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UNITEDSTATES
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FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
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WASHINGTON,D.C.
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IN RE OPINIONS & ORDERS OF THIS COURT
ADDRESSING BULK COLLECTION OF DATA
UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT

)
)
)
)

Docket No. Misc. 13-08

THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE BRIEF
REGARDING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

,

I

I

JOHN C. DEMERS
Assistant Attorney General
for National Security
J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
STUART J. EVANS
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General

JEFFREY M. SMITH
Appellate Counsel
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Room6500
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 532-0220
Jeffrey.Smith5@usdoj.gov

GOlF~T

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHOR!TlES .......................................................................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................2
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................7
I.

This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdic-tion over This Case ......................................?

JI.

The Exercise of This Court's Inherent Power over Its Records Neither
Requires Nor Permits the Court To Assume Jurisdiction over Cases
Brought by Third Parties .............................................................................................. 12

Ill.

The Proper Way for Movants To Assert Any Claimed Legal Entitlement
to the Withheld Classified Material Is Through a Suit Against Relevant
Government Agencies in District Court ...................................................................... 14

IV.

Movants' Legal Claims Lack Merit.. ........................................................................... 16

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 19

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

In re Alterra Healthcare Corp., 353 B.R. 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) ............................................. 10
Ankenbrandtv. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) ...............................................................................7
Jn re Benne/I Funding Group, Inc., 226 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998) ................................. 11
Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2016) ................................................................ 10
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236 (1845) ..................................................................................................7
In re Certification of Questions ofLaw to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
ofReview, FISCR No. 18-01, 2018 WL 2709456 (PISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018) ........... 12, 16, 17
CIA v. Sims, 471U.S. 159 (1985) .......................................................................................... 2, 3, 16
Dep 't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (I 988) ........................................................................... 12
Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep 't ofJustice, 296 F. Supp. 3d I09 (D.D.C. 2017) ................. 14
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) ............................................................................. 1
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (20 13).............................................................................................. l
Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859) ......................................................................................... 14
Jn re J. Fife Symington, 111, 209 B.R. 678 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997).................................................. 11
Kokkonenv. Guardian Life ins. Co. ofAm., 5 11 U.S.375 (1994) ........................................ 1, 9, 11
In re Motion for Consent to Disclosure ofCourt Records,

Misc. No. 13-01 , 2013 WL 5460051 (FISA Ct. June 12, 2013) .................................................... 11
In re Motion for Release ofCourt Records,

526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FISA Ct. 2007) ........................................................ 4, 5, 7, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18
Jn re Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Misc. No. 13-08,

2017 WL 427591 (FISA Ct. Jan. 25, 2017) .............................................................................12, 16
In re Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection ofData
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Misc. No. 13-08,

2017 WL 5983865 (FISA Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) .................................................................6, 11, 12, 16
ii

 Jn re Orders ofthis Court Interpreting Section 215 ofthe Patriot Act,

Misc. No. 13-02, 20 14 WL 5442058 (FISA Ct. Aug. 7, 20 14) ........................................ ,..............5
Jn re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 ofthe Patriot Act,

Misc. No. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) .........................................5, l 3, 15
Press-Enterp rise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. l (1986) ......................................................6, 17
In re Proceedings Required by§ 702(i) ofthe FJSA Amendments Act of2008,

Misc. No. 08-0 I, 2008 WL 9487946 (FlSA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008) ..................................... 4, 5, 11, 16
Jn re Sealed Case, 237 F.3d 657 (D.C. Cir. 200 I) ......................................................................... I 0
Twitter v. Holder, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .......................................................9. 10
United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ............................................................ 10

Statutes
5 U.S. C. § 552(a) .......................................................................................................................2, J 5
28 U.S. C. § 13 3 I ..................................................................................................................2, I 0, 15
50 u.s.c. § 1803(c) "" ......."" ...........""..." .......""." ....... "" .....""""." ..... " .......".".." ... "" ""."" ......3
50 U.S. C. § 1803 (g)( I) ....................................................................................................................8
50 u.s.c. § I 804 ..............................................................................................................................7
50 U.S.C. § I 806(1) .......................................................................................................................... 8
50 u.s.c. § 1823 "." """"""""" """."" ...... """" """". """"""""." .... """ ........ ". """ ..."""....""".".7
50 u.s.c. § I 842 ..............................................................................................................................7
50 u.s. c. § 1861....."."" ....."." .... " ....."".". " ......."" ....... "" ........." ....""........"" ..... " ......"." " ........ "7
50 U.S.C. § I 872 ............................................................................................................................ 14
50 U.S. C. § I 88 Ia ............................................................................................................................7
50 U.S.C. § I88 I b ............................................................................................................................ 7
50 u.s.c. § 1881c "" """".". """ """"... " ....."" .. """" ........"""""""' " ............ """"." " •• """."" ....".7
iii

