IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION Case No. FOR CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FOR MARIIA BUTINA, ALSO KNOWN AS MARIA BUTIN A AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AN APPLICATION FOR A CRIMINAL CONIPLAINT I, Kevin Helson, being ?rst duly sworn, hereby depose and state that I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and charge as follows: THE FBI INVESTIGATION I. The bases of my knowledge for the facts alleged herein are as follows. I have been a Special Agent with the FBI for 15 years. Currently, I am assigned to the Counterintelligence Division within the Washington Field Of?ce of the FBI. The focus of my counter intelligence efforts has been the investigation of the foreign intelligence activities of the Russian Federation. 1 have learned the facts contained in this af?davit from, among other sources, my personal participation in this investigation, my discussions with other law enforcement agents, searches that have been conducted, surveillance that has been conducted, and reviews of documents, electronic items, and other evidentiary materials. 2. In the course of this investigation, the FBI has employed a variety of lawful investigative methods, including the acquisition of Rule 41 search warrants of two premises, which included authorization to search electronic devices. One of those searches included a laptop computer belonging to MARIIA BUTINA, afkf a ?Maria Butina? ?(hereinafter Laptop?) and an iPhone belonging to BUTINA (hereinafterBBUTINA?s iPhone?). Because this af?davit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not include every fact that I have learned during the course of this investigation. Further, any statements related herein are related in substance and in part only. Finally, certain items related herein were translated by FBI linguists from Russian to English. BACKGROUND Title 18, U.S. Code, sections 371 (Conspiracy) and 951 {Agents of Foreign Governments) 3. Title 18 of the United States Code, section 371 (Conspiracy to Commit Offense or to Defraud United States), makes it a criminal offense for any person(s) to conspire together with one or more others either to commit an offense against the United States or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof, in any manner or for any purpose. 4. Title 18 of the United States Code, section 951 (Agents of Foreign Governments), makes it a criminal offense for any person, other than a diplomatic or consular official or attache, to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior noti?cation to the Attorney General, as required by law. For purposes of this law, the term ?agent of a foreign government? includes an individual who agrees to operate within the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or of?cial. Relevant Persons and De?nitions 5. Defendant BUTINA is a Russian citizen who entered the United States in August 2016 on an F-l Student Visa. Before and after her arrival in the United States, BUTINA served as Special Assistant to the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL. Conspiring together, BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFF took various overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal purpose thereof. 6. The RUSSIAN OFFICIAL is a Russian citizen and a high?level o?icial in the Russian government. The RUSSIAN OFFICIAL was previously a member of the legislature of the Russian Federation and later became a top of?cial at the Russian Central Bank. The RUSSIAN OFFICIAL directed activities in furtherance of the conspiracy. 7. US. Person 1 is a United States citizen and an American political operative. BUTINA established contact with Person 1 in Moscow in or around 2013. U.S. Person I worked with BUT to jointly arrange introductions to US. persons having in?uence in American politics, including an organization promoting gun rights (hereinafter RIGHTS for the purpose of advancing the agenda of the Russian Federation. 3. US. Person 2 is a United States citizen who was included among the participants in a series of email communications in 2016 and 2017 that reveal efforts to arrange a series of dinners in the District of Columbia and New York City involving Russian nationals and US. persons having in?uence in American politics (hereinafter ?friendship and dialogue dinners?). BU TINA told .8. Person 2 that the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL was ?very much impressed by you? and that ?the Russians will support the efforts from our side.? 9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA) is the Russian 1 government agency with primary responsibility for the Russian Federation? foreign relations and foreign policy. Actions of the Russian Federation 10. The Russian Federation, or Russia, is one of the leading state intelligence threats to U.S. interests, based on its capabilities, intent, and broad operational scope. Penetrating the US. national decision-making apparatus and the Intelligence Community are primary objectives for numerous foreign intelligence entities, including Russia. The objective of the Russian Federation leadership is to expand its sphere of influence and strength, and it targets the United States and US. allies to further that goal. 1 1. Russian in?uence operations are a threat to U.S. interests as they are low-cost, relatively low-risk, and deniable ways to shape foreign perceptions and to in?uence populations. Moscow seeks to create wedges that reduce trust and confidence in democratic processes, degrade democratization efforts, weaken US. partnerships with European allies, undermine Western sanctions, encourage anti-US. political views, and counter efforts to bring Ukraine and other former Soviet states into European institutions. 