UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 18.6.12.6 §18 (U) STANDARDS FOR USE AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS RETRIEVAL OF DISCARDED OR ABANDONED PROPERTY, ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES OF LOST OR MISPLACED PROPERTY AND INVENTORY SEARCHES GENERALLY I 18-162 UNCLASSIFIED-r!Olt OFFICIAL OSE ONLS' Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USfi'. ONLS' Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY b6 b7C Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 18.6.13 (U) INVESTIGATIVE METHOD: UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS 18.6.13.1 (U/f!:""'8:,1"8' I (U) SUMMARY I b7E (U//FOUO) Undercover operations must be conducted in conformity with The Attorney General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau ofInvestigation Undercover Operations (AGG­ UCO) in investigations relating to activities in violation of federal criminal law that do not concern threats to the national security or foreign intelligence. In investigations that concern threats to the national security or foreign intelligence, undercover operations involving religious or political organizations must be reviewed and approved by FBI Headquarters, with participation by the NSD in the review process. (AGG-Dom, Part V.A.7) Other undercover operations involving threats to the national security or foreign intelligence are reviewed and approved pursuant to FBI policy as described herein. I O 11/POI /lJI Annlicatianl 18.6.13.2 b7E (U) LEGAL AUTHORITY A) (U) AGG-Dom, Part V.A.7 B) (U) AGG-UCO 18.6.13.3 A) (U) DEFINITION OF INVESTIGATIVE METHOD I (U//Fe-Be) Undercover Activitv.l B) U//�)I C) (U/lmtff)) Undercover Operation: I b7E I I I I 18-163 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 b7E 18.6.13.3.1 (U) DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSITIVE CIRCUMSTANCE AND SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER U//r8tr8,I b7E USOPG and for national security matters in the NSUCOPG. in the AGG-UCO and the I The detailed policy for undercover operations is described in this section of . . the DIOG, the USOPG, the NSUCOPG, and the FBIHQ operat10nal d1v1s10n PGs. 18.6.13.4 (U/fFOUO) STANDARDS FOR USE AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE METHOD 18.6.13.4.1 (U) STANDARDS FOR USE OF INVESTIGATIVE METHOD (U//FOUO) An official considering approval or authorization of a proposed undercover application must weigh the risks and benefits of the operation, giving careful consideration to the following: A) (U//�) The risks of personal injury to individuals, property damage, financial loss to persons or business, damage to reputation, or other harm to persons; B) (U//ffl-f:fE>) The risk of civil liability or other loss to the government; C) (U//J;iO.fJO) The risk of invasion of privacy or interference with privileged or confidential relationships and any potential constitutional concerns or other legal concerns; D) (U//FOUO) The risk that individuals engaged in undercover operations may become involved in illegal conduct; and E) (U//mtj\j) The suitability of government participation in the type of activity that is expected to occur during the operation. See AGG-UCO, Part IV.A. 18-164 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR Ofifi'ICIAL OSE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 b7E F) (U//fiffiE>i I 18.6.13.4.2 (U//ttOUO) APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UCOS (INVESTIGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW THAT DO NOT CONCERN THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY OR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE) b7E (U/ff-OUO)I A) (U//FOUO)! B) I I I C) (U//r'OU011 I D1 I I E) (U//Fe-BQ)I F) (U//f"ffl:ff:)) I I I I H) (U/Jro� 18-165 UNCLASSIFIED fi'Ott Ofi'fi'ICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - fi'Oft O'F''F'tCIAL U�t! Ot�tY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 b7E I) (U//FOUO)! I 18.6.13.4.3 b7E (U/fFOUQ.)APPR0VALREQUIREMENTS FOR UCOS A) (U/!FOUt))I I B) (U//FOUOI U/ff>OUO ______ ________ f the matter involves religious or political ..,..... orgamzatlons, t e review must me u ___. e participation by a representative of the DOJ NSD. See AGG-Dom, Section V; an� I D) (U//FOUO) ....__..,..... E) (U//flOUO) 18.6.13.5 CU,'./FOuoj (Uj pIA IN UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS .________ b7E B) (U)! ) C f-l-------------------------_..----' D) (U 47 (U)I 18-166 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL OSE ONLr Dom estic In vestigations an d O perations Gu ide §18 E) (U) b7E F) (U1 (U I ) G)(U)I I U//reBQ ,I 18.6.13.6 (U 'FOUO)I // 18.6.13.7 I (U) DURATION OF APPROVAL b7E (U) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE A)(U//FOUff, B) crn/-Foue)I I C) (U/J'FOU0-)1 18.6.13.8 I( // (U) COMPLIANCE AND MONITORING, AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ! _________________.�sin g the All UCOs....mu p_rov_ i_ de_ _ a_n.... _ t_ __ _ s )ap propriat� to fi'ej -.... ------------ UNCLASSIFIED- 'FOK OFFICIAL USE 0�.fLY 18-167 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED-POK OPFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL OSE ONLr Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 18.7 §18 (U) AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE METHODS IN FULL INVESTIGATIONS (U) See AGG-Dom, Part V.A.11-13. (U) In Full Investigations, to include Enterprise Investigations, the authorized investigative methods include: A) (U) The investigative methods authorized for Assessments. 1) (U) Public information. (See Section] 8.5.1) 2) (U) Records or information - FBI and DOJ. (See Section 18S2) 3) (U) Records or information - Other federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign government agency. (See Section 1_8.5.3) 4) (U) On-line services and resources. (See Section 18.5.4) 5) (U) CHS use and recruitment. (See Section 18.5.5) 6) (U) Interview or request information from the public or private entities. (See Section 18.5.6) 7) (U) Information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities. (See Section 18.5.7) 8) (U) Physical Surveillance (not requiring a court order). (See Section 18.5.8) B) (U) The investigative methods authorized for Preliminary Investigations. 1) (U) Consensual monitoring of communications, including electronic communications. (See Section 18.6.1) 2) (U) Intercepting the communications of a computer trespasser. (See Section 18.6.2) 3) (U) Closed-circuit television/video surveillance, direction finders, and other monitoring devices. (See Section 18.6.3) 4) (U) Administrative subpoenas. (See Section _18.6A) 5) (U) Grand jury subpoenas. (See Section 18.6.5) 6) (U) National Security Letters. (See Section 18J:i.6) 7) (U) FISA Order for business records. (See Section 18.6.7) 8) (U) Stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records. (See Section 18.6.8)48 9) (U) Pen registers and trap/trace devices. (See Section 18.6.9) 10) (U) Mail covers. (See Section 18.6.10) 11) (U) Polygraph examinations. (See Section _18.6.1_1) 12) (U) Trash Covers (Searches that do not require a warrant or court order). (See Section 18.6.12) 13) (U) Undercover operations. (See Section 18.6.13) 48 (U/jrffife) The use of Search Warrants to obtain this information in Preliminary Investigations is prohibited. (See DIOG Section 18.6.8.4.2.3) UNCLASSIFIED 18-168 POR OPPICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFFICIAL us� ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 C) (U) Searches - with a warrant or court order (reasonable expectation of privacy). (See Section 18.7.l below) D) (U) Electronic surveillance - Title III. (See Section 1_8.7.2 below) E) (U) Electronic surveillance - FISA and FISA Title VII (acquisition of foreign intelligence information). (See Section 18.7.3 below) (U//FSYf)) Not all investigative methods are authorized while collecting foreign intelligence as part of a Full Investigation. See DIOG Section 9 for more information. 18-169 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICll,L U�B OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE Of�tY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED POR OPPICIAL USE O�lLY UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL OSE ONLr Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 18.7.1 §18 (U) INVESTIGATIVE METHOD: SEARCHES- WITH A WARRANT OR COURT ORDER (REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY) (U) See AGG-Dom, Part V.A.12 and the Attorney General's Guidelines On Methods Of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held By Third Parties, Pursuant to Title II, Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-440, Sec. 201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-l 1, et seq.). 18.7.1.1 (U) SUMMARY (U) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution governs all searches and seizures by government agents. The Fourth Amendment contains two clauses. The first establishes the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The second provides that no warrant (authorizing a search or seizure) will be issued unless based on probable cause. Although an unlawful search may not preclude a prosecution, it can have serious consequences for the government. These include adverse publicity, civil liability against the employee or the government and the suppression of evidence from the illegal seizure. b7E (U\1f:OUO) Application: (U) A search is a government invasion of a person's privacy. To qualify as reasonable expectation of privacy, the individual must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy and society must be prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361. The ability to conduct a physical search in an area or situation where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy requires a warrant or order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or an exception to the requirement for such a warrant or order. The warrant or order must be based on probable cause. The United States Supreme Court defines probable cause to search as a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). A government agent may conduct a search without a warrant based on an individual's voluntary consent. A search based on exigent circumstances may also be conducted without a warrant, but the requirement for probable cause remains. (U//FOUO) There are special rules that must be followed prior to obtaining a search warrant that might intrude upon professional, confidential relationships. 18.7.1.2 (U) LEGAL AUTHORITY (U) Searches conducted by the FBI must be in conformity with FRCP Rule 41; PISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829; or E.O. 12333 § 2.5. 18-170 UNCLASSIFIED -FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 18.7.1.3 §18 (U) DEFINITION OF INVESTIGATIVE METHOD (U) Physical Search defined: A physical search constitutes any physical intrusion within the United States into premises or property (including examination of the interior of property by technical means) that is intended to result in the seizure, reproduction, inspection, or alteration of information, material, or property, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. (U) A physical search requiring a warrant does not include: (i) electronic surveillance as defined in PISA or Title III; or (ii) the acquisition by the United States Government of foreign intelligence information from international foreign communications, or foreign intelligence activities conducted according to otherwise applicable federal law involving a foreign electronic communications system, using a means other than electronic surveillance as defined in PISA. 18.7.1.3.1 (U) REQUIREMENT FOR REASONABLENESS (U) By the terms of the Fourth Amendment, a search must be reasonable at its inception and reasonable in its execution.I 18.7.1.3.2 (U) REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY (U) The right of privacy is a personal right, not a property concept. It safeguards whatever an individual reasonably expects to be private. The protection normally includes persons, residences, vehicles, other personal property, private conversations, private papers and records. The Supreme Court has determined that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in certain areas or information. As a result, government intrusions into those areas do not constitute a search and, thus, do not have to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. These areas include: (i) open fields; (ii) prison cells; (iii) public access areas; and (iv) vehicle identification numbers. The Supreme Court has also determined that certain governmental practices do not involve an intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy and, therefore, do not amount to a search. These practices include: (i) aerial surveillance conducted from navigable airspace; (ii) field test of suspected controlled substance; and (iii) odor detection. A reasonable expectation of privacy may be terminated by an individual taking steps to voluntarily relinquish the expectation of privacy, such as abandoning property or setting trash at the edge of the curtilage or beyond for collection. 18.7.1.3.3 (U) ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT (U) Under FRCP Rule 41, upon the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, a search warrant may be issued by: A) (U) a federal magistrate judge, or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record within the federal district, for a search of property or for a person within the district; B) (U) a federal magistrate judge for a search of property or for a person either within or outside the district if the property or person is within the district when the warrant is sought but might move outside the district before the warrant is executed; 18-171 UNCLASSIFIED-POR OFFICIAL TJSF QNT Y Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - J'i'Ott: OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 C) (U) a federal magistrate judge in any district in which activities related to the terrorism may have occurred, for a search of property or for a person within or outside the district, in an investigation of domestic terrorism or international terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331); and D) (U) a magistrate with authority in the district to issue a warrant to install a tracking device. The warrant may authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or property located within the district, outside, or both. (U) Physical searches related to a national security purpose may be authorized by the FISC. (50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829) 18.7.1.3.4 (U) PROPERTY OR PERSONS THAT MAY BE SEIZED WITH A WARRANT (U) A warrant may be issued to search for and seize any: (i) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; (ii) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (iii) property designed or intended for use or that is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense. In addition to a conventional search conducted following issuance of a warrant, examples of search warrants include: 18. 7.1.3.4.1 (U) ANTICIPATORY WARRANTS (U) As the name suggests, an anticipatory warrant differs from other search warrants in that it is not supported by probable cause to believe that contraband exists at the premises to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. Instead, an anticipatory search warrant is validly issued where there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed, and that evidence of such crime will be found at the described location at the time of the search, but only after certain specified events transpire. These conditions precedent to the execution of an anticipatory warrant, sometimes referred to as "triggering events," are integral to its validity. Because probable cause for an anticipatory warrant is contingent on the occurrence of certain expected or "triggering" events, typically the future delivery, sale, or purchase of contraband, the judge making the probable cause determination must take into account the likelihood that the triggering event will occur on schedule and as predicted. Should these triggering events fail to materialize, the anticipatory warrant is void. 18. 7.1.3.4.2 (U) SNEAK AND PEEK SEARCH WARRANTS (U) A sneak and peek search warrant allows law enforcement agents to surreptitiously enter a location such as a building, an apartment, garage, storage shed, etc., for the ouroose of looking for and documenting evidence of criminal activitvl I 18. 7.1.3.4.3 (U) MAIL OPENINGS (U) Mail in United States postal channels may be searched only pursuant to court order, or presidential authorization. United States Postal Service regulations governing such UNCLASSIFIED 18-172 FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - POft OF'F'ICIAL U!i� ONL r Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 activities must be followed. A search of items that are being handled by individual couriers, or commercial courier companies, under circumstances in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, or have been sealed for deposit into postal channels, and that are discovered within properties or premises being searched, must be carried out according to unconsented PISA or FRCP Rule 41 physical search procedures. 18. 7.1.3.4.4 (U) COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF THE CONTENTS OF STORED WIRE OR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS (U) Contents in "electronic storage" (e.g., unopened e-mail/voice mail) require a search warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). A distinction is made between the contents of communications that are in electronic storage (e.g., unopened e-mail) for less than 180 days and those in "electronic storage" for longer than 180 days, or those that are no longer in "electronic storage" (e.g., opened e-mail). In enacting the ECPA, Congress concluded that customers may not retain a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in information sent to network providers. However, the contents of an e-mail message that is unopened should nonetheless be protected by Fourth Amendment standards, similar to the contents of a regularly mailed letter. On the other hand, if the contents of an unopened message are kept beyond six months or stored on behalf of the customer after the e-mail has been received or opened, it should be treated the same as a business record in the hands of a third party, such as an accountant or attorney. In that case, the government may subpoena the records from the third party without running afoul of either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. If a search warrant is used, it may be served on the provider without notice to the customer or subscriber. 18.7.1.3.4.4.1 (U) SEARCH WARRANT (U/,ffiUO.) Investigators can obtain the full contents of a network account with a search warrant. ECPA does not require the government to notify the customer or subscriber when it obtains information from a provider using a search warrant. Warrants issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 must either comply with FRCP Rule 41 or be an equivalent state warrant. Warrants issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703 do not require personal service on the customer; the warrants are only be served on the electronic communication service or a remote computing service. FRCP Rule 41 requires a copy of the warrant be left with the provider, and a return and inventory be made. Federal courts have nationwide jurisdiction to issue these search warrants (see below). (U) With a search warrant issued based on probable cause pursuant to FRCP Rule 41 or an equivalent state warrant, the government may obtain: A) (U) The contents of a wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, and B) (U) Everything that can be obtained using a 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) court order with notice. (U) In other words, every record and all of the stored contents of an account-including opened and unopened e-mail/voice mail- can be obtained with a search warrant based on probable cause pursuant to FRCP Rule 41. Moreover, because the warrant is issued by a neutral magistrate based on a finding of probable cause, obtaining a search warrant effectively insulates the process from challenge under the Fourth Amendment. 