 50 u.s.c. § 188 ld ............................................................................................................................7
USA PATRlOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 109, 120Stat.192 (2006) ...........................................................................8

FISC Rule of Procedure 3 ..........................................................................................................4, 13
f!SC Rule of Procedure 62(a)........................••................................••....•.................... .4, 5, 6, 13, 17

Other Authorities
S. Rep. No. 95-604 ( 1977) ...................................................•••.........................................................2
S. Rep. No. 95-701 (1978) ............................................................................................................... 2

H.R. Rep. No. 109-333 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) ....................................................................................8
Foreign lnlelligence Elec/ronic Surveillance: Hearing on HR. 5794, HR. 9745,
H.R 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation ofthe H Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 74 (1978) (statement of Carl H. Imlay) ........................ 2
Security Procedures Established Pursuant to Public Law No. 95-511,
92 Stat. 1783, as Amended, by the ChiefJustice ofthe United States
for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ofReview (Feb. 21, 2013) .................................................................3, 4, 12, 13

iv

 INTRODUCTION
This Court possesses the full range of inherent powers of an Article III court, including
powers "to punish contempt, to regulate admission to [practice before it], to discipline attorney
misconduct, to dismiss lawsuits for failure to prosecute, and to enforce decorum in the
courtroom." Movants' June I 3, 2018 Brief at 4. But Article In inherent powers do not create
subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by a third-party litigant asserting a broad request for
records from prior cases. The relevant question is not one of power but ofjurisdiction over the
particular case or controversy brought by movants. "Only Congress may determine a lower
federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction" over cases, Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237,
257-58 (2008) (quotation marks omitted), and this jurisdiction " is not lo be expanded by judicial
decree," Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); accord Gunn v.

Minton, 568 U.S. 251 , 256-58 (2013).
The Court must begin (as movants do not) with the "presum(ption] that a cause lies
outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. al 377. Here, there is no congressional
authorization to rebut that presumption. Congress has assigned this specialized Court two
categories of cases-adjudications of government applications and certifications regarding
foreign intelligence collection authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"),
and adjudications of certain challenges by recipients of FISA process- and movants' claims do
not fall within either category. Moreover, this Court does not have ancillary subject-matter
jurisdiction over this case because "[t]he facts to be determined" in this action "are quite separate
from the facts" detennined in earlier FISC proceedings, and adjudication of movants' claims is
not "essential" to the conduct of the work assigned to this Court by Congress. id at 381.
Statutory subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking access to national security information

 classified by the Executive Branch lies not in this Court, but in the U.S. District Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).

BACKGROUND
Jn 1978, Congress enacted FISA, which provided for a judicial oversight and approval
role regarding the government's collection of foreign intell igence. See S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 16
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3917 ("[T]he courts for the first time will
ultimately ru le on whether such foreign intelligence surveillance shou ld occur."); see also id. at
7, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3908 (FlSA intended to strike "a fair and just balance between
protection of national security and protection of personal liberties"). To undertake this important
task, Congress created two highly specialized courts: this Court (the "FlSC") and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (the "Court of Review"). Congress deemed
"consolidation ofjudicial authority in a special court" to be necessary due to "(t]he need to
preserve secrecy for sensitive counterintelligence sources and methods." S. Rep. No. 95-701, at
12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3980. 1
Congress was, of course, "well aware of the importance of secrecy in the intelligence
field." CIA v. Sims, 471U.S. 159, 172 (1985); accord id. at 172 n.16 ("Secrecy is inherently a
key to successfu l intelligence operations."). By the time Congress created this Court, Congress

1 An

earlier version of the bill that would become FISA would have empowered select
district judges to adjudicate FlSA applications, but Congress instead decided to create "a special
court [sitting] continuously in the District of Columbia." S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 48 (1977).
Congress created this Court "upon the recommendation of the General Counsel of the
Adm inistrative Office of the U.S. Courts." Id. at 47-48 & n.28. In testimony before the Senate,
the General Counsel explained that judges on this new Court "would be chosen with discretion"
and "could be relied upon to maintain the security of intelligence." Foreign Intelligence
Electronic Surveillance: Hearing on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before
the Subcomm. on Legislation of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 74
( I 978) (statement of Carl H. Im lay).

