U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535 June 27, 2018 MR. CHARLIE SAVAGE NEW YORK TIMES C/O NEW YORK TIMES WASHINGTON BUREAU 1627 1 SOUTH STREET NORTHWEST 7TH FLOOR WASHINGTON, DC 20006 FOIPA Request No.: 1363761-000 Subject: Shooting Incident Reports (SIRT) Summaries ET. AL (2012 – Present) Dear Mr. Savage: The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. The checked exemptions boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions. Section 552 Section 552a (b)(1) (b)(7)(A) (d)(5) (b)(2) (b)(7)(B) (j)(2) (b)(3) (b)(7)(C) (k)(1) (b)(7)(D) (k)(2) (b)(7)(E) (k)(3) (b)(7)(F) (k)(4) (b)(4) (b)(8) (k)(5) (b)(5) (b)(9) (k)(6) 18 U.S.C., Section 2518 (b)(6) (k)(7) 324 pages were reviewed and 324 pages are being released. Below you will also find additional informational paragraphs about your request. Where applicable, check boxes are used to provide you with more information about the processing of your request. Please read each item carefully. Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency [OGA]. This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you. We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed. In accordance with standard FBI practice and pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552/552a (b)(7)(E)/(j)(2)], this response neither confirms nor denies the existence of your subject's name on any watch lists. For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions. For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under “Contact Us.” The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following website: https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked “Freedom of Information Act Appeal.” Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI’s FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state “Dispute Resolution Services.” Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s), meaning the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown such additional references, if identified to the same subject of the main investigative file, usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). As such, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s) given our significant backlog. If you would like to receive any references to the subject(s) of your request, please submit a separate request for the reference material in writing. The references will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit. See additional information which follows. Sincerely, David M. Hardy Section Chief Record/Information Dissemination Section Records Management Division Enclosure(s) The enclosed documents represent the final release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIPA) request. It is unnecessary to adjudicate your request for a fee waiver since the release is being provided to you at no charge. EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552 (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order; (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual; (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding; (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals; (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods; (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056; (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records; (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence; (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service he release of which would compromise the testing or examination process; (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence. FBI/DOJ FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Albuquerque Field Office, 05/20/2016 Title: From: Date: 09/21/2016 INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C THOMAS VADIM DANIEL Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A7769021 (U) Albuquerque accidental discharge 05/20/2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U//~ The Delegated Shooting Incident Report, dated 06/13/2016, was reviewed by INSD Inspector Vadim D. Thomas and Assistant Inspector /Team Leader ... I____________. b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On May 20, 2016, at approximately s,oo a.m., Special Agent (SAlc=== !accidentally discharged a single round from her FBI i...._s_s_u_e_d__9_mm __G_l_o_c_k__1_7_. pis to 1, serial number I...______.I causing no injuries but leaving minor damage to her residence's storm door, an additional interior door, and passing through the double fence surrounding the property. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Albuquerque Field Office by Acting Chief Inspector Frank Vito on May 20, 2016. The SIRT investigation revealed the following: UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Albuquerque Field Office, 05/20/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7769021, 09/21/2016 (U/~ On the morning of May 20, 2016, in preparation for range qualification later in the day, SAi !cleaned and oiled her Glock 17 pistol and her Bureau-approved, personally-owned! lin the laundry room of her residence, I I in ..._ ___, At the conclusion of cleaning, the Glock 17 pistol was reloaded and secured in the holster with a full magazine and one round in the chamber. SAi !intentionally left herl pistol and related magazines empty. She holstered the .. planning to dry fire the weapon and practice ejecting the empty magazine. Once she felt comfortable operating t~ SAi.---~ holstered the emptyl land set it aside. SAC: lthen put the holstered Glock 17 on her belt and decided to practice drawing from the holster. Forgetting she had already loaded the Glock 17 and failing to double check that the pistol was safe and empty, SAi drew the Glock 17 (pointing the pistol towards the laundry room door) and pulled the trigger, which fired one round. _____________ I I_________.. b6 b7C I I (U/~ After the accidental discharge, SA ..l ____limmediately used the magazine release to drop the remaining magazine and ejected the remaining bullet from the chamber. SAi lensured the weapon was clear and safe and placed the weapon on the floor. Due to herl lbeing in the kitchen located near the laundry room w.._h_e_n_t_h_e_. ._a_c_c_i_d_e_n_t_a~l discharge occurred, SAi knew they were safe and not I harmed. Approximately ten minutes later, she attempted to trace the round which traveled through the laundry room door to ensure no one else was harmed. SAi lnoted the bullet exited a glass storm door, another metal door, and through a double fence located on her side yard in the direction of her neighbor's house across the street. SAi walked across the street and searched the neighbor's house and could not trace the exact trajectory of the round. Intending to ensure no one b6 b7C I was harmed, SA I I asked I.._.....,._...,...___. . ,. ________.I to place a telephone call to the neighbor's house, but no one answered the call. ____....lleft a message asking the neighbor to call back. I (U/~ SAi I contacted SAi the Albuquerqu~e_ _ ___, Field Office Primary Firearms Instructor (PFI). She spoke to PFII..__ _ _~ UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Albuquerque Field Office, 05/20/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7769021, 09/21/2016 and advised what had happened. PF~ !advised sAI lhe would make the appropriate notifications to the Albuquerque Field Office. SA ~ified her Supervisor, Acting Supervisory Special Agent!.___ ___. of the accidental discharge. b6 b7C L__________J (U/~ PFI ._I_ _ __.I responded on scene to take custody of SA._I_____. weapon as part of the AIS procedures. The weapon was secured and transported to the Albuquerque weapons vault and subsequently shipped to Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit, for Weapons Serviceability Inspection, which revealed the weapon was operating to factory specifications. (U/~ An Albuquerque Police Department Officer responded to SA I !residence, but SAi lcould not recall the name of the Officer. SAi !provided the details of the accidental discharge to the Officer. The Officer attempted to trace the bullet trajectory but was unable to identify where the round may have impacted across the street. The Officer did not document the response to the residence in a written report. Albuquerque SSAI I subsequently, confirmed contact was made with the APD, and no further investigative action was conducted. b6 b7C b6 b7C (U/~ At approximately 9:15 a.m., Albuquerque Evidence Response Team (ERT) personnel arrived at the residence. The ERT processed the scene and located the expended casing on the laundry room floor. The ERT documented the scene with sketches, photographs and measurements and performed a trajectory estimate for the expended round. The trajectory estimate indicated the round passed through SA~ exterior fence and into a neighbor's dirt driveway locate~ The ERT obtained consent to search ___, and used metal the driveway from the neighbor, ...._ detectors during the search for the spent round, however the round was not recovered. Albuquerque documented SAi laccount of the accidental discharge in a Signed Sworn Statement, completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed SAi !firearms qualification and training records were current. _______ UNCLASSIFIED~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Albuquerque Field Office, 05/20/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7769021, 09/21/2016 SIRG Observations On 08/25/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Because the shooting was determined to be a non-operational accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational panning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. !_________. .I (U/ ~ Observation 1: SA .. Albuquerque Field Office, had an accidental discharge while conducting dry-firing training in her residence. (U/~ b6 b7C Analysis 1: The Firearms Policy Guide (FPG), dated 01/08/2015, subsection 4.1.1, stated in relevant part, "When first handling a firearm for nonoperational purposes, a safety check must be conducted. A safety check is defined as positive confirmation that a firearm is empty." (U//~ I sAI Idid not conduct a safety check or properly clear her weapon before conducting training, as mandated by FBI Policy. SA lhad an accidental discharge while conducting dry-firing training at her residence. As was her practice, SAi !occasionally conducted dry-firing training in her residence to improve her familiarity and proficiency with her pistols. In her Signed Sworn Statement, SA._I___~ stated, "Recalling I had difficulties drawing the Glock 17 from this holster in February, I decided to practice drawing from the holster. Forgetting I had already loaded it and to double check that it was empty, I drew the Glock 17 (pointing the pistol towards the laundry UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Albuquerque Field Office, 05/20/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7769021, 09/21/2016 b6 b7C room door) and pulled the trigger which fired one round." SA._I_____. failure to clear her weapon created an unnecessary risk, and resulted in an avoidable accidental discharge. (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Albuquerque will ensure attends remedial firearms training. 3. (U/~ b6 b7C SAi.______. Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if The SIRG recommended the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. deemed necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Eric D. Welling, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Section Chief (SC) M.A. Myers, Instruction Section, Training Division (TD); SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) ________.I Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; ssAI.______________. Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Charles McGoniqal, CD-2 Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ucl Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; Senior Trial Attorney Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; ucl.________. SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group .__(_C_I_R_G_)_;__.SSAI I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory b6 b7C I Division. (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Kathryn Peterson and Regina Thompson, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leadersl I IOI, INSD; Management and Program Analysts! I oI, INSD~;~s-s-A~l~~~~~~---..1-s_o_u_,~c-I_R_G_;~s-sA-r-l~~~~---'~---,I ..._ ___._ ....--------'...._ ....,.. __, .... ___ I __ ____ _________.....I __________ TTU, TD; SSAI TTU, TD; and ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ Inspector General. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Albuquerque Field Office, 05/20/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7769021, 09/21/2016 Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Albuquerque, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instruction 1 is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Albuquerque, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instruction 1. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit, INSD. I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: CC: (U/ ~ Atlanta Shooting Incident Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 David From: J_ Date: 04/21/2017 Levalley INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C Lawrence E. Koleff TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: ~I~~~~~~~~~~--' Case ID #: 297L-HQ-A2107404 (U) Atlanta Shooting Incident: Animal Involved Shooting 11/28/2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~The Shooting Incident Report, dated 11 /28/2016, was prepared by Atlanta Field Office Inspector-in-Place (IIP) ASAC Clyde E. Wallace and Assistant Inspector-In-Place (AIIP) in coordination with INSD Chief Inspector Lawrence E _ Koleff and Assistant Inspector/Team Leader (TL) I I I b6 b7C I Details: (U/~ On 03/22/2017, the SIRG reviewed a shooting incident involving two members of the Atlanta (AT) FBI SWAT team which occurred on 11/28/2016 !Georgia. The shooting incident review was delegated to the AT Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 11/28/2016. inl The delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation revealed the following: UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Atlanta Shooting Incident - Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2107404, 04/21/2017 (U/~ On 11/29/2016 at approximately 6:12 a.m. EST, members of the FBI AT SWATI jwere involved in a shooting incident with two dogs during an arrest of and a search of his residence located at L----------..--------i was a subject of a DEA b6 b7C b7E AT SWAT was requested to provide assistance in arrest and search operations at multiple locations, including thel lsite. I (U/~ On 11/28/2016, an FBI Operations Plan was completed to direct and guide the actions of AT SWAT teams in support of DEA investigation! land AT investigation A briefing was conducted by a DEA Agent who provided details on the background of the investigation, the subjects, and any threats posed to law enforcement. It was also noted the subject at the residence in ._I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.I had weapons and two Doberman Pinschers at his residence. Following the DEA brief, the FBI Operations Plan was briefed by SWAT Team Leaderl land included the Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy. AT SWAT operators then met with their SWAT detachments for individual team briefs for the two locations. I b6 b7A b7C b7E (U/~ Upon arrival at the target location, at 6:10 a. m., on the morning of 11/29/2016, the AT SWAT team took positions at the front door of the residence and at the gated entrance to the backyard. It was dark and raining outside and the only lighting in the backyard was provided by Agents' mounted flash lights. I and SA I.__________. were assigned to the rear perimeter team and were positioned at the gate. The Agents were advised during the operational briefing, provided by the DEA on 11/28/2016, the subject had two Doberman Pinschers in his backyard. SAi (U/~ At the commencement of the operation at 6:15 a. m., the dogs were heard barking as the Agents approached the UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Atlanta Shooting Incident - Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2107404, 04/21/2017 gate. The rear perimeter teaml Ito distract and scare the dogs away from the SWAT operators. SAi land SAi I breached the gate of a six foot privacy fence which shielded the team's view and access to the rear door. SAi and SA I I entered the back yard with the other two .___ _.... perimeter team members, SAi land SAi I I following behind. ....___ _ _____, b6 b7C b7E (U/~ As sAI lcovered the back door of the house, one of the dogs (light colored) charged toward the house, turned and lunged at sAI las if to bite him. SA .... l _ _....ljumped back and fired one round into the dog with his M-4 rifle. The dog ran away towards the rear of the yard crying and yelping. The other dog (dark colored) then charged aggressively at the operators and sAI lfired three rounds into the second dog with his M-4 rifle as he was covering the rear perimeter. The dog ran away yelping into the yard. As SAi lthen turn~e_d_ ___, around, the light colored dog charged at him again and SA~I_ ___. fired another round at the dog. Both dogs were yelping badly due to their injuries. sAI lcontinued to cover the rear perimeter until the house was cleared . b6 b7C ....-~~-(U/~ Shortly afterwards, SWAT Assault TLI Igave the "all clear" command and advised the su._b_J-._e_c_t__.was ...._i_n~c-u~stody. At this time, TLI lstated the dogs were suffering and needed to be put down. SAi I advised the dogs were still able to bite and he didn't want to get close to them. Subsequently, SAsl landl lshot the dogs to end their suffering. In his Signed Sworn Statement (SSS), SAi I stated "fearing the Doberman was a continued threat and to put the dog out of misery, I fired one round into the light colored dog." sAI I stated in his SSS, "Realizing that the dog I shot was still able to bite and to end dog's pain and suffering, I fired one round into the dog." UNCLASSIFIED~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Atlanta Shooting Incident - Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2107404, 04/21/2017 SAsl (U/~ There were two SWAT operators, and in close proximity to the shooting inci~.d~e-n-t-.~-T~he SSSs of SA and and interviews of the additional two SWAT operators were consistent with one another. No other law enforcement officers fired their weapons and there were no injuries, with the exception of the loss of life of the two dogs. The shooting scene was processed for evidence by AT ERT. I I I I sAI (U/~ Atlanta completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed !firearms qualification and training records were current. Atlanta CDC !confirmed 1ast attended FBI Deadly Force Policy Training on 03/22/2016 . SAi I land SAi SAi I .------.(U/ ~ On 12/13/2016, PFI submitted SA .._~~~I and weapons and magazines to the Training Division, DSU, for weapon serviceability inspections. On 12/19 /2016, the DSU subsequently inspected and tested the firearms, and concluded the firearms functioned as designed. SAi I b6 b7C I land sAI I b6 b7C b6 b7C SIRG Observations On 03/22/2017, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. ~ SAsl land The SIRG unanimously determined L_________}cted within the FBI's Deadly Force Policy when they discharged their weapons at the two charging and aggressive dogs. The SIRG concluded the Agents perceived the dogs to be an imminent threat to themselves and other Agents. With respect to the shots fired to euthanize the dogs, the SIRG assessed the shots were fired under reasonable standards, but noted FBI policy directives and guides do not sufficiently cover UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Atlanta Shooting Incident - Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2107404, 04/21/2017 procedures and processes for animal shootings. This was addressed in an INSD recommendation to the Training Division. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions, if any, concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. SAi _ _ _...,(U/~ Observation l: Atlanta SWAT Operator was unaware of the total number of rounds loaded i...._n_h_i_·s___. ___...I b6 b7C weapon and extra magazines. (U/~Analysis 1: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG, section 4.1.l stated, "All SAs are responsible for knowing the loaded condition (total number of rounds) of their pistols and/or shoulder weapons and must be prepared to report that number in connection with any postincident debriefingsr reviewsr or investigations." I SAi (U/~ The SSS of revealed he was unaware of the total number of rounds loaded in his weapon and magazine. advised on 11/29/2016, he grabbed a loaded duty magazine from his bag and placed it in his pocket and grabbed another loaded magazine lying next to his training bag. He was not sure of the total number of rounds in the magazines. SAi I (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Atlanta, will ensure Agents have knowledge of the total number of rounds contained in their weapon(s) and magazine(s) in accordance with the Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG. (U/~ Observation 2: SWAT operators removed expended flash bangs from the animal shooting scene before ERT arrived and processed the scene. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Atlanta Shooting Incident - Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2107404, 04/21/2017 (U/~ Analysis 2: The Field Evidence Management Policy Guide, 0780PG, Section 2.3 states "All FBI personnel who handle physical evidencer including SAsr professional staffr and others working on behalf and under the direction of the FBir in addition to the specific responsibilities of their respective positionsr must: • Handle and document evidence in accordance with this PG and other applicable FEU procedures. • Ensure that all evidence is handledr storedr reviewedr and marked in accordance with the relevant FBI dissemination marking policyr including requirements related to federal grand jury (FGJ) material and federal taxpayer information (FTI) . • Maintain the chain of custody of all evidence in accordance with this PG and other applicable FEU policies and procedures." (U/~ The FBI Policy Directive on Shooting Incident Response Procedures, 0782D, 11.4 states "In the event of an AISr the involved FBI employee (or designee) should: Secure and leave the [accidental discharge] scene undisturbedr to the extent practicabler until the arrival of ERT and supervisory personnel." The Policy Directive defines Agent-Involved Shootings (AIS) incidents to include animal shootings. With respect to AISs, the INSD Shooting Incident Guide also states "Once any remaining threats have been addressedr establish a perimeter to protect the incident scene(s) and evidence. To the extent possibler the incident scene shall be preserved in its entirety." UNCLASSIFIED/~§:::"" 6 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Atlanta Shooting Incident - Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2107404, 04/21/2017 (U/~ sAI lstated the SWAT perimeter team cleaned up the expended flash bangs that were laying in the back yard prior to the scene being processed. The SIRG concluded this was a violation of the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide, 0780PG, Section 2.3. I I (U/~ Instruction 2: SAC, Atlanta will ensure SWAT personnel preserve the shooting incident scene until ERT arrives and processes the scene, in accordance with the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide. (U/~ Observation 3: The FBI Training Division's Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide lacks procedures and guidance addressing animal shootings. (U/~ Analysis 3: The FBI Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741PG establishes policy governing firearms carried by FBI Special Agents, FBI police officers, and any other approved FBI employee. The Policy Directive and Guide informs armed FBI employees of required procedures and responsibilities pertaining to the authorization to carry firearms, the utilization of firearms, firearms training and qualification requirements, issued firearms, personally owned weapons (POW), the maintenance and repair of firearms, ammunition, holsters and accessory equipment, demonstrations and tours, and firearms training safety. The Policy Directive and Guide does not provide procedures and processes addressing animal shootings. In addition, a guide for encounters with dogs that stipulates an escalating scale of options in which lethal force is considered a last resort should be established. (U/~ Recommendation 3: AD, Training Division, in coordination with INSD, should consider adding procedures and processes for animal shootings to the scope of the FBI Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741PG. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Atlanta Shooting Incident - Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2107404, 04/21/2017 Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed necessary. (U/~ The SIRG did not recommend the captioned shooting incident for referral to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), INSD. (U/~ DAD Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: A/Chief Inspector Lawrence E. Koleff, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; ssAI r I Defensive Systems Unit, Training Di vision_(_T_D_)_;_S_S_A.... I I Squad CR-4, Washington Field Office; SC MaryJo Thomas, CPC Counterproliferation Center, Counterintelligence Division; ucl !Investigative Law Unit (ILU), OGC; Senior Trial Attorneyl..._~~~~~~~~-1 Organized Crime and Gang Section, DOJ; Special Legal Counsel I lcivil Rights Division, DOJ; ucl I !Firearms Training Unit, TD; ssAI National Operations and Training Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); ssAI !Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. b6 b7C l I (U/~ The following non-voting personnel were also in attendance: Inspectors Eric D. Welling, Scott B. Cheney, Cindy L. Hall, OI, INSD; SC Voviette D. Morgan, Internal Investigations Section, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders I IOI, I INSD; MAPAsl I ...... loI, INSD; ssAI I TTU, ..._T_D_;~a-n-d~S~SA-_...-1~~~~~~~~~----------__,I ILU, OGC-.~~~~~~___, ---------------------. ---------------- Procedures for Responding to Observations UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Atlanta Shooting Incident - Animal Involved Shooting Atlanta Field Office, 11/28/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2107404, 04/21/2017 (U~ SAC, Atlanta and AD, TD are required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the Field Office/Division to resolve the Instructions /Recommendation. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions and Recommendation are addressed by the Field Office/Division. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the responses to determine if the Instructions/Recommendation have been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the Field Office/Division has under consideration to implement . Follow-up EC responses must be directed to A/UC ._____________.I Inspection Management Unit, INSD. •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Baltimore Animal Shooting Incident 12/26/2014 Title: Date: 04/09/2015 CC: b6 b7C NK-SAC (SAC) From: INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: David Paul Gelios TWERSKY RONALD A/AD TWERSKY RONALD b6 b7C ._I_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ , 297L-HQ-A5884319 (U) Baltimore Animal Shooting DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS This document contains information that is restricted to case participants. Synopsis: (U~Following the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) meeting held on 03/17/2015, this communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the SIRG with respect to the captioned shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ Reference Shooting Incident Report (FD-1085) submitted electronically on 01/02/2015 by ssAI I Baltimore Field Office. .______.I b6 b7C Details: (U/~On 12/26/2014, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Ifrom SAi the Newark Field Office was involved in a.______._. .__s_h_o_o_t_i_·n_g_i_n.....cident Maryland. SA was TDY inl I UNCLASSIFIED/~ I I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Baltimore Animal Shooting Incident 12/26/2014 Re: 297L-HQ-A5884319, 04/09/2015 to Quantico as a Firearms Instructor and visiting family members in Maryland during the federal holiday on Friday, 12/26/2014. Soon after arriving at his brother's residence, offered to walkl !Miniature Schnauzer dog. During the course of the walk, a Great Dane dog broke loose from its handler, lunged at and attacked the Miniatur_e~~~~~ Schnauzer. Fearing for his safety during the attack, SA~I~~~~~ discharged two 9 mm rounds from his personally owned weapon (POW) Glock 26 into a Great Dane dog. sAI sAI (U/~ sAI I I b6 b7C I immediately moved to a position of safety, administered medical assistance to the Schnauzer, offered the dog handler medical assistance to the Great Dane, and called 911 to report the shooting. The Great Dane expired from blood loss shortly after the two shots. then contacted his chain of command in the Newark Field Office and in coordination with the Inspection Division, the shooting incident was delegated to the Baltimore Field Office on 12/26/2014. b6 b7C I SAi (U/~ Baltimore's delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) processed the scene of the shooting incident jointly with the Anne Arundel County Police Department. The weapon, magazine, ammunition, shell casings and one projectile were properly passed to Quantico for further analysis. remained on-site until released upon completion of the local investigation. SAi I (U/~ The Maryland State's Attorney's Office declined prosecution. The USAO advised no federal prosecutive opinion was necessary inasmuch as there was no applicable federal violation SIRG Observations: (U/~ On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Baltimore Animal Shooting Incident 12/26/2014 Re: 297L-HQ-A5884319, 04/09/2015 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously determined the application of deadly force by SA I Ion 12/26/2014, was in compliance with the Department of Justice's deadly force policy. b6 b7C 2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational standpoint. The SIRG made no observations concerning this shooting incident. 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed ne cessary. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken against SAi las a result of his involvement in this shooting incident. b6 b7C (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chief Civil Rights Di vision, Criminal Section, Department of Justice (DOJ); Criminal Section, DOJ; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA S uad L----r--------------..., CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); SSA ._________.I Firearms Training Unit, TD; UC I Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; ssAI !violent Crime and Gang Section; ssAI I Defensive Systems Unit(DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ssAI I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Assistant Special Agent In _______....I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Baltimore Animal Shooting Incident 12/26/2014 Re: 297L-HQ-A5884319, 04/09/2015 __c_h_a_r_g~e_.._l____________~loffice Of Inspector General; ucl ~~~~-I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Di-.v~i-s_i_o_n_;_ Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders! I _I I I IOI, INSD; uc,I .__M __a_n_a_g_e_m__e_n_t__P_r_o__g_r_a_m__A_n __a_lys ts (MAPAs) .._ I land __, ...,.......I I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; MAPAI I I Inspection Analysis Unit, and Special Assistant!-----~ i--~~~~---.---.1 OI, INSD . ________________ __________ i.--~~~-----. !...-~~.....--~-----, I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Accidental Shooting Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office Title: Date: 12/21/2016 b6 CC: b7C From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: Lawrence E. Koleff WELLING ERIC D TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C Drafted By: Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A2059295 (U) Baltimore Field Office Shooting Incident 07/18/2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Baltimore Shooting Incident Report, dated 08/04/2016, was prepared by the delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) _ The SIRT included Assist~a_n_t___________ Inspector-In-Place (AIIP) land ASAC 4 The Inspector's Report was prepared by INSD Inspector] land Assistant Inspector /Team Leader ri--------L-------.-_J f______--,.._ ___. I b6 b7C I Details: (U/~ On 12/08/2016, the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed an accidental discharge shooting incident involving Special Agent (SA) who accidently discharged one round from her FBI-issued Glock 22, serial number_l_ _ _ on 07/18/2016. The shooting I I _.I incident review was delegated to the Baltimore Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 07/18/2016. UNCLASSIFIED~ b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Shooting Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A2059295, 12/21/2016 The delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation revealed the following: (U/~ On 07/18/2016, at approximately 9:00 a.m., SA_I~___. participated in a firearms training session at the Charles V. Main Training Facility, located at 6424 Plant Road, Frederick, Maryland, which FBI Baltimore uses as its principle firearms range. The FBI also shares the range with other local agencies, to include the Frederick City Police Department (FCPD). As part of firearms training, SAi.__~~~ shot a skill drill and two pistol qualification courses (PQCs), in which she shot two passing scores. Thereafter, SA_l~~-lcleaned her weapon at the range's designated cleaning area; assembled her weapon; and then loaded her weapon with service ammunition at the designated loading area. sAc==Jhad difficulty in properly assembling her weapon, and she provided her weapon to Baltimore Principal Firearms Instructor (PFI) PFII !noticed the weapon's rod for the recoil spring assembly was sticking out from under the muzzle. PFI disassembled the weapon; put it back together; performed a function check; determined the weapon was performing b6 b7C I correctly; and then returned the weapon back to her. (U/~ At approximately 11:15 a.m., SA_l~~~lwalked to and entered her FBI vehicle, intending to leave the range. While seated alone in the driver's side seat, sAc==Jremoved her weapon, which was still holstered in her FBI issued paddle-style holster. Upon doing so, the weapon's magazine became unseated from the weapon. SAi attempted to seat the magazine back into the weapon with negative results, as the magazine would not seat properly. Believing a round had improperly fed into the chamber, SAi !placed the magazine on the passenger's seat, turned her body to face the passenger's seat, then attempted to clear the weapon. She pulled the weapon partially out of the holster, pulled the slide to the rear, but placed her right index finger on the trigger, causing the weapon to discharge one round through her front windshield. The discharged round created a hole in the lower, passenger's side portion of the window. The position of the weapon at the time of the discharge was pointed in a generally I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Shooting Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A2059295, 12/21/2016 horizontal position. unsuccessful. Subsequent attempts to locate the round were (U/..ZJreue:o::::- sAI ldid not attribute the accidental discharge to any malfunction of the weapon. She could not identify any specific factor which led to her inadvertently placing her finger on the trigger, causing the accidental discharge. b6 b7C (U/~ After the weapon fired, SA_l~~~llooked around the parking lot area and did not see anyone present. She placed her weapon on the passenger seat, then walked back to the ran e area and toldc==J ._~~~__.I SA dischar ...... e. r-~~~~ SA....... ~~~ b6 b7C of the accidental notified PFI who in turn notified ASAC who notified SAC Kevin L. Perkins. ....,.~~~...J -~~~~___, (U/~ FCPD Sergeant parked his vehicle diagonally across the parking and observed her walking to and sitting in her vehicle. Sergeant heard SAi.__~~~~ weapon discharge and observed a bullet hole and smoke emitting from her vehicle. Sergeant! lnever interacted with sAI I but was angered, due to his close proximity to SAi !vehicle at the time the accidental discharge occurred. (U/~ At approximately 12:30 p.m., ERT Leaderl land other ERT members responded to the range. ERT processed the scene and located the expended shell casing on the front passenger side seat. An extensive search for the discharged round was met with negative results. (U/~ Baltimore PFI_l~~~~-ltook possession of SA~I~~~--' weapon. A round count revealed 15 rounds of service ammunition remained in the weapon's magazine. SA_l~~-lwas issued another FBI issued Glock, Model 22. ~ PFII !collected and submitted into evidence SA l______________ Glock, Model 22 and her spare magazine. PFII l1ater UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Shooting Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A2059295, 12/21/2016 submitted these items to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection, which revealed all safeties were present and the weapon was in correct operating condition. There were no unusual abnormalities in the disseminated parts and there were no unauthorized modifications which contributed to the accidental discharge. The weapon was in good condition, and passed all safety and function checks. The FCPD documented the incident in a Case Summary Report and noted lhad "no deliberate intent to discharge her weapon." The FCPD attributed the AD to "operator error." sAI SAi (U/~ bG b7C I Baltimore documented account of the accidental discharge in a Signed Sworn Statement, which was consistent with witness interviews and ERT processing of the scene. Baltimore completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed SA~I~~~~ b6 b7C firearms qualification and training records were current as of 07/18/2016. SIRG Observations On 12/08/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: Because the shooting was determined to be an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ Proposed Observation 1: While attempting to clear her weapon, accidentally discharged one round from her FBI issued Glock 22 service pistol, causing damage to her FBI vehicle. SAi (U/~ I Analysis 1: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide (0741DPG) published on January 8, 2015, Section 4.3.1, Cardinal Safety Rules, stated in relevant part: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Shooting Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A2059295, 12/21/2016 "Keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to press it" (U/~ sAc==Jconcluded firearms training at the Charles V. Main Training Facility and entered her vehicle to depart the range. sAc=J inadvertently unseated her magazine when she removed her holstered weapon while seated in the driver's seat before departing. SA~I_ __. failed to seat the magazine back in the weapon. Believing a round had improperly fed into the chamber, sAc==Jplaced the magazine on the passenger's seat, turned her body to face the passenger's seat, then attempted to clear the weapon. She pulled the weapon partially out of the holster, pulled the slide to the rear, but placed her right index b6 b7C finger on the trigger, causing thl weapol to discharge one round through her front windshield. SA AD caused no injuries and resulted in damage to her vehicle. I (U/~ An operational test of SA !Glock 22 pistol was performed by DSU, which determined the firearm functioned properly. (U/~ Proposed Instruction 1: SAC, Baltimore will ensure SA .---~!attends remedial firearms training, with specific emphasis on the b6 b7C b6 b7C safe handling of firearms. 3. Provide recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed The SIRG recommended the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Ins ector Lawrence ,_,, Koleff, INSD, Office of Inspections (OI); SS OGC, ....,... FBI Washington Field Investigative Law Unit;....---..._ SSA Office, Squad CR-4; UC TD, Firearms Training Unit; UC ~I________.I CIRG, _S_W_A_T_O_p_e_r_a_t_i_·o_n_s_U_n_i_·t..... (SOU) ; UC TD, ________ I Defensive Systems Unit; Asel I !criminal Investigative UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Shooting Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A2059295, 12/21/2016 Division, Violent Crime & Gang Section; SSA TD, Tactical L-------~-----..., Training Unit; SC Stephen C, Laycock, CD, CD-1; Attorney .___ _ _ ____.lusDOJ, Civil Rights Division; Attorney _ _ _ _....._ _ _ ___, __________ USDOJ, Organized Crime & Gang Section; SSA ...._ b6 b7C __. Evidence Response Training Unit. (U~ attendance: The following non-voting members were also in Inspectors Regina E:. Thompson and Eric D. Welling, INSD, OI; Ass is tant Inspectors /Team Lea_d_e_r_s_.I.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,~ I INSD, IINsD, oI; MAPAs[L.r"-___,___,___,___,___,___,___,___,...,...___,___,___,___,___,___,___,___,~r Inspection Management Unit~..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I INSD, Investigative Analysis Unit; SC James 2. Langenberg, INSD, External Audit & Compliance Section; UC .. INSD, IIS; SSA 1-------------------.1 I CIRG, SOU; Attorney! United States .__D_e_p_a_r_t_m_e_n_t_o_f_J_u_s_t_i_·_c_e... (USDOJ), Office of Legal Policy (OLP);I.___ _ _ _~ .._____.I USDOJ, OLP . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Group Title: Date: 11/24/2014 CC: b6 b7C From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: Drafted DELACOURT PAUL D STROUD SHAWN W David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara b6 b7C By:~I~~~~~~~~~~__, Case ID#: 297I-HQ-A4717273 (U) BALTIMORE SHOOTING REVIEW 04-11-2014 =LAW ENFQRCi:BflNI SiHSI~IJ7F'= This information is the property of the FBI and may be distributed to state, tribal, or local government law enforcement officials with a need-to-know. Further distribution without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Agent-involved shooting incident following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014. Administrative Notes: (U/~ This communication summarizes the Inspection Division (INSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 05/15/2014, prepared by Inspector Paul D. Delacourt. A copy of the complete INSD Shooting Incident Report was uploaded to the captioned file. UNCLASSIFIED/~ UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 Details: (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an Agent-involved shooting incident that occurred on 04/11/2014, involving Special Agents (SAs) and Detective (Det.) Baltimore County Police Department (BCPD). Agents and Det. were supporting - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' inves tiga ti on ofr-1--------------,.--...J Pursuant to a Court-authorized Title-III wiretap, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)I al I b3 b6 b7A b7C b7E I Agents and Det.1 I ---------------------------' ....________. briefed the A/SSA, and SAC they intended to establish surveillance of Harrison, observe the narcotics purchase, and have uniformed BCPD officers conduct a traffic stop of Harrison or his supplier after they departed the area. U/ Dur in lanned surveillance A ents observed Harrison drove along an access road leading to .._R_e_i_s_t_e_r_s_t_o_w_n_R_o_a_d-.__A_g.....en ts and Det . l._______.I driving three separate vehicles, followed Harrison. At the Reisterstown Road stop light, Harrison was positioned in the right turn lane. Prior to the arrival of a marked unit, Agents decided to conduct a traffic stop and effect an arrest of Harrison. Agents and Det.1 !positioned their vehicles in the adjacent lane, along Harrison's driver's side, with Det.I !vehicle angled slightly in front of Harrison's vehicle. Agents and Det. approached Harrison's vehicle, identified themselves as police, issued verbal commands, and ordered Harrison to exit the vehicle. Harrison ignored commands and drove his SUV in reverse, striking a civilianl !positioned behind him. I b6 b7C b7E I (U/~ Harrison, still in reverse, maneuvered his SUV between the rear Agent's vehicle and the~ Fearing for the safety of civilians and fellow Agents, Age~shot the tire of Harrison's UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 vehicle and Agents ..l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...lfired their weapons at Harrison. Harrison's vehicle struck and came to rest against which was positioned two vehicles behind the;..1-----1.---t-h_e_r_i_g_h_t__. ali·n lane. I b3 b6 b7C I I Title-III intercept. I I (U/~ Harrison succumbed to his wounds at the scene. Emergency Medical Services responded immediately and pronounced Harrison dead within five minutes of the initial call of shots fired. No civilians or law enforcement personnel were injured. (U/~ rs_A __ s~l----,___________________~lfired their weapons. SA and Det. did not fire their weapons. BCPD identified and interviewed four civilian witnesses to the shooting incident. Baltimore Agents investigating the Assault on a Federal Officer case identified and interviewed others. One local surveillance camera captured a portion of the incident at a distance. The shooting scene was processed by FBI BA ERT, the Laboratory Division's Shooting Reconstruction Team, and BCPD. Signed Sworn Statements of the Agents and an interview of Det.1 !presented consistent recollections of the events. ----1 I I (U/~ Harrison was transported to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) for the State of Maryland and assigned case number 14-3355. On 04/12/2014 at 9:00 a.m., Assistant Medical Examiner MD, performed the autopsy of Harrison. The OCME opinion was as follows: ___________. .I "This 34 year old, African American male, JAMEEL KAREEN OFORUM HARRISON, died of MULTIPLE (6) GUNSHOT WOUNDS of the head (3), neck (3), and left shoulder (1). Two of the gunshot wounds of the head (A and B) injured the skull and brain. A bullet was recovered in association with each of these gunshot wounds. One of the gunshot wounds of the neck (D) injured the carotid arteries on either side of UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 the neck. This was a through-and-through gunshot wound with no bullet recovery. A bullet jacket was recovered in association with the other gunshot wound of the neck (E). A bullet jacket was recovered in association with the gunshot wound of the left shoulder (F). By report, the decedent was shot by law enforcement while he was in his car. The manner of death is HOMICIDE." (U/~ Toxicology results associated with the autopsy revealed high levels of Oxycodone as follows: 1) Blood Heart: Oxycodone 0.7 mg/L; 2) Blood Femoral: Oxycodone 0.5 mg/L; 3) Urine: Oxycodone Positive. (U/~ Laboratory examination of items recovered from the person of Jameel Harrison revealed the following: 1) 136.41 grams of a hard white substance was determined to be heroin; 2) 57.79 grams of a hard white substance was determined to be heroin. SIRG Observations (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. a. The SIRG voted unanimously the application of deadly force by discharging his firearm solely to disable a moving vehicle was out of compliance with the Department of Justice (DOJ) Deadly Force Policy. SAi lby b. The SIRG voted ten to one the application of deadly force by SAs ._I___________.Ion 04/11/2014, was in compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 a. The SIRG determined SAi !discharged his firearm solely to disable a moving vehicle, in violation of the DOJ Deadly Force policy. b6 b7C Therefore, the SIRG proposed an observation with recommendations for corrective actions. The SIRG determined SAs~l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.ltook appropriate actions to protect themselves and others from the imminent threat posed b. by Jameel Harrison. b6 b7C The SIRG noted, however, Agents improperly utilized civilian vehicles as a blocking mechanism during a high-risk traffic stop and proposed an observation with recommendations for corrective actions. ________.I SA ~I discharged his firearm solely to disable a moving vehicle, in violation of the DOJ Deadly (U/~ Observation 1: Force Policy. (U/~ Analysis 1: The DOJ Deadly Force Policy stated, "Law enforcement officers of the Department of Justice may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person. A. Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect. B. Firearms may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles. C. If feasible and to do so would not increase the danger to the officer or others, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the officer shall be given prior to the use of deadly force. D. Warning shots are not permitted. E. Officers will be trained in alternative methods and tactics for handling resisting subjects which must be used when the use of deadly force is not authorized by this policy." UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 (U/~ On 04/11/2014, SAi lwas involved in an AIS in the vicinity of 9750 Reisterstown Road, Owings Mills, Maryland. Following the incident, !provided a detailed account to SIRT members of the events leading up to the shooting. Within his account, advised the following: SAi SAi b6 b7C I "As Harrison's vehicle continued to accelerate backwards, my gun was pointed at Harrison through his driver-side window. His vehicle continued to apply force on the civilian vehicles behind him. In the split second I had available to me to assess the deadly threat to civilians and my colleagues, posed by Harrison, and my belief his vehicle, as operated by him, was a dangerous instrument which could imminently cause grave bodily harm, I fired two rounds into Harrison's driver-side front tire in an attempt to immobilize the vehicle and neutralize the threat. I was within one foot of the tire at the time I fired these two rounds." (U/~ Instruction la: (U/~ Instruction lb: (U/~ Observation 2: SAC, Baltimore Field Office, will ensure SAl._~~~lreceives remedial training regarding the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. .--_;_---=;,---~~~~~- SAC, Baltimore Field Office, will ensure all Baltimore Field Office personnel are appropriately trained regarding the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. Agents improperly utilized civilian vehicles as a blocking mechanism during a high-risk traffic stop. (U/~ Analysis 2a: On 04/11/2014, at approximately 4:40 p.m., Baltimore FBI Agents and a BCPD TFO initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle operated by Jameel Harrison, a subject of a suspected narcotics transaction. Harrison was operating a gray 2013 Infinity. The enforcement action occurred on an access road adjacent to a Wal-Mart parking lot in the area of 9750 Reisterstown Road, Owings Mills, Maryland. At the time of the initial enforcement action, Harrison's vehicle was stopped on the access road and behind civilian vehicles at a traffic light. A civilian vehicle was immediately behind Harrison's UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 vehicle. To effect the traffic stop, Detective ._I______.I positioned his unmarke~ lat the front driver side corner of Harrison's vehicle. positioned his unmarked! !immediately ad'acent to Harrison's driver's side, followed by !unmarked Once the law enforcement vehicles moved into position, SA activated his emergency lights and Agents and the TFO exited their vehicles and approached Harrison's vehicle. All law enforcement officials were wearing body armor, with four of the five officials displaying the word "POLICE" on the front and back panels of the armor. Law enforcement officials were positioned as follows: 1) SA lat the driver's side door, 2) Detective! lat the front .__d_r_i-.v-e~r's side corner, 3) SAi lat the front driver's side SAi I SAi lin corner, 4) SAi front of the vehicle, 5) the passenger side of the vehicle. SAi b6 b7C Iat (U/~ Law enforcement officials identified themselves as "Police" and gave Harrison instructions to raise his hands. Harrison initially complied and raised his hands in the air. Moments later, however, Harrison began to slowly look around then lowered his hands from sight against lawful commands to keep his hands in the air. Harrison's vehicle then began moving in reverse in an apparent attempt to flee. Harrison's vehicle struck the civilian car behind him. Fearing for the life and safety of civilians in the area, as well as enforcement officers attempting to apprehend Harrison, SAi lfired two rounds from his handgun into the driver's side front tire in an attempt to immobilize the vehicle. After colliding with the first vehicle, Harrison continued to back his vehicle toward other civilian vehicles and to disregard official commands to "Stop." SADand SA ._______.lthen fired their handguns multiple times at Harrison, striking Harrison six times in the head, neck, and left shoulder. Both Agents stated they feared for the life and safety of innocent civilians in the area, as well law enforcement officers on foot in the area, causing them to utilize deadly force. Harrison's vehicle finally stopped after colliding with another vehicle. (U/~ The Tactical Training Unit (TTU) at the FBI Academy in UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 Quantico, Virginia conducts training sessions for all New Agent Trainees (NATs) I I b7E In the scenario described herein, law enforcement personnel utilized civilian vehicles as a blocking mechanism to effect a high-risk traffic stop. This placed the occupants of the vehicles at risk of being introduced into the enforcement action, placing them in danger. Furthermore, the use of civilian vehicles as a blocking mechanism failed to ensure a proper blockade, which would have minimized dangers associated with a non-compliant subject. In consultation with TTU, INSD assessed (U~ Analysis 2b: NATs received minimal tactical training regarding the proper execution of high-risk vehicle stops. New Agents training consists of 20 weeks (approximately 100 days) of training, with nine days allocated to TTU. Of the time allotted to tactical training, NATs receive approximately two hours of instruction on compliant vehicle stops and vehicle blocking techniques. An additional five hours are spent utilizing vehicle stops in scenario-based training. (U/~ INSD has reviewed multiple Agent-involved shootings associated with vehicle stops. INSD review and Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) discussion evaluated the circumstances leading to, and tactical execution of, the individual vehicle stops. INSD has not reviewed TD curriculum. SIRG discussion advised and INSD recommends the Training Division (TD) review the current curriculum regarding high-risk vehicle stops and re-evaluate the sufficiency of the existing training curriculum to adequately prepare Agents for the heightened dangers associated with high-risk vehicle enforcement actions. (U/~ Analysis 2c: TTU advised the Law Enforcement Training for Safety and Survival (LETSS) course was previously used by TD to UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 address the continuing development of tactical skills in arrest scenarios for tenured Agents and Task Force Officers (TFOs) on operational squads, who were more likely to be involved in adversarial actions as a result of SSTF, VCTF, JTTF or other investigations. TTU advised LETSS was the only advanced FBI tactical training available to Agents and TFOs. TTU advised no current funding is allocated for LETSS in FY 2015. (U/~ Recommendation 2a: SAC, Baltimore Field Office, should ensure all Baltimore Field Office Agents are trained in the proper methods of conducting traffic stops. (U/~ Recommendation 2b: AD, TD should review and assess the sufficiency of existing New Agent training curriculum for high-risk vehicle stops. (U/~ AD, TD should assess the feasibility of funding FY 2015 Law Enforcement Training for Safety and Survival courses to facilitate the continuing development of tactical skills in arrest scenarios for Agents and TFOs. Recommendation 2c: 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary. a. The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken against a result of their involvement in the 04/11/2014 shooting incident. SAsl las b. The SIRG found the actions of SA_l~~__.lto be out of compliance with the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. Therefore, the SIRG determined actions warranted referral to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. SAi I (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 I Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chief I.______. Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ); Trial Attorney! criminal Division, USDOJ; SSA Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division (TD); SSA Firearms Training Unit, TD; special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; and SC Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith! SWAT Operations Unit, CIRG; r-_ _SSA _....__ _ _ _ _ _,___ _ _---1 Ballistics Research Facility, DSU; SSA Protective Operations Unit, Security Division; UC Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Kathryn Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders! I loI, INSD; Special Assistant I OI, INSD; ucl land Management Program Analysts I Inspection Management (MAPAs)I Unit (IMU), INSD; and MAPAI Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), INSD. I I ucl I uc_l__________I I I l I I Procedures for Responding to Observations (U~~ SAC, Baltimore, is responsible for ensuring the Inspection Instructions and Recommendations are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Observations are addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if Instructions and Recommendations have been resolved or UNCLASSIFIED/~ 10 I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Group Re: 297I-HQ-A4717273, 11/24/2014 require further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. (U/~ SAC, Baltimore, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve the Instructions and Recommendations. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e-mail the I____________. Sentinel link to MPA .. •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 11 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office, 04/07/2016 Title: From: Date: 05/26/2016 INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: FRANK S. VITO Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C Drafted By: Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A7400335 (U) Baltimore Shooting Incident Synopsis: (U/~This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shooting Incident Report, dated 04/25/2016, was prepared by INSD Inspector Frank S. Vito and Assistant Inspector /Team Leader I...____________.I b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On May 10,2016, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge shooting incident involving Special Agent (SA)I lwho accidentally discharged a round from his FBI SWAT-issued Glock Model 17, serial number on April 7, 2016, causing no injuries but leaving damage to the bed !bedroom. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Baltimore Field Office by the Chief Inspector on April 7, 2016. I I inl b6 b7C b7E The SIRT investigation revealed the following: (U/~ On t~h_e___m_o~rning of April ..___________.I SAi returned home I 7, 2016, after drivingl between approximately ...8_:_0_0____8_:_3_0_a_m..._ UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office, 04/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7400335, 05/26/2016 At the time, there was no one else in the residence. While preparing for work, he retrieved his SWAT-issued Glock Model 17 from his safe and holstered the weapon in an inside the waistband holster on his right hip, which was concealed under his shirt. The weapon was loaded with a full magazine of 19 rounds of 9mm ammunition and one round in the chamber. (U/~sAI lwas issued the weapon on February 1, 2016. In an effort to become more familiar with the weapon, he decided to practice drawing from concealment as he moved from room to room. It was not unusual for practice clearing rooms in his home, as he had done this as part of his training regimen previously. !advised he only practiced when the residence was empty. He did not make a conscious or deliberate decision to practice using a loaded weapon on this occasion, as he has used a loaded weapon when practicing in the past. SAi Ito b6 b7C SAi ~When simulating clearing! lsecond-floor bedroom, SA l___Jentered the room and took approximately two steps to the right into the bedroom to clear the doorway. From a standing position and while still slightly moving forward, lused his right hand to pull up his shirt concealing his weapon, and he drew the weapon from concealment with his right hand. In a continuous motion, he cleared the weapon from the holster, moved the weapon out and away from his body. While moving the weapon out to the low ready position stance and just SAi b6 b7C prior to his left hand joining to support the weapon, SA~l~~~­ inadvertently discharged one round from his weapon. The position of the weapon at the time of discharge was pointed at a downward angle similar to the low ready position in the general direction of the bed. (U/~ SAi ldid not attribute the accidental discharge to any malfunction of the weapon. Though he could not identify any specific factor that led to the inadvertent finger on the trigger which resulted in the accidental discharge, he did have several factors weighing on his mind at the time of the incident which may have been contributing factors; namely a sensitive and complex planned multi-subject arrest 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office, 04/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7400335, 05/26/2016 which required numerous long days of work and attention to detail, and a less than normal night of sleep prior to the incident. (U/~ After the accidental discharge, SAi !holstered his weapon and attempted to locate the round to ensure it had not traveled outside of the home. SAi I went downstairs and outside his residence to determine if the round might have exited the house. Upon his inspection, it did not appear as though the round exited the residence, so he returned inside and promptly contacted his supervisor, Supervisory Special Agent (SSAd lat approximately 8:36am. SSAI lmade the necessary notifications to the PFI and ERT members, as well as SAC Kevin L. Perkins and ASAcl ASAcl I notified Carroll County Sheriff Jim._D_e_W_e_e_s__o_f_t_h_e____. b6 b7C accidental discharge, and Sheriff Dewees deferred review to the FBI. (U/~ SSAI !responded to SAi I residence shortly after lO:OOam, along with ERT Leader SA ... l _ __...._____""land PFI SA._I________. .