18-173 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - fi'Oft Ofi'fi'tCIAL U�t! Ot�tY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 18.7.1.3.4.4.2 §18 (U) NATIONWIDE SCOPE (U) Search warrants under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) may be issued by a federal "court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation," and may be executed outside the district of the issuing court for material responsive to the warrant. State courts may also issue warrants under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), but the statute does not give these warrants effect outside the issuing court's territorial jurisdiction. As with any other FRCP Rule 41 warrant, investigators must draft an affidavit and a proposed warrant that complies with FRCP Rule 41. 18.7.1.3.4.4.3 (U) SERVICE OF PROCESS (U) 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) search warrants are obtained just like any other FRCP Rule 41 search warrant but are typically served on the provider and compel the provider to find and produce the information described in the warrant. ECPA expressly states that the presence of an officer is not required for service or execution of a search warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 18.7.1.3.4.4.4 (U) COURT ORDER WITH PRIOR NOTICE TO THE SUBSCRIBER OR CUSTOMER (U//f\'OU()t-Investigators can obtain everything in a network account except for unopened e-mail or voice-mail stored with a provider for 180 days or less using a 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) court order with prior notice to the subscriber unless they have obtained authority for delayed notice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705. ECPA distinguishes between the contents of communications that are in "electronic storage" (e.g., unopened e-mail) for less than 180 days, and those that have been in "electronic storage" for longer or that are no longer in "electronic storage" (e.g., opened e-mail). (U) FBI employees who obtain a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), and either give prior notice to the subscriber or comply with the delayed notice provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a), may obtain: A) (U) "The contents of a wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). B) (U) "The contents of any wire or electronic communication" held by a provider of remote computing service "on behalf of ...a subscriber or customer of such remote computing service," 18 U.S.C.§§ 2703(b)(l)(B)(ii), 2703 (b)(2); and C) (U) Everything that can be obtained using a 18 U.S.C.§ 2703(d) court order without notice. (U)I b7E I (U)I I 18-174 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - fi'Oit OfifilCIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 b7E 18.7.1.3.4.4.5 (U) LEGAL STANDARD (U) To order delayed notice, the court must find that "there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the court order may... endanger the life or physical safety of an individual; [lead to] flight from prosecution; [lead to] destruction of or tampering with evidence; [lead to] intimidation of potential witnesses; or . . . otherwise seriously jeopardiz[e] an investigation or unduly delay[ ] a trial." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2705(a)(l)(A) and 2705(a)(2). The applicant must satisfy this standard anew each time an extension of the delayed notice is sought. 18.7.1.3.4.4.6 (U) NATIONWIDE SCOPE (U) Federal court orders under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) have effect outside the district of the issuing court. Orders issued pursuant tol8 U.S.C. § 2703(d) may compel providers to disclose information even if the information is stored outside the district of the issuing court. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) ("any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction" may issue a 18 U.S.C. § 2703[d] order); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3) (court of competent jurisdiction includes any federal court having jurisdiction over the offense being investigated without geographic limitation). (U) 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) orders may also be issued by state courts. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2711(3), 3127(2)(B). Such orders issued by state courts, however, do not have effect outside the jurisdiction of the issuing state. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2711(3). 18.7.1.3.4.4.7 (U) COURT ORDER WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO THE SUBSCRIBER OR CUSTOMER (U) A court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) may compel disclosure of: A) (U) All "record(s) or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications [held by providers of electronic communications service and remote computing service])," and B) (U) Basic subscriber information that can be obtained using a subpoena without notice. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(l). 18.7.1.4 A) (U) APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE METHOD (U//FOUO) Search warrants issued under authority o{FRCP Rule 41: A warrant to search is issued by a federal magistrate (or a state court judge if a federal magistrate is not reasonably available). Coordination with the USAO or DOJ is required to obtain the warrant. B) (U//PQYO) FISA: In national security investigations, field office requests for PISA authorized physical searches must be submitted to FBIHQ using the FBI F,..IS __A ______ Request Form. Field office requests for PISA approval are tracked throug�,....______, This form should be completed by the case agent. C) (U//FOUO) Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM): Notice to the appropriate FBIHQ operational Unit Chief and Section Chief is required if the matter under investigation 18-175 UNCLASSIFIED - fi'Oit Ofi'fi'ICIAL U�t! ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - fi'Olt Ofi'fi'ICIAL USE Of�tY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 is a sensitive investigative matter. Notice to DOJ is also required, as described in DIOG Section 10. I D) (U//FOU(}j (U) 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(b)(1)(ii) provides guidance on categories of individuals and entities not by, and therefore not entitled to the protections of the DOJ policy set out above. 18.7.1.5 (U) DURATION OF APPROVAL (U) The duration for the execution of a warrant is established by the court order or warrant. 18.7.1.6 (U) SPECIFIC PROCEDURES 18.7.1.6.1 (U) OBTAINING A WARRANT UNDER FRCP RULE 41 18.7.1.6.1.1 (U) PROBABLE CAUSE (U//FOUO) After receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge or a judge of a state court of record must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize a person or property under FRCP Rule 4l(c). Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within the FBI employee's knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that ..." a crime has been or is being committed, and that sizable property can be found at the place or on the person to be searched. Probable cause is a reasonable belief grounded on facts. In judging whether a reasonable belief exists, the test is whether such a belief would be engendered in a prudent person with the officer's training and experience. To establish probable cause, the affiant must demonstrate a basis for knowledge and belief that the facts are true and that there is probable cause to believe the items listed in the affidavit will be found at the place to be searched. 18.7.1.6.1.2 (U) REQUESTING A WARRANT IN THE PRESENCE OF A JUDGE A) (U) Warrant on an Affidavit: When a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government presents an affidavit in support of a warrant, the judge may require the affiant to appear personally and may examine under oath the affiant and any witness the affiant produces. B) (U) Warrant on Sworn Testimony: The judge may wholly or partially dispense with a written affidavit and base a warrant on sworn testimony if doing so is reasonable under the circumstances. C) (U) Recording Testimony: Testimony taken in support of a warrant must be recorded by a court reporter or by a suitable recording device, and the judge must file the transcript or recording with the clerk, along with any affidavit. 18-176 UNCLASSIFIED - fi'Olt Ofi'fi'ICIAL U�t! ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 18. 7.1.6.1.3 (U) REQUESTING AWARRANT BY TELEPHONIC OR OTHER MEANS A) (U) In General: A magistrate judge may issue a warrant based on information communicated by telephone or other appropriate means, including facsimile transmission. B) (U) Recording Testimony: Upon learning that an applicant is requesting a warrant, a magistrate judge must: (i) place under oath the applicant and any person on whose testimony the application is based; and (ii) make a verbatim record of the conversation with a suitable recording device, if available, or by a court reporter, or in writing. C) (U) Certifying Testimony: The magistrate judge must have any recording or court reporter's notes transcribed, certify the transcription's accuracy, and file a copy of the record and the transcription with the clerk. Any written verbatim record must be signed by the magistrate judge and filed with the clerk. D) (U) Suppression Limited: Absent a finding of bad faith, evidence obtained from a warrant issued under FRCP Rule 4l(d)(3)(A) is not subject to suppression on the ground that issuing the warrant in that manner was unreasonable under the circumstances. 18. 7.1.6.1.4 (U) ISSUING THEWARRANT (U) In general, the magistrate judge or a judge of a state court of record must issue the warrant to an officer authorized to execute it. The warrant must identify the person or property to be searched, identify any person or property to be seized, and designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned. The warrant must command the officer to: (i) execute the warrant within a specified time no longer than 14 days; (ii) execute the warrant during the daytime, unless the judge for good cause expressly authorizes execution at another time; and (iii) return the warrant to the magistrate judge designated in the warrant. 18. 7.1.6.1.5 (U)WARRANT BY TELEPHONIC OR OTHER MEANS (U) If a magistrate judge decides to proceed under FRCP Rule 4l(d)(3)(A), the following additional procedures apply: A) (U) Preparing a Proposed Duplicate Original Warrant: The applicant must prepare a "proposed duplicate original warrant" and must read or otherwise transmit the contents of that document verbatim to the magistrate judge. B) (U) Preparing an Original Warrant: The magistrate judge must enter the contents of the proposed duplicate original warrant into an original warrant. C) (U) Modifications: The magistrate judge may direct the applicant to modify the proposed duplicate original warrant. In that case, the judge must also modify the original warrant. D) (U) Signing the Original Warrant and the Duplicate Original Warrant: Upon determining to issue the warrant, the magistrate judge must immediately sign the original warrant, enter on its face the exact time it is issued, and direct the applicant to sign the judge's name on the duplicate original warrant. 18. 7.1.6.1.6 (U)WRITTEN OPERATION ORDERS FOR SEARCH OPERATIONS (U) The ADIC/SAC is responsible to ensure that careful and thorough planning is conducted for the successful execution of a high risk search operation involving a potentially dangerous situation or subject. The plan must be adapted to each situation and must include relevant details to enhance the safety and effectiveness of the agents and 18-177 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 officers involved in the search operation. The planning and execution of arrests, raids, and searches should be assigned to experienced Agents. All plans must be approved by ASACs or their designees. (U) Prior to conducting a search operation deemed a high risk, the agent must prepare a written operation order (OPORDER) to include the five critical categories: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Equipment, and Control and Communication (SMEAC), and must utilize the Law En(orcement Operations Order (OPORDER), FD888. In situations where an FBI SWAT Team(s) or the Critical Incident Response Group's (CIRG), Tactical Section is involved, the Operations Order Template must be used in lieu of the FD-888. See the an ___________________.... or more on the use of the SWAT Teams and CIRG, Tactical Section in high risk operations. (U) The written OPORDER must be presented in an oral briefing to all personnel involved in the execution of the search warrant prior to the operation. During the briefing, the briefing agent should stress to the participants of the operation that the search has the potential to become dangerous. At the discretion of the field office approving official, the CDC/ADC may review the OPORDER (FD-888) and/or participate in providing the FBI deadly force briefing to the search operation participants. (U) Exigent circumstances (i.e., emergency, pressing necessity requiring immediate action) may necessitate an oral briefing in lieu of the written OPORDER. The ASAC or designee must approve the use of an oral briefing in lieu of a written and approved OPORDER in exigent circumstances. An oral briefing must follow the requirements of a written OPORDER to address the SMEAC categories identified above. Documentation of the oral briefing must occur as soon as possible following the operation by preparing and filing the FD-888 or the Operations Order Template, whichever is appropriate for the situation. (U) The agent may consider utilizing, and/or alerting local authorities to the planned search, if appropriate under the circumstances. Although the time of notification is left to the discretion of the agent, he/she must consider the jurisdiction of local law enforcement, its responsibility to its community and its need to be aware of law enforcement actions in its jurisdiction. 18. 7.1. 6.1. 7 (U) EXECUTING AND RETURNING THE WARRANT A) (U) Noting the Time: The officer executing the warrant must enter on its face the exact date and time it is executed. B) (U) Inventory: An officer present during the execution of the warrant must prepare and verify an inventory of any property seized. The officer must do so in the presence of another officer and the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken. If either one is not present, the officer must prepare and verify the inventory in the presence of at least one other credible person. C) (U) Receipt: The officer executing the warrant must: (i) give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken; or (ii) leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the property. 18-178 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL U�E ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 D) (U) Return: The officer executing the warrant must promptly return it - together with a copy of the inventory - to the magistrate judge designated on the warrant. The judge must, on request, give a copy of the inventory to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken and to the applicant for the warrant. 18.7.1.6.1.8 (U) FORWARDING PAPERS TO THE CLERK (U) The magistrate judge to whom the warrant is returned must attach to the warrant a copy of the return, the inventory, and all other related papers and must deliver them to the clerk in the district where the property was seized. (FRCP Rule 41) 18.7.1.6.1.9 (U) WARRANT FOR A TRACKING DEVICE A) (U) Noting the Time: The officer executing a tracking device warrant must enter on it the exact date and time the device was installed and the period during which it was used. B) (U) Return: Within 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer executing the warrant must return it to the judge designated in the warrant. C) (U) Service: Within 10 calendar days after use of the tracking device has ended, the officer executing the warrant must serve a copy of the warrant on the person who was tracked. Service may be accomplished by delivering a copy to the person who, or whose property was tracked; or by leaving a copy at the person's residence or usual place of abode with an individual of suitable age and discretion who resides at that location and by mailing a copy to the person's last known address. Upon request of the government, the judge may delay notice as provided in FRCP Rule 4l(f)(3). 18.7.1.6.1.10 (U) DELAYED NOTICE (U) Upon the government's request, a magistrate judge-or if authorized by FRCP Rule 4l(b), a judge of a state court of record-may delay any notice required by FRCP Rule 41 if the delay is authorized by statute. 18.7.1.6.2 (U) 0BTAININGAFISA WARRANT (U) Applications for court-authorized physical search pursuant to PISA must be made by a federal officer in writing upon oath or affirmation and with the specific approval of the Attorney General. (See 50 U.S.C. § 1823). 18.7.1.6.2.1 (U) CERTIFICATE BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI (U) Each PISA application must be accompanied by a Certification by the Director of the FBI or one of nine other individuals authorized by Congress or the President to provide such certifications that: the information being sought is foreign intelligence information; that a significant purpose of the search is to obtain foreign intelligence information; that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques; that the information sought is "foreign intelligence information" as defined by PISA. The certification must include a statement explaining the certifier's basis for the certification. (U) 50 U.S.C. § 1823 specifies the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; E.O. 12139 as amended by E.O. 13383 specifies the Director of the FBI, Deputy Director of the FBI, the Director of National Intelligence, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary 18-179 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR Of:HCIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - 'FOR OFFICIAL USE ON'Ut Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 of Defense as appropriate officials to make certifications required by PISA. The FBI Director has represented to Congress that the FBI deputy Director will only certify FISA' s when the FBI Director is not available to do so. 18.7.1.6.2.2 (U) LENGTH OF PERIOD OF AUTHORIZATION FOR FISC ORDERS (U) Generally, a FISC Order approving an unconsented physical search will specify the period of time during which physical searches are approved and provide that the government will be permitted the period of time necessary to achieve the purpose, or for 90 days, whichever is less, except that authority may be: A) (U) For no more than one year for "Foreign Power" targets (establishments); or B) (U) For no more than 120 days for a non-USPER agent of a foreign power, with renewals for up to one. 18.7.1.6.2.3 (U) EXTENSION OF PHYSICAL SEARCH AUTHORITY (U//POUO) An extension of physical search authority may be granted on the same basis as the original order upon a separate application for an extension and upon new findings made in the same manner as the original order. 18.7.1.6.2.4 (U) EMERGENCY FISA AUTHORITY A) (U) The Attorney General may authorize an emergency physical search under FISA when he reasonably makes a determination that an emergency situation exists that precludes advance FISA court review and approval, and there exists a factual predication for the issuance of a FISA Court Order. In such instances, a FISC judge must be informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of the authorization and an application according to FISA requirements is submitted to the judge as soon as is practicable but not more than seven (7) days after the emergency authority has been approved by the Attorney General. B) (U) If a court order is denied after an emergency authorization has been initiated, no information gathered as a result of the search may be used in any manner except if with the approval of the Attorney General, the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. b7E C) (U//FOUQf For an emergency FISA for physical search, 18.7.1.6.2.5 (U) SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES (U) The President through the Attorney General may also authorize a physical search under PISA without a court order for periods of up to one year, if the Attorney General certifies that the search will be solely directed at premises, information, material, or property that is used exclusively by or under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power; there is no substantial likelihood that the physical search will involve the premises, information, material, or property of a United States person (USPER); and there are minimization procedures that have been reported to the court and Congress. The FBl's involvement in such approvals is usually in furtherance of activities pursued according to E.O. 12333. Copies of such certifications are to be transmitted to the PISA Court. See 50 U.S.C. § 1822[a]. 