2

 had for years "simply and pointedly protected (from disclosure] all sources of intelligence that
provide, or are engaged to provide, information the (Intelligence Community) needs to perform
its statutory duties with respect to foreign intelligence.'' Id. at 169-70; see also id. at 170
(observing that the reasons "to protect the secrecy and integrity of the intelligence process ... are
too obvious to call for enlarged discussion"). Congress created this Court to allow adjudication
of certain FISA issues without endangering the secrecy of that national security information.
To ensure the protection of classified national defense and intelligence information,
Congress provided that the Court's files, including its orders, "shall be maintained under security
measures established by the Chief Justice in consu ltation with the Attorney General" and the
nation's top intelligence official, originally the Director of Central Intelligence and now the
Director of National Intelligence. 50 U.S.C. § l 803(c). The currently applicable Security
Procedures were issued by Chief Justice Roberts on February 2 1, 2013. See Security Procedures
Established Pursuant to Public Law No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, as Amended, by the ChiefJustice
of the United Stales for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillonce Court ofReview (Feb. 21, 2013). They provide for both the Court's judges and its
staff to undergo appropriate FBI background checks " under applicable Executive Branch
standards for investigations performed in support of determinations of eligibility for access to
sensitive compartmented information or other classi fied national security information," id.

~~

3,

4, and that "(m)embers of the [C)ourt and [C)ourt personnel shall be briefed on security
measures appropriate to the functions of the (C]ourt by designees of the Attorney General and
the Director ofNational Intelligence,"

id. ~

9. The Security Procedures further require that "all

court records (including notes, draft opinions, and related materials) that contain classified

3

 national security information are maintained according to applicable Executive Branch security
standards for storing and handling classified national security information," id. ii 7.
Consistent with the statutorily-required Security Procedures imposed by the Chief
Justice, this Court has promulgated rules that provide that, " [i)n all matters, the Court and its
staff shall comply with the security measures established pursuant to [FISA], as well as
Executive Order 13526, 'Classified National Security Information' (or its successor)." FISC
Rule of Procedure 3. T he rules permit an order, opinion, or other decision to be published only
upon the direction of the Presiding Judge, which shall issue only in response to a request from
the judge who authored the decision or a party to the proceeding that produced the decision, and
only after any Executive Branch review that may be "necessary to ensure that properly classified
information is appropriately protected pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (or its successor)."
FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a).
Given the special nature of th is Court and the secrecy that necessarily surrounds its
proceedings, Congress limited th is Court's jurisdiction to two classes of cases in which secrecy
is essential to the protection of national security. See Jn re Motion/or Release o/Court Records,
526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487 (FISA Ct. 2007) ("The FISC is a unique court. Its entire docket relates
to the collection of foreign intelligence by the federal government."). Despite Congress's careful
design, in recent years, th is Court's docket has swol len to include a new category of cases in
wh ich it is being asked by private parties to adj udicate "request[s] for the release of records." In

re Proceedings Required by§ 702{i) of the FISA Amendments Act o/2008, Misc. No. 08-01,
2008 WL 9487946, at *2 (FJSA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008). By the government's count, there have been
eight such record-request cases filed in th is court, five of which are currently pending:

4

 Case
Misc. No. 07-0 I
Misc. No. 08-0 I
Misc. No. 13--02
Misc. No. 13-08
Misc. No. 13-09
Misc. No. 16-01

Misc. No. 18-0 I
Misc. No. I8-02

Records Reouested
Court orders and government
pleadings regarding the President' s
Surveillance Pro11ram
legal briefs and Court opinions
re1rnrdi112 FISA & 702
"opinions evaluating the meaning,
scope, and constitutionality of
Section 215 of the Patriot Act"
"opin ions addressing the legal basis
for the 'bulk collection' of data"
a "specific opinion or opinions ...
referenced on" specified pages of a
2013 ooinion
"opinions and orders containing
novel or significant interpretations
of law issued between September
11. 200 I and . .. June 2, 20 IS"
"orders authorizing surveillance of
Carter Page"
"disposition of any . . . proceeding
to review whether the Justice
Department committed
misconduct" related to a FlSA
application referenced in a
conl!ressional memorandum

Claimed Basis
First Amendment
Com mon Law

Outcome
Denied2

First Amendment

Denied 3

First Amendment
FISC Rule 62

Granted in
Part4

First Amendment
Pending
FISC Rule 62
First Amendment
Pending
Supervisory Powers
First Amendment
FISC Rule 62

Pending

FISC Rule 62

Pending

Inherent Authority

Pending

The instant case, No. 13-08, is the fourth on the above chart. In it, movants seek
"opinions addressing the legal basis for the ' bulk collection' of data" by the government pursuant
to FISA. Motion, Misc. No. 13-08, at I (Nov. 6, 2013). As the Court is aware, there are four

2

See In re Motion for Release ofCourt Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484 (FJSA Ct. 2007).

