Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1929 Page 1 of 24 1 CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General 2 SCOTT G. STEWART 3 Deputy Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. PEACHEY 4 Director 5 Office of Immigration Litigation U.S. Department of Justice 6 WILLIAM C. SILVIS 7 Assistant Director Office of Immigration Litigation 8 SARAH B. FABIAN 9 Senior Litigation Counsel NICOLE MURLEY 10 Trial Attorney 11 Office of Immigration Litigation U.S. Department of Justice 12 Box 868, Ben Franklin Station 13 Washington, DC 20442 Telephone: (202) 532-4824 14 Fax: (202) 616-8962 15 ADAM L. BRAVERMAN 16 United States Attorney 17 SAMUEL W. BETTWY Assistant U.S. Attorney 18 California Bar No. 94918 19 Office of the U.S. Attorney 880 Front Street, Room 6293 20 San Diego, CA 92101-8893 21 619-546-7125 22 619-546-7751 (fax) Lee Gelernt* Judy Rabinovitz* Anand Balakrishnan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad St., 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 F: (212) 549-2654 lgelernt@aclu.org jrabinovitz@aclu.org abalakrishnan@aclu.org 23 Attorneys for Federal Respondents24 Defendants Attorneys for Petitioners-Plaintiffs *Admitted Pro Hac Vice 25 26 27 28 Bardis Vakili (SBN 247783) ACLU FOUNDATION OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES P.O. Box 87131 San Diego, CA 92138-7131 T: (619) 398-4485 F: (619) 232-0036 bvakili@aclusandiego.org Stephen B. Kang (SBN 292280) Spencer E. Amdur (SBN 320069) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 T: (415) 343-1198 F: (415) 395-0950 skang@aclu.org samdur@aclu.org Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1930 Page 2 of 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 1 2 Case No. 18cv428 DMS MDD MS. L, et al., 3 Petitioners-Plaintiffs, 4 vs. 5 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 6 ENFORCEMENT, et al., 7 Respondents-Defendants. 8 9 10 I. JOINT STATUS REPORT REGARDING SUITABILITY PROCESS FOR RELEASE OF UAC TO POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS IN THE GENERAL PUBLIC JOINT STATUS REPORT On July 9, 2018, this Court instructed the parties to confer on the processes 11 12 bearing on the reunification of class members with their children. The parties 13 submit this joint status report in compliance with the Court’s instruction. In areas 14 where the parties disagree, the federal government requests clear guidance from 15 16 the Court on those steps that must be taken prior to reunification so that it can 17 comply with the Court’s order on timing consistent with its statutory and 18 regulatory obligations under existing law. Each of these actions will affect the 19 20 speed with which the government can reunify families. The actions concern the 21 following: 22 • First, may HHS conduct DNA testing in every case to confirm each parent23 24 child relationship? 25 26 27 28 1 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1931 Page 3 of 24 1 • Second, must HHS use only information already obtained prior to the 2 reunification deadlines to determine if the parent will put the child at an 3 imminent risk of danger, abuse, or neglect? 4 5 • Third, may HHS run fingerprint background checks on unrelated adults in 6 the anticipated domicile of the child, before placing a child with a released 7 parent? 8 9 • Fourth, may HHS require released parents to submit proof of address and a 10 sponsor care plan? 11 12 • Fifth, may HHS require released parents to sign a Sponsor Care Agreement 13 14 15 and attend legal orientation trainings? • Sixth, must HHS reunify children who are themselves determined to present a danger? 16 17 II. ISSUES ON WHICH THE PARTIES AGREE 18 19 20 1. Vetting Parent-Child Relationships The parties agree that the federal government may screen a putative class 21 members to confirm that he or she is, in fact, the parent of the child(ren) with 22 whom he or she seeks to reunify. The parties also agree that when HHS conducts 23 24 DNA testing to verify parentage, the federal government will not use the DNA 25 samples or test results for any purpose besides verifying parentage, and will ensure 26 that the DNA samples and test results are destroyed afterwards. The parties have 27 28 2 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1932 Page 4 of 24 1 not been able to agree on whether HHS can use DNA testing in every case 2 concurrent with other methods of verifying parentage to try to complete the 3 verification process within the court’s deadlines. 4 2. 5 6 Background Checks on Purported Parents The parties agree HHS may conduct fingerprint background checks on 7 8 potential class members while parentage is being verified, to ensure that the person 9 is actually a class member without pertinent criminal history as set forth in the 10 Court’s class definition, and to ensure that the parent is neither unfit nor presents a 11 12 danger to the child presenting an obstacle to release. The parties further agree that 13 HHS will in all possible cases use information already obtained by ICE when it 14 collected the fingerprints of the potential class members and ran checks on them. 15 16 HHS cannot, however, exclude the possibility that in a small number of cases HHS 17 will need to collect potential class members’ fingerprints again to run the checks 18 necessary to ensure child safety and sponsor suitability. HHS believes that 19 20 fingerprinting may be appropriate in some situations to ensure child welfare where 21 there are objective indications of child endangerment. 