12. In 2018, pursuant to Executive Order 13661, the US. Department of the Treasury?s Of?ce of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in consultation with the US. Department of State, listed seven Russian oligarchs and 12 companies they own or control, senior Russian government officials, including the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL, and a state?owned Russian weapons trading company and its subsidiary, a Russian bank, as specially designated nationals. OFAC sanctioned the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL for being an Of?cial of the Government of the Russian Federation. In sanctioning these entities, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin announced: The Russian government engages in a range of malign activity around the globe, including continuing to occupy Crimea and instigate violence in eastern Ukraine, supplying the Assad regime with material and weaponry as they bomb their own civilians, attempting to subvert Western democracies, and malicious cyber activities. Russian oligarchs and elites who pro?t from this corrupt system will no longer be insulated from the consequences of their government?s destabilizing activities. THE ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF RUSSIA 13. As detailed below, the investigation has revealed that BUT INA, the defendant, was working in the United States at the direction of the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL. 14. The investigation has further revealed that BUTINA and the RUSSIAN . OFFICIAL took steps to develop relationships with American politicians in order to establish private, or as she called them, ?back channel? lines of communication. These lines could be used by the Russian Federation to penetrate the US. national decision-making apparatus to advance the agenda of the Russian Federation. 15. The investigation has also revealed that BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL planned to advance Moscow?s long-term strategic objectives in the United States, in part, by establishing relationships with American political organizations, including the GUN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION. Based on my training, experience and familiarity with this investigation, I believe that BUTTNA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL took these steps in order to infiltrate those groups and advance the interests of the Russian Federation. 16. The Russian in?uence operation included, among other things, taskings from the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL to (ii) meetings between BUTINA and US. politicians and political candidates; attendance at events sponsored by special interest groups, also attended by politicians and political candidates; and (iv) reporting back to Moscow through the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL the results of the various encounters with the US. politicians and political candidates. Laying the Groundwork in Russia During the course of her work as a covert Russian agent, BUTINA regularly met and communicated with the RUSSIAN OFF ICIAL and .3. Person I to plan and develop the contours of the in?uence operation. 18. On or about March 24, 2015, BUTINA emailed U.S. Person 1 with the subject line of ?The Second Former?? The body of this email also contained a project proposal. BUTINA noted to US Person I in the email that she was sending the ?Google Translator text. Maybe I could translate it myself but it would take at least a day because the text is very speci?c.? She went on to note that she ?will be happy to answer to any your questions [sic] and follow your recommendations before a [sic] ?nally send it.? The ?rst line of the proposal reads, ?Project Description ?Diplomacy.?? It goes on to state that a major US political party [hereinafter I believe that this statement likely refers to Vladimir Pozner, a propagandist who served in the disinformation department of the Soviet KGB and who often appeared on Western television to explain the views of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 5 PARTY would likely obtain control over the US. government after the 2016 elections; that POLITICAL PARTY is ?traditionally associated with negative and aggressive foreign policy, particularly with regards to Russia. However, now with the right to negotiate seems best to build konstruktivnyh [sic] relations;? and that ?[c]entral place and in?uence in the PARTY 1] plays the RIGHTS The RIGHTS [is] the largest sponsor of the elections to the US congress, as well as a sponsor of The CPAC conference and other events.? 19. The March 24, 2015 email further highlighted relationship with the GUN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS leadership, including her attendance at events in the United States and and the RUSSIAN connections to of?cials of the GUN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION. BUTINA described recent visits to the United States, including references to instances when she was introduced to POLITICAL PARTY 1 leaders as a ?representative of informal diplomacy? of the Russian Federation. project proposal concluded by noting, ?