______~I SAi !processed the scene and located the expended round on the floor below the mattress and box spring, and the expended casing in a yellow cup on SAi !dresser. SAi I took photographs, drafted a sketch, and collected the spent shell casing and round. (U/ ~ SA I I took possession of SAi I weapon and conducted a round count, which revealed 19 rounds of ammunition remained. SA ldid not issue another weapon, a B s A still had his standard FBI-issued Glock Model 22. PFI collected and submitted SAi IGlock Model 17, serial number and his spare magazine to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit, for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection. The weapon was determined to be in good condition, and passed all safety and function checks. Baltimore documented SAi (U/~ I account of the accidental discharge in a Signed Sworn Statement, completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed SAi Ifirearms qualification and training records were current. SIRG Observations UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C b6 b7C b7E b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office, 04/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7400335, 05/26/2016 On 05/10/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Because the shooting was determined to be a non-operational accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational panning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ Observation 1: SAi !Baltimore Field Office, had an accidental discharge while conducting room clearing training in his residence. (U/~ Analysis 1: SA_l~~---lhad an accidental discharge while conducting room clearing training at his residence. As was his practice, SAi loccasionally conducted tactical room clearing training in his residence when his family was not home. In his Signed Sworn Statement, SAi lstated, "I did not make a conscious or deliberate decision to practice using a loaded weapon on this occasion, as I have used a loaded weapon when practicing in the past." SAi._______. failure to clear his weapon created an unnecessary risk, and resulted in an avoidable accidental discharge. (U/~ b6 b7C b6 b7C The Firearms Policy Guide (FPG), dated 01/08/2015, subsection 4. 1. 1, stated in relevant part, "When first handling a firearm for nonoperational purposes, a safety check must be conducted. A safety check is defined as positive confirmation that a firearm is empty." I (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Baltimore will ensure SAi attends remedial firearms training, including review of firearms safety rules and procedures per the Firearms Policy Guide, subsections 4.1.1 and 4. 3. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office, 04/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7400335, 05/26/2016 3. (U/~ Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if The SIRG did recommend the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. deemed necessary. (U/~Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chiefl Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ); Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I I Tactical Training Unit (TTU), Training Division (TD); Assistant Section Chiefl ...______...!violent Crime and Gang Section, Criminal Investiga_t_i_v_e_____. I b6 b7C Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; SSA Investigative Law Unit, Office of L------ii-------------..., General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Roger A. Coe, East Asia Section, Counterintelligence Division; Senior Trial Attorney ..------.. . . .-------,_---J Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC . . - - - - - - - - - - , __ _ _ _ ____J __... SWAT Operations Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; UC ...._ Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); ssAI I .________.I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. --------------. ________ (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: ______________ Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas, Kathryn Peterson, and Lawrence E. Koleff, ___, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders ...._ OI, INSD; Mana ement and Program Analysts OI, INSD; Special Assistant INSD; L--~---------,.1 SSA SOU, CIRG; SSA TTU, TD; SSA DSU, TD; and ASAC USDOJ Inspector General . ___.... ...._ .... ~------ Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Baltimore, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instruction 1 is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Baltimore Field Office, 04/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7400335, 05/26/2016 complete until the Instruction is addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Baltimore, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instruction 1. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl !Inspection Management Unit, INSD. •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Buffalo Field Office, 09/30/2016 Title: Date: 01/04/2017 b6 b7C CC: From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: Drafted BONE ROBERT C II WELLING ERIC D TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C By:~I~~~~~~~~~~---' Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A2086088 (U) Buffalo Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shootin1 Incident Report, dated 11/22/2016, was prepared by ssAI _Buffalo Field Office. b6 b7C Details: I (U/~ On September 30, 2016, SAi Buffalo Field Office, experienced an accidental discharge (AD) with his Bureau-issued .40 caliber, Glock 22 firearm, serial numberl !while in the multipurpose storage and gun cleaning room of the Rochester RA (RRA) ASACI !notified INSD Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney of the AD. Chief Inspector Feeney delegated the investigation to Buffalo, under the supervision of Inspector in Charge Robert C. Bone, II. There were no injuries as a result of the AD. The single round was discharged into the floor of the gun cleaning room and ricocheted into the interior drywall of the room. The round penetrated one layer of drywall UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Buffalo Field Office, 09/30/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A2086088, 01/04/2017 and fell to the floor in the space between studs. The round did not exit the wall of the room and was recovered by Buffalo ERT. (U/~ On September 30, 2016, SAi lshot a pistol qualification course at the Rochester Police Department's (RPD) firearms range under the supervision of FBI Firearms Instructor! After completion of the qualification course, SAi !holstered what he believed was an empty weapon with the magazine removed from the I b6 b7C I magazine well. SAi then returned to the FBI Buffalo Field Office RRA with what he believed was an empty weapon. The RRA is approximately 0.1 mile from the RPD range. At approximately 12:15 p.m., entered the RRA gun cleaning room to clean his weapon. He was alone in the room. sAI I (U/~ sAc===Junholstered what he thought was an empty weapon for cleaning. sAc===Jpointed his firearm at the point where the wall met the floor, which he believed to be a safe direction. sAc==Jpulled the trigger to disassemble the Glock 22 for cleaning and a single round discharged. sAc==Jobserved an impact mark on the tile floor and noticed the round did not penetrate the floor. I I (U/ ~ At the time, RRA SA and SAi lwere in the Technically Trained Agent room down the hall from the gun cleaning room. Upon hearing the gunshot, SAsl !entered the gun cleaning room and found SAi lalone and uninjured. Together, the three agents located an impact mark in the back wall of the gun cleaning room above the gun cleaning station. The three verified that the round did not exit the wall of the room. SA then immediately notified land PFI about the AD. (U/~ PFI took possession of SA Glock 22 firearm and four magazines. PFI subsequently shipped SAi weapon to the Training Division's Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) in Quantico, Virginia, for testing. ssRAI l I I b6 b7C I I (U/~ On September 30, 2016 at approximately 2:00 p.m., two Buffalo ERT members arrived at RRA's gun cleaning room to process the scene. ERT took photographs, drafted a sketch, and collected the spent .40 UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Buffalo Field Office, 09/30/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A2086088, 01/04/2017 caliber shell casing and some bullet fragments. ERT determined the round hit the floor and ricocheted into the wall above the gun cleaning station, and did not exit the gun cleaning room. On November 9, 2016, Buffalo ERT personnel removed a piece of drywall and recovered the projectile which had fallen behind the drywall. (U/~ On October 6, 2016, DSU tested and inspected sAI IGlock 22. DSU indicated the weapon functioned as designed and there were no noted issues with !Glock 22. b6 b7C SAi (U/~ SAi !training records revealed he was current with respect to firearms qualifications at the time of the incident. A signed sworn statement was obtained from sAc==Jon October 14, 2016. b6 b7C SIRG Observations On 12/08/2016 the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Because the shooting was determined to be an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. Observation 1 (U/~ Observation 1: SAi !experienced an Accidental Discharge while preparing to clean his FBI issued Glock 22 firearm. (U/~ Analysis 1: On September 30, 2016, SA_l~~~~~~---1 Buffalo Field Office, experienced an Accidental Discharge (AD) with his Bureau-issued .40 caliber, Glock 22 firearm while in the gun cleaning room of the RRA. There were no injuries as a result of the AD. After completing a firearms qualification course, !returned to RRA's SAi UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C bG b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Buffalo Field Office, 09/30/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A2086088, 01/04/2017 gun cleaning room. sAc==]unholstered what he thought was an empty weapon for cleaning. ~pointed his firearm at the point where the wall met the floor, which he knew to be a safe direction. SAi.._~__. pulled the trigger to disassemble the Glock 22 for cleaning and a single round discharged. It was determined the weapons clearing tube was being used to prop open the door to the gun cleaning room and was not utilized. bG b7C b6 b7C (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Buffalo will ensure sAc===Jreceives remedial firearms training specific to the safe handling of firearms. (U/~Recommendation 1: SAC, Buffalo should ensure the clearing tube is properly located and properly utilized in the RRA gun cleaning room. Observation 2 (U~ Observation 2: The safety check conducted at the completion of the pistol qualification course was deemed a factor in the AD. (U/~ Analysis 2: On September 30, 2016, SAc==Jshot a pistol qualification course under the supervision of Firearms Instructor FI advised he conducted a safety check after the pistol qualification course. After completing the course, said he holstered what he believed was an empty weapon and immediately returned to the RRA gun cleaning room. In the gun cleaning room, SA !verified there was no magazine in his weapon and then unholstered ~w~h-a-t~he believed was an empty weapon for cleaning. lknew it was I I I I SAi I sAI necessary to pull the trigger to disassemble the weapon at the point where the wall met the floor, trigger, and a single round discharged. Although conducted after the course, the safety check was properly. (U/~ The FBI Firearms Policy Guide weapon. He pointed the depressed the a safety check was not conducted (FPG) 0741DPG, dated 01/08/2015, Section 4.2.1 stated in relevant part, "The supervising FI must ensure that: 1. Safety checks are conducted on all firearms prior UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Buffalo Field Office, 09/30/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A2086088, 01/04/2017 to the commencement of training, and a final safety check of all firearms is conducted by an FI at the conclusion of training." (U/~ The FBI Field Firearms Training Program Guidance EC dated 02/09/2016, stated "A safety check of a detachable magazine fed weapon (pistol, carbine and submachine gun) is performed as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Keep your finger off the trigger. Keep the muzzle pointed in a safe direction. Place the weapon on safe (if applicable) Check for and remove the magazine. Lock the slide or bolt to the rear. Check the chamber and magazine well, look away and check again." (U/~ Recommendation 2: SAC, Buffalo should ensure Firearms Instructors comply with the Firearms Policy Guide and properly conduct safety checks. 3. (U/~ Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed necessary. (U/~ The SIRG recommended SA~l~~~-laccidental discharge shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action deemed appropriate. b6 b7C (U/~On 12/08/2016, Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Lawrence Koleff, INSD, Office of Inspections (OI); SSA ._~~~~__.loGC, Investigative Law Unit; SSA Field Office, Squad CR-4; UC TD, FBI Washington Firearms Training Unit; ucl lcIRG, SWAT Operations Unit (SOU); ucl TD, Defensive Systems Unit; Asel criminal ..._~~~~---' I Investigative Division, Violent Crime & Gang Section; SSA~l~~~~~~­ TD, Tactical Training Unit; SC Stephen Laycock, CD, CD-1; Attorney ._~~~~~~~~___.I USDOJ, Civil Rights Division; Attorney! UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Buffalo Field Office, 09/30/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A2086088, 01/04/2017 _______.I USDOJ, Organized Crime & Gang Section; SSAI LD, Evidence Response Training Unit. ------------(U/~The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Regina Thompson and Eric Welling, INSD, OI; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders! ________ __________ I I INSD, OI; MAPAsl _.......__________.....r ...._ ___.IINSD, Inspection Management Unit; ...._ __.I I INSD, Investigative Analysis Unit; SC James Langenberg, INSD, External _A_u_d_i_t__&_c_o....mpliance Section; I INSD, IIS; ssAI_ _ _ __ CIRG, SOU; Attorney""i------1-u_n_i_t_e__.d States Department of _J_u_s_t_i_c_e--(U....SDOJ), Office of Legal Policy (OLP);I I USDOJ, i-----------'1-------------~ I b6 b7C b6 b7C ucl OLP; ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ, Office of Inspector General. Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~SAC, Buffalo, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instruction 1, Recommendation 1, and Recommendation 2 are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction and Recommendations are addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Buffalo, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instruction 1, Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 2. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management Unit, INSD. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Buffalo Field Office, 09/30/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A2086088, 01/04/2017 •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Title: From: Date: 10/26/2016 MIAMI MM-I-1 Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C PETERSON KATHRYN SC Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD A/AD TWERSKY RONALD Drafted By: Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A7576801 (U) Accidental Discharge Boston Field Office Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shooting Incident Report, dated 06/01/2016, was prepared by the delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) _ The SIRT included Assistant Inspector-In-Place (AIIP) I .___ _ ___.IAIIPI I and ASAC Joseph R. Bonavolonta. The Inspector's Report, dated 06/21/2016, was prepared by INSD Inspector Kathryn Peterson and Assistant Inspector/Team Leaderl I b6 b7C Details: I (U/~ On August 25, 2016, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge shooting incident involving a weapon owned by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) On April 22, 2016, at approximately 3:00 p.m., ofr---------...,_ SSA _____. accidentall dischar ed one round from SSA Bureau-approved serial number in SSA .-.------.-r-e_s_i_d_e_n_c_e__...-----...-w-a-1-k-e-d-S-S_.A dog I every day while SSA I ---- I was at work. Several weeks before the UNCLASSIFIED~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 accidental discharge incident, he observed, handled, and photographed a loaded handgun SSAI lstored in her nightstand. On April 22, while SSAI lwas at work,I I removed ssAI lfrom the nightstand in the presence of two minor friends and pressed the trigger, unintentionally discharging one round. The round penetrated the bedroom floor and the kitchen ceiling below, but did not exit the residence. No one was injured during the incident. SSAI !learned of the accidental discharge on April 25, 2016, from~i--------------.1 b6 b7C and immediately notified her ASAC. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Boston Field Office by Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney on April 26, 2016. The delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation revealed the following: (U/~ ssAI lresided alone and employed her .__________________.I I I to walk her dog while SSA I I was .--a_t_ _ _..., work. Several weeks prior to the accidental discharge incident, I observed an unsecured handgun in a nightstand drawer in SSA~I_________, b6 b7C master bedroom, but he did not touch it. Approximately one week later, while in her residence again to walk her dog, I Jopened the nightstand drawer, removed the handgun, and took "selfie" photographs of himself with the gun, which he sent to friends via SnapChat. (U/~ On April 22, 2016, at approximately 3:00 p.m., invited to go with him to SSA residence to walk her dog and see the handgun. used a key provided by ssAI Ito enter her residence, and b6 b7C he, went to the master bedroom.I !removed SSA loaded and unsecured! lfrom the nightstand next to the bed, took it out of a holster, and pressed the trigger, unintentionally discharging one .40 Smith & Wesson round into the floor. (U/~picked up the spent shell casing from the hallway floor near the nightstand. observed a UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 hole in the kitchen ceiling below the bedroom when they went downstairs.I lpicked up a bullet fragment and attempted to clean up some debris from the kitchen floor .1 then took the dog for a walk, returning the dog to ssAI residence approximately 15 minutes later. They subsequently walked back tol !residence, and at approximately 3:55 p.m.I lmother drove I !residence for a sleepover. b6 b7c ltol (U/~When SSAI !returned to her residence at approximately 6:00 p.m., she noticed her dog was unusually anxious, there was debris on the kitchen floor, and a hole in the kitchen ceiling. She was concerned about a possible intruder and searched her residence with her service pistol drawn. During her search she found the master bedroom windows, which were closed when she went to work, wide open. She subsequently calledl !residence, butLl----~1-w_a_s_n_o...,t home. When .__ _ ___.lcalled back a few minutes later, he told SSA_ lhe found and tried to clean up debris from the floor, but did not know its origin and did not notice a hole in the ceiling. He further told her he had opened the bedroom windows because the room was very warm for the dog. SSAI I stated in her Signed Sworn Statement she was unable to determine...._t_h_e_c-ause of the hole in her kitchen ceiling and askedl..._~- b6 b7C about the hole when he visited her home that evening. stated during an interview the ceiling had been replaced approximately two months prior to the incident and he told SSAI I the hole might be the result of a nail popping loose. (U/~ On April 23, 2016,I ltold his parents about the accidental discharge .1 lfather went to SSAI !residence on the afternoon of April 23 to speak with her, but no one was home. On April 25,i: ltold his mother about the incident.I mother andl lmother, who were friends, spoke wi~.-t-h_e_a_c_h_o_t_h-er I._______. on April 25, then went to I !residence and told parents about the incident. On April 25, 2016, at approximately 6:00 p.m.,I land his parents went to ssAr==lresidence and told her about the incident.I lshowed SSA~ hole in the master UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 bedroom floor near the nightstand obscured by a carpet. SSAI immediately informed Boston ASAC ._I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I and Bo._s_t_o_n_C_D_.C b6 b7C I (U/~ The Boston Evidence Response Team (ERT) processed SSA ....__________!residence at approximately 3:45 p.m. on April 26, 2016. ERT sketched, photographed, documented the scene, and collected SSA _____________.I magazine, holster, and ammunition. ERT' s trajectory analysis indicated the holes in the master bedroom floor and kitchen ceiling were consistent with the path of a single bullet. ERT searched for, but did not locate, any additional bullet holes in ssAI I home, or any holes indicating a bullet exited the residence.I I threw the shell casing and bullet fragment into the heavily wooded area behind! !residence on April 22, 2016. A search of the area on April 29, 2016, was unsuccessful. b6 b7C (U/~SSA._l______....lstated in her Signed Sworn Statement she routinely kept a Bureau weapon loaded and unsecured in her nightstand. Massachusetts General Law Chapter 140 §131L provided criminal penalties for failing to secure a firearm in a manner rendering the weapon inoperable by someone other than the owner or authorized user. On April 26, 2016, the Marshfield Police Chief advised the Marshfield Police Department received no complaints or reports related to this incident. He further advised absent additional extenuating circumstances in the case his agency would not seek criminal charges against SSAI !involved. However, he reserved the right t_o_r_e_v_i_e_w_ _, b6 b7C I the matter further upon completion of the FBI's internal investigation. interviewed separately regarding this incident on April 28 and 29, 2016, with the consent and in the presence of their parents. Their accounts were materially consistent with SSA I...______.I Signed Sworn Statement. Due to the time elapsed between the incident and investigation, and the other evidence, no attempt was made to identify or interview other witnesses. (U/~ Boston Principal Firearms Instructor UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 SAi._______________. b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 confirmed SSAI lwas assigned to her as a personally-owned weapon (POW) in the Asset Management System (AMS) Defensive Systems Unit Chiefl !verified the weapon was assigned to ssAI las a POW in the Firearms Information, Registration and Shooter Tracking (FIRST) application. b6 b7C (U/~ INSD directed Boston to provide ssAI I firearms qualification records as part of INSD's standard shooting investigation protocol. The assigned AIIP initially requested the records from the Boston PFI, who reported to SSAI I The AIIP discussed the request directly with ssAI lsoon after. ssAI ladvised the AIIP she would not "approve" releasing her qualification records. Following several additional conversations, the Inspector in Charge addressed the issue directly with Boston ASAC after which Boston provided the requested records. Review of SSA firearms qualification records from FIRST determined SSA had not qualified, or attempted to qualify, with her since March 2013 . b6 b?C .....-~---.......,....-~~---' .-----...__~~~ ...... ~~~~- (U/~ Office of General Counsel SSA_l~~~~~~~~~~___.ladvised the FBI's firearms qualification requirements were a measure to mitigate the risks inherent in the carry and use of firearms by FBI employees. The Bureau would be negligent if it failed to adequately mitigate and manage those risks. The requirement for every Agent to demonstrate a minimum level of proficiency with each authorized weapon at least once each year accounted for the different operational and performance characteristics of different approved weapons, and was a necessary element of the risk mitigation provided by qualification standards. b6 b7C (U/~ According to DSU, FIRST generated multiple automatic reminder/warning e-mails near the end of each FY to shooters who had POWs with which they had not qualified during the year, informing them they would lose the authority to carry the POW if they failed to qualify. SSAI I non-compliance with the annual POW qualification policy began in FY 2014 while she was assigned to FBIHQ and continued while she was assigned to a non-supervisory position in Boston beginning in January 2015. INSD determined SSAI lfailed to qualify UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/ ~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 I I with her POW throughout her tenure in Boston, and Boston did not revoke her authorization to carry the weapon as required by policy. INSD also noted SSAI !current role as a supervisor included oversight of Boston's firearms training program and the Boston PFI. (U~Despite the FIRST-generated reminder/warning e-mails to shooters noted above, INSD determined through conversations with DSU UC ._~~~~~land FBIHQ PFII IFIRST did not provide PFis or DSU with a report of weapons Agents failed to qualify with during a FY. The existing FIRST report only listed shooters who failed to qualify four times in a FY, resulting in an unknown number of approved POWs with which Agents were not currently qualified. Subsequent to INSD's inquiries a new release of FIRST added a report to allow PFis and Training Division firearms Program Managers to easily track weapons which were not shot for qualification during any FY. (U/~ SSA._l___.....,.________.I magazine, holster, and ammunition were secured in the Lakeville RA on April 26, 2016, after collection by ERT. On May 3, 2016, SAi lshipped SSAI lvia FedEx to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection. (U/~ Inspection and testing conducted by DSU indicated SSA _____.... ----------iweapon functioned as designed. SIRG Observations (U/~On August 25, 2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Because the shooting was determined to be a non-operational accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ Observation 1: ssAI lfailed to secure her weapon in accordance with the Firearms Policy Guide, 0741PG, subsections 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.3. (U/~ Analysis 1: The Firearms Policy Guide (FPG), dated January 8, 2015, subsections 4.1.2.1, and 4.1.2.3, articulated firearms security requirements and acceptable security methods. Subsection 4.1.2.1 stated in relevant part, "FBI personnel are responsible for the security of all FBI-approved firearms under their control in order to prevent unauthorized handling and unintentional discharges [emphasis added] " Subsection 4.1.2.3 stated in relevant part: FBI personnel must ensure the security of their issued and approved FBI firearms at all times while the firearms are maintained in their residences. When unattended, FBI firearms must be secured by one of the following methods to prevent access by unauthorized personnei [emphasis added], regardless of location: • Install an FBI-issued Master Lock #528 (large, curved-shackle lock available from the DSU), armored cable lock, or other device capable of rendering the firearm inoperable. • Field strip the weapon, and store major components in different locations (e.g., slide and receiver separated). As a last resort, handcuffs may be used to deter reassembly or to immobilize the firearm. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 • Store the weapon in a commercially available lock box, gun safe, or other locked, secure container. If stored in this manner, the firearm may be stored loaded. (U/~ On April 22, 2016, SSA whom ssAI I provi...d_e_d_u_n_r_e_s_t_r_i_'c_t_e_d__a_c_c_e_s_s_t_o_h_e_r_v_a.. cant ____J ___ to residence, opened a nightstand drawer which he knew previously contained an unsecured handgun to show the gun !removed the gun and pressed the trigger. unintentionally firing _o_n_e__r_o_u....nd from ssAI I FBI-approved ssAI lstated in tol I b6 b7C I her Signed Sworn Statement she routinely stored her FBI service pistols loaded and unsecured in the nightstand. (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Boston will ensure SSAI !receives remedial firearms training, including security of FBI-issued and approved firearms per the Firearms Policy Guide, 0741PG, subsection b6 b7C 4 .1. 2. (U/~ Observation 2: Boston did not revoke SSAI _____. .Iauthorization to carry her personally-owne_d_G_l_o_c_k--2-7--i... n accordance with the Firearms Policy Guide, 0741PG, subsection 4.2.2, when SSAI !failed to qualify with the weapon in FY 2015. (U/~ Analysis 2: The Firearms Policy Guide (FPG), dated January 8, 2015, subsection 4.2.2 stated in relevant part, "SAs must qualify with each assigned (Bureau-issued and personally-owned) firearm a minimum of once per fiscal year." Subsection 4.2.3.1(3) stated in relevant part, "If an SA fails to qualify with each POW at least once per fiscal year, the SA loses the authority to carry that specific firearm for the following fiscal year. PFis must execute FD-431s, removing POWs from SAs who have lost their authority to carry them." A February 9, 2016 electronic communication entitled "Field Firearms Training Program Guidance" from the Training Division, Firearms Training Unit (FTU), to UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 all ADICs, SACs, training ASACs, training SSAs, and Principal Firearms Instructors (PFis), reiterated the FPG policy cited above, and further stated in relevant part: If an approved personally owned weapon has not been fired for qualification at least once during the fiscal year, the Agent will lose authority to carry that weapon for one year. An FD-431 rescinding approval must be executed and forwarded to the DSU [Defensive Systems Unit}, Weapons Property Administration Office (WPAO). If a POW is removed due to not being fired in a fiscal year, at the completion of the penalty year, the weapon, along with a new FD-431 for the POW must be submitted to the gun vault for inspection and approval. Nearing the end of the fiscal year, FIRST [the Firearms Information, Registration and Shooter Tracking application} will generate multiple reminder e-mails notifying POW owners who have not fired a qualifying score with their POW(s). (U/~ This guidance mirrored guidance disseminated to the same recipients by FTU in November 7, 2013 and November 24, 2014 electronic communications. (U/~ Boston PFI sAI stated SSA._I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __, c==Jwas listed in the Asset Management System as a POW as of May 3, 2016. Firearms qualification records provided by PFII lshowed SSA .___ _ _ _~lmost recent qualification with hetj lwas March 19, 2013, and she did not attempt to qualify with it in the subsequent three years. Defensive Systems Unit Chief I lstated SSA I was listed in FIRST as a POW assigned to SSA-1------. .__a_s_o_f__M_a_y__2_0_,_2_0...... 16, and ssAI IMarch 2013 qualification was b6 b7C completed while assigned to the New York Field Office. (U/~ Instruction 2a: SAC, Boston will ensure an FD-431 is prepared and forwarded to the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), Weapons Property Administration Office, revoking SSAI I POW authorization for her in accordance with the Firearms Policy Guide, 0741PG, UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 subsection 4.2.3.1, and February 9, 2016 FTU electronic communication, and will ensure SSAI notified of the revocation. lis b6 b7C (U/~ Recommendation 2b: SAC, Boston should ensure Boston's PFI reviews the FY 2015 qualification records for all Boston POWs for compliance with FPG subsection 4.2.3.1(3) requirements. 3. (U/~ Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed necessary. The SIRG recommended the captioned shooting incident be referred to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Eric D. Welling, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Section Chief (SC) M.A. Myers, Instruction Section, Training Division (TD); SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) I I Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; ssAI I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Charles McGonigal, b6 b7C CD-2 Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; uc~I~~~~~~~~--' Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; Senior Trial Attorney Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; uc_I~~~~__, SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group ..._(_C_I_R_G~)-;__,SSAI Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Kathryn Peterson and Regina Thompson, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leadersl IOI, INSD; Manaaement and Program Analysts! ....... ......I ..... I oI, ~I_N_s_D_;__ s_sA __l ____---,______.....I sou, CIRG; ssAI I __T_T_U~,~T-D__,; ssAI ITTU, TD; and ASACs Jim-K~i-r_d_a_r~-a-n-d~M~i-k-e ---~~.....-~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~ ---~~~~~~~~---' Dillinger, USDOJ Inspector General. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 10 ~~~~~~ ~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Boston Field Office, 04/22/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7576801, 10/26/2016 Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Boston, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instruction 1 and Instruction 2a are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions are addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instructions have been resolved or require further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the field office has under consideration to implement. SAC, Boston, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instruction 1 and Instruction 2a. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit, INSD. I •• UNCLASSIFIED/Z):r8~ 11 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Agent Involved Animal Shooting Incident, Chicago Field Office, 05/24/2016 Title: Date: 10/25/2016 INSPECTION Contact: From: Approved By: b6 b7C WELLING ERIC D Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: Case ID #: 297L-HQ-A7771848 (U) Chicago Shooting Incident: Animal Involved Shooting 05/24/2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned animal shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Delegated Shooting Incident Report, dated 06/28/2016, was reviewed by INSD Inspector Frank S. Vito and Assistant Inspector/Team Leader .. ___.I !__________ b6 b7C Details: (U~ On May 24, 2016, Special Agent (SA) I.____________. discharged one round from his FBI-issued Glock Model 22 pistol, serial at an aggressive and threatening pit bull dog during an number FBI arrest operation in support ofl lat a residence located atl While the round was aimed to strike the dog, the round missed the dog and impacted the ground. The dog retreated to a porch of the residence, and there were no injuries or property damage. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Chicago Field Office by the Chief Inspector on May 25, 2016. I I I The delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation UNCLASSIFIED~ b6 b7A b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Agent Involved Animal Shooting Incident, Chicago Field Office, 05/24/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A7771848, 10/25/2016 revealed the following: (U/~ On May 18, 2016, a "take down" operations plan for the execution of 16 simultaneous federal arrest warrants was briefed to all 16 Team Leaders (TLs) in the Chicago Field Office Command Post (CP). In addition to the FBI's Deadly Force Policy, contingency plans, medical plans, communications plans, and detailed subject descriptions were briefed. All 16 TLs subsequently submitted individual arrest operation I plans or SWAT orders \in Sentinel to Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I _on May 23, 2016. All operation plans were subsequently approved by ASACI I On May 24, 2016, a CP was established at the Chicago Field Office at 5:00 a.m., to monitor the progress of all 16 arrest team operations and to provide Executive Management oversight of the entire operation. (U/~ A team compromised of seven FBI Agents and three Task Force Officers (TFOs) was assigned to execute the federal arrest warrant for at A final team briefing was conducted at 5:30 a.m. on May 24, 2016 at the Chicago Central Area Police District and was attended by all participants in the operation. SA._l_________.I discussed the operations order, and SSA ..._________!discussed the FBI Deadly Force Policy. Team members were also provided copies of the operations order and photographs of subject .______land his residence. (U/~ The team departed the parking lot a few minutes before 6:00 a.m. and reported directly tol SAi land SAi ltook positions at the rear of the residence as the rest of the team went to the front of the residence. SAi land SA ._______.!jumped over a high wooden fence and entered the residence's backyard. The residence was a two story home with a second floor back deck and staircase that led to the ground level. SAi took a position closer to the residence as SAi lstayed toward the rear fence, able to observe the entire backyard and rear of the residence. b6 b7C b7E b6 b7C I b6 b7C I (U/~ A dog, which appeared to be a pit bull, came down from the second level rear deck and cautiously approached SAi The pit I UNCLASSIFIED~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Animal Shooting Incident, Chicago Field Office, 05/24/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A7771848, 10/25/2016 bull then went back up to the second level. A few moments later, the pit bull again came down the second floor back deck, bypassed SA I I and barked as it approached sAI I The pit bull retreated two times walking around the back yard. The pit bull approached SA ._~~_.lfor a third time, low to the ground and growling. SAi maneuvered around the pit bull, out of direct line of fire of SA ._~~~~-I in case he had to shoot the pit bull. The pit bull then aggressively lunged and attempted to bite sAI I Believing he was in imminent danger of being attacked by the pit bull, SAi lfired one round from his duty-issued Glock 22 pistol. The round missed the pit bull and hit the grass. The pit bull immediately ran toward the rear of the residence and retreated to a wooden crate on the second floor deck. At the same time, subject! lwas taken into custody inside the residence without further incident by other members of SAi lteam. I b6 b7C (U/~ In his signed sworn statement, SAi ladvised he used his gloved left hand to try and maintain distance from the dog before the dog leaped at him and attempted to bite his left hand/arm. SAi stated the dog was within a foot of him at the time he fired a single round from his pistol from the strong-hand, right hip firing position. After firing, SAi !stepped back and transitioned to a two-hand grip on his weapon, but the threat ended as the dog retreated. (U/~ SAi lwas also interviewed after the incident and provided an ac._c_o_u_n_t~-o~f the incident consistent with SAl._~~~~laccount. (U/~ Chicago ERT was unable to respond, as the ERT had been dispatched to other arrest/search locations, including a location in where two SWAT ...... ..... operators were wounded. As a result, FBI SA SA SA and S responded to and interviewed the residents and owners of the pit bull, interviewed the next door neighbors, and searched the scene for the bullet casing with negative results. ~~~~~~~~~...._~~~~~~ (U/~ FBI Chicago's PFI submitted SAi I Model 22 pistol, serial numberl caliber Glock, and his magazines to TD, UNCLASSIFIED~ 3 I .40 b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C b7E b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Animal Shooting Incident, Chicago Field Office, 05/24/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A7771848, 10/25/2016 Defensive Systems Unit, for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection, which revealed all safeties were present and the weapon was in correct operating condition. There were no unusual abnormalities in the disseminated parts and there were no unauthorized modifications to the pistol. The weapon was in good condition, and passed all safety and function checks. (U/~ Chicago documented Iaccount SAi of the weapon discharge in a Signed Sworn Statement, completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report and three witness FD-302s, and confirmed SAi firearms qualification and training records were current. b6 b7C I SIRG Observations On 08/25/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: Because the shooting was determined to be an animal shooting incident, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. However, the SIRG concluded SAi !discharged his firearm in accordance with FBI legal and firearms policy. 1. 2. Evaluate the application of deadly force. b6 b7C Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational panning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ The SIRG had no observations, recommendations, or instructions for Chicago regarding this animal shooting incident. The SIRG determined SAi lacted within FBI Policy in discharging his service weapon at the attacking dog. 3. (U/~ Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if The SIRG did not recommend the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. deemed necessary. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Animal Shooting Incident, Chicago Field Office, 05/24/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A7771848, 10/25/2016 (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Eric D. Welling, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Section Chief (SC) M.A. Myers, Instruction Section, Training Division (TD); SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; ssAI I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Charles McGonigal, CD-2 Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; Senior Trial Attorney Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC I I ucl b6 b7C I Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; uc~I~~~~~ SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group .__(C~I-R_G_)-,-.......ssAI I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Kathryn Peterson and Regina Thompson, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders! loI, INSD; Manaqement and IProgram IAnalysts! oI, INSD~,-. I _s_s_A.,..-l------------,.1-s_o_u_,_c_I_R_G_;__s_sA~,lr-----------..__....,I ...... .--~~~~ ...... TTU, TD; SSA I I TTU, TD; and ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ Inspector General. ~~~ ~~~~--' ~~~~~~~~~~ UNCLASSIFIED~ 5 ~~~~~~~~~~ I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Animal Shooting Incident, Chicago Field Office, 05/24/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A7771848, 10/25/2016 •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Title: Date: 04/23/2015 CC: b6 b7C From: BOSTON BS-ASCT Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C PETERSON KATHRYN David Paul Gelios TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: Case ID#: 297K-HQ-A5771758 (U) Criminal Investigative Division Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U/~This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG meeting held on March 17, 2015. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the Washington Field Office on 11/19/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 11/21/2014, was submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agentl Washington Field Office. I b6 b7C Details: On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed an Accidental Discharge which occurred on 11/19/2014, involving Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Civil Rights Unit, FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) _ _I~~~~~~~~ On 11/19/2014, at approximately 5:45 p.m., SSA~l~~~~lwent into the UNCLASSIFIED~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U//FOUO) Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5771758, 04/23/2015 FBIHQ third floor bathroom, room 3585, and entered a bathroom stall. SSAI lput his Glock 23 handgun and his coat on the clothing hook located on the inside of the stall door. While SSAI lwas in the stall, Forensic Accountant (FoA) Criminal Investigative Division (CID), entered the bathroom. A short time later, S S A D reached for his coat and then reached for his handgun. As SSA tried to remove his handgun from the hook, the gun discharged one bullet into the ceiling. I I I checked SSAI on FoAI land then went upstairs to the fourth floor bathroom to ensure no one was injured and to determine if the round had penetrated the bathroom floor. SSAI land FoA_I~~~~ were not injured. After returning to the third floor bathroom for a short time, SSAI attempted to contact Unit Chief (~ ~ CID, by cell phone but did not leave a message. SSA~n left the scene and returned to his office. While in his office SSA worked on a power point presentation, went to the gym to change cloths, and left a phone message for Security Officer regarding the incident. SSAI !left the building at approximately 6:15 p.m. and while driving he made contact with U~ SSA_I~~~~ was instructed by UC~to return to FBIHQ. SSAL____jreturned to FBIHQ at approximately 6:50 p.m. I I b6 b7C I I I The Washington Field Office Evidence Response Team responded to FBIHQ and processed the scene at approximately 8:00 p.m. During a subsequent interview, ssAI !advised he had placed his handgun on clothing hooks many times in the past. Upon review of the Accidental Discharge shooting incident, the SIRG voted and unanimously agreed SAi ldid not store his weapon properly and mishandled his weapon upon removing it from the coat hook. SIRG OBSERVATIONS (U/~ On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed the agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b6 b7c b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5771758, 04/23/2015 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the incident reviewed involved an Accidental Discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training and/or safety issues. ssAI !experienced an Accidental Discharge after failing to safely secure his handgun. Observation 1: b6 b7C FBI Firearms Policy Guide, Section 8.2.3 states, "When removing a handgun for short-term storage, FBI employees should remove the handgun and holster together as one. This is recommended to prevent an unintentional discharge of the handgun." Analysis 1: ssAI lremoved his FBI issued handgun from the holster and placed it on a clothing hook on a bathroom stall door as a means of temporary storage. The handgun discharged as SSA~i-----.lattempted to b6 b7C remove the handgun from the hook. Recommendation 1: AD, CID, should ensure SSAI !receives remedial training, which specifically addresses the proper handling and storage of firearms. Observation 2: SSA._!_____.I did not remain on scene until supervisory b6 b7C b6 b7C personnel arrived. FBI Corporate Policy Notice 11.3.3, dated 01/25/2015, entitled Shooting Response Procedures states, "In the event of an AIS, the involved FBI employee or designee should to the extent practicable, secure and leave undisturbed the scene of the AD until the arrival of ERT and supervisory personnel." Analysis 2: On 11/19/2014, at 5:45 p.m., SSA~l~~~~lhad an Accidental Discharge in a third floor bathroom at FBIHQ. After the Accidental Discharge, SSA._l_____.I went to the fourth floor to ensure no one was injured and UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5771758, 04/23/2015 then briefly returned to the third floor bathroom before leaving the scene and returning to his office. SSAI !initially called his UC, and did not leave a message. ssAj j then called ..._S_e_c_u_r_i_t_y_O_f...ficerl I and left a message. ssAI Ileft the I b6 b7C building at approximately 6:15 p.m. and while driving, made contact with UC Owho advisedj j to return to the office. returned to FBIHQ at approximately 6:50 p.m. I_____. SSA .. Instruction 2: AD, CID, should ensure Agents are aware of the requirement to remain at the scene of an Accidental Discharge until supervisory personnel arrive. 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed This matter is being referred to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for potential administrative action. necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of Inspections (OI) INSD; Deputy Chief Civil Rights Division, ............. __.___ Criminal Section, Department of Justice (DOJ); Criminal ________ L--------1-----_._---, _______ _ ______ ~ Section, DOJ; Supervisory Special Agent(SSA) Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA .._ _._ ___, ,__ __. Sguad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); SSA _______._________ Firearms Training Unit, TD; UC Special ____ ..._~. I I Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA Violent Crime and Gang Section; SSA._j_____~ Defensive Systems Unit(DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A . ..C_o_e-,--C-D---2-,~Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ssAj I ________.I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division. non-voting members were also Charge Jim Kirdar, Office Of Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Teyema, Vadim D. Thomas, and The following in attendance: Assistant Special Agent In Inspector General; ucj Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5771758, 04/23/2015 I Inspectors/Team Leaders! I OI, I INSD; L-~r-~~~~~~---.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-f"~~.._~__, ucJ...... ....-~ I and Management Program Analysts (MAPAs)I I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; MAPA I Inspection Analysis Unit, and Special Assistant roI, INSD . ......~~~~---"~ ~~~~~~~ I r-~~~~~~~~---..~~~~ f>-~~~~~~~~~~"l....J ...._~~~~~~~~~---' Procedure for Responding to the Observations (U/~ AD, CID, is responsible for ensuring inspection instructions and recommendations are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the instructions and recommendations are addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's responses to determine if the instructions and recommendations were resolved or require further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans to implement . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI OFFICE 12/09/2014 Title: Date: 04/23/2015 CC: From: b6 b7C INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C LEFF DOUGLAS A David Paul Gelios TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara I ____________. Drafted By: ... Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A5836071 (U) Cincinnati Field Off ice Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge incident following the SIRG meeting held on 03/17/2015. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the Cincinnati Field Off ice by the Chief Inspector on 12/09/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 01/11/2015, was submitted electronically by SSAI I b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On the morning of 12/09/2014, SAi participated in a SWAT operation at~i------------------------. .._~__.I The mission of the SWAT team was to assist in executing a federal search warrant by clearing the residence to be searched and turning the scene over to the search team once it was determined to be safe. SA UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI OFFICE 12/09/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5836071, 04/23/2015 .__ ___.lwas designated as the primary breacher in the operations order. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on 12/09/2014, the command to execute was given. The entry team knocked on the front door of the residence and announced the presence of law enforcement officers for the purpose of executing a search warrant. After receiving no response from inside the house, lwas called up to breach the front door. b6 b7C SAi (U/~ SAi land SAL-l-----r-------------....1 land then sAI lhit the inner front door with .__a_r_a_m_,_p_r_o_v_i_·d_i_n_g_t_h_e_e.....ntry team access to the residence. SA I Ithen b6 b7C b7E transitioned from the ram to his handgun. As he was covering the stairwell just inside the front door, he accidentally discharged a round from his handgun, which struck the wall approximately three-quarters of the way up the stairwell. Once it was determined no injuries resulted from the shot and it was safe to proceed, the team continued clearing the residence. (U/~ After the residence was cleared, the Cincinnati Evidence Response Team (ERT) was contacted and advised of the accidental discharge. ERT took photographs and drafted a sketch of area in which the discharge occurred. ERT attempted to locate the discharged round and the spent shell casing, but was unable to find either item. (U/~ Cincinnati Executive Management (EM) informed INSD of the accidental discharge on 12/09/2014. (U/~ PFI I Icollected SAi ISpringfield model 1911 pistol, serial numberl land his spare magazines and submitted these items to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit, for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection. DSU's analysis was the weapon functioned as designed. The Springfield model 1911 is a single-action pistol. (U/~ SAi !indicated in his Signed Sworn Statement he accidentally fired his weapon while attempting to activate the FBI-approved and issued Streamlight TLR-2 flashlight mounted on his pistol. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b7E b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI OFFICE 12/09/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5836071, 04/23/2015 (U) SIRG Observations (U/~ On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed the accidental discharge incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the incident reviewed involved an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. (U/~ Observation 1: during a SWAT operation. SA_l~~__.lexperienced an accidental discharge b6 b7C (U/~ Analysis 1: MIOG Part II, Section 12-2.2(5), Firearms Safety Rules, indicated, "To preclude unintentional discharges when covering an adversary, double-action weapons should be decocked and finger off the trigger. Single-action weapons (including shoulder weapons) should have the safety engaged and finger off the trigger." SAi (U/~ On 12/09/2014, !failed to have the safety of his single-action pistol engaged and failed to keep his finger off the trigger of his weapon when he attempted to activate the mounted flashlight. (U/~ SAi lreceives remedial training on the handling of a Springfield .45, and the use of the safety device thereon. (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Cincinnati will ensure b6 b7C b6 b7C 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if The SIRG found this accidental discharge was caused by lfailure to employ sound pistol safety techniques. Therefore, the SIRG determined the Agent's actions warranted referral deemed necessary. SAi UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI OFFICE 12/09/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5836071, 04/23/2015 to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division, for any further administrative action. (U~Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chief .. Civil R ...... i ....g_h_t_s______..., 1---------.1 Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice (DOJ); r---------1----~ Criminal Section, DOJ; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) L - - - - - - r -__...__ _..., I Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA ,._ ....... _ ...... ............ I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) ,_________l._.P....... r ....a...c,_t....i....,·cal Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); SSA ____ _____ ~------.~ I .______________.I Firearms Training Unit, TD; ucl Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Grou ; SSA Violent Crime and Gang Section; SSA._I_______. Defensive Systems Unit(DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A. ..._C_o_e_,_C_D __-2-,~Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ssAI ..._______.I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Assistant Special Agent In Charge Jim Kirdar, Office Of Inspector General, DOJ; ucl Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders! I I I I OI, INSD; uc,I land Management Program Analysts (MAPAs) ....--------....._ ___, .........--------"'"-----. ......I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), _____ ________________ INSD; MAPAI r-"------------....----1I Inspection Analysis Unit, and Special Assistant! IOI, INSD. (U) Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Cincinnati, is responsible for ensuring the Inspection Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT CINCINNATI OFFICE 12/09/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5836071, 04/23/2015 determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. (U/~ SAC, Cincinnati, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve the Instruction. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief (UC) Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is ._s_e_r__ i_a_l_i_z_e_d--,--p-1-ease E-mail the Sentinel link to ucl....______ I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Animal Shooting Cincinnati Field Title: Date: 04/14/2015 Off ice CC: b6 b7C From: BOSTON BS-ASCT Contact: Approved By: Drafted THOMAS VADIM DANIEL David Paul Gelios TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C By:_I~~~~~~~--- Case ID #: 297L-HQ-A5836068 (U) Cincinnati Field Off ice Animal Shooting Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG meeting held on 03/17/2015. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the Cincinnati Field Off ice by the Chief Inspector on 12/09/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 12/23/2014, was submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agentl Cincinnati Field Office. .._~~~~~~~ b6 b7C Details: On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed an Animal Shooting incident which occurred on 12/09/2014, involving Special Agent (SA)I Cincinnati Field Office. SAi !discharged four ~r-o_u_n_d...,....s___,,f~r-o-m~h,........,.i_s__, Bureau-issued M4 rifle into a pit bull breed dog. UNCLASSIFIED/~ The shooting took b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Animal Shooting Cincinnati Field Office Re: 297L-HQ-A5836068, 04/14/2015 place as the Cincinnati Field Office SWAT Team executed a search warrant, issued by the United States District Court, Southern District Of Ohio, on a residence located atl Ohio. The purpose of the warrant was to search the property for heroin and any other illegally controlled substances and related paraphernalia. I On 12/09/2015, at approximately 10:05 a.m., the search warrant was executed at and after breaching several doors, the SWAT Team made entry into the residence. SAi lalong with SAs were in the kitchen of the residence ..a_n_d_l_o_c_a_t_e_d__a_d_o_o_r_l_e_a_d_i_n_g__t_o_a_ gar age . SA 10 o ke d in to the I I b6 b7C b6 b7C garage with a flashlight and could not determine if anyone was present. sAI lstated, "FBI, come out with your hands up." After no response, SAi lthrew a flash-bang into the garage from the top of the stairway which led into the garage. _______________ ___. entered the garage . SAs .._ SA._l_ ___.I pushed an automatic garage door button located at the top of the stairs which opened the garage door. As the door opened, SAsl observed a pit bull dog run out of the garage and onto the driveway. SAi !walked out of the garage and advised a SWAT Team member assigned to the perimeter of the residence that he was going to close the garage door to keep the pit bull out of the garage while they conducted a search. I b6 b7C I __________ SAs ... _.!went back to the stairway and attempted to close the garage door using the garage door button, however the garage door would not close. SAi standing in the center of the garage, observed the pit bull run back into the garage. The Pit bull's ears were pinned back and the dog did not make any noise as it ran toward I I__________ SAs .. __.lwho were on the stairs. SAi lstated, "dog," and "no, no, no." SA feared the dog could cause serious bodily harm to SAs and as the dog closed to within five feet of the Agents, SA rounds from his M4 rifle ---- UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Animal Shooting Cincinnati Field Office Re: 297L-HQ-A5836068, 04/14/2015 into the pit bull. expired. The dog stopped at the foot of the stairs and SIRG OBSERVATIONS (U/~ On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed the Animal Shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined the application of deadly force towards the pit bull breed dog was justified under the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. 2. Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning The SIRG determined there were no safety issues and operational plans were followed in and execution, training and/or safety issues. accordance with Bureau policy. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of Inspections (OI) INSD; Deputy Chief Civil Ri hts Division, .............. ___.____, Criminal Section, Department of Justice (DOJ); Criminal ...._ Section, DOJ; Supervisory Special Agent(SSA) Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA L----r-----, Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) ....... Practical Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); SSA L.r--------------. Firearms Training Unit, TD; UC Special ________ ..... ____________ ----- I I Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA Violent Crime and Gang Section; SSA .. Defensive Systems Unit(DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ssAI I .._______.I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Di vision. The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Assistant Special Agent In Charge Jim Kirdar, Office Of Inspector General; I______. ucl UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Animal Shooting Cincinnati Field Office Re: 297L-HQ-A5836068, 04/14/2015 Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders! I I IOI, INSD; UC~ ...... I land Management Program Analysts (MAPAs)I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; MAPA ......I Inspection Analysis Unit, and Special Assistant loI,INSD . I ------~~~~~~~--~~~~---. t-~~~~~~~~~~.,....~~~~ rr-~~~~~~~~~~ ...._~~~~~~~~~---' •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge in the FBIHQ Indoor Firing Range Title: Date: 04/14/2015 CC:I_From: b6 b7C INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: LEFF DOUGLAS A Trent R. Teyema TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Approved By: Drafted b6 b7C By:~I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___. Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A6023919 (U) Counterterrorism Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG meeting held on 03/17/2015 Administrative Notes: The shooting incident review was delegated to the Counterterrorism Division by the Chief Inspector on 01/21/2015. The Shooting Incident Report was submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agent ~I___________.Ion 02/20/2015. b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed an Accidental Discharge which occurred on 01/20/2015, involving Supervisory SpeciallAgentl(SSA) ITOS II, Counterterrorism Division (CTD) _ SSA was I I at the FBIHQ Indoor Firing Range for firearms qualification training with his Glock 22 Pistol. Courses of fire included the Immediate Distance Drill and two PQCs. UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge in the FBIHQ Indoor Firing Range Re: 297K-HQ-A6023919, 04/14/2015 (U/~ On 01/20/2015, at approximately 3:10 p.m., SSA~l~~__.land six additional shooters reported to the firing line to begin the Intermediate Distance Drill. During the drill, the shooters were required to begin each stage of fire by drawing from concealment. Following four stages of fire, which consisted of approximately 30 rounds, ssAI !reloaded his weapon and attempted to holster. Upon holstering his weapon, ssAI laccidently discharged one round through the right front pocket of his cargo pants. The round skimmed the seam on the right leg of ssAI I cargo pants, did not make contact with ssAI I and impacted the range floor. ssAI I stated he believed his outer garment caught the trigger and caused the weapon to discharge. b6 b7C (U/~ On 01/20/2015, at approximately 6:05 p.m., the WFO Evidence Response Team (ERT) arrived on scene and recovered several empty .40 caliber shell casings from firing lanes at the indoor range, and located the discharged round which struck and was lodged in the cement floor at lane 5. (U/~ On 01/30/2015, SSA~l~~~~IGlock 22 was submitted to the Training Division, Defensive Weapons System Unit (DSU) for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection. On 02/05/2015, DSU Gunsmith! I inspected and tested the weapon. Gunsmithc==Jdid not observe any weapon malfunctions or modifications during the testing; the weapon functioned as designed. SIRG OBSERVATIONS (U/~ On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed the agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: 1. (U/~ Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined this was not a deadly force issue. 2. (U/~ Provide the Director with an evaluative analysis, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge in the FBI HQ Indoor Firing Range Re: 297K-HQ-A6023919, 04/14/2015 operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. (U/~ Observation 1: CTD ssAI I experienced an accidental discharge while attempting to holster his weapon during firearms b6 b7C qualification training. (U/~ Analysis 1: ssAI I participated in firearms training, which included the Intermediate Distance Drill. During the drill, the shooters were required to begin each stage of fire by drawing from concealment. Following four stages of fire, which consisted of approximately 30 rounds, SSAI !reloaded his weapon and attempted to holster. As he holstered his weapon, ssAI laccidentally discharged one round. ssAI I stated he believed his outer garment caught the b6 b7C trigger and caused the weapon to discharge. ssAI I attends remedial weapons handling training focused on the safe holstering of weapons. 3. b6 b7C Provide recommendations for administrative action if This matter is being referred to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for potential administrative action. deemed necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chief I I Civil R~i-·g_h __t_s__________, Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice (DOJ); r--"---------~ Criminal Division, DOJ; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) L-----r--.._-..., ,.._ __.........,Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA....,.. __,___. ....., __.___, Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); SSA ~------........-----.Firearms Training Unit, TD; I Special ____ _____ ____ ucl Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; Assistant Section Chiefl violent Crime and Gang I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge in the FBIHQ Indoor Firing Range Re: 297K-HQ-A6023919, 04/14/2015 Section; ssAI !Defensive Systems Unit(DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ssAI I Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Assistant Special Agent In Charge Jim Kirdar, Office Of Inspector General; ucl !Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, Vadim D. Thomas, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders! I .....loI, INSD; ucl Management Program Analysts (MAPAs)j Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; MAPAI Inspection Analysis Unit, and Special Assistant! INSD. b6 b7C land ...._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I ...._~~~~---~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~ I ........... ....____,,.....~~~~~~~~~ ..... IOI, ~~~~~~~~~~--' Procedure for Responding to the Observation (U/~ AD, CTD, is responsible for ensuring the inspection Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed by CTD. The Inspector-in-Charge will review CTD's response to determine if Instruction 1 above is resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans to implement. (U/~AD, CTD, is required to provide a written response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by CTD to resolve the Instruction. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief~I~~~~~~~~--' Inspection Management Unit, INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please email the Sentinel link to MAPAr IAny questions may be directed to Assistant InspectorfTeam Leaderj...._~~~~~~~~ •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: (U/~ Cyber Division 03/26/2016 Accidental Discharge 06/24/2016 Date: CC: From: b6 b7C INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C FRANK S. VITO Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: ~1-------~ Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A7364612 (U) Cyber Division Shooting Incident 03/26/2016. Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and instructions of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the Washington Field Office by Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney on 03/28/2016. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 04/27/2016, was submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Washington Field Office_ ..___ _ __. I ________.I b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 05/10/2016, the SIRG reviewed a 03/26/2016 accidental discharge incident involving Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) _ _ _ _ _lcyber Di vision_ ..___ _ _ __. I UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Cyber Division 03/26/2016 Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A7364612, 06/24/2016 On 03/26/2016, at approximately 10:30 p.m.,~1~~~~~~~--' of Cyber Division Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) r-----------a-c...Jcidentally discharged one round from SSA (U/ I______. Bureau-issued .40 Smith & Wesson Glock 22 handgun, serial number I I in their apartment. I !experienced the accidental discharge while moving the loaded Glock 22 SSAI lstored unholstered in a small lockbox thel lused to secure weapons and personal valuables. The round did not exit the apartment's master bedroom and no one was injured during the incident. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Washington Field Office (WFO) by Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney on 03/28/2016. On 03/26/2016, at approximately 10:30 p.m., . .SSA . . . - - - - - - - . . , __ ____. returned to their apartment, located at L---r-----1 after dinner. SSA .-----i----...J then left the apartment to walk their dogs. While SSA was walking their dogs, I lused a key to open a small lockbox to replace a credit card. The couple kept the lockbox under their nightstand to secure ssAI !weapons and the couples' small valuables. ssAI lroutinely stored his issued Glock 22 and his FBI-approved personally-owned Glock 27 loaded and unholstered in the lockbox. Whenl lopened it, the box contained SSA loaded and unholstered Glock 22. While attempting to move the weapon, depressed the trigger, accidentally discharging one Speer .40 Smith & b6 b7C b7E (U/ .,.....;.....;....;.::;;....__;:::o,,.,_ ____, b6 b7C Wesson duty round into the nightstand. (U/~ minutes! I When ssAI I returned to the apartment after 30-45 lwas sitting on the balcony and seemed bothered, but SSA ldid not know why and did not press her for an explanation before going to bed. On 03/27/2016, at approximately 11:30 a.m., SSAI I opened the lockbox to store the Glock 27 he had been carrying the previous week. When he opened the box he noticed his Glock 22 was not there. He subsequently located it in the bottom drawer of the nightstand. SSAI !checked the Glock 22 and found a round missing and the weapon dirty. SSAI !observed a hole in the front of the nightstand and wood fragments on the floor, and located a fired bullet UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Cyber Division 03/26/2016 Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A7364612, 06/24/2016 and expended shell casing on the bedroom floor. He placed the bullet and casing in a plastic bag. When questioned by ssAI I initially denied removing the gun from the lockbox or firing it. However, after ssAI !expressed his intent to investigate the incident as a break-in she admitted she accidentally fired it. b6 b7C (U/~ ssAI I did not report the accidental discharge until late morning on 03/28/2016, when he notified his CyD and Birmingham Field Office chains of command. (SSA I Iwas on a Headquarters Staffing Initiative TDY to CyD from the Birmingham Field Office.) SSA ._~~~-!stated in his Signed Sworn Statement he was unaware an accidental discharge under these circumstances must be reported until he checked the policy on Monday, 03/28/2016. The WFO Evidence Response Team (ERT) processed SSA_l~~~~­ apartment at approximately 2:00 p.m. on 03/29/2016. ERT sketched, photographed, and documented the scene, took custody of the bullet and shell casing collected by SSAI I and collected SSAI IGlock 22, magazine, and ammunition. ERT did not identify any holes in SSA I I apartment indicating a bullet exited the residence, and assessed the scene was consistent with information provided by SSA b6 b7C (U/~ b6 b7C I (U/~ On 03/29/2016, the Fairfax County Police Department (FCPD) advised it received no complaints or reports related to the incident and considered it an internal FBI administrative matter. Due to the time elapsed between the incident and investigation, and the other evidence, no attempt was made to identify or interview other witnesses. I lwas interviewed on 04/05/2016, regar_d_i_n_g..__ __, this incident. Her account was materially consistent with SSA_I______ Signed Sworn Statement. b6 b7C (U/~ On 04/05/2016, the weapon, magazine, and ammunition were turned over to FBIHQ Primary Firearms Instructor ( PFI) for submission to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection. PFI I...____.I delivered the weapon to DSU on 04/08/2016. _I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Cyber Division 03/26/2016 Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A7364612, 06/24/2016 (U/~ Inspection and testing conducted by DSU indicated SSA --~~~---1 weapon functioned as designed. b6 b7C SIRG Observations (U/~ On 05/10/2016, the SIRG reviewed the accidental discharge shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. (U/~ As the incident reviewed involved an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. (U/~ Observation 1: SSA .. l _________...lfailed to secure his weapon in accordance with the Firearms Policy Guide, 0741PG, subsections 4.1.2.1 and 4.1.2.3. (U/~ Analysis 1: The Firearms Policy Guide (FPG), dated 01/08/2015, subsections 4.1.2.1, and 4.1.2.3, articulated firearms security requirements and acceptable security methods. Subsection 4.1.2.1 stated in relevant part, "FBI personnel are responsible for the security of all FBI-approved firearms under their control in order to prevent unauthorized handling and unintentional discharges added]." [emphasis Subsection 4.1.2.3 stated in relevant part: FBI personnel must ensure the security of their issued and approved FBI firearms at all times while the firearms are maintained in their residences. When unattended, FBI firearms must be secured by one of the following methods to prevent access by unauthorized personnei [empha UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Cyber Division 03/26/2016 Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A7364612, 06/24/2016 sis added], regardless of location: Install an FBI-issued Master Lock #528 (large, curved-shackle lock available from the DSU), armored cable lock, or other device capable of rendering the firearm inoperable. Field strip the weapon, and store major components in different locations (e.g., slide and receiver separated). As a last resort, handcuffs may be used to deter reassembly or to immobilize the firearm. Store the weapon in a commercially available lock box, gun safe, or other locked, secure container. If stored in this manner, the firearm may be stored loaded. (U/~ on 03/26/2016, ssAI entered a lo c kb ox in which "'"1-------,_l_s_t_o_r_e_d_p_e_r_s_o_n_a_l__v_a_l_u_a_b_l_e_s__a_n_d__S_.SA I !firearms to replace a credit card. I !accidentally depressed the trigger and fired one round from SSAI I FBI-issued Glock 22 while moving it. ssAI lstated in his Signed Sworn Statement he routinely stored his FBI service pistols loaded and unholstered in the lockbox to whichl had unrestricted access. b6 b7C I (U~ While SSAI !employed an approved method to store his weapons, he stored them loaded and unholstered in a container to which I lhad unrestricted access. INSD determined SSAI lthus failed to ensure the method chosen adequately addressed an explicit objective of the security policy - "to prevent unauthorized handling b6 b7C and unintentional discharges." (U/~ Instruction 1: (U/~ Observation 2: AD, CyD will ensure SSAI !receives remedial firearms training, including security of FBI-issued firearms per the Firearms Policy Guide, 0741PG, subsection 4.1.2. Upon learning! !accidentally weapon, SSA .. did not know or discharged his FBI-issued follow the Agent-involved shooting policy specified in the Shooting I. . . . . . .____. . . .__I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Cyber Division 03/26/2016 Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A7364612, 06/24/2016 Incident Response Procedures Policy Directive, 0782D, Section 11.4. (U/~ Analysis 2: The Shooting Incident Response Procedures Policy Directive, 0782D, dated 04/24/2015, Section 11.4, stated: In the event of an AIS [Agent-involved shooting}, the involved FBI employee (or designee) should: 11.4.1 Notify his or her supervisor immediately. 11.4.2 Notify local law enforcement. In the event of an accidental discharge, notify local law enforcement i f either required by law, the location of the AIS is in proximity to residential or business premises, or the circumstances indicate the potential for public alarm. 11.4.3 Secure and leave the accidental discharge scene undisturbed, to the extent practicable, until the arrival of ERT and supervisory personnel. (U/~ ssAI lstated in his Signed Sworn Statement he was unaware he was reguired to immediately notify his supervisor upon learning! I accidentally fired a round from his FBI-issued Glock 22. He failed to notify his supervisor until the following day, did not notify local law enforcement, and collected the fired bullet and shell casing himself. ssAI lstatus as an experienced and current FBI-certified firearms instructor increased the expectation he should know and follow firearms incident policy. (U/~ Instruction 2: AD, CyD will ensure SSAI lreviews and complies with the requirements in the Shooting Incident Response Procedures Policy Directive. 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary. (U/~ The SIRG voted and unanimously agreed to refer this matter UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Cyber Division 03/26/2016 Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A7364612, 06/24/2016 to the Internal Investigation Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for further administrative review and potential administrative action. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chiefl Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ); Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I !Tactical Training Unit (TTU), Training Division (TD); Assistant Section Chiefl _______.I Violent Crime and Gang Section, Criminal Investiga_t_i_v_e_____. I Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; SSA Investigative Law Unit, Office of -----------------~ General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Roger A. Coe, East Asia Section, ..... Counterintelligence Division; Senior Trial Attorney .-------..__ _ _ _ _ _ _,___...J Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC ..._________...,...__________---1 ..--.....;..____ ...._ Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; UC SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); ssAI I Laboratory Division. _______.I Evidence Response Team Unit, b6 b7C ----------- _________... (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas, Kathryn Peterson, and Lawrence E. Koleff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leadersl OI, INSD; Management and Program Analysts OI, INSD; Special Assistant INSD; L----r----------------,1 SSA SOU, CIRG; SSA TTU, TD; SS .-----1--...----------' ___________. DSU, TD; and ASAC Jim Kirdar, USDOJ Inspector General. I Procedures for responding to the Observations (U/~ AD, Cyber Division is responsible for ensuring each Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until each instruction is addressed by the division. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the division's response to UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Cyber Division 03/26/2016 Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A7364612, 06/24/2016 determine if the Instructions have been resolved or require further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. (U/~ AD, Cyber Division is required to provide a written response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the division to resolve the Instructions. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Any questions may be directed to Assistant Inspector/Team Leaderl I I I ~~ •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/ ~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Detroit Field Office, 1/15/2016 Title: Date: 10/25/2016 b6 b7C From: OMAHA OM-9 Contact: Approved By: Drafted WELLING ERIC D Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C By:~I~~~~~~--' Case ID #: 297I-HQ-A6846789 (U) Detroit Field Office Shooting Incident Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shooting Incident Report, dated 07/14/2016, was prepared by INSD Inspector Eric Welling and Assistant Inspector/Team Leader! I b6 b7C Details: (U~ On 08/25/2016, the SIRG reviewed a shooting incident involving the use of deadly force by Special Agent .......__, Detroit Field Office, which occurred on 1/15/2016 in On 01/15/2016 at approximately 7:45 P.M., SA and three Task Force Officers (TFO) were involved in the shooting incident while attempting to apprehend! land Rakeem Bentley in support of a Human Trafficking I Child Prostitution operation. During the incident ...._,.....~~~~~~ .---~~~-;...~~~~~~~~~ one of the TFOs was shot in ballistic vest, and Rakeem Bentley was shot UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Agent Involved Shooting Incident Detroit Field Office, 1/15/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A6846789, 10/25/2016 and killed. In response to the Agent Involved Shooting (AIS), the Inspection Division (INSD) deployed a Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) on 01/16/2016. A Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team did not deploy. The SIRT investigation revealed the following: (U/~ The Detroit Field Office Violent Crimes Against Children (VCAC) squad was working jointly with partners on the Southeast Michigan Trafficking and Exploitation Crimes Task Force (SEMTEC) on a three-day operation during the North American International Auto Show targeting underage prostitution and trafficking. The SEMTEC is an FBI-led task force, supervised by Detroit VCAC SSA .. I____________. b6 b7C (U/~ On 01/15/2016 at approximately 7:30 P.M., SAli-------T_F_o_ __, I (Huron Township Police Department), TFO_ ._(_M"""i_c_h_i"'"·_g_a_n_S_t_a_t_,e Police ) , and T FO I I ( Hig hl._a_n_d_P_a_r_k_P_o_l_i_c_e.... Department) were on surveillance at the Marriott Hotel, located at 27033 Northwestern Highway, Southfield, Michigan, when they were requested by the command post to locate and detain the occupants of a gray Chrysler Pacifica, which delivered a prostitute to the hotel. SA .______.land TFOI l1ocated the vehicle in the hotel parking and then blocked the Pacifica with their vehicle and activated emergency lights. land TFol lthen exited their vehicle to detain the ants. lapproached the driver,I and TFO approached the passenger, Rakeem Bentley (Rakeem). When TFO SAi b6 b7C I, SAi ~===:====~-a......nd I TFo.,...._____.arrived at the scene, TFol backed up TFO ...._..,....._ _....._b_a_c..,ked up I The driver,!____.. complied with SA commands and was handcuffed. Rakeem, who was 5 foot 8 inches, 272 pounds, resisted and a struggle ensued amongst Rakeem, TFOI SAi I and TFO ._I_ __ _ . (U/~ During the struggle, Rakeem removed TFOI I Glock 27 . 40 caliber pistol (serial from TFOI !non-retention hip holster and shot TFol lonce in the body armor covering his abdomen. The round did not penetrate TFOI !ballistic vest. TFol lfell from the impact. TFOI lcontinued struggling to disarm Rakeem, #I I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Detroit Field Office, 1/15/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A6846789, 10/25/2016 SAi first standing and then on the ground. lheard the shot fired and observed Rakeem on the ground, holding a handgun, and wrestling with TFO approached Rakeem. Due to the immediate danger and close entanglement of TFol land Rakeem, lput his FBI-issued Glock 22 .40 caliber pistol (serial weapon "within a few inches from Rakeem's head" and fired one shot to eliminate the threat to himself and other law enforcement personnel. I I SAi I #I SAi b6 b7C b7E I (U/~After Rakeem was shot, TFOI !handcuffed him behind his back and assessed his condition. Rakeem did not have a pulse. Southfield Fire Emergency Medical Services (EMS) responded to the scene, pronounced Rakeem deceased and contacted the Oakland County Medical Examiner. TFOI !sustained a non-penetrating injury to his abdomen beneath his ballistic vest, and was transported by task force personnel to a nearby medical center. TFOI lwas later released. The Detroit ERT processed the shooting scene. (U/~ The SIRT obtained Signed Sworn Statements (SSS) from SA ...___ __.I TFO TFO TFO .... and Cadetl regarding the AIS. The SIRT conducted 27 additional interviews of Detroit management, TFOs, other law enforcement officers, FBI SAs, a second police Cadet, and a non-governmental organization witness, all of which were documented on FD-302s. The SIRT obtained nine Michigan State Police (MSP) investigative reports related to the incident. The MSP canvassed the hotel and surrounding area for additional witnesses on the night of the incident. The interviews documented in the SSSs and FD-302s were consistent regarding the circumstances of the AIS. I I I I 1-------1 I b6 b7C b6 b7C (U/~ On 01/16/2016, the Oakland County ME performed an autopsy on I Rakeem. On 4/14/2016, Deputy Medical Examiner,! M.D. rendered the following opinion: Rakeem Bentley, a 28 year old male, died of a gunshot wound to the head while fighting with police. In consideration of the circumstances of this death, autopsy findings and toxicological analysis, the manner of death is homicide. b6 b7C (U/~ b6 b7C SAi land TFol lwere wearing body armor when they approached Rakeem andl Both law enforcement vehicles had their I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Detroit Field Office, 1/15/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A6846789, 10/25/2016 emergency lights activated. Other than badges, the operational personnel were not wearing readily-identifiable law enforcement markings as directed in the Operations Plan. (U/~ On 05/16/2016, after review of the materials presented by the SIRT, the Oakland County Attorney's Office determined SAi ldid not commit any act that warranted criminal prosecution. A letter of declination was provided to SAC Gelios byl lof the Warrants Division of the Oakland County Prosecutor's Office. (U/~ On 06/22/2016, Deputy Chiefl..._~~~~~~~-1 U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, provided a prosecutorial declination for SAi lregarding the 01/15/2016 AIS incident. The declination was provided to IIC Welling via email. b6 b7C b6 b7C SIRG Observations On 08/25/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: Upon review of the facts and circumstances of the Agent-Involved shooting incident, the SIRG unanimously concluded the application of deadly force by SA~l~~~~-lon 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. b6 b7C 01/15/2016 was within the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational panning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ Observation 1: Civilians participated in an FBI surveillance and arrest operation as observers without EM authorization. (U/~ Analysis la: Cadetl I a non-sworn civilian employee of the Southfield Police Department, was present in the FBI vehicle assigned to TFol !throughout the operation. Cadet~I~~~~ was authorized by his Police Department for a ride-along as part of his training, and was permitted to attend the operational briefing. Detroit UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Detroit Field Office, 1/15/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A6846789, 10/25/2016 SA I..___________.I authorized Cadetl Ito join a surveillance/arrest team as an observer. The Detroit SSA, ASAC and SAC were not aware of Cadetl !participation as part of the surveillance/arrest team. I (U/~ Cadet lwas a non-sworn, civilian employee of a law enforcement agency participating in an FBI-led operation and in an FBI vehicle as an observer. Cadetl lwas deployed under dangerous circumstances and/or against targets which were potentially Armed and Dangerous. Subjects of the operation, specifically pimps, qualify as Armed and Dangerous as they are typically affiliated with violent crime, could reasonably be believed to present a potential risk of violent reaction toward surveillance personnel, or demonstrate confrontational or unpredictable behavior toward other persons. (U/~ Cadetl !participation in the surveillance was not approved by DE management. (U/~ Analysis lb: TFo._l_ ___.I allowed._l_ _ _ _ _ _ __.I a civilian employee from the Salvation Army, to observe the planned human trafficking operation andl !attended the operations briefing at the Southfield Police Department. TFOI lthen drove her to the command post at the Marriott Hotel. Immediately following the shooting incident, lwas left alone in the observation room and walked to the detention room to be near law enforcement personnel. While in the detention room, lstayed with two FBI agents, a TFO, two prostitutes and a handcuffed male subject who delivered one of the prostitutes. I b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C I (U//~ DIOG Section 19.2.4 gives specific guidance to agents conducting arrests and handling prisoners, emphasizing safety concerns and risks facing the agents.I I a non-law enforcement, untrained civilian, was permitted to remain unattended in the observation room with law enforcement sensitive materials and in the immediate vicinity of three detained individuals, a high-risk environment for which law enforcement personnel receive extensive training. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Detroit Field Office, 1/15/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A6846789, 10/25/2016 (U/~ Accepting the need to cooperate with partner agencies and to include private partners where appropriate, no specific FBI authorization was obtained forl !participation (outside of the Southfield Police Department) andl l1acked oversight, resulting in ._~~~~~I self-directed access to individuals being detained. (U/~ Analysis le: Two civilians, Cadetl were permitted in the vicinity of an operation which resulted in the application of deadly force. Civilian participation in the FBI operation exposed both to potentially life threatening situations and exposed sensitive materials (equipment and information) to unmonitored access by non-law enforcement personnel. FBI management was not aware of the level of civilian participation in the operation. 19.2.3 (U) ARREST PLANS (U) The ADIC/SAC is responsible to ensure that careful and thorough planning is conducted for the successful execution of a high risk arrest operation involving a potentially dangerous situation or subject. The arrest plan must be adapted to each situation and must include relevant details to enhance the safety and effectiveness of the agents and officers involved in the search operation. The planning and execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to experienced Agents. All arrest plans must be approved by ASACs or their designees. (U/7.l::@wtZ[ Recommendation 1: SAC, Detroit should ensure civilian participation in operations is authorized by EM. 3. b6 b7C (U/~ Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if The SIRG did not recommend the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. deemed necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Eric D. Welling, Office of UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U//FOUO) Agent Involved Shooting Incident Detroit Field Office, 1/15/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A6846789, 10/25/2016 Inspections (OI), INSD; Section Chief (SC) M.A. Myers, Instruction Section, Training Division (TD); SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) .__________.I Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; SSA._I____________. Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Charles McGonigal, CD-2 Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; UC .. Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; Senior Trial Attorney Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; uc .. SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); SSAI I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. I__________, b6 b7C I______. (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Kathryn Peterson and Regina Thompson, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders OI, INSD; Management and Program Analysts b6 b7C L--------------,--------.......------...L..---. ._~~~--'I OI, ~I_N_S_D~;~s_s_A_._~~---,1-~~~~ sou, CIRG; SSA.._~~~~~~--' TTU, TD; SSA TTU, TD; and ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ Inspector General. Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Detroit, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the Division to resolve Recommendation 1. The inspection process is not complete until the Recommendation is addressed by the Division. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Division's response to determine if the Recommendation has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit, INSD. I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Detroit Field Office, 1/15/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A6846789, 10/25/2016 •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Detroit Field Office, 02/04/2016 Title: CC: Date: 10/25/2016 b6 I From: b7C INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: WELLING ERIC D Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: I._____________. Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A6966889 b6 b7C (U) Detroit Shooting Incident Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shooting Incident Report, dated 04/19/2016, was prepared by the delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) _ The SIRT included Assistant Inspector-In-Place (AIIP)I I land ASAC I I The Inspector's Report, dated 07/18/2016, was prepared by INSD Inspector Eric D. Welling and Assistant Inspector/Team Leaderl I b6 b7C I Details: (U/~ On 08/25/2016, the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed an accidental discharge shooting incident involving Special Agent (sAil who accidentally discharged a round from her FBI-issued Glock Model 22, on 02/04/2016. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Detroit Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 02/04/2016. I UNCLASSIFIED/~ bG b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Detroit Field Office, 02/04/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A6966889, 10/25/2016 The delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation revealed the following: (U/~ On 02/04/2016, Iaccidentally SAi .40 caliber round from her FBI-issued Glock 22, serial discharged one number~l~~~--­ causing injury to her right leg and foot. participating in firearms qualifications sAl....-~~~~- Schoolcraft College indoor range. wearing her holster on her right side. The range training was supervised by three FBI-certified firearms instructors. (U/~At approximately 9:00 a.m., the Agents downloaded their weapons and firearms instructors conducted a safety check of each Agent's weapon. Lead firearms instructor, SA~l~~~~~~~~~-1 provided a firearms safety brief followed by a block of defensive tactics training led by firearms instructor b6 b7C SA~I~~~~~~~--- (U/~ At the conclusion of this training, Agents loaded their weapons and shot the FBI's pistol qualification course (PQC) without incident. The Agents reloaded in preparation for another PQC. During the first course of fire, while wearing a concealing garment, SA ._~~~~~!attempted to draw her weapon from the holster during the one-handed, three-shot stage of fire. weapon, SAi In the process of drawing the laccidently discharged her weapon, causing injury to her right leg and foot. SAi lstated in her Signed Sworn Statement (SSS), "As the targets turned, I had trouble drawing my pistol; it was not a clean draw. I am not sure what exactly happened, during the draw of my weapon, I just know that it was not a normal draw. Almost immediately I felt a burning sensation in my right foot. I looked down and saw upon the floor a spent bullet." UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 A witness stated b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Detroit Field Office, 02/04/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A6966889, 10/25/2016 he observed, during the "draw stroke" of Iweapon from the SAi holster, the muzzle flash from her gun as it was pointed downward and the weapon recoil while nearly simultaneously b6 b7C SA~l~~~~~__.lbody experience a "slight jolt." (U/~ Upon realizing she shot herself, SA~l~~~~_.lsafely benched her weapon on the table in her firing lane, exited her firing lane, and notified the firearms instructors. Firearms instructors assisted her to a chair, administered first aid, and alerted Schoolcraft College range personnel, who called 911. SA._l_ _ ___.lwas b6 b7C transported to a local hospital where it was determined she had entry and exit wounds in her thigh and right foot. released later that day. She was treated and lhas made a full recovery from her SAi injuries. (U/~ Detroit firearms instructors contacted Detroit EM, the ERT, and the PFI. Detroit SAC David P. Gelios notified INSD of the accidental discharge. On 02/04/2016, the Chief Inspector delegated the investigation of the Agent Involved Shooting to Detroit ASAc_l~~~~- b6 b7C The Detroit ERT responded to the firing range at Schoolcraft College to process the scene, and collected SAi._~~~~~~ weapon, holster, belt, and the spent shell casing. confirmed by a witness interview, SAi The ERT noted, !holster also had a bullet hole in it. (U/~ On 05/11/2016, Detroit PFI~I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___. submitted the weapon and magazine to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) for a weapon serviceability inspection. On 06/13/2016, the DSU subsequently inspected and tested SA_l~~~~~--­ firearm, and concluded the firearm functioned as designed. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Detroit Field Office, 02/04/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A6966889, 10/25/2016 (U/~ Detroit documented sAI laccount of the accidental discharge in a Signed Sworn Statement, which was consistent with witness interviews, range surveillance footage and ERT processing of the scene. Detroit completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed SA~l_ _ _ _ ___.lfirearms qualification and training records b6 b7C were current. SIRG Observations On 08/25/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: Because the shooting was determined to be an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ Observation 1: SA ~I______________.I Detroit Field b6 b7C Office, accidentally discharged a round during firearms training, causing injury to her leg and foot. (U/~ Analysis 1: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide (0741DPG) published on 01/08/2015, Section 4.3.1, Cardinal Safety Rules, stated in relevant part: "Keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to press it" (U/~ !accidentally discharged a round during firearms training. In her SSS, S~ lstated, "As the targets turned, I had trouble drawing my pistol; it was not a clean draw. I am not sure what exactly happened, during the draw of my weapon, I just SAi UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Detroit Field Office, 02/04/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A6966889, 10/25/2016 l_______.laccidental know that it was not a normal draw." SA ... resulted in injury to her leg and foot. discharge !_____ (U/ ~An operational test of SA .. __.I Glock 22 pistol was performed by DSU, and determined the firearm functioned as designed. (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Detroit will ensure I______ SA.. b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C attends remedial firearms training, with specific emphasis on the safe handling of firearms 3. Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed The SIRG recommended the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Eric D. Welling, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Section Chief (SC) M.A. Myers, Instruction Section, Training Division (TD); SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID); Unit .-c_h_i_e_f__(_u_c_)~l._..,________.I Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; SSA._I_ ___ Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Charles McGonigal, CD-2 Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ucl Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; ___._,Organized Crime and Gang Senior Trial Attorney Section, USDOJ; UC Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; UC SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); ssAI Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. I b6 b7C I _____________ I (U/~The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Kathryn Peterson and Regina Thompson, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders OI, INSD; Management and Program Analysts 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Detroit Field Office, 02/04/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A6966889, 10/25/2016 I I I OI, sou, CIRG; S S A D TTU, TD; ssAI TTU, TD; and ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ Inspector General. INSD; ssAI b6 b7C Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Detroit, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instruction 1 is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Detroit, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instruction 1. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief Inspection Management Unit, INSD . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office Title: Date: 01/08/2015 b6 b7C CC:I._____From: INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: Case ID #: R Justin Tolomeo David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara 297L-HQ-A5637323 b6 b7C (U) Animal Shooting Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG meeting held on 12/15/2014. Administrative Notes: (U) The shooting incident review was delegated to the Detroit Field Office by the Acting Chief Inspector on 10/15/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 11/06/2014, ....-------. was submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Detroit Field Office. I I b6 b7C Details: On 12/15/2014, the SIRG reviewed an Animal Shooting incident involving SAi Detroit Field Office, on 10/15/2014. SAi_ _ _ __. discharged one round from his Bureau-issued M4Al rifle at a pit bull breed dog. The shooting took place as the Detroit Field Office, Violent Crimes Task Force, consisting of Squad C-7 Special Agents and Task Force Officers (TFOs) from the Detroit Police Department, executed a search warrant, issued by the State of Michigan, District Court, on a I UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office Re: 297L-HQ-A5637323, 01/08/2015 ________________ ___. Michigan. The residence located at ..._ purpose of the search warrant was to arrest a fugitive wanted in West Virginia for a violent home invasion and enhance an ongoing violent gang investigation. The fugitive was suspected of being a member of the Dirty Dogs street gang investigated by the Detroit Field Office, but not listed as a subject or reference in the case. The Dirty Dogs street gang was involved in multiple robberies and shootings in Detroit and West Virginia. Detroit executed the state warrant in an attempt to garner more information about the gang and the subject. The Detroit Field Office did not initiate a separate fugitive investigation nor was a federal Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) warrant obtained. b6 b7C On October 15, 2014, at approximately 2:15 p.m.,I !Agents and TFOs approached the front door of the residence located ..___________.I Michigan, while other TFOs and uniformed p._o_l_i_c_e______, onl maintained a perimeter around the residence. Agents and TFOs knocked loudly on the door and announced their presence. After approximately one minute and a lack of response, Agents and TFOs breached a steel gate located approximately three feet in front of the main door threshold. Agents and TFOs subsequently breached the wooden front door to gain access to the residence. Immediately upon opening the door, a pit bull dog lunged aggressively towards the entry team barking and growling. Fearing the dog was going to attack the entry team, SA fired one round from his FBI-issued M4Al rifle at .._____________.I the dog striking it on the neck area. The dog fell to the ground but immediately got up and continued charging towards the entry team. A TFO then fired three rounds from his DPD-issued Smith & Wesson .40 caliber handgun at the dog striking it at least once in the face. The dog stopped charging and ran away towards the street. The pit bull dog was recovered several blocks away by the Detroit Animal Control Department and subsequently euthanized. SIRG Observations UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office Re: 297L-HQ-A5637323, 01/08/2015 (U/~ On 12/15/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Animal Shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG determined the application of deadly force towards a pit bull breed dog was justified under the DOJ Deadly Force Policy. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. Observation 1: Detroit did not properly follow requirements for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) investigations. Criminal Investigative Division, Fugitive Policy Implementation Guide, 0404PG, Section 3.4.2 indicated requirements to initiate fugitive investigations. The Fugitive Policy Implementation Guide (FPIG) requires local authorities to have a warrant for a subject's arrest and agree to extradite and prosecute upon Analysis 1: apprehension. A request for assistance must have been received by the local FBI Field Office and the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) must authorize the filing of a complaint. Per the FPIG, there ·~ust be sufficiently articulated facts to show with reasonable certainty that the subject fled interstate for the purpose of avoiding prosecution. " Field Offices have the option of initiating an 88 classification Preliminary Investigation (PI) "to ascertain i f an articulable factual basis of interstate flight exists or to establish probable cause of interstate flight for obtaining a UFAP warrant." Detroit did not receive a request for assistance from local authorities for the arrest of the fugitive and did not seek U.S. Attorney's Office concurrence for a UFAP warrant. Detroit obtained a state of Michigan UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office Re: 297L-HQ-A5637323, 01/08/2015 search warrant to locate the fugitive and effect a West Virginia arrest warrant. The Detroit Field Office did not follow the requirements stated within Section 3.4.2 of the Criminal Investigative Division, Fugitive Policy Implementation Guide, 0404PG. Instruction 1: SAC, Detroit will ensure fugitive investigations follow the requirements listed under section 3.4.2 of the Fugitive Policy Implementation Guide, 0404PG. 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary. The SIRG found this Animal Shooting to be justified under the DOJ Deadly Force Policy and did not recommend any administrative action be taken against SA .. I______________. b6 b7C (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David P. Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following I Board Members were in attendance: Deputy Chiefl Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA1 !Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division (TD); SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, TD; Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ssAI Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; and Inspector Trent R. Teyema, Office Of Inspections (IO), INSD; The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas and Douglas A. Leff, OI,INSD; Assistant ucl I ucl I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Animal Shooting Detroit Field Office Re: 297L-HQ-A5637323, 01/08/2015 ectors/Team Leaders! UC ...... OI, INSD; INSD; Program Management Analyst~j~~~~~.......Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; and Special Assistant OI, INSD. ~~~~~ ~---~---. Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Detroit, is responsible for ensuring the Inspection Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: (U) Accidental Discharge El Paso Field Off ice Date: 04/16/2015 b6 b7C From: INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: PETERSON KATHRYN David Paul Gelios TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C Drafted By: Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A6096153 (U) El Paso Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG meeting held on 03/17/2015. Administrative Notes: (U) The shooting incident review was delegated to the El Paso Field Off ice by the Acting Chief Inspector on 02/03/2015. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 02/20/2015, was submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agent (SSAH I IEl Paso Field Office. .._~~~~- b6 b7C Details: On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed an Accidental Discharge shooting incident involving Special Agent (sAd IEl Paso Field Office, on 02/03/2015. sAI !accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau-issued Rock River Arms LAR-15 rifle toward the floor of I a residence located at during the execution of an arrest warrant. _T_h_e__r__o_u_n_d__i-·m __ p_a_c_t_e_d---S-A~1...-----------.lright foot UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge El Paso Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A6096153, 04/16/2015 causing him significant injuries. No one else was injured during the incident. The shooting incident review was delegated to the EPFO by the Acting Chief Inspector on 02/03/2015. On 02/03/2015, at approximately 6:00 a.m., an arrest team led by SA .____..!consisting of two FBI SAs, six Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) SAs, three Odessa Police Department (OPD) narcotics officers and one OPD uniformed officer b6 b7C multi-subject arrest operation conducted simultaneously in four different sites. Upon obtaining authorization from the Command Post to execute the arrest, SAi !informed his team to take their .._~~~1--~~--- SAi p o sit ions. At that moment, lslung his LAR-15 over his shoulder, removed a magazine from his vest, and loaded his LAR-15 rifle. SAi !ensured his safety was on prior to approaching the residence. I ___..I was SA ... the first Agent in the stack followed by seven other Agents and Police Officers. After knocking and announcing their presence, an older male opened the door halfway and was asked to step out of the house along with a younger female. The arrest team then made entry into the residence clearing the living room, the kitchen, and one bedroom. The team continued down a narrow hallway to clear a bathroom, a bedroom, and another room found to be locked. SA~I_____ entered the bedroom and encountered an adult female along with three younger children sitting on the bed. were escorted out of the room. The female and the three children 1-----.l SA .. lowered his weapon to avoid pointing it toward any of the residents or team members. tight space, SAi lplaced his weapon close to him and straight down the right side of his body. HSI SAi Given the Simultaneously, FBI SAi land lwere attempting to open the locked door located UNCLASSIFIED~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge El Paso Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A6096153, 04/16/2015 across from the cleared bedroom. Iturned SAi around and re-adjusted his weapon whiler-1---------L--....,lbreached the door and cleared the room. went off. SAi Almost immediately, a round from I SAi ILAR-15 then turned his weapon, looked at the safety lever l_-.-___.limmediately and noticed i t.___w_a_s__o_.n the "fire" position . ....._s_A...... pain in his right foot and ankle area. SAi b6 b7C felt lhanded his LAR-15 to SA._!_____.land was immediately evacuated fr.__o_m_t_h_e-residence. SAi.______. was transported to the Odessa Medical Center and later airlifted to the University Medical Center in El Paso, Texas for further treatment. The rest of the team completed clearing the residence and did not locate the subject. A total of six occupants were encountered at the residence which consisted of the the two adults escorted outside upon entry and the adult female and the three children who remained escorted inside the house. The EPFO Evidence Response Team (ERT) arrived on scene and recovered one .223 caliber shell casing. ERT took measurements, sketched, photographed, and documented the scene. ERT did not identify any damage to the floor of the residence. ERT later found bullet fragments inside SAi b6 b7C lboot. SA ._I______.I assigned LAR-15 was sent to the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), Training Division, for inspection and testing. Upon inspecting the weapon, DSU noted a visibly loose pistol grip, which could reduce the compression on the selector. Testing verified this malfunction was not present on the weapon and the selector functioned as designed. Upon review of the Accidental Discharge shooting incident, the SIRG voted and unanimously agreed !mishandled his weapon during the execution of the arrest warrant resulting in an Accidental Discharge. SAi UNCLASSIFIED~ 3 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge El Paso Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A6096153, 04/16/2015 SIRG Observations (U/~ On 03/17/2015, the SIRG reviewed the Accidental Discharge shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the incident reviewed involved an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. Observation 1: SA~l~~~_.laccidentally discharged one round from his Bureau-issued LAR-15 toward the floor causing significant injuries to his right foot. Analysis 1: On 02/03/2015, at approximately 6:05 a.m., sAI b6 b7C I ._~~~~~IEPFO, accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau-issued b6 b7C Rock River Arms LAR-15 rifle toward the floor of a residence in Odessa, Texas, while maneuvering his weapon during the execution of an arrest warrant. The round impacted SAi right foot causing him significant injuries. I Instruction 1: SAC, El Paso will ensure firearms training. Observation 2: SA~l~~~_.lattends b6 b7C remedial Icarried al b6 b7C I Analysis 2: I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge El Paso Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A6096153, 04/16/2015 b7E On 02/04/2015, El Paso Primary Firearms Instructor! received the weapon carried by SAi lduring the......_a_c_c_i_d_e__n_t_a_l_______. discharge on 02/03/2015, described as a Rock River Arms, LAR-15, serial numberl I On 02/05/2015, PFII !examined the magazine contained within the LAR-15 prior to packaging the weapon to be sent to the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU). PFI noted the magazine contained a staggering of Instruction 2: SAC, El Paso will ensure Agents comply with the requirements listed under I I Observation 3: b6 b7C b7E b7E El Paso did not secure the scene prior to the arrival of ERT. Analysis 3: Immediately upon the accidental discharge on 02/03/2015, SAi I was transported by HSI RACI Ito the Odessa.-------~ Medical Center hospital to receive medical attention. After SAi._________ had been taken to the car and the entire residence had been cleared, FBI SAi ltook photos of areas inside of the residence where the accidental discharge occurred, the blood on the floor, and the spent .223 caliber casing, with his FBI-issued Samsung Galaxy phone. Thereafter, sAI I communicated with his supervisor via cellular phone, ssAI I and proceeded to clean the blood on the floor. The team then left the residence at approximately 6:45 a.m. to continue to search for the subject who was not located at the residence. At approximately 1:30 p.m., the El Paso ERT arrived to the scene of the accidental discharge located atl The team I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge El Paso Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A6096153, 04/16/2015 obtained a consent to search from the homeowner and processed the scene, which had already been released by the arrest team at approximately 6:45 a.m. The processing included taking additional photos, drawing a sketch and taking measurements. The scene was released at approximately 3:00 p.m. SAC, El Paso should ensure scenes involving accidental discharges are not released until fully processed by ERT absent exigent circumstances. Recommendation 3: 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed The SIRG voted and unanimously agreed to refer this matter to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for further administrative review and potential administrative action. necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector David P. Gelios, Office Of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chiefl lcivilR ~-i_g_h_t_s____________, ............ ___, Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice (DOJ); Criminal Section, DOJ; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) L - - - - -......---'-----. Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA ,._______.___, Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Lr-------......~ ~--------' Practical Applications Unit, Training Division(TD); SSA ________......___...,Firearms Training Unit, TD; ucl I Special _____ ____ r-----,.~ Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; SSA Violent Crime and Gang Section; SSA~I______ Defensive Systems Unit(DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A. ~C_o_e_,_C_D __-2-,-Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ssAI I I IEvidence Response Team, Laboratory Division. The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Assistant Special Agent In Charge Jim Kirdar, Office Of Inspector General; ucl____________. Firearms and Toolmarks Unit ,Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge El Paso Field Office Re: 297K-HQ-A6096153, 04/16/2015 Teyema, Vadim D. Thomas Inspectors/Team Leaders! and Doualas A. Leff OI. INSD; Assistant I 1 .......~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i--~~~~...J I OI, UC, I I and INSD; Management Program Analysts (MAPAs) I I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; MAPA I Inspection Analysis Unit, and Special Assistant OI, INSD. ....-~--~~~~~~~~--~~~----; ....... I ~~~~~~~~~~~.,...~~-I 1--~~~~~~~~~~--..---1 I --~~~~~~~~~~-- Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, El Paso, is responsible for ensuring the Inspection Recommendation and Instructions are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Recommendation and Instructions are addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Recommendation and Instructions have been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Animal Shooting Incident, Indianapolis Field Office, 10/20/2016 Title: Date: 04/19/2017 b6 b7C From: INSPECTION DA-OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS SECTION Contact: Lawrence E. Koleff, ~I~~~~~~-. Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: b6 b7C TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Lawrence E. Koleff 297L-HQ-A2093200 (U) Indianapolis Shooting Incident: Animal Involved Shooting 10/20/2016 Synopsis: communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and observations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned animal shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shooting Incident Report, dated 01 /19/2017, was b Indianapolis Field Office Inspector-in-Place (IIP) ASAC and Assistant Inspector-In-Place (AIIP) in coordination with INSD Inspector Lawrence E. Koleff and Assistant Inspector/Team Leader~!~~~~~~~--' b6 b7C Details: On 03/22/2017, the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed a shooting incident involving Special Agent (SA)I lwho discharged three rounds from his FBI-issued Colt M-4, 5.56 mm carbine rifle at an attacking pit bull dog during a SWAT operation to serve a search warrant on 10/20/2016. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Indianapolis Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 10 /20/2016. UNCLASSIFIED~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Animal Shooting Incident, Indianapolis Field Office, 10 /20/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2093200, 04/19/2017 The delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation revealed the following: (U/~ On 10/19/2016, a U.S. Magistrate Judge signed a Search Warrant for the residence located at That same date, an In-d~i-a_n_a_p_o~l-i-s~S~W-A-T~T~e-a-m~c~o-n_s_i-.s~t-i_n_g~~- I Imet ._o_f~-f-o_u_r_t~e-e-n~A~g~ents and ssAI and discussed a11 b6 b7C aspects of the SWAT Operations Order, including the FBI Deadly Force Policy being briefed. SWAT members were then provided hard copies of the Operations Order. (U/~ During the brief, information regarding the known presence of a dangerous pit bull dog at the target location was discussed. An incident was discussed when the dog previously attacked and injured a CHS during a controlled drug buy (witnessed and documented by ssAI 1There was significant conversation regarding the dangerous and aggressive behavior exhibited by the dog, 'Dillinger' , including social media posts claiming the dog was a "killer" as well as video footage of the dog being trained to bite and attack. Due to the potential animal threat, the SWAT Team discussed the use of flash bangs during entries as effective deterrents and decided one would be deployed just prior to entry to make the dog flee. The SWAT team then conducted a brief-back followed by entry rehearsals. (U/~ On 10/20/2016, at approximately 6:00 A.M., the SWAT Team deployed to the residence. FBI Agents knocked and announced the presence of the FBI and authority to enter the residence multiple times. A dog was heard barking inside the residence. After waiting an appropriate amount of time with no response, breached the door and !deployed a flash bang. SA acting in his capacity as breach cover positioned on the left side of the door, was confronted by an aggressive pit bull dog almost immediately after the door was opened. The pit bull dog charged SA identified the dog as posing an imminent threat and used deadly force by firing three rounds, striking the dog to mitigate the I I I lwho SAi SAi UNCLASSIFIED~ 2 I bG b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U~ Animal Shooting Incident, Indianapolis Field Office, 10 /20/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2093200, 04/19/2017 threat. Once the threat was eliminated, the SWAT team was able to clear the residence without further incident. (U/~ Animal Control Officers who were pre-staged responded to the residence where the dog had been shot. They located the dog lying underneath the SWAT van. They confirmed the dog was deceased, took photographs, and removed the dog from the scene according to the policies of their agency. FBI Search Team Agents located the three SAi spent shell casings discharged from them and collected them into evidence. (U/~ !weapon, photographed b6 b7C A post-shooting inspection of SAi lrifle revealed the magazine was loaded with 62-grain tactical bonded 5.56 mm duty rifle ammunition manufactured by Federal. There were 16 rounds remaining in the magazine, and one in the chamber. (U/~ On 12/05/2016, Indianapolis PFI SAl...._~~~~~~-- .