weeks I stayed
in the office beyond my already extremely long hours in order to complete the first draft ofthe
new EB-5 policy memorandum. It is not unusual for leaders to draft documents of critical
importance to the agencies they lead.
Once I completed my first draft ofthe new EB-5 policy memorandum,I distributed it
the Office of Policy and Strategy or anyone in
internally so that everyone, including the
that office, could comment and revise as they deemed warranted. USCIS personnel provided
Office of Policy and
input and their comments were incorporated when valid (if
opportunity to
ample
had
certainly
Strategy did not provide comments,that is unfortunate;
do so). In addition, subsequently revised drafts were posted for public comment. Public
comments were incorporated when valid. Ultimately, legal, policy, economic, and operational
experts within and outside the agency contributed significantly to the new memorandum,leading
to the final product that was issued on May 30,2013. The final product, the drafting and
preparation of which I did not lead, was a significant and marked improvement on my initial
draft.
If there has been some suggestion or allegation that I drafted the first draft ofthe new
EB-5 policy memorandum in order to favor some party or improperly favor some legal or policy
interpretation, that is one ofthe more absurd allegations to which I have had to respond.
5.

Motives behind direct contact with particular stakeholders, petitioners, or
agents acting on their behalf(i.e. Lurie,Rosenfeld, HIasko, McAuliffe, Gov.
Rendell, Sen. Reid)and end results of such contact.

to
As Director, cases came to my attention in a variety of ways. Matters were brought
my attention by, for example, my staff, the Secretary's Office, press accounts, the USCIS
Ombudsman, members ofthe public, and Members of Congress from both parties. When
matters
matters did come to my attention, I decided to become personally involved when those
to
attention
presented complex, novel, or otherwise important issues that needed my personal
singular
resolve, clarify, or shape the agency's broader policies and procedures. It was with the
I
that
law
motive ofimproving the quality ofour work and more ably enforcing the
26

91

 communicated externally with the individuals you have identified and with many others.
Regardless whether the matters that came to my attention involved the poor or the rich, the
powerful or the otherwise voiceless, I engaged based on the equalizing principle I have
described: whether the cases presented complex, novel, or otherwise important issues that
required my personal attention. When they did not, I refrained from personal involvement no
matter how prominent, powerful, or wealthy the person seeking my involvement. When they
did, I engaged. And the goal and end result of my communications with particular stakeholders,
petitioners, or their agents was always the same: to promote adherence to the law and the facts
in the adjudication of every case, regardless of whether that meant an approval or denial.
Nothing more, nothing less.
In each instance, it bears repeating, I engaged in the external communications openly,
transparently, and in consultation with my staff.
Position on the appearance of impropriety as a result of direct
6.
communications with stakeholders, petitioners, or agents acting on their behalf(i.e. Lurie,
Rosenfeld, Klasko, McAuliffe, etc.).
I was vigilant in guarding against any appearance ofimpropriety. I consistently and
systematically consulted with USCIS attorneys about my communications. I consistently and
systematically shared the communications with them. I actively sought their counsel and the
advice of others. Not once do I recall being advised to proceed differently.
I engaged with the individuals and entities at issue in the EB-5 program no differently
than stakeholders for other programs, governed always by the principles I have articulated in this
I
statement and championed as the Director of USCIS. I was praised for my leadership when
more
engaged with the poor and the needy. It cannot be the case that the affluent or those with
the
and
law
the
to
adheres
resources are less entitled to an adjudication that is governed by and
performing
facts. My sole motive in everything I did as Director was to ensure that USCIS was
makes
with excellence and integrity regardless of who or what was involved. As the record
ents in the
clear, I was vigilant in guarding against any appearance issue throughout my engagem
EB-5 program:
undue
• On July 28,2010, Mr. Smith forwarded a complaint by Mr. McAuliffe of
,
processing delays. I forwarded Mr. Smith's e-mail to
and wrote:
and