18-180 UNCLASSIFIED - FOtt OfifitCIAL USE O�JLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ON'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 (U) Information concerning USPERs acquired through unconsented physical searches may only be used according to minimization procedures. See: 50 U.S.C. §§ 1824(d)(4) and 1825(a). 18. 7.1.6.2.6 (U) REQUIRED NOTICE (U) If an authorized search involves the premises of an USPER, and the Attorney General determines that there is no national security interest in continuing the secrecy of the search, the Attorney General must provide notice to the USPER that the premises was searched and the identification of any property seized, altered, or reproduced during the search. (U//OOU8) ! b7E (U//FOUO)I A) (U/lFDot,) F SA i:-:T"""..,...,.""""----:-..-�.......-----------------,-1-s......1I ocumentatlon relied u on must me u e: 1) (U//�10UOj I I 2) (U//�� 3) (U//FOUO)I I I I I B) (U//�j 18-181 UNCLASSIFIED - FOlt OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE Ot�tY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 18.7.1.6.2.8 (U) USE OF FISA DERIVED INFORMATION IN OTHER PROCEEDINGS (U//FOUO) There are statutory (50 U.S.C. Sections 1806, 1825, and 1845) and Attorney General (AG) policy restrictions on the use of information derived from a PISA ELSUR, physical search, or PR/TT. These restrictions apply to and must be followed by anyone "who may seek to use or disclose FISA information in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States...." See DIOG Appendix E for the AG Memo, Revised Policy on the Use or Disclosure of PISA Information, dated 01-10-2008. The guidance in the AG's Memo establishes notification/approval procedures which must be strictlv followed. Thou2:h not contained in the AG Memo. FBI oolicv reauires thatl I b7E (U//FOUO) The United States must, prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at a reasonable time prior to an effort to disclose or use that information or submit it into evidence, notify the "aggrieved person" [as defined in 50 U.S.C. Sections 180l(k), 1821(2), or 1841(2)], and the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used, that the United States intends to disclose or use such information. See 50 U.S.C. Sections 1806(c), 1825(d), and 1845(c). b7E 18.7.1.6.2.9 (U//FOUOj I (U//FOUO) Each investigative file for which an application is or has been re ared for submission to the FISC will include a sub-file to be labele ,... ,.,. u b s Thi _"""'file.....,...is_ to_ _ c_on_ t_ a..,.in---1copies ...., ====: :===== ____, __ _ _ ___ ___ ___ .__ of all applications to and orders issued by the FISC for the conduct of physical searches in the investigation. The following data must be included in thisl I A) (U/i'ffit:f0 ....____________________________ and I ....__________________� B) (U//� I 18.7.1.6.2.10 (U//FOUO) FISA RENEWALS (Uh'FOUO)I b7E (U//FOUO�: I 18-182 UNCLASSIFIED - l"Ott O'Ffi'ICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 b7E 18.7.1.6.2.10.1 (U) APPEALING THE DECISION OF THE REVIEW BOARD I (U//FOUO,I (U _1 //F I 18. 7.1.6.2.11 (U) COMPLIANCE AND MONITORING FOR FISA O U _ ffi'. _______r 18. 7.1.6.2.12 (U) FISA OVERCOLLECTION I contact NSLB for further guidance regarding the handling of any I PISA overcollection. 18-183 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� O�TLY UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 18.7.2 18.7.2.1 §18 (U) INVESTIGATIVE METHOD: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE - TITLE Ill (U) SUMMARY (U//roU&) Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) under Title III is a valuable investigative method. It is, also, a very intrusive means of acquiring information relevant to the effective execution of the FBI's law enforcement. To ensure that due consideration is given to the competing interests between law enforcement and the effect on privacy and civil liberties, this section contains various administrative and management controls beyond those imposed by statute and DOJ guidelines. Unless otherwise noted, it is the responsibility of the case agent and his/her supervisor to ensure compliance with these instructions.I I itle III ELSUR requires: (i) administrative or judicial authorization prior to its use; (ii) contact with the field office ELSUR Technician to coordinate all necessary recordkeeping; and (iii) consultation with the Technical Advisor (TA) or a designated TTA to determine feasibility, applicability, and use of the appropriate equipment. 18.7.2.2 (U) LEGAL AUTHORITY (U) Title III ELSUR is authorized by chapter 119, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (Title III of the Omnibus and Safe Streets Act of 1968). 18.7.2.3 (U) DEFINITION OF INVESTIGATIVE METHOD (U) Title III ELSUR is the non-consensual electronic collection of information (usually communications) under circumstances in which the parties have a reasonable expectation of privacy and court orders or warrants are required. 18.7.2.4 (U) TITLE III GENERALLY (U) With the prior approval of the Attorney General, or Attorney General's designee, the United States Attorney, by and through an AUSA, or the Strike Force Attorney, may apply to a federal judge for a court order authorizing the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications relating to one or more of the offenses listed in Title III (18 U.S.C. § 2516). Judicial oversight continues throughout the operational phase of the electronic surveillance including the installation, monitoring, and handling of recording media. (U) For purposes of obtaining review and approval for use of the method, Title III applications are considered to be either "sensitive" or "non-sensitive." The requirements for each are set forth below. 18.7.2.5 (U) STANDARDS FOR USE AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR NON­ SENSITIVE TITLE Ills (U//FOUO) An SAC is the authorizing official to approve all requests for "non-sensitive" Title III orders, including original, extension, and renewal applications. SAC approval of all 18-184 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL □SE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b?E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 extensions and renewals is required to ensure that field office managers will allocate the resources necessary to use this method. Any delegation of SAC approval authority to an ASAC under this section must be in writing (See DIOG Section 3.4.3). (U//FOUO) Prior to SAC approval referred to above, CDC or OGC review is required for the initial "non-sensitive" Title III order. Extensions and renewals sought within 30 days after the expiration of the original Title III order in non-sensitive Title Ills do not require CDC review, unless requested by the SAC or designee. The CDC must review renewals sought more than 30 days after the expiration of the original Title III order. (U/7POUO-) There may be situations or unusual circumstances requiring the FBI to adopt an already existing Title III from another federal law enforcement agency. Such adoptions may only be done on a case-by-case basis, in exceptional circumstances, and subject to the requirements set forth herein relating to CDC review and SAC approval. Should the Title III proposed for adoption involve sensitive circumstances, it must also be handled in accordance with the approval and review requirements set forth below. 18.7.2.6 (U) STANDARDS FOR USE AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SENSITIVE TITLE Ills (U//FOUO) All Title III applications involving one of the seven "sensitive circumstances," listed below, including all extensions and renewals, must be reviewed by OGC and approved by FBIHQ. The SAC, with the recommendation of the CDC, must determine whether the request involves sensitive circumstances. The term "sensitive circumstances" as used in this section relating to electronic surveillance under Title III is different from the term "sensitive investigative matters," as used in conjunction with approval requirements for opening Assessments and Predicated Investigations, and is different from the term "sensitive monitoring circumstances" as used in conjunction with the approval requirements for consensual monitoring. (U/fPOU� The field office must include a copy of the completed CDC checklist (FD-926) when forwarding the initial sensitive Title III applications to OGC and FBIHQ for review. After the initial submission, the CDC checklist must be completed by the appropriate OGC unit for all subsequent extensions or renewals of sensitive Title Ills. (U//FOUO) Although ultimate approval for sensitive Title Ills is at the FBIHQ level, the SAC or ASAC must continue to review and approve the use of the method for all sensitive Title III applications as it relates to the allocation of resources within their field office. (U//FOUO) The following five sensitive circumstances require the approval of a Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) or a higher level official from the Criminal Investigative Division (CID), Cyber Division, Counterterrorism Division (CTD), Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD), or Counterintelligence Division (CD), as appropriate, and such approvals must be documented in an EC: A) (U/�OUO,-Significant privilege issues or First Amendment concerns (e.g., attorney-client privilege or other privileged conversations or interception of news media representatives); B) (U/lfl'et:j'e)) Significant privacy concerns are anticipated (e.g., placing a microphone in a bedroom or bathroom); 18-185 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OPPICIAL u�� otqL r Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 C) (U/,lliOUE)J Application is based on "relaxed specificity" (i.e., "roving" interception) under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(ll)(a) and (b); D) (U//�) Application concerns a Domestic Terrorism (DT), International Terrorism, or Espionage investigation; or E) (U//FOUO� Any situation deemed appropriate by the AD of CID or OGC. (U//FOUO) The following two sensitive circumstances require the approval of the Director, the Acting Director, Deputy Director, or the Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for the Criminal Cyber Response and Services Branch or National Security Branch, or the respective Assistant Director for Criminal Investigative Division (CID), Cyber Division, Counterterrorism Division (CTD), Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD), or Counterintelligence Division (CD), and such approvals must be documented in an EC: A) (U/ff>OUO) "Emergency" Title III interceptions (i.e., interceptions conducted prior to judicial approval under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)); or B) (U//re-Be) It is anticipated that conversations of members of Congress, federal judges, high­ level federal officials, high-level state executives, or members of a state judiciary or legislature will be intercepted. (U//POUO, "Sensitive circumstances" may develop at any point in time during the course of a Title III. For example, while an initial application for interceptions might not be considered sensitive, conversations intercepted thereafter of a high-level state executive would render any subsequent spinoffs, extensions, or renewals "sensitive" Title III requests. 18.7.2.7 (U) PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCY TITLE Ill INTERCEPTIONS (U/JPOUO) 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) provides that any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General, who reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists that requires communications to be intercepted before an order authorizing such interception can, with due diligence, be obtained, and there are grounds upon which an order could be entered authorizing interception, may intercept such communications. (U//POUO) Section 2518(7) postpones, rather than eliminates the need for judicial authorization. If the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General authorizes an appropriate FBI official to approve an emergency Title III interception, an after-the-fact application for an order approving the interception must be made in accordance with Title III to the appropriate Court, and an order obtained, within 48 hours after the interception has occurred or begins to occur. I (U/7'PtJtf'O)I D 18-186 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLy Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED-FOR Of'f'ICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 (U) 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) defines an emergency situation as one involving: A) (U) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person, B) (U) conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest, or C) (U) conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime. (U//FOUO) In all but the most unusual circumstances, the only situations likely to constitute an emergency by the Department of Justice (DOJ) are those involving an imminent threat to life, e.g., a kidnapping, hostage taking, or imminent terrorist activity. 18.7.2.7.1 (U) OBTAINING EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION b7E (U//FOUO)I A) (U/,,�QYQ)I I B) (U//fflY.Qj D) (U//fflee) (U/7'f"fflffi) -=======================---. 18-187 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 b7E 18.7.2.7.2 (U) POST-EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION (U//FOUO) Once the AG or his designee has authorized the Director, or his designee to make the determination whether to proceed with the emergency Title III, the government has 48 hours (including weekends and holidays) from the time the AG granted authorization to apply for a court order approving the interception. The field office, in coordination with the AUSA, must immediately begin preparing an affidavit, application and proposed order for court authorization. (U//FOUO) The affidavit in support of the after-the-fact application to the court for an order approving the emergency interception must contain only those facts known to the AG or his designee at the time the emer enc interce tion was a roved. The a lication must be accompanied by th ..__________________________.orm, which must reflect the date and time of the emergency authorization. b7E (U//f'OUO) The government may also request, at the time it files for court-authorization for the emergency, court-authorization to continue the interception beyond the initial 48 hour period. If continued authorization is sought at the same time, one affidavit may be submitted in support of both requests. However, the affidavit must clearly indicate what information was communicated to the AG or his designee at the time the emergency interception was approved and what information was developed thereafter. Two separate applications and proposed orders should be submitted to the court in this situation - one set for the emergency and one set for the extension. If continued interceptions are not being sought, no further authorization is needed from OEO. The AUSA should, however, still submit the application, affidavit, and order to OEO for review. If continued interceptions are sought, that application, affidavit, and order must be reviewed by OEO and approved by DOJ like any other Title III request. In either situation, the affidavit must also be submitted through the operational unit for OGC review, when time allows. I (U/fffi"Ut))I (U//F'OttO) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7), in the absence of a court order, interception shall immediately terminate when the communication sought is obtained or when the application for the order is denied, whichever is earlier. In the event an application for approval is denied, or in any other case where the interception is terminated without an order having been issued, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted 18-188 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of Title Ill, and an inventory shall be served on the person named in the application. §18 (U//f'OUO b7E A) (U//l'OtlO) B) (U//f-effl,)I C) (Uh'FOUO) (U//FOUO)I A[ (u17F'Ore)I B) (U/fo¥10U8) 1......---------------------- C) (U//rffiffi1 I 18.7.2.8 (U) PRE-TITLE III ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (ELSUR) SEARCH POLICY (U//FOUG-) 18 U.S.C § 2518(l)(e) requires that each application for an order to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications (hereinafter "Title III") contain a statement describing all previous applications for Title III surveillance of the same oersons. facilities. or places named in the current applicationJ I (U) For specific details on how to conduct and document such ELSUR searches, see DIOG Appendix H. 18.7.2.9 (U) DURATION OF APPROVAL FOR TITLE III 18.7.2.10 (U) SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR TITLE III AFFIDAVITS (U) Court orders issued pursuant to Title III are for a period not to exceed 30 days. An "extension" order may be sought to continue monitoring beyond the initial 30-day period without a lapse in time. When a break in coverage has occurred, a "renewal" order may be sought to continue monitoring the same interceptees and facilities identified in the original order. The affidavit and application in support of an extension or renewal must comply with all of the Title III requirements, including approval of the Attorney General or designee. (U//rlOUO) The requirements in 18 U.S.C. § 2518 must be followed in the preparation of a Title III affidavit. The employee drafting the Title III affidavit and approving officials must consider the following requirements: A) (U//F8U8) The identity and qualifications of the affiant must be articulated; 18-189 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E us� UNCLASSIFIED- FOR OFFICIAL ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 B) (UNFOUe) For the interception of wire or oral communications, the affidavit must establish probable cause to believe a violation of at least one of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) has been, is being, or will be committed. For the interception of electronic communications, the affidavit must establish probable cause to believe that some federal felony has been, is being, or will be committed; C) (U//f>OUQ) The affidavit must set forth the identities of those persons, if known, for whom there is probable cause to believe they are committing the alleged offenses, even if it is not believed they will be intercepted over the target facility. This group of individuals is often referred to as the "Subjects." "Interceptees" may be listed separately; "interceptee" are those Subjects who are expected to be intercepted; D) (U//ffl't:10) Probable cause must be current and relevant to the use of the particular facilities for which interception is sought; E) (U//FOUO) The necessity for the Title III must be articulated. There must be a factual basis for concluding that alternative investigative procedures have been tried and failed or a demonstration why these procedures appear to be unlikely to succeed or would be too dangerous if tried ("boilerplate" statements in this respect are unacceptable); F) (U//�) Interceptions must be minimized, as statutorily required; G) (U//�) The facility or premises to be intercepted must be described fully, including a diagram, if possible, if microphone installation is contemplated (surreptitious entries may not be conducted for the purpose of preparing a diagram); and H) (U//�) A statement describing all previous applications for Title III surveillance of the same persons (both subjects and interceptees), facilities or places named in the current affid jt To comp)y wjth thjs requjre ent, a "search," e.g., an automated indices search of the , FBI'sr .,__ ----,----,----,------,----,----,----' system and the systems of other appropriate agencies, must be conducted prior to submitting the Title III affidavit to the DOJ OEO (non-sensitive circumstances) or to the responsible FBIHQ operational unit (sensitive circumstances). The squad SSA is responsible for verifying that pre-Title III ELSUR checks have been completed before the affidavit is sent to the court. The ELSUR Operations Technician (EOT) and the ELSUR supervisor are responsible for confirming that ELSUR searches were properly conducted as set forth in the final application submitted to the court. (U//flOUQ) Note: When drafting the Title III Affidavit, the agent must determine whether the proposed Title III intercept involves any of the DOJ-designated seven "sensitive circumstances" listed in DIOG Section 18.7.2.6. If the proposed Title III will involve one or more of the seven "sensitive circumstances," the agent must consult with the assigned AUSA to determine how the "sensitive circumstance(s)" will be addressed and how/when the federal judge will be notified. (U//mut)) Note: It is also recommended that the application include how the FBI will address any sensitive circumstances as listed in DIOG Section 18.7.2.6, if they exist. (U//'FOtlO) At least 10 calendar days prior to submitting the original Title III request to DOJ OEO, the field office must forward an electronic communication to FBIHQ setting forth by separate subheading: a synopsis of the investigation; the priority of the investigation within the office; the anticipated manpower and/or linguistic requirements and outside support, if any, that will be needed; a synopsis of the probable cause supporting the Title III application; the prosecutive opinion of the USAO; and description of the interceptees. If a field office is unable to submit the EC 10 calendar days prior to submitting the request to DOJ OEO, the 18-190 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�E ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED f:OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 field office must advise the operational unit immediately and note the circumstances that prevent timely notification. b7E (U//FOUQ.) Case agents must use the 18.7.2.11 (U) DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR TITLE III APPLICATIONS (U//f-8.UO) When there are legal questions/concerns that cannot be resolved through discussions with reviewing officials at DOJ, the responsible FBIHQ operational division supervisors or executives must forward the application to OGC for its review, advice, and recommendation. 