All information is considered unclassi?ed except where otherwise grg?ggm; shown- 7 UNITED STATES C?lml . - Classify By: IZ3I98T32 . . GET Reason: (C) A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COW __Tw Li 131.1 Derived From: FBI NSICG, dated 10.2016 i; Hg?: b3-1 1 . . - 4 ELEM Ur LQUM . ec aSSIfy n. . WASHINGTON, DC. WM (3) IN RE CARTER W. PAGE, A US. Docket Number: . - b1-1 . - - 'b7A-1 (U) VERIFIED APPLICATION (3) The United States of America hereby applies to this Court for authority to conduct_ as described herein, pursuant . b1-1 to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, Title 50, United b3-1 . b7A-1 states Code (pm or the Act(U) Identity of Federal Of?cer Making Application This-application is made by_ a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) whose of?cial duties Headquarters include bl'l b3-1 supervision of the investigation of the above-captioned target based upon BEA: . . - b7C-1 information of?crally furnished to? b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 TOW Classified by: b11 Derived from: 7 I 133?1 Declassify on: I - a I - IVA-1 OI Tracking No; 143045 - 1 mom I 2. (3) Identity of the Target The target of this application is Carter W. b1?1 b3-1 b7A?l b7E?l, 2, 3, 6 Page, a US. person, and an agent of a foreign power, described in detail below. The status of the target was determined in or about October 2016 from information provided by the us. Department of State. 3. gs) Statement of Facts The United States relies upon the following facts 1 - 1 and circumstances in support of this application. b3-1 b7A-1 b7E?l, 2, 3, 6 . a. The target of this application is an agent of a foreign power. 15) The following describes the foreign power and sets forth in detail a description of the target and the target's activities for or on behalf of this foreign power. (U) 125) The Government of the Russian Federation is a foreign power as de?ned by 50 U.S.C. 1801(a)(1). (U) 7 (X) The Government of the Russian Federation (Russia) is an internationally recognized foreign government and, as of the execution of this application, is listed in the Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, and in Permanent Missions to the United Nations published by the United Nations, and its establishments in the United States are components thereof. -2- - 2 419W 15) Clandestine Intelligence Activities Of The Russian Federation (59? - 3 bl-l b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1,2 bl-l b3-1 b7A-1 b7E? 1, 2 bl-l b3?1 b7A:1 b7E-l,2 I . "llE (Una) Carter W- Pag? b3 1 knowingly engage in . b7E-l,2 clandestine intelligence activities (other than intelligence gathering activities) for or On behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, or knowingly conspires with other persons to engage in? such activities and, therefore, is an agent of a foreign power as defined by 50 U.S.C. 1801(b)(2)(E). mm This application targets Carter Page. The FBI believes Page has been the subject of targeted recruitment by the Russian Government- bI-l b3~1 undermine and in?uence the outcome of the 2016 US. Presidential election in 3:1 . b7C}2 violation of US. criminal law. Page is a former foreign policy advisor to a 13713-1, 2, 3, 6 Candidate for US. President (Candidate res?seam - 4 bl-l b3-1 b7Eil,2 I. (U) RIS Efforts to Influence US. Presidential Elections. During a recent interview with an identi?ed news organization, the Director of National lntelligence' (DNI) stated, "Russia has tried to in??en'ceiUS. elections since the 19605 during the Cold War? and ?there?s a tradition in Russia of interfering With elections, their own and others." The DNI commented that this in?uence included providing money to particular candidatespor providing disinformation. The DNI added that. ?it shouldn?t come as a-big shock to people, I think it?s more dramatic maybe because they have the cyber tools that they can bring to bearinthe same effort-"? b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E?1, 2 - 5 bl-l b3-l ?b7A-l b7E- 1,2 up or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released a trove of e-mails from the Democratic National Committee . - b1-1 133?1 - b7A-1 - There has been speculation in US. media that the Russian Government was b7E' 1? 2? 3 behind the hack. Russia has publicly denied any involvement in the hack. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in or about September 2016 that Russia was not responsible for the hack, but said that the release of the DNC documents was a net positive: {The important thing is the, content that was. given to the public. Despite Russia'sdemal? 1.1-1 . b3-1 b7A-1 . b7E-1, 2, 3 1 According to information on its website, WikiLeaks is a multi- national media organization and associated library. WikiLeaks specializes in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted of?cial materials involving war, spying, and corruption. According to open source - bl-l information, in or about July 2016, WikiLeaks released thousands of e-mails it says are from the accounts of DNC of?cials. E73134 m- 1, 2 -6- - 6 In addmon, according to 2:11 . b7A-1 an October 7, 2016 Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and the b7E- 1, 2, 3 O??ice of the Director of National intelligence on Election Security (Election Security Joint Statement), the USIC is con?dent that the Russian deernment directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US. persons and institutions, including from US. political organizations. The Election Security Joint Statement states that the recent disclosures of e?mails on, among others, sites like WildLeaks are consistent with the - methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. ACCording to the Election Security Joint Statement, these thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US. election process; activity that is not new to Moscow the Russians haVe used similar tactics and techniques across Europe and Eurasia, for example, to I in?uence public opinion there. The Election Security Joint Statement states that, based on the scepe and sensitivity of these efforts, only Russia?s senior-most officials could have authorized these activi?es. (8W) Based on'the Russian Government?s historical efforts to in?uence -8- elections}. and the informatiOn discussed herein regarding Russia?s coordination with Carter Page b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2 - 7 _e undermine and improperly iuegeuy in?uence the 2016 US. Presidential election. (KIM) - ?As stated in the legislative history of FISA: Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation?s security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or