[t]he resulting status needs to be strengthened is in the current time interval, before the presidential election in 2016,? and requesting a budget of $125,000 for EU TINA to participate in ?all upcoming major conferences? of POLITICAL PARTY 1. 20. In late March 2015, US. Person I replied to BUTINA via email with the subject ?Potential American Contacts?: Dear Maria, Your challenge in your ?special project? will be to balance two opposing imperatives: Your desire to communicate that you speak for Russian interests that will be ascendant (still around) in a post?Putin world while simultaneously doing nothing to criticize the President or speed the arrival of his successor. This restriction is easily understood in private meetings with political and business leaders. It will SEVERELY limit your interactions with media. 6 Most of the potential ?guest appearances? listed under media will only be possible if you?re willing to be more candid (honest) than is politically . prudent for you. But ALL of the media personalities listed would be interested in meeting you ?off the record? though your patrons sponsors may not fully understand the power of such meetings if you do not appear on television, radio, or print as you do in Russia. [T]here is NO limit as to how many American companies that you can meet?at the highest levels?if you are able to represent that you are a potential line of communication into future Russian Federation governments. In this email, U.S. Person listed potential media, business, and political contacts, and closed with, ?Everyone on this list understands (to some degree) U.S. Russian relations under President Oharna and President Putin. Everyone on this list would like to better understand US. 1? Russian relations under new presidents for each country. YOU can provide commentary on both? if you?re willing to take that risk.? 21. Also in late March 2015, U.S. Person I emailed BUTINA, with the subject line ?Your Plan Forward.? In this email, US. Person I told BUTJNA that If you were to sit down with your special ??iends and make a list of ALL the most important contacts you could find in America for a time when the political situation between the US. and Russia will change, you could NOT do better than the list that I just emailed you. NO one certainly not the ?of?cial? Russian Federation public relations representative in New York could build a better list. And for a variety of current political reasons, the current Russian ambassadors to the United States and United Nations do not even try. YOU HAVE ALREADY MET ALL OF THE AMERICANS necessary to introduce you to EVERYONE on that list. . . . I If you had NOT spent the last year attending conferences in America, it would take you ANOTHER year to be able to meet the names on that list. What you have done is prepare all of the groundwork (necessary introductions) in order to be introduced to everyone on that list. All that is needed is for your friends to provide you with the ?nancial resources to spend the time in America to TAKE ALL OF THESE MEETINGS. and your friends in America can?t make it any easier for you than that. 7 Your potential sponsors either understand this or they don?t. The names of all of the people that impress your friends by listing them. All that your friends need to know is that meetings with the names on MY list would not be possible without the unknown names in your ?business card? notebook. Keep them focused on who you are NOW able to meet, NOT the people you have ALREADY met. 22. Your affiant has reviewed a number of .pdf documents stored in Laptop containing Twitter direct messages between BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL that reflect direction and coordination of efforts by the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL. The direct messages between BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL in the latter half of 2015 include: I A conversation between the RUSSLAN OFFICIAL and BUTINA regarding an article published by BUTINA in he National Interest on or about June 12, 2015, which argued that certain .S. politicians and Russians share many common interests. BUTINA asked the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL to look at the article, and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL said it was very good; 0 A request by the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL for BUTINA to ?write [him] something brief" about a political event in the United States which she was scheduled to attend. BUTINA provided that write~up the next day, which included descriptions of her speaking to a political candidate on the night of the announcement, as well as previous private meeting with the candidate at the 2015 annual GUN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION members? meeting; 0 Discussions about the RUSSIAN anticipated attendance at a National Prayer Breakfast (including whether he had received approval to attend from the MFA), and providing the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL with biographies of U.S. politicians and executives of the GUN RIGHTS 0 Discussions about the RUSSIAN plans to meet with a U.S. Congressman during a Congressional Delegation trip to Moscow in August 2015. In that conversation, BUTINA noted that she has the RUSSIAN diplomatic passport and can purchase a plane ticket for him from St. Petersburg to Moscow; and A statement from BUTINA to the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL that the latter ?has the responsibility of a serious mission restoration of relations between countries.? BUTINA continued by saying that this is a long game and that ?maybe, by inviting the RIGHTS here, you have prevented a conflict between two great nations. although, I think, this is the very beginning of the journey.? 