,

,
Douglas Smith,the Assistant Secretary for Private Sector in DHS,just
in
forwarded to me the attached regarding an EB-5 petition(he called me
advance a minute ago and indicated that he would be doing so)[.] I am
so that they have visibility. I want to make sure that
and
copying
we
we are providing customer service consistent with our standards but that
ate.
appropri
as
axe not providing any preferential treatment. Please address
Thanks very much. Ali
27

92

 responded to my initial e-mail, my reply reflected my vigilance in
After
being open and seeking counsel's advice as to how best to proceed:
. As long as this case receives prompt, full, and fair
Thank you,
consideration -- as we wish for all cases -- that is great. I would like to know
ofthe decision only so that I may inform our colleagues at DHS,as long as
concurs that is appropriate.
Thanks. Ali
(See Tab 6.)
• On February 2, 2011, consistent with my practice of seeking legal and ethical advice,
about a request from the DHS Secretary's Office that I
I e-mailed
attend a meeting.the following day with Mr. McAuliffe. I indicated that I had
previously requested not to attend such a meeting but that I had nevertheless been
asked to do so and, under the circumstances, intended to attend in listen-only mode:
,
I have been requested by S 1's office to join a meeting with Terry McAuliffe
about the EB-5 program. I believe Mr. McAuliffe, whom I have not met
before, has an interest in particular cases that are pending with us. Previously
I requested that I notjoin such a meeting given the pendency ofthe cases. I
now have been asked to join the meeting. I will not discuss the cases or
provide information about them. I will be in listen-only mode. May I,
though, inform him only that our agency representatives recently had a
discussion with the attorney ofrecord?
Thank you. Ali
affirmed that I was proceeding in the best way possible:
Thanks Ali. While it would have been better, as you note below,for you not
to be involved in this type of meeting —given the current situation —what you
outline below is the most appropriate course of action. I do not see any harm
in indicating that the agency has been in touch with the regional center's
attorney of record and that that will remain the avenue for any agency
communications on this matter.
(See Tab 8.)
, two of
and
• On June 28, 2011, I sent the following e-mail to
my
the USCIS attorneys with whom I systematically shared and consulted about
communications with Ms. Lurie:
,
has spoken with you about the fact that Dawn Lurie
I understand that
her
contacted me about the Virginia EB-5 case. I am forwarding to you now
to
as
you
to
defer
I
follow-up email to me,along with my brief response.
28

93

 what should or should not be shaxed with SCOPS,as we are all mindful ofthe
need to ensure that our adjudicators do not feel any pressure in their
adjudication ofthese (or any)cases.
I will forwaxd to you another e-mail from Dawn that I received this morning
as well.
Thank you very much. Ali
(See Tab 17, also subsequently forwarded to

.)

On September 21,2011, Ms. Lurie copied me into an e-mail chain with
a USCIS adjudicator. My immediate response was to seek counsel from
on how to avoid any appearance of
, and
,
impropriety:
I am cc'd on this message. Should I respond or not, and if so, with what
message?
Thank you. Ali
responded:
You should not have been copied and should not respond.
Two minutes later I responded:
Will do.
(See Tab 4.) As indicated, I followed the advice of
communication.

to ignore the

• In the SLS case, when I received case-specific information that I did not request or
need in order to address the broader legal and policy issues that had been brought to
my attention, I wrote:
Please drop me from the case-specific chain. Adding
Office of Legislative Affairs] to the extent a legislative inquiry is
involved.
Thanks. Ali
(See Tab 14.)
Secretary of
• When I thought that Mr. Smith was overstepping his role as the Assistant
the DHS Office of Private Sector, I admonished him accordingly:
I recommend that you cease communications with Mr. McAuliffe on USCIS
matters in which he has an interest.
29