18.7.2.12 (U) REPORTING AND NOTICE REQUIREMENTS-TITLE III I (UlfFeuo� (U/,lf:OYO) I b7E I (U//retfe)I b7E I b7E (U//FOUB)! (U//f:OYO 18-191 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL 0SE ONLY Version Dated: September 28, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL U�� O�TLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 b7E (U//FOUOj (U//FOUO�I b7E I (Ul!�I 18.7.2.12.1 (U//"F'DtJOJ NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS (SIM) THAT lNVOL VE TITLE Ill INTERCEPTIONS (U//FOuo, The anticipated interception of conversations related to a "Sensitive Investigative Matter" (SIM) as defined in DIOG Section 10 requires notice to the appropriate FBIHQ Unit Chief and Section Chief, and DOJ Criminal Division. Note: A sensitive investigative matter (SIM) is not the same as a sensitive circumstance described in DIOG Section 18.7.2.6. 18.7.2.13 (U) JOINT TITLE III OPERATIONS WITH OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 18.7.2.13.1 (U) FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (U//POUO) In joint FBI operations with other federal law enforcement agencies wherein electronic surveillance is conducted through a Title III installation, the federal agency administering the electronic surveillance will assume overall responsibility for ELSUR indexing and recordkeeping. The fact that the investigation is a joint operation with another federal law enforcement agency must be stated in the affidavit and application for the court order. The joint federal agency must provide the FBI case agent with a copy of the court order and application. I (U//FOUO-� 18.7.2.13.2 (U) STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (U//POUO) In joint FBI operations involving state and local law enforcement agencies wherein electronic surveillance is conducted through a federal Title III installation, any state 18-192 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: September 28, 2016 b 7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 officer being used as an affiant must be federally deputized. The FBI will be the administering agency responsible for the indexing and recordkeeping. (U//FOUO) In joint FBI operations involving state and local law enforcement agencies wherein electronic surveillance is conducted pursuant to the authorization of a state court (i.e.. a wiretap authorized by a state court, as opposed to a federal court)J I 18.7.2.14 (U) EVIDENCE HANDLING (U//FOUO) All ELSUR downloading, processing, and handling of original, derivative, and copies of original or derivative ELSUR evidence must be conducted by an ELSUR operations technician (EQT) or other designated employee (e.g. an agent who has successfully completed ELSUR training in Virtual Academy). ELSUR evidence must not be uploaded intol I 18-193 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b?E UNCLASSIFIED POR OPPICIAL USE O��LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED FO� OFFICIAL USE 0�.fLY UNCLASSIFIED - 'FOil OfflCIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 18.7.3 §18 (U) INVESTIGATIVE METHOD: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE - FJSA AND FJSA TITLE Vil (ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION) 18.7.3.1 (U)SUMMARY (U//ffiU�ELSUR conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (PISA) is a valuable investigative method. It is, also, a very intrusive means of acquiring information relevant to the effective execution of the FBI' s national security and intelligence missions. To ensure that due consideration is given to the competing interests between national security and the effect on privacy and civil liberties, this section contains various administrative and management controls beyond those imposed by statute and DOJ guidelines. Unless otherwise noted, it is the responsibility of the case agent and his/her supervisor to ensure compliance with these instructions. PISA ELSUR is only authorized as an investigative method in the conduct of Full Investigations. PISA ELSUR requires administrative or judicial authorization prior to its use. (U//POU�) Coordination: I b7E b7E (U//FOUOJ Application: (U) This section is divided below into PISA (18.7.3.2) and PISA Title VII (18.7.3.3). 18.7.3.2 (U)FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) 18.7.3.2.1 (U) LEGAL AUTHORITY (U) 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (PISA) and E.O. 12333 § 2.5. (U) PISA Amendments Act of 2008 (P.L.No. 110-261). 18-194 UNCLASSIFIED FOR Of:flCIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 18.7.3.2.2 (U) DEFINITION OF INVESTIGATIVE METHOD 18.7.3.2.3 (U) STANDARDS FOR USE AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FJSA (U) PISA is the non-consensual electronic collection of information (usually communications) under circumstances in which the parties have a reasonable expectation of privacy and court orders or warrants are required. 18. 7.3.2.3.1 (U) FISA REQUEST FORM (U//FOUO) FBIHQ and field office requests for FISC ELSUR orders must use the PISA Request Form. Field office requests for PISA orders are submitted and tracked through !The PISA request forms, in a question and answer format, have been designed I to ensure that all information needed for the preparation of a FISC application is provided to FBIHQ and to the DOJ. __________________________ (U//ffiUQ.) See .__ for additional guidance. 18. 7.3.2.3.2 ...., (U) CERTIFICATE BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI (U) Each PISA application must be accompanied by a Certification by the Director of the FBI or one of nine other individuals authorized by Congress or the President to provide such certifications that: the information being sought is foreign intelligence information; that a significant purpose of the electronic surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information; that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques; that the information sought is "foreign intelligence information" as defined by PISA. The certification must include a statement explaining the certifier's basis for the certification. (U) Title 50 of the United States Code Section 1804 specifies the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; E.O. 12139 as amended by E.O. 13383 specifies the Director of the FBI, Deputy Director of the FBI, the Director of National Intelligence, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense as appropriate officials to make certifications required by PISA. The FBI Director has represented to Congress that the FBI Deputy Director will only certify FISA's when the FBI Director is not available to do so. 18. 7.3.2.3.3 (U) EMERGENCY FISA AUTHORITY (50 U.S.C. § 1805[F]) (U) The Attorney General, on request from the Director of the FBI or his/her designee, may authorize an emergency PISA for electronic surveillance when it is reasonably determined that an emergency situation exists that precludes advance FISC review and approval and that a factual predication for the issuance of a PISA Order exists. A FISC judge must be informed by DOJ at the time of the emergency authorization and an application must be submitted to that judge as soon as is practicable but not more than seven (7) days after the emergency authority has been approved by the Attorney General. If a court order is denied after an emergency surveillance has been opened, no information gathered as a result of the surveillance may be used as evidence or disclosed 18-195 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED FOR Of:HCIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 in any trial or other proceeding, and no information concerning any USPER acquired from such surveillance may be used or disclosed in any manner, except with the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. I (U//Fffiffi)I 18.7.3.2.4 b7E (U) DURATION OF APPROVAL FOR FJSA (TT//F:: TT �,1 I I 18.7.3.2.5 (U//FOV� SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR FISA (U//FOU6) PISA related initiation and renewal procedures are contained within the PISA Initiation Form which can be found withinl pr on the Forms section of the NSLB lihrarv. -------------...,1-, 18. 7.3.2.5.1 (U//flOUQ-) 1 b7E (U//�)I I (U//�j A) (U//�) 1) (U/�)I I 2) 1U//rouCnl 18-196 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I Version Dated: March 3, 2016 I I UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 3) (U/',--,�:.,r�' I b7E B ) (U//FO'f1e)j 18. 7.3.2.5.2 (U) USE OF FISA DERIVED INFORMATION IN OTHER PROCEEDINGS (U//FeUQ.) There are statutory (50 U.S.C. Sections 1806, 1825, and 1845) and Attorney General (AG) policy restrictions on the use of information derived from a PISA ELSUR, physical search, or PR/TT. These restrictions apply to and must be followed by anyone "who may seek to use or disclose FISA information in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States...." See DIOG Appendix E for the AG Memo, Revised Policy on the Use or Disclosure of PISA Information, dated 01-10-2008. The guidance in the AG's Memo establishes notification/approval procedures which must be strictly followed. Thou_gh not contained in the AG Memo, FBI policy requires tha� I (U//FOU9) The United States must, prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at a reasonable time prior to an effort to disclose or use that information or submit it into evidence, notify the "aggrieved person" [as defined in 50 U.S.C.Sections 180l(k), 1821(2), or 1841(2)], and the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used, that the United States intends to disclose or use such information. See 50 U.S.C. Sections 1806(c), 1825(d), and 1845(c). 18. 7.3.2.5.3 (U/fF-OUQ.) FISA ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ADMINISTRATIVE (FISA ELSUR) SUB-FILE (U//�] 18-197 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFFICIAL USE'. ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 b7E A)(U//� B)(U/�) -------------------------- 18. 7.3.2.5.4 (U/iFUUOJ FISA REVIEW BOARD U//.fOUO b7E I U//fiC,tfC,JI (U//-FOtl'C, )I 18.7.3.2.5.4.1 I (U) APPEALING THE DECISION OF THE REVIEW BOARD (U//FOUO)I 18.7.3.2.6 (U) NOTICE AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR FJSA (U//liOUG) I 18.7.3.2.7 (U) COMPLIANCE AND MONITORING FOR FJSA (U//�)I 18.7.3.2.8 b7E (U) SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR FJSA (U) Under 50 U.S.C. § 1802, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance under PISA without a court order for periods of up to one year, if the 18-198 UNCLASSIFIED - FC,tl C,f/FICIAL USE O�JLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-POlt OPPICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that the surveillance will be solely directed at acquiring communications that are transmitted by means that are exclusively between or among foreign powers and there is no substantial likelihood of the surveillance acquiring the contents of communications to which USPERs are parties. 18.7.3.2.9 (U) FISA OVERCOLLECTION b7E U//FOUO contact 18.7.3.2.10 (U) OTHER APPLICABLE POLICIES 18. 7.3.2.10.1 (U) FISA A) (U//�) Counterintelligence Division Policv Guide. 0717DPG B) (U//fiffie) Q?!,!!.!t!?'!.r!.mr.fm.1_.f..Q[.fr;y__Gy}ds1___Q_?.JJPEG C) (U/ff'OUO) Investigative La\V Unit Library D) (U//�) Foreign Intdfo::ence Surveillance Act (FlSAl Unit 18.7.3.2.11 (U)COLLECTION HANDLING (U,'/FOUO) All ELSUR downloading, processing, and handling of original, derivative, and copies of original or derivative ELSUR evidence must be conducted by an ELSUR operations technician (EQT) or other designated official (e.g. an agent who has successfully completed ELSUR training in Virtual Academy). ELSUR evidence must not be uploaded intq._ _____. 18. 7.3.2.11.1 (U) DOWNLOADING, HANDLING, AND STORAGE OF FJSA INTERCEPT MEDIA FOR USE AS ORIGINAL EVIDENCE (U//POU81 I I b7E I (U//FOUO) I 18-199 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §18 (U//POUO)I I) b7E U Y Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §21 security; or (ii) inform or facilitate intelligence analysis and planning pertinent to the FBI' s law enforcement or national security missions. (U//ruuuA b7E (U) For example: I A) (U//FOtff,j I J C) U//�O)I I (U/�00) Before any investigative activity is conducted in order to respond to an FBI national collection requirement, an Assessment or Predicated Investigation must be opened or already open. An Assessment cannot be opened solely based upon an FBI national collection requirement. An authorized purpose (national security or criminal threat) and clearly defined objective(s) must exist prior to opening an Assessment. During an Assessment, the FBI is authorized to collect against any FBI national collection requirement that is relevant to the Assessment! r I(U//f"OOO)I 21-2 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - POil OFFICIAL USE O�JLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §21 b7E C!WfQIJQ)! 21.3 (U//FOU6) FBI FIELD OFFICE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (U//FOUO) An FBI field office collection requirement describes information needed by the field to: (i) identify or obtain information about potential targets of or vulnerabilities to Federal criminal activities or threats to the national security; or (ii) inform or facilitate intelligence analysis and planning pertinent to the FBI's law enforcement or national security missions. (U//FOUO) Before any investigative activity may be conducted to respond to an FBI field office collection requirement, an Assessment or Predicated Investigation must be opened or already open. An Assessment cannot be opened solely based upon an FBI field office collection requirement I 21-3 UNCLASSIFIED - POil OPFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O��LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICL<\L U�Ji OWLY b6 b7C Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide A (U) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS A-1 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL □SE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS [Including subsequent revisions by the Attorney General Orders] A-2 UNCLASSIFIED - FOit Ofi'fi'ICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED- FOR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide PREAMBLE These Guidelines are issued under the authority of the Attorney General as provided in sections 509, 510, 533, and 534 of Title 28, United States Code, and Executive Order 12333. They apply to domestic investigative activities ofthe Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI) and other activities as provided herein. A-3 UNCLASSIFIED-rlOlt Of'f'ICIAL U9E ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide I. I\', vu. A-4 UNCLASSIFIED-POR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POK OFFICIAL us� O�TLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide INTRODUCTION As the primary investigative agency of the federal government, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the authority and responsibility to investigate all violations offederal law that are not exclusively assigned to another federal agency. The FBI is further vested by law and by Presidential directives with the primary role in carrying out investigations within the United States ofthreats to the national security. This includes the lead domestic role in investigating international terrorist threats to the United States, and in conducting counterintelligence activities to meet foreign entities' espionage and intelligence efforts directed against the United States. The FBI is also vested with important functions in collecting foreign intelligence as a member agency of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The FBI accordingly plays crucial roles in the enforcement of federal law and the proper administration of justice in the United States, in the protection of the national security, and in obtaining information needed by the United States for the conduct of its foreign affairs. These roles reflect the wide range of the FBI' s current responsibilities and obligations, which require the FBI to be both an agency that effectively detects, investigates, and prevents crimes, and an agency that effectively protects the national security and collects intelligence. The general objective of these Guidelines is the full utilization ofall authorities and investigative methods, consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, to protect the United States and its people from terrorism and other threats to the national security, to protect the United States and its people from victimization by all crimes in violation of federal law, and to further the foreign intelligence objectives of the United States. At the same time, it is axiomatic that the FBI must conduct its investigations and other activities in a lawful and reasonable manner that respects liberty and privacy and avoids unnecessary intrusions into the lives of law-abiding people. The purpose of these Guidelines, therefore, is to establish consistent policy in such matters. They will enable the FBI to perform its duties with effectiveness, certainty, and confidence, and will provide the American people with a firm assurance that the FBI is acting properly under the law. The issuance of these Guidelines represents the culmination of the historical evolution of the FBI and the policies governing its domestic operations subsequent to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Reflecting decisions and directives of the President and the Attorney General, inquiries and enactments of Congress, and the conclusions ofnational commissions, it was recognized that the FBI's