-~~~~~~lsubmitted the weapon and magazine to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) for a weapon serviceability inspection. On 12/19/2016, the DSU subsequently inspected and tested SAi !firearm, and concluded the firearm functioned as designed. b6 b7C sAI (U/~ Indianapolis documented laccount of the shooting in a Signed Sworn Statement, which was consistent with multiple witness interviews, and the processing of the scene. Indianapolis completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed SAi !firearms qualification and legal training records were current. (U/~ On 01/03/2017, the Marion County Prosecutor's Office declined pursuing any criminal charges relating to this shooting incident. SIRG Observations UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U//~ Animal Shooting Incident, Indianapolis Field Office, 10 /20/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2093200, 04/19/2017 (U/~ On 03/22/2017, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. During discussion of the incident, members of the SIRG determined SA I.._____.I acted b6 b7C within the FBI's Deadly Force Policy when he discharged his weapon at an aggressive Pit Bull dog. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations (if any) for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. Indianapolis SWAT Operator SA was unaware of the total number of rounds loaded in Proposed Observation 1: b6 b7C his weapon. (U~ Analysis 1: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG, section 4.1.1 stated, "All SAs are responsible for knowing the loaded condition (total number of rounds) of their pistols and/or shoulder weapons and must be prepared to report that number in connection with any post-incident debriefings, reviews, or investigations." (U/~ The SSS of SAi !revealed he was unaware of the total number of rounds loaded in his weapon and magazine. SA .. advised on 01/17/2017 that, at the time of the operation, he was carrying an FBI-issued Colt M-5, 5.56 mm carbine rifle, with a chambered round and the magazine loaded with 24 rounds of service ammunition. However, following the shooting incident, the PFI's examination of SAi lrifle determined that the magazine was loaded with 16 rounds, and there was one in the chamber. Witnesses cited that three rounds were discharged, there were three shell casings located, and the post-mortem of the dog was consistent with approximately three rounds having struck the animal. The logical I_____. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Animal Shooting Incident, Indianapolis Field Office, 10 /20/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2093200, 04/19/2017 conclusion was that his weapon was loaded with a 20-round magazine, one round of which was then chambered. After the discharge of three rounds, a total of 17 remained. Instruction 1: SAC, Indianapolis, will ensure Agents (U/~ have knowledge of the total number of rounds contained in their weapon (s) and magazine(s) in accordance with the Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG. 3. Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed necessary. The SIRG had no recommendations for further administrative action. (U/~ DAD Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Lawrence E. Koleff, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; ssAI DSU, Training Division (TD); ssAI Squad CR-4, Washington Field Office; SC MaryJo Thomas, CPC Counterproliferation Center, Counterintelligence Division; UC Investigative Law Unit (ILU), OGC; Senior Trial Attorney Organized Crime and Gang Section, DOJ; Special Legal Counsel Civil Rights Division, DOJ; UC ...______________.!Firearms Training Unit, TD; SSA._I__________. National Operations and Training Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); and ssAI Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. I I (U/~ The following non-voting members attendance: AD Gregory D. Cox, CIRG; Inspectors Scott B. Cheney, and Cindy L. Hall, OI, INSD; SC Internal Investigations Section, INSD; Assistant Leaders I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 were also in Eric D. Welling, Voviette D. Morgan, Inspector/Team b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Animal Shooting Incident, Indianapolis Field Office, 10 /20/2016 Re: 297L-HQ-A2093200, 04/19/2017 L-~~~~~~~~~r-l_o_I_,~I_N_S_D___;~s_s_A~l~~~~~,_~_JI I________________. Unit, TD; and SSA .. Tactical Training ILU, OGC. b6 b7C Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Indianapolis, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instruction one is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review Indianapolis' response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the field office has under consideration to implement. SAC, Indianapolis, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instruction one. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Acting Unit Chiefr-1----------.1 Inspection Management Unit, INSD. •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Date: 04/24/2017 b6 CC: From: b7C INSPECTION DA-OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS SECTI~O-N.._~~~~---. Contact: LAWRENCE E. KOLEFF, ._I_ _ _ _ _ __ _ . Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: b6 TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b7C LAWRENCE E. KOLEFF 297I-HQ-A7538340 (U) Kansas City Shooting Incident Topeka Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, conclusions, and observations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~The Shooting Incident Report was prepared by INSD Inspector Eric D. Welling and Assistant Inspector /Team Leader ... b6 b7C I_________. Details: (U/~ On 03/22/2017, the SIRG reviewed a shooting incident involving the execution of a federal arrest warrant on 04/23/2016 by the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) Fugitive TF, assisted by two Topeka RA (TRA) personnel, SA land TFO During the shooting incident, two Deputy U.S. Marshals and were injured by gunfi"'"·_r_e_w_h_i_c_h_____. I I I I SAi I I I emanated from inside the hotel room from subject Orlando Joe Collins. Collins later set fire to the hotel room and died of a self inflicted gunshot. In response to the shooting incident, the INSD deployed two Assistant Inspector Team Leaders to gather information UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 and coordinate with the Topeka Police Department (TPD), which conducted the Shooting Incident Investigation, per USMS policy. TPD was assisted by the Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT), which processed the scene along with KC ERT. (U/~The The SIRT investigation revealed the following: (U~ On 04/04/2016, an attempted robbery was committed at Dillon' s Supermarket, 2815 SW 29th St., Topeka, KS, by an unidentified black male. The suspect brandished an SKS/AK-47 style rifle and was attired in a black hooded jacket, tan pants, brown boots, a white t-shirt, and a black mask. Less than thirty minutes after the Dillon's Supermarket robbery, a Kwik Shop located at 102 SW 37th St., Topeka, KS, was robbed by someone wearing similar clothing, and matching the description of the subject from the Dillon's Supermarket robbery. The suspect brandished a semi-automatic pistol. (U/~On 04/05/2016, a black male wearing a black hooded jacket was reported shooting an SKS/AK-47 style rifle at a creme-colored Cadillac in the 800 block of Lindenwood Ave., Topeka, KS. Following the shooting the subject got into and left the scene. At al I approximately 5: 38 pm,I lwas found on f i._r_e_..,.i_n_t_h_e_7_0_0__b_l_o_c_k_o_f_S_W_G_a_g_e_B_l_v_d_.-,-T-o_p_e_k__,a, I KS. The I I Iwas registered to I I 1--.. land Orlando Collins, .. LJ OKI I A search of the revealed a pair of brown boots with a tread pattern matching the boots worn by the subject who robbed the Kwik Shop, as well as a black rag cut to look like a mask. Additionally, documentation in thel included a pay stub in the name of Orlando Collins. TPD conducted a search of social media and found a Facebook account attributed to Collins. Photographs I located on Collins' Facebook page included an image of the and numerous weapons, including an SKS/AK-47 style rifle. I________. (U/~ On 04/06/2016, SIR-00023446044, entitled "Threat to Law Enforcement by USPER Orlando Collins, as of 04/06/2016" was published by FBI KC. On 04/07/2016 the Shawnee County District Court issued an arrest warrant for Collins for a violation of Kansas Statutes UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 Annotated (KSA) 21-5420(b) and KSA 21-5301, Attempted Aggravated Robbery, and a violation of KSA 21-6308 (a) (1) (b) (1) (A), Criminal Discharge of a Firearm at an Occupied Dwelling or Vehicle. The warrant was assigned to the USMS Fugitive TF. (U/~ In early April 2016, SAi land TFol lwere at the Special Operations Division (SOD) in Springfield, VA attending a three day training assignment. The 04/04/2016 robberies of Dillon's Supermarket and the Kwik Shop were committed while SAi land TFOI lwere attending training. TFol lwas called by TPD and advised the robberies were being committed by Collins and a local arrest warrant had been obtained by TPD. Upon his return to Topeka, KS, TFOI lwent to the TPD to obtain police reports and determine a course of action. TFOI met with AUSAI to discuss the local investigation and the charges filed against Collins. TFOI land AUSAI !determined a federal Criminal Complaint would be sought. I b6 b7C I (U/~On 04/20/2016, a Federal Criminal Complaint was obtained charging Collins with two counts of Title 18 USC 1951(a), Attempted Interference with Commerce by Means of Robbery. An Arrest Warrant was issued for Collins and signed over to the USMS for delegation of apprehension using a DOJ Form, USM Form-560. As a general practice, the TRA signed over FBI arrest warrants to the USMS via the form USM560. SSRAI advised the TRA routinely utilized the USMS because RA personnel resources were not sufficient to undertake time-intensive fugitive investigations. The USMS said they would advise SAi land TFOI lif Collins was located. SA ._________.land TFO !wanted to interview Collins upon his arrest. I I (U/~ On 04/22/2016, another robbery was committed by Collins at Smoke 4 Less, 101 SW 37th St., Topeka, KS. Collins brandished a sawed off shotgun and fled the scene in a silver Nissan he stole from an employee. Shortly thereafter, the Silver Nissan was found on fire in the 100 block of SE Lime St., Topeka, KS. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 bG b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 (U/~ On 04/22/2016, the USMS identified a possible cellular telephone associated with Collins and obtained a court order for Global Positioning System (GPS) location. While the TF was tracking the cellular telephone, sAI land TFol !followed logical leads, to include an address associated with Collins' I I Upon obtaining GPS data it was determined the telephone was located in the vicinity of the Country Club Motel (CCM), 3732 SW Topeka Boulevard, Topeka. b6 b7C (U/~ On 04/23/2016, TFOI !provided SSRAI land TPD Sergeant (Sgt.)I lwith a case update. He advised they had 40meter ping accuracy on the cellular telephone associated with Collins. The data indicated the telephone was located in the CCM. SSRAI approved TFO and SAi Ito assist the USMS with.__~__. surveillance. SSRA b6 b7C subsequently notified and obtained concurrence from ASAC .___________.for SAi the USMS with the surveillance. land TFOI Ito assist (U/ ~ SAi land TFol I conducted surveillance at the CCM in an attempt to identify Collins. Also participating in the surveillance were DUSMs and USMS At some point during the surveillance went to the CCM manager and obtained a guest list. SA and TFOI lshowed the guest list to the DUSMs and it was determined Room 28 was rented tol whom the DUSMs determined was a relative ofr-1___....._______,____...J b6 b7C ...._______.....~ Room 28 was in close proximity to the GPS data associated with Collins' cellular telephone. (U/~ TFol land S~ !initially set up surveillance in the lot of Ed Bozarth Chevrolet, 3731 SW Topeka Boulevard, Topeka, KS, located across the street from the CCM. SAi land TFO lcould see Room 28 from their surveillance location. At some ..._p_o_i_n_t_ _.during the surveillance SAi I and TFO I , I were relieved by DUSM I I SAi land TFol tra'ter returned to surveillance and set up in the parking lot of Capital City Bank UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 (CCB), located north of the CCM. SA_l_ _ _ _ _ ___.land TFo_I_ _ _ ___. objective was to check license plates of vehicles belonging to hotel guests and check occupants in an attempt to locate Collins. b6 b7C (U/~ At approximately 9:00 pm, TFo_l_ _ __.lheard over the USMS radio an unidentified male was leaving Room 28. Surveillance assets did not see the unidentified male get into a vehicle; however, shortly upon the male leaving Room 28, a vehicle left the parking lot of the CCM. DUSMsl !followed the car to Larry's Short Stop (LSS), a gas station located at 3834 SW Topeka Blvd, Topeka, KS. SA land TFOI I followed the DUSMs and parked in an adjacent _m_o_t_e_l___T_h_e... DUSMs, assisted by SAi I and TFO made contact with the unidentified male, later identified as I The DUSMs ran the license plate of the vehicler----,_w_a_s___ J _d_r_i_·v_i_n_g_. and the vehicle was registered tol I DUSMs I detained! Iwas questioned, specifi..._c_a_l_l_y__i_f_h_.e _w_a_s__ s_t_a_y...ing at the CCM and with whom.[ ldenied staying at or b6 b7C visiting anyone at the motel.I !denied leaving the CCM; therefore, TFol Ire uested a marked TPD unit to meet them at LSS, and TPD Police Officer (Pol I arrived with a civilian ride-along PO was asked to detainl las the DUSMs wanted to check the motel to ascertain if Collins was in the room vacated byl I I (U~ At I I approximately 9: 40 pm, SAi and TFO left LSS and walked back to their car to put on their protective vests. SA land TFOI I drove back to the CCM and parked south of the building housing the room registered tol I (Room 28). SA ________.land TFOI !drafted a one page operational plan (OPS Plan) which was later utilized by TRA personnel. The OPS Plan outlined actions to be taken by assisting teams to include any information obtained by the team since the last known update. On the back of the plan, SAi lsketched the motel and annotated with an asterisk what rooms were occupied by motel guests. The OPS Plan was sent electronically to SSRAD for approval. SA and TFO contacted SSRAc==Jand discussed the changes to the surveillance I I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 I I.------. b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 operation. ssRALJverba11y approved the use of sAI land TFO as augmentation to the USMS TF as perimeter coverage. ASAC was not notified, nor did he provide verbal concurrence for SA ____......._ ___,and TFO I Ito assist with the USMS OPS Plan to b6 b7C apprehend Collins. (U/~ The DUSMs, USMS TFOs, TFo._I_ _ __. and SA .. I _______. discussed the USMS plan to approach the room, and make contact with the occupant(s) in an attempt to locate Collins. A dynamic entry would be made if the occupant did not open the door. USMS TFol I covered the northwest corner of the building while the rest of the team approached from the northeast. b6 b7C (U/~ USMS TFOI I parked south of the hotel housing Room 28. He asked TFol lif someone had called TPD dispatch to advise of the pending operation and was advised dispatch had been notified. USMS TFOI !called dispatch again to advise them of the operation. b6 b7C _______________ (U/~At approximately 9:53 pm, ____, DUSMs ...._ approached the room and announced "USMS," "We have a warrant," "Give yourself up"; however, there was no response. After approximately one minute, DUSMI lwent back to his vehicle to retrieve a ballistic shield. He returned with the shield and gave it to DUSM._I_ _ _ _ __. b6 b7C (U/~When the DUSMs were announcing their presence at the door, SAi land USMS TFOI lwere located at the northeast corner of the building. Approximately three minutes after the DUSMs announced their presence, TFOI ldecided it was not tactically sound for USMS TFOI Ito be alone at the northwest corner. TFO .______.I decided to link up with USMS TFOI I Prior to leaving the northeast corner of the building to join USMS TFO DUSM asked TFO I I to obtain a key card for the roomL-.-S-A-r__...____...,_w_a_s---1 also asked to obtain a key card for the room. As SA was at the CCM off ice getting the key card he encountered TFO SA ltook the key card, returned to the northeast corner of the .__b_u_i-.1-d_i_n_g_,__.and gave it to DUSMI I TFOI llinked up with USMS I ______.lat TFO .. the northwest corner of the building. TFO I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 land b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 USMS TFo_l______.lthen moved from the northwest corner of the building to a position closer to Room 28, adjacent to Room 29. b6 b7C __________________ ___, (U/~ At approximately 9: 58 pm, DUSMs approached the room and announced "Orlando Collins," "US Marshals," "We have a warrant for your arrest." However, there was still no response. DUSMI lwas holding a ballistic shield and DUS~ went to the door to disengage the lock with the key card. DUSM~ was standing to the left of DUSMI I Upon DUSMI Idisengaging the door lock, two rounds were fired from inside the room. A barrage of additional gun fire from the room started immediately after the initial two rounds. DUSMI lfell backwards and yelled "I'm hit!", "I'm hit!" b6 b7C (U/~ DUSMI !returned fire through the door with his USMS issued AR-15 rifle. After the initial barrage of gunfire abated, DUSM .__ ___.lreloaded his AR-15 rifle. DUS~felt a sharp pain in his right foot and ascertained he (DUSML______jwas hit by gunfire. DUSM !continued to engage the occupant(s) of Room 28 while he withdrew ..._t_o--a---position of cover. DUSMI !returned fire with his I b6 b7C department issued Glock 22 handgun into Room 28. DUSMI lwas firing from behind the ballistic shield and the shield was being impacted by what appeared to be rifle rounds coming from Room 28. DUSM lhad a malfunction and reloaded his Glock 22 from behind the shield. (U/~ After seeing DUSMI !unlock the door to Room 28 and hearing gun fire from inside the room, lheard DUSM ... SAi SAi 1-----. yell "I'm hit! I'm hit!" l1eft his position of cover to assist DUSMI moving to a position of cover behind the northeast corner of the building. SA then returned to the corner of the building because he believed DUSM ..--------....J was also injured. Upon pivoting around the corner, SA DUSMI I lsaw Room 28 was._d_a_r_k_e_n_e_d__a...nd he did not lin SAi observe a subject, although rounds were being fired from within the room. Shortly upon determining DUSMI lwas not near Room 28, FBI UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 SAi lwas struck by gunfire in his right elbow and he lost his grip on his bureau issued AR-15. He attempted to re-engage but was unable to hold his rifle. SAi lmoved to a position of cover and was provided first aid by.___D_U_S_M_l___._...,I SAi lthen moved to b6 b7C a position behind the wheel well of an SUV parked southeast of the corner of the building housing Room 28. He used the hood to support his rifle and maintained this position in the event Collins left Room 28 and came around the northeast corner of the building. (U/~When the gun fire started, USMS TFol !witnessed DUSM lroll backwards from the front of Room 28, but did not know if .__h_e__w_a_s.... shot or had stumbled. USMS T F O l l ran to DUSMI I land, along with SAi I helped DUSM~to a position of cover. USMS TFOI lannounced over the police radio "Signal 13, shots fired," which meant officer needs assistance and every unit responds with lights and sirens. USMS TFO held the northeast perimeter with DUSMsl I and SA Although sustaining a gunshot wound to his foot, DUSM provided first aid to DUSM land SA An INSD review of CCM surveillance video showed both SA and USMS TFol l1eaving a position of cover to aid DUSM b6 b7C I (U/~ TFOI land USMS TFO I lwere covering the window located west of the door to Room 28 when the DUSMs attempted entry. TFOI I fearing for the safety of himself and other LEOs, intended to engage but saw SAi the northeast corner of the building and felt there was a ood chance rounds could ricochet off of the motel and hit SA TFOI lmoved along with USMS TFO I land DUSM to the northwest corner of the building. While moving, the ballistic shield held by DUSMI ltook multi~le hits in the process. During the exchange of gunfire, DUSMI J USMS TFO I I and TFO I lwere slightly injured by..._s_h_r_a_p_n_e_l.... lat INSD could not determine if the injuries were caused by ricochets or from bullet fragments impacting the cinder block structure of the CCM. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 (U~Approximately 30 seconds after the attempt to enter Room 28, all LEOs stopped their engagement and withdrew to positions of cover. Collins continued to fire indiscriminately from Room 28 for approximately 38 minutes, at which point a large fire spread throughout the structure. Topeka Fire and Emergency Medical Technicians did not immediately respond to the scene because there was continuous gunfire. TPD Pol !blocked traffic on SW Topeka Blvd. due to gunfire from Room 28. Eventually, smoke started emanating from Room 28. The smoke was thick enough to obscure the fence on the northeast side of Room 28. A Kansas Highway Patrol helicopter arrived and utilized a searchlight, which provided illumination to cut through the smoke. (U/~ At approximately 10:00 pm, DUSM scene. At approximately 10:22 pm he transported SA ....---....... DUSMsl Ito the hospital. DUSM -,.lv_e_h_i_c_l_e_t_o__t_r....1ansport the injured LEO s . - r-1---.. . . arrived on and ......-----' utilized DUSM b6 b7C b6 b7C (U~ At approximately 10:38 pm, Collins flung a mattress engulfed in flames out of the window of Room 28. Shortly after the mattress was flung from the window, flames were observed coming out of the room. According to TFOI I gunfire from Room 28 continued while the room was on fire. During a lull in the shooting from Room 28, TFol and USMS TFOI !heard a single gunshot. _____. b6 b7C (U~During the surveillance, it was noted people were using rooms previously identified by CCM management as being vacant. LEOs evacuated guests from all of the occupied rooms and checked unoccupied rooms to ensure they were vacant. Atlapproxtmately 11:15 pm, DUSM .______.I USMS TFol I and TFO departed the scene en route to Stormont-Vail Hospital (SVH). b6 b7C (U~TPD Lieutenant! lwas the TPD West Watch Commander and was the on-scene commander until TPD Major Steven Purney arrived to assume command of the scene. TRA SAi I responded to the scene and coordinated the FBI response. S~ larrived at UNCLASSIFIED~ 9 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 the CCM shortly after DUSMI !departed to the hospital. SA ._~~~__.lremained on scene u-n~t-i-l~S~S-RA-c===Jand FBI Kansas City (KC) EM b6 b7C arrived. (U/~ KC EM was notified by ssRAc==Jat approximately 10:14 pm. SAC Eric K. Jackson, ASAC Shelley A. Doherty, and SSRAI !responded to the scene. SAC Jackson ensured timely notification was provided to SIOC, the INSD AD, Chief Inspector, and CID EM. KC ERT responded and processed the crime scene, later supported by the LSRT. The LSRT transported the weapons of the subject Collins and the LEOs to Quantico for analysis. b6 b7C (U/~ INSD was unable to corroborate the LEO round count as the fire to the CCM hindered the collection of all shell casings. The majority of shell casings and spent cartridges were located in the grass between Room 28 and a picket fence, north of the hotel. The round count was as follows; 18 5.56 mm shell casings, 14 .40 caliber shell casings, and six shotgun wads were located in the grass between Room 28 and the picket fence, north of the hotel. Three .40 caliber shell casings and 14 shotgun wads were located in the parking lot of the CCB, and six .40 caliber shell casings were located in debris from the fire. (U/~ Following is a summary of round counts based on interviews and ERT evidence recovery logs: • SAi ldid not believe he engaged Collins with his FBI issued Rock River Arms AR-15 or his issued Glock Model 22. In his post shooting Signed Sworn Statement (SSS), lstated, "Prior to or during the point I was shot I do not believe I fired my weapon, but if I did it would have been a sympathetic reflex as a result of the sAI shot to my arm. I don't think I fired for I did not have a target to engage or shoot at." Following the encounter, he had one AR-15 magazine with 26 rounds (unable to determine if one round was chambered and the magazine contained 25 rounds), and one Glock Magazine with 15 rounds, and one round in the chamber of the Glock. SA not aware of how many rounds were loaded in the AR-15 I lwas UNCLASSIFIED/~ 10 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 because he advised he always stripped a few rounds from the 30 round magazine to prevent stressing the spring and potentially causing a malfunction. Prior to departing for SVH, sAI l1ocked his AR15 rifle in a lock box in DUSMI !vehicle, where it was collected by KC ERT. • TFo_l~~~__.ldid not engage Collins with his issued Glock Model 19. Following the encounter he had two magazines with 31 rounds and one round in the chamber. • DUSMI I stated he fired approximately 20-24 rounds from his issued Colt M-4 carbine, including a magazine change. DUSMl...._~~­ had 30 rounds in the magazine. Following the encounter, he had a magazine with 30 rounds, and the M-4 carbine had one round loaded. DUSMI I also had an additional magazine with 17 rounds. A sidearm was not collected from DUSMI I • DUSM_l~~~~__.lstated he fired an unknown number of rounds from his department issued Glock Model 22 Gen 4 pistol. He had a malfunction, and performed a reload during the encounter. Following the encounter he had one magazine with 10 rounds and one round in the chamber. DUSMI lstated he began the operation with a fully loaded Glock 22 pistol plus three fully loaded magazines on his gun belt. • DUSMI I did not engage Collins with his department issued Colt M4 carbine. On 04/26/2016, FBI SAsl I collected DUSMI !colt M4 Carbine, and a magazine loaded with 28 rounds of ammunition. DUSMI ldid not provide his weapon to ERT on 04/23/2016 because he was shot in the arm and was being prepared for surgery. At the time of collection there was not a round in the chamber of the weapon; however, DUSMI lstated there was a round in the chamber when he cleared the weapon, and he placed the round back into the magazine. The round in the chamber was the first round in the magazine and it was separated as such upon collection. A sidearm was not collected from DUSM_I~~~~- UNCLASSIFIED~ 11 b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 • USMS TFO I..______.I did not believe he engaged Collins with his department issued Bushmaster Model XM15-E2S rifle. Following the encounter, he had a magazine with 28 rounds, and one round in the chamber. A sidearm was not collected from USMS TFO .. b6 b7C I_____.. • USMS TFol....______.ldid not engage Collins with his department issued Glock Model 19 pistol. Following the encounter he had three magazines with 50 rounds. INSD was unable to determine how the magazines were loaded or if the weapon had a round loaded in the chamber. • After the incident, two of the long guns (likely belonging to DUSM land USMS TFOI of the LEOs involved in the incident were placed in the back seat of a Shawnee County Sheriff's Office's (SCSO) patrol vehicle and taken to the SVH. collected the weapons from the patrol vehicle and brought them to a central evidence collection oint in a hospital room. While collecting the two long guns, SA observed two magazines on the floor of the patrol car. SA collected the magazines and took them to the collection point. One magazine was loaded with 30 5.56 mm rounds and the second magazine was loaded with 22 5.56 mm rounds. Neither magazine was attributed to an individual SA, DUSM, or TFO. INSD was also unable to confirm to whom the long guns retrieved from the SCSO vehicle were assigned. Additionally, one empty Glock 22 magazine was recovered at the CCM. INSD assessed it was most likely a I b6 b7C I SAi._______ b6 b7C magazine used by DUSM._I_ _ _ ___. (U~Collins was found by KC ERT in the bathtub, partially burned, and in a kneeling position. Collins was declared deceased at the scene Shawnee County Coroner. ..._~~~I prepared a Report of Death, dated 12/07/2016 stating the cause of death was listed as a perforating, intraoral gunshot wound. According the characteristics of the wound were consistent with a self-inflicted injury. by._l_______________.lthe tol I (U/~All LEOs present at the shooting scene were wearing appropriate body armor with attached agency identifiers. UNCLASSIFIED~ 12 D b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 (U/~ On 04/24/2016, a search of the shooting incident scene was conducted at the CCM and surrounding businesses by members of the KC ERT. The premises searched included Room 28, an area adjacent to the motel, and the CCB. The scene was significantly impacted by the fire Collins started from within Room 28. (U~FBI Agents involved in the shooting incident: was transported by DUSM ... l _ _ _ _...lto SVH, 1500 SW 10th Ave.,--T-o_p_e_k_a_,_ _. sAI SAi KS. !sustained a gunshot wound to his right arm. The gunshot wound caused a fracture of the upper end of his right ulna. The severity of the wound precipitated the transfer of SA~I to Kansas University Medical Center, 3901 Rainbow Blvd, Kansas City, KS. SA made a full recovery and b6 b7C _______. I I I I I (U/ ~Other LEOs involved in the shooting incident: DUSMsl sustained gunshot wounds. DUSMI sustained a wound to his right foot causing anterior and posterior damage to the entire foot. DUSMI sustained a wound to the mid-shaft of his right forearm. USMS TFO and DUSMI were hit by TFO shrapnel but the injuries were minor. I I I I I b6 b7C I I USMS maintained primary investigative lead and delegated the shooting investigation to the TPD, per USMS policy. The SIRT was deployed to liaise with the USMS IG, the TPD, and to interview FBI personnel involved in the incident. The SIRT prepared one SSS from SA An additional interview of TFOI lwas conducted and documented in an FD-302. All additional statements and reports were prepared by TPD. (U/..Zr:eUY:C'The I I (U/~ SAi I Firearms qualification records for were provided to the SIRT by SSRAI IA review of the training records reflected SAi lmost recent qualification with his issued Glock 22 pistol and Rock River Arms LAR-15 rifle was on 03/25/2016 and he was in compliance with firearms qualification requirements. A UNCLASSIFIED/~ 13 bG b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 review of TFOI I firearms qualification records reflected TFO ...._~~~_.lmost recent qualification with his issued Glock 19 pistol was on 09/28/2015 and he was in compliance with the TPD firearms qualification requirements. b6 b7C (U/~On 05/13/2016~~~~~~~~~~~~___.IDistrict Attorney, Office of the District Attorney, Third Judicial District of Kansas provided a written letter advising no charges would be filed against the officers and DUSMs who discharged their weapons on 04/23/2016. On 12/05/2016, AUSAI !provided a declination of criminal charges for the law enforcement officers involved in the 04/23/2016 shooting incident at the CCM. b6 b7C (U/~ SIRG Observations (U/~l!1tZ! On 03/22/2017, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: (U/~1. Evaluate the application of deadly force: Because no TRA personnel fired their weapons, the application of deadly force was not evaluated by the SIRG. (U/~ 2. Proposed Observations: (U/~ Observation 1: Kansas City did not conduct an adequate operational briefing in accordance with DIOG Section 19.2.4.6, prior to a joint operation. (U//~ Analysis 1: During the investigative evolution of 1928-KC7462741, SSRAI f'became aware of a proposed joint operation involving surveillance and a likelihood of an arrest. SSRA~ advised ASACI labout the joint operation; however, ASAcL________J was not fully aware of the details of the joint arrest planned with the USMS. DIOG, Sections 19.2.3 and 19.2.4.6 addresses joint arrest scenarios. 19.2.3 (U) ARREST PLANS UNCLASSIFIED/~ 14 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 (U) The ADIC/SAC is responsible to ensure that careful and thorough planning is conducted for the successful execution of any high risk arrest operation involving a potentially dangerous situation or subject. The arrest plan must be adapted to each situation with relevant details for the safety and effectiveness of all agents and officers involved. The planning and execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to experienced agents. All arrest plans must be approved by ASACs or their designees. 19.2.4.6 (U) JOINT ARRESTS (U) An SSA may authorize a joint arrest with state and local authorities, USMS, or other federal law enforcement agencies. In circumstances of joint arrests, the SAC remains responsible to ensure that there is a well-considered arrest plan. (U/~ A well-considered arrest plan would have likely identified the following factors which contributed to the shooting incident and subsequent injuries to the LEOs. 1. Law Enforcement personnel were aware of subject Collins' criminal history and the indication he was considered armed and dangerous, but the arrest team placed themselves in harm's way by standing in front of Collins' motel room, which had a large pane window, without cover or concealment, in excess of eight minutes. The arrest team eventually retrieved a ballistic shield; however, it was not brought with the entry team when Collins' room was first approached. 2. The arrest team knocked and announced prior to obtaining a key to the room. When the key was obtained, they again knocked and announced. A position of cover could have been taken while a key was obtained. Additionally, FBI personnel were designated as perimeter security; however, land TFol !approached in the arrest team stack and were positioned in close proximity (approximately five feet for from the entry/arrest team. SAi sAI I 3. No medical contingencies were briefed. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 15 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Kansas City will ensure Joint Arrest Plans and Operations Briefings are thoroughly reviewed to ensure all risks to FBI personnel and TFOs are well-considered. (U/~ b6 b7C (U/ ~Analysis 2: The SSS of SAi lrevealed he was unaware of the total number of rounds loaded in his Rock River Arms AR-15 rifle. SAi lstated he had one round in the chamber of his AR15 and a magazine with aJproximately 27-28 rounds at the start of the operation. SAi _advised he would remove a few rounds after loading a magazine as to prevent stress on the magazine spring. b6 b7C Observation 2: Kansas City, TRA Agent I lwas unaware of the total number of rounds loaded in his weapon and extra magazines. (U/~ The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG, section 4.1.1 stated, "All SAs are responsible for knowing the loaded condition (total number of rounds) of their pistols and/or shoulder weapons and must be prepared to report that number in connection with any post-incident debriefings, reviews, or investigations." (U/~ Instruction 2: SAC, Kansas City, will ensure Agents have knowledge of the total number of rounds contained in their weapon(s) and extra magazines in accordance with the Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG. (U/~DAD Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a nonvoting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: A /Chief Inspector Lawrence E. Koleff, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; ssAI I Defensive Systems Unit, Training Division (TD)L.-;_S_S_A....,..1-------------.1 Squad CR-4, Washington Field Office; SC MaryJo Thomas, Counter Proliferation Center, Counterintelligence Division; UC Investigative Law Unit (ILU), OGC; Senior Trial Attorney Or anized Crime and Gang Section, DOJ; Special Legal Counsel Civil Rights Division, DOJ; UC Firearms Training UNCLASSIFIED/~ 16 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office; Topeka RA (TRA), 04/23/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7538340, 04/24/2017 I Unit, TD; ssAI National Operations and Training Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); ssAI I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. b6 b7C (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Eric D. Welling, Scott B. Cheney, Cindy L. Hall, OI, INSD; SC Voviette D. Morgan, Internal Investigations Section, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders! I loI, INSD; a....~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__.......... 1r-~~--~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~l....,0I, ...... I TTU, TD; and ~~--- b6 b7C I I MAPAsl ......~~~~~-. INSD; ssAI I OGC. ...._~~~~--- I ILU, SSAI ..._~~~~~~~~~~~~~--' (U/~ Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Kansas City, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instructions one and two are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions are addressed. The IIC will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instructions have been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Kansas City, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instructions one and two. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to A/UC Chief Inspection Management Unit, INSD . I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 17 I b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Title: From: Date: 12/21/2016 INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C THOMAS VADIM DANIEL WELLING ERIC D TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: Case ID #: 297I-HQ-A7332578 (U) KANSAS CITY FIELD OFFICE SHOOTING INCIDENT Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting incident. Details: (U/~ On 12/08/2016, the SIRG reviewed a shooting incident involving the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department's Criminal Section (CCS)Task Force (TF) (KCMPD) Career ,which occurred on 03/24/2016 in Blue Springs, MO. (U/~ On 03/24/2016, at approximately 3:30 a.m., eight participants of the KCMPD's CCS TF were involved in a shooting incident I I while attempting to apprehend! Jermon Jabbar Seals (Seals), andl subsequent to an armed robbery at a Walgreens Store at 1701 NW Missouri Highway 7, Blue Springs, MO. In response to the Shooting Incident, the Inspection Division (INSD) deployed a Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) and a Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) on 03/24/2016. I I I UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 The SIRT investigation revealed the following: (U/~ The shooting incident followed a surveillance and arrest operation led by the KCMPD's Career Criminal Section (CCS) Task Force (TF), of which Kansas City FBI was a participant. As all three subjects fled the Walgreens, Seals andl lboth displayed a handgun while running in the direction of law enforcement. In response, seven KCMPD officers and the DUSM fired their weapons to eliminate the threat posed b6 b7C to themselves and other law enforcement personnel. Seals was mortally wounded by 15 rounds.~l_____.ltripped, separating him from Seals, and immediately surrendered after a single shotgun round missed him. __________.I was arrested after a short foot pursuit. ~I_________. also possessed a handgun; however, he did not display the weapon and was not fired upon. (U/~In response to the shooting and at the request of SAC Eric K. Jackson, the Inspection Division (INSD) deployed a Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) with Inspector Vadim Thomas as the Inspector In Charge (IIC), and a Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) on 03/24/2016. Although FBI SAs participated in surveillance operations on the morning of 03/24/2016, no FBI SAs discharged their weapons in the shooting incident. (U~ The CCS was an "Ad Hoc" TF which consisted primarily of KCMPD detectives, officers from other state/local agencies, and three federal agencies, including the Kansas City FBI. The Kansas City FBI had two Special Agents (SA) assigned to the KCMPD CCS TF since 2002. On 03/24/2016, SAi lwas the sole FBI Agent participating in the CCS TF oepration. The TF was responsible for investigating violent criminal subjects in the Kansas City area, and had been UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~~Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 investigating at least 21 commercial armed robberies since 02/2016. TF ____ ___ ________ intelligence indicated .._ .....,. of the robbery crew, dubbed the ....._ and Seals were ~two of the members _____________...... ...._ enforcement. On 3/11/2016, FBI SA by law b6 b7C initiated a Hobbs Act investigation (192B-KC-7248646), and on 03/22/2016 the TF obtained a state GPS warrant for Seals' BMW SUV. The GPS tracking device was installed in the early morning hours of 03/23/2016 by a KCMPD Street Crimes Unit (SCU) Tactical Enforcement Squad (TES), which also participated in the CCS TF. (U~ The TF Supervisor, KCMPD Sergeant (Sgt)~I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___, provided a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) briefing to TF members on 03/17/2016. On 03/23/2016, Sgt.I !provided TF members a 17-page document which provided biographical information on thel land robbery locations associated with the group. While Sgt. .,__ _ _ _..._!briefed the CONOPS to apprehend the no I I I b6 b7C written KCMPD or FBI operations plan was prepared. Anticipating the ._______________.I would attempt another armed robbery, 43 TF personnel, which included an augmentation of 16 members of the SCU and four members of the KCMPD's Illegal Firearms Unit, initiated surveillance at 8:00 p.m. on 03/23/2016. lwas the only FBI Agent participating in the operation. The TF exploited the GPS tracking device to support the surveillance. A KCMPD helicopter joined the surveillance at approximately 3:25 a.m. The operation called for two surveillance teams to follow vehicles associated with the subjects, augmented by the SCU TES (tactical team). SAi (U~ Seals andl lmet in Kansas and picked up a third associate, later identified asl All three proceeded in Seals' BMW SUV to Blue Springs, Missouri where they attempted to commit an armed robbery of a Phillips 66 gas station at approximately 3:00 a.m. The crew was not successful at this location because the gas station attendant had locked the front door while he cleaned the restroom, so the subjects proceeded to the intersection of I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 NW 9th Street (St.) and NW Duncan Road (Rd.) at approximately 3:20 a.m. The GPS indicated the BMW SUV was stationary, and surveillance assets observed all three subjects approach the Walgreens located at 1701 NW Missouri Highway 7, take an employee hostage (who was standing outside smoking), and enter the store. Three Walgreens employees were present during the robbery and later provided statements, which corroborated Walgreens video security footage. While the subjects were inside the Walgreens, the TF physically disabled Seal's BMW SUV to prevent the subjects from fleeing in their vehicle and to support law enforcement's apprehension of all subjects. (U/~ During the armed robbery, the subjects assaulted an employee, and stole money and liquid codeine. As the TF tactical team (SCU TES) moved in, a KCMPD helicopter with Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) capability filmed the subjects running from the Walgreens back to Seals' vehicle. The TF tactical team and two DUSMs, all wearing tactical vests with law enforcement markings, turned on their weapon-mounted flashlights and issued verbal commands to the approaching subjects. However, Seals !continued to flee and ran onto NW 9th !tripped and fell at the intersection of NW 9th St. and NW Duncan Rd. Upon standing, DUSM observed! !holding cash in one hand and a _h_a_n_d_g_u_n__i_n_t_h_e_o_t_h_e_r-hand. "'"I_ _.__ _,_I_s_q_.uared himself off to Law andl St.I Enforcement Officers (LEO) and moved his handgun from a position of low ready to a position of aim. DUSMI lfired one round from his USMS issued Remington Model 870 1-2--g-a_u_g_e--s-hotgun Thereafter, atl b6 b7C I limmediat_e_l....___......____a...nd was determined not to have received a gunshot wound. and Seals, who were approximately 20 feet ahead of proceeded to run towards the LEOs, at which time Seals displayed a silver colored revolver and failed to comply with commands to stop. ._I_ _ _ _ _ (U/~ To eliminate the threat posed by Seals approaching the LEOs, seven SCU TES members fired a total of 23 rounds, striking Seals 15 times. KCMPD Police Officer (PO) I..._________.I fired three rounds from his department issued Glock Model 22 handgun. KCMPD PO _I_ _ __ UNCLASSIFIED~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 I fired 10 rounds from his department issued Glock Model 22 ..._h_a_n_d_g_u_n___K_C...MPD Detective ( Det.) I Ifired six rounds from I_______________. his department issued M-4 carbine. KCMPD PO .. fired three rounds from his department issued M-4 carbine. KCMPD PO fired two rounds from his department issued M-4 carbine. KCMPD Det.I I fired one round from his department issued M-4 carbine. KCMPD Pol lfired one shotgun round from his department issued Benelli 12 gauge shotgun. Statements of the TF members who discharged their weapons and ERT evidence logs corroborated the round count. I b6 b7C I (U was apprehended a short distance from the shooting scene without further incident. A handgun located in a black sock was recovered in close proximity tol lseveral TF members rendered first aid to Seals prior to EMS arrival; however, Seals was declared deceased on scene by EMS personnel. (U/~ Kansas City Executive Management (EM) was immediately notified by SAi land TFol SSAI I Acting ASAC rl_....__ _ __.__ _ _ _....,_I_a_n_d__S_A_C_E_r_i_c_K__.. Jackson responded to the scene. SAC Jackson notified SIOC, the INSD AD and Chief Inspector, and CID EM. Kansas City FBI ERT responded and processed the crime scene, later supported by the LSRT. The LSRT transported the weapons of the seven TF members, the DUSM, and the three subjects to Quantico for analysis. SAC Jackson requested INSD investigate the shooting incident based on a September 2015 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the KCMPD, FBI, United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for the Western District of Missouri, and the Jackson County, Missouri District Attorney's Office (JCDA) regarding possible Civil Rights violations. The MOU was an agreement which stated, whenever there is an incident involving a KCMPD member committing a possible violation of the federal civil rights statutes and/or applicable state criminal statutes, the FBI will be called upon to conduct an investigation or an in-depth review. (U/~ b6 b7C On 03/25/2016, the Jackson County, Missouri Medical UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 Examiner's Office conducted an autopsy on Seals. Kansas City ERT and a SIRT member attended the autopsy. The provisional anatomical diagnosis report identified 15 gunshot wounds to Seals with the cause of death being multiple firearm inflicted wounds. The manner of death was listed as a homicide. (U/~ The SIRT prepared one Signed Sworn Statement (SSS) for Kansas City SAi SAi lstated he remained with Sgt.I._~~~~--' to assist with surveillance and did not witness the shooting incident or discharge his weapon. The SIRT conducted an additional 48 interviews, of which 42 were conducted jointly with KCMPD detectives. All eight interviews of the TF members who discharged their weapons were digitally recorded (audio and video) in the presence of their counsel. Interview results were documented in FD-302s, and reviewed and initialed by the assigned Agents and KCMPD detectives. I b6 b7C (U/~ The SIRT conducted an investigation to determine whether the shooting of subject Seals was justified (a state criminal matter) and if there were any potential federal Color of Law Civil Rights violations. Additionally, the SIRT investigation was conducted to determine whether the utilization of deadly force was justified according to the deadly force policies of the agencies involved in the incident. The IIC was called upon to meet with the heads of the agencies and explain the SIRT investigation. KCMPD detectives participated with SIRT members in all interviews except SA~I~~~~---. The JCDA and the KCMPD requested the interviews of the LEOs who discharged their weapons to be audio recorded, videotaped, and non-compelled to avoid any Garrity issues. ..... objected to the interviews being recorded and refused to produce the KCMPD officers to be interviewed by the FBI. The IIC negotiated withl Ito allow the interviews to be conducted after the expiration of the FoP mandated 48 hour period to allow personnel to collect their thoughts and to consult with an attorney if they so chose. ...._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (U/~ On 03/30/2016, the SIRT provided a briefing and UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 completed investigative binders for SAC Jackson; the USAO for the Western District of Missouri; the Jackson County, Missouri District Attorney's Office (JCDA); the United States Marshal's Service (USMS); and the KCMPD Deputy Chief of Police. The SIRT conducted a second meeting on 03/30/2016 with SAC Jackson and KCMPD EM to provide proposed observations, which are included in this report. (U~ At the conclusion of the SIRT investigation, the JCDA and the USAO were briefed by the IIC on the statements of the LEOs and witnesses, forensic evidence, projectile trajectory analysis, autopsy evidence/wound pattern analysis, video footage of the armed robbery prior to the shooting, FLIR footage, 911 audio recordings, and a live reenactment of the positioning of the subjects' body during the shooting. The JCDA reviewed the SIRT investigation and provided a written declination of prosecution on 06/08/2016 for the LEOs involved in the shooting incident. The USAO provided a declination via email on 06/08/2016. SIRG Observations On 12/08/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. 2. Because no FBI Agents discharged weapons, the application of deadly force by FBI personnel was not assessed by the SIRG. (U/~ Kansas City did not execute an MOU prior to assigning Agents to the CCS TF. U/~ Observation 1: Analysis 1: Kansas City participated on KCMPD's CCS TF without a formal MOU. Kansas City participated on the CCS TF since it UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 was formed in 2002. The TF was described as an ad-hoc TF but it routinely engaged in the surveillance and apprehension of armed subjects, as its stated goal was to target repeat violent offenders. OGC 0273PG 2.2. Identifying the Need for an MOU MOUs should be considered primarily in situations requiring substantial cooperation over time that will be enhanced by a single, agreed upon document establishing a mutual understanding of the roles and expectations of the parties. Considerations in deciding whether to enter into an MOU may include: • The expected duration of the cooperative activities. • The nature of the parties and their importance to FBI mission accomplishment. • The need to coordinate the activities of each party's employees or for supervision of one party's employees by another's. (U/~ Recommendation 1: SAC, Kansas City should ensure an MOU is formalized to continue FBI participation on the CCS TF. (U/~t("C\,_ Kansas City Agents and TFOs participated in a high risk arrest operation without a written operations order. Observation 2: (U/~ Analysis 2a: During the investigation ofl Kansas City became aware of a proposed operation involving surveillance and a potential arrest. Kansas City did not prepare a written Operations Order by the Case Agent or partner Agency personnel pursuant to DIOG 19.2.3. (U/ ~ (see below) Analysis 2b: Per Kansas City SSA._l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I FBI operations orders were not prepared if an operation was led by CCS. KCMPD b7A Sgt.~l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _lpresented a briefing on 03/17/2016 regarding UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 the planned surveillance and possible arrest of multiple subjects. The briefing consisted of a PowerPoint presentation which included investigative information, surveillance photographs, possible subject identities and addresses, and the identification of possible vehicle used by the subjects. However, the PowerPoint lacked details regarding contingency plans, the deadly force policy, and other categories contained in FBI "FD-888" Operations Orders. 19.2.3 (U) ARREST PLANS (U) The ADIC/SAC is responsible to ensure that careful and thorough planning is conducted for the successful execution of any high risk arrest operation involving a potentially dangerous situation or subject. The arrest plan must be adapted to each situation with relevant details for the safety and effectiveness of all agents and officers involved. The planning and execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to experienced agents. All arrest plans must be approved by ASACs or their designees. (U) Prior to conducting an arrest operation deemed a high risk, the agent must prepare a written operation order (OPORDER) to include the five critical categories: Situation, Mission,Execution, Administration and Equipment, and Control and Communication (SMEAC), and must utilize the Law Enforcement Operations Order (OPORDER), FD-888 in situations where an FBI SWAT Team(s) or the Critical Incident Response Group's (CIRG), Tactical Section is involved, the Operations Order Template must be used in lieu of the FD-888. See the Special Weapons and Tactics Policy Guide, 0444PG and Hostage Rescue Team Policy Guide, 0801PG for more on the use of the SWAT Teams and CIRG's Tactical Section in high risk operations. U) The written OPORDER must be presented in an oral briefing to all UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 personnel involved in the execution of the arrest warrant(s) prior to the operation. During the briefing, the briefing agent should stress to the participants of the operation that the arrest(s) has the potential to become dangerous. At the discretion of the field office approving official, the CDC/ADC may review the OPORDER (FD-888) and/or participate in providing the FBI deadly force briefing to the arrest operation participants. (U) Exigent circumstances (i.e., emergency, pressing necessity requiring immediate action) may necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of the written OPORDER. The ASAC or designee must approve the use of an oral briefing in lieu of a written and approved OPORDER in exigent circumstances. An oral briefing must follow the requirements of a written OPORDER and include the SMEAC categories identified above. Documentation of the oral briefing must occur as soon as possible following the operation by preparing and filing the FD-888 or the Operations Order Template, whichever is appropriate for the situation. (U/~ Instruction 2: (U/~ Observation 3: SAC, Kansas City will ensure written Operations Orders are prepared prior to high-risk operations. Kansas City failed to submit an FD-1015 to SIOC. (U/~ Analysis 3: Kansas City openedl !following the shooting incident on 03/24/2016. An FD-1015 was not prepared and b7A submitted to SIOC per Violent Incident Crimes (VIC) Policy Guide 0511PG b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ 10 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 b7E (U/~ SAC, Kansas City will ensure an FD-1015 is submitted to SIOC in accordance with VIC Policy Guide 0511PG. 3. (U/~ Instruction 3: Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if The SIRG did not recommend the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. deemed necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Lawrence Koleff, INSD, Office of Inspections (OI); SSA OGC, Investigative Law Unit; SSA FBI Washington Field Office, Squad CR-4; ucr----------"--......-T-D-,-F-i_r_e.....arms Training Unit; I ucl I CIRG, I ucl I b6 b7C SWAT Operations Unit (SOU); TD, Defensive Systems Unit; ASC Criminal Investigative Division, Violent Crime & Gang Section; SSA TD, Tactical Training Unit; SC Stephen Laycock, CD, CD-1; Attorney USDOJ, .--------....i.---.----------' Civil Rights Division; Attorney USDOJ, Organized Crime & Gang Section; SSA LD, Evidence Response Training Unit. (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Regina Thompson and Eric Welling, INSD, OI; Assistant Ins ectors/Team Leaders INSD, OI; MAPAs Jamie Cephas and INSD, Inspection Management UnitA INSD, Investigative Analysis Unit; SC James Lan enberg, INSD, External I Audit & Compliance Section; UC INSD, IIS; SSA~I----~ lcIRG, SOU; Attorney United States Department of ~J-u_s_t_i_·_c_e_(_U-SDOJ), Office of Legal Policy (OLP) USDOJ, ;I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 11 I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Kansas City Field Office, 03/24/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7332578, 12/21/2016 OLP; ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ, Office of Inspector General. Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC,Kansas City, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the Division to resolve Recommendation 1. The inspection process is not complete until the Recommendation is addressed by the Division. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Division's response to determine if the Recommendation has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit, INSD. I bG b7C (U/~ SAC, Kansas City, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instructions 2 and 3 are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Kansas City, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instructions 2 and 3. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl !Inspection Management Unit, INSD . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 12 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08 Title: Date: 04/24/2017 /25/2016 CC: FIKE DEIRDRE L From: INSPECTION DA-OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS SECTION Contact: LAWRENCE E. KOLEFF,-1~~~~~~--. Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: b6 b7C TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara LAWRENCE E. KOLEFF 297I-HQ-A2073832 (U) Los Angeles Shooting Incident 8/25 /2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analyses, conclusions, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~The Shooting Incident Report, dated 02 /02/2017, was prepared by Inspector Robert C. Bone, II and Assistant Inspector I I b6 b7C Details: (U/~On 08/25/2016 at approximately 9:36 p.m., the Los Angeles Field Office (LAFO) FBI SWAT team was involved in a shooting incident while executing a state search warrant at During the initial stages of the SWAT operation, David Tony Coborubio, Jr., date of birth 11/19/1984, was shot by SWAT operator! after Coborubio presented himself with a handgun, failed to comply with Special Agent (SA) ._~~~~__.lcommands, and maneuvered in an attempt to gain a tactical advantage of cover and concealment behind a structure. Coborubio was transported to a local hospital and died from his wounds the same day. ...._~~~~~~~~~~~~~---' '--~~~~~~~~~~~~~----' I UNCLASSIFIED~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 In response to the Agent Involved Shooting (AIS), the FBI Inspection Division (INSD) deployed a Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) to LAFO on 08/26/2016. A Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) did not deploy due to the inability to safely preserve the scene of the Agent-Involved-Shooting for a lengthy period of time, attributed to a dangerous and volatile environment which existed in the neighborhood after the shooting occurred. The LAFO Evidence Recovery Team (ERT) processed the scene. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation revealed the following: (U/~In September 2015, Compton, CA was selected as one of 15 Department of Justice (DOJ) funded Violence Reduction Network (VRN) cities across the country due to crime statistics. In 2014, Compton, which had a population of approximately 120,000, had 477 violent acts, of which 200 (41.9%) were related to violent gang activity. The VRN promoted complete community improvement through collaborative efforts which included law enforcement actions and community outreach. The Los Angeles (LA) San Gabriele Valley Safe Streets Task Force-Compton (SGVSSTF) was the recipient of the VRN funding. LAFO Squad CE-4 participated in the SGVSSTF with other federal agencies and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD). The SGVSSTF objectives were to identify violent gang activity, develop CHSs who are members or associates of the gangs, and initiate or further investigations to disrupt and dismantle the violent gangs . .-(~U~/~~2_~_~5'_~_I.......,The SGVSSTF identified~I--------------------.-----------------__.--__, as the location where~!____________________. date of birth~!______. resided on the property of a suspected ~-------------------------------' narcotics trafficker. A reliable CHS reported observing! I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b7D UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 The CHS further re orted b6 b7C b7D I (U/~ On 08/25/2016, LASD Deputy! obtained a state search warrant for the property and structures The California State Departme._n_t_o_f_C_o_r_r_e_c_t_i_o_n_s_. I .