3

See In re Proceedings Required by § 702(i) ofthe FlSA Amendments Act o/2008,

Misc. No. 08-01, 2008 WL 9487946 (FISA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008).
4

See Jn re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section 215 ofthe Patriot Act, Misc. No. 1302, 2014 WL 5442058 (FISA Ct. Aug. 7, 2014); In re Orders of this Court Interpreting Section
215 ofthe Patriot Act, Misc. No. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064 {FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013).
5

 responsive documents. All four were publicly released in 2013, with classilied information
redacted, two by the Court and two by the government.
Movants seek to consolidate this case with Misc. No. 16-0 I in which they seek all
"opinions and orders containing novel or significant interpretations of law issued between
September II , 200 I and ... June 2, 2015." Motion, Misc. No. 16-0 I, at I (Oct. 18, 20 16). In
contrast to this case, where the four responsive records have been released, the number of
records responsive to the request in Misc. No. 16-0 l is unknown, although the government
estimates it to be at least 80.s See generally infra note 13.
In each case, "Movants want [the Court] to rule that they have a 'right' ofaeeess to the
information classified by the Executive Branch and that Executive Branch agencies must defend
each redaction in the face ofMovants' challenges." In re Opinions & Orders of this Court

Addressing Bulk Collection ofData under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Misc. No.
13-08, 2017 WL 5983865, at •9 (FlSA Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (en bane) (Collyer, P.J., dissenting).
Movants rely on the First Amendment right of access described by the Supreme Court in Press-

Emerprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. l (1986), and this Court's Rule of Procedure 62(a),
described above.

' Because of the different postures of the two cases, the government submits that
consolidation is not appropriate at this time. Rather, the most efficient way to proceed would be
to litigate Misc. No. 13-08 to completion and then apply its holdings to other pending cases as
applicable.

6

 ARGUMENT
I.

This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over This Case
Subject matter j urisdiction is distinct from judicial power. While "the judicial power of

the United States" is vested in the courts by Article III of the Constitution, the scope of an
inferior Article fll court's subject matter jurisdiction is entirely with in the control ofCongress.6
Congress possesses "the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) and
of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding
jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper
for the public good." Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (I 992) (quoting Cary v.

Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845)). That this Court has power regarding its records says nothing
about whether it has jurisdiction over the claims brought by movants in this case. The latt.e r
question is determined based on a review of"the relevant jurisdictional statutes." Id.
This Court's subject matter jurisdiction is set forth in FISA. Congress has assigned the
Court two related categories of cases: (I) adjudications of certain applications and certifications
related to the collection of foreign intelligence that may be filed by the government, see 50
U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1823, 1842, 1861 , 1881b, 1881c, 1881d, and (2) adjudications of certain claims
brought by recipients of FISA process concerning that process, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861 (f), 1881 a.
Nowhere does FJSA (or any other statute) provide this Court with subject matter jurisdiction
over legal claims brought by non-recipients of FISA process seeking records or, for that matter,
over any legal claims brought by private parties who have not received FISA process. Indeed,
even the targets of electronic surveillance authorized by this Court, as well as other aggrieved

6

It is undisputed that "the FISC is an inferior federal court established by Congress under
Article 11J." In re Motion for Release, 526 f. Supp. 2d at 486.

7

 persons, can challenge that surveillance only in a "United States district court." 50 U.S.C.

§ 1806(1).
As movants do not dispute, 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g)(I) does not provide subject matter
jurisdiction. That provision sets forth, but is not intended to expand or diminish, this Court's
inherent powers to establish rules and procedures and co "take such actions, as are reasonably
necessary to administer [its] responsibilities under [FlSA]." id This provision was added in
2006 as part of a larger section entitled "Enhanced Congressional Oversight." See USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 109, 120 Stat.
192, 205 (2006). The statement of the Court's authority to promulgate rules and procedures (an
authority that the Court clearly had prior to the enactment of the 2006 Act) 7 served as a reference
for the following provision, which required the rules and procedures to "be recorded" and
"transm itted" to certain congressional committees. See id.; H.R. Rep. No. 109-333, at 93 (2005)
(Conf. Rep.) ("Section 109 of the conference report ... requires ... the FISA court to publish its
ru les."). Section l 803(g)(l) provides only for powers "necessary to administer" the
responsibilities vested in the Court by other provisions ofFISA. It does not create subject matter ·
jurisdiction over a new class of cases involving private parties who do not claim to have received
FISA process. Indeed, neither movants nor amicus contend that this case falls within any
statutory provision providing subject matter jurisdiction to this Court.
Apart from explicit statutory authorization, the only basis on which an Article III court
(other than the Supreme Court) may exercise subject matter jurisdiction is the narrow doctrine of

7 The

2006 Act was signed into law on March 9, 2006. TI1is Court published its (sincesuperseded) rules on February 17, 2006, after the 2006 Act had passed the House of
Representatives but before it had passed the Senate. This Court published (also sincesuperseded) Procedures for Review of Petitions Filed Pursuant to Section 501(!) ofFISA on
May 5, 2006.