22 3. Home Studies 23 24 The parties agree that HHS will conduct home studies for purposes of 25 reunification only when required by the TVPRA. The TVPRA states that home 26 studies: 27 28 3 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1933 Page 5 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 shall be conducted for a child who is a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons, a special needs child with a disability (as defined in section 12102 of title 42), a child who has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse under circumstances that indicate that the child's health or welfare has been significantly harmed or threatened, or a child whose proposed sponsor clearly presents a risk of abuse, maltreatment, exploitation, or trafficking to the child based on all available objective evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(B). 7 8 9 10 III. ISSUES ON WHICH THE PARTIES DISAGREE A. Plaintiffs’ Position The crux of Plaintiffs’ position is that the Government should not be allowed 11 12 to delay reunification to conduct procedures that would not have been used if the 13 child had not been forcibly taken from the parent. If a Class Member parent and 14 child had showed up at the border together, and had not been separated, then the 15 16 parent would not be required to undergo the extensive procedures proposed by the 17 Government to maintain custody of the child. 18 Plaintiffs thus believe that streamlined procedures are appropriate and lawful 19 20 in this unique context. The TVPRA, by its terms, does not mandate any particular 21 procedures for reunification, except for a small subset of cases where home studies 22 are required because there have been, inter alia, indications of abuse or trafficking. 23 24 8 U.S.C. 1232(c)(3)(B). There are also no regulations that ORR has promulgated 25 pursuant to the TVPRA that address reunification procedures. The Government, 26 however, as a matter of policy has created procedures for vetting sponsors (the 27 28 4 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1934 Page 6 of 24 1 “normal” reunification process). The Court need not, however, decide whether 2 these normal reunification procedures are required by the TVPRA. Even assuming 3 that these procedures are required by the TVPRA for certain children who come to 4 5 the United States without their parents, the TVPRA plainly does not preclude the 6 use of streamlined procedures in this unique context, where the Government has 7 8 forcibly taken children from their parents and is simply being asked to return 9 children to their parents. 10 Indeed, the purpose of the TVPRA is to promote the best interests of the 11 12 child and to reunite families. Delayed reunification, especially for babies and 13 toddlers, is not in the best interests of the child. 14 In short, there is nothing in the language or purpose of the TVPRA that 15 16 precludes this Court from ordering that in this unique context, and only for 17 purposes of this case, the Government use the streamlined procedures suggested by 18 Plaintiffs. The procedures that Plaintiffs are proposing—parental verification and 19 20 pursuing any red flags known to the Government at the time of the reunification 21 deadline—are entirely consistent with the TVPRA. 1 22 1. DNA Vetting of All Families. 23 24 1 Plaintiffs’ position that streamlined procedures are both appropriate and lawful in this unique context, and not precluded by the TVPRA, is supported by 26 the Women’s Refugee Commission and Kids in Need of Defense (“KIND”), who have years of experience working with unaccompanied children and the 27 reunification process. They will be submitting a declaration in conjunction with this filing, and have both previously filed declarations in this case. 28 25 5 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1935 Page 7 of 24 1 Plaintiffs’ position with respect specifically to DNA testing is that the 2 Government should use DNA testing to verify parentage only where necessary, 3 meaning that there is no other reliable documentary, testimonial, or other evidence 4 5 of parentage. That way no further delays in reunification will occur as a result of 6 the need to DNA test every family. Had the families not been separated, they 7 8 9 10 would not routinely have been subjected to DNA testing. 2 In addition to any delays caused by DNA testing of every class member, the Class Members and their children also have powerful interests in the privacy of 11 12 their DNA information. As the Ninth Circuit has said, “[o]ne can think of few 13 subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than that 14 of one’s health or genetic make-up.” Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley 15 16 17 18 Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). The circumstances of this case also render it inherently coercive for the Government to require parents to submit to DNA testing to get back the children 19 20 that were unlawfully taken from them. Parents should not have to sacrifice their 21 privacy rights, and face the risk of having their DNA information collected in a 22 Government database, to be reunified with their children. Moreover, the 23 24 25 2 The Government states that three individuals were identified as nonparents during the HHS verification process, but does not state that DNA testing 27 was the basis for that determination, and in fact notes that the adults actually told the Government they were not the parents. 28 26 6 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1936 Page 8 of 24 1 Government proposes routine DNA testing of young children, some of whom are 2 mere weeks or months old. 3 If, however, the Court concludes that the Government may use DNA testing 4 5 of parents and children to effectuate the injunction, at the absolute minimum the 6 Court should order the Government to: 7 8 9 10 (1) exhaust first all other means of establishing or verifying parent-child relationships, including through the use of techniques commonly used by U.S. courts to determine family relationship—including official documents, 11 12 13 14 representations from a witness, parent, and/or child, and/or observation of behaviors of the adult and child toward each other; (2) only conduct a DNA test on those adults who have agreed to undergo a test; 15 16 17 18 (3) to ensure that all samples and data collected are not shared with any other federal agency outside of HHS and that all such samples, data, and any results are destroyed upon completion of the required matching tests and, in 19 20 21 22 any event within 7 days. (4) To the extent that the Government employs outside contractors or medical providers to conduct the DNA tests, such contractors must also be forbidden 23 24 from retaining any results and test samples and must destroy them within 25 seven days of producing a testing result. This will prevent the Government 26 from maintaining a database of samples and will ensure that any results are 27 28 7 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1937 Page 9 of 24 1 not used for any purposes other than facilitating reunification pursuant to the 2 Court’s injunction. 3 4 Finally, the Court should also make clear that the lack of a DNA match is not 5 conclusive proof of the lack of a parent-child relationship, in recognition that many 6 parents are not the biological parents of their children. For example, some parents 7 8 may not be aware that they have no biological relationship to their child in cases of 9 undisclosed rape or adultery. 10 11 12 2. Restrictions on HHS Information Gathering and Decision Making about Child Welfare Plaintiffs’ position is that if the Government becomes aware of evidence 13 14 prior to the reunification deadline that the parent is abusive, neglectful, or 15 otherwise poses a risk of danger to the child, Plaintiffs have no objection to the 16 Government taking additional time to verify the fitness of the parent before 17 18 releasing the child to his or her custody. For example, as set forth above, Plaintiffs 19 have no objection to the Government using information obtained from already20 performed fingerprint and background checks on Class Members to evaluate 21 22 parental fitness. In addition, if ORR workers have spoken with the child during the 23 child’s custody and learned information that calls the parent’s fitness into question, 24 that could be a basis to delay reunification. What Plaintiffs object to is permitting 25 26 the Government to drag out the reunification process by imposing procedures or 27 conducting additional investigation that is not required by statute. 28 8 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1938 Page 10 of 24 1 Plaintiffs acknowledge that any evaluation of parental fitness must rely to 2 some extent on “professional judgment.” But in the context of this case, and in 3 light of constitutional standards governing the separation of children from their 4 5 parents, that judgment must be based on actual, verifiable facts – not the untested 6 and subjective opinions of unknown Government case workers. Given that the 7 8 Government has already forcibly separated Class Members from their children, it 9 should be subjected to a rigorous burden to justify maintaining that separation. 10 The government should not be permitted to delay reunification any longer to 11 12 conduct a background check that would not have occurred had the parents not been 13 separated from their children. (Criminal background checks would of course 14 already have been done at the time of apprehension when the parent was initially 15 16 17 18 fingerprinted.) 