__P_a_r_o_l_e_F_u_g_i_t_i-·v_e_A_p_p__,rehension Team declared! I I atl la danger to public safety due to his violent criminal history, street gang membership, and parole violations. Deputy! ldeterminedl !apprehension was in the interest of the VRN, and coordinated with FBI SAi to utilize SGVSSTF resources. Deputy !requested the Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB), LASD's tactical unit, to conduct entry and clearing operations in support of the high risk search warrant; however, the SEB was unavailable due to other I I b6 b7C tactical obligations. As a result, lrequ~sted LAFO SWAT Acting Senior Team Leader(ASTL) _utilize LAFO SWAT to execute the search warrant and potential apprehension ASAC I SAi ofl I ___________.I and SAC Stephen S. Woolery approved a LAFO SWAT operation plan to execute the state search warrant. LAFO SWAT conducted this operation at night due to previously planned operations scheduled for the morning of 08/26/2016. (U/~ FBI LAFO SWAT established a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at a Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) facility in Compton on 08 /25/2016. All participating SWAT operators, LASD Deputies, TOC personnel, and ASACI lwere present for the operational brief, which included a verbatim reading of the FBI Deadly Force policy. LAFO personnel conducted site surveillance at the target location prior to the operation. At approximately 9:30 p.m., LAFO SWAT proceeded to I Ito execute the warrant. (U/~ Twenty-five LAFO SWAT operators were on site. Based on previously agreed upon assignments, part of the SWAT team deployed on the North side of the residence, while two operators provided security UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 on the West side of the residence, and the Acting Senior Team Leader (ASTL) conducted command and control from the tactical vehicle on the North side. LAFO SWAT operator sAI !proceeded to breach a metal sliding entry gate in the front of the residence while SWAT operator S~ !provided protective cover. As SAi lwas breaching the gate, SAi observed Coborubio seated near the exterior of a garage structure. Coborubio turned his head in the direction of SAsl Coborubio's hands were in his lap and SAi lyelled "let me see your hands." Coborubio stood and moved quickly towards the main house structure. As Coborubio began to run, SAi !yelled "FBI." Coborubio did not stop. SAi saw a pistol in Coborubio's hand. SAi !yelled "Gun" multiple I I I b6 b7C b7E I times. SAi also observed a gun held by Coborubio. SA ..I~~~~--' described the gun as a semi-automatic with a silver slide and black grip. In his SSS, SAi stated, "In the split second that was available to me to assess the threat posed by the male, I believed that the male meant to use his pistol as he tried to get a tactical advantage because he did not drop the pistol and just try to escape, but was moving to a position out of my line of sight, where he could shoot me or my fellow operators on the perimeter or set up an ambush for myself or other operators who tried to serve the search warrant." To eliminate the threat to himself and SAi who were both exposed without cover during the breach of the gate, SAi lfired three shots at Coborubio from his Carbine/SMG Model M4Al Colt .223 from a distance of approximately 60 feet. rifle, serial number .. I I I______. (U/~ After the shots were fired and the gate opened, LAFO SWAT continued their tactical entry to execute the search warrant. While clearing the structures, LAFO operators identified and arrested the subject of the California State Search Warrant, who complied with law enforcement ..._S_W_A_T__o_p_e_r_a_t_o_r_s____.. I I I observed Coborubio lying on the ground near the primary structure at the location. Approximately 10 feet from Coborubio was a gun matching SAi description of the gun which was in Coborubio's possession prior to being shot by SAi SWAT operators I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 relocated Coborubio to the casualty collection point on White Street where FBI medics and the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) administered medical aid. LAFD transported Coborubio to a medical facility, where he was pronounced dead at the hospital. (U/~ ASACI lwho was monitoring communications in the TOC, immediately responded to the scene, and notified SAC Woolery. SAC Woolery notified ADIC Deirdre L. Fike, and she made notification to the Deputy Director, Inspection Division, and SIOC. sAI lwas immediately separated from other law enforcement and had his weapon secured. He was subsequently transported to the TOC. All SWAT operators wore body armor with visible law enforcement markings, and all were current on their respective firearms qualifications. SA l1ast received Deadly Force training on 05/30/2014. SA 1---------'---.lmost recent qualification on his Carbine/SMG Model M4Al b6 b7C Colt .223 rifle was on 05/16/2016. U/~ The LAFO ERT responded and processed the scene and recovered three .223 caliber shell casings from the scene in near proximity to the vehicle gate. The ERT canvassed the neighborhood, but did not identify any bullet holes in any adjacent structures. The SIRT did not conduct a neighborhood canvass due to the dangerous and volatile environment which existed in the area following the AIS; however, one non law enforcement witness I date of birth .. ~I was identified and interview._e_d_b_y_A_s_s_i_s_t_a__,nt Inspectors-in-Place! lwas waiting outside his frie...._n_d_'_s__, ._r_e_s_i_d_e_n_c_e_a_t--ri-------------..........,1 waiting to go to the gym . ,1 I_______ ....__ _ ___.lw as t._e_x_t_i_n_g__o_n_h_i_s_c_e_l_l_u_l_a_r__t_.e l epho ne when he looked up and observed a group of police officers walking towards him. He later realized they were FBI Agents.I !resumed texting until he heard a loud bang and he looked up. The bang was not a gunshot, but seemed to be one of the tools used on the gate. He heard one of the Agents say "Gun."I !dropped his cellular telephone and stated he heard more than one gunshot. I ldid not see who fired a weapon. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 I b6 b7C (U/~ The autopsy of Coborubio identified one fatal gunshot which travelled through his torso, catastrophically damaging a kidney and the liver. The round exited the chest cavity and embedded in his bicep. This bullet fragment was recovered by the coroner and provided to the FBI. The other two rounds fired were not recovered. (U/~ The SIRT prepared two Signed Sworn Statements (SSSs) from FBI LAFO SWAT operators SAsl The SIRT also prepared 37 FD-302s, from two LAFO SACs, two LAFO ASACs, three LAFO SSAs, 23 LAFO SWAT operators, two non-SWAT LAFO SAs, three LAFD personnel, one LASD Deputy, and one civilian witness. A FLEOA attorney represented SAsl The interviews documented in the SSSs and FD-302s were consistent with the evidence collected from the shooting scene. Other than SAsl who were exposed at the vehicle gate, the remaining SWAT operators could not see Coborubio, as they were visually impeded by a cement wall approximately six feet tall; however, SWAT operators consistently stated during their interviews they heard SAi lyell "let me see your hands," "FBI," and "Gun" before firing two or three rounds. I I bG b7C I (U/~ On 10/05/2016, Justice System Integrity Division, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, submitted a letter to IIC Bone which advised his office declined to review the Agent involved shooting based upon the absence of any local law enforcement involvement in the AIS and the fact the USAO, Central ..._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---' UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 District of California planned to conduct a review. In a letter dated 11/20/2016,I I Assistant United States Attorney for the USAO, Central District of California, declined to issue charges against lthe Agent involved in the shooting incident. On 10 /06/2016, Chief James Felty, DOJ Civil Rights Division, verbally declined prosecution in the LAFO AIS. SIRG Observations b6 b7C sAI (U/~ On 03/22/2017, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. (U/~ The voting SIRG members determined through a majority vote SAi of nine members Los Angeles SWAT lacted within the FBI's Deadly Force Policy when he discharged his weapon at Coborubio. Special Legal Counsel Civil Rights Division, DOJ voted luse of deadly force was not within the Deadly Force Policy, and Senior Trial Attorney! Organized Crime and Gang Section, DOJ abstained from the vote. The SIRG concluded SA !perceived Coborubio to be an imminent threat to himself and other Agents. SAi I I I b6 b7C I 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for, if any, corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ lwas Observation 1: Los Angeles SWAT Operator! unsure of the total number of rounds loaded in his shoulder weapon and extra magazines. (U/~ Analysis 1: The Signed Sworn Statement of SAi._~~~~~ UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 revealed he was unsure of the number of rounds loaded in his shoulder weapon and extra magazines. SAi lstated he had one round in the chamber of his Colt M4Al rifle and a magazine with "approximately 27 rounds" at the start of the operation. SAi ~tated he carried three additional loaded magazines for his Colt M4Al rifle, but he was unsure of the round count in each. b6 b7C (U/~ The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG, section 4.1.1 stated, "All SAs are responsible for knowing the loaded condition (total number of rounds) of their pistols and/or shoulder weapons and must be prepared to report that number in connection with any post-incident debriefings, reviews, or investigations." (U/~ Instruction 1: ADIC, Los Angeles, will ensure Agents have knowledge of the total number of rounds contained in their weapon(s) and extra magazines in accordance with the Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide 0741DPG. (U/~ Observation 2: Appropriate review and authorization was not obtained in the Los Angeles Criminal Division to conduct the SWAT I operation atl (U/~ Analysis 2a: FBI LAFO Squad CE-4 member and SGVSSTF Coordinator, SAi who also serves on the LAFO SWAT team, briefed FBI SWAT personnel the tactical operation was in support of Squad CE-4 investigation! However, Squad CE-4 SSA ladvised he was unaware the SWAT operation was in support of a Squad CE-4 investigation. sAI I sent ssAI Ian email advising of his participation in the operation, as well as the operation being in support of Operation Pandemic. However, SSA-1~~~--. b6 b7C I I I did not read the message in its entirety, and only focused on SA !participation as a SWAT operator. Operation Pandemic is the FBI case file which Squad CE-4 utilized for predicated Violence I 8 b6 b7A b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 Reduction Network (VRN) subjects investigated by Squad CE-4. Additionally, the responsible Criminal A/ASAC,1 and Criminal Division SAC Sean Ragan were unaware of the operation in support of the Criminal program. I b6 b7C (U/~ There was no coordination between executive management (EM) in the Los Angeles Counterterrorism Division, which oversees the FBI SWAT program, and EM in the Criminal Division for a SWAT operation which utilized a Criminal Division matter as its predication. Coordination could have identified the lack of predicated FBI information to conduct the operation under a 281D Criminal Enterprise file. Coordination would have allowed executive management analysis as to whether to utilize a police cooperation file to render aid to the LASD in this instance. (U/~Analysis 2b: The SWAT Operation was conducted by FBI Los Angeles SWAT in support of the LASD. LASD's tactical team was unable to serve the California state search warrra_n_t_o_n-1!1....._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ueas to other commitments. The LASD describedl._________________ a danger to society whose immediate apprehension was necessary. J_. However ,._I______.I parole officer was unaware of l.______._Ia_r_r_e_s_t_u_n_t_i_l___, several days after he was placed into custody for .. I____________. 12.4.1 (U) AUTHORITY (U/~ Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §0.85(g), the FBI is authorized to provide assistance to local law enforcement in certain circumstances. Pursuant to AG Order 2954-2008, the FBI is authorized to provide reasonable technical assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (and to certain foreign agencies, see Section 12.4.2.4 below) to assist such agencies in the lawful execution of their authorized functions. 21 Under the Order, such technical assistance includes: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 F) (U) Providing the assistance of expert personnel in accordance with written guidelines issued by the FBI GC (General Counsel) or approved by the GC (See Section 12.3.2.3.D.2 above); and G) (U) Rendering other assistance and cooperation to such agencies that is not expressly precluded by applicable law. 12.5.3 (U) DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO OTHER AGENCIES (DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN) (U/~ The FBI Domestic Technical Assistance PG (Policy Guide) and the FBI Foreign Technical Assistance PG provide guidance and standardized sample templates and certification documents to assist employees on the procedures for providing assistance to domestic and foreign agencies. The Domestic Police Cooperation - Technical Assistance (343V) case classification and the Foreign Police Cooperation - Technical Assistance (163V) case classification were created to maintain technical assistance documentation. Additionally, technical assistance program management related control files may be used in certain circumstances. 12.3.2.3 (U) AGENCIES INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE TO STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL In addition, the FBI is authorized to provide the assistance of expert personnel to support state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies "when lives are endangered," Exec. Order 12333 § 2.6(c), provided that such assistance is either approved by the FBI GC or in accordance with written guidelines approved by the FBI GC. See id; A.G. Order No. 29542008. Thus, even when the FBI lacks any other basis of authority, FBI expert personnel may respond to requests for expert assistance by local authorities in situations involving the safety of human life. In UNCLASSIFIED/~ 10 UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 this context, "expert personnel" are FBI employees who possess special skills or knowledge derived from their education, training, or experience and not normally possessed by professional law enforcement officers (e.g., polygraphers, crisis negotiators, crisis management, and HRT and SWAT personnel); the term does not encompass FBI employees who have specific knowledge about a particular investigation derived from participating in the investigation. (U/~ Analysis 2c: VRN is a DOJ initiative designed to identify cities with high or rising violent crime rates, which the FBI supports by implementing a 10-point strategy to assist in violent crime reduction. VRN status is not predication for an investigation, nor is it justification for an FBI investigation/operation. VRN status did not provide sole justification or predication for investigative activity outside policy. Field Offices responsible for VRN cities /areas must follow the DIOG to open and predicate investigations on individuals or groups. Squad CE-4 conducted all VRN related activities utilizing I I I I There was no documentation onl lin the Per DIOG the following are necessary for investigative activity: I ...._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---' 7.7.1 (U) OPENING DOCUMENTATION (U/~The predication to open a Full Investigation must be documented in the opening EC. In addition to the opening EC, division PGs may require the use of other specific forms to supplement the opening EC, i.e. FD-920, etc. The appropriate approving authority may grant oral authority to open a Full Investigation if the standards for opening or approving a Full Investigation are met. Should oral authorization to conduct a Full Investigation be granted, an EC setting forth the predicating facts, as well as the identity of the UNCLASSIFIED/~ 11 b6 b7A b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident 08/25/2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A2073832, 04/24/2017 authorizing supervisor and date of oral authorization, must be documented to the supervisor who granted the oral authorization, as soon as practicable, but not more than five (5) business days after granting the authorization. (U/~ Instruction 2a: ADIC, Los Angeles, will ensure coordination between Executive Management of the LAFO SWAT program and the respective investigative program being supported by SWAT. (U/~ Instruction 2b: ADIC, Los Angeles, will ensure police cooperation files are opened and necessary requests are filed when the LAFO SWAT is used on local matters in the absence of open predicated investigations. (U/~ Instruction 2c: ADIC, Los Angeles, will ensure all VRN related matters warranting FBI investigation are addressed in separate predicated case files, initiated in accordance with DIOG . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 12 FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Title: Date: 01/05/2015 CC: b6 b7C From: INSPECTION DA-OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS SECTION Contact: LEFF DOUGLAS A,1--~~~~~~--. Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: b6 b7C David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara LEFF DOUGLAS A 297J-HQ-A5319916 (U) Los Angeles Shooting Incident Synopsis: (U/~ Following the SIRG meeting held on 12/15/2014, this communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting. Administrative Notes: (U/~Reference Shooting Incident Report submitted electronically by Special Agent (SA)l._~~~~~~~___,ldated 09/11/2014. b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 07/30/2014, at approximately 6:45 p.m., SA~I~~~~~~--' from the Los Angeles Field Office was involved in a shooting incident in Chatsworth, California. On 07/30/2014, SAi larrived home from work sometime after 5 p.m. SAi drove their personally owned vehicle b6 (POV) to a car dealership to pick up their second POV. SAi lthen drove his second POV to Chipotle restaurant in Chatsworth to get dinner. S~was dressed in gym clothes. Prior to exiting his vehicle, sAc==Jlocked his personally UNCLASSIFIED/~ b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 01/05/2015 I_____.. owned weapon (POW), a .. ~ 40 caliber handgun, in the glove box of his vehicle. Earlier, he loaded the POW by inserting a nine-round magazine in the slide, but did not put a round in the chamber. SAD was current on his POW qualification. (U/~ b6 b7C SA~l_ _~lparked his POV in the parking lot and exited his vehicle carrying his mobile phones, FBI credentials, handcuffs, and car keys. After exiting his vehicle, SA' lheard several loud voices arguing in the parking lot. SAi . saw a mar--l_e......___________,__..J and female arguing near a was screaming and attempted to shove into the driver's seat of the pushed head, pulled her hair, and shoved her body in an attempt to get her into t h e D SA ~roached! land asked what was going on. L_________Jpulled a black semi-automatic handgun from his midsection and pointed it at SAi SAi !immediately put his hands up and his head down to minimize any impression he posed a threat. He stated something to the effect of, "This is your business, not my business," and backed away with his hands in the air. As SAi !backed away, b6 b7C I ~-----'!pointed his weapon directly at the head ofl continued to try to get her into thee==] land (U/ ~ After reaching the cover of a large vehicle, S A D ran to his POV, retrieved his POW, and chambered a round by racking the slide. He put his mobile telephones and handcuffs on the car seat and retrieved his FBI credentials from his pocket. Concerned for I bG b7C l======:::::;--lsafety, SAi ran back to the large vehicle for cover . was in the driver's seat of the entered the front passenger seat of the tried to exit the vehicle from the driver's side door but grabbed her and pulled her back into the vehicle. !continued to scream for help. ..______....I I (U/ ~ While behind cover, S A D held his FBI credentials in his left hand to ensure anyone facing him could see his picture, name, and title. He held his handgun in his right hand. SAi stood up from l____..I and his place of cover, pointed his handgun at .. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 I repeatedly b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 01/05/2015 stated in a loud authoritative voice, "Police! Drop the weapon! Show me your hands!" who was seated in the front passenger seat with the door closed, looked at SAi land pointed his weapon at SA c===Jthrough the windshield. I I (U/ ~ Fearing for his life and the life of ._I_ _ _ _ __.I SA immediately ducked down behind cover for a split second to secure a two handed grip, stood up, and fired nine rounds. I lfired at least During the exchange of gunfire and unknown to one round at SAi law enforcement at the time, a bullet fragment struck the front of .___ _ _ ___.lhandgun and became lodged in the recoil spring housing. This caused the slide to become dislodged and partially separated from the frame, and made the handgun inoperable. b6 b7C . _ I_ __ . I b6 b7C (U/~I lforcedl Ito drive the car out of the parking lot and into the street. SAi lkept his credentials above his head and continued to verbally identify himself as "police." SAi lused parked cars as cover and chased ther==Jin order to assess whether he could successfully rescue! ~also so he could gather information for responding law enforcement. Thec==Jaccelerated and SA .___ __.!was unable to keep up. sAc===Jreturned to the parking lot, continued to display his credentials, identified himself as "police," and used a bystander's telephone to provide a description of the events to a 911 operator. Approximately one minute later, a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) vehicle responded and gave chase. (U/~ b6 b7C I I was able to escape from thec==Jwhen she made a turn onto a side street. flagged down a bystande,..r__w_h_o_ _ ___, I I I___. .,. .____. assisted her in getting to the LAPD. I lnow drivin...g..... .___ __.I continued to flee from police. At an intersection, I..._____. pointed his handgun at a California Highway Patrol Officer. The officer, fearing for his safety and believing! lwas about to fire his handgun at him, fired eight rounds atl as he drove by. b6 b7C I (U/~ After a lengthy high-speed pursuit involving several local law enforcement agencies on Los Angeles freeways and mountain roads, stopped I lat the Malibu Bluffs Park in Malibu, UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 01/05/2015 California, approximately 21.3 miles from the scene of the Agent Involved Shooting (AIS). As he fled on foot from the_I________. pointed his handgun at a responding LAPD officer. Fearing for the officer's safety and believing! lwas about to fire his handgun at the officer, another LAPD officer fired one round at then ran down a steep cliff and eventually discarded the handgun in a bush. Approximately two hours after the initial shooting, was taken into custody by LAPD SWAT on the hillside below Malibu Bluffs Park. b6 b7C _I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ . I (U/~I I lwas taken to UCLA medical hospital where he was treated for what was erroneously believed to be a superficial gunshot wound to the chin, but was later determined to be a cut sustained during a fall while he fled on foot from the police. He was released into LAPD custody after several hours. lwas treated by Los Angeles Fire Department paramedics and transported to Northridge Hospital, where she was treated for a half-inch laceration to her right ear. The medical report indicated the injury was the result striking her with his handgun or was caused by flying glass debris. I lwas released later that evening. b6 b7C I ofl (U/~ On 07/30/2014, at approximately 8:52 p.m., FBI LA ERT arrived at the AIS scene. Items recovered included nine discharged Winchester S&W .40 caliber cartridge cases, three fired copper bullets of unknown caliber with brass disks at their base, the smashed passenger-side window of the and one water bottle. I LJ I b6 b7C I (U/~ LAPD Robbery Homicide Division conducted an investigation and filed a 12-count complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court which charged! lwith two counts each of Attempted Murder and Assault with a Firearm (Victims and 1, one count each of Kidnapping (Victim , Carjacking (Victim , Criminal Threats (Victim , Stalking (Victim , Disobeying a Domestic Relations Court Order (Victim Injuring a Spouse .....---.......--...,..------' After a Prior Conviction (Victim Possession of Firearm by a Felon, and Evading an Officer. SAi ------- UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 01/05/2015 SIRG Observations (U/~ On 12/15/2014, the SIRG reviewed the AIS incident with the intent to: 1. (U/~ Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously determined the application of deadly force by SAi.-~~~~~ ._~~-Ion 07/30/2014 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's b6 b7C deadly force policy. 2. (U/~ Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational planning and execution, training, and safety perspective. The SIRG made the following observations: (U/~ Observation 1: Los Angeles Field Office failed to provide INSD with updated, accurate information on the subject's medical condition. (U/~ Analysis 1: (U/~ The shooting took place on 07/30/2014. Initial reporting indicated! !received one through-and-through gunshot wound to his shoulder and one through-and-through gunshot wound to his right cheek. On 08/20/2014, INSD requested! !booking photo. Upon receipt of the photo, INSD observed did not have a gunshot wound through the cheek, but instead had a band-aid on his chin. INSD followed up with Los Angeles Field Office (LAFO) to confirm injuries. On 08/26/2014, LAFO uploaded a medical report (serial 36), dated 07/31/2014, which revealed! !wounds were superficial. LAFO either had not followed up to determine whether! fact sustained gunshot wounds through the cheek and shoulder, or was aware but failed to notify INSD. In either case, this resulted in inaccurate information which was relayed to FBIHQ senior executive management. It was LAFO's responsibility to properly update INSD !medical condition as the investigation progressed. I I lin onl UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 01/05/2015 (U/~ Recommendation 1: ADIC, Los Angeles, should ensure INSD is advised of significant investigative developments when handling a delegated AIS. (U/~ Observation 2: (U/~ Analysis 2: Los Angeles Field Office failed to immediately send SA_l~~~-lweapon to the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU). (U/~ SAi I LAFO collected firearm immediately after the AIS and turned it over to the LAPD so it could be processed consistently with the remaining evidence to be used in the state criminal case against On 08/15/2014, INSD sent en email to LAFO which reminded them of the need to send !firearm to DSU as quickly as possible. Instead of doing so, it was returned to SAi who qualified on it and then sent it to DSU on 09/08/2014. I (U/~ b6 b7C SAi b6 b7C I Recommendation 2: ADIC, Los Angeles, should ensure immediate coordination with DSU after collection of weapons from an AIS. (U/~ Observation 3: SA~l~~~__.IPOW was not in the proper on-duty carrying configuration. (U/~ Analysis 3: (U/~ MIOG Section 12-2.2,"CARRYING OF WEAPONS," paragraph 6 stated, "When SAs are armed, handguns must be fully loaded." Although not further defined in the MIOG, DSU indicated "fully loaded", based upon common industry language and consistent with entry level and recurring firearms training provided by the FBI, required a round in the chamber and the magazine filled to either the manufacturer's stated capacity or an alternative capacity set forth by DSU for a particular weapon. In the case of a Glock .27, "fully loaded" required a round in the chamber and a full magazine. Although formally superseded by Corporate Policy Directive (CPD) 0634D, MIOG Section 12-2.2 is still incorporated by reference on the Training Division, Firearms Training UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 01/05/2015 Unit (FTU) website and the guidance to always carry a "fully loaded" firearm is still taught by the FTU. (Despite the supersession, CPD 0634D does not address carry configuration) . I (U/~ I After the initial confrontation with S A D ran to his POV, retrieved his handgun, and chambered a round by racking the slide. As noted above, FTU guidance was for all handguns to be fully loaded. Accordingly, lshould have already had a round chambered. b6 b7C SAi (U/~ Recommendation 3: ADIC, Los Angeles, should ensure all Agents adhere to the proper firearms carrying configuration. (U/~ Observation 4: S A D locked his weapon in an unauthorized container in his vehicle. (U/~ Analysis 4: (U/~ CPD 0634D, entitled, "Firearms Security," Section 8.4.2.1, provided, b6 b7C "Glove boxes/consoles are never considered a secure container whether they are locked or not." (U/ ~ Prior to exiting his vehicle, S A D locked his firearm in his vehicle's glove box. This was prohibited by the above policy. (U/~ b6 b7C ADIC, Los Angeles, will remind Agents of policy prohibiting firearms from being left unattended in a vehicle glove compartment, whether locked or unlocked. 3. Instruction 4: (U/~ Provide recommendations for administrative action if The SIRG unanimously determined there would be no referral to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), INSD for potential administrative action. deemed necessary. (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David P. Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Deputy Chiefl !civil UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 01/05/2015 _________ Rights Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice; Supervisory ..____, Special Agent (SSA)I....__....... I Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division (TD); SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, TD; UC Spec ia l.__W_e_a_p_o_n_s_a_n_d_T_a_c_t_i_c_s.... ( SWAT ) Operations Unit, I I ucl Critica_l_I_n_c_i_d_e_n_t_R ....esponse Group; INew Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSAI Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; and Inspector Trent R. Teyema, Office Of Inspections (OI), INSD; The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders! OI, INSD; INSD; Program Management Analyst! Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; and Special Assistant INSD. I ucl f I I I IOI, Procedures for Responding to the Observations (U/~ ADIC, Los Angeles is responsible for ensuring each Inspection Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans to implement. (U/~ ADIC, Los Angeles is required to provide a written response via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~ Los Angeles Shooting Incident Re: 297J-HQ-A5319916, 01/05/2015 Unit Chief I.__________. Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. the EC is serialized, the Sentinel link should be e-mailed to MPA I I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 Once b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Miami Field Office, 04/13/2016 Title: From: Date: 06/03/2016 INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C KOLEFF LAWRENCE E Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A7480799 (U) Miami Shooting Incident 04/13/2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the Miami Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 04/13/2016. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 05/04/2016, was electronically submitted by SSAI land coordinated with INSD Assistant Inspector/Team Leaderj jand Inspector Lawrence E. Koleff_ b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 05/10/2016, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge shooting incident involving sAj jwho accidentally discharged one round from her Bureau-issued .40 caliber Glock 22 pistol into a clearing barrel, while attempting to load her weapon shortly after an annual weapons inventory at the Miami Field Office. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Miami Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 04/13/2016. The SIRT investigation revealed the following: UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Miami Field Office, 04/13/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7480799, 06/03/2016 (U/~ On 04/13/2016, SA_l~~~~__.lwas one of the first Agents in line for the weapons inventory which occurred on the ground floor of the Miami Field Office parking garage. SAi !removed her weapon, a .40 caliber Glock, Model 22 pistol, serial numberl from a holster in her handbag, proceeded to a gun clearing barrel near the weapons inventory table, removed a loaded magazine, ejected the round from the chamber, and locked the slide in the open position. SA llhanded a safe and empty weapon to Miami PFI, SAi ._~~~__.~r purposes of inventory. After sAI lconducted the inventory, he returned the weapon to SAi land directed her back to the clearing barrel to load her weapon. Acknowledging SAi I instructions, SAi !pointed the muzzle of her weapon into the clearing barrel, inserted a magazine, and sent the slide forward at which time, a single round was simultaneously discharged into the clearing barrel. SAi lcould not say with certainty whether her right index finger was on the trigger when she sent the slide forward, but stated she believed her finger was alongside the frame of the pistol at the time the accidental discharge of her weapon occurred. I b6 b7C b7E (U/~ SSA was next in line for his weapons inventory when he heardL----ir-~~~~~~"""'lweapon accidentally discharge. ssAI I notified A/ASAC of the incident and called the ERT Team Leader to request they respond and process the scene. SSA instructed SAi Ito secure SAi !firearm, ammunition, and magazines then blocked off the clearing barrel area and awaited ERT and the shooting team response. (U/~ Once on scene, ERT collected one spent round of ammunition from inside the clearing barrel and one shell casing on the ground in front of the clearing barrel. PFII lcollected sAI I pistol, one magazine containing 12 rounds, and two loose rounds from SA I Examination of the ammunition collected by PFII I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Miami Field Office, 04/13/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7480799, 06/03/2016 ~en ~I lbrouoht this to SAi I attention !submitted sAI 1.40 (U/~ PFII 22 pistol, ser~i-·_a_l__n_u_mb~ er~l __________.I she stated she caliber Glock, Model and her magazines to TD, Defensive b6 b7C b7E b6 b7C b7E Systems Unit, for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection, which revealed all safeties were present and the weapon was in correct operating condition. There were no unusual abnormalities in the disseminated parts and there were no unauthorized modifications which contributed to the accidental discharge. The weapon was in good condition, and passed all safety and function checks. (U/~ Miami documented SAi laccount of the accidental discharge in a Signed Sworn Statement, completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report and two witness FD-302s, and confirmed SA~I_____________ firearms qualification and training records were current. b6 b7C SIRG Observations On 05/10/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: Because the shooting was determined to be a non-operational accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ Observation 1: SA~l______________________laccidentally discharged b6 b7C one round from her .40 caliber Glock 22 pistol into a clearing barrel. (U/~ Analysis 1: On 04/13/2016, ~--------~I attempted at approximately 8:49AM, SA to reload her weapon after an annual weapons UNCLASSIFIED~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Miami Field Office, 04/13/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7480799, 06/03/2016 inventory at the Miami Field Office. While performing this action and pointing the weapon into a clearing barrel, !accidentally discharged one round from her Bureau-issued .40 caliber Glock 22 pistol, serial number._I______. sAI b6 b7C b7E (U/~ INSD requested FTU perform a functionality test on SA .________!Glock 22 pistol to determine if critical deficiencies exist on the weapon causing it to malfunction. On 04/29/2016, an operational test of !Glock 22 pistol was performed by the FBI TD, Defensive Systems Unit and determined the firearm was functioning properly. SAi b6 b7C (U/~ Firearms Policy Guide 0741PG, dated 01/08/2015, Section 4.3.1, Cardinal Safety Rules, stated in relevant part: "Keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to press it." (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Miami will ensure sAI !receives training to reinforce critical skills for the safe and effective handling of firearms. (U/~ Observation 2: SAi (U/ ~ Analysis 2: I I b6 b7C b6 b7C b7E I .__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__,IAfter SA_l~~~~--- accidentally discharged one round from her Glock 22 pistol, Miami Field Office PFI SA~-----"'l-_ __JI collected her pistol and magazine and determined SA a total of 14 rounds remaining. Twelve rounds were loaded in the magazine, and two loose rounds were on her person. Further examination determined lhad I I I s:zi.1 I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Miami Field Office, 04/13/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7480799, 06/03/2016 stated in relevant part: b7E (U/~ Instruction 2: SAC, Miami will ensure compliance with the b7E 3. (U/~ Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if The SIRG recommended the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. deemed necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chiefl Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ); Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I I Tactical Training Unit (TTU), Training Division (TD); Assistant Section Chiefl ______!violent Crime and Gang Section, Criminal Investiga._t_i_v_e_____. I Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) b6 b7C Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; SSAL----r---------.....__I_n...,vestigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Roger A. Coe, East Asia Section, Counterintelligence Division; Senior Trial Attorney . - - - - -......----------.L___j ....----..._ ,__ ____. Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; UC SWAT Operations Unit (SOU) , Critical Incident Respons._e__G_r_o_u_p_(_C_I_R_G_)-,-._,SSA I I ....------------. _____ _____ _______.!Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas, Kathryn Peterson, and Lawrence E. Koleff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector /Team Leaders I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 I b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Miami Field Office, 04/13/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7480799, 06/03/2016 OI, INSD; Mana ement and Program Analysts OI, INSD; Special Assistant....... SOU, CIRG; SSA TTU, TD; SSA DSU, TD; and ASAC Jim Kirdar, USDOJ Inspector General. ..--~~~~~~ SSA INSD; b6 b7C ...,...~~~~~~~.--~..L..~---. ...._~~~~~~~---' ..._~~~~~ Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Miami, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instructions are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions are addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Miami, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each Instruction. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl Inspection Management Unit, INSD . •• UNCLASSIFIED~ 6 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/ ~ SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2014 Title: Date: 11/14/2014 CC:I_- - - - - b6 b7C PIRO GEORGE L From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: Drafted b6 b7C R Justin Tolomeo STROUD SHAWN W David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara By:~!~~~~~~~~~~----' Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A5470031 (U) Miami Field Office Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Accidental Discharge incident following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the Miami Field Office by the Acting Chief Inspector on 08/28/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 10/01/2014, was submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)~I~~~~~---. Miami Field Office. I I b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an Accidental Discharge incident involving SSAI !Field Office, on 08/28/2014. SSA=i==~~~~-----~~1-w_a_s~p-a~r-t_i_c_i-.p-a~t-i_n_g___.in quarterly firearms qualifications at the Martin County Sheriff's Office Firearms Range in Palm City, Florida, when the Accidental Discharge occurred. At about UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U//~ SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5470031, 11/14/2014 11:45 a.m., after completing two qualification courses and one combat course, ssAI l1eft the range without having been cleared by a Firearms Instructor, entered the cleaning shack, and began preparing to clean his Bureau-issued Glock 23 handgun. b6 b7C As the last pair of Agents prepared to shoot the combat course, the final course of fire for the day, Firearms Instructor (FI) I !noticed some Agents had left the range area. Fri._~~--' told Fii lthe line was not cleared and proceeded to retrieve the Agents who had left the area so the line could be cleared with a final safety check. (U/~ In the cleaning shack, SSAI !manipulated the slide to remove the slide from the rest of the weapon in preparation for cleaning. When ssAI lwas unable to remove the slide, he let the slide go forward and pulled the trigger to release the slide with the gun pointed downward facing the wall. The firearm discharged once. One round traveled in a downward path through the top of a cleaning box and through the wall of the cleaning shack into the ground outside. No injuries were caused by the Accidental Discharge. However, minor damage resulted to a cleaning box and to the wall of the cleaning shack. SIRG Observations (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Accidental Discharge incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Since the incident reviewed involved an Accidental Discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5470031, 11/14/2014 and execution, training, and/or safety issues. ssAI !experienced an Accidental Discharge while preparing to clean his Bureau-issued handgun after firearms qualification training. Observation 1: b6 b7C The Firearms Training Unit (FTU) provided guidance to field off ices regarding the administration of the Firearms Training Program for FY 2014 (1Z-HQ-A1355419, Serial 148, EC dated 11/07/2013). Analysis 1: The EC stated, "SAFETY: At the conclusion of firearms training shooters will perform a safety check. Prior to holstering or removing weapons from the firing line, a final safety check of all weapons will be performed by a Firearms Instructor. Shooters must also perform a safety check immediately prior to disassembling weapons for cleaning." MIOG Part II, Sections 12 (g) and (h) indicated, " ... After training you ...need to ensure the weapon is unloaded before cleaning. Load and unload only on the firing line and only when instructed to do so. Any exceptions will be stipulated by the lead Firearms Instructor." On 08/28/2014, SSA._l_ _ _ ___.lweapon was not safety checked by a Firearms Instructor at the conclusion of firearms training. In addition, ssAI lfai1ed to perform a safety check prior to disassembling his weapon for cleaning to ensure his weapon was unloaded before cleaning. As a result, SSA ... l _____lsuffered an Accidental Discharge in the cleaning shack while attempting to disassemble his weapon for cleaning. l______.I attends SAC, Miami, will ensure SSA .. firearms training. Instruction 1: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 remedial b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5470031, 11/14/2014 Firearms Instructors permitted Agents to depart the firing line before a final safety check was conducted by a Firearms Instructor. Observation 2: The Firearms Training Unit (FTU) provided guidance to field off ices regarding the administration of the Firearms Training Program for fiscal year (FY) 2014 (1Z-HQ-A1355419, Serial 148, EC dated Analysis 2: 11/07/2013). The EC stated, "SAFETY: Prior to holstering or removing weapons from the firing line, a final safety check of all weapons will be performed by a Firearms Instructor." According to the General Rules of FBI Firearms Safety Rules, which is published on the Firearms Training Unit intranet site, "At the conclusion of training, a final safety check of all weapons will be performed by a Firearms Instructor." On 08/28/2014, Agents departed the firearms qualifications range without a safety check. Specifically, Firearms Instructors-I~.......~~--. Ifailed I to perform a safety check of SSA !weapon at the firing line at the conclusion of firearms I training. SAC, Miami, will ensure final safety checks are conducted at the conclusion of firearms training, in accordance with 1Z-HQ-A1355419, Serial 148, and General FBI Firearms Safety Rules. Instruction 2: Firearms Instructors were not present in the cleaning area when Agents began to disassemble their weapons in preparation for cleaning. Observation 3: The Firearms Training Unit (FTU) provided guidance to field off ices regarding the administration of Firearms Training Program for FY 2014 (1Z-HQ-A1355419, Serial 148, EC dated 11/07/2013). The EC Analysis 3: stated, "SAFETY: Ammunition is prohibited in the cleaning area. Weapons should be loaded and unloaded in a designated safe location UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5470031, 11/14/2014 away from the cleaning area. A Firearms Instructor must be present in the cleaning, clearing and loading areas in order to supervise the safe disassembly, cleaning, lubrication, assembly, function check and loading of weapons." On 08/28/2014, a Firearms Instructor was not present in the cleaning, clearing and loading areas to supervise the safe disassembly, cleaning, lubrication, assembly, function check, and loading of weapons. SSA suffered an Accidental Discharge in the cleaning shack while attempting to disassemble his weapon for cleaning. _____. .I b6 b7C SAC, Miami, will ensure Firearms Instructors are present in the cleaning area at the conclusion of firearms training, in accordance with 1Z-HQ-A1355419, Serial 148. Instruction 3: 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed The SIRG found this Accidental Discharge to be the result of SSAI failure to conduct a final safety check prior to departing the range after quarterly firearms qualifications. Therefore, the SIRG determined the Agent's actions warranted referral to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. necessary. I b6 b7C (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W. Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chief Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ); Trial Attorney! Criminal Division, USDOJ; SSA ...__....... ..., Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit L----.---------------. Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training L------r--------------, Division (TD); SSA Firearms Training Unit, TD; UC I________. I ______________ ________I Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5470031, 11/14/2014 ucl Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; and SC Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith SWAT Operations Unit, CIRG; SSA Ballistics Research Facility, DSU; Protective Operations Unit, Security Division; UC Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Kathryn Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders .._ ....... .......OI, .....,INSD; Special Assistant ____ _____ __ b6 b7C L-~~~~~~~~~~~---r~~~~~~~~~~.,...~~~ _____ OI, ~---------___,,..........._ ...., """"'I""'N""S""D'"",._·....;;.U""'C""""-----------'""a""'n.;.d"""""""M""a""inagemen t Pro gr am Analysts (MAP As ) Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; L - - - - -.......- - - - - - - - - - - -...... and MAPA Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), INSD. ------ Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Miami, is responsible for ensuring the Inspection Instructions are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions are addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Instructions have been resolved or require further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. (U/~ SAC, Miami, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve the Instructions. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief I IMU, INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e-mail the ..S_e_n_t_i_n_e_l_l_i_n_k... to MPA ~I____________, UNCLASSIFIED~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U~ SHOOTING INCIDENT MIAMI FIELD OFFICE 08/28/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5470031, 11/14/2014 •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT MINNEAPOLIS FIELD OFFICE 06/12/2014 Date: 11/24/2014 CC: b6 b7C From: INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: Timothy M. Feeney STROUD SHAWN W David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara b6 b7C Drafted By: Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A5073785 (U) Minneapolis Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge incident following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014. accidental discharge report by ASAC 09/10/2014. b6 b7C dated ...._~~~~~~~~_____.. Details: (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge incident that occurred on 06/12/2014 involving SAi Minneapolis Field Office. SAi lwas participating in a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) live-fire sniper training exercise at Target Field, One Twins Way, Minneapolis, Minnesota. During the course of the exercise, an accidental discharge occurred. On his last shot of the I UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT MINNEAPOLIS FIELD OFFICE 06/12/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5073785, 11/24/2014 exercise, SAi lpulled the trigger of his sniper rifle and discovered the weapon's safety was engaged. SAi lremoved his finger from the trigger and used that finger to disengage the safety. Upon removing the safety, SAi lsniper rifle immediately discharged a single round without SAi lfinger on the trigger. The round from this discharge missed the designated target, pierced a stadium seat and caused minor damage to a cinder block wall. No one was injured as a result of the accidental discharge. For his personal use, SAi lhad his live-fire sniper relays recorded on a digital-video recording device. b6 b7C (U/~ On 06/13/2014, SA~l~~~-lbrought his sniper rifle and the digital-video recording to his Primary Firearms Instructor, who sent the weapon to the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU). Review of the digital-video recording corroborated SAi lassertion the weapon spontaneously discharged when he disengaged the safety. DSU examined and tested SAi IH-S Precision Pro 2000 Series .308 rifle, and consulted with the weapon's manufacturer, H-S Precision Rifles. The results of DSU's analysis and consultation with H-S Precision Rifles revealed SAi !weapon, and others of the same make and model, can malfunction in a way to cause an accidental discharge when the safety is disengaged. The malfunction was attributed to a faulty firing pin/safety shroud assembly. (U/~ Minneapolis Executive Management (EM) informed INSD of the accidental discharge on 06/14/2014. SIRG Observations (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the accidental discharge incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the incident reviewed involved an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT MINNEAPOLIS FIELD OFFICE 06/12/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5073785, 11/24/2014 and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. Minneapolis EM did not notify Inspection Division of the accidental discharge in a timely manner. Observation 1: The Shooting Incident Guide required SAC, Minneapolis to immediately notify INSD of the accidental discharge. INSD was notified on 06/14/2014 of the accidental discharge which occurred on 06/12/2014. Analysis 1: Instruction 1: SAC, Minneapolis will ensure INSD is promptly notified of all Agent-involved shooting incidents, to include accidental discharges, in accordance with INSD's Shooting Incident Guide. 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed The SIRG found this accidental discharge to be attributable to the rifle's faulty firing pin/safety shroud assembly. Therefore, the SIRG determined the Agent's actions did not warrant referral to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. necessary. (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W. Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chief I Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States ...._~~._D_e_p__a_r_t~ment of Justice (USDOJ); Trial Attorney! Criminal I I Division, USDOJ; SSA Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA quad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division (TD); SSA Firearms Training Unit, TD; SWAT Ope._r_a_t_i_'o__n_s__U_n__ i_t_,__C_r __i_t_i......cal Incident ucl I I New Response Grou~p---(-C_I_R_G __)_;__u_c~I Agent Training Program Section, DSU, TD; Section Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, Violent Crimes UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) SHOOTING INCIDENT MINNEAPOLIS FIELD OFFICE 06/12/2014 Re: 297K-HQ-A5073785, 11/24/2014 Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; and SC Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith! ._~~_.lswAT Operations Unit, CIRG; SSA Ballistics Research Facility, DSU; SSA Protective Operations Unit, Security Division; UC Firearms and Toolmarks --~~~~~~~~---Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Kathryn Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders! r--~~~~--..,1--~~~~~~~.--~~~~~...L.O~I..:.,, INL-S_D_;~S-p~e-c_i_·a~l~A-s-s~i-s_t_a_n_t.....,..I~~~.......~~ ""'""~~~~~~~~~.,....___, ......OI, ._~~~__,~ INSD; UC....... ~~~~~~~ b6 b7C and Management Program Analysts ..... Inspection Management ....... Inspection Analysis ~~~~~~~~--~~~~~ (MAPAs) Unit (IMU), INSD; and MAP Unit (IAU), INSD. L-~~~~~~~~~~~r-~~~~~~~~~~~ Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Minneapolis, is responsible for ensuring the Inspection Instructions are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions are addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Instructions have been resolved or require further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. (U/~ SAC, Minneapolis, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve the Instructions. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl I Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please E-mail the Sentinel link to •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 MPA~I~~~~~~~ b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: (U/ ~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 From: INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: Date: 09/21/2016 THOMAS VADIM DANIEL Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C I___________. Drafted By: ... Case ID #: 297J-HQ-A7422633 (U) Milwaukee Shooting Incident Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shooting Incident Report, was prepared by INSD Ins:ector Vadim D. Thomas and Assistant Inspector/Team Leader ... __.J I_______ b6 b7C Details: I I (U/~ On 08/25/2016, the SIRG reviewed a shooting incident involving the execution of a state search warrant on 04/06/2016 by the Milwaukee SWAT Team. Approximately six shots were fired from inside the target residence at Special Agents (SAs) The Agents were not injured, as the ballistic shield SA !carried absorbed the subject's rounds. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Milwaukee Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 04/06/2016. (U/~ The delegated Shooting Incident Review Team investigation revealed the following: (U/~ On 04/05/2016, the Milwaukee County District Court issued a UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 Re: 297J-HQ-A7422633, 09/21/2016 search warrant for the purpose of searching the property atl ________________________.! The search warrant was--r-e_q_u_e_s_t_e_d__. following an investigation by Milwaukee FBI Squad CE-1, Safe Streets Gang Task Force. The investigation identified! a convicted felon, as an associate of drug suppliers. Cooperating witnesses reported! !maintained firearms inside the residence. The FBI Milwaukee SWAT Team was assigned to clear and secure the residence for a Milwaukee search team. I I (U/~ On 04/05/2016, at approximately 7:00 p.m., SWAT Team Leader (STL), SAl.____________.I briefed the approved operational plan. The operational briefing took place at the FBI garage located at~I_ _ _ ___. The objective of the operation was to safely clear and secure the residence located atl lprior to the execution of the search. The brief~i-n_g_a_l_s_o______. b6 b7C b6 b7C b7E included the criminal history of the subject and recent intelligence regarding the existence of firearms within the residence. (U/~ The operational plan dictated the SWAT Team would breach the front windows and door of the residence to gain a view of the interior of the residence and control of the subject by calling him out of the residence. The SWAT team would make their entry from the nearest logical point and would also provide outside perimeter support. The briefing also included an overview of the FBI's Deadly Force Policy. (U/~ On 04/06/2016 at approximately 4:00 a.m., the SWAT Team reassembled at the FBI garage, briefed the mission a second time and practiced for the mission. The briefing again addressed the criminal history of the subject and the recent intelligence received about handguns at the residence. (U/~ At approximately 5:54 a.m., SAi !requested and received authority from ASACr-1----------,..1-v-i,...,a__.the TOC, to move from phase line yellow to phase line green to initiate the execution of the search warrant. The SWAT Team arrived atl lat approximately 6:00 a.m. and deployed into assigned positions. SA I lwas assigned to cover the NW window from the cover of a UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U//~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 Re: 297J-HQ-A7422633, 09/21/2016 ballistic shield. SA._!_ ___.I was assigned to "rake and break" the NW window of the residence. At approximately 6:08 a.m., SAi lraked the NW window as the SWAT Team Operators identified themselves as FBI. The glass and the blind were cleared from the opening, but a bedroom sheet continued to cover the opening, which obscured the view of SAs linto the residence. A shot rang out and hit SA ------.-lb_a_l_l_i_·_s_t...ic shield. A short time after the initial gunshot, five b6 b7C additional shots rang out from the NW window and impacted the ballistic shield and the Bearcat vehicle located on the front lawn of the residence. Several SWAT Operators announced shots had been fired. SAs .------------.lsought cover behind the Bearcat vehicle. (U/~ SAs called the occupants out of the residence utilizing a public address (PA) system. Approximately ___. five minutes after the gun shots were fired; ....._ exited the front door of the residence and were taken into custody. informed the Agents an elderly man with dementia was inside the residence. I lalso advised SA I I that I I fired at the Milwaukee SWAT Operators, however he subsequently admitted he was the shooter when questioned by sAI land Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) Detective ... ____________ b6 b7C !___. (U/~ At approximately 6:10 a.m., SAi lnotified the TOC shots were fired, but no SWAT Team Operators or civilians appeared to have been injured. The SWAT Team effected entry into the residence from the rear door, systematically cleared the residence, took the elderly male into custody (later identified as I and secured the residence for the search. b6 b7C I, (U/~ The SWAT Team secured the residence until additional Agents and the Evidence Response Team (ERT) arrived at the residence. ERT conducted the search at the residence, recovered three firearms, and photographed the SWAT Team. SAs were interviewed by FBI SAs with Milwaukee Police Department detectives. (U~ At approximately 9:10 a.m., the SWAT Team reconvened in the UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 Re: 297J-HQ-A7422633, 09/21/2016 FBI garage. The SWAT Team Medic, 12 SWAT Team Operators, and a TOC Agent were interviewed by FBI Agent personnel. The statements from the interviewees were consistent with the statements provided by SAsl._____ Following the interviews, SAi lconducted a post operational briefing. b6 b7C ________ and SSA ..... along with Task Force Officer conducted a neighborhood canvass of the residents located within close proximity to the search warrant location. The Agents and TFo~I____. attempted to contact and interview the residents of eight nearby units; only three residents were home at the time of the canvass. The residents who were home stated they heard gun shots and observed FBI personnel in SWAT gear giving commands to the residents atl The statements from the residents were consis~t-e_n_t_w_i-.t-h__. (TFO) ...._ b6 b7C ._________I the accounts provided by the SWAT Operators. All of the interviewed neighbors advised they sustained no property damage or injuries as a result of the FBI operation. (U/~ Subsequent to his arrest,! lwas interviewed by SA land MPD Detective! lwas in the residence L-w-i-.t-h--rl_ _ _...___,lin the NW corner bedroom at 6 a.m. lstated he kept I I I a hand gun on the floor of the room. woke up when he heard a loud noise, then heard~screaming, and saw the window glass coming into the bedroo~stated he was holding his gun in his right hand when he fired several rounds over his head at the person(s) he thought were trying to enter his residence through the window . .____.!stopped firing his weapon when he heard the individuals at the window identify themselves as FBI, stating they had a search warrant. At this point, he dropped the gun and exited the house withl ~~~~~__.I (U/~ __ ...._ .....Iand ~~~____. Additionally, was interviewed by SSA MPD Detecti ve,......_______..,....._I_n_t.....he morning hours of 04/06/2016, bedroom. b6 b7C was with in the NW corner of their woke up to the sound of people yelling, glass UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 Re: 297J-HQ-A7422633, 09/21/2016 breaking, and things being thrown into their residence. She also heard what sounded like bombs going off inside her home. lstated she was not aware the individuals outside their residence were law enforcement. !recalled hearing gunshots, which she believed were coming from both the outside and inside of her home. observed a gun inl lhand which was pointed towards the window. She heardl fire approximately three rounds and then observed!.------. place the gun on the floor of the bedroom. lpicked up the gun and put it inl !bedroom. At some point during the shooting,! lcalled 911 and requested MPD send officers to her location. I I I I I I b6 b7C I (U/ ~ SAi lwas interviewed by sAI land MPD Detective I I SAi Istated he was assigned to take a tactical position on the NW window of the residence with SAi SA :lrole was to provide cover from behind a ballistic shield. SA ~sitioned himself to the right of the window, held the shield with light activated in his left hand, and held his duty pistol in his right hand. Shortly after the execute command, SAi !raked the window, a flash bang was deployed near the SW window, and SWAT Team Operators yelled "FBI, Search Warrant" and "FBI, don't move." SA felt the impact of a fired round on the shield. He then heard approximately three more gunshots and felt the impact of those rounds on the shield. SAi !yelled "shots fired" and fell back to a position of cover . .__SA_..l_......._ __,lstated he did not fire any shots from his b6 b7C ____. .I weapons because he was not able to locate the individual or individuals who had shot at them. (U/~ Iwas interviewed by SAi land MPD Detective I I was assigned to rake the window and I SAi any coverings with the "rake and break" tool at the NW window of the residence. Following the order to execute, SAi proceeded to break the window and pull out the blinds covering the window. After removing the blinds, SA....... noticed the window was still covered by a bedroom sheet. SA was working on removing the bedroom sheet when he heard SA.