23. Based on my training, experience, and familiarity with this investigation, I believe that the above?described email and Twitter conversations represent plan to conduct activities as an illegal agent of the Russian Federation in the United States through a Russian in?uence operation. Acts in the United States 24. efforts in the United States to promote the political interests of the Russian Federation were diverse and multifaceted, including efforts to organize a series of ??'iendship and dialogue? dinners, some of which are believed to have taken place in the District of Columbia, as well as attendance at two National Prayer Breakfasts in the District of Columbia. 25. On or about January 19, 2016, BUTTNA and the Russian Representative exchanged Twitter direct messages regarding logistics for the 2016 National Prayer Breakfast. The RUSSIAN OFFICLAL noted that the MFA had given approval for his attendance. 26. On February 4, 2016, both BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL attended the 2016 National Prayer Breakfast in the District of Columbia. 27. A series of email communications (also known as ?email strings?) spanning March 10 and 11, 2016 and involving BUTINA, U.S. Person 1, and 1.1.8. Person 2 reveal efforts to arrange the ?friendship and dialogue? dinners in the District of Columbia and New York City near the end of May 2016. U.S. Person 1 provided a list to BUTINA .of American individuals and noted that this list would serve as ?a good start for Maria?s first briefin for [the RUSSIAN OFF Friday morning in Moscow.? BUTINA expressed her gratitude to U.S. Person 1 and noted that she had received the list before her meeting with the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL, and ?that [w]e con?rm the Dates! [the RUSSIAN is working on the best third person from the Russian side now.? Additionally, BUTINA told U.S. Person 2 that the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL had expressed to her that he was ?very much impressed by you and expresses his great appreciation for what you are doing to restore relations between the two countries. He also wants you to know thatRussians will support the efforts from our side. That is all I can tell you for now. More information next week!? 28. On March 14, 2016, BUTINA emailed U.S. Person 2 and said that the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL continued to her ?his desire in our Russian-American project,? and that a representative of the Russian Presidential administration had expressed approval ?for building this communication channel.? BUTINA additionally assured U.S. Person 2 that he should not worry as ?all that we needed is <1 from Putin?s side. The rest is easier.? 29. On March 30, 2016, BUTINA sent an email thanking an associate of the organizer 10 of the 2017 Prayer Breakfast for meeting with her and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL in Moscow. In this email, BUTINA noted that the RUSSIAN OFFICLAL ?suggested to President Putin that he consider coming to the Prayer Breakfast next year, Feb 2017, and Pres. Putin did not say ?no? BUTINA observed that she believed that there were a number of conditions that should be met in order for President Putin to attend, including a personal invitation from the President of the United States and the attendance of at least fifteen other world leaders or heads of state. In a later March email, the organizer of the 2017 National Prayer Breakfast promised BUTINA he would provide ten seats at the 2017 event. 30. On September 16, 2016, BUTINA sent an email to U.S. Person 1 and U.S. Person 2 regarding organizing another Russian-American ?friendship and dialogue? dinner in the District of Columbia. BUTINA suggested scheduling the next dinner at the beginning of October 2016, because ?we only have 2 month left before the elections and it?s the time for building an advisers team on Russia for a new president. I am seriously worry that the candidates some upcoming day will suddenly realize that ?now? is the time to do something with Russia and will look for advisory among currently popular radically oppositional to Russia crowd of experts. Bad things happen than. I believe we can prevent it.? [sic] On October 4, 2016, U.S. Person I sent an email to an acquaintance. The email covered a number of topics. Within the email, U.S. Person 1 stated, ?Unrelated to speci?c presidential campaigns, I?ve been involved in securing a VERY private line of communication between the Kremlin and key POLITICAL PARTY 1 leaders through, of all conduits, the RIGHTS Based on my training, experience, and familiarity with this investigation, I believe that this email describes U.S. Person 1?s involvement in BU efforts to establish a ?back channel? communication for representatives of the Government of Russia. 