3. Background Checks on Other Adults in the Household Nothing in the TVPRA requires the Government to conduct background 19 20 checks of nonparent adults in the household, or alternate care givers, before 21 releasing a child from ORR custody. And the Government cites no applicable 22 statutory provision that so requires. Nor does the Flores Agreement contain any 23 24 language demanding that the agencies fingerprint and run checks on individuals 25 who live in the parent’s household. 26 27 28 9 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1939 Page 11 of 24 1 Requiring these background checks will impose needless delay on the 2 process by requiring household members to submit to checks. Moreover, DHS has 3 recently revised its regulations to allow information it collects from ORR during 4 5 the sponsor reunification process, including background checks of household 6 members, for the purposes of conducting immigration enforcement activities. As a 7 8 result, those household members may rightfully have concerns about sharing 9 information with DHS in light of its stated intent to use that information to come 10 after them. 11 12 In sum, nothing in the statute requires background checks of other adults or 13 alternate care givers, and it will only add further needless delay to this process. If 14 the Government had not separated Class Members from their children, they would 15 16 not have been required to undergo any of these procedures prior to obtaining 17 release. There is no reason to make them go through those processes here. 3 18 4. Proof of Address, Sponsor Care Plans and Alternate Care Givers 19 20 Plaintiffs do not object to Class Members submitting a proof of address of 21 where they will live with the child. But Plaintiffs object to any requirement that the 22 Plaintiff provide a “sponsor care plan” or identify alternate care givers prior to 23 24 3 Indeed, the government itself recognizes that this procedure is not required. They are currently planning on reuniting parents and children tomorrow without 26 conducting background checks on all household members, even assuming the Class Member knows at this point where she will be living and with whom. 27 25 28 10 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1940 Page 12 of 24 1 obtaining release of their children. Reunification should not be delayed because of 2 these unnecessary procedures. 3 The key here is in the first sentence of the Government’s position—“in the 4 5 ordinary operation of the UAC program.” Nothing about this particular context is 6 “ordinary,” and the Government is wrong to apply procedures that were developed 7 8 9 10 for an entirely separate context to this one. The Government cites Section 1232(c)(3)(A), but that statute merely requires ORR to make a “determination” that the proposed custodian is capable of 11 12 caring for the child. The statute does not compel that “determination” to be made 13 in a certain way, much less that this determination must take the same form in all 14 cases. Thus, there is nothing in the statute that precludes the Government from 15 16 adopting, in the unique circumstances of this case, streamlined procedures to return 17 separated children to their parents’ care. 18 The Government wants parents—whose children were unlawfully taken 19 20 from them—to fill out long paper applications and identify other caregivers for 21 them before it returns their children. The TVPRA was not intended to inhibit 22 family reunification—in fact, just the opposite. The Government cannot use it as a 23 24 sword to prohibit or delay reunification by throwing up such needless bureaucratic 25 roadblocks. 26 5. Legal Orientation and Sponsor Care Agreement 27 28 11 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1941 Page 13 of 24 1 Plaintiffs do not object to requesting Class Members to attend legal 2 orientation programs or sign “sponsor care agreements” that are consistent with the 3 requirements set forth in Plaintiffs’ positions above, so long as reunification by the 4 5 Court’s deadlines is not made contingent on fulfilling those conditions. For 6 example, there is no reason why Class Members cannot sign streamlined sponsor 7 8 care agreements as the child is released to their care pursuant to the Court’s 9 deadlines. In addition, Class Members can attend legal orientation programs after 10 reuniting with their children. But reunification of children should not be delayed 11 12 past the Court’s deadlines by requiring attendance at a legal orientation program or 13 the signing of a sponsor care agreement. 4 14 6. Children Presenting a Danger 15 Plaintiffs respectfully request additional time to respond to this point, 16 17 unless the Government represents that there are children under five years old who 18 fall into this category and present risks to the safety of themselves or others. 19 B. Defendants’ Positions 20 21 22 1. Vetting Parent-Child Relationships Despite the points of agreement noted above on this issue, the parties have 23 24 not been able to agree on the necessity of using DNA testing overall. In particular, 25 26 4 Plaintiffs note, however, that if the parents had never been separated from their children, they would not have to sign sponsor care agreements or attend legal 27 orientation program to maintain custody of their children. 