functions needed to be expanded and better integrated to meet contemporary realities: [C]ontinuing coordination...is necessary to optimize the FBI's performance in both national security and criminal investigations ... [The] new reality requires first that the FBI and other agencies do a better job of gathering intelligence inside the United States, and second that we eliminate the remnants of the old "wall" between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement. Both tasks must be accomplished without sacrificing our domestic liberties and the rule of law, and both depend on building a very different FBI from the one we had 4 A-5 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-POK OPFICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide on September 10, 2001. (Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 466,452 (2005).) In line with these objectives, the FBI has reorganized and reoriented its programs and missions, and the guidelines issued by the Attorney General for FBI operations have been extensively revised over the past several years. Nevertheless, the principal directives of the Attorney General governing the FBI's conduct of criminal investigations, national security investigations, and foreign intelligence collection have persisted as separate documents involving different standards and procedures for comparable activities. These Guidelines effect a more complete integration and harmonization of standards, thereby providing the FBI and other affected Justice Department components with clearer, more consistent, and more accessible guidance for their activities, and making available to the public in a single document the basic body of rules for the FBI's domestic operations. These Guidelines also incorporate effective oversight measures involving many Department of Justice and FBI components, which have been adopted to ensure that all FBI activities are conducted in a manner consistent with law and policy. The broad operational areas addressed by these Guidelines are the FBI's conduct of investigative and intelligence gathering activities, including cooperation and coordination with other components and agencies in such activities, and the intelligence analysis and planning functions of the FBI. A. FBI RESPONSIBILITIES -FEDERAL CRIMES, THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE Part II of these Guidelines authorizes the FBI to carry out investigations to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence. The major subject areas of information gathering activities under these Guidelines - federal crimes, threats to the national security, and foreign intelligence - are not distinct, but rather overlap extensively. For example, an investigation relating to international terrorism will invariably crosscut these areas because international terrorism is included under these Guidelines' definition of "threat to the national security," because international terrorism subject to investigation within the United States usually involves criminal acts that violate federal law, and because information relating to international terrorism also falls within the definition of "foreign intelligence." Likewise, counterintelligence activities relating to espionage are likely to concern matters that constitute threats to the national security, that implicate violations or potential violations of federal espionage laws, and that involve information falling under the definition of "foreign intelligence." While some distinctions in the requirements and procedures for investigations are necessary in different subject areas, the general desi gn of these Guidelines is to take a uniform approach wherever possible, thereby promoting certainty and consistency regarding the applicable standards and facilitating compliance with those standards. Hence, these Guidelines do not require that the FBI's information gathering activities be differentially labeled as "criminal investigations," "national security investigations," or "foreign intelligence collections," or that the categories of 5 A-6 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OPPICIAL USE O�q'LY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL U�E'. ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide FBI personnel who carry out investigations be segregated from each other based on the subject areas in which they operate. Rather, all of the FBI's legal authorities are available for deployment in all cases to which they apply to protect the public from crimes and threats to the national security and to further the United States' foreign intelligence objectives. In many cases, a single investigation will be supportable as an exercise of a number of these authorities - i.e., as an investigation of a federal crime or crimes, as an investigation of a threat to the national security, and/or as a collection of foreign intelligence. 1. Federal Crimes The FBI has the authority to investigate all federal crimes that are not exclusively assign ed to other agencies. In most ordinary criminal investigations, the immediate objectives include such matters as: determining whether a federal crime has occurred or is occurring, or if planning or preparation for such a crime is taking place; identifying, locating, and apprehending the perpetrators; and obtaining the evidence needed for prosecution. Hence, close cooperation and coordination with federal prosecutors in the United States Attorneys' Offices and the Justice Department litigating divisions are essential both to ensure that agents have the investigative tools and legal advice at their disposal for which prosecutorial assistance or approval is needed, and to ensure that investigations are conducted in a manner that will lead to successful prosecution. Provisions in many parts of these Guidelines establish procedures and requirements for such coordination. 2. Threats to the National Security The FBI's authority to investigate threats to the national security derives from the executive order concerning U.S. intelligence activities, from delegations of functions by the Attorney General, and from various statutory sources. See, e.g., E.O. 12333; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. These Guidelines (Part VII.S) specifically define threats to the national security to mean: international terrorism; espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, and assassination, conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons; foreign computer intrusion; and other matters determined by the Attorney General, consistent with Executive Order 12333 or any successor order. Activities within the definition of "threat to the national security" that are subject to investigation under these Guidelines commonly involve violations (or potential violations) of federal criminal laws. Hence, investigations of such threats may constitute an exercise both of the FBI's criminal investigation authority and of the FBI's authority to investigate threats to the national security. As with criminal investigations generally, detecting and solving the crimes, and eventually arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators, are likely to be among the objectives of investigations relating to threats to the national security. But these investigations also often serve important purposes outside the ambit of normal criminal investigation and prosecution, by providing the basis for, and informing decisions concerning, other measures needed to protect the national security. These measures may include, for example: excluding or removing persons involved in terrorism or espionage from the United States; recruitment of double agents; freezing 6 A-7 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U3E ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide assets of organizations that engage in or support terrorism; securing targets of terrorism or espionage; providing threat information and warning to other federal, state, local, and private agencies and entities; diplomatic or military actions; and actions by other intelligence agencies to counter international terrorism or other national security threats. In line with this broad range ofpurposes, investigations of threats to the national security present special needs to coordinate with other Justice Department components, including particularly the Justice Department's National Security Division, and to share information and cooperate with other agencies with national security responsibilities, including other agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Department ofHomeland Security, and relevant White House (including National Security Council and Homeland Security Council) agencies and entities. Various provisions in these Guidelines establish procedures and requirements to facilitate such coordination. 3. Foreign Intelligence As with the investigation of threats to the national security, the FBI's authority to collect foreign intelligence derives from a mixture of administrative and statutory sources. See, e.g., E.O. 12333; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.; 28 U.S.C. 532 note (incorporating P.L. 108-458 §§ 2001-2003). These Guidelines (Part VILE) define foreign intelligence to mean "information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorists." The FBI's foreign intelligence collection activities have been expanded by legislative and administrative reforms subsequent to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, reflecting the FBI's role as the primary collector of foreign intelligence within the United States, and the recognized imperative that the United States' foreign intelligence collection activities become more flexible, more proactive, and more efficient in order to protect the homeland and adequately inform the United States' crucial decisions in its dealings with the rest of the world: The collection of information is the foundation of everything that the Intelligence Community does. While successful collection cannot ensure a good analytical product, the failure to collect information ... turns analysis into guesswork. And as our review demonstrates, the Intelligence Community's human and technical intelligence collection agencies have collected far too little information on many of the issues we care about most. (Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 351 (2005).) These Guidelines accordingly provide standards and procedures for the FBI's foreign intelligence collection activities that meet current needs and realities and optimize the FBI's ability to discharge its foreign intelligence collection functions. The authority to collect foreign intelligence extends the sphere of the FBI's information gathering activities beyond federal crimes and threats to the national security, and permits the FBI to seek information regarding a broader range of matters relating to foreign powers, organizations, 7 A-8 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL OSE ONLr Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide or persons that may be of interest to the conduct of the United States' forei gn affairs.The FBI's role is central to the effective collection of foreign intelligence within the United States because the authorized domestic activities of other intelligence agencies are more constrained than those of the FBI under applicable statutes and Executive Order 12333.In collecting foreign intelligence, the FBI will generally be guided by nationally-determined intelligence requirements, including the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the National HUMINT Collection Directives, or any successor directives issued under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). As provided in Part VII.F of these Guidelines, foreign intelligence requirements may also be established by the President or Intelligence Community officials desi gnated by the President, and by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an official designated by the Attorney General. The general guidance of the FBI's foreign intelligence collection activities by DNI­ authorized requirements does not, however, limit the FBI's authority to conduct investigations supportable on the basis of its other authorities -to investigate federal crimes and threats to the national security - in areas in which the information sought also falls under the definition of foreign intelligence.The FBI conducts investigations of federal crimes and threats to the national security based on priorities and strategic objectives set by the Department of Justice and the FBI, independent of DNI-established foreign intelligence collection requirements. Since the authority to collect foreign intelligence enables the FBI to obtain information pertinent to the United States' conduct of its foreign affairs, even if that information is not related to criminal activity or threats to the national security, the information so gathered may concern lawful activities. The FBI should accordingly operate openly and consensually with U.S. persons to the extent practicable when collecting foreign intelligence that does not concern criminal activities or threats to the national security. B. THE FBI AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY The FBI is an intelligence agency as well as a law enforcement agency. Its basic functions accordingly extend beyond limited investigations of discrete matters, and include broader analytic and planning functions.The FBI's responsibilities in this area derive from various administrative and statutory sources. See, e.g., E.O. 12333; 28 U.S.C. 532 note (incorporating P.L. 108-458 §§ 2001-2003) and 534 note (incorporating P.L. 109-162 § 1107). Enhancement of the FBI's intelligence analysis capabilities and functions has consistently been recognized as a key priority in the legislative and administrative reform efforts following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: [Counterterrorism] strategy should ...encompass specific efforts to ...enhance the depth and quality of domestic intelligence collection and analysis .... [T]he FBI should strengthen and improve its domestic [intelligence] capability as fully and expeditiously as possible by immediately instituting measures to . . . significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities ...(Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S. Rep. No. 351 & H.R. Rep. 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ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide C C. l APPENDIX C: (U//FOUO) USE AND TARGETING OF A FEDERAL PRISONER HELD IN THE CUSTODY OF THE BOP OR USMS DURING AN FBI PREDICATED INVESTIGATION; INTERVIEW OF A FEDERAL PRISONER HELD IN THE CUSTODY OF THE BOP OR USMS DURING AN FBI ASSESSMENT OR PREDICATED INVESTIGATION (U) OVERVIEW/SUMMARY (U/7'fiOUQ) Use and Targeting a Federal Prisoner: During an FBI Predicated Investigation, it may be necessary and appropriate to: 1) use a cooperating federal prisoner to gather and obtain evidence and intelligence; or 2) target a federal prisoner. This policy sets forth the approval process for the use of and targeting of a federal prisoner held in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or the United States Marshals Service (USMS). (U/� Interview a Federal Prisoner: During an FBI Assessment or Predicated Investigation, it may be necessary and appropriate to interview a federal prisoner in the custody of the BOP or USMS. This policy sets forth the approval process for the interview of a federal prisoner held in the custody of the BOP or the USMS during an FBI Assessment or Predicated Investigation. (UJ7P6YO:l...Exclusions from this Policy: This policy does not apply to: A) C.2 I b7E (U//FOuoj (U) LEGAL AUTHORITY (U) The FBI is authorized by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to use and target a federal prisoner for investigative purposes and interview a Federal Prisoner (DOJ Memorandum "Use and TaJgeting of Federal PrisoneJs in Investigations," January 22, 2009). C.3 (U) DEFINITIONS (U) Federal Prisoner: For purposes within this section, a federal prisoner is one who is held in the custody of either the BOP or the USMS pursuant to an order of a court in connection with a criminal matter, regardless of where the person is housed. (U) Use of a Federal Prisoner: Use of a federal prisoner means to employ a federal prisoner during an investigation in such a manner that the prisoner will interact with others who are not members of law enforcement (e.g., the prisoner will engage in a consensually monitored telephone call with a target) or the prisoner will be taken out of the custody of BOP or USMS (e.g., the prisoner is removed from the prison to assist the FBI in locating a hide-out) or law enforcement will interact covertly with the prisoner (e.g., an undercover agent engages with the prisoner in the visiting room of the prison). C-1 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCL ASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Inv estig ations and Ope ations Guide r (U) Targeting a Federal Prisoner: "T a geting" a fede al prisone m eans that the fede al p isone is the ta get of the inv estigation and that inv estigativ e activ ity w ill di ectly inte act w ith eithe the prisone o the fede al facility (e.g., as part of a money l aunde ing inv estig ation targeting a p isone , the FBI wishes to engage in a consensu ally monito ed conv e sation w ith the p isone ). r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r (U) Interview of a Federal Prisoner: Inte v iew of a fede al p isone means to inte act w ith a fede al p isone , ov e tly ep esenting oneself as an FBI employee, in o de to g athe information. r r r r C.3.1 r r r r r r r r r r (U) USE AND TARGETING A FEDERAL PRISONER re uest the use of or the tar etin of a federal risoner in an b7E b7E C.3.2 (U) INTERVIEW A FEDERAL PRISONER in.a..= an FBI A ssessm ent (U//FOUO) An FBI emplo"'"""aa....a.a.a.;a;..i....;;..;;."'"""'a.a;,,,;,..a.;a..=a;.a..;...a..;;..a.a...aa�=.a.aa..=r=is;..ao=n=e.a..= ;.;....a..==.a. ==='""=== a.a...., o P edic ated Inv esti atio r r r C.4 b7E (U) APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS C.4.1 (U) APPROVAL - USE AND TARGETING OF A FEDERAL PRISONER b7E (U//p't,tft,A I (U//fflffl)j b7E I The p ocess is as follows: r A) (U/iF'OUSj The FBI field office employee must: b7E 1) (U//F'bt,Q b7E b7E b7E 4) (U//� I C-2 UNCL ASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOB OFFICIAL USE onLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide I 5) (U//ffltffij I B) 6r\)//ffit/Dll I (U//FOUOi I "'-;::::========-------------] JI m11f"ot10 1 ------------------------- 2) (U//F'Ol:1'e ,...._____________________. 3) (U//ffit:te>) b7E b7E b7E b7E b7E b7E b7E (Ui'FOUQ.) Note:! I (U//mtrOj CIWmttaj I b7E b7E b7E I (U//FOUO) Note: The DOJ Memorandum governing the Use and Targeting of Federal Prisoners is labeled "Se nsitive In vestigative Matter" This is not a SIM as defined in DIOG Section C.4.2 10.I I b7E (U) APPROVAL - INTERVIEW A FEDERAL PRISONER (U//FOUOt-The FBI employee must: A) B) C) (U!!P'6aj____________________ I (U/�1 I b7E b7E ___________________ crn,q::ouo) ,...._ C-3 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY __, Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� O�lY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide C.5 (U) EXEMPTIONS TO DOJ APPROVAL REQUIREMENT b7E U//POUO,I A) B) C) D) (U)I I I (Uli'�eHel I I u//F'Cffie b7E 1) (U/+P8U6) b7E 2) (UiiFO0O) b7E 3) (ULL!lO.I b7E � 4) (U/ll'l'lt!l'l : I C.6 b7E b7E (UNFOH8l b7E I (U,@880 B) (U//Fe-Ue D) (U//�j C) b7E I (U/ff-0-HE)� (U/,'FOU8) I A) b7E I (U//F6t:r0) I (U) EXTENSION REQUESTS b7E b7E b7E I b7E I b7E b7E A) B) (U/tfoOUQ) I (U/}f'OUO)'"'"I ________________..........., C-4 UNCLASSIFIED - roR OFFICIAL USE ONLy Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E b7E ��:;::�l C) D) C. 7 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� O�TLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b7E b7E ..,. E) (U//FOUO� i-----------.