8

 ancillary jurisdiction. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80 (reversing district court order based on
"inherent power" because case was outside district court's subject matter jurisdiction). Anci llary
jurisdiction exists only"(!) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying
respects and degrees, factually interdependent" or "(2) to enable a court to function successfully,
that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." Id. The
former allows overlapping claims, such as state and federal causes of action based on the same
events, to be adjudicated together, while the latter applies only when jurisdiction is "essential to
the conduct of federal-court busi11ess," id. at 381, and permits, for example, contempt
proceedings relating to conduct before the court, id. at 380.
The claims brought by movants are not at all factually interdependent with the F!SC 's
earlier cases considering whether FISA process should be authorized. It is not apparent that any
fact-find ing at all is necessary in this action, and any such fact-finding would not be the type the
FISC ordinarily engages in, such as determining whether there is probable cause to believe a
target is an agent of a foreign power or a facility is used by a target. Nor is the adjudication of
this case or similar cases essential to the proper functioning of the FJSC or the effectuation of its
orders. To the contrary, the adjudication sought here "is quite remote from what [the FJSC)
require[s) in order to perform [its] functions." Id. at 380.8

8

This Court does have ancillary jurisdiction over certain cases, unlike this one, that
concern application of its own orders. For example, this Court had jurisdiction over several
actions brought by internet service providers in 2013 that sought clarification and/or alteration of
orders issued by this Court. See Misc. Nos. 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06, & 13-07. In the
government's view, a similar case filed by Twitter, Inc. in the Northern District of California
should be adjudicated in this Court since it involves interpretation of and/or a challenge to
nondisclosure provisions in FlSA orders and directives that l\vitter may have received.
See Defs Mot. to Dismiss Am. Campi. at 10-16, Twifler v. Sessions, No. 14-cv-4480-YGR
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016), ECF No. 94. The district court disagreed with the government's
suggestion that the doctrine of comity applied, holding that Twitter's claims do not call on that
court "to interpret, review, or grant relief from any particular FISC order or directive." Twifler v.

9

 Movants rely on only two cases discussing ancillary jurisdiction, and they have no
application here. Both involve parties that alleged that their legal rights were about to be
violated by unlawful disclosures of information in o ngoing government enforcement actions
pending in district court. See United States v. Hubbard, 650 f.2d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(owner of"seized property," which in that case was private papers, could bring a claim to
prevent the court from publicizing those papers); Jn re Sealed Case, 237 F.3d 657, 664 (D.C. Cir.
200 l) (targets of Federal Election Commission investigation could bring claim to prevent court
from unsealing their identities in violation of statute). Neither of those cases involved a request
for documents from other cases; they concerned the district courts' imminent unlawful disclosure
of private, protected information in ongoingjudicial proceedings.
The cases that movants cite that address records-request claims also provide no support to
movants here. The basis for subject matter jurisdiction in those cases, brought in district courts,
is no mystery. In such a case, the district court has " federal-question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 because [the case] is an action 'arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States."' Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 761 (7th Cir. 2016). Unlike district
courts, however, this Court has not been granted Section 133 l federal question jurisdiction.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Movants are left with several cases. from non-Article III bankruptcy courts applying
"Rule 2018(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure" to the question whether a thirdparty may intervene in a bankruptcy proceeding to challenge a bankruptcy court's sealing or
protective orders. Jn re Alterra Healthcare Corp., 353 B.R. 66, 70 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); see

Holder, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2016). T hat case remains in litigation before the
district court.
10

 also In re Benne/I Funding Group, Inc., 226 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998); In re J. Fife
Symington, 111, 209 B.R. 678 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997). Those cases have no application in this
Court where the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure do not apply. In the FISC, third parties
have no right to intervene, see Jn re Proceedings Required by§ 702(i) ofthe FISA Amendments

Act o/2008, 2008 WL 9487946, at *4-5, and the orders and opinions at issue here are not under
any court sealing or protective order, see In re Motion/or Consent to Disclosure ofCourt