28 12 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1942 Page 14 of 24 1 HHS believes that, to reliably verify parentage and to do so within or close to the 2 Court’s deadlines, HHS must be able to use DNA testing generally to determine 3 parentage. 4 5 6 Sound verification of parentage is critical. HHS is charged with faithfully implementing the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 7 8 (TVPRA). To do so, HHS must be sure in all cases that a putative class member is 9 a child’s parent, including through DNA testing, before it forever releases the child 10 to the custody and care of that person. As HHS stated previously, ORR’s 11 12 experience is that children are smuggled across the border or trafficked by adults 13 who fraudulently or inaccurately hold themselves out as parents. See White Dec. 14 ¶ 25. Consistent with that experience, HHS reports that it found that three putative 15 16 class members seeking release of children aged 0–4 were not the parents of the 17 children. Indeed, some of the putative class members admitted as much during 18 HHS’s verification-of-parentage process. 19 20 To verify parentage of a potential sponsor claiming to be a parent, HHS 21 commonly uses overlapping methods of comparing documents submitted by the 22 sponsor, consulting with the consulate of the home country, interviewing the 23 24 prospective sponsor and child, and obtaining results from DNA tests. To more 25 quickly implement the Court’s order, HHS has coordinated between its staff, its 26 grantees, and ICE, to obtain DNA test results on all the possible plaintiffs and 27 28 13 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1943 Page 15 of 24 1 children through cheek swabs. HHS is simultaneously checking documents and 2 conducting interviews, but many potential plaintiffs do not have adequate 3 documentation, and HHS does not control how fast other countries’ consulates will 4 5 provide documentation. The normal length of stay of a UAC in HHS custody 6 before release is 28 days, which is almost twice as long as the time the Court has 7 8 9 10 given HHS to complete reunifications with some class members. In short, HHS does not believe that it can both expedite its processes and ensure parentage if it foregoes the use of DNA testing to help verify parentage. Nor 11 12 would it be a good use of agency resources for HHS to spend more hours per case 13 reviewing documents only to find that DNA tests are ultimately required to resolve 14 questions arising from poor documentation. HHS thus respectfully submits that 15 16 17 18 19 20 Plaintiffs’ restriction of “necessity” does not promote the aims of the Court’s order. 2. Restrictions on HHS Information Gathering and Decision Making about Child Welfare HHS believes that it is important for the Court to permit it to evaluate all reasonably available and relevant information to allow HHS to make sound 21 22 judgments about child welfare. 23 24 It would therefore be a mistake, in HHS’s view, to adopt Plaintiffs’ proposed limitation on the information that HHS can consider only evidence that it obtains 25 26 prior to the reunification deadline. This restriction could endanger children welfare 27 by preventing HHS from considering information material to assessing parental 28 14 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1944 Page 16 of 24 1 fitness. As discussed below, HHS may need additional information from 2 prospective sponsors to ensure child safety and sponsor suitability, and HHS 3 believes this to be the case even where the prospective sponsor is a parent. HHS 4 5 should not be prevented from obtaining this information simply because a 6 reunification deadline has passed. 7 8 HHS also does not believe that the Court should adopt the restriction that it 9 must release the UAC unless its finding of child endangerment is based on “actual, 10 verifiable facts.” The test is attractive in formulation, but unworkable given the 11 12 critical calls of professional judgment that HHS must make in promoting child 13 safety and wellbeing. The test that Congress chose for HHS is the interests of the 14 child. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(B). HHS determines what is in the interests of the child 15 16 based on common forms of information used in child welfare contexts, including 17 interviews and assessments of children by ORR and clinicians, interviews by ORR 18 of relatives and friends, documents, background checks, and information presented 19 20 by the prospective sponsor. These determinations necessarily rest on sound 21 professional judgment, and do not lend themselves to easy review by wooden 22 resort to “actual, verifiable” information. HHS believes that the better approach is 23 24 for HHS to make informed decisions about an individual child’s interest, and for 25 Plaintiffs to petition this Court if they believe HHS has denied a release on grounds 26 that do not actually show danger to that child. This would accommodate the 27 28 15 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1945 Page 17 of 24 1 competing interests—and would provide a critical safety valve for the affected 2 children. 