-------' b7E (U) TRANSPORTATION OF FEDERAL PRISONER (U//FOUO) If it is necessary to remove the federal risoner from the detention facilit in which he/she is housed as a art of the investi ation b7E I b7E A) B) I E) F) G) H) I (U//rvL.JV (UL '-.J:..;V C) D) (U//rffi,91 I I b7E I (U/i'FOHO b7E b7E (U//FOUO�I ,(U//FO□,� --------------------------, b7E (U//FOU02I b7E I _____________. b7E (U/�) ..... C-5 UNCLASSIFIED POtt OPPICIAL USE ONLY b7E Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�li: O�LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide D APPENDIX D: (U) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM ON COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS, DATED MAY 11, 2009 D-1 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OPFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED POR OPPICIAL USE O��LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b6 b7C <@ffice of tf?t .Atforntl! <'tntral lll�s�ingfon, il. QI. 205.90 May 11, 2009 MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENT COMPONENTS ALL UNITED STATES ATIORNEYS FROM: �E ATTORNEY GENERAL SUBJECT: Communications with the White House and Congress The rule oflaw depends upon the evenhanded administration ofjustice. The legal judgments ofthe Department ofJustice must be impartial and insulated from political influence. It is imperative that the Department's investigatory and prosecutorial powers be exercised free from partisan consideration. It is a fundamental duty ofevery employee ofthe Department to ensure that these principles are upheld in all ofthe Department's legal endeavors. In order to promote the rule oflaw, therefore, this memorandum sets out guidelines to govern all communications between representatives ofthe Department, on the one hand, and representatives ofthe White House and Congress, on the other, and procedures intended to implement those guidelines. (The "White House," for the purposes ofthis Memorandum, means all components within the Executive Office of the President.) These guidelines have been developed in consultation with, and have the full support of, the Counsel to the President. I. Pending or Contemplated Criminal or Civil Investigations and Cases The Assistant Attorneys General, the United States Attorneys, and the heads ofthe investigative agencies in the Department have the primary responsibility to initiate and supervise investigations and cases. These officials, like their superiors and their subordinates, must be insulated from influences that should not affect decisions in particular criminal or civil cases. As the Supreme Court said long ago with respect to United States Attorneys, so it is true of all those who exercise the Department's investigatory and prosecutorial powers: they are representatives "not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but ofa sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). a. In order to ensure the President's ability to perform his constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," the Justice Department will advise the White House concerning pending or contemplated criminal or civil investigations or cases when-but only when-it is important for the performance of the President's duties and appropriate from a law enforcement perspective. D-2 UNCLASSIFIED POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide Memorandum for Head of Department Components All United States Attorneys Subject: Communications with the White House and Congress Page 2 b. Initial communications between the Department and the White House concerning pending or contemplated criminal investigations or cases will involve only the Attorney General or the Deputy Artomey General, from the side of the Department, and the Counsel to the President, the Principal Deputy Counsel to the President, the President or the Vice President, from the side of the White House. If the communications concern a pending or contemplated civil investigation or case, the Associate Attorney General may also be involved. If continuing contact between the Department and the White House on a particular matter is required, the officials who participated in the initial communication may designate subordinates from each side to carry on such contact. The designating officials must monitor subsequent contacts, and the designated subordinates must keep their superiors regularly informed of any such contacts. Communications about Justice Department personnel in reference to their handling of specific criminal or civil investigations or cases are expressly included within the requirements of this paragraph. This policy does not, however, prevent officials in the communications, public affairs, or press offices of the White House and the Department of Justice from communicating with each other to coordinate efforts. c. In order to ensure that Congress may carry out its legitimate investigatory and oversight functions, the Department will respond as appropriate to inquiries from Congressional Committees consistent with policies, laws, regulations, or professional ethical obligations that may require confidentiality and consistent with the need to avoid publicity that may undermine a particular investigation or litigation. Outside the context of Congressional hearings or investigations, all inquiries from individual Senators and Members of Congress or their staffs concerning particular contemplated or pending criminal investigations or cases should be dim:ted to the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General. In the case of particular civil investigations or cases, inquiries may also be directed to the Associate Attorney General, d. These procedures are not intended to interfere with the normal communications between the Department and its client departments and agencies (including agencies within the Executive Office of the President when they are the Department's clients) and any meetings or communications necessary to the proper conduct of an investigation or litigation. 2. National Security Matters It is critically important to have frequent and expeditious communications relating to national security matters, including counter-terrorism and counter-espionage issues. Therefore communications from (or to) the Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs, the staff of the National Security Council and the staff of the Homeland Security Council that relate to a national security matter are not subject to the limitations set out above. However, this exception for national security matters does not extend to pending adversary cases in litigation that may have national security implications. Communications related to such cases are subject to the guidelines for pending cases described above. D-3 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICil,L USE O�tLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide Memorandum for Head of Department Components All United States Attorneys Subject: Communications with the White House and Congress Page 3 3. White House Requests for Legal Advice All requests from the White House for formal legal opinions shall come from the President, the Counsel to the President, or one of the Deputy Counsels to the President, and shall be directed to the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel. The Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel shall report to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General any communications that, in his or her view, constitute improper attempts to influence the Office of Legal Counsel's legal judgment. 4. Communications Involving the Solicitor General's Office. Matters in which the Solicitor General's Office is involved often raise questions about which contact with the Office of the Counsel to the President is appropriate. Accordingly, the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General may establish distinctive arrangements with the Office of the Counsel to govern such contacts. 5. Presidential Pardon Matters The Office of the Pardon Attorney may communicate directly with the Counsel to the President and the Deputy Counsels to the President, concerning pardon matters. The Counsel to the President and the Deputy Counsels to the President may designate subordinates to carry on contact with the Office of the Pardon Attorney after the initial contact is made. 6. Personnel Decisions Concerning Positions in the Civil Service All personnel decisions regarding career positions in the Department must be made without regard to the applicant's or occupant's partisan affiliation. Thus, while the Departme_nt regularly receives communications from the White House and from Senators, Members of Congress, and their staffs concerning political appointments, such communications regarding positions in the career service are not proper when they concern a job applicant's or a job holder's partisan affiliation. Efforts to influence personnel decisions concerning career positions on partisan grounds should be reported to the Deputy Attorney General. 7. Other Communications Not Relating to Pending Investigations or Criminal or Civil Cases All communications between the Department and the White House or Congress that are limited to policy, legislation, budgeting, political appointments, public affairs, intergovernmental relations, or administrative matters that do not relate to a particular contemplated or pending investigation or case may be handled directly by the parties concerned. Such communications should take place with the knowledge of the Department's lead contact regarding the subject D-4 UNCLASSIFIED-POK OPFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED 'FOil OfflCIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide Memorandum for Head of Department Components All United States Attorneys Subject: Communications with the White House and Congress Page4 under discussion. In the case of communications with Congress, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and Office of the Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs should be kept informed of all communications concerning legislation and the Office of the Associate Attorney General should be kept informed about important policy communications in its areas of responsibility. As Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti noted in issuing a similar memorandum during the Carter Administration, these guidelines and procedures are not intended to wall off the Department from legitimate communication, We welcome criticism and advice. What these procedures are intended to do is route communications to the proper officials so they can be adequately reviewed and considered, free from either the reality or the appearance of improper influence. Decisions to initiate investigations and enforcement actions are frequently discretionary. That discretion must be exercised to the extent humanly possible without regard to partisanship or the social, political, or interest group position of either the individuals involved in the particular cases or those who may seek to intervene against them or on their behalf. This memorandum supersedes the memorandum issued by Attorney General Mukasey on December 19, 2007, titled Communications with the White House. D-5 UNCLASSIFIED FOR Of:flCIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U:Sf! ONLi Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED POR OPPICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide E APPENDIX E: (U/fFOUO) ATTORNEY GENERAL MEMORANDUM - REVISED POLICY ON THE USE OR DISCLOSURE OF FISA INFORMATION, DATED JANUARY 10, 2008 b6 b7C E-1 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations .Guide b6 b7C F'6R 6F'PICIAI:. BSli:l O:P.l+..Y U.S. Department of Justice National Security Division Office of the Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530 January 10, 2008 TO: All United States Attorneys All National Security Division Attorneys All Anti-Terrorism Coordinators CC: Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division Director, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation FROM: Kenneth L. Wainstein Assistant Attorney General for National Security SUBJECT: Revised FISA Use Policy as Approved by the Attorney General \l\,J We are pleased to provide the Department of Justice's revised policy on the use or disclosure of information obtained or derived from collections under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as approved by the Attorney General today. Also attached is a form for use with respect to notifications that are required under Section I of the revised policy. This revised policy includes significant changes from current practice that will streamline the process for using FISA information in certain basic investigative processes, while still ensuring that important intelligence and law enforcement interests are protected. ·1,_____________. You will note that the revised policy authorizes the use or disclosure ofFISA information, under the specific circumstances described in the policy, with notification to NSD and after consultation with the FBI (or other Intelligence Community agencies) for the following investigative processes: b7E F0R 8FFl61,t.I,, HSE QP!bY E-2 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED POR OFFICIAL USE QNT Y Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide li'OR 0FFICI:\I USE QNLY ··1-;=I ======================================::1 b7E b7E · 1L...--__________JI b7E As described in the revised policy, the Department continues to require prior authorization from the Assistant Attorney General for National Security (AAG/NSD) for the use or disclosure of FISA information in order to file criminal charges or in post-charge criminal proceedings, as well as in connection with certain investigative processes (e.g., criminal search warrants under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). The revised policy also requires the prior authorization of the AAG/NSD or his designee for the use or disclosure of FISA information in non-criminal proceedings. The revised policy was drafted by a Justice Department working group that included representatives from the Attorney General's Advisory Committee of United States Attorneys (AGAC), National Security Division (NSD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Office of Legal Policy (OLP). The working group also consulted with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in the course of the development of this policy. The revised policy requires that it be reviewed one year from its effective date and requires NSD to issue guidance on what constitutes information "derived from" PISA collections by March 31, 2008. As noted in the policy, prosecutors are encouraged to contact the National Security Division at any time in order to obtain guidance regarding this policy and to expedite resolution of any issues. 2 ¥OR 0¥¥1CIJ,b l,JSt; 0�11,,Y E-3 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL IISli: OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b6 b7C U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C 20530 Office of the Attorney General January 10, 2008 TO: All Federal Prosecutors CC: Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division Director, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation FROM; Michael B. Mukase�(� Attorney General SUBJECT: Revised Policy on the Use or Disclosure ofFISA Information j:-1/fjt/t As a general matter, it is the policy of the Department of Justice to use all lawful processes in the investigation and prosecution of cases involving terrorism, intelligence, and national security, and to undertake all efforts necessary to protect the American people from the threat posed by foreign powers and their agents, while also exercising due regard for the protection of intelligence sources, methods, and collections, and the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons. There are important purposes to be served by consultation and coordination with respect to the use or disclosure ofFISA information1 in investigations, criminal prosecutions, and other proceedings. First, because FISA information is almost always classified, the use or disclosure of such information will normally require declassification by the originating agency in accordance with the originating agency's policies and procedures. Second, the use of such information could directly or indirectly compromise intelligence sources, methods, or collections, or disclose the existence or nature of or otherwise compromise an investigation. Third, PISA requires the Government to notify the court and an "aggrieved person" of its intent 1 The tenn "FISA infonnation," as used in this policy, means any information acquired, obtained, or derived from collection authorized pursuant to FISA. Whether specific information qualifies as "derived from" FISA collection may be a fact-bound question that depends, at least in part, on the attenuation of the infonnation to he used from the original FlSA acquired or obtained lnfonnation and whether the information was also obtained from an independent source, as well as other factors. Where such a question arises, the application of this policy should be discussed among the USAO, FBI, and NSD, and if consensus is not reached, a determination will be made by the Assistant Attorney General for National Security. Separate guidance regarding what constitutes information "derived from" FISA collection will be issued by the National Security Division no later than March 31, 2008. E-4 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR: OPPICIAL U9E ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide FQR QUl(;IAb HSI! ONLY to use or disclose any FISA information before it is used against such person in a broad range of proceedings. Fourth, the Government is required to ensure that complete and accurate filings are made with the Forei gn Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and that the Government complies with all ofFISA's statutory requirements. Fifth, it is important to ensure that litigation risks, if any, are properly assessed. Finally, in certain cases, it may be appropriate to make disclosures to a United States District Court regarding classified facts before legal process is obtained. Given these purposes, it is essential that coordination take place in connection with the use or disclosure ofFISA information. Such coordination should be streamlined in order to promote efficient, nimble, and useful investigative activities. The risk of compromising the purposes described above varies depending on the sta e of the investi ation criminal roceedin . As a ener matter b7E approaches for taking action. Prosecutors are encouraged to contact the National Security Division at any time in order to obtain guidance regarding this policy and to expedite resolution of any issues. The following policy is therefore adopted and supersedes any existing Attorney General policies with respect to the use and disclosure of FISA information to the extent that they are inconsistent with this policy: (a) (b) the Assistant Attorney General for National Security may act as the Attorney General, as provided for under FISA. see 50 U.S.C. § 180l(g), for the purpose of authorizing the use or disclosure of PISA information pursuant to this policy;2 and federal prosecutors and all others who may seek to use or disclose FISA information in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority ofthe United States, in coordination with NSD and FBI, are authorized to do so ursuant to the terms of this olic shall coordinate with NS ....i:::·d shall comply with the ,...,.,..--,---..----,,--,--,---.-....,...,.-..,..........,....-L.....,following procedures m matters that mvolve e use or disclosure of FISA information:3 b7E ' Such authorization may also be provided by the Attorney General, Acting Attorney General, and the Deputy Attorney General. Su 50 U.S.C. § 180l(g). l Nothing in this policy is intended to supersede or replace existing policies for prosecutors regarding notification, consultation, and approval for certain investigative and prosecutive steps, including consultation with other districts where related matters may be under investigation. For example, the United States Attorneys' Manual sets forth when a prosecutor must obtain prior approval for various court actions in national security prosecutions. See, e.g., United States Attorneys' Manual (USAM) §§ 9-2.131 ("Matters Assumed by Criminal Division or Higher 2 E-5 UNCLASSIFIED POtt OPHCIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide FQll QFl'ICIA+.. l:JSl!l 8NL'Y I. Use or Disclosure of PISA Information Reqyiring Consultation with FBI or other Intelligence Community Agencies and Notification to NSD A. B. Certain investigative processes present only moderate risks. As a result, where FISA information is used or disclosed in connection with the processes described below, consultation with FBI (or other Intelligence Community agencies, as appropriate)4 and notice to NSD is required: 1. b7E 2. b7E 3. b7E 4. b7E Where FISA information is used or disclosed in connection with the processes described above, the following notification process shall be followed: b7E l. Authority"); 9-2.136 ("Investigative and Prosetutive Policy for International Terrorism Matters"); 9-2.155 ("Sensitive Matters"); 9-2.4-00 ("Prior Approvals Chart"). 