Records, Misc. No. 13-01, 2013 WL 5460051, at •3.4 (FISA Ct. June 12, 2013). Moreover,
unlike the ACLU motion that was rejected by this court in 2008 in Jn re Proceedings, movants'
present motions do not remotely resemble a motion to intervene. No court would allow
simu ltaneous intervention in all cases "addressing the legal basis for the 'bu lk collection' of
data," let alone all cases in wh ich the court has issued an opinion or o rder "containing novel or
significant interpretations of law" during a 14-year period. These arc not efforts to intervene in
an extant case; they are broad requests for records that seek to challenge the government's
classification decisions.
A case that "is more than just a continuation or renewal of' an earlier case "requires its
own basis for jurisdiction." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378. There is no such jurisdictional basis for
the records-request claims movants seek to bring in this Court. This Court should decline
movants ' invitation to "expand its jurisdiction" contrary to "statutory provisions that limit its
jurisdiction to a specialized area of national concern, and the evident congressional mandate that
the Court conduct its proceedings ex parte and in accord with prescribed security procedures."

Jn re Opinions & Orders ofthis Court Addressing Bulk Collection ofData 1111der the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 2017 WL 5983865, at 21 (Collyer, P.J., dissenting).

11

 II.

The Exercise of This Cou rt's Inhere nt Power over Its Records Neither Requires Nor
Permits the Court To Assume Jurisdicrion over Cases Brought by Third Parties

Movants' principal argument and amicus's entire argument are premised on this Court's
inherent supervisory power over its records, including opinions and orders. That power must be
exercised in a manner that is consistent with the Executive Branch's constit utional power to
control access to national security information,9 Congress's intent that this Court operate in a
secure manner to protect classified information, and the statutorily required Security Procedures
promulgated by the Chief Justice.10 In the 40 years since this Court was created, it has
unfailingly exercised its inherent powers in a manner consistent with Congress's decision to
protect sensitive intelligence, the Executive Branch's constitutional power and responsibility to
protect national security information, and the requirements imposed by the Chief Justice. This
case thus does not involve any conflict between the branches.
The statutory provisions ofF!SA, the Security Procedures issued by the Chief Justice,
and the Court's own rules provide "a comprehensive scheme for the safeguarding and handling
ofFISC proceedings and records." Jn re Motion/or Release o/Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d

9 The

Executive Branch shares classified national security information with courts and
Congress as appropriate to facilitate those branches' exercises of their respective constitutional
responsibilities. This does not place the information outside the scope of the Executive Branch's
protection. See Jn re Motion/or Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (observing that "the proper
functioning of the FISA process wou ld be adversely affected if submitting sensitive information
to the FISC cou ld subject the Executive Branch's classification to a heightened form ofj udicial
review"). Indeed, such a ru le would create a "chilling effect" that would interfere with all three
branches' ability to exercise their constitutional functions in a manner consistent with national
security. Id.
10 See,

e.g., In re Opinions & Orders ofthis Court Addressing Bulle Collection ofData
rmder the Foreign Intelligence S11rveillance Act, Misc. No. 13-08, 2017 WL 427591 , at• 14
(FISA Ct. Jan. 25, 2017) (quoting Dep 't ofthe Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 ( 1988)), vacated on
other grounds, 2017 WL 5983865 (FISA Ct. Nov. 9, 2017} (en bane), ajf'd, 2018 \VL 2709456
(FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018).
12

 484, 488 (FISA Ct. 2007). Under both the Securil)' Procedures and the Court' s Rules of
Procedure, this Court docs not release information classified by the Executive Branch. Security
Procedures~

7 (requiring that "all court records" be "maintained according to applicable

Executive Branch security standards"); FISC Rule of Procedure 3 (requiring that in "all matters,
the Court and its staff shall comply with ... Executive Order 13526," or its successor). These
requirements, imposed by the judicial branch (the Chief Justice and this Court), represent a
decision to exercise the Court's powers over its records in an appropriate manner consistent with
the national sccuril)' concerns that led Congress to create this specialized Court.
The Court's procedures for publishing its decisions are consistent with this practice. See
FISC Rule of Procedure 62(a). By the terms of the Court's rules, that process can be
commenced on ly by the judge who authored the decision o r a party to the case in which the
decision was issued. id.; see also In re Orders of this Court Jnterpreling Section 215 ofthe

Patriot Act, Misc. No. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064, at •5 (FlSA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (holding that
"the tenn 'party' in Rule 62(a) refers to a party to the proceeding that resulted in the 'opinion,
order, or other decision' being considered for publication"). 11 And publication can only occur
upon direction of the Presiding Judge afler consultation with the other judges on the Court. FISC
Rule of Procedure 62(a). Where a decision contains classified information, the Court may direct