32. On October 5, 2016, BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL exchanged the 11 following direct messages on Twitter: Time will tell. We made our bet. I am following our game. I will be connecting the people from the prayer breakfast to this group. Most importantly, you get better. Everything else we will win. RUSSIAN OFFICIAL: No doubt! Of course we will win, but I (you are right) need to beat the illness ?rst and get out of the hOSpital (I made an attempt today it didn?t work). And it is not about winning today?s ?ght (although we are striving for it) but to win the entire battle. This is the battle for the future, it cannot be lost! Or everyone will lose. BUTINA: True! But don?t try to get out right now: the doctors ordered you to stay for a reason. Better finish the treatment. Please do not risk it. You have a key role and you know it. I will not manage without you. RUSSIAN OFFICIAL: No! This is a mistake. Your political star has risen in the sky. Now it is important to rise to the zenith and not burn out (fall) prematurely. BUTINA: Oh well. I am just starting in this ?eld. I still have to learn and learn from you! These are notjust words! Harsh and impetuous moves will ruin everything early. RUSSIAN OFFICIAL: This is hard to teach. Patience and cold blood faith in yourself. And everything will de?nitely turn out. BUTINA: By your recommendation, I am setting up the groundwork here but I am really in need of mentoring. Or the energy might to towards the wrong direction. Yesterday?s dinner showed that American society is broken in relation to Russia. This is now the dividing line of opinions, the crucial one in the election race. PARTY are for us, [another major US. political party] against 50/50. Our move here is very important.? [sic] 33. During the October 5, 2016 Twitter direct communications, BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL also discussed other potential steps to take in the operation. The RUSSIAN OFFICIAL asked about how the ?Russia?USA friendship society? looked at that time. BUTINA responded, ?It?s not alive. We are currently ?underground? both here and there. Now, private clubs and quite [sic] in?uence on people making decisions is the trend. No publicity.? She 12 continued, ?Adviser is the profession of the current day. Even a secret advisor. Right now the Administration here is ?exible and there is the idea, so that the right thoughts would dominate.? 34. Following this October 5, 2016 Twitter conversation, BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL discussed whether BUTINA should volunteer to serve as a US. election observer from Russia and agreed that the risk was too high. The RUSSIAN OFFICLAL expressed the opinion that ?the risk of provocation is too high and the ?media hype? which comes after it,? and BUTINA agreed by responding, ?Only incognito! Right now everything has to be quiet and careful.? 35. In October 2016, BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL intermittently communicated to discuss the topics of the 2017 National Prayer Breakfast invitation and the upcoming elections via Twitter direct message. On October 17, 2016, BUTINA asked the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL for a list of ten individuals from Russia who would be attending the National Prayer Breakfast. BUTINA further suggested to the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL that it would be a good idea to invite the Russian Ambassador and noted that it ?needs to be somebody in?uential from Russia, it would be better [if it were someone] from the Kremlin or RPC [Russian Orthodox Church] of course.? 36. In a series of November 8 and 9, 2016 Twitter direct messages, the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL and BUTINA discussed the results of the US. Presidential election as they were announced. As part of that same Twitter conversation, told the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL, . . I?m going to sleep. It?s 3 am here. I am ready for further orders.? The RUSSIAN OFFICIAL responded, ?Think about in which areas of life we could go towards bringing us closer. ISIS understandably, what else we need to look at the American agenda.? After speculating about who might be nominated as Secretary of State, BUTINA suggested a phone call to discuss, and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL noted that he liked the idea, but was worried that ?all our phones are being listened to!? BUTINA suggested that they talk via WhatsApp. l3 37. On November 1 1, 2016, BUTINA sent the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL a direct message via Twitter, in which she predicted who might be named Secretary of State and asked the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL to ?nd out how ?our people? felt about that potential nomination. 38. Also on November 11, 2016, BUTINA sent the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL a direct message via Twitter which included a screen shot of two ?reports? in Russian. One report proposed ways to establish dialogue with U.S. politicians through a conference. The proposal stated that ?