4 For the purposes of this document, the tenn "Intelligence Community agencies" refers to the appropriate agencies within the Intelligence Community, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Consultation with Intelligence Community agencies other than the FBI is typically appropriate when the sources, methods, or collections involve Intelligence Community agencies other than the FBI. Prose;:utors are encouraged to contact the National Security Division, as needed, to assist with the consultation process with the FBI or other Intelligence Community agencies. I ' Some courts require a significant measure t · · of· information · · with respect · to the ex he disclosure o dvance authorization as prov, e or m ect1on the court. e t ona b7E m orma 10n poor to sue app 1ca ons mg 3 FOR omcrxL 'tfStll ONLY E-6 UNCLASSIFIED POR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POR Of:f:ICIAL IISli: Ql}U Y Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide FOR OFFICIU. Yil! gm,y 2. 3. b7E As provided on the attached drl¥"'-----....LW...J.C1.11.1Ji1,LJ;W,,1,;iiia,il must indicate that he or she h I ,_,,,__., """"" b7E Ihm NSD oomph"" Mih p,>1,m..t ohl,g,mo"' fu nJ the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. C. D. \Vhere consultations with the FBI or other Intelli ence Communi a encies, as appropriate) demonstrate tha b7E l. b7E rmit the use or disclosure of FISA information obtained b7E e er prosecutors mus seek specific, separate use authority from the Assistant Attorney General for National Security prior to initiating any criminal proceedings. IL Use or Disclosure ofFISA Information Requiring the Advance Authorization of the Assistant Attorney General for National Security A. The advance authorization of the Assistant Attorney General for National Security I '" remrired ..... mA ,_,n" I b7E b7E FQRQl-.'\· o,,,._...,;l li.\"1�11 :;,. M.::;,,,!i� m n��'i:l':' ,¼,.¼:isl fall«� ,�f!<>•�$Si�"' t�i���h;R.js;§:.-4..�X, i<:.!¾•�� t�i�t�ii;.1 . � U�:�i�l$����-t��fat�::�;k� l�����:�--K�� ::��}��JS�f�fx� rw���-�t��:::.�iJ5�;:� krn:i,- l<{. <'.t,1� ;,-;;..,.../i!:e .l�) ,",l�,��f 1.k""1,i!I ii��:��:-i�•l¾R¾����f�:f\��':J :C*�t'}: .. 1�-::�fJ����::n��J��:�)e�}�t:�J��:);� �ti�if :i%-,:R����:(�����t�1:/ff!� �:;!, :��H•t : ��W��:-���� =4\��::�:���t:h-�f������ ::�} �::.:��i ����t��1:����·�M���:�--:�����-: F-3 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b6 b7C �t�:�\"i�:�:(:-6:f -i��t:i�:i - :::�1:'.:r:{�:�� ::;;� ::.., --$�'.- ::.��;f7::Kk;f�:�J�n*�i ���::.:·f;;�-� ��-i:�f ..:-:�� �::-�i�:.��;��:�,��: :),::�.���:: t�\�� :���:,t_:�:�;:;: i:;:��-:f��<•t� �/'/'.�:: _i:::,,�;.:::•�'s�����:�---��id�:_·· ·�.�-�::{:;:-_:J�t��•�I,. 1-· : -��i�:.;:r..:•}�:�.��);_,-:x-·_.::-;����;:�.-­ ��i::,$tz:., ·x: ::�rtct �::�:�;.::�: -:li����:- :�:���:#:i:{�;_'{l•: t:*!)��:,°'":Xc�{':(: ·i_;;�:�:-$ ::.-�� �_.rt,::�fi?f-� �::::...;•;..-:��'.�� �t ::;::�;'...�_: :��?th�s· �t�t{\��i�� .; : • i:i;;;.i: ',, t� mi��i�$,t._.Si: f;:.3:-:-:r�t�: �i:.:�, { :;.;c:f��:. ��t:::- :· :�:��::::��-f::::: -:::�:.t:;�::}\;· �,;i��!::·s:��1:i::;:n· - �i�::S F-4 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFFICIAL U�� ON! Y Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide F-5 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICll,L U�B OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U5� ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide F.2 (U) USE OF DEADLY FORCE (U) Deadly Force Policy, dated 7/1/2004. F-6 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL U�Ji o�u y Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b6 b7C POLICY STATEMENT USE OF DEADLY FORCE Approved by the Attorney General July 1. 2004 GENERAL PRINCIPLES I. Law enforcement officers and correctional officers of the Department of Justice may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person. A. Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect. B. Firearms may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles. C. If feasible and if to do so would not increase the danger to the officer or others, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the officer shall be given prior to the use of deadly force. D. Warning shots are not permitted outside of the prison context. E. Officers will be trained in alternative methods and tactics for handling resisting subjects, which must be used when the use of deadly force is not authorized by this policy. CUSTODIAL SITUATIONS II. Unless force other than deadly force appears to be sufficient, deadly force may be used to prevent the escape of a prisoner committed to the custody of the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons A. if the prisoner is effecting his or her escape in a manner that poses an imminent danger to the safety of the officer or another person; or B. if the prisoner is escaping from a secure facility or is escaping while in transit to or from a secure facility. 111. If the subject is in a non-secure facility, deadly force may be used only when the subject poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or another person. IV. If the subject is in transit to or from a non-secure facility and is not accompanied by a person who is in transit to or from a secure facility, deadly force may be used only when the subject poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person. F-7 UNCLASSIFIED 'FOil OfflCIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide V. After an escape from a facility or vehicle and its immediate environs has been effected, officers attempting to apprehend the escaped prisoner may use deadly force only when the escaped prisoner poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or another person. VI. Deadly force may be used to maintain or restore control of a prison or correctional facility when the officer reasonably believes that the intended subject of the deadly force is participating in a disturbance in a manner that threatens the safety of the officer or another person. VII. In the prison context, warning shots may be fired within or in the immediate environs of a secure facility if there is no apparent danger to innocent persons: (A) If reasonably necessary to deter or prevent the subject from escaping from a secure facility; or (B) if reasonably necessary to deter or prevent the subject's use of deadly force or force likely to cause serious physical injury. APPLICATION OF THE POLICY VIII. This policy is not intented to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officer or employees, or any other person. F-8 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide F.3 (U) TRAINING A) (U) Deadly Force Policy Training Material, dated 7/29/2004. F-9 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OPPICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b6 b7C (Rev. 01-31-2003) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: To: ROUTINE All Divisions From: Date: Attn: General Counsel Legal In trnctiqn TTnit i Contact:l 07/29/2004 AD ADIC SAC CDC PFI FBIHQ, Manuals Desk FBIHQ, Manuals Desk b6 b7C �II________. I Approved By: .....,c�a�n.r�a�u ...... j___.v�a�J�e�r-1-·e .........,E Drafted By: Case ID#: 66F-HQ-1312253 66F-HQ-C1384970 66F-HQ-C1384970 Title: REVISIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEADLY FORCE POLICY DISSEMINATION OF TRAINING MATERIALS Synopsis: This Electronic Communication (EC) provides recipients with training materials incorporating the revisions approved on July 1, 2004 to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Deadly Force Policy. Reference: 66F-HQ-1312253 Serial 8 Enclosure(s): One copy of an instructional outline and one copy of use of force scenarios provided to all recipients for training purposes. Details: As discussed in the referenced EC, dated 7/7/2004, on July 1, 2004, the Attorney General approved a revised Policy Statement on the use of Deadly Force. In order to assist Field Offices in providing training and guidance on the practical application of the Deadly Force Policy in light of the revised language, the Legal Instruction Unit (LIU), Office of the General Counsel, revised training materials used with the prior Policy Statement to reflect the changes approved by the Attorney General. F-10 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICll,L U�B OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide To: Re: All Divisions From: General Counsel 66F-HQ-1312253, 07/29/2004 The training materials consist of an Instructional Outline and a set of 13 factual scenarios with a discussion of the use of force within the scenario and whether its use violates the policy. This material is similar to what was used for instructional purposes since 12/1/1995. The revised material reflects what was noted in the EC, that the revised policy does not expand or contract the current justification for the use of deadly force. Nonetheless, revisions to the training materials were necessary in order to describe the application of deadly force consistent with the new more succinct policy statement. The revisions to the training materials primarily relate to the elimination of the "safe alternative" language as a function of the "necessity" for us,-.........__"""'.....,"-'-"-....._...._._.__.......,_..____.,. elimination of lan ua e addressin For a more etai lSCUSSlOn O e na ure 0 Policy Statement the basis for these revisions, referenced EC. 2 F-11 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide To: Re: All Divisions From: General Counsel 66F-HQ-1312253, 07/29/2004 LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action) ALL RECEIVING OFFICES It is requested that this communication be distributed to all appropriate personnel . •• 3 F-12 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b6 b7C DEADLY FORCE POLICY TRAINING MATERIAL - 7/29/2004 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEADLY FORCE POLICY 1 Law enforcement officers of the Department of Justice may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person. A. Deadly force may not be used solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect. B. Firearms may not be fired solely to disable moving vehicles. C. If feasible and to do so would not increase the danger to the officer or others, a verbal warning to submit to the authority of the officer shall be given prior to the use of deadly force. D. Warning shots are not permitted2 E. Officers will be trained in alternative methods and tactics for handling resisting subjects which must be used when the use of deadly force is not authorized by this policy. This policy is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person. 1Department of Justice Policy Statement Use of Deadly Force (07/01/2004) in pertinent part (Language relating to Custodial Situations has been intentionally omitted pursuant to FBI policy. See, 66F-HQ-1312253, EC from the Director's Office to All Divisions, titled "REVISIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEADLY FORCE POLICY", dated 07/07/2004). 2 Not included in the above description is the policy relating to the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a prisoner committed to the custody of the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons. Because Agents will seldom find themselves in a position to apply the custodial aspect of the policy, the FBI will adhere to the policy decision set forth in the Airtel from the Director to All Field Offices, titled "Deadly Force Policy Matters," dated 1/5/95, which states "A policy decision has been made that except in cases of prison unrest which would principally involve HRT and/or SWAT, FBI Agents should adhere to the policy and training principles governing the use of deadly force in non-custodial situations. F-13 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFPICll.,L USE QNT Y Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide F.4 (U) TRAINING B) (U) Instructional Outline and Use of Force Scenarios. F-14 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED- FOR OFFICIAL USE O�.fLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 07/29/2004 INSTRUCTIONAL OUTLINE I. INTRODUCTION The following general principles shall guide the interpretation and application of this policy: II.. A. This policy shall not be construed to require Agents to assume unreasonable risks to themselves. B. The reasonableness of an Agent's decision to use deadly force must be viewed from the perspective of the Agent on the scene without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. C. Allowance must be made for the fact that Agents are often forced to make split-second decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. DEFINITIONS A. "DEADLY FORCE": Is force that is reasonably likely to cause death or serious physical injury. B. "REASONABLE BELIEF": Is synonymous with "Probable Cause". It is determined by a totality of the facts and circumstances known to Agents at the time, and the logical inferences that may be drawn from them. C. "NECESSARY": The necessity to use deadly force based on the existence of a reasonable belief that the person against whom such force is used poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the Agent or other persons. D. "IMMINENT DANGER": "Imminent" does not mean "immediate" or "instantaneous", but that an action is pending. Thus, a subject may pose an imminent danger even if he is not at that very moment pointing a weapon at the Agent. For example, imminent danger may exist if Agents have probable cause to believe any of the following: 2 F-15 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�TLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED POR OPHCIAL USE O��LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 1. The subject possess a weapou, or is attempting to gain access to a weapon, under circumstances indicating an intention to use it against the Agents or others; or, 2. The subject is armed and running to gain the tactical advantage of cover; QL 3. A subject with the capability of inflicting death or serious physical injury--or otherwise incapacitating agents--without a deadly weapon, is demonstrating an intention to do so; QI, 4. The subject is attempting to escape from the vicinity of a violent confrontation in which the suspect inflicted or attempted the infliction of death or serious physical injury. III APPLICATION OF DEADLY FORCE In assessing the necessity to use deadly force, the following practical considerations are relevant to its proper application: A. Inherent Limitation on Abilities to Assess the Threat and Respond. 1. Limited Time (Action v. Reaction) - there will always be an interval of time between a subject's action and an Agent's ability to perceive that action, to assess its nature, and to formulate and initiate an appropriate response. The inherent disadvantage posed by the action/reaction factor places a significant constraint on the time frame within which Agents must perceive, assess and react to a threat. 2. Limited Means (Wound Ballistics) - When the decision is made to use deadly force, Agents have no guaranteed means of instantaneously stopping the threat. The human body can sustain grievous - even ultimately fatal - injury and continue to function for a period of time (from several seconds to several minutes) depending on the location, number, and severity of the wounds. The lack of a reliable means of instantaneously stopping the threat, may extend the time that imminent danger can persist. This factor further constrains the time frame within which Agents must respond to a perceived threat. B. Achieving Intended Purpose. II.____--3 F-16 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL U�E ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide If the subject does not surrender, the only reliable means of achieving that goal is to cause physiological incapacitation of the subject(s) as quickly as possible. Attempts to do anything else - such as shooting to cause minor injury - are unrealistic and can risk exposing Agents or others to continued danger of death or serious physical injury. C. b7E 21_______ Consideration of Risk to Other Parties. Even when deadly force is permissible, Agents should assess whether its use creates a danger to third parties that outweighs the likely benefits of its use. 4 F-17 UNCLASSIFIED - POlt OfifitCIAL USE O�JLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b6 b7C bS b7E SCENARIO #1: DISSCUSSION: I F-18 UNCLASSIFIED - FO� OFFICIAL USE O�iLY I b7E Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #2: DISCUSSION: I I b7E 2 F-19 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #3: b7E DISCUSSION: 3 F-20 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OEFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #4: DISCUSSION: b7E I 4 F-21 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #5: b7E DISCUSSION: 5 F-22 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OPPICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #6: DISCUSSION: I I b7E 6 F-23 UNCLASSIFIED - l"Ott OPFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #7: b7E DISCUSSION: 7 F-24 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - 'FOK OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #8: DISCUSSION: I I b7E 8 F-25 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #9: DISCUSSION: I I b7E 9 F-26 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED POR OPHCIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide bS b7E SCENARIO #10: I DISCUSSION: b7E 10 F-27 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O�.:LY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide SCENARIO #11: I__________. bS b7E b7E DISCUSSION: 11 F-28 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED POR OPHCIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide SCENARIO #12: DISCUSSION: I.__________________. I bS b7E I b7E 12 F-29 UNCLASSIFIED - FOlt OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FO� OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide SCENARIO #13: DISCUSSION: I.______________. bS b7E I I b7E 13 F-30 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide SCENARIO #14: DISCUSSION: I ________. bS b7E ... I I b7E 14 F-31 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7C SECite:rm +O.EiI iRH_ Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §G (U) DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (U) Appendix G (U) Classified Provisions (U) Version Dated: September 28, 2016 SEL f<:.El'fh1itOi URN Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §G APPENDIX G: (U) CLASSIFIED PROVISIONS (U) This Part supplements the unclassified provisions of the AGG-Dom and DIOG. (U) Table of Contents HJ) G. l (U) Limitation on Certain Searches ................................................................................. 3 G.2 (U) Circumstances Warranting a Preliminary or Full Investigation ................................ 4 G.3 (U) Determination of United States Person (USPER)Status ............................................ 5 G.4 �) Attorney General Threat Country List ................................................................ 6 G.5 (U) Assistance to and/or from Foreign Agencies in the United States ............................ 7 G.6 (U) Consensual Monitoring .............................................................................................. 8 G.7 (U) Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM) ....................................................................... 9 G.8 (U) Data Analysis ........................................................................................................... 11 G.9 (U) Notice Requirements for the DOJ National Security Division (NSD) .................... 