3 3. Background Checks on Other Adults in the Household 4 5 6 In the interests of child welfare, HHS believes that the Court should allow 7 for sound background checks of non-sponsor adults with whom a UAC may be 8 released to live. HHS has implemented the TVPRA by requiring background 9 10 checks—including fingerprinting of other adults in the household and alternate 11 care givers where a sponsor parent will take a UAC to live. The importance of 12 background checks was borne out in the past week, during HHS’ screening of 13 14 potential class members for reunification of the separated children aged 0–4. HHS 15 reports that the checks showed three parents with criminal histories involving 16 human smuggling, child cruelty and narcotics convictions, and alleged murder, 17 18 respectively. When a parent plans to house a child with one or more other adults, 19 who might not even be relatives, those adults are no less likely to have significant 20 criminal histories. 21 22 Plaintiffs ask the Court to require HHS to release children directly into such 23 a situation without first running fingerprint background checks on those adults. 24 HHS submits that this would needlessly risk these children’s safety and wellbeing. 25 26 The Flores Settlement Agreement (see paragraphs 14–18) has long authorized the 27 government to conduct safety and suitability assessments before releasing UACs to 28 16 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1946 Page 18 of 24 1 parents in the general public who seek sponsorship. Legislating on this 2 background, the TVPRA requires HHS “to ensure that unaccompanied alien 3 children in the United States are protected from traffickers and other persons 4 5 seeking to victimize or otherwise engage such children in criminal, harmful, or 6 exploitative activity,” and to “make[] a determination that the proposed custodian 7 8 is capable of providing for the child's physical and mental well-being.” 8 U.S.C. 9 § 1232(c)(1) & (c)(3)(A). The TVPRA in turn requires HHS to “establish policies 10 … to ensure” these child safety measures are satisfied. Id. at 1232(c)(1). HHS has 11 12 established those policies in ORR’s UAC Policy Guide, “Children Entering the 13 United States Unaccompanied, Section 2: Safe and Timely Release from ORR 14 Care.”5 The guide requires “[p]roof of identify of adult household members and 15 16 adult care givers identified in a sponsor care plan.” Id. “In order to ensure the 17 safety of an unaccompanied alien child and consistent with the statutory 18 requirements under the TVPRA, ORR requires a background check of all potential 19 20 sponsors and household members. The background check takes place as soon as 21 the potential sponsor and adult household members have completed the 22 Authorization for Release of Information form, submitted fingerprints, and 23 24 provided a copy of a valid government issued photo identification.” Id. HHS has 25 26 5 Available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/children-entering-the-united-states- 27 unaccompanied-section-2#2.1 28 17 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1947 Page 19 of 24 1 conducted background checks of adult household members since January 2016, 2 when the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 3 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, majority and minority staff report, 4 5 concluded that failing to require background checks on non-sponsor adult 6 household members or on backup sponsors led to child abuse and exploitation, 7 8 including when the sponsor was a parent.6 For these reasons, HHS respectfully submits that the Court should permit 9 10 HHS to continue to require background checks of other household adults where the 11 12 released parent will take the UAC to live. 13 4. Proof of Address, Sponsor Care Plans and Alternate Care Givers 14 15 16 HHS believes that the Court should, in accordance with the ordinary operation of the UAC program, permit HHS to require released sponsor parents to 17 18 submit proof of address and a sponsor care plan. Consistent with the statutory 19 requirement that “the proposed custodian [be] capable of providing for the child’s 20 physical and mental well-being,” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3), proof of address and a 21 22 sponsor care plan ensures the child will not be homeless or live in harmful 23 24 6 Available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Majority%20&%20Minority%20Staff%20Report 26 %20%20Protecting%20Unaccompanied%20Alien%20Children%20from%20Trafficking%20and%20 27 Other%20Abuses%202016-01-282.pdf 25 28 18 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1948 Page 20 of 24 1 conditions (it is easy to imagine many such conditions). And because class 2 members are likely to be without immigration status at this time, the sponsor care 3 plan is particularly appropriate so the parent would identify an alternate care giver 4 5 in the event that the parent, but not the child, is removed or deported. Fingerprints 6 and background checks are also required for those alternate care givers. HHS 7 8 understands that Plaintiffs’ proposal would preclude these child safety measures. 