[t]he conference must be presented as a private initiative, not a government undertaking.? The proposal also suggested that BUTINA and a number of political of?cials and U.S. Congressmen should participate. In this report, BU TINA noted to the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL, under the heading ?advantages,? that ?[t]he event will get wide coverage in the press; it will be the ?rst positive event regarding Russia in Washington (currently, all of them are anti?Russian and anti-Putin). The event does not pose any risks because no government officials from either country will attend; yet it creates a foundation for further talks on the level of government officials.? 39. In a November 12, 2016 Twitter direct message, the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL acknowledged reading the proposal referenced above and informed BUTINA that ?they? won?t go for it. He told BU TINA that he could not reach an MFA contact and noted ?[p]eople are waiting for the formed decisions. I will try to clarify this subject on Monday one more time.? Based on . my training, experience, and familiarity with this investigation, I believe these messages are the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL relaying the Russian Federation?s instructions to its agent, BUTINA. 40. On November 30, 2016, BUTINA emailed U.S. Person 1 regarding the Russian delegation to the 2017 National Prayer Breakfast. BUTINA stated that the ?[p]eople in the list are handpicked by [the RUSSIAN and me and are VERY in?uential in Russia. They are coming to establish a back channel of Let?s think if our Person 2?s ?rst name] would like to meet with them. . (ellipses in original) 14 41. On December 1, 2016, U.S. Person I emailed BUT INA with instructions for ?what is required to book the Russian delegation hotel rooms in the Washington Hilton the actual venue of the National Prayer Breakfast.? The email listed rooms and prices, and US. Person I noted, ?To be safe, I?d ask [the RUSSIAN to place US $3500 on one of your Russian charge cards in order to pay these deposits.? 42. In a December 26, 2016 email, the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL told BUTINA that the MFA had no objection to his trip to attend the National Prayer Breakfast, but ?it does not mean that everything is settled. . . . Of?cially, only ambassadors will be invited. There will be no state leaders and delegations.? BUTINA-replied, ?The response from the MFA is perfect.[] 1 am serious.? 43. On January 5, 2017, BUTINA was forwarded a copy of an email between US. Person I and Person 2 regarding the 2017 National Prayer Breakfast in which US. Person 1 attached a list of Russian visitors, including 12 Russian guests, noting, ?In addition to delegation leader [the RUSSIAN the list is populated by important political advisers to Russian President Putin, university presidents, mayors, and substantial private businessmen.? 44. On January 26, 2017, BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL communicated via Twitter direct message about the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL delivering a speech the night before the National Prayer Breakfast. BUTINA told the Russian Representative that ?[t]he only thing I ask is to somehow mention me. This is very important for me for negotiations with the breakfast committee. They need to see me not as the delegation ?organization committee? but as your partner and colleague.? The Russian Representative agreed as to the ?need to stress status as a key figure.? 45. On February 2, 2017, BUTINA and the RUSSIAN OFFICIAL attended the 2017 National Prayer Breakfast in the District of Columbia. 15 46. On February 6, 2017, BUTINA emailed a National Prayer Breakfast organizer to thank him for ?the gift of you [sic] precious time during the National Prayer Breakfast week and for the very private meeting that followed. A new relationship between two countries always begins better when it begins in faith. Once you have a chance to rest after last week?s events, I have important information for you to?mher this new relationship. I would appreciate one brief additional meeting with you to explain these new developments. I remain in Washington, DC. pursuing my Master?s Degree at American University. My schedule is your schedule!? (emphasis added) 48. On February 8, 201?, BUTINA emailed U.S. Person 2 to thank him and noted, ?Our delegation cannot stop chatting about your wonderful dinner. My dearest President has received ?the message? about your group initiatives and your constructive and kind attention to the Russians.? 49. At no time did BUTINA notify the Attorney General, whose of?ce in the Department of Justice is located in the District of Columbia, that she would and did act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government. 16 CONCLUSION 50. For the reasons stated above, there is probable cause to believe that BUTINA conspired with one or more persons to violate 18 U.S.C. 951, in violation of 13 .S.C. 371. 51. I declare under the penalty of perjury that the information provided above is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Respectfully submitted, ?aw ?avm Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation Subsc ed and swo to before on 01/ I i DEBORAH A. ROBINSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17