--......---....shout, "Shots fired." SAi then heard two gunshots SAi I __ ____ I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 Re: 297J-HQ-A7422633, 09/21/2016 and moved into a position of cover behind the tactical vehicle. SA .____.!did not fire his weapon for he was still holding the rake and break tool when the shots were fired, and was not able to locate the individual or individuals who had shot at them. SAi ldid not hear or witness any other member of the SWAT Team fire their weapons, but recalled members of the team identifying themselves as "FBI" or "Police" upon the execution of the warrant. SAi !observed what appeared to be five bullet holes in the bedroom sheet covering the window. Both SAsl lwere wearing FBI SWAT uniforms with body armor. b6 b7C (U/~ At approximately 7:00 a.m., members of the Milwaukee ERT arrived and processed the scene. ERT documented and photographed the equipment, weapons, residence, number of rounds in the weapons of SAs ._____________.I and the front and back of each SWAT Team Operator assigned to the mission. ERT recovered seven .45 caliber casings from the NW corner bedroom and a .45 caliber Ruger SR 45 from the closet of the same room. One live round was in the chamber of the Ruger SR 45, and the magazine was in the weapon and empty. A .357 Smith and Wesson revolver was recovered from the same room with six live rounds in the cylinder. Additionally, an Intertec machine pistol with a drum magazine was recovered from the same room. ERT also recovered the bedroom sheet which covered the window of the NW bedroom. The sheet had several holes in it. ERT did not identify any evidence of destruction to the residence, vehicles, or any other property near the scene as a result of the shooting. (U/~ On April 8, 2016, the District Attorney for Milwaukee County filed charges of attempted homicide and felon in possession (three counts) aqainstl No charges were filed against I b6 b7C b6 b7C I (U/~ CDCI !reviewed the history of legal training for the Milwaukee Division and determined the training was provided for Agents in conjunction with the 1st quarter firearms training, but was not provided to most SWAT Team Operators because they do not typically 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 Re: 297J-HQ-A7422633, 09/21/2016 attend field office firearms training in lieu of monthly SWAT Team firearms training. CDC has arranged with the SWAT STL, SA (U/ ~ bS b6 b7C SIRG Observations (U/~ On 08/25/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: (U/~ 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. (U/~ 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, Because no Milwaukee SWAT Team Operators fired their weapons, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational panning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U//~ Milwaukee SWAT Team Operators did not attend or failed to sign in for mandatory annual legal training. Observation 1: (U/~ Analysis 1: Milwaukee Chief Division Counsel (CDC)I ._~~~~~~!provided training that met the mandatory annual leg-a~l~~~training requirements in conjunction with the first quarter field b6 b7C office firearms training sessions. CDcl !reviewed the training records and determined a majority of the SWAT Team Operators were not in attendance during these training sessions. SWAT STL, SAi._~~~~~ confirmed SWAT Team Operators regularly participated in monthly SWAT specific firearms training sessions, in lieu of the field office quarterly firearms traininq sessions. I I b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 Re: 297J-HQ-A7422633, 09/21/2016 SAC, Milwaukee will ensure Instruction 1: (U/ b7E (U/~ Observation 2: Milwaukee SWAT Team Operators did not have their pistols fully loaded during the execution of an Operations Order on 04/06/2016. (U/~ Milwaukee conducted the delegated SIRT, in which it was determined lhad 17 rounds loaded in his Glock 17 (one less round than fully loaded) and lhad 15 rounds loaded Analysis 2: SAi in his Glock 22 b6 b7C SAi (one less round than fully loaded). The Firearms Policy Guide (FPG), dated 01/08/2015, subsection 4.1.1, stated in relevant part, "When armed, SAs must have their pistol.s ful.1.y 1.oaded and secured on their persons." (U/~ SAC, Milwaukee will ensure armed SWAT Team Instruction 2: Operators have their pistols fully loaded. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Eric D. Welling, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Section Chief (SC) M.A. Myers, Instruction Section, Training Division (TD); SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) --~~~~~---I Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; ssAI I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Charles McGonigal, CD-2 Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; Senior Trial Attorney Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC uc_I_________ uc I.._____ -------.,_______..... Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. SSAI I (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Kathryn Peterson and Regina Thompson, OI, INSD; Assistant UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ Agent Involved Shooting Incident Milwaukee Field Office, 04/06/2016 Re: 297J-HQ-A7422633, 09/21/2016 Inspector/Team Leadersl I lo I, INSD; Manaqement and Program Analysts! IOI, I b6 b7C INS~D_;__ S_S_A~I--------------,--------------........-----------'----. ________ I sou, I CIRG; SSAI ..._T_T_U_,_T_D__.; S SAi...._ ___. TTU, TD; and ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ Inspector General. (U/~ I Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Milwaukee, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instructions 1 and 2 are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions are addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instructions have been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Milwaukee, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instructions 1 and 2. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief Inspection Management Unit, INSD. I I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 bG b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, New Haven Field Office, 06/07/2016 Title: CC: Date: 09/21/2016 b6 I From: b7C INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: Drafted PETERSON KATHRYN Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C By:~I~~~~~~~~~~---' Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A7933936 (U) New Haven Field Office AD 06/07/2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shooting Incident Report, dated 06/07/2016, was prepared by INSD Inspector Kathryn Peterson and Assistant Inspector/Team Leader b6 b7C ..__~~~~~~~~~~___.... Details: (U/~ On 08/25/2016 the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge shooting incident involving New Haven Special Agent (SA)I On 06/07/2016 sAI laccidentally discharged a _r_o_u_n_d~f-r_o_m~-h-i_s_ I FBI SWAT-issued Glock Model 17, serial numberl during a New Haven SWAT Operation. There were no injuries as a result of the AD. The single round was discharged into a door jamb causing damage to the door jamb of a private residence where an FBI New Haven subject was arrested. The round embedded in the door jamb and was recovered by FBI UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, New Haven Field Office, 06/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7933936, 09/21/2016 New Haven personnel. The shooting incident review was delegated to the New Haven Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 06/07/2016. The SIRT investigation revealed the following: (U/~ On 06/07/2016 the New Haven SWAT Team was assigned to execute a Federal arrest warrant The arrest was part of a larger operational plan being carried out by New Haven's Bridgeport RA Safe Streets Task Force in support of New The investigation was a joint investigation between FBI New Haven, Bridgeport, CT Police Department, and the Connecticut State Police Statewide Narcotics Task Force. !targeted violent, gang-affiliated individuals involved in illegal narcotics distribution. The target of New Haven SWAT's arrest operation .__________.I was was known by New Haven to hav..._e_a_ _. at ..I______________________. I b6 b7A b7C b7E atl I violent criminal history, gang affiliations, involvement in drug distribution, and access to firearms. was indicted by a FGJ on 06/06/2016 along with six other subjects on heroin trafficking offenses. I I (U/~ On 06/06/2016 at approximately 3:30 p.m., New Haven SWAT Team Leader (STL) !briefed the approved operational plan to New Haven SWAT operators. The briefing occurred in the New Haven Field Office and included a briefing of the FBI's Deadly Force Policy. The objective of the operation was to locate and arrest SAi subject I I____________, lat his residence, .. (U/~ On 06/07/2016 at approximately 4:00 a.m., the SWAT Team assembled at the designated staging area, STL provided a briefing on th._e__o_p_e_r_a_t_i_o_n_a_l_p_l_a_n __f_o_r__t_h_e_.... D I b6 b7C I I SWAT Team. (U/~ On 06/07/2016 at approximately 5:00 a.m., members of the New Haven SWAT Team, including executed the arrest warrant for subject ... l ______~lat the subject's residence. New Haven had obtained authorization for early execution (5:00 a.m.) of the arrest warrants. I SAi UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b7E b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, New Haven Field Office, 06/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7933936, 09/21/2016 While conducting a law enforcement clear of the subject residence, SA I lwas holding a ballistic shield in his left hand and his Glock 17 handgun in his right hand. As SAi lbegan to clear a room which was not well lit, he activated the light on his shield by squeezing the shield's handle with his left hand. At the same time, SA_I_ _ __ intended to activate the light mounted to his Glock 17 by pressing down with his right hand index finger on the toggle which was located along the right side of the handgun. As SAi lpressed downward on the light toggle switch, his finger came off the toggle, went onto the trigger, and he accidentally discharged a round into the door jamb of the room. SAi lwas wearing his flame-resistant SWAT gloves at the time. SA I.._____.I immediately notified STLI I who was in the vicinity of his location, that there was no threat. The New Haven SWAT Team continued the operation, completing the arrest of the subject. b6 b7C (U/~ At approximately 5:15 a.m., STL and PFII lnotified New Haven CDc_l________lof the AD. Bridgeport, CT Police Department officials, who were present at New Haven's Command Post, were also notified of the AD. The scene of the accidental discharge was not processed by New Haven ERT. Due to security concerns in the neighborhood of the subject's residence and the time it would take to deploy ERT, the New Haven Command Post instructed the on-scene FBI search team to photograph the scene and collect the discharged round. The on-scene search team conducted a search of the subject residence, photographed the area of the subject residence damaged by the round, and recovered the discharged round from the door jamb. The search team was led by ERT member SA ..I _________ b6 b7C I (U/ ~ Acting ASAc .. l __________..... notified INSD Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney an AD had occurred. Chief Inspector Feeney informed SAC Patricia M. Ferrick and A/ASACI lthe Agent involved shooting (AIS) incident review had been delegated to New Haven, under the supervision of Inspector in Chargel I b6 b7C (U/ ~ PF~ took possession of SAL..l____.......l_G.,lock 17 firearm, serial number~and three magazines. PFII !conducted a b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, New Haven Field Office, 06/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7933936, 09/21/2016 round count and determined there were 17 rounds in SA_l~~~~__.lmagazine and one round in the chamber (Total of 18 rounds). The SWAT-issued Glock 17 magazine has a 19 round capacity. In his signed sworn statement, SAi !advised his Glock was loaded with 18 rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber prior to the accidental discharge (Total of 19 rounds). PFII I provided SAi eith a new weapon and magazines. PFII !subsequently shipped SAi !weapon to the Training Division's Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) in Quantico, Virginia, for testing. (U/~ On 06/17/2016 DSU tested and inspected SA_l~~~~-IGlock 17. DSU indicated the weapon functioned as designed and there were no noted issues with SAi IGlock 17. (U/~ New Haven documented SAi I account of the accidental discharge in a Signed Sworn Statement, completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed SAi !firearms qualification and training records were current. b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C SIRG Observations On 08/25/2016 the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: Because the shooting was determined to be an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational panning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. Observation 1 (U/~ Observation 1: SAi I New Haven Field Office, experienced an accidental discharge while attempting to operate the frame-mounted light on his Glock 17 firearm. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, New Haven Field Office, 06/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7933936, 09/21/2016 (U/~ Analysis 1: While conducting a law enforcement clear of a subject residence, SAi lwas holding a ballistic shield in his left hand and his Glock 17 handgun in his right hand. As SAi lbegan to clear a room which was not well lit, he activated the light on his shield by squeezing the shield's handle with his left hand. At the same time, SAi !intended to activate the light mounted to his Glock 17 by pressing down with his right hand index finger on the toggle which was located along the right side of the handgun. As SA ._~~~~!pressed downward on the light toggle switch, his finger came off the toggle, went onto the trigger, and he accidentally discharged a round into the door jamb of the room. SAi lwas wearing his flame-resistant SWAT gloves at the time. (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, New Haven will ensure SA~l~~~_.lattends remedial firearms training, specific to the safe operation of firearms and frame-mounted lights. b6 b7C b6 b7C Observation 2 (U/~ Observation 2: indicated SAi his Glock 17 handgun. A round count conducted on 06/07/2016 New Haven Field Office, had not fully loaded (U/~ Analysis 2: On 06/07/2016, after an accidental discharge, a round count was conducted of SAi lswAT issue Glock 17 handgun. The round count determined that SAi lswAT issue Glock 17 was loaded with 18 rounds of service ammunition after the accidental discharge of a single round (a total of 19 rounds; one less round than fully loaded). A standard SWAT issue Glock 17 magazine holds 19 rounds. A fully loaded topped off SWAT Glock 17 would have 20 rounds including 19 in the magazine and one in the chamber. (U~ The FBI Firearms Policy Guide (FPG) 0741DPG, dated 01/08/2015, Section 4.1.1 stated in relevant part, "When armed, SAs must have their pistois fuiiy ioaded and secured on their persons." UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, New Haven Field Office, 06/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7933936, 09/21/2016 (U/~ Instruction 2: SAC, New Haven will ensure armed SWAT Team Operators have their pistols fully loaded. 3. (U/~ Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if The SIRG recommended the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. deemed necessary. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Eric D. Welling, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Section Chief (SC) M.A. Myers, Instruction Section, Training Division (TD); SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) ._~~~~~~-I Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; SSAI I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Charles McGonigal, CD-2 Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; Senior Trial Attorney Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group ._(_C_I_R_G~)-;_.SsAI I Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory ucl b6 b7C I ucl I Division. (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Kathryn Peterson and Regina Thompson, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders OI, INSD; Management and Program Analysts .._~~~--'I OI, INSDL-;~S-S-A-r~~~~~~~--,_s~o-u-,~C-I-R~G-;~S-S_A_r-~----_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_L_-_-_..., .... TTU, TD; SSA TTU, TD; and ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ Inspector General. Procedures for Responding to Observations UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, New Haven Field Office, 06/07/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7933936, 09/21/2016 (U/~ SAC, New Haven, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instruction 1 and Instruction 2 are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Baltimore, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve Instruction 1. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief Inspection Management Unit, INSD. I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident New York Field Office 06/10/2014. Date: 11/28/2014 CC: Georqe C. Venizelos From: b6 b7C INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara Drafted By: ~I~~~~~~~~--' Case ID #: 297L-HQ-A5057795 (U) Animal Shooting New York - June 2014 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned animal shooting following a SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the New York Field Office (NYFO) by the Chief Inspector on 06/13/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 09/04/2014, was approved and submitted electronically by NYFO SAC Leo Taddeo. Details: (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an animal shooting incident which occurred on 06/10/2014, involving NYFO Special Agent (SA)~I~~--' b6 b7C (U/~ I On 06/10/2014, SAi was contacted by his neighbor requesting his assistance to address a rabid groundhog. An attempt was made to get the New York State Police to respond, but the dispatcher UNCLASSIFIED/~ UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: Incident New York Field Office 06/10/2014. Re: 297L-HQ-A5057795, 11/28/2014 advised there were no Troopers available. At approximately 9:30 p.m., SAi !discharged two rounds from his personally-owned weapon (POW), serial numberl at the groundhog which appeared rabid based on the actions of the animal. SAi recovered one of two shell casings and did not take photographs or conduct any other form of basic shooting scene processing. 4 I I I (U/~ SAi lwent to firearms training at the West Point Firing Range, West Point, New York on 06/11/2014. SA reported the shooting incident to a firearms instructor who advised SA ....... to contact his supervisor and complete an FD-1085. S did as he was instructed and also contacted the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), Region 3, New Paltz, New York to determine how he should properly handle the animal remains. .....-~~~ ~~~---' (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the NYFO on 06/13/2014. Investigation determined SAi !killed the animal since it posed a persistent threat to the family of a nearby neighbor. SA b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C ._~~~~-!was qualified and trained to use his POW in accordance with FBI policy. SIRG Observations (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously determined the application of deadly force by SA~l~~~__.lon 06/10/2014 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly Force policy. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made three observations regarding this shooting incident: (U/~ The Agent involved in an animal shooting failed to notify NYFO management of the shooting incident in a timely Observation 1: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED//~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident New York Field Office 06/10/2014. Re: 297L-HQ-A5057795, 11/28/2014 manner. (U/~ Analysis 1: !discharged his POW at approximately 9:30 p.m., on 06/10/2014. sAj ldid not notify his supervisor of the shooting until approximately 1:30 p.m., on 06/11/2014. The INSD SAi b6 b7C Shooting Incident Guide stated,"Following a shooting incident, an Agent who discharges a weapon should ensure the field office operations center and your immediate supervisor, or the next available member of your chain of command, is contacted. " (U/~ Instruction 1: ADIC, NY will ensure Agents involved in a shooting incident notify management in a timely manner in accordance with INSD's Shooting Incident Guide. (U/~ Observation 2: NYFO did not notify INSD of the Agent-involved shooting incident in a timely manner. (U~ The shooting incident was reported to NYFO EM on 06/11/2014. The incident was not reported to INSD until 06/13/2014. As specified in the INSD Shooting Incident Guide for animal shootings, Analysis 2: "The SAC or designee will immediately notify the Chief Inspector, Inspection Di vision. " (U/~ ADIC, NY will ensure INSD is promptly notified of all Agent-involved shooting incidents, to include animal shootings, in accordance with INSD's Shooting Incident Guide. Instruction 2: (U/~ Observation 3: NYFO did not have an ERT process the scene following an Agent-involved shooting. Following the incident, there was no ERT (U/~ Analysis 3: deployed to the scene. NY EM stated there was no ERT available due to the location of the Agent-involved shooting being in a remote RA location. Subsequently, ldid not take photographs, SAi UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident New York Field Office 06/10/2014. Re: 297L-HQ-A5057795, 11/28/2014 immediately recover the shell casings, or conduct any other basic shooting scene processing. SA l.._______.I neighbor recovered one of two shell casings on 06/11/2014. b6 b7C (U/~ Instruction 3: ADIC, NY will ensure the scene of an Agent-involved shooting is processed by an ERT in accordance with INSD Shooting Guide, whenever possible. If an ERT is not available, then an Agent should conduct basic shooting scene processing. 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken against SAi a result of his involvement in this shooting incident. necessary. las (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W. Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chief I._________, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ); Trial Attorney! !criminal Division, USDOJ; SSA Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; L-------------....&.---~ SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit L-----f"'"----------'--~ Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training ..____---ir---------------, Division (TD) ; SS Firearms Training Unit, TD; UC Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; and SC Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith ----------.I I ucl I I SWAT Op er at ions Unit, c_I_R_G_;_s_s_A ......_ _ _ _ _"'l-----....-..J 1 Ballistics Research Facility, DSU; SSA Protective ir-----------,.-~ Operations Unit, Security Division; UC Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Kathryn Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders .. OI, INSD; Special Assistant !________. .,. ._____. UNCLASSIFIED~ 4 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident New York Field Office 06/10/2014. Re: 297L-HQ-A5057795, 11/28/2014 OI, INSD; UC and Management Program Inspection ....... Inspection .......~~~~~~~.......~~~~~~~.......~~~~--, L-~~~~~~~~....- Analysts (MAPAs) Management Unit (IMU), INSD; and MAPA Analysis Unit (IAU), INSD. L-~~~~~~~~~~~-r-~~~~~~~~~ ~, b6 b7C Procedures for Responding to the Observations (U/~ ADIC, NY, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions are addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans to implement. (U/~ ADIC, NY, is required to provide a written response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each Instruction. Follow up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is ._s_e_r_i-.a~l-i_z_e_d~,~p~lease e-mail the Sentinel link to MPA~I~~~~~~~~~~_. I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~NY Accidental Discharge Title: Date: 11/24/2014 CC: b6 b7C STROUD SHAWN W From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: STROUD SHAWN W, b6 b7C David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara STROUD SHAWN W 297K-HQ-A5401152 (U) New York Field Off ice Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014. Administrative Notes: (U/~Reference FD-1085 submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)~I~~~~,,,...,,,,.......,..~....,,,...,,,.,,.__. dated 09/15/2014. Reference accidental discharge summary EC by SSA I ldated 09/19/2014. b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 08/20/2014, at approximately 1:30 p.m., SA~I~~~~ ._~~~__.I New York Field Office (NY), accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau-issued Colt M4 rifle into the rear bumper of his Bureau-issued vehicle following a SWAT training exercise. No one was injured. The shooting incident review was delegated to NY by the Chief Inspector on 08/21/2014. UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ NY Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5401152, 11/24/2014 (U/~ The investigation determined SA_l~~~~~lwas at a SWAT training exercise located at Palisades Shopping Mall. Team members entered the mall in nondescript clothing and walked to the fourth floor training area/facility where they changed into training gear. As part of the normal weapons clearing procedures for the training facility, SA ._~~~_.lremoved the bolt from his M4 while in the parking lot of the mall by removing the bolt out of the upper receiver. Removal of the bolt was a requirement for entering the training facility. While removing the bolt, ~eft a ten-round magazine inside the magazine well. !normally kept a ten-round magazine in his M4 to keep it ready for use. !advised the M4 fit easier in his covert Blackhawk gun bag with a ten-round magazine than loaded with a full-sized magazine. There was no round in the chamber. SA~I~~~~~ then reassembled the M4 without the bolt, secured it in a covert gun bag which resembled a tennis racket bag, and entered the training facility. Just outside the fourth floor training facility was a "staging area" for individuals to conduct safety checks prior to carrying any weapons into the training area. placed the bag at the staging area and did not touch it during the training period because he was a training coordinator and not a participant for the exercise. The M4 was never inspected to ensure no live ammunition was loaded because the M4 never entered the training area. SAi SAi bG b7C SAi I SAi (U/~ SAi I After the training exercise concluded, returned to his vehicle. He opened the rear hatch of his Bureau-issued SUV and unzipped the gun bag. Keeping the M4 concealed in the gun bag, SA !unhinged the upper receiver and reinserted the bolt. He then re-hinged the upper receiver to the lower receiver. The ten-round magazine was still in the well. By keeping the M4 in the bag, SA ._~~~~~!attempted to keep the M4 out of public view; as a result, he was unable to visually inspect the chamber and magazine well and did not realize the magazine was in the well. The M4 was inside the covert bag and the muzzle was oriented downward into the rear bumper of his Bureau vehicle which at the time was deemed the safest direction. The M4 was cycled and !pulled the trigger to relieve the tension on the trigger, something he indicated he learned from his time as an I sAI UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ NY Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5401152, 11/24/2014 b6 b?C discharging a round into the bumper of his SUV. (U/~SA I notified his supervisor, ssAI Senior Team Leader (STL) SA who was at the training facility, contacted A/SSA and A/ASAcl A/ASAC !notified SAC Leo Taddeo, who notified INSD of the accidental discharge. b6 b7C I SIRG Observations (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: 1. (U/~ Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the incident reviewed involved an Accidental Discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. (U/~ Provide the Director with an evaluative analyses,observations, and recommendations for corrective actions from an operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made the following observations regarding operational techniques used by SAi !during this shooting incident and requested additional training. (U/~ Observation 1: S~ !accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau-issued M4 into the rear bumper of his Bureau-issued SUV while relieving the tension on his trigger following a SWAT training exercise. (U/~ Analysis 1: The Firearms Training Unit (FTU) provided guidance to field offices regarding the administration of the Firearms Training Program for FY 2014 (1Z-HQ-A1355419 Serial 148, EC dated 11/07/2013) The EC stated, "A safety check of a detachable magazine fed weapon (pistol, carbine and submachine gun) is performed as follows: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ NY Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5401152, 11/24/2014 1. Keep your finger off the trigger. 2. Keep the muzzle pointed in a safe direction. 3. Place the weapon on safe (if applicable). 4. Check for and remove the magazine. 5. Lock the slide or bolt to the rear. 6. Check the chamber and magazine well, look away and check again." (U/~ On 08/20/2014 SAi lwas at a SWAT training exercise located at a shopping mall. Prior to entering the training area located in the mall, S~ !removed the bolt from his M4 while in the parking lot of the mall by removing the bolt out of the upper receiver. While removing the bolt, SA~left a ten-round magazine inside the magazine well. S~then reassembled the M4 without the bolt, secured it in a covert gun bag, and entered the training facility. Just outside the fourth floor training facility was a "staging area" for individuals to conduct safety checks prior to carrying any weapons into the training area. SAi lplaced the bag at the staging area and did not touch it during the training period because he was a training coordinator and not a participant for the exercise. The M4 was never inspected to ensure no live ammunition was loaded because the M4 never entered the training area. (U/~ After completing SWAT training, SAi !returned to his vehicle. He opened the rear hatch of his Bureau-issued SUV and unzipped his gun bag, which contained his M4. Keeping his M4 concealed in the gun bag, SAi !unhinged the upper receiver and reinserted the bolt. He then re-hinged the upper receiver to the lower receiver. The ten-round magazine was still in the well. By keeping the M4 in the bag, SAi !attempted to keep the M4 out of public view; as a result, he was unable to visually inspect the chamber and magazine well and did not realize the magazine was in the well. The M4 was inside the covert bag and the muzzle was oriented downward into the rear UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ NY Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5401152, 11/24/2014 bumper of his Bureau vehicle. The M4 was cycled and SA_l_____lpulled the trigger to relieve the tension on the trigger, something he indicated he learned from his time asl ._______.I discharging a round into the _b_u_m_p_e_r__o_f_h_i_s_S_U_V___S_A_I______, b6 b7C failed to conduct a proper safety check and utilized a non-Bureau protocol after reassembling his Bureau-issued M4. (U/~ Recommendation la: ADIC, NY should ensure SA_l_____lreceives remedial firearms training. b6 b7C I (U/~ Recommendation lb: ADIC, NY should ensure SAi receives remedial training regarding Bureau protocols for weapons reassembly, storage, and transport. (U/~ Observation 2: The scene of the AD was not secured and processed by ERT immediately subsequent to the AD. (U/~ Analysis 2: On 08/20/2014, at approximately 1:30 p.m., SA .___ _ __.!accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau-issued Colt M4 rifle into the rear bumper of his Bureau-issued vehicle following a SWAT training exercise. STL SAi I who was at the training facility, arrived at the scene after the AD. SAi !told everyone not involved in the incident to leave and SAi !remained on the scene with SA and two other SWAT team members who attended the training, SA and SAi I At approximately 2: 30 p .m., SA SAi land SAi I went to a diner in the area to await instructions. They eventually received a call from A/ASACI !telling them they had satisfied their notification requirements with the New York Office and could leave. SA ltold SAi Ito leave and head home. sAI l1eft the .__m_a_l_l_a_r-ea around 3:30 p.m. or 4:00 p.m. SAi lwas thereafter telephoned and advised by A/SsAI Ito have someone meet ERT at Palisades Mall to take photos of the location and of the vehicle. Since SA~ad already headed back to the city, SA_I_ _ _ __. advised sAL________Jto travel to 26 Federal Plaza so ERT could process the vehicle. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ NY Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5401152, 11/24/2014 (U/~ ERT was called to Palisades Mall to take photos of the scene. sAj !advised SAi Ito show ERT where the vehicle was parked in the parking lot when the shot was fired. ERT arrived at Palisades Mall at approximately 5:35 p.m. sAI lshowed ERT members where SA ._______!vehicle had been parked and the orientation of the vehicle in the parking spot. At the time of ERT's arrival, another vehicle was occupying the parking space. A sketch was initiated at approximately 5:45 p.m. A few minutes later, the owners of the vehicle returned and exited the parking space. Entry photographs were taken. A search was conducted and a bullet fragment was collected. At approximately 6:20 p.m., exit photographs were taken. At approximately 6:25 p.m., the search was completed and ERT departed the area. b6 b7C (U/~ ERT responded to the garage located at 26 Federal Plaza at approximately 4:39 p.m. SAi !vehicle was photographed and a photo log was maintained. An administrative log, an evidence recovery log and a sketch were generated. SAi !provided a shell casing which was collected as evidence. (U/~ sAI I was later advised by ssAI I to take possession of.._S_A____I"""_-_-_-_ ...._ ..._-_------...... _lwea po n. SA :1======~~.,.1-i_n_s_t_r_u_c_t_e_d_S...1A1-----1 to turn in his weapon, ammunition, tactical bag and remaining rounds to him on the morning of 08/21/2014. SAi lmet SAi Ion the morning of 08/21/2014, at approximately 10 a.m., and provided him with the requested items. SAi lentered the items into evidence the same day. b6 b7C b6 b7C (U/~Recommendation 2: ADIC, NY should ensure the scene of an AD is processed by ERT immediately subsequent to the AD whenever practical. (U~ SAi Iviolated weapon safety protocols for the Palisades Mall Training Facility. Observation 3: (U/~Analysis On 08/20/2014 SAi !accidentally discharged one round from his Bureau-issued Colt M4 rifle into the rear bumper of his Bureau-issued vehicle following a SWAT training exercise. Prior to 3: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ NY Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5401152, 11/24/2014 entering the training facility located at Palisades Mall, as part of the normal weapons clearing procedures for the training facility, SA ....__ _ ___.!removed the bolt from his M4 while in the parking lot of the mall by removing the bolt out of the upper receiver. Removal of the bolt was a requirement for entering the training facility. SWAT operators who participate in these training exercises are required to remove their bolts and any live ammunition prior to entering the training facility. While removing the bolt, SA~eft a ten-round magazine inside the magazine well. sAL___________Jthen reassembled the M4 without the bolt, secured it in a covert gun bag, and entered the training facility. Just outside the fourth floor training facility was a "staging area" for individuals to conduct safety checks prior to carrying any weapons into the training area. SA ._______.I placed the bag at the staging area and did not touch it during the training period because he was a training coordinator and not a participant for the exercise. The M4 was never inspected to ensure no live ammunition was loaded because the M4 never entered the training area. (U/~ SAi !receives remedial instruction regarding weapon safety protocols for the Palisades Mall Training Facility. (U/~ Recommendation 3: ADIC, NY should ensure Observation 4: his Bureau-issued M4. SA._l_____.I had unauthorized modifications to (U/~ Analysis 4: MIOG Section 12-5 "MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR" provided guidance regarding weapons modification. Specifically Section 12-5 provided: Alterations, repairs, and refinishing of assigned firearms must be conducted by FBI gunsmiths. Exceptions include refinishing by manufacturers or other contractors whose use has been requested in writing and approved by the National Firearms Program Unit (NFPU) in advance. After-market parts or options will not be approved unless authority is UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ NY Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5401152, 11/24/2014 requested in writing and approved by the NFPU Unit Chief. Questions regarding the installation of after-market parts on a Bureau-approved firearm should be resolved PRIOR to purchase of these parts or modifications by contacting the NFPU. (U/~ On 09/08/2014, New York PFII !requested inspection and testing of SAi lcol t M4Al (SN: pursuant to an AD on 08/20/2014. On 09/09/2014, the weapon was received at DSU. On 09/10/2014, Gunsmith! inspected and tested the weapon. The weapon functioned as designed. However, there were unauthorized parts on the weapon. The unauthorized parts included one 10-round PMAG Magazine, a GG&G front sight rail adaptor, a B5 collapsible stock, and a BCM gunfighter charging handle not issued by the FBI or DSU. I I I b6 b7C (U/~ Instruction 4: ADIC, NY will ensure weapons are not modified unless approved by the DSU (formerly known as NFPU) Unit Chief. 3. (U/~Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary. This matter is being referred to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), INSD for potential administrative action. Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W. Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chiefl I Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ); Trial Attorney! criminal Division, USDOJ; SSA~I~~~~~ I I Investigative Law Unit, Office of I Squad CR-2, Washington ........ L-~~.--~~~~~~~~~ (UC)j General Counsel; SSA Field Office; Unit Chief I Practical Applications Unit, Training Division I (TD); SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, TD; ucl ~ Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); ucl New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) I Robert E. Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ NY Accidental Discharge Re: 297K-HQ-A5401152, 11/24/2014 Division; and SC Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith SWAT Operations Unit, CIRG; SSA Ballistics Research Facility, DSU; SSA ......Protective Operations Unit, Security Division; UC Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Kathryn Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders ....... OI, INSD; Special Assistant OI, INSD; UC and Management Program Analysts (MAPAs) Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; and MAPA Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), INSD. L-~~~~..-~~~~~ ~~-, L-~~~~~~~~~~~-r~~~~~~~~~~ b6 b7C ~....J L-~~~~~.f""""~~~~--~~--, ..._~~~~---' L-~~~~-r-~~~~~~~~~~~-, Procedures for Responding to the Observations (U/~ ADIC, NY is responsible for ensuring each Inspection Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Instruction/Recommendation has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans to implement. (U/~ ADIC, NY is required to provide a written response via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chief Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once I I the EC is serialized, please E-mail the Sentinel link to •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 MPA~I~~~~~~~ b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: (U) Accidental Discharge New York Field Office 08/27/2014. Date: 12/05/2014 b6 b7C From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: PETERSON KATHRYN,~!~~~~~~~--' b6 David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara b7C PETERSON KATHRYN Drafted By: I Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A5465949 (U) New York Field Off ice Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014. Reference: 297K-HQ-A5465949 Serial 2 Administrative Notes: (U) Reference FD-1085 and accidental discharge report submitted electronically by ssAI I dated 09/19/2014. b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge which occurred on 08/27/2014, involving FBI Special Agent ( SA)I I New York Field Office_ SAi I was securing her FBI-issued Glock 22 in her bedroom closet safe. After opening the safe, SAi !noticed her Personally Owned Weapon (POW) in the safe and decided to remove this weapon's barrel before UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge New York Field Office 08/27/2014. Re: 297K-HQ-A5465949, 12/05/2014 re-securing the POW in the safe. SAi lremoved the POW and, following the Glock disassembly procedures, pulled the trigger and pulled the slide to the rear. SAi unable to disassemble the POW. SAi !pulled the trigger a second time which caused the AD. SAi !removed the loaded magazine from the magazine well, locked the slide to the rear, and placed the weapon in the safe. SAi lremoved her FBI issued weapon from her purse, removed the magazine, locked the slide to the rear, and placed this weapon in the safe. The round discharged into the concrete floor beside the safe but did not penetrate the floor. SAi retrieved the slug and spent casing, placed both in the safe, and secured the safe. SAi then departed with her family for an overnight trip to an amusement park in Pennsylvania. She telephonically notified her immediate supervisor of the AD after leaving her residence. lwas I (U/~ On 08/28/2014, after b6 b7C I sAI lreturned from her overnight trip, the scene was processed by the NY Evidence Response Team (ERT) and SAi interviewed. b6 b7C lwas SIRG Observations (U/~ On 10/21/2014 the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: 1. (U/~ Evaluate the application of deadly force. As the incident reviewed involved an Accidental Discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. (U/~ Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. Observation 1: SA~l~~~~~-lexperienced an accidental discharge while disassembling her POW. 1: SAi Iremoved the POW and, following the Glock disassembly procedures, pulled the trigger and pulled the slide to the Analysis UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge New York Field Office 08/27/2014. Re: 297K-HQ-A5465949, 12/05/2014 lwas rear. SAi unable to disassemble the POW. pulled the trigger a second time which caused the AD. b6 b7C ADIC, NY, should ensure SA._!_ _ _ _ __.I attends remedial firearms training. Recommendation 1: I Observation 2: SAi failed to notify her supervisor of the AD until after departing the scene of the AD. SA .. l _ _ _ _ _~ltelephonically notified her immediate supervisor of the AD at her residence only after departing her residence for an overnight trip. Analysis 2: b6 b7C b6 b7C ADIC, NY, should ensure personnel remain at the scene of an AD until Executive Management dismisses them. Recommendation 2: Observation 3: SA._l_ _ _ _ _~lcollected the spent round and shell b6 b7C casing. I Subsequent to her AD, SAi retrieved the slug and spent casing, placed both in a safe and secured the safe. SA did not notify her supervisor of the AD until after leaving her residence, and ERT was not not promptly notified and ordered to respond to the scene. As a result, ERT did not process the scene until the following day, after SAi !returned from an overnight trip. INSD's Shooting Incident Guide stated, "The ERT should be notified and respond accordingly." Analysis 3: I ADIC, NY, will ensure the scene of an Agent-involved shooting is processed by an ERT, when possible, in accordance with INSD's Shooting Incident Guide. Instruction 3: 3. (U~ Provide recommendations for administrative action if The SIRG recommended this matter be referred to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD) for any further administrative action. deemed necessary. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge New York Field Office 08/27/2014. Re: 297K-HQ-A5465949, 12/05/2014 (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W. Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chiefl civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States ...._____. ._D_e_p_a_r_t-ment of Justice (USDOJ); Trial Attorney! Criminal I I Division, USDOJ; SS Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) L-_ __,__________....._Practical Applications _ __, (TD) ; SSA Firearms Training Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations .---------.I Response Group (CIRG); UC ._I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.I New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; and SC Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith .___________.I SWAT Op er at ions Unit, r-C_I_R_G_;_s_s_A..______________. ...,... _. Protective Ballistics Research Facility, DSU; SSA ,__ Operations Unit, Security Division; UC Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Kathryn Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff OI INSD; Assistant Ins ectors/Team Leaders .. OI, INSD; Special Assistant .....-----------......---------r-----...... --.... OI, INSD; UC Management Program L-----------r-....____________________ _..and _____ ....., Analysts (MAPAs) Inspection L---------------------------..... Management Unit (IMU), INSD; and MAPA Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), INSD. _________ _ !_____________ Procedures for Responding to the Observations (U/~ ADIC, NY, is responsible for ensuring each Inspection Instruction/Recommendation is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction/Recommendation is addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Recommendation UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U) Accidental Discharge New York Field Office 08/27/2014. Re: 297K-HQ-A5465949, 12/05/2014 has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration or plans to implement. (U/~ ADIC, NY, is required to provide a written response, via EC, detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each Instruction/Recommendation. Follow up EC responses must be directed to Unit Chiefl lrnspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD. Once the EC is serialized, please e-mail the Sentinel link to MPA~I~~~~~~ •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: (U/ ~Accidental Discharge (Ammunition Explosion) Incident Report Date: 01/11/2017 CC:I_From: b6 b7C INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: WELLING ERIC D TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: I_________ Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A7399783 b6 b7C (U) New York Accidental Discharge (Ammunition Explosion) Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge following the SIRG meeting held on December 8, 2016. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The incident review was delegated to the New York Field Office by Chief Inspector Timothy Feeney on April 5, 2016. The Accidental Discharge Report, dated May 9, 2016, was submitted electronically by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I New York Field Office. b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On December 8, 2016, the SIRG reviewed an Accidental Discharge incident which occurred on April 5, 2016, involving SA I I New York Field Office. (U/~ On April 5, 2016, a 9 millimeter (mm) round exploded while Special Agent (SA) was loading a personally owned I I UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge (Arrnnunition Explosion) Incident Report Re: 297K-HQ-A7399783, 01/11/2017 sAI 9mm magazine in his basement. !sustained minor injuries to his left forearm and right wrist from the exploded cartridge casing. b6 b7C (U/~ On the morning of April 5, 2016, while off duty, SA .------.!visited a private shooting range to practice for his upcoming qualification shoot to become a Firearms Instructor. SAi at the range from approximately 10:00 am to 12:00 pm and practiced shooting with a bureau issued 40 caliber Glock model 22 (G22), and a personally owned, bureau approved, 9mml SA I.______. returned home in New Jersey at approximately 2:50 pm. He proceeded to the basement and attempted to reload a personally owned ~agazine from a box of bureau issued Speer G-2 9mm ammunition. He held the magazine at mid-chest level and attempted to insert the first 9mm round by pushing the round into the magazine with his right thumb in a forward and downward motion. At the same time, SAi came down the stairs into the basement and told him she just received a text message regarding! turned his head to he was inserting the 9mm round and heard a ~P· He felt pain in his left forearm and right wrist. ~I_____. L_____Jcalled 9-1-1 for assistance. lwas I I I I I facel IHe las (U/~ The Bordentown Township Police Department (BTPD) and the Bordentown Township Emergency Medical Services responded to SA .___ _ _ _....lresidence. BTPD investigators processed the scene of the incident, collected evidence, and interviewed SAi SA us t ai ne d minor in j ur ie s to hi s__l_e_f_t__f_o_r_e_a_r_m_,_w_h_i_c_.h ._____. .I I Is lwas was photographed by BTPD. SAi transported to the hospital. While at the scene, BTPD investigators determined firearms did not play a role in the explosion of the round. A~hich was initially collected from SAi the residence, was returned and locked in a safe prior to the departure of BTPD ..._____.... I I b6 b7C lat b6 b7C tol investigators. (U/~ On the evening of April 6, 2016, a joint NYFO and Newark Field Office Evidence Response Team (ERT) processed the scene of the accidental discharge at SAi !residence. ERT personnel UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Discharge (Arrnnunition Explosion) Incident Report Re: 297K-HQ-A7399783, 01/11/2017 collected SA~bureau issued G22 personally o~Serial Number I (Serial Numberl and his ~ along with.__t_h_e_i_r_. corresponding magazines and ammunition. The NYFO ERT also took custody of other items, including the exploded cartridge casing and the bullet, collected from SAi !residence on April 5, 2016 by BTPD. b6 b7C b7E (U/~ BTPD reviewed evidence collected at SAi.______. residence. BTPD's review showed the exploded cartridge casing was deformed with three sharp edges expanded outward from one side. The primer had a mark on the rear which appeared to match the lip of the 9mm magazine SAi lwas attempting to load. The bullet appeared to be fully intact and showed no signs of expansion. (U/~ On April 6, 2016, NYFO evidence control unit submitted SAi !bureau issued G22, personally owned along with their corresponding magazines, ammunition, cartridge casing, and the bullet to the Firearms and Toolmark Unit (FTU), for examination. The weapons were also sent to Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), for a Weapon Serviceability Inspection. Examination performed by FTU indicated no rifling was present on the bullet, therefore the bullet was not consistent with being fired through a rifled barrel of a firearm. Additionally, FTU indicated the powder collected from the scene shared similar characteristics with powder from a 9mm cartridge sampled from the ammunition box collected from the scene. Inspection and testing conducted by DSU indicated SAi !weapon functioned as designed. b6 b7C D b6 b7C (U/~ On April 8, 2016, in addition to sAI the NYFO also interviewed! witness in the basement at the stated she was talking to SAi loud pop, which sounded like a bent over holding his arm, and reviewed the 9-1-1 call, which statement. (U/~ linterview, I who was the only other time of the incident.I lin the basement when she heard a firecracker. She observed SAi lwas she called 9-1-1 in a panic. The NYFO was consistent withl ....____________, The NYFO documented sAJ_______.laccount of the incident UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Discharge (Arrnnunition Explosion) Incident Report Re: 297K-HQ-A7399783, 01/11/2017 in a Signed Sworn Statement, reviewed sAI !medical records following the incident and investigative records of the BTPD. NYFO's inquiry found no discrepancies between SAi laccount of the incident and findings froml !interview. b6 b7C SIRG Observations (U/~ On 12/08/2016, the SIRG reviewed the Accidental Discharge incident: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. (U~ Members of the SIRG did not evaluate the application of deadly force since there was no weapon involved, and the incident involved the accidental discharge of a 9mm round of ammunition. b6 b7C 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and rec ommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. (U~There were no Observations. The incident was assessed to be an accidental discharge of a 9mm round of ammunition which occurred while sAI lwas attempting to load a magazine. b6 b7C 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessar y. (U/~ The SIRG determined this incident did not warrant referral to the Internal Investigations Section. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Lawrence Koleff, INSD, Office of Inspections (OI); SSA OGC, Investigative Law Unit; SSA FBI Washington Field Office, Squad CR-4; UC TD, Firearms Training Unit; I CIRG, SWAT Operations Unit (SOU); I TD, Defe_n_s_i-.v--'e ._S~y-s_t_e_m~s-Unit; Asel Criminal Investigative Division, I ucl UNCLASSIFIED~ 4 ucl b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge (Arrnnunition Explosion) Report Re: 297K-HQ-A7399783, 01/11/2017 Incident Violent Crime & Gang Section; SSA TD, Tactical Training Unit; SC Stephen Laycock, CD, CD-1; Attorne USDOJ, Civil Rights Division; Attorney USDOJ, Organized Crime .....-~~~~~-----~~.......~~~~~---' & Gang Section; SSA LD, Evidence Response Training Unit. --~~~~~~~~---' .-----~~~~--~1-~~~~~___J b6 b7C (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Regina Thompson and Eric Welling, INSD, OI; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders INSD, OI; MAPAs ........ INSD, Inspection Management Unit; INSD, Investigative Analysis Unit; SC James Langenberg, INSD, ~E_x__t_e_r_n_a_l~Audit & Compliance Section; INSD, IIS; .....-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--..,1--~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~--~~~ "-r~~~~---,i--~~~~~~~~~--' --~~~~~-' ucl I I ssAj CIRG, SOU; Attorney I I United States Department of Justice (USDOJ), Office of Legal Policy (OLP);I --~~~~IUSDOJ, OLP; ASACs Jim Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ._,~0-f_f_l-.c~e~ of Inspector General . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE 05/20/2014 Title: Date: 08/15/2014 CC: b6 b7C From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: Drafted By: Case ID #: STROUD SHAWN W, 202-324-5069 David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara STROUD SHAWN W 297L-HQ-A4933783 (U) Animal Shooting Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following a SIRG meeting held on 07/31/2014. Administrative Notes: (U/~This communication summarizes the Inspection Division (INSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 06/12/2014, prepared by Inspector Shawn W. Stroud. A copy of the complete INSD Shooting Incident Report was uploaded to the captioned file. Details: (U/~ On 07/31/2014, the SIRG convened to review a shooting incident which occurred on 05/20/2014, involving Philadelphia Field Office Special Agent (SA)I I On 05/20/2014, the Philadelphia Evidence Response Team (ERT) was assisting the Lehigh County Homicide Task Force regarding a cold case homicide investigation. Evidence developed by the task force resulted in the issuance of a search warrant. At approximately 8:00 a.m., the search team was preparing to begin their search of a privately owned, heavily UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~SHOOTING INCIDENT PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE 05/20/2014 Re: 297L-HQ-A4933783, 08/15/2014 wooded area when S~ la member of the ERT, was severely bitten by a raccoon which bit and latched on to her lower leg. SA ._~~__.lmoved her leg and kicked at the raccoon in an attempt to get it to release. SAi lbegan to scream for help at which point members of the search team ran to her. Shortly before team members arrived at her location, the raccoon released her leg and ran down an embankment adjacent to a nearby road. SAi lof the Allentown Resident Agency (ARA) alerted personnel and advised the raccoon needed to be killed and captured so it could be tested for rabies. b6 b7C (U/~ Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Trooper! land Deputy Coroner~l~~~~~~~lboth fired two shots at the raccoon. The raccoon was struck, but continued to move downhill, parallel to the road and adjacent to a stream. Once PSP Trooperc==Jand Deputy b6 b7C I I Coroner lshot at the raccoon, SAi saw the raccoon and fired nine shots, killing the raccoon. The raccoon was placed in a body bag provided by the Lehigh Coroner (who was on scene as part of the homicide investigation) and transported to a facility to be tested for rabies. The raccoon tested positive for rabies. Results of the SIRG (U/~ On 07/31/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG unanimously determined the application of deadly force by SA_l~~~__.lon 05/20/2014 was in compliance with the Department of Justice's Deadly Force policy. 2. b6 b7C Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. The SIRG made no observations regarding this shooting incident. 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken against SAi las a result of his involvement in this shooting necessary. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE 05/20/2014 Re: 297L-HQ-A4933783, 08/15/2014 incident. (U/~ (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting member. The following members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Paul D. Delacourt, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD;I I Trial Attorney, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ);I !special Legal Counsel, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; Section Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, Criminal Investigative Division; Acting Counterintelligence Division; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) I I ,,_ ..._Investigative ..;;........, Law Unit, Office of the General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2 Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division (TD); SSA Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU), Laboratory Division (LD); SSAI I Firearms Training Unit, TD; ucl Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); and ucl Defensive Systems Unit, TD. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Division, USDOJ; Off ice of Inspector ...... Internal General, USDOJ; ..._ Affairs, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP); CBP; UC ..___________.I Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, LD; SSA _________. ERTU, LD; Inspectors Shawn W. Stroud, Timothy M. Feeney, Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Kathryn Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Team Leadersl I sci ______ ____ I I b6 b7C I ________________________ I OI, INSD;I !special Assistant, OI, L-I_N_S_D-,-.