94

 (See Tab 20.)
In my interview you raised the issue of my involvement in a matter that was in litigation.
That a particular matter might have been in litigation was not a factor dispositive of whether I
should become involved or not. There were at least several matters in which I determined that
our course in litigation was ill-advised under the law or as a matter of policy, and I took action to
change course. One example is the national security-related citizenship case I referenced earlier;
another is the Chang EB-S litigation I referenced in my interview. That case, which Senator
Jeffrey Sessions brought to my attention, was a litigation in which the agency was attempting to
impose retroactively new EB-5 rules in the processing ofinvestor petitions. In 2003, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit soundly rejected the agency's approach in a published opinion
that was embarrassing for the agency. See Chang v. United States, 327 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003).
Senator Sessions asked me to look into the case, suggesting that it was incumbent upon the
government "to do the right thing." I did so and consulted with the USCIS staff involved in the
case and personnel from the Department of Justice's Office of Litigation who,in my opinion,
were executing an ill-advised litigation strategy. I also researched the applicable law. I came to
agree with Senator Sessions: the agency got it wrong under the law, and it was my duty to make
it right. I participated in the development ofthe agency's litigation strategy and even offered to
'attend the settlement conference myself. The matter was settled in 2013, 15 years after the
complaint against us had been filed. Senator Sessions commended me for my leadership.
To the extent I felt my involvement in a litigation -- any litigation, regardless ofthe
parties involved -- was necessary to safeguard the agency's integrity and purpose, then I would
become involved. That I needed, for the reasons discussed at length above, to communicate
directly with an individual in order to honor the agency's obligations and duty to the law, was
not a need I failed to fulfill because the matter was in litigation. I do not recall ever being
advised to the contrary. On Apri12, 2010,I promulgated to all USCIS employees a
memorandum about preferential treatment. I have attached at Tab 21 a copy ofthat
memorandum. I have always adhered to the guidance in my Apri12, 2010 memorandum. I
vigorously object to, and frankly cannot accept, any suggestion to the contrary.
7.

Reason/specific cases)that prompted the implementation of the deference
review board.

As I learned of our poor administration ofthe EB-5 program, I developed a number of
a
ideas and took a series of steps, some very significant, to improve our work. I have described
Board
Decision
a
of
creation
the
number of those steps previously. One ofthe ideas I had was
in
that would permit a party to appear before USCIS experts and argue a factual or legal issue
n of
person, thereby gaining greater efficiency for all concerned and facilitating the resolutio
proposal
our
contested issues. On May 19, 2011, we announced, among other proposed reforms,
Center
to "convene an expert Decision Board to render decisions regarding EB-5 Regional
on/uscisimmi~rati
Applications." See www.uscis.~ov/news/public-releases-topic/businessThe proposal
proposes-significant-enhancements-eb-5-visa-~rocessin~p-america-win-future.
of my
result
a
as
d
changed over time, in part based on stakeholder feedback that was generate
continuing commitment to public engagement.