12 _____.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G.10 (U� ______ .__ G.11 (U� 13 1 ................................................................... 16 G.12 (U) National Security Letters for Telephone Toll Records of Members of the News Media or News Organizations ................................................................................................... 17 G.13 (U) Other Investigative Resources ................................................................................. 20 G.14 (U) Recruitment-In-Place Type 5 Assessments ("RIP Type 5") on Subjects of Approved Counterintelligence (CD) Full Investigations ........................................................................... 21 G-2 §§CB 6 Li1¢0i ull& b7E ,Sf1 4}'.fl;)1�0f ORN Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G. l §G (U) LIMITATION ON CERTAIN SEARCHES G.1.1 (U) CLASSIFIED A GG-DOM PROVISION G.1.2 (U) DJOG CLASSIFIED PROVISION J (! \ \'"'I (U) Refer to the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) Section 18.7.1 for procedures to obtain a FISA search warrant. G-3 sl:;ciffiiJJNOfO&W bl b3 om 'Sli:CiW7h1iGi Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G.2 §G (U) CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING A PRELIMINARY OR FULL INVESTIGATION G.2.1 G.2.2 U CLASSIFIED A GG-DOM PROVISION (U) DJOG CLASSIFIED PROVISION (U) The provisions ofDIOG Sections 6 (Preliminary Investigations) or 7 (Full Investigations) with regard to the purpose, approval and notification requirements apply fully to investigations predicated under this provision. G-4 ...SJ-iciwrm+oi om bl b3 om SF(:FtET,01 T■ZIFI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G.3 §G (U) DETERMINATION OF UNITED STATES PERSON (USPER)STATUS G.3 .1 (U) CLASSIFIED A GG-DOM PROVISION bl b3 ...@Ciffith1¼Gi 01®. Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide GA §G �) ATTORNEY GENERAL THREAT COUNTRY LIST G.4.l (U) CLASSIFIEDAGG-DOM PROVISION G.4.2 (U) DJOG CLASSIFIED PROVISION bl b3 J,,.\ \I.I/ bl b3 G-6 �FCP�T,41 l"Offi !KN SliGid!Th1,Q,l: OIW Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G.5 §G (U) ASSISTANCE TO AND/OR FROM FOREIGN AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES G.5 .1 (U) DJOG CLASSIFIED PROVISION bl b3 G-7 Sill 'lEOR.N Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §G G.13 (U) OTHER INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES G.13.l (U) DJOG CLASSIFIED PROVISION G. I3. I. I (U//FOUO) SENSITIVE TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT Definition: The term "Sensitive Technical E ui ment" STE includes TEis a tee no ogy t at has been jointly developed with or developed by another U.S. Government (USG) agency such that the FBI is not the sole owner and on which originator controls have been placed. The Assistant Director of the OTD after consultation with the relevant operational division is authorized to determine whether particular equipment is (or is not) STE. Authorized Investi ative Activit : An use of .----------------, For additional guidance, refer to the Extraterritorial G-20 :sTICt&i2A1'P IF( )@i bl b3 b7E Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G.14 §G (U) RECRUITMENT-IN-PLACE TYPE 5 ASSESSMENTS ("RIP TYPE 5")0 b7E (U) See Quick Reference Guide for RIP Tvpe 5 Assessments (links to a� document). (U//FOUO) Summary: A Type 5 Assessment provides the authority and process for identifying, evaluating, and recruiting a potential confidential human source (CHS). The following provisions integrate guidance from relevant subsections of the DIOG, the Countenntelligence Division Polin' Ouide (CJ)PG). 0717PG and the Con nlential Human Source Polic, Guide here noted, {CHSPG), 0836PG requirements remain the same as those in the DIOG, the CDPG, and the CHSPG, but the process · · e 5 Assessment� I ereinafter referred to as "RIP T e 5s." G.14.1 Ji"'I, \a.I/ (U) RIP TYPE 5 ASSESSMENTS bl b3 �GiltrnNOF Offfi Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G.14.2 G.14.3 §G (U) STANDARDS FOR OPENING OR APPROVING A RIP TYPE 5 ASSESSSMENT (U) FILE REVIEW (U) The frequency of the supervisory file review must be in accordance with DIOG 3.4.4.3. Additionally, the RIP Type 5 Assessment review standards (ARS) are as follows and must be documented in an Eq I • (U//F9YQ) Whether authorized investigative methods have been used properly. • • bl b3 (U//FQ.YQ) Whether reimbursable expenses incurred by an SA, if any, were reasonable and properly authorized. (U//FOUO) Whether the potential RIP can or should be recruited. G-22 �CiffiI))f�HliORN b7E s§ 'It£IHt<51 Oil:N Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide • §G (U/fti'OUO) Whether the RIP Type 5 Assessment should continue for an additional 90 days (60 days for probationary employees). If continuation is deemed justified, the supervisory special agent (SSA) must document the rationale for keeping the RIP Type 5 Assessment open. (U//fiOU�) Because the ARS EC must be made part of the case file and documented b7E above. G.14.4 !S) (U) AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE METHODS PERMITTED IN RIP TYPE 5 ASSESSMENTS G,14,5 IC\ \W/ s].U&±'�- rG-3.l.--­ �7fiOF9Fll bl b3 �Ci&ThNOroiE.r Domestic Investi ations and O erations Guide {S) G.14.5.1 G-24 ::s:E'.CRs£4;(Q:IQfO� G bl b3 SECv.-bbflqO£ ORN Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide §G bl b3 G.14.5.2 (U) ADDITIONAL APPROVAL REQUIREMENT FOR UNITED STATES PERSONS {TT'.! PF.--••N�\ I,,,\ \i.1/ G-25 �Cl&l))NOfQRN SFi IJZTh1TQFi ,B[_ Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G.14.5.3.1 (U) RECRUITMENT HAND-OFF TO ANOTHER AGENT G.14.5.3.2 (U) RECRUITMENT FROM THE COVERT APPROACH (No HAND-OFF) §G bl b3 ..S:P j r�:rm fg;;i Irf"N Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G.14.6 G.14.7 ruJI �NRIPTYPE5 �G bl b3 b7E bl b3 (U) CLOSING A RIP TYPE 5 (U//FOUO) A RIP Type 5 must be closed, via EC to the subfile, with SSA approval. G-27 �CRET,11 t1:1E( i&N.. _]Fi 1U"iill#NOFOB i::I. Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide G.14.8 §G (U) DECONFLICTION GUIDANCE bl b3 G.14.9 (U) STATUS AS A POLICY EXCEPTION H H. l b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED - POft OPPICIAL U�t! ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide APPENDIX H: (U) PRE-TITLE III ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (ELSUR) SEARCH POLICY (U) SCOPE (U) 18 U.S.C.§ 2518(1) (e) requires that each application for an order to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications (hereinafter "Title III") contain a statement describing all previous applications for Title III surveillance of the same persons, facilities, or places named in the current application. The below policy is designed to conform with this statutory requirement, clarify any past confusion, and address the effects on the previous search policy resulting from the recent elimination of the requirement for an agency Action Memorandum by the Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO). H.1.1 (U) COMPLIANCE WITH THE PREVIOUS APPLICATION PROVISION (U) 18 U.S.C.§ 2518(1) (e) requires that each application for an order to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications (hereinafter "Title III") contain a statement describing all previous applications for Title III surveillance of the same persons, facilities, or places named in the current application. Although a failure to comply with§ 2518(1) (e) will not always result in suppression of evidence, deliberate noncompliance likely will. (U) To comply with this requirement, BT search oalicv re@ires that a ' 'arch," i.e., an l r automated indices search, of the FBI's.__ _ _ ___ __ _system be conducted ....,.. ..,.... ...,...,___, ,... ........ prior to filing a Title III affidavit and application with the court. To assist field offices in conducting appropriate searches, the following guidelines are provided. H.1.1.1 A) B) H.1.1.2 (U) WHEN To SEARCH (U) ELSUR SEARCHES: ELSUR searches for both sensitive and nonsensitive Title Ills, including all original, extension, and renewal applications53 , must be conducted not more than 45 calendar days prior to the date the application and affidavit are filed with the court. (U) Any of the persons, facilities, and/or places named in an extension or renewal application and affidavit which have been the subject of a previous search conducted not more than 45 calendar days prior to the date the application and affidavit are filed with the court need not be searched again. (U) If an individual named by a partial name, nickname, street name, and/or code name in a previous application is subsequently identified by at least a first initial and a last name, a search must be conducted for the now-identified individual prior to seeking any new application naming that person. (U) How To SEARCH (U) ThQmust be searched for previously submitted Title III applications to intercept communications involving any of the persons, facilities, and/or places specified in the current Title III application. 53 This requirement also applies to what is sometimes referred to as a "spin-off" Title III which is actually a new application to begin surveillance at or of additional facilities arising from an existing investigation in which one or more Title Ills have already been authorized. As such "spin-off' Title Ills are considered to be an "original" request, even though some or all of the named persons are also named in the prior Title III(s). H-1 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICll,L U�B OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide A) (U) PRIOR APPLICATIONS: Searches are required only for previously submitted applications. There is no obligation to search for prior interceptions. The ELSUR search will provide records of the persons, facilities, and/or places named in prior applications filed by the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies named in the request. Any prior applications identified must be set forth in the affidavit in support of the new application._ H.1.1.2.1 (U)PERSONS , list the true (U) In submitting a Pre-Title III ELSUR Search Re uest FD-940 names or best known names of individuals for whom there is probable cause to believe that: (1) they are involved in the specified criminal activity, or (2) their criminal communications are expected to be intercepted over the target facility or within the target premises.54 These individuals are often identified in the application and affidavit as the "Target Subjects," "Target Violators," and/or "Target Interceptees." D A) (U) A minimum of a first initial and last name is required for an search. Biographical data such as date of birth, FBI Number, and/or Social Security Account Number, if known, must be included in the search request, even if not listed in the affidavit. Aliases, partial names, nicknames, street names, and/or code names may also be included as further identifying information on the FD-940. However, they will only be searched if they otherwise meet minimum ELSUR search requirements. For example, if an alias is a full name alias, it must be included and will be searched (i.e., John Smith a/k/a 'William Johnson" or William Smith a/k/a "Liam Smith"). However, if the subject is identified as John Smith a/k/a "Big Buddy," "Big Buddy" may be included as further identifying information, but will not be the subject of a separate ELSUR search. B) (U) Persons not fully identified by at least a first initial and a last name who are identified in the application and affidavit as "John Doe," "Jane Doe," or "FNU LNU" need not be the subject of a pre-Title III ELS UR search. For example, FNU LNU a/k/a "El Jefe" need not be included in an ELSUR search, or listed in the FD-940 search request. C) (U) A search of the0must be conducted for the subscriber or service provider of the target facility only if the subscriber or service provider is believed to be involved in the specified criminal offense(s). D) (U) Any additional persons, facilities, and/or places mentioned in the affidavit, but not also specified in the application as a person, facility, and/or place for which authorization to intercept is being sought, need not be searched or listed in the FD-940 (Pre-Title III ELSUR Search Request). H.1.1.2.2 (U) FAGILITY (U) List available numeric and/or alphanumeric values directly associated with the targeted device, equipment, or instrument over or from which the subjects are communicating (e.g., a telephone, pager, computer, etc.), and over or from which interceptions are being sought. Such values may include, but are not limited to, the telephone number of a land line phone, cell phone, or pager, Personal Identification Number (PIN), Cap Code, Electronic Serial Number (ESN), International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) Number, International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEi) Number, and/or Internet account information (including but not limited to screen name, online identity, ICQ number, and/or IP address). 54 (U) All individuals listed in the application and affidavit as being involved in the specified criminal activity should be searched inc=] H-2 UNCLASSIFIED POlt OfifslCIAL USE O�JLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - POft OPPICIAL U�t! ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide A) (U) Names of businesses, organizations, or agencies must be searched only if there is probable cause to believe the business, organization, or agency is culpable in the specified criminal offense(s). B) (U) Searches need not be conducted for telephone numbers or other facilities subscribed to, leased, or owned by the FBI for use in the investigation for which the ELSUR is being sought. (U) Any additional facilities mentioned in the affidavit, but not also specified in the application as a person, facility, and/or place for which authorization to intercept is being sought, need not be searched or listed in the FD-940 (Pre-Title III ELSUR Search Request). For example, telephone numbers identified as calling or being called by the Target Telephone, and set out in the pen register section of a Title III affidavit need not be the subject of a pre-Title III ELSUR search. C) H.1.1.2.3 (U)PLACES (U) List: (1) each address of a targeted landline hone or com uter terminal which will be sub· ect to the Title III order, and/or 2) H.1.1.2.4 b7E (U) ADDITIONS (U) Persons, facilities, and/or places added to an application and affidavit during the course of the review process and after the initial pre-Title III search request must be searched prior to 55 submitting the affidavit to the court. H.1.1.3 (U) WHERE TO SEARCH (U) A search of the FBI'sDmust be conducted for each item named in the search request. DOJ policy requires a search of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)r--lfor all Title 21 predicate offenses. As a matter of FBI for allOandr offense. A) lic a DEA and ICE ELSUR'seiircJi is automatically conducted by FBIHQ i'nvestigative classifications, and any other application involving a Title 21 (U) ThQ of any other federal, state, or local law enforcement agency that is actively participating in a joint investigation (as opposed to mere task force participation) or as to which there is reason to believe may have previously sought to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the persons, facilities, and/or places specified in the instant application, should be searched. Where a search of state and/or local law enforcement ELSUR records is requested, the request should include a point of contact from the outside agency, if known. Occasionally, during the course of their review, DOJ's Office of Enforcement Operations, will suggest that an additional name be added as a "Target Subject" (or similar) in a Title III pplic on and affidavit prior to the r grant of DOJ approval. If that name is added, it must be searched throug� rior to submitting the affidavit to the court. 55 H-3 UNCLASSIFIED - POit OFFICIAL USE O�TLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED-fiOit OPFICIAL USE O�ijLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (U) If there is reason to believe that any of the persons, facilities, and/or places specified in the current application have been the target of Title III electronic surveillance by another federal agency, that agency must be requested to conduct an ELSUR search of its records. B) H.1.1.4 (U) How To INITIATE A SEARCH REQUEST (U) The FD-940 (Pre-Title III ELSUR Search Request) is used for requesting pre-Title III ELSUR searches of theLJ)f the FBI and any other federal, state, or local law enforcement agency. The form is designed to assist personnel requesting a search by guiding them through the process. Use of the form will ensure search requirements are met. (U) If an emergency situation exists, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7), an ELSUR search may be requested telephonically to the field office EOT. H.1.1.4.1 (U) SEARCH PROCEDURE (U) The EQT will conduct a search of theLJor records of "previous applications only" or "all records" as specified in the FD-940. Records retrieved as a result of the search will be furnished to the requesting Agent. If intercept records are requested for any or all of the persons, facilities, and/or places named in the FD-940, intercept records which relate to unclassified criminal matters will be provided in their entirety to the requesting Agent and documented in the appropriate case file location(s). (U) It is the responsibility of the requesting Agent to use reasonable efforts to determine whether the persons, facilities, and/or places identified in the search are the same persons, facilities, and/or places specified in the current application. If there is reason to believe they are, offices identified as having filed previous applications must be contacted and the EQT in that office must be asked to review the pertinent investigative file(s) to determine whether the persons, facilities, and/or places identified in the search are, in fact, the same as those specified in the current application. (U) It is not necessary to contact other offices regarding common names for which no special identifying data is available unless there is reason to believe there is a nexus between the current investigation and the investigation conducted by the other field offices. (U) Documentation confirming the conduct of all pre-Title III ELSUR searches must be electronically placed in the appropriate investigative file. H.1.1.5 A) (U) WHAT To SAY (U) NO PREVIOUS APPLICATIONS: Sample proposed affidavit language when no previous applications have been filed: 1) (U) "Based upon a search of the records of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (and any other agency requested), no previous applications have been filed for an order authorizing the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications involving any of the persons, facilities, and/or places specified herein for which authorization to intercept is being sought." B) (U) PREVIOUS APPLICATIONS: 1) (U) If there was a previous application, include all relevant information concerning such application in the affidavit in support of the current application. Identify the persons, facilities, and/or places named, the method(s) of interception sought, the date the order was granted or denied, the court that issued or denied the order, the name of the authorizing or H-4 UNCLASSIFIED-l"Oit OfiPICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide denying judge (if known), and the relevance, if any, of the previous application to the current investigation. 2) (U) Sample proposed affidavit language when previous applications have been filed: "John Doe was named in a previous application for an order authorizing the interception of wire and electronic communications. The order was signed on (date), by U.S. District Judge (name), of the District of (State), authorizing the interceptions for a period of thirty (30) days. An extension of the order was signed by Judge (name) on (date), authorizing the continued interception for an additional 30-day period." (Include relevance, if any, of the previous applications to the current investigation). (U) DOCUMENTATION H.1.1.6 A) (U) Agents must provide a copy of the following to the field office's ELSUR Operations Technician (EOT): 1) (U) executed affidavit, application