-u-c-r--1-------t and Management Program Analysts (MAPAs) I I ________________ ..._ ____,I Inspection Management Unit UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 (IMU), INSD . UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE 05/20/2014 Re: 297L-HQ-A4933783, 08/15/2014 •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Richmond Field Office Title: Date: 12/16/2016 b6 b7C From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: WELLING ERIC D TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara b6 b7C Drafted By: I.._~~~~~~~~~~--' Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A2058775 (U) Richmond Accidental Discharge 07/15/2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Richmond Shooting Incident Report, dated 08/22/2016, was prepared by the delegated Shooting Incident Review Team !SIRTl _ The SIRT included Assistant Inspector-In-Place (AIIP)I ~nd A/ASAcl The Ins ector's Report. dated 10/19/2016, was prepared by INSD Ins ector I land Assistant Inspector/Team Leader._~~~~~~~~~---' I b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 07/15/2016, the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) reviewed an accidental discharge shooting incident involving Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)I I who accidentally discharged a round from his FBI approved Personally Owned Weapon (POW) on 07/15/2016. The shooting incident review was delegated to the Richmond Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 07/15/2016. I I UNCLASSIFIED/~ bG b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Richmond Field Off ice Re: 297K-HQ-A2058775, 12/16/2016 The delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation revealed the following: (U/~ On 07/15/2016, SSA~l~~~~~~~~laccidentally discharged one .40 caliber round from his FBI approved Personally Owned Weapon (POW) I I serial number I I inside the first floor of the range tower at the Henrico Police Department Range, Sandston, Virginia. ssAI lcompleted firearms training and was preparing to clean his weapon. The accidental discharge (AD) caused no injuries and resulted in minor damage to a cleaning table and rubber matting covering the table. (U/~ At approximately 8:30 a.m., the Richmond Field Office conducted a quarterly shoot which began with a range safety briefing. According to the Primary Firearms Instructor ( PFI) , I I and confirmed in witness interviews, a safety check of a weapon was not physically demonstrated as part of the safety brief. After the standard Pistol Qualification Course (PQC), Agents were split into two groups and rotated through two combat courses. During the day's training, SSA I IPOW malfunctioned three times, twice during the PQC and once during the combat course of fire. ssAI ldid not shoot hisl lover the past two training quarters. ssAI I did qualify with his I Ion the PQC. He is a right handed shooter. (U/~ Upon completion of the combat courses, expended brass was picked up from range and Agents were released. PFI I lstated he did not conduct a final safety check of weapons for participants after all shooting was completed for the day. After being released from the range, ssAI !reloaded his weapon, intending to depart the range for the day. At the last minute, SSAI !changed his mind and decided to clean his weapon before leaving the range. SSAI lwent to the range UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Richmond Field Off ice Re: 297K-HQ-A2058775, 12/16/2016 tower where PFII lwas supervising the cleaning area. Five other Agents were cleaning their weapons inside the tower. No non-FBI personnel were present. (U/~ b6 b7C ssAI l1aid out his cleaning supplies on a cleaning table, removed the magazine from his POW, and placed it on the cleaning table to his right. ssAI lwas aware a round was still in the chamber of his weapon, so he pulled back the slide with his left hand to eject the round. At some point during this process, he felt the gun jerk as if it exploded in his hand when the round accidentally discharged. ssAI lhad no recollection of pressing the trigger or having his finger on the trigger at any point during this process. In his signed sworn statement, ssAI lstated it was possible he over-rode the slide lock when he pulled back the slide of the weapon, which could have caused the firing pin to come forward firing the weapon. However, the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) advised the gun will only fire when the trigger is pulled, and a subsequent DSU examination of SSAI !determined it functioned as designed. (U/~ All Agents present in the cleaning area were faced away from ssAI lat the time and did not directly observe the AD or events immediately preceding it. The expelled round penetrated the nitrile rubber mat, which was ~ inch thick, and was captured under the mat on the cleaning table. There was a small hole in the mat and a scrape on the table where the round had traveled approximately a foot. b6 b7c b6 b7C I (U/~ Richmond A/SAcl who was in the tower at the time of the incident, notified Richmond SAC Adam S. Lee and the AD of INSD. On 07/15/2016, the Chief Inspector delegated the investi ation of the Agent Involved Shooting to Richmond A/ASAC A member of the Richmond ERT, SA who was also cleaning her weapon in the tower at the time of the AD, processed the scene and collected UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Richmond Field Off ice Re: 297K-HQ-A2058775, 12/16/2016 ssAI !weapon, empty magazine, four service rounds from the magazine, and the spent round and shell casing. On 08/12/2016, Richmond documented SSA_l~~~~--­ account of the AD in a SSS. Richmond's shooting inquiry found one discrepancy among accounts of the incident. sAI I I lstated immediately after the AD, SSA~l~~~~l~s-a-i-.d~h~e--' pulled the magazine out of the weapon and pressed the trigger, but then stated he had merely removed the magazine and the weapon went off. All other witness interviews, and ERT processing of the scene, were consistent with ssAI I account of the AD. Richmond completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed ssAI !firearms qualification and training records were current. Richmond CDCI !confirmed SSA ._~~~__.llast attended FBI Deadly Force Policy Training on 11/13/2015 . b6 b7C (U/~ ...-~.........(U~/~~ On ._~~~-~~~wwEeapon 07/19/2016, Richmond PFII !submitted SSA and magazine to the Training Division, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), for a weapon serviceability inspection. On 07/28/2016, the DSU subsequently inspected and tested SSA I !firearm, and concluded the firearm functioned as designed. (U/~ Richmond documented ssAI I account of the accidental discharge in a Signed Sworn Statement, which was consistent with witness interviews and ERT processing of the scene. Richmond completed a FD-1085 Shooting Incident Report, and confirmed ssAI !firearms qualification and training records were current. SIRG Observations On 12/08/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 Because the b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Richmond Field Off ice Re: 297K-HQ-A2058775, 12/16/2016 shooting was determined to be an accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ Observation 1: ssAI I Richmond Field Office, accidentally discharged one round inside the range tower at the Henrico Police Department Range while preparing to clean his weapon. b6 b7C (U/~ Analysis 1: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide (0741DPG), published January 8, 2015, Section 4.3.l, Cardinal Safety Rules, stated in relevant part: "Keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to press it" (u/~ ssAI !concluded firearms training at the Henrico Police Department Range and went inside the tower to clean his weapon. He did not unload his weapon before entering the gun cleaning facility. ssAI ldid not properly clear his weapon and render it safe before disassembling his weapon for cleaning, as mandated by FBI Policy, and as a result accidentally discharged one round inside the range tower. In his SSS, SSA ...._~~~__.lstated, "I dropped the magazine for the weapon and placed it on the table to my right, knowing a round was still in the chamber of the weapon. As I pulled the slide back with my left hand to eject the round from the chamber, I felt the gun jerk, as if it exploded in my hand." ssAI IAD caused no injuries and resulted in minor damage to a cleaning table and rubber matting covering the table. (U//~ An operational test of SSA_I~~~~~~~~~­ pistol performed by DSU determined the firearm functioned properly. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Richmond Field Off ice Re: 297K-HQ-A2058775, 12/16/2016 ~ Instruction 1: SAC, Richmond will ensure SSA L__________Jattends remedial firearms training, with specific emphasis on unloading, cleaning, and safe handling of firearms. b6 b7C (U/~ Observation 2: PFII I Richmond Field Office, did not provide a demonstration on how to properly conduct a safety check on a weapon at the beginning of the firearms training session. (U/~ Analysis 2: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide (0741DPG), published January 8, 2015, Section 4.3, Firearms Safety Rules, stated in relevant part: "A safety briefing must be conducted at the beginning of each training session. The briefing must includer at minimumr a review of the three "Cardinal Safety Rules" and a demonstration on how to properly conduct a safety check on each type of firearm that is to be utilized during training." (U/ ~ On 07/15/2016, PFI I...._ __.I did not provide a safety check demonstration on how to properly conduct a safety check on each type of firearm which was to be used during firearms training, as required by FBI policy. PFII lstated in his interview, along with interviews of Agents who attended firearms training on that day, the demonstration of a safety check was not provided. Instruction 2: SAC, Richmond will ensure PFr_I~~provides a safety check demonstration on each type of firearm used during firearms training sessions. (U/~ (U/~ D Observation 3: PFI did not conduct a final safety check of all firearms at the conclusion of firearms training. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Richmond Field Off ice Re: 297K-HQ-A2058775, 12/16/2016 (U/~ Analysis 3: The Firearms Policy Directive and Policy Guide (0741DPG), published January 8, 2015, Section 4.32, General Range Safety Rules, stated in relevant part: "At the con cl usi on of training r a final safety check of all firearms must be conducted by an FI." (U/~ On 07/15/2016, PFI_l~~-ldid not conduct a final safety check of all firearms at the conclusion of training, as required by FBI policy. PFII lstated in his interview he did not conduct a final safety check of all firearms at the conclusion of training. (U/~ Instruction 3: SAC, Richmond will ensure PFI_I_ __ conducts a final safety check of all weapons at the conclusion of all firearms training sessions. 1. b6 b7C b6 b7C Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed necessary. The SIRG recommended the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Lawrence E. Koleff, INSD, Office of Inspections (OI); ___....._ __._ SSA OGC, Investigative Law Unit; SSA FBI Washington Field Office, Squad CR-4; UC TD, Firearms Training Unit; UC CIRG, SWAT _O_p_e_r_a..,.t...,.i_o_n_.s Unit (SOU) ; UC I TD, Defensive Systems _ __ I Unit; Asel I Criminal Investigative Division, Violent Crime & Gang Section; ssAI I TD, Tactical Training Unit; SC Stephen C. Laycock, CD, CD-1; Attorney_!_ _ _ _~ UNCLASSIFIED~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Richmond Field Off ice Re: 297K-HQ-A2058775, 12/16/2016 I USDOJ, Civil Rights Division; Att~o__r_n_e_v~l.______________---.__....J ._U_S_D_O __J_,--0-r~ganized Crime & Gang Section; SSA~I--------------------~ LD, Evidence Response Training Unit. b6 b7C (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Regina E. Thompson and Eric D. Welling, INSD, OI; Assistant Ins ectors/Team Leaders INSD, OI,~·-MA __P_A_s~1------..........,1 I Langenberg, I INSD, Inspection Management Unit; INSD, Investigative Analysis Unit; SC James C. INSD, External Audit & Compliance Section; I CIRG, L--------...-___..l_I_N_s_D~,~IIS; ssAI I ucl sou; Attorney! United States Department of Justice (USDOJ), Office of Legal Policy (OLP) USDOJ, OLP . I ;I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b6 b7C I FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE 10/20/2014. Title: Date: 12/22/2014 b6 b7C From: INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: THOMAS VADIM DANIEL David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara Drafted By: I.__~~~~~~~~- Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A5644445 b6 b7C (U) San Francisco Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U) This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting following the SIRG meeting held on 12/15/2014. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the San Francisco Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 10/20/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 11/17/2014, was sqbmjttef electronically by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) ~I~~~~--. San Francisco Field Office. I b6 b7C Details: On 12/15/2014, the SIRG reviewed an Accidental Discharge incident involving SAi San Francisco Field Office, on 10/20/2014 _ L..S-A--r1----... 1w_a_s_p_r_a__.cticing for quarterly firearms I qualifications, inside her apartment, when the Accidental Discharge occurred. SA~l____.lwanted to practice drawing her weapon from the holster and dry firing so she drew her weapon and aimed at a target she UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE 10/20/2014. Re: 297K-HQ-A5644445, 12/22/2014 sAI placed on her dresser. !pressed the trigger and discharged her weapon. She had not conducted a safety check or cleared her weapon, prior to firing her weapon. limmediately checked behind the target and found a hole in her bedroom wall. She followed the most likely path of the bullet and discovered holes through her bedroom wall into her bathroom, through the bathroom wall, and through an open door in the bathroom where it shattered the bathroom sink mirror on the opposite wall. !walked out of her bedroom into the kitchen to deduce the bullet's continued path from the bathroom sAI SAi when she determined the bullet had not left her bathroom. SA~l~~~­ returned and looked at the bullet hole in the bathroom wall and saw what appeared to be a shattered brass pipe in her wall where the bullet likely impacted, then dropped to the ground floor after contact. The round could not be located without causing unreasonable damage to SA ...._~~~~-I personal residence as well as multiple apartments within her building and was accordingly not recovered. confident nobody had been hurt, walked back into her bedroom, removed the magazine from her weapon, pulled the slide back ejecting a live round from the weapon, and placed both the weapon and magazine on her night stand. SAi I SIRG Observations (U/~ On 12/15/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Accidental Discharge incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Since the incident reviewed involved an Accidental Discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE 10/20/2014. Re: 297K-HQ-A5644445, 12/22/2014 Observation 1: SA~l~~~---lexperienced an Accidental Discharge while preparing to dry fire her weapon prior to firearms qualification b6 b7C training. Analysis 1: MIOG Part II, Section 12(g), Firearms Safety Rules, indicated, "Perform a safety check on the weapon before a training session. Make sure the weapon is unloaded." On 10/20/2014, SA_l~~~-lfailed to perform a safety check prior to drawing her weapon to conduct a dry fire practice exercise. As a b6 b7C result, SA~l~~~__.lsuffered an Accidental Discharge in her apartment while attempting to dry fire her weapon. Instruction 1: SAC, San Francisco, will ensure remedial firearms training. SA~l~~~_.lattends b6 b7C 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed necessary. The SIRG found this Accidental Discharge to be the result of sAj !failure to conduct a safety check, prior to conducting a dry fire practice exercise. Therefore, the SIRG determined the Agent's actions warranted referral to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division, for any further administrative action. b6 b7C (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David P. Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Deputy Chiefl Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, Department of Justice; Supervisory Special Agent (SSA Investigative Law Unit, Office Of General Counsel; SSA Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division (TD); Firearms Training Unit, I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/ ~ SHOOTING INCIDENT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE 10/20/2014. Re: 297K-HQ-A5644445, 12/22/2014 I ucl TD; Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group; New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; SSA .. Evidence Response Team, Laboratory Division; and Inspector Trent R. Teyema, Office Of Inspections (IO), INSD; The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Vadim D. Thomas and Douglas A. Leff, OI,INSD; Assistant Team Inspectors/Team Leaders! OI, INSD; UC INSD; Program Management Analyst! Inspection Management Unit (IMU), INSD; and Special Assistant ...... ..... OI, INSD. ucl I I____________.I I I ----------- Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, San Francisco, is responsible for ensuring the Inspection Instruction is satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instruction is addressed by the field office. The Inspector-in-Charge (IIC) will review the field office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement . •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE 06/14/2014 Title: cc Date: 11/14/2014 =1.____-------' b6 b7C Sean M. Cox From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: Drafted R Justin Tolomeo STROUD SHAWN W David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara b6 b7C By:~I~~~~~~~~~~--' Case ID #: 297I-HQ-A5065721 (U) Springfield-Peoria Shooting Incident Review 06-14-2014 Synopsis: (U/~This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Agent-involved shooting incident following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014. Administrative Notes: (U/~ This communication summarizes the Inspection Division (INSD) Shooting Incident Report dated 09/18/2014, prepared by Inspector R. Justin Tolomeo. A copy of the complete INSD Shooting Incident Report was uploaded to the captioned file. Details: (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed an Agent-involved shooting incident that occurred on 06/14/2014 involving Special Agent (SA) Springfield Field Office. At approximately 7:30 I P.M., SAi l(a TFO) arrived at The UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE 06/14/2014 Re: 297I-HQ-A5065721, 11/14/2014 Fifth Quarter Sports Bar & Pizzeria in East Peoria, Illinois. The purpose of the visit was to attendl lhigh school reunion. b6 b7C (U/~ Jason A. Moore, born 10/12/1973, entered the establishment at about 7:45 P.M. and had a brief conversation with the greeter at the door. At approximately 7:49 P.M., he drew a Sig Sauer 9mm handgun with a laser sight, walked a short distance into the bar, and shot his ex-wife, Lori A. Moore, and her boyfriend, Lance Griffel, once each in the head. Jason Moore then walked back to the greeting area. Jason Moore pointed his handgun at his own head as well as at a crowded dining area where lwas standing. While the weapon was pointed at his head, Jason Moore fired one round in what appeared to be a suicide attempt; however, the bullet only grazed his left cheek. As SAi Jason Moore pointed the weapon at the crowded dining area, SA~I~~~~~ fired two rounds from his Bureau-issued Glock 23 .40 caliber handgun hitting Jason Moore once in the shoulder and once in the upper right side of his torso. Jason Moore died at the scene. Lori Moore and Lance Griffel were transported to the Order of Saint Francis Medical Center in Peoria, Illinois, where they were pronounced dead. There were no other injuries. (U/~ An autopsy of Jason Moore determined the cause of death to be a gunshot wound which punctured his aorta. Jason Moore's toxicology report listed the ethanol alcohol level in his blood as 0.354. The report also indicated the presence of a prescription antidepressant. Interviews conducted by local authorities indicated Jason Moore had ongoing issues with Lori Moore regarding their divorce, which occurred about one year earlier. Text messages reviewed from the day of the incident revealed several messages between Jason Moore and Lori Moore where Jason complained of matters such as child custody, support payments, and Lori Moore's new boyfriend. The last text message from Jason Moore to Lori Moore was sent at 7:14 P.M. and read, "anywho, I'm gonna show up just to piss you off." Another interview with a friend of Lori Moore indicated at about the same time Lori stated Jason was going to ruin her night. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE 06/14/2014 Re: 297I-HQ-A5065721, 11/14/2014 SIRG Observations (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the Agent-involved shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. The SIRG voted unanimously the application of deadly force by sAI Ion 06/14/2014 was in compliance with the Department of Justice Deadly Force Policy. b6 b7C 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning The SIRG determined SA I ltook appropriate actions to protect himself and others from the imminent threat posed by Jason Moore. Therefore, the SIRG did not propose any observations. and execution, training, and/or safety issues. b6 b7C 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken against sAI las a result of his involvement in the 06/14/2014 shooting incident. necessary. b6 b7C (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W. Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chief I._~~~~~~--' Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States Department of Justice (USDOJ); Trial Attorney I I Criminal Division, USDOJ; SSA Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; SSA ....... Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division (TD); SSA Firearms Training Unit, TD; UC ..._~..,....~~~~~~~~--~~~~ L-~~~..--~~~~~~~ ~.....-, L-~~~--r~~~~~--'~~~~-, ._~~~~~~__.I Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ SHOOTING INCIDENT SPRINGFIELD FIELD OFFICE 06/14/2014 Re: 297I-HQ-A5065721, 11/14/2014 ucl Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; and SC Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith ._~~~~~~~~__.I SWAT Operations Unit, .-c_I_R_G~;~s_s_A....._~~~~~.,....~~~~~..... Ballistics Research Facility, DSU; SSA Protective Operations Unit, Security Division; UC Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Paul D. Delacourt, Kathryn Peterson, and Douglas A. Leff, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders~!~~~~~~~~~~~.... OI, INSD; Special Assistant ....... ..... and Management Program ...... OI, INSD; UC...... .... Analysts (MAPAs) Inspection ....... Management Unit (IMU), INSD; and MAPA Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), INSD . ~~~~~~~~~~-.-~~~~~~~--~~~~~ ._~~~~~~~~~-- ~~~~~~~ ~---. ~~~~~~~--''--~~~~ L-~~~~~~~~~~~..--~~~~~~~~~ •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 ~, b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U~ Shooting Incident Review Board Title: Date: 11/20/2014 b6 b7C From: INSPECTION DA-TDY Contact: Approved By: Trent R. Teyema David Paul Gelios Nancy McNamara Drafted By: I__________. Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A5086719 b6 b7C (U) Springfield Accidental Discharge Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned Accidental Discharge incident following the SIRG meeting held on 10/21/2014. Administrative Notes: (U//~ The shooting incident review was delegated to the Springfield Field Office by the Chief Inspector on 06/23/2014. The Shooting Incident Report, dated 06/27/2014, was submitted electronically by SSAI I Springfield Field Office. b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the 06/22/2014 Accidental Discharge (AD) incident involving SSAI.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ Springfield (SI) Field Office. The AD incident was delegated by the Chief Inspector at 1:14 a.m., on 06/23/2014, to the SI Field Office for investigation. The investigation determined, while at his residence, SSAI !discharged his~l~~~~~lpersonally owned weapon (POW) as he attempted to render the weapon safe. SSAI UNCLASSIFIED/~ lfailed to remove b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Shooting Incident Review Board Re: 297K-HQ-A5086719, 11/20/2014 the loaded magazine from the weapon as he drew the slide to the rear. As a result, the weapon discharged when ssAI !depressed the weapon's trigger. The round penetrated an interior wall and then embedded in the floor of an adjoining bedroom. There were no injuries as a result of the AD. The Defensive Systems Unit tested the weapon and its magazine and determined it functioned as designed. The Madison County Sheriff's Office declined to investigate the matter. SSA I !retired on 08/31/2014 (U/~ b6 b7C after~I~~~~~~~~~---' On 10/21/2014, the SIRG reviewed the AD incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Since the incident reviewed involved an AD, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety issues. Since SSA ._~~~~_.lretired from the FBI on 08/31/2014, the SIRG identified no observations or recommendations pertaining to SSAI incident. b6 b7C IAD 3. Provide recommendations for administrative action if deemed The SIRG recommended no administrative action be taken against SSAI a result of his involvement in the 06/22/2014 AD incident. necessary. las (U/~ Acting Deputy Assistant Director David Paul Gelios, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Shawn W. Stroud, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Deputy Chiefl...._~~1 Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, United States ...._D_e_p_a_r__,tment of Justice (USDOJ); Trial Attorney! I Criminal Division, USDOJ; ssAI I Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; ssAI I Squad CR-2, Washington UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~~ Shooting Incident Review Board Re: 297K-HQ-A5086719, 11/20/2014 I Field Office; Unit Chief (UC) Practical Applications Unit, Training Division (TD); ssAI Firearms Training Unit, TD; ucl Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Operations Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); uc ... New Agent Training Program Section, Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; Section Chief (SC) Robert E. Hughes, Violent Crimes Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; and SC Roger A. Coe, CD-2, Global Section, Counterintelligence Division. The following non-voting individuals were also in attendance: Gunsmith I SWAT Operations Unit, CIRG; ssAJ Ballistics Research Facility, DSU; SSAI Protective Operations Unit, Security Division; ucl Firearms and Toolmarks Unit, Laboratory Division; Inspectors Trent R. Teyema, R. Justin Tolomeo, Pau l D. De l acour t , Ka th ryn Pe t er son, an d Douq l as A. Le ff , OI, INSD; Assistant Inspectors/Team Leaders OI, INSD; Special Assistant IOI, INSD; UCI land Manaqement Program Analysts I Inspection Management (MAPAs)I Unit (IMU), INSD; and MAPAI Inspection Analysis Unit (IAU), INSD . I I I l_________. .I I I •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~- FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication Title: CC: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15/2016 Date: 04/21/2017 I Gregory D Cox b6 b7C Sean M. Cox From: INSPECTION Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C Lawrence E. Koleff TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: Case ID#: 297I-HQ-A7717110 (U) Springfield Shooting Incident 05/15 /2016 Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Shooting Incident Re ort, dated 03 /07/2017, was prepared by INSD Chief Inspector and ______, Assistant Inspector/Team Leader .._ _________ b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On 05/15/2016 at approximately 7:44 a.m. CST, members of the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), FBI Chicago (CG) SWAT, and Illinois State Police (ISP) SWAT were involved in a shooting incident while searching for a fugitive. were searching a vacant residence located at The teams 1----------. In response to the UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 Agent Involved Shooting (AIS), INSD deployed a Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) and a Laboratory Shooting Reconstruction Team (LSRT) on 05/16/2016. The SIRT investigation revealed the following: (U/~ On 05/07/2016, Dracy "Clint" Pendleton exchanged gunfire with a Mahomet Police Officer following a traffic stop in the 500 block of South Vine Street, Mahomet, Illinois. Pendleton fled to rural Pope County, Illinois. ISP requested assistance from FBI Springfield (SI) apprehension of Pendleton. The regarding the An arrest warrant for Pendleton was issued on 05/10/2016 by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) (U/~ On the morning of 05/14/2016, search teams located a loaded AK-47 magazine and bloody clothes, possibly associated with Pendleton, in a church. On 05/15/2016 at approximately 2:20 a.m., SI SAC Sean M. Cox, who served as the On Scene Commander (OSC), requested HRT to report to the command post (CP) as Pendleton may have been located. At 3:35 a.m., CG SWAT deployed to set up a perimeter around the surrounding area of the church. While establishing the perimeter, CG SWAT operators observed a light emanate from a house in the vicinity of the church and reported it to the OSC. The OSC instructed CG SWAT to secure the perimeter and HRT Silver would be utilized to clear the house. ISP made contact with the property owners and UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 received consent for law enforcement to make entry into the house to search for Pendleton. The owners further advised the house was vacant with the utilities turned off. (U//~ At approximately 6:00 a.m., HRT arrived at the church and developed a plan to clear the house using the CG SWAT Bearcat armored vehicle as cover to approach the house. The Bearcat was driven by CG SWAT Senior Team Leader (STL)l...._~~~~- ...._~~~~~l and occupied by four HRT operators and an ISP negotiator. b6 b7C As HRT operators approached the house in both the Bearcat and on foot, a determination was made to clear a detached garage prior to clearing the house. The Bearcat approached and breached the garage door while CG SWAT operators physically cleared the garage. (U/~W:e:t After multiple call-out warnings announcing the presence of the police and FBI, HRT utilized Robots were inserted to visually inspect the first and second floor of the residence and found no evidence of occupants. After remote inspection, HRT deployed their canine asset to clear the first and second floor with negative results. HRT b6 b7C b7E TLl...._~~~~~­ ._~~~--'lsubsequently completed a verbal brief of roles and assignments and decided to allow CG SWAT operators to assist with clearing the second floor of the house. (U/~ At approximately 7:40 a.m., CG SWAT operators STL and HRT UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 operators _______________________________ ...._ proceeded up the stairs to physically clear the second floor. SAs ._I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I opened the small crawl space door, previously identified on the northwest side of the room from the video feed of the robot, and cleared the area with a pistol flashlight. Afterwards, another panel was observed in the drywall on the opposite southwest side of the room. accessed and began to open the panel with STLI As sAc==J !providing cover, Pendleton fired multiple shots from behind the drywall, b6 b7C lin The remaining five operators striking STLI both arms. """"""-;:=::::::::......... (excluding STLI he attempted to retreat to the stairs) las returned fire in the direction of the threat. SSA~l_____land HRT sAl....______lfired In addition, HRT their weapons positioned from the stairwell towards the threat. During the encounter, SSA ....__ _ ___.lalso fired from the first floor through the ceiling in the direction of where he assessed Pendleton to be firing from behind the panel (knee wall) on the second floor. I (U/~ During the gunfire, grabbed STLI SAi pulled him down the stairs while the other operators continued to address the threat. Once STLI Iwas removed, the operators descended and exfiltrated the house. At 7:57 a.m., ISP arrived at the scene in an ISP Bearcat to provide cover as medical treatment was provided to STLI ISP Trooperc=J ...._______!observed movement in the first floor window and FBI SI negotiator SAi !observed the blinds in the first floor window move, as if being pull inward. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 Four ISP operators b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 and two HRT operators (SSA_l_____land SAi.._~~--' began firing into the first floor window to address the threat. ISP operators reported a large caliber rifle could be heard firing rounds from inside the house and muzzle blast was seen from the house. ISP Communication issues between the HRT helicopter, TOC, and CP resulted in the MEDVAC arriving in a Landing Zone (LZ) within range of direct fire from the house. As HRT operator! ._____.lbroke cover and ran to physically wave the helic._o_p_t_e_r_o__.ff, HRT operator SAi b6 b7C lbegan firing into the northeast, second floor window, as he believed the pilots and SAi lwere in imminent danger after movement was seen in the window and Pendleton was still in the house. The helicopter was re- directed and landed on Eddyville Blacktop Road first, and then preceded to a LZ located on the northeast corner of the property. At 8:08 a.m., STLI lwas loaded into a MEDVAC helicopter and provided care by HRT operator/medic SAi---------. The helicopter transported STLI Ito a Marion, IL hospital and later a trauma hospital in St. Louis, Missouri. (U/~ Subsequently, HRT re-entered the house, cleared floors with the canine, and physically located Pendleton deceased on the second floor. The HRT medic on the scene,_I_____________. determined Pendleton had no vital signs and an electrocardiogram conducted on Pendleton by Carterville Emergency Medical Services (EMS) confirmed he was deceased. Pendleton's body was UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 transported to the Williamson Country morgue in Marion, IL. (U/~ The SIRT prepared 13 Signed Sworn Statements (SSS) from the FBI CG SWAT and HRT operators who discharged their weapons (7), or were present in or near the house during the shooting incident. The SSS accounts of the shooting incident were consistent with one another and with the collected evidence. The SIRT also prepared 24 witness statement FD-302s from additional FBI employees and ISP personnel. The SIRT also reviewed FBI Aviation Forward Looking Infra-red Radar (FLIR) video taken during the incident, which was consistent with SWAT and HRT operator accounts. (U/~ SAC Cox made notification of the shooting to the Deputy Director and the ADS of INSD and CID. ._________~!notified SIOC. SI ASAcl The Agents involved in the sh_o_o__ t_i_n_g__. b6 b7C were transported to the CP where their weapons were secured. All HRT and SWAT operators were wearing body armor with visible law enforcement markings, and all were current on their respective firearms qualifications. (U/~ On 05/24/2016, Deputy Chiefl U. S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, declined the AIS for a federal criminal civil rights prosecution after review of the SIRT investigation. On 05/31/2016,I.___________________. Acting U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Illinois, upon review of the SIRT materials, advised there was no wrongdoing on the part of the FBI or on the part of the Agents involved in the UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 AIS. Accordingly, there was no basis for prosecution of anyone involved in the incident. 07/28/2016,_l~~~~~~~~~-IPope On b6 b7C County IL Prosecutor's Office, provided in a letter to FBI SI, in which she declined prosecution of any LEOs involved in the AIS. (U/~ The SIRT coordinated with ISP Division of Internal Investigation personnel during the AIS investigation. ISP conducted interviews involving ISP Special Operations Command SWAT Master Sergeant I Sergeants ......__~----;====::::::::...~~~~ I __________. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ . and Trooper ... who each fired their weapons during the incident. The four ISP rifles discharged during the shooting incident were secured by ISP Crime Scene Investigations and subsequently test fired. The projectiles and fired shell casings were transferred to the FBI for forensic comparison. According to the ISP investigation, the shots by the four ISP SWAT officers into the first floor window of the house were fired in response to observing movement and an individual looking out from the first floor window, and their reasonable belief Pendleton was at that location and posed an imminent threat to all officers, and in particular, to those I _____. officers rendering aid to SLT ... SIRG Observations (U/~ On 03/22/2017, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 7 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ (U/~ Title: Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 1. 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 Evaluate the application of deadly force. (U/~ The SIRG unanimously determined CG SWAT SAs HRT SSAI I and HRT SAs_I~~~~acted within the FBI' s Deadly Force I .,.1-------------------.l Policy when they discharged their weapons during the AIS. b6 b7C The SIRG concluded the Agents perceived Pendleton to be an imminent threat to themselves and other Agents. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations, if any, for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/ ~ Observation 1: HRT operators removed ... I _ _ _ _ _ ___. from the incident scene before ERT arrived and processed the scene. (U/~ Analysis 1: The Field Evidence Management Policy Guide, 0780PG, Section 2. 3 states "All FBI personnel who handle physical evidencer including SAsr professional staffr and others working on behalf and under the direction of the FBir in addition to the specific responsibilities of their respective positionsr must: • Handle and document evidence in accordance with this PG and other applicable FEU procedures. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 8 b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 • Ensure that all evidence is handledr storedr reviewedr and marked in accordance with the relevant FBI dissemination marking policyr including requirements related to federal grand jury (FGJ) material and federal taxpayer information (FTI). • Maintain the chain of custody of all evidence in accordance with this PG and other applicable FEU policies and procedures." (U/~ The FBI Policy Directive on Shooting Incident Response Procedures, 0782D, 11.4 states "In the event of an AISr the involved FBI employee (or designee) should: Secure and leave the [accidental discharge] scene undisturbedr to the extent practicabler until the arrival of ERT and supervisory personnel." With respect to AISs, the 2016 INSD Shooting Incident Guide also directs Agents as follows: "Once any remaining threats have been addressedr establish a perimeter to protect the incident scene(s) and evidence. To the extent possibler the incident scene shall be preserved in its entirety." (U/~ Through discussions with ERTU and SL ERT, INSD learned that prior to the arrival of the SIRT and LSRT to process the AIS scene, HRT personnel policed their breaching round shell casings and collected the evidence in violation of the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide, 0780PG, Section 2.3. ~ ~ere subsequently provided to ERT TL SA I lby ...._~~~~~~~~~~--- HRT TL I I UNCLASSIFIED/~ 9 b6 b7C b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 (U~The Iw..._h_i_c_h__w_e_r_e__f_i_r_s_t__o_b_t_a_i_n_e_d__b_y_t_h_e_F_B_I_i_n_ _. I ____________I this ...._a_p_p_r_o_x_i_m_a_t_e_l_y_2_0_1_1_a_n_.d employed by HRT ... incident. At the time of the incident, HRT represented to the SIRT and ERT personnel that thel b7E lwere I INSD determined thel (U/~ With input from OGC, INSD assessed that HRT's use of thel use, the and any reference to or documentation of that I I is characterized at the 'UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY' or 'LAW ENOFRCEMENT SENSITIVE' level. Regardless of the classified or sensitive nature of the breaching tactic or tool used, or I__________.Ft presumed evidentiary value of a ... the incident scene, HRT Operators must ensure incident scenes are preserved in their entirety, to the extent practicable, according to the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide and the 2016 INSD Shooting Incident Guide. I __________Iis If a ... be a safety and security risk, determined to the Agent should arrange for immediate recording of the ... l _________....lbefore retrieval. (U/~ Instruction 1: AD, CIRG will ensure HRT personnel preserve AIS incident scenes, to the extent practicable, UNCLASSIFIED/~ 10 in b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 their entirety according to the Field Evidence Management Policy Guide and INSD Shooting Incident Guide. (U/~ Observation 2: Approval and use of thee=] ---~~~~~~~---lby b7E HRT was not sufficiently covered by FBI policy or the Hostage Rescue Team Policy Guide. (U/~ Analysis 2: A classified electronic communication (EC), dated 09/30/2010, summarized the operational characteristics and tactical effectiveness of a described breaching round, and requested authorization for use by HRT only with "appropriate approval." address the The EC did not specifically but stated the described falls under the National Breaching Program. b7E (The I (U/~I b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ 11 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 b7E I The HRT Policy Guide does not .._a_d_d_r__ e_s_s__t_h __e__u_s__ e __o_r___ a_p_p_r_o_v __a_l__o__f .....the~I_________________________, (U) The I I states:! b7E (U/~ Instruction 2a: AD, CIRG will coordinate with OGC to ensure appropriate policy and an approval process is established for the use of thel I to include approval for general use from TD. a sensitive tool, For individual deployment of the policy should include factors for the authorizing SAC to consider in order to establish reasonableness, including a discussion with OGC or the CDC about any risk to potential prosecution or defense of a potential civil matter. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 12 b7E UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 (U/~ Instruction 2b: AD, CIRG will coordinate with OGC to ensure an appropriate policy and approval process is established for the use of anyl When b7E CIRG is offered a tool by another government agency or develops a tool, either independently or with another government agency, CIRG AD should ensure policy for determining both the classification and sensitivity of that tool, and for advising users of the appropriate marking and handling restrictions. For individual deployment of a sensitive tool, the policy should include factors for the authorizing SAC consider establishing reasonableness, including a discussion with OGC or the CDC about any risk to potential prosecution or defense of a potential civil matter. (U/~ Observation 3: Agents involved in the shooting incident were not photographed in their clothing and tactical gear following the incident per the 2016 INSD Shooting Incident Guide. (U~ Analysis 3: The 2016 Shooting Incident Guide page 30 states, "Following a shooting incidentr an Agent who discharges a weapon should: UNCLASSIFIED/~ 13 UNCLASSIFIED/~ (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 Title: /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 o "If you did not sustain injuries and no medical attention is needed requiring you to change clothes or remove gearr do not change clothes or remove your gear as you will need to be photographed. This is standard practice and is often done by the Evidence Response Team." (U/~ Inotified ERTU SI ssAI I _____. SSA .... .-~~~Ion 05/15/2016, HRT Agents who fired their weapons refused to be photographed in their clothing and tactical gear. SI EM and INSD conferred and directed the Agents be photographed as per protocol outlined in the INSD 2016 Shooting Incident Guide. This did not take place until the following day, at which time the Agents involved in the shooting re-donned their clothing and tactical gear to be photographed. SSA I....._ __.I later spoke with SI SAC Sean Cox, who advised HRT personnel refused to have their faces photographed while wearing their identifying FBI and tactical gear. Without a circumstance requiring the immediate removal of their clothing and tactical gear, the removal of clothing and gear prior to being photographed, then the re-donning of the gear subsequently, jeopardizes the integrity of the evidence, particularly the preservation of accurate photographs to capture any visual evidence, tactical gear, and law enforcement markings worn by each Agent at the time of the shooting incident. UNCLASSIFIED~ 14 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 (U/~ Recommendation 3: AD, CIRG will ensure HRT personnel do not remove their clothing and tactical gear following a shooting incident until they are photographed, absent extenuating circumstances. 3. Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed necessary. (U/~ The SIRG did not recommend the captioned shooting incident be referred to the Internal Investigations Section (IIS),INSD, for further administrative action. (U/~ DAD Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members (voting) were in attendance: SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes I Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division; SSA~I~~~~~~ Defensive Systems Unit, Training Division (TD); SSA ,1~----------L-~~~~~lsquad CR-4, Washington Field Office; SC MaryJo Thomas, CPC Counter Proliferation Center, ~nvestigative Counterintelligence Division; ucl Attorney~!~~~~~~~~---' Law Unit (ILU), OGC; Senior Trial Organized Crime and Gang Section, DOJ; Special Legal Counsel lcivil Rights Division, DOJ; ucl l============r~F-i_r_e~arms Training Unit, TD; ssAI I I National Operations and Training Unit, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); ssAI Team Unit, Laboratory Division. I Evidence Response A/Chief Inspector Lawrence E. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 15 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 Title: /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 Koleff, a member of the SIRG, was part of the AIS presentation and did not cast a vote in this incident. (U/~ The following personnel were also in attendance: AD Gregory D. Cox, CIRG; Inspectors Eric D. Welling, Scott B. Cheney, Cindy L. Hall, OI, INSD; SC Voviette D. Morgan, Internal Investigations Section, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders b6 b7C loI, INSD; MAPAsl ......~~~~~~~~~~~,__~~~-.IOI, INS-D~;~S-S_A,l_________________T_T__.U, TD; and SSA_l~~~~~~~~~~~~---1 ILU, OGC. Procedures for Responding to Observations (U//~ AD, CIRG and SAC Chicago are required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the Division/Field Office to resolve Instructions. The inspection process is not complete until the Observations are addressed by the Division/Field Office. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Division's response to determine if the Observations have been resolved or require further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. Follow-up EC responses must be directed to Management Unit, A/ucl_____________, INSD. UNCLASSIFIED/~ 16 Inspection b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Agent-Involved Shooting Springfield Field Office, 05/15 /2016 Re: 297I-HQ-A7717110, 04/21/2017 •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 17 FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10) UNCLASSIFIED/~ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Electronic Communication (U/~Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Salt Lake City Field Office, 03/11/2016 Title: From: Date: 10/25/2016 NEW YORK Contact: Approved By: b6 b7C PETERSON KATHRYN Timothy M. Feeney TWERSKY RONALD Nancy McNamara Drafted By: Case ID #: 297K-HQ-A7258645 (U) Salt Lake City Shooting Incident Synopsis: (U/~ This communication was prepared to furnish the analysis, comments, and recommendations of the shooting incident Review Group (SIRG) with respect to the captioned accidental discharge shooting incident. Administrative Notes: (U/~ The Delegated Shooting Incident Report, dated 04/18/2016, was reviewed by INSD Inspector Kathryn Peterson and Assistant Inspector /Team Leader I..._________.I b6 b7C Details: (U/~ On August 25, 2016, the SIRG reviewed an accidental discharge shooting incident involving Special Agent (SA) I I Salt Lake City Division (SU), when he accidentally discharged (AD) a round while cleaning his Bureau-issued .40 caliber, Glock 22 while in the SU gun cleaning room on 03/11/2016. There were no injuries. The shooting incident review was delegated to the SU by the Chief Inspector on 03/11/2016. The Delegated Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) investigation revealed the following: UNCLASSIFIED/~ b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Salt Lake City Field Office, 03/11/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7258645, 10/25/2016 (U/~ On 03/11/2016, SA_I~~~~~- experienced an accidental b6 b7C discharge (AD) while cleaning his Bureau-issued .40 caliber, Glock 22 firearm in the SU gun cleaning room. There were no injuries or witnesses, and the AD was recorded by a security surveillance camera which was directly angled towards the gun cleaning table. The single round was discharged into a yellow container which held cleaning supplies located on top of the gun cleaning table. The round caused minimal damage to the cleaning area, the concrete wall located behind the cleaning table, and a file cabinet located to the left of the table. (U/~ On 03/11/2016, at approximately 4:00 p.m., SAi._~~~~--' entered the SU gun cleaning room for the purpose of cleaning his gun to participate in a SU firearms training session on 03/14/2016. SA .__~~~~__.lcleared his weapon utilizing the clearing barrel, then disassembled and cleaned his weapon on the cleaning table located on the north side of the gun cleaning room. SAi !reassembled his weapon, inserted a loaded magazine, and charged the weapon. SA b6 b7C !proceeded to wipe down his weapon when he noticed oil .__d_r_i-.p--p_i_n_g---down the trigger. SAi !attempted to use a gun barrel cleaning patch to wipe off the excess oil, but then decided to disassemble the weapon to wipe off the excess oil. During the disassembly, SAi !pressed the trigger and discharged a round into the yellow container located on top of the cleaning table. (U/~ At approximately 4:30 p.m., Principal Firearms Instructor (PFI) SA __________ contacted ______...., SA .........._ ...._....,.----------...--------' of the AD. At approximately 4:40 p.m., SA supervisor, SSAI ......_ SU and advised contacted his and reported the AD. Thereafter, at approximately 6:10 p.m., SU Evidence Response Team Leader UNCLASSIFIED/~ 2 SA~I_______. b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Salt Lake City Field Office, 03/11/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7258645, 10/25/2016 I larrived at the cleaning room after being notified by ASAC I...__________.I SA._!_ _ ___.I and ERT member SAi.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____, b6 b7C photographed and processed the scene. (U/~ SAC Eric K. Barnhart notified INSD Chief Inspector Timothy M. Feeney an AD had occurred. Chief Inspector Feeney informed SAC Barnhart the Agent involved shooting (AIS) incident review was delegated to SU, under the supervision of Inspector Kathryn Peterson. (U/~ SAi !training records revealed he was current with respect to firearms qualifications at the time of the incident. A signed sworn statement was obtained from SAi b6 b7C Ion 03/14/2016. SA ________.I account of the AD was consistent with the video surveillance footage of the gun cleaning area. (U/~ ERT collected bullet fragments from the gun cleaning room floor. The fragments were located underneath the cleaning table and in the NW corner of the gun cleaning room floor. (U/~ PFI~took possession of SAi !Glock 22 firearm, serial numberc====J three magazines, and SAi ....__ _......lprovided SAi lholster. PFI lwith a new weapon and magazines as well as a remedial safety briefing. PFII lsubsequently shipped SA b6 b7C b7E _______...lweapon to the Training Division's Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) in Quantico, Virginia, for testing. I (U/ ~ On 04/28/2016, PFI !received SAi DSU. The weapon was test fire._d_a_n_d... inspected. I weapon from Glock 22 S._A....,..1--------.1 functioned as designed, and there were no noted issues. (U/~ Observation UNCLASSIFIED/~ 3 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Salt Lake City Field Office, 03/11/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7258645, 10/25/2016 On 08/25/2016, the SIRG reviewed the shooting incident with the intent to: 1. Evaluate the application of deadly force. Because the shooting was determined to be a accidental discharge, the application of deadly force was not considered or evaluated by the SIRG. 2. Provide the Director with evaluative analyses, observations, and recommendations for corrective actions concerning operational planning and execution, training, and/or safety concerns. (U/~ Observation 1: SA~l~~~~~~lexperienced an accidental discharge while preparing to clean his Bureau-issued firearm. (U/~ Instruction 1: SAC, Salt Lake City will ensure SAi.__~~~~__. receives remedial firearms training, specific to the safe handling of firearms. 3. (U/~ Provide Recommendations for Administrative Action if deemed necessary. The SIRG recommended the captioned shooting incident be referred to Internal Investigations Section (IIS), Inspection Division (INSD), for any further administrative action. (U/~ Deputy Assistant Director Ronald Twersky, INSD, chaired the meeting and was a non-voting Board Member. The following Board Members were in attendance: Acting Chief Inspector Eric D. Welling, Office of Inspections (OI), INSD; Section Chief (SC) M.A. Myers, Instruction Section, Training Division (TD); SC Robert Hughes, Violent Crimes UNCLASSIFIED/~ 4 b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Salt Lake City Field Office, 03/11/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7258645, 10/25/2016 Threat Section, Criminal Investigative Division (CID); Unit Chief (UC) ________.I Defensive Systems Unit (DSU), TD; ssAI I Squad CR-2, Washington Field Office; Section Chief Charles McGonigal, CD-2 Global Section, Counterintelligence Division; ucI..__________. Investigative Law Unit, Office of General Counsel; Senior Trial Attorne b6 b7C Organized Crime and Gang Section, USDOJ; UC Firearms Training Unit (FTU), TD; uc~I_____ SWAT Operations Unit (SOU), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG); ssAI !Evidence Response Team Unit, Laboratory Division. (U/~ The following non-voting members were also in attendance: Inspectors Kathryn Peterson and Regina Thompson, OI, INSD; Assistant Inspector/Team Leaders! b6 b7C loI, INSD; Management and I Program Analysts! L-----i..---------......---------r-------.........., .__~~~-I OI,rI_N_s_D~;_s~sA_.._l~~,_~~~....JI sou, CIRG; ssAl...._~~~~~___.I TTU, TD; _________ I ssAI..._ _. TTU, TD; and ASA Kirdar and Mike Dillinger, USDOJ Inspector General. Procedures for Responding to Observations (U/~ SAC, Salt Lake City, is responsible for ensuring Inspection Instructions are satisfactorily resolved. The inspection process is not complete until the Instructions are addressed. The Inspector-in-Charge will review the Field Office's response to determine if the Instruction has been resolved or requires further action. Resolution is based upon specific actions taken and not a recitation of the actions the division has under consideration to implement. SAC, Salt Lake City, is required to provide a written response via EC detailing the actions taken by the field office to resolve each Instruction. Follow-up EC responses must UNCLASSIFIED/~ 5 UNCLASSIFIED/~ Title: (U/~ Accidental Discharge Shooting Incident, Salt Lake City Field Office, 03/11/2016 Re: 297K-HQ-A7258645, 10/25/2016 be directed to Unit INSD . Chief_I~~~~~~~.... Inspection Management Unit, •• UNCLASSIFIED/~ 6 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 January 21, 2016 PERSONAL b6 b7C Federal Bureau of Investigation Miami, Florida I __. . Dear .... I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged one round from your Bureau-issued firearm while you were in the process of calibrating and testing a simulated handgun, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one day. DISCUSSION On the morning of June 16, 2015, you met another agent in the Firearms Training Simulator (FATS) room in the Miami Field Office. The other agent was instructing you on how to use and calibrate the MILO Range Pro system, a program that utilized, among other things, a computer, a screen with targets, and a simulated laser-fired weapon. 1 Later that morning you had another appointment; however, you returned to the FATS room alone around 11:00 a.m. You then removed your Bureau-issued Glock 23 handgun from your holster and placed it on a table next to the MILO Range Pro laptop computer, thinking that it would not take you very long to check the calibration on the MILO system. You did not unload or remove the magazine from your Glock 23 handgun before placing it on the table in front of where you were sitting. You then holstered the simulated firearm. As you began to conduct one of the MILO scenarios, you fired several shots from the simulated laser-fired weapon, finding that the system was not properly calibrated. You then reconfigured the system, recalibrated the sensors, and attempted to restart the same scenario. The system, however, prompted you to calibrate the simulated handgun. As you sat in a chair in 1 The MILO Range Pro system offers advanced features for interactive use-of-force and firearms training, including several hundred ready-to-train scenarios, interactive graphics, and laser-fired firearms drills. The system is to be used only with the special nonlethal weapons that are designed specifically for this training. b6 b7C front of your computer screen and clicked on the icon to calibrate the simulated weapon, a target immediately appeared on the wall. You mistakenly grabbed your Glock 23 which was on the table in front of you, raised the gun with a two-handed shooting grip, and fired one round. The bullet traveled through the wall and entered an adjacent office belonging to a Supervisory Foreign Language Specialist, who fortunately was not in her office at the time. The bullet then continued to penetrate the opposite wall of that office and enter the Foreign Language squad area, finally piercing some ceiling tiles before lodging in an HV AC pipe. Fortunately, there were no mJunes. You promptly investigated the surrounding areas and reported the matter to your supervisor. The incident was subsequently investigated by the Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT), who directed that you receive remedial firearms training. Your service weapon was additionally examined and found to be working properly. In your Signed-Sworn, Statement (SSS), you accepted responsibility for the incident. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5.14, it is a violation for an employee to "[c]aus[e] the unintentional discharge of a weapon." The FBI Firearms Policy Guide, paragraph 2.5, states that Special Agents must "be directly responsible for the appropriate use, security, and maintenance of all firearms and related equipment under their control." You admitted that you mistakenly grabbed your real weapon and fired it, thinking that it was the simulated laser-fired gun. Firing a live weapon in a FATS scenario is not an authorized, safe, and appropriate use of firearms. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation that you violated Offense Code 5 .14 is substantiated. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. The Penalty Guidelines do not provide a mitigated penalty. Aggravating factors warrant a three~ to 14-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI' s Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors . ..-----.Ihave considered all relevant mitigating factors, including, but not limited to, your nearly lof service to the Bureau, your Division's positive comments concerning your work, and your previous awards and accomplishments. Nevertheless, I find the standard penalty is warranted. Fortunately, neither the Foreign Language Specialist nor members of the squad were inside the two rooms where the bullet penetrated; however, this incident potentially could have been quite devastating had someone been hit. Based on the circumstances in this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one day. I 2 bG b7c b6 b7C CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 2 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Assistant Director, Human Resources Division, Room 10903, Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD' s Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRD. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the AD, HRD, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen ( 14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard of review on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the AD, HRD, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the AD, HRD, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0235D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. 2 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (HS), OPR, the Human Resources Division's Appellate Unit (APU), the Security Division, the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from IIS, OPR, or APU. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 3 b6 b7C REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, I Ichief Adjudication Unit II Office of Professional Responsibility 4 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 September 23, 2014 PERSONAL b6 b7C Federal Bureau of Investigation Cincinnati, Ohio Demi_ _ __ I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged one round from your personally-owned pistol while off-duty, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5.14 (Misuse of Weapon-Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. On March 21, 2014, you returned from work to your home. You andl ~egan preparing for the arrival of dinner guests. You removed your FBI-issued Glock Model 23 and placed it in a gun safe you kept in the den. You routinely secured your pistol in the safe when not on duty. You then removed a personally-owned Walther PPK pistol from the gun safe that you intended to carry that evening. 1 You flicked the safety of the Walther PPK twice with your left hand. Then, with your left hand, you removed a pocket holster from the top shelf of the gun safe. Holding the Walther PPK in your right hand, you slid the weapon into the pocket holster. Both hands were in the safe. You were talking tq who was in the kitchen. While holstering the gun, you accidentally discharged a round. I The discharged round grazed the second knuckle on your left index finger and entered the wall of the gun safe. The round dented the safe, but did not exit the safe. There were no other injuries or damage. 1 This weapon was not Bureau-approved. I note that the Shooting Incident Review Group instructed the SAC, Cincinnati to ensure that you carry and utilize only Bureau-approved weapons per FBI policy, MIOG Part II, Section 12-3(1) ("FBI SAs are authorized to carry and utilize only issued or Bureau-approved personally owned weapons (POWs) regardless of on- or off-duty status."). I will consider this violation of FBI policy as an aggravating factor in the Penalty Determination. b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C _ _ _ ____.!assisted you in washing and wrapping your injury. She then drove you to the hospital. On the way to the hospital, you telephoned your supervisor to report the incident. At the hospital, you received stitches. On March 24, 2014, you had surgery to repair the injured nerves and veins in your finger. According to FBI Offense Code 5.14, employees are prohibited from "[c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon." You accidentally discharged one round from your personally-owned Walther PPK while holstering it, injuring your finger. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation that you violated Offense Code 5 .14 is substantiated. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. Offense Code 5 .14 does not include a mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a three- to 14-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. You havel lof FBI service and a positive performance record. You have received remedial firearms safety training. However, in aggravation, the Walther PPK was not a Bureauapproved weapon. Finally, you have been the subject of one prior administrative inquiry. In Casel you received an oral reprimand for accessing inappropriate material on Bureau computers, in violation of FBI Offense Code 3.6 (Misuse of Government Computer(s)). Based on the circumstances of this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one day for your 5.14 offense. I The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 2 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Assistant 2 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (US), OPR, the Human Resources Division's Appellate Unit (APU), the Security Division, the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from US, OPR, or APU. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C Director, Human Resources Division, Room 10903, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD's Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRD. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the AD, HRD, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard ofreview on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the AD, HRD, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the AD, HRD, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or QPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Notice #0235N (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, . . . . . . . . . . . . . ---..-.. . . . .-1 Acting Unit Chief Adjudication Unit II Office of Professional Responsibility 3 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 September 13, 2016 PERSONAL b6 Federal Bureau of Investigation Miami, FL b7C Dear!.___ _ _ __. I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged your service weapon, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. DISCUSSION You arrived at the Miami Division's parking garage on April 13, 2016 for the annual inventory. As part of the inventory, you cleared your weapon and rendered it safe at the gun clearing barrel so the Primary Firearms Instructor (PFI) could inspect it. During the inspection, the PFI noted that your weapon was older and needed to be serviced at the next firearms qualification. You guessed the firearm had not been serviced for approximately five to eight years. After completing the inspection, you approached the gun clearing barrel to reload your weapon. The slide was locked to the rear and the muzzle of the gun was in the opening of the barrel as you inserted a fully loaded magazine. You assert your right index finger was along the side of the weapon, not on the trigger, as you inserted the magazine. However, the slide moved forward and one round was accidentally discharged into the gun clearing barrel. You were shocked and made a comment of disbelief. The PFI came over and took your weapon, unloaded it, and rendered it safe. The procedures for a non-lethal shooting incident were started and the proper management notified. As part of the process, the Evidence Response Team (ERT) responded to the parking garage to collect all evidence and photograph the scene. Your magazine was fully unloaded an R bullets collected from our ma azine b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C As part of the accidental discharge investigation, your firearm, magazine, and ammunition were sent to the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) for testing on April 18, 2016. DSU provided a written report, dated May 9, 2016. They found the weapon to have a cracked frame on the left side, just above the locking block pin. However, they noted the condition of the weapon was not uncommon for a weapon of that age. Additionally, the condition did notaffect the functioning of the firearm, nor would it contribute to a mechanical defect like an accidental discharge. The Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) delegated a review of the shooting incident to the Miami Division. The Shooting Incident Review Team (SIRT) determined that you could not say with certainty whether or not your finger was on the trigger when you sent the slide forward, but stated "you believed your finger was alongside the frame of the pistol" at the time of the accidental discharge. SIRG reviewed SIRT's investigation and found you violated Firearms Policy Guide 0741PG, Section 4.3.1, dated January 8, 2015. The policy states in relevant part: "Keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to press it." SIRG instructed the Miami Division ensure you receive training to reinforce critical skills for the safe and effective handling of firearms. SIRG further noted, 1....-~---~~~...-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,_....1 b7E SIRG found ou states, m part: b7E As a result of their findings, SIRG recommended the shooting incident be referred to the Internal Investigations Section of the Inspection Division for further administrative action. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5 .14, employees are prohibited from "[ c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon." In this case, you maintain in your signed sworn statement (SSS) that your right index finger was along the side of the weapon at the time you reloaded it. However, SIRT noted in their Executive Summary that you could not say with certainty whether or not your finger was on the trigger. Additionally, DSU inspected the weapon and found nothing that would contribute to an accidental discharge. Paragraph 2.5 of the Firearms Policy Guide states in part, "FBI SAs must: [b]e directly responsible for the appropriate use, security, and maintenance of all firearms and related 2 b6 b7C equipment under their control." Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude you violated Offense Code 5.14 when you accidentally discharged one round from your service weapon. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. Offense Code 5.14 does not include a mitigated penalty range. Aggravating factors warrant a three-day to 14-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. In mitigation, you have been with the FBI fod lwith no prior disciplinary history. You have been rated "Outstanding" on your last four P ARs and received numerous awards throughout your career. Your Division holds you in high regard. However, in aggravation, you loaded your weapon with service and training ammunition, and should have known the difference between the two given the number of years you have been with the Bureau. Additionally, despite regular training, you failed to properly handle your weapon, resulting in an accidental discharge. Based on the circumstances of this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day for your 5.14 offense. CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 1 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD's Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action 1 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (IIS), OPR, the Human Resources Division's Appellate Unit (APU), the Security Division, the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from IIS, OPR, or APU. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 3 b6 b7C b6 b7C other than a dismissal, the QPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard ofreview on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by QPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0235D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection Board.and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, _______Ichief Adjudication Unit II Office of Professional Responsibility 4 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau oflnvestigation Washington, D. C. 20535-0001 April 04, 2017 PERSONAL Federal Bureau of Investigation· Miami, FL I ______, Dear..... Reference is made to your appeal of a one-day suspension, which was imposed by the Office of Professional Responsibility (QPR). I have conducted a thorough review of the investigative record, the information provided in your appeal, relevant FBI policy, and disciplinary precedent. After careful analysis, I have decided to affirm OPR's finding that you violated FBI Offense Code 5.14, Misuse of Weapon-Accidental Discharge, as well as the oneday suspension OPR imposed for your misconduct. On appeal, your attorney argued that substantial evidence does not support OPR's conclusion you violated FBI Offense Code 5.14. In part, your attorney argued, "[w]hile the Shooting Incident Review Group has assumed that, because they could not recreate the weapon malfunction, [your] finger must have pulled the trigger, there is no real evidence to support this assumption. The existence of an objective finding of [the cracked frame on the left side, just above the locking block pin] renders a conclusion that [you were] the source of the discharge nothing more than conjecture." Your attorney also asserted that because of your due diligence by placing the muzzle of the weapon in the gun-clearing barrel, there was no reason to conclude you "mindlessly deviated from [your] long-standing routine practice by putting [your] finger on the trigger when [you] reloaded the weapon." Finally, in the alternative, your attorney argued that your sanction should not include any suspension because it was established that your weapon was old and in need of repair; the discharge occurred in a clearing barrel; and you have "already received 'punishment' as a result of this incident." OPR determined you violated Offense Code 5.14 when you "accidentally discharged one round from your service weapon." A substantial evidence review of the record shows that although you stated you did not "believe" you pulled the trigger of your firearm, you admitted that one round of ammunition was accidentally discharged from your firearm while you were inserting a fully-loaded magazine into it. Additionally, the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) determined the cracked frame of your firearm "did not affect the functioning of the pistol nor would it contribute as a mechanical defect to the accidental discharge." Applicable FBI policy states that "FBI SAs must: [b]e directly responsible for the appropriate use, security, and maintenance of all firearms and related equipment under their control." Therefore, OPR's finding that you violated Offense Code 5 .14 is supported by substantial evidence. b6 b7C b6 b7C In regard to your penalty, a review of the record shows OPR considered applicable mitigating and aggravating factors in your case prior to imposing your suspension, including: your lof FBI service; a lack of prior disciplinary history; an "Outstanding" rating on your last four PARs; your numerous awards throughout your career; your Division holds you in high regard; and, you loaded your weapon with service and training ammunition, and you should have known the difference between the two given the number of years you had been with the FBI. 1 Additionally, a review ofrelevant precedent shows that since 2004, OPR has deviated from the guidelines and issued a letter of censure in only five out of 129 cases involving Offense Code 5 .14, based on facts and circumstances that are distinguishable from those in your own case. As such, OPR' s imposition of a standard one-day suspension for your violation of Offense Code 5.14 is consistent with penalties imposed on similarly situated employees. I b6 b7C In conclusion, pursuant to a substantial evidence review of the record, FBI policy, applicable precedent, mitigating and aggravating factors, and your Division's Douglas factors analysis, I am affirming OPR's finding that you violated FBI Offense Code 5.14, Misuse of Weapon -Accidental Discharge, as well as the one-day suspension OPR imposed for your misconduct. Respectfully, Valerie Parlave Executive Assistant Director Human Resources Branch . Cc: b6 b7C 1 Regarding OPR's consideration, in aggravation, that ''despite regular training, you failed to properly handle your weapon, resulting in an accidental discharge," a review of the record shows that this is a restatement of the basis of the 5.14 violation; consideration of the same facts to substantiate a violation and to aggravate the penalty constitutes impermissible double-counting. However, substantial evidence supports OPR's consideration, in aggravation, that you violated policy by loading your weapon with service and training ammunition; thus, further mitigation is moot. -2- b6 b7C Enclosures NOTE TO SAC, MM: The Executive Assistant Director, HRB, affirmed the one-day suspension imposed by OPR. The enclosed letter should be delivered to lwithin five business days, at which time you are to proceed with the suspension implementation procedures as outlined below. If you have any ~uestions concerning the implementation of the suspension, please contact OPR Unit Chie I sAI Rules that Apply to the Imposition of Suspensions • • • • • • • • • • • All suspensions must commence on Monday morning. Suspensions are calculated in calendar days, not work days. Suspensions should commence within seven calendar days after the enclosed letter is presented to the employee. If there are operational reasons for delaying the suspension, please contact OPR to request an extension. All work days during the period of suspension must be recorded in Web TA as "Suspension." Suspensions may be imposed over a federal holiday. If a suspension is imposed over a federal holiday, the holiday itself must be recorded in the WebTA system as "Suspension." It cannot be recorded in WebTA as 8 hours of pay. No employee can work an alternate work schedule during any portion of a pay period in which a suspension is being served. Before the employee starts a suspension, the Division must e-mail the proposed dates of the suspension to the OPR Unit Chief who signed the proposal letter. OPR will ensure that the suspension conforms to the requirements listed above, in accordance with the requirements of the OIG's 2009 audit, and will advise the Division. Once OPR has approved the suspension start date, the Division must enter the corresponding SF-52 (Request for Personnel Action) into HR Source. For suspensions of 1-14 days, use code "USP" in HR Source. For suspensions of 15 days or more, use code "USR" in HR Source. The employee will thereafter receive an SF-50 (Notification of Personnel Action). Upon the employee's return to duty, the Division must enter an SF-52 in HR Source with the annotation Nature of Action Code 292 (Return to Duty); the Authority Code and Authority, CGM Reg. 335.102; and the effective date of the action. If the Division is unable to enter the employee's return-to-duty SF-52, the Division must contact the HRD Call Center, (202) 324-3333, for guidance. The Division shall enter the following information in HR Source: "Adjudication of disciplinary action." Administrative Issues • • Bureau property in the custody of the employee should be secured and retained until the employee returns to duty. In general, it is not necessary to debrief employees who are being suspended in connection with disciplinary actions. -3- b6 b7C b6 b7C • • If specific security issues arise, the division head or designee should consult with the Division's security officer for a determination as to whether debriefing of the employee's Top Secret clearance and any applicable Sensitive Compartmented Information accesses is warranted. Suspended employees must be reminded of their continuing obligation not to disclose FBI sensitive and classified information, and that failure to abide by FBI rules in this regard may result in disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal. FOR SUSPENSIONS OF 7 DAYS OR MORE: • Furnish the employee with a copy of Standard Form 8, Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation, before he starts the suspension. -4- b6 b7C 1 - SAC, MM (Personal Attention) (Please present the enclosed letter to the employee and advise lvia e-mail, of the date presented.)(Also advisel luc, OPR of date nresented) (See Note, pg. 3) 1 1 1 I 1 .....__~~~~~~~-- ! - AIU, PAT II, P-602 (ATTN: Unit Chief) 1 - ODA (16-050) DGD (7) Note: The EAD, HRB affirmed the one-day suspension imposed by OPR. -5- b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 November 18, 2016 PERSONAL Federal Bureau of Investigation Birmingham, Alabama b6 b7C De~--I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an alle ation that you were responsible for an accidental discharge of your Bureau-issued firearm b in violation of FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge). Base on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. 1 Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. · At the time of the incident, you were on a TDY assignment to the Cyber Divis"""·................._ ... Washington, DC. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on Saturday March 26, 2016, )'.ro_u_an____.d...__,____,,_J returned to your apartment after dinner. You then departed to walk your dogs. use a key to open a small lockbox located under your nightstand in order to return a credit card. The nightstand lockbox contained small valuables including credit cards and passports as well as your Bureau-issued, loaded, and unholstered Glock 22. At the time, you were carrying your personally-owned Glock 27. Asl !attempted to move the Glock 22 she accidentally depressed the trigger, discharging one .40 caliber round into the nightstand. There was no indication the gunshot was heard by neighbors in the apartment complex.I ldid not place the Glock 22 back in the lockbox, but instead placed the weapon in the bottom drawer of the nightstand. When you returned to the apartment approximately 30 minutes later, you foun~ sitting on the balcony, visibly bothered. You did not seek an explanation for her behav...1o_r_an_d_... instead went to bed, placing your Glock 27 in the top drawer of the nightstand. On Sunday March 27, 2016, at approximately 11 :30 a.m., you opened the lockbox and noticed the Glock 22 1 OPR notes that some evidence supports the allegation thatllwas in violation of Offense Code 5.13 (Misuse of Weapon - Safety Violation). However, this allegation is Precrrc'ated on the same misconduct forming the basis of the allegation that he violated Offense Code 5.14. According to the Penalty Guidelines, "OPR will exercise care in assessing multiple penalties where the substantiated charges are essentially restatements of the same act of misconduct." Therefore, OPR will limit its discussion to Offense Code 5.14. b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C b6 b7C I was missmg. You subsequently located the weapon in the bottom drawer of the nightstand. You observed that a round was missing and suspected the weapon had been fired; you then observed a hole in the front of the nightstand, wood fragments on the floor, and located a fired bullet and spent shell casing on the floor. You placed the bullet and casing in a plastic bag. You aske~ !repeatedly if she had taken the Glock 22 out of the lockbox and fired it, but she responded that she had not. You then retrieved your FBI credentials and told lyou were going to the building property manager's office to view video surveillance in order to determine if somebody had entered your apartment and fired the Glock 22. At that pointj confessed to taking the gun out of the lockbox and accidentally firing the weapon mto the nightstand. After ensuring tha~ lwas not injured, but undertaking no additional steps to ensure that neighbors had not been injured, you placed the Glock 22 back in the safe. According to your SSS, you did not believe that you had to report the accidental discharge immediately because you did not shoot the gun, no injuries occurred, no authorities were notified, no one else was involved, and no third-party property was damaged. I On Monday March 28, 2016, you reported to work and attended a mandatory meeting at 9:15 a.m. Afterwards, you began reviewing the Firearms Policy Guide regarding accidental discharges. At approximately 12:00 p.m., you reported the unintentional discharge to your Cyber Division Section Chief who, in turn, notified the Inspection Division. Later that day, you notified your Birmingham Division supervisor, ASAC, and Principal Firearms Instructor. On March 29, 2016, the Washington Field Office (WFO) Evidence Response Team (ERT) processed your apartment and failed to identify any holes indicating the bullet exited the residence. ERT sketched, photographed, and documented the scene and took custody of the bullet and shell casing you had collected. Additionally, ERT took possession of your Glock 22 along with the magazine and ammunition. Upon further inspection and testing, the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) determined that your Glock 22 functioned as designed. On March 29, 2016, the local police department advised that no complaints or reports were received relating to the incident and they considered the matter to be a FBI internal investigation. On May 10, 2016, a Shooting Incident Review Group (SIRG) was convened to review the case. SIRG recommended that you receive remedial firearms training and that you review and comply with Shooting Incident Response Procedures Policy Directives in the future. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5.14, employees are prohibited from "[c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon." The FBI provides policy guidelines in order to assist employees with the means and procedures to properly avoid weapons being unintentionally discharged. The FBI's Firearms Policy Guide (January 8, 2015), Section 4.1.2.3, states: FBI personnel must ensure the security of their issued and approved FBI firearms at all times while the firearms are maintained in their residences. When unattended, FBI firearms must be secured ... to prevent access by unauthorized personnel, regardless of location. 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C -_I_ __ A number of prevention procedures are suggested in the Firearms Policy Guide including field stripping the weapon, installing a FBI-issued Master Lock, or storing the weapon in its own lockbox. None of these procedures were followed. See FBI Firearm Policy Guide (January 8, 2015), Section 4.1.2.3. While you did not pull the trigger in this accidental discharge, the incident would not have occurred in the manner it did had you properly secured your Bureauissued Glock 22. At no time in your SSS did you accept responsibility for your role in the accident. SIRG concluded that you had a duty to follow the agent-involved shooting procedures and that you failed to do so. The Shooting Incident Response Procedures Policy Directive (April 24, 2015), Section 11.4, states: In the event of an agent-involved shooting, the involved FBI employee ... should notify his supervisor immediately[;] ... notify local law enforcement if either required by law, the location of the agent-involved shooting is in proximity to residential ... premises, or the circumstances indicate the potential for public alarm[; and] ... secure and leave the accidental discharge scene undisturbed, to the extent practicable, until the arrival of ERT and supervisory personnel. 2 Though the accidental discharge occurred whilel jwas handling the weapon, you were responsible for properly securing your service weapon and making proper notifications and you failed to do so. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation you violated Offense Code 5 .14 is substantiated. b6 b7C PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. Guidelines do not include a mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a three- to 14-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. In mitigation, you havel lof FBI service, a positive performance record, the full confidence of your Division, and no prior disciplinary actions. However, especially given your position on SWAT and as a firearms instructor, you should have been keenly aware of the procedures for carrying and safely securing your weapon in order to "prevent access by unauthorized personnel." In this case, you allowed unauthorized personnel, namely...-----.Ito have access to the weapon. Furthermore, you did not act in accordance with proper reportmg procedures after learning of the accidental discharge and, contrary to policy, also began collecting the evidence at the scene yourself. The procedures for dealing with shooting incidents are clear: notify a supervisor immediately, notify local law enforcement, and secure and leave the scene undisturbed. ! 2 As the shooting occurred in a private apartment within a residential complex, you had a duty to report due to the apartment's location and the potential for harm to and alarm from your neighbors. Additionally, you should have secured the scene and left the evidence undisturbed. 3 b6 b7c ·1 b6 b7C . Your autonomous decision not to report the unintentional discr;:e of yoj Bureauissued weapon would be considered improper for an average SA with of experience, much less a SWAT operator and certified firearms instructor. In fact, urmg your TDY, you served as an instructor at the Headquarters firearms range. Based on the circumstances of this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day for your 5.14 offense. 3 CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 4 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD's Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you ar~ appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard of review on appeal in examining OPR's f;:ictual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. 3 OPR would be justified in aggravating the penalty under these circumstances. 4 You are adnionished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (US), OPR, the Human Resources Division's Appellate Unit (APU), the Security Division, the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from US, OPR, or APU. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 4 b6 b7c b6 b7C Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0235D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, I IChief Adjudication Unit II Office of Professional Responsibility 5 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 December 16, 2016 PERSONAL b6 b7C Federal Bureau of Investigation Detroit, Michigan Demi.__ _ ____. I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged a firearm, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. DISCUSSION On Thursday, February 4, 2016, you and five other Agents participated in firearms qualifications at the local college indoor range. The range training began at approximately 9:00 a.m. and was supervised by three FBI-certified firearms instructors. You were using your FBIissued .40 caliber, Glock Model 22 . .As a right hand dominant shooter, you had your weapon holstered on your right side. Instructors required each Agent to wear an outer garment to conceal their pistols. You were wearing an unzipped, North Face brand vest. Following an initial training, Agents participated in the first FBI pistol qualification course (PQC) without incident. Agents then reloaded their firearms in preparation for another PQC. In this PQC, Agents began with their weapons in a holstered position and were given three seconds to shoot three one-handed shots from a distance of three yards. During the first course of fire, in the process of drawing your pistol, you accidently discharged your weapon and shot yourself, causing injury to your right foot and leg. As you stated in your signed sworn statement (SSS): As the targets turned, I had trouble drawing my pistol; it was not a clean draw. I am not at all sure what exactly happened, during the draw of my weapon, I just know that it was not a normal draw. Almost immediately I felt a burning sensation in my right foot. I looked down and saw upon the floor a spent bullet. b6 b7C Witnesses described seeing a muzzle flash and recoil from your gun as you attempted to draw your weapon from your holster, followed nearly simultaneously by your body experiencing a "slight jolt." You then calmly placed your weapon on the bench in your firing lane, stepped back, and turned away from your firing lane. You then notified instructors that you had shot yourself. Witnesses saw blood on your right leg and it was determined that you shot yourself in the upper right thigh and the right foot. You were immediately seated and first aid was administered. A 911 call was placed by one of the witnesses on the scene and paramedics arrived soon thereafter. You were transported to a local hospital. You made a full recovery. Following the shooting incident, your weapon was tested and determined to be functioning normally. One spent round was located and your holster had a bullet hole in it. The investigation documented your account of the accidental discharge, which was consistent with the witness statements, range surveillance footage, and Evidence Response Team processing of the scene. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5.14, employees are prohibited from "[c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a ~eapon." In this case, you accidentally discharged your Bureau-issued Glock Model 22 causing injury to your right leg and foot while participating in firearms qualifications. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude you violated Offense Code 5.14 when you accidentally discharged the weapon. PENAL TY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5.14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. Offense Code 5 .14 does not include a mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a three to fourteen-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. In mitigation, you have a positive performance record during yourl lwith the Bureau, you have completed remedial firearms training, and your Division has full confidence in your abilities. In aggravation, you have a prior substantiated disciplinary case. Based on the circumstances in this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day for your 5.14 offense. CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 1 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD's Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard of review on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or QPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0235D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for. additional details pertaining to appeals. REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. 1 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (IIS), OPR, the Human Resources Division's Appellate Unit (APU), the Security Division, the FBl's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from lIS, OPR, or APU. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 3 b6 b7C Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, IAdJud1cat10n OmtIchief II Office of Professional Responsibility 4 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 January 04, 2017 PERSONAL Federal Bureau of Investigation Albuquerque, New Mexico b6 b7C Dea~.__ _ __. I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you, while "dry firing" your weapon in your residence, failed to perform a proper safety check on your Bureau-issued Glock 17 and accidentally discharged one round, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day, and ordering you to attend remedial firearms training. DISCUSSION On the morning of May 20, 2016, you were in the laundry room of your personal residence while preparing your Bureau-issued Glock 17 for the shooting range. After you cleaned and oiled your weapon, you reloaded it, with one round in the chamber, and secured the weapon in a holster. You then took your Bureau-approved personally owned weapon, a Glock 26, and began to dry fire the weapon. After you were finished dry firing the Glock 26, you holstered the weapon and set it aside. You then picked up your holstered Glock 17 and placed it on your belt and proceeded to dry fire the weapon. Forgetting that the weapon was loaded, you drew the Glock 17 from your holster, aimed it at the laundry room door, pulled the trigger, and discharged a live round through the door. There were no injuries and minimal property damage. You immediately contacted the Principal Firearms Instructor. You then informed your supervisor and ASAC about the accidental discharge. Local police arrived, but did not make a report and were unable to locate the discharged round. Later, the Evidence Response Team arrived, processed the scene, but was also unable to locate the round. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5.14, employees are prohibited from "[c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon." You failed to take adequate safety precautions while dry ·_1_ __ b6 b7C firing your Bureau-issued weapon, resulting in an accidental discharge. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, including your own admission, I conclude the allegation that you violated Offense Code 5.14 is substantiated. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. Offense Code 5.14 does not include a mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a three- to fourteen-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. Based on the circumstances of this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day, and ordering you to attend remedial firearms training, for your 5 .14 offense. CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day, and ordering you to attend remedial firearms training. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 1 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD's Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the QPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar 1 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (IIS), OPR, the Human Resources Division's Appellate Unit (APU), the Security Division, the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from IIS, OPR, or APU. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 2 b6 b7C days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard of review on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors thatrequire additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0235D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, .......,....,,.,........,,.,.....--.....--,,..........,.....,,.......1 Chief Adjudication Unit I Office of Professional Responsibility 3 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 PERSONAL b6 b7C Federal Bureau of Investigation Salt Lake City, Utah Dea~.__ _ _____. I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged a round from your Bureau-issued pistol, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for 1 calendar day. DISCUSSION · On March 11, 2016, you were cleaning your gun in the gun cleaning room at the Salt Lake City Field Office at approximately 4:00 pm. The gun was your Bureau-issued, .40 caliber, Glock 22 pistol. 1 You cleared your weapon at a gun clearing barrel and disassembled it on a table. You cleaned it, reassembled it, inserted a loaded magazine and charged the weapon. After it was assembled, you noticed oil dripping down the trigger. You first tried to wipe it off with a gun barrel cleaning patch, but decided to disassemble it and remove the excess oil. 2 During disassembly, you pressed the trigger3 and a round discharged. The round struck a yellow container on top of the table and then a cinder block wall behind the table. A nearby file cabinet was struck by bullet fragments and sustained minimal damage. No one was irtjured and no one else was in the room with you at the time. The entire incident was recorded by a security camera. 4 You located your Division's Principal Firearms Instructor (PFI) and your supervisor to advised them what had occurred. I Serial numbe~ The Firearms Traming Unit advises during New Agent Training on the proper lubrication of the Glock pistol: "The weapon is designed to vent debris away and requires a minimal amount of lubrication ... If the weapon has more than a light film of lubricant when you are done, wipe off the excess." 3 The trigger must be pressed in order to disassemble a Glock pistol. 4 The video was not contained in the file. 1 2 b6 b7C b7E b6 b7C - _ I- - - - You advised you were shocked when your weapon discharged a round and were not immediately sure what had happened. In your signed sworn statement (SSS), you advised, "[m]y recollection of the exact sequence of events immediately preceding the accidental discharge is not entirely clear," and, "I do not recall pulling the trigger ... though given the events, it is clear the trigger was pulled." Regarding your frame of mind that day, you said: As I originally began and continued through the initial process of disassembling, cleaning and reassembling the weapon, my mind was occupied with other thoughts, such as tasks I needed to accomplish after this work week in preparation for operational activities to occur the following week. Likewise, it was late on a Friday during a week in which I had been traveling. In addition to being preoccupied in my thoughts, I was fatigued. Your pistol was examined by the Defensive Systems Unit and determined to have been functioning correctly. Salt Lake City's PFI provided you with remedial firearms training including a review of weapon safety protocols. You were current on your firearms qualification at the time of the incident. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5.14, employees are prohibited from "[c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon." In this case, you unintentionally discharged a round from your Bureau-issued Glock 22 while disassembling it for cleaning while in the gun cleaning room at the Salt Lake City Field Office. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation that you violated Offense Code 5 .14 is substantiated. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a 1-day suspension. There is no mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a 3- to 14-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. In mitigation, you were fatigued and your mind was occupied with other work-related tasks you needed to perform. 5 I note there is no mitigated range for an accidental discharge. Based on the circumstances of this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for 1 calendar day for your 5 .14 offense. 5 It is noted that agents are expected to handle weapons safely in many challenging conditions, including while fatigued and when multi-tasking. These are listed as mitigators here for the purposes of recognizing the unsafe handling of a weapon was out-of-character for you. 2 b6 b7C ·.___I_ _ ____. CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for 1 calendar day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 6 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD's Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard of review on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0235D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. 6 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (IIS), OPR, the Human Resources Branch's Office of Disciplinary Appeals (ODA), the Security Division, the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from !IS, OPR, or ODA. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 3 b6 b7C ._I_ _ ____. REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, . . . ,_. ,.,. . .,.,. . -. . ,. .-. . , ,_. . ,. . ., . . I. Chief Adjudication Unit I Office of Professional Responsibility Enclosures 4 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-000 I February 24, 2017 PERSONAL b6 b7C Federal Bureau of Investigation New Haven, Connecticut Dea~.__ _ ____, I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged one round from your Bureau-issued Glock 17 pistol, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. DISCUSSION On June 7, 2016 at approximately 5:00 a.m., you participated in a SWAT operation to execute search and arrest warrants. The operation invo~ved personnel from the Bureau, the local Police Department, and a Statewide Narcotics Task Force. You were present for the briefing on June 6, 2016 and were fully aware of your responsibilities in the joint operation. As you entered the premises in full tactical gear, including flame-resistant gloves, you were carrying a ballistic shield, weighing approximately 20-25 pounds, in your left hand and your Bureau-issued Glock 17 9mm handgun in your right hand. As you entered a dark room, you activated the light on your ballistic shield by squeezing the handle with your left hand. At the same time, you attempted to activate the light attached to your Glock 17 handgun by pressing down with your right index finger on the toggle located just in front of the trigger. As you pressed downward, your finger came off the toggle and depressed the trigger, causing an accidental discharge. The round discharged in to a door jamb on the scene, but no individuals were injured. The only person in the vicinity at the time of the accidental discharge was SWAT Team Leader (STL) #1. Immediately following the incident, you notified STL #1 of the accidental discharge and confirmed that the shot was not fired by any of the subjects of the operation. After the operation was successfully concluded, at approximately 5:15 a.m., STL #1 notified the Chief Division Counsel (CDC) of the accidental discharge. 1 The on-scene FBI 1 The Acting ASAC of the Division, Inspection Division, and the on-scene local Police Department officers were also notified. b6 b7C ·I_______ search team photographed the discharge site, the weapon, and the interior doorway of the arrest warrant subject's residence that was damaged by the round and recovered the discharged round from the door jamb. The team at the scene was led by an Emergency Response Team (ERT) member. 2 STL #1 then took possession of your Glock 17 handgun and three magazines. After conducting an examination of the weapon, STL # 1 noted that there were 17 rounds in the magazine and one round in the chamber. In your signed sworn statement (SSS), you advised that you loaded your Glock 17 with 18 rounds in the magazine and one round in the chamber prior to the operation. 3 STL #1 provided you with a replacement Glock 17 9mm handgun and magazines and shipped the handgun used in the accidental discharge to the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) for analysis. DSU tested the weapon on June 17, 2016 and determined the weapon operated as designed. In your SSS, you estimated that you practiced operating the light attachment configuration on your Glock 17 handgun at the firing range approximately five to ten times. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5.14, employees are prohibited from"[ c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon." You accidentally discharged your weapon in to a door jamb while executing a warrant. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude you violated Offense Code 5.14. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. This offense does not include a mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a three- to 14-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI' s Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. You have accepted full responsibility for the accidental discharge and have been completely forthright with the details of the incident. Your Division stated that you are wellrespected, productive, and dependable, and reiterated that you received an "Excellent" rating in your last four PARs. However, the incident could have resulted in serious injury to yourself, other law enforcement, or a member of the public. Additionally, you did not act in accordance with FBI Firearms Policy Guide when you failed to fully load your pistol at the beginning of the 2 The ERT did not report to and analyze the scene due to security concerns regarding the neighborhood and the amount of time it would take to respond. 3 The standard, SWAT-issue Glock 17 magazine holds 19 rounds; a fully-loaded handgun would hold a total of20 rounds, 19 in the magazine and one in the chamber. According to FBI Firearms Policy Guide (0741 DPG), Section 4.1.1: "When armed, SAs must have their pistols fully loaded and secured on their persons." I note that you were not acting fully in accordance with the Firearms Policy Guide at the outset of the operation, but will address the issue in the Penalty Determination. 2 b6 b7C operation. Based on the circumstances of this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day for your 5 .14 offense. CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 4 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRB's Office of Disciplinary Appeals at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen ( 14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard of review on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0235D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. 4 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (IIS), OPR, the Human Resources Branch's Office of Disciplinary Appeals (ODA), the Security Division, the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from IIS, OPR, or ODA. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 3 b6 b7C ·_I_ ____. REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, .________IChief Adjudication Unit II Office of Professional Responsibility Enclosures 4 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 April 20, 2017 PERSONAL b6 b7C Federal Bureau oflnvestigation Richmond, Virginia I ______, Dear .... I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged one round while cleaning your Bureau-approved POW following firearms training, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5.14 (Misuse of Weapon-Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one day. DISCUSSION On July 15, 2016, you participated in a quarterly firearms training with your co-workers. You were attempting to qualify with your Bureau-approved POW, a Glock 27, and the weapon reportedly malfunctioned three times while on the firing range that day. After being released from your firearms training, you reloaded your weapon and you initially intended to depart for the day; however, you changed your mind and decided to clean the weapon before leaving the range. After going to the firearms cleaning area, you laid out your supplies, removing the magazine from your POW and placing it on a table. Being aware that one round still remained in the chamber of your weapon, you pulled back the slide with your left hand to eject the remaining round. Sometime during this process the gun accidentally discharged. You had no recollection of pressing the trigger on the weapon, but in your signed-sworn statement (SSS) you acknowledged that it was possible you "over-rode the slide lock when [you] pulled back the slide of the weapon, which could have caused the firing pin to come forward." 1 Although other agents were in the general area, no one was injured nor did they directly observe your accidental discharge as they were all looking away at the time. The expelled round penetrated a rubber mat on the cleaning table and was located underneath. 1 The unit that subsequently investigated the incident maintained that the gun would only have fired if the trigger was pulled. b6 b7C The incident was promptly reported to your Management and the Inspection Division. A member of your Division's ERT was delegated to process the scene and collect your weapon, the empty magazine, four service rounds from the magazine, and the spent round and shell casing. The weapon was then submitted to the Bureau's firearms review unit for a serviceability inspection. On July 28, 2016, that entity concluded your firearm was functioning properly. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5 .14, employees are prohibited from "[ c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon.,, Although you could not specifically recall touching the trigger when you pulled back the slide lock to eject the remaining round; nevertheless, you recognized that an accidental discharge had occurred. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation that you violated Offense Code 5.14 is substantiated. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. The Penalty Guidelines do not contain a mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a three- to 14-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. I have considered all relevant mitigating factors, including, but not limited to, your many awards, your favorable P ARs, and the confidence your Division expresses for your work. Notwithstanding, you should have been more cautious in disassembling and unloading your weapon in the gun cleaning area. Additionally, you are a supervisor and expected to set a positive example. Based on the circumstances in this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one day for your 5.14 offense. CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 2 2 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (IIS), OPR, the Human Resources Branch's Office of Disciplinary Appeals (ODA), the Security Division, the FBI's Employee Assistance Program, the FBI's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from IIS, OPR, or ODA. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with 2 b6 b7C . _ I- - - - APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRB's Office of Disciplinary Appeals at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen ( 14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard ofreview on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by QPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0915D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 3 b6 b7C REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, ,_________.I Chief Adjudication Unit II Office of Professional Responsibility Enclosures 4 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 April 25, 2017 PERSONAL b6 b7C Federal Bureau oflnvestigation Buffalo, New York Dea~...._ _ _.... I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged one round from your Bureau-issued pistol, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5.14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. DISCUSSION On September 30, 2016, you shot a pistol qualification course under the supervision of Firearms Instructor Special Agent (SA) #1 at the Local Police Department's (LPD) range. You arrived at the range at approximately 11:30 a.m. and ran one course of fire on your FBI-issued Glock 22 firearm, which shoots a .40 caliber round. When SA #1 advised the course of fire was complete, you dropped the magazine from your gun. You holstered what you believed was an empty weapon. SA #1 conducted a safety check after the pistol qualification course, but it was later determined that the safety check was not conducted properly. You decided to return to Resident Agency (RA) #1 to clean your weapon because you did not want to take more of SA #1 's time. You arrived at RA #1 's gun cleaning room at approximately 12:15 p.m. You were alone in the room, confirmed there was no magazine in your firearm, and unholstered what you believed was your empty weapon. You pointed the weapon at a point where the wall met the floor, which you considered to be a safe direction. You pulled the trigger because it was necessary to remove the slide from the Glock 22 and disassemble the weapon for cleaning. A single round discharged from the gun. You immediately looked down and observed an impact mark on the floor. You noticed the round did not penetrate the floor. Upon hearing the gunshot, SA #1 and SA #2 entered the gun cleaning room and confirmed that you were alone and uninjured. You found the shell casing and placed it on a b6 b7C storage shelf. You, SA #1, and SA #2 began trying to determine where the round went. SA #1 and you left the gun cleaning room to be sure no one was injured outside the room. The two of you did not see anyone in the vicinity and ultimately determined no one was injured. You did not find any bullet exit marks outside the room. SA #1 and you re-entered the gun cleaning room and continued searching for the round. SA #2 removed small bullet fragments from a ceiling tile and handed them to you. You then observed where the round hit the wall above the cleaning station. Knowing where the bullet entered and the location of the hole, you, SA # 1, and SA #2 left the gun cleaning room again to see if the round exited the room. The three of you found no indications the round exited the room. You then informed Supervisory Special Resident Agent (SSRA) #1 about the accidental discharge and called Principal Firearms Instructor (PFI) #1 to notify him of the incident. At 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, two Team #1 members processed the scene. Team #1 determined the round hit the floor and ricocheted into the wall above the gun cleaning station and did not exit the gun cleaning room. On November 9, 2016, Team #1 personnel removed a piece of drywall and recovered the projectile, which had fallen behind the drywall. After inspection and testing, it was determined that your Glock 22 functioned as designed with no noted issues. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon - Accidental Discharge), employees are prohibited from "[ c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon." You accidentally discharged your Bureau-issued weapon while attempting to clean it in RA # 1's gun cleaning room. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation that you violated Offense Code 5 .14 is substantiated. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5.14 (Misuse of WeaponAccidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. Offense Code 5.14 does not include a mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a three to fourteen-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. In mitigation, you havellof FBI service with a positive performance record. You have won numerous awards an~minated for a Director's A ward. The Division stated that you are dependable, well-respected, and held in high regard throughout the FBI and United States Attorney's Office. Your supervisor has complete confidence in your ability to perform assigned duties. Based on the circumstances in this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day for your 5 .14 offense. 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 1 APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRB' s Office of Disciplinary Appeals at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you.are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard of review on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 0915D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. 1 You are admonished not to discuss this matter with anyone other than the Inspection Division's Internal Investigations Section (llS), OPR, the Human Resources Branch's Office of Disciplinary Appeals (ODA), the Security Division, the FBl's Employee Assistance Program, the FBl's Ombudsman, or an attorney who has signed the appropriate Nondisclosure Agreement. Neither you, your attorney, nor anyone acting on your behalf should contact any witness or potential witness about this inquiry without first obtaining approval from llS, OPR, or ODA. In addition, you are admonished that any redacted materials or other FBI documents you review in connection with this inquiry are the property of the FBI, and you are prohibited from photocopying or removing such documents from FBI space. You may take notes concerning the content of such material, but those notes may be used only to facilitate your participation in this disciplinary inquiry and for no other purpose. 3 b6 b7C REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, ...___ _ _ ___.I chief Adjudication Unit II Office of Professional Responsibility Enclosures 4 b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535-0001 July 25, 2017 PERSONAL Federal Bureau of Investigation Denver, Colorado b6 b7C Dea~.__ ____, I have completed my review of an administrative inquiry regarding an allegation that you accidentally discharged your Bureau-issued weapon, in violation of FBI Offense Code 5.14 (Misuse of Weapon -Accidental Discharge). Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude the allegation is substantiated. Based on the circumstances of this case, and considering the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. DISCUSSION On the morning of January 30, 2017, you arrived at a Law Enforcement Training Facility in Littleton, Colorado, to participate in a Defensive Tactics/ Combatives session. You parked your Bureau-issued Ford Expedition in the parking lot of the facility. At approximately 8:20 a.m., the training instructor instructed all trainee personnel, including you, to bring their long guns, unloaded with bolt removed, into the classroom. Standing at the rear of your vehicle, you unlocked you secure lock box and retrieved your Bureau-issued Colt M4Al carbine. You thought you removed the magazine, and then proceeded to push the take-down pin while pointing the gun down towards the bumper of your vehicle. When the pin did not release, you disengaged the safety and depressed the trigger. One round was discharged. The bullet penetrated the car's rear bumper and struck the pavement below. You realized you had not removed the magazine and then proceeded to do so. Then you cleared the next round from the chamber and locked the bolt. No one was injured by the discharge. Two Special Agents (SA) witnessed the event. SA #1 walked over to you while you. were picking up the spent shell casing from the pavement, and he observed the bullet hole in the rear bumper. At that time, you assured SA #1 that everything was okay. You advised that you would have to report the incident. Once the weapon was secure, you attempted to call your Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and then called your Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) to report the accidental b6 b7C I._____ ____. discharge. At approximately 10:35 a.m., two others SAs arrived at the training facility to process the scene. Then, another SSA collected your Colt M4Al Carbine for the Defensive Systems Unit (DSU) to perform a Weapon Serviceability Inspection. The DSU inspection revealed that an Accu-Wedge had been installed, which was not authorized. Furthermore, it was installed incorrectly. The inspection determined that the unauthorized Accu-Wedge was unrelated to the accidental discharge; it did not affect the gun's functionality or safety. You advised that you did not install the Accu-Wedge and had no knowledge of its presence in your weapon. ANALYSIS According to FBI Offense Code 5.14, employees are prohibited from "[c]ausing the unintentional discharge of a weapon." You accidentally discharged your firearm while attempting to release the take-down pin. The bullet damaged the rear bumper of your Bureau vehicle. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, I conclude you violated Offense Code 5.14 when you unintentionally discharged the weapon. PENALTY DETERMINATION The investigation establishes you violated FBI Offense Code 5 .14 (Misuse of Weapon Accidental Discharge). The standard penalty is a one-day suspension. Offense Code 5.14 does not include a mitigated range. Aggravating factors warrant a three to fourteen-day suspension. When determining an appropriate penalty, I considered the 12 Douglas Factors, including, but not limited to, consistency with precedent, the FBI's Penalty Guidelines, prior disciplinary history, and aggravating/mitigating factors. In mitigation, you have a positive performance record and almostllof service with the Bureau. You have received numerous awards and "Excellent" review~r last four PARs. The Division advises that you are well regarded by your co-workers, noting: "[He] is viewed as the consummate professional. [He] has a reliable work ethic and is genuine in his commitment to the FBI mission." The Division also remarked that, given your exemplary safety record, this accident was atypical. In aggravation, you caused damage to your Bureau vehicle, and you serve as the Division's Principal Firearms Instructor and as a SWAT Senior Team Leader. Based on the circumstances in this case, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day for your 5 .14 offense. CONCLUSION In sum, I am suspending you from duty, without pay, for one calendar day. The FBI must hold employees accountable for violations of its standards of conduct, rules, regulations, and policies. This disciplinary penalty is intended to convey the seriousness with which the FBI views your actions. Progressive discipline is applied, where appropriate. Thus, you can expect to receive a more severe disciplinary penalty in the future for a similar disciplinary offense. 2 b6 b7C b6 b7C · _ I_ __ APPEAL RIGHTS If you wish to appeal, within ten (10) calendar days following notification of OPR's final decision, you must forward a brief statement that you intend to appeal to the Executive Assistant Director, Human Resources Branch, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, J. Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001. You may also fax your notice of appeal to HRD's Appellate Unit at 202-324-9312. You will then be provided an opportunity to review the file and submit a brief based on a deadline set by HRB. Your division head must be notified at the time you file an appeal. If an appeal is filed for any action other than a dismissal, the OPR disciplinary penalty will be held in abeyance pending the appellate decision. If you are appealing a suspension of fourteen (14) calendar days or less, the EAD, HRB, will decide the appeal. If you are appealing a suspension of more than fourteen (14) calendar days, demotion, or dismissal, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) will decide the appeal. The standard ofreview on appeal in examining OPR's factual findings and penalty is the substantial evidence standard of review. The penalty set by OPR cannot be increased on appeal by either the EAD, HRB, or the DRB. In the rare instance that the EAD, HRB, or the DRB identifies factors that require additional investigation and/or adjudication, the case will be remanded to the Inspection Division and/or OPR for additional action. Should you wish to retain an attorney to assist you in your appeal, you must ensure that the enclosed forms are completed prior to disclosing any Bureau information to the attorney handling your appeal. If you and the attorney who will assist you have already completed and provided these disclosure forms to the Bureau in connection with this case, you do not have to re-submit them. You are referred to Corporate Policy Directive 09 l 5D (Disciplinary Appeals Process) for additional details pertaining to appeals. REFERRAL TO OTHER DIVISIONS In accordance with established policy, the results of this administrative inquiry will be shared with other divisions, as appropriate. Thus, a copy of this communication is being provided to the Security Division as it may be relevant to your retention of a Top Secret security clearance. Information regarding this inquiry will also be provided to the Special Agent MidLevel Management Selection Board and/or the Director for their consideration on any future promotion or other action requiring their recommendation. Sincerely yours, .....__ _ _ _ _.....lchief Adjudication Unit I Office of Professional Responsibility Enclosures 3 b6 b7C