11

Although the Court correctly construed the term "party," the government respectfully
submits that the Court misapplied Rule 62(a) in Jn re Orders ofthis Court lmerpreting Section
215. The ruling in that case was not sua sponte, as it was based on the suggestion of movants
who were not parties to the underlying decision that was ultimately released. And the judge who
presided in Jn re Orders ofthis Court lmerpreting Section 215 was not the judge who authored
the earlier decision. The Court justified its departures from the rule's commands based on
"cxtrnordinary circumstances." 2013 \VL 5460064, at *5. However extraordinary the
circumstances may have been at that time, cases such as the one at bar have since become all too
ordinary in this Court.
13

 the Executive Branch to "redact it as necessary to ensure the properly classi tied information is
appropriately protected pursuant" to Executive Order. Id. In short, this Court does not release
information that has been classified by the Executive Branch. 12
Jfthe Court has the inherent power to make material public, it has the concomitant power
to protect material from public release where,

as here, there is a strong pub lic interest in doing

so. Cf Amicus Br. 19-20 (discussing Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859)). For 40 years,
the Court has exercised these powers without any conflict with the Executive. The Court's
inherent powers provide no basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted by
movan ts.
III.

T he P roper Way for Movants To Assert Any Claimed Legal Entitlement to the
W ithh eld C lassified Material Is Th rough a S uit Against Relevant Government
Agencies in Distr ict Court
While movants nominally direct their ire at the Court for failing to release to the public

classified national security information, the Court has merely exercised its administrative powers
in a manner consistent with Congress's mandate for confidential ity and the Executive Branch's
constitutional power to protect national security. Movants' actual dispute is with the Executive
Branch, whose decisions to classify the material sought are directly and solely responsible for
movants' inability to access the material. Movants may put that dispute to judicial adjudication
in a suit against the appropriate government agencies in district court.

12

To the extent that Congress has mandated transparency regarding F!SC opinions, it has
directed that the government, not the FISC, redact and release opinions, and it has not created a
cause of action beyond that provided by FOIA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1872. T he Director ofNational
Intelligence's obl igation to "make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable" FISC
decisions was added in June 20 15 and does not apply to FISC decisions issued prior to its
enactment. Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep 't ofJustice, 296 F. Supp; 3d I 09, 127 (D.D.C.
2017).

14

 District courts have subject matter jurisdiction over federal-law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
and Congress has created a cause of action that allows private parties to challenge withholdings
based on classification in district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). It has been apparent that recordsrequest cases in this Court (such as this one) are effectively thinly-veiled Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA") requests, since this Court rejected the ACLU's first such request by noting that
"there would be no point in this Court' s merely duplicating the judicial review that the ACLU,
and anyone else, can obtain by submitting a FOIA request to the Department of Justice for these
same records." Jn re Motion/or Release o/Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.32. Six
years later, this Court sua sponte partially dismissed another records request case on the grounds
that one of the movants was seeking some of the same FISC opinions in a FOIA case:
The present motion thus asks the FISC to do the same thing that the ACLU is
asking the District Court in New York to do in tbe FOIA litigation: ensure that the
opinions are disclosed, with only properly classified information withheld.
Having both courts proceed poses the risks of duplication of effort and
inconsistent outcomes that the first-to-file rule is intended to avoid.
In re Orders ofthis Court Interpreting Section 215 ofthe Patriot Act, 2013 WL 5460064, at *7. 13

This Court should not duplicate the work of district courts, and it should not undertake to
adjudicate issues that Congress has assigned to those courts.
Movants complain about the standard ofreview applied in FOTA cases, but the standard
of review for judicial consideration of Executive Branch classification decisions results not from
the text ofFOIA, but from the Executive Branch's responsibility and competence for

13

Misc. No. 16-0 I, which movants ask this Court to consolidate here, is similar to a
FOIA case filed in April 20 I 6 by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. See Electronic Frontier
Found. v. Dep't of.Justice, No. 4:16-cv-2041-HSG (N.D. Cal.). Over the subsequent two years,
the parties negotiated a narrowed request (one that is somewhat narrower than movants' request
in Misc. No. 16-01) that the government processed, finding 80 responsive opinions and orders.
See Joint Status Report at 1, Electronic Frontier Found. v. Dep't ofJustice, No. 4: 16-cv-2041HSG (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2018), ECF No. 62. The case remains in litigation.
15

 safeguarding national security information. Sims, 471 U.S. at 179 ("The decisions of the
[Executive], who must of course be familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges are not, are
worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential
risks at stake."). It is the responsibility of the Executive Branch, "not that of the judiciary, to
weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether disclosure of information
may lead to an unacceptable risk" to national security. Id. at 180.
The government would characterize this standard, as the Supreme Court has, as one
involving "great deference" to Executive judgments, id. at 179, while amicus describes it as
"scrutinizing" the Executive' s determinations, Amicus App. C 76. The important point,
however, is that the appropriate standard (whether in a FOIA case or otherwise) should be
applied in the appropriate forum, the district court. See In re Motion for Release ofCourt

Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491 ("Under FISA and the applicable Security Procedures, there is
no role for this Court independently to review, and potentially override, Executive Branch
classification decisions.") (emphasis added).