in?uencing of public of?cials to act in favor or the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false ormisleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens. H.R. Rep. No. 95?1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978). II. The Russian Government?s Attem ts to In?uence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. W) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos2 and Carter Page (the 1 target of this application) were publicly identi?ed by Candidate #1 as part of his/her policy - . bl-l 'b3-1 b7A-1 MEL 2 - 8 I bl-l b3-1 b7E-l, 2 b7A-l b7E-l, 2 bI-l b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2 _the FBI believes that-the Russian Government's efforts are being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with Candidate 1 #l?scampaign_? bu b? . b7A-1 b7D-1 b7A-1 (U) w? - 9 b3-l b7A~1 b7D-1 b7E- 1, 2 As discussed below, Page has established relationships with Russian Government of?cials, including Russian intelligence of?cers,? Carter Page. (U) A. (m Page?s Connections to Russia and the R18. W) Page, a US. citizen, is, the founder and managing partner of Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets. EVA-1 7E- l, 2 - .-10- - 10 b7? b7E-1,2 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 (U) (W) 1 - b7A-1 -from approximately 2004 2007, Page lived in Russi_ b7E-1, 2 During business dealings suprem? b1-1 b3-1 b7Ar1 b7E-1,2 '11? 11 mam (WK) According to information prOVided by Page during - Egg-11 2 age -12- - 12. b6-2 . b7Ab7C-2 W) According to Information prov1ded by Page dunng - mterv1ew b7E-1, 2 with the FBI, bl-l b3-l b6-2 b7A-l b7C-2 b7E?1, 2, 6 (U) mm or about lanuary 2015, Podobnyy, along with Evgeny Buryakov and lgor Sporyshev, were charged by a sealed complaint in the US. District Court I for the Southern District of New York for violationsof 18 U.S.C. 371 and 951 (conspiring to act, and acting as, an unregistered agent of a foreign government). According to the complaint, Buryakov worked in the United'States as an agent of the SVR. Speci?cally, Buryakov operated under non?of?cial cover, posing as an employee in the Manhattan of?ce of a Russian bank. Buryakov worked with two other SVR agents, Podobnyy and Sporyshev, to gather intelligence on behalf of . ?13" 13 Russia!? The complaint states that the intelligence gathering-efforts of Podobnyy and Sporyshev included, among other things, attempting to recruit New York City residents as intelligence sources for Russia. (W) bl?l b3-1 b6-2 b7A-1 b7C-2 b7E-1, 2 (U) 6 Buryakov was arrested in or about January 2015. At the time of Buryakov?s arrest, Podobnyy and Sporyshev no longer lived in the United States and were not arrested. In or about March 2016, Buryakov pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an agent of Russia, without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. In or about May 2016, Buryakov Was sentenced to 30 months in 13118011. 7 ?14- . - 14 b1?1 . b3-1 bs-z . b7A-1 . a b7E-l, 2 (U) B. (W Page?s Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 US. Presidential Election In?uence Activities. According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School? In bl-l . b3-1 addition to giving this address, the FBI has learned that Page met with at least two b7 A-l I b7D-1 Russian of?cials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI 13713- 1, 2 con?dential human source (Source reported that Page had a . b3-1 . b7? - (KANE) - b7E- 1, 2, 4 sourcemq and has been an FBI source since b3-1 - Source #l?s reporting has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings b7A-1 and the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable. Source #1 has been compensated b7Eunaware of any derogatory information pertaining to Source (W Source who now owns a foreign business/?nancial intelligence ?rm, was approached by an identi?ed US. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a '15- . - 15 U.S.-based law firm had hired the identi?ed US. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1?s ties to Russia (the identi?ed U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified?US. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified US. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation. behind the research into Candidate #l?s ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identi?ed US. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #l's campaign. (U) Source #1 tasked his sub?source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identi?ed US. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI. Notwithstanding Source #l's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #l?s ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #l's reporting herein to be credible. '15 - 16 b3-1 b7A-l b7D?l b7E-l,2 bl?l b3-l b7A-l b7D-1 b7E- l, 2 bl-l b3-1 b7A-1 b7D?1 b7E- l, 2 7 WEN secret meeting with Igor Sechin, who is the President of Rosneft [a Russian energy company] and a close associate to Russian President Putin.10 b1-1 - - b3-1 reported that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy b7A?1 b7D cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western b7E- 1, 2 actions against Russia. .b7A-1 b7D-1 b7E?l, 2 b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7D-l b7Eabout April 2014, the US. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identi?ed as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has ?shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin - a key component to his current standing.? '17" 17 mm - according to Source bl ?l b? -Divyelo-t .N .7mna T 6 of this target. I (X) b1-1 b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-l, 2, 3, 6 -66- b3-1 b7A-1 . b7E-1,2, 3,6 I b3-1 b7A-1 b7E-1, 2, 3, 6 b1-1 9. (15) Duration of the Authorities Re uested (See also,? b3-1 7 b7A-1 The authorities requested should not automatically terminate when foreign b731, 2, 3, 6 intelligence information has ?rst been obtained. Additional information of the same type will be obtained on a continuous basis throughout the entire period requested. The activities which the United States must identify and monitor are incremental and continuous, and communications relating to such activities are often disguised to appear innocuous. The type of foreign intelligence information being sought and the fact that the activities of this target are ongoing preclude the conclusionothat, at a given time, all such information has been obtained and collection can be ended. Accordingly, the United States requests the authorities specified herein for a period of ninety (90) days. ?67- NATMBL Taxma? H13 73 Jinn? Taxma? TE T