9 This would be a mistake. 10 5. Legal Orientation and Sponsor Care Agreement 11 12 The TVPRA declares that before release of a UAC to a sponsor in the 13 general public, “[t]he Secretary of Health and Human Services shall cooperate with 14 the Executive Office for Immigration Review to ensure that custodians receive 15 16 legal orientation presentations provided through the Legal Orientation Program 17 administered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review.” 8 U.S.C. 18 § 1232(c)(4). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires that before HHS 19 20 releases a UAC, it “shall … ensure” that UACs “(i) are likely to appear for all 21 hearings or proceedings in which they are involved; (ii) are protected from 22 smugglers, traffickers, or others who might seek to victimize or otherwise engage 23 24 them in criminal, harmful, or exploitive activity; and (iii) are placed in a setting in 25 which they are not likely to pose a danger to themselves or others.” 6 U.S.C. 26 § 279(b)(2). HHS’s policy guide thus requires sponsors—including verified 27 28 19 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1949 Page 21 of 24 1 parents—to sign a sponsor care agreement to ensure UAC attend their immigration 2 and other proceedings and follow certain guidance in case the UAC runs away or 3 an emergency occurs. These statutory requirements are important—including for 4 5 released class members—and so should be retained here. 6 6. Children Presenting a Danger 7 8 The parties disagree on whether HHS may decline to release a UAC to a 9 class member based on danger presented by the UAC to himself or herself. HHS 10 believes that it should retain its ability to protect children and the community in 11 12 13 14 these circumstances. Since before the Flores Settlement Agreement, the government has held a small percentage of UACs in secure custody because of the UAC’s own history 15 16 demonstrating they present a risk to the safety of themselves or others. In 17 reviewing the files of separated children over age five, HHS has identified children 18 with serious issues that would support a finding of dangerousness for that child. 19 20 Under cases implementing the Flores Settlement Agreement, any UAC in secure 21 custody with ORR is entitled to a bond hearing with an administrative law judge, if 22 the UAC contends that he or she is not a danger and should not be held in secure 23 24 custody. 25 26 HHS’s position is that if a UAC is in secure custody, and has not asked for a bond hearing, or has had a bond hearing and lost the right to leave secure custody, 27 28 20 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1950 Page 22 of 24 1 then that child is properly detained. And the government does not have facilities 2 for detaining children who are security risks together with their parents. HHS 3 submits that it would be a particular mistake to order HHS to release such a UAC 4 5 into the general public when the UAC is already being provided with a bond 6 hearing on that issue under the implementation of the Flores Settlement 7 8 Agreement. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1951 Page 23 of 24 1 DATED: July 9, 2018 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Lee Gelernt Lee Gelernt* Judy Rabinovitz* Anand Balakrishnan* AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 125 Broad St., 18th Floor New York, NY 10004 T: (212) 549-2660 F: (212) 549-2654 lgelernt@aclu.org jrabinovitz@aclu.org abalakrishnan@aclu.org 11 12 13 14 15 16 Bardis Vakili (SBN 247783) ACLU FOUNDATION OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES P.O. Box 87131 San Diego, CA 92138-7131 T: (619) 398-4485 F: (619) 232-0036 bvakili@aclusandiego.org 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Stephen B. Kang (SBN 292280) Spencer E. Amdur (SBN 320069) AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 39 Drumm Street San Francisco, CA 94111 T: (415) 343-1198 F: (415) 395-0950 skang@aclu.org samdur@aclu.org Attorneys for Petitioners-Plaintiffs *Admitted Pro Hac Vice 27 28 22 18cv428 DMS MDD Case 3:18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD Document 96 Filed 07/09/18 PageID.1952 Page 24 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General SCOTT G. STEWART Deputy Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director WILLIAM C. SILVIS Assistant Director 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 /s/ Sarah B. Fabian SARAH B. FABIAN Senior Litigation Counsel NICOLE MURLEY Trial Attorney Office of Immigration Litigation Civil Division U.S. Department of Justice P.O. Box 868, Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 (202) 532-4824 (202) 616-8962 (facsimile) sarah.b.fabian@usdoj.gov ADAM L. BRAVERMAN United States Attorney SAMUEL W. BETTWY Assistant U.S. Attorney 19 20 Attorneys for Respondents-Defendants 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23 18cv428 DMS MDD