JV.

Movants' Legat Claims Lack Merit
In any event, movants ' First Amendment claim is meritless for reasons repeatedly

explained by this Court. See In re Opinions & Orders of this Courl Addressing Bulk Co/lee/ion

of Dala under /he Foreign lnlefligence Surveillance Act, Misc. No. 13-08, 2017 WL 427591 , at

* 17-21 (FISA Ct. Jan. 25, 2017), vacated on 01her grounds, 2017 WL 5983865 (FISA Ct. Nov.
9, 2017) (en bane), aff'd, 2018 WL 2709456 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018); ln re Proceedings

Required by§ 702(i) of the F!SA Amendmenls Act o/2008, 2008 WL 9487946, at •3-4;
Memorandum Opinion, Jn re Motion for Releare ofCourt Records, Misc. No. 07-01, at 6-9
(FISA Ct. Feb. 8, 2008); In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 491-97.
As is not disputed, to succeed on their First Amendment claim, movants would need to meet both
16

 the experience and logic tests set forth in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1
( 1986). This Court has correctly and consistently found that neither test is met. The Court of
Review's opinion in this case further reinforces both conclusions.
The Court of Review recognized that "the work of the FISC is different from that of other
courts in important ways that bear on the F irst Amendment analysis." In re Certification of
Questions ofLaw to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, FISCR No. 18-0 I,
2018 WL 2709456, at • 1 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018). The nature of this "unique court['s]"
work, " unlike the work of more conventional courts, requires that it be conducted in secret." Id.
And "the orders of [the FISC], including orders that entail legal analysis, often contain highly
sensitive information, the release of which cou ld be damaging to national security." id (citing Jn
re Motion for Release ofCourt Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487-90). In addition to "the highly
sensitive nature of the work, the FISC is not well equipped to make the sometimes difficult
determinations as to whether portions of its orders may be released without posing a risk to
national security or comprom ising ongoing investigations." Id.; accord In re Motion for Release
ofCourt Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 494-97. The Court of Review's analysis thus confirms
what has long been plain-that there is no tradition of public access to this Court's proceedings,
and it would not be logical for there to be such access. There are thus two independent reasons
that movants' First Amendment claim lacks merit.
Movants' Rule 62(a) claim is similarly without merit. That provision provides no rights
to movants because they are neither an authoring judge of this Court nor a party to any
proceeding in which there is a (partially or entirely) classified opinion of this Court. See FISC
Rule of Procedure 62(a). Moreover, publication pursuant to Rule 62(a) is discretionary, and it
wou ld not be an appropriate use of discretion to entertain movants' records request for classified

17

 infonnation both because of"the serious negative consequences that might ensue" from such
review, and because of the alternative remedy "available to [movants] in a district court through
a FOIA request to the Executive Branch." Jn re Molionfor Release ofCourt Records, 526 F.
Supp. 2d at 497.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this case should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN C. DEMERS
Assistant Attorney General
for National Security
J. BRADFORD WIEGMANN
STUART J. EVANS
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General
Isl Jeffrey M Smilh

JEFFREY M. SMITH
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Room 6500
Washington, DC 20530
Telephone: (202) 532-0220
Jeffrey.Smith5@usdoj.gov

18

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was served by the Government via
Federal Express on this 11th day of July 2018, addressed to counsel of record below, and that, on
the same day the foregoing was electronically mailed to ptoomey@aclu.org,
bkaufinan@aclu.org, and lkdonohue@georgetown.edu:
Professor Laura K. Donohue
Georgetown University Law Center
McDonough 504
600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.
Washingt.on, DC 20001

Patrick Toomey
ACLU Foundation
125 Broad St., 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Arthur B. Spitzer
ACLU Foundation of D.C.
915 15th Street, N.W.
Second Floor
Washington, DC 20005

Designated Amicus Curiae

David A. Schulz
Media Freedom & Information Access Clinic
Yale Law School
P.O. Box 2082 15
New Haven, CT 06520
Counsel for Movants

Isl Jeffrey M. Smith

19