95

 I was disappointed that, after the passage of more than 18 months, Service Center
Operations had not yet convened the Decision Board. It was not in my view a complex
undertaking. The failure to convene the Decision Board reflected a failure to act in response to
our deficient performance in the administration ofthe EB-5 program. The failure was more
acute given our representation to the public that we would convene the Decision Board and the
public's enthusiastic and endorsing response.
At the same time, one ofthe complaints we were consistently receiving about our
administration of immigration programs,including the EB-5 program, was our failure to adhere
to our own deference policy. Our deference policy guided when we were to defer to our prior
adjudication of an issue in a case. One adjudicative failure could lead to drastic adverse results
in the context of an EB-5 regional center case. For example,there were cases in which we
approved a regional center petition and approved a number ofimmigrant investor petitions, the
and
investors invested their funds and immigrated to the United States (often with their families),
t.
then we suddenly and without notice determined that our original adjudication was incorrec
l
We would then begin denying subsequent investor petitions in the same case, the EB-5 regiona
dollars
of
s
center that we previously approved faced collapse and the loss of hundreds of million
and lawsuits, and the investing immigrants and their families, most of whom moved to the
United States from across the world, could not remain in the United States despite their good
faith reliance on our prior(and apparently erroneous) adjudication. (I have attached as one
ges I
example ofthe harm that such errant adjudicative conduct caused a series ofe-mail exchan
22.)
had with my staff leadership concerning an EB-5 regional center case from Colorado at Tab
case,
The issue of our failure to adhere to our own deference policy arose in the LA Films
the
in
and I may well have urged my staff to convene the Decision Board to address that issue
case, although I have no specific recollection of doing so. It was a perfect subject for the
h and
Decision Board given the gravity and complexity ofthe issues and the need for a thoroug
ofthe
vibrant exchange of views. Although I do not recall specifically, it was perhaps because
the
as
to
d
referre
was
Board's application to the subject of our deference policy that the Board
convened the "Deference Board" in the LA Films case and
"Deference Board."
"Deference
reported to me that the proceeding was very effective. I did not participate in the
reached.
Board" proceeding or the adjudication, and I do not recall the outcome that others
I do not know whether the "Deference Board," or the Decision Board of broader
ed since, I
application, has been convened since the LA Films case. If it has not been conven
for example, the
hope it is because the quality of USCIS's EB-5 adjudications has improved and,
. If that
granted
usly
agency is no longer reversing its prior adjudications as having been erroneo
communicated
is not the case, I hope there is a performance-based reason why and that has
accordingly to the public.
8.

established
Reason for convening the deference review board without any
policy, protocols, or procedures in place.

ing the Decision
I respectfully do not agree with the characterization ofthis issue. Institut
could be effected rather
Board, or the "Deference Board," was not a complex undertaking and
of the Decision Board
idea
easily and swiftly. I understand that some in USCIS did not like the
the Decision Board was
and did not do anything to advance its progress. I have confidence that
31

96

 in the capable hands ofindividuals whom I moved into place, including
Service Center and whom I selected to build the new EB-5 program
from the Office of Chief Counsel, whom I selected to
office at Headquarters;
spearhead the legal work in the EB-5 program; and
economist and whom I hired
economics professor who served as the Department
to serve our agency as a consultant in the EB-5 program. As I mentioned above,
reported that the "Deference Board" proceeding led was very effective.
9.

Any ethical advice sought and/or received regarding the communications
with Lurie, Rosenfeld, Klasko, or others and my actions after receiving any
advice.

I believe I have fully addressed this issue in my response to issue number 6 above,
throughout this statement, and in my in-depth interview.
10.

Describe your management practices and/or style as it relates to the
ration
administration of the EB-5 program in comparison to other immig
programs.

committed
I was ahands-on Director of USCIS who worked extremely hard and was
highest ideals
the
to
and
y
with all my energy to the improvement and advancement ofthe agenc
ed for its excellence and
of government service. I sought to build USCIS into an agency herald
, legal interpretation,
integrity. In the service ofthat drive, I led change in structure, policy
,technology,
personnel, discipline, performance management,financial management
ty, administrative process,
transparency, public engagement,fraud detection and national securi
d more intensely on areas of
and every other aspect of our work and our responsibilities. I focuse
greater need, including the EB-5 program.
assumed a more ceremonial
I could have taken a far easier path as the Director of USCIS,
perks. Instead, I worked tirelessly
role, traveled far and wide on trips of interest, and enjoyed the
were the greatest chance of
and tackled the agency's biggest challenges. Conquering those
excellence and integrity.
realizing my,and the public's, aspirations for an agency of
statement and for the in-depth
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this written
statement under oath, submit to a
interview that preceded it. I am prepared to submit this
, or to otherwise address any question or
polygraph examination as to any matter you have raised
importance to me and I have responded to
issue you might have. This matter is of the utmost
your question with full conviction.
Th

o
i
~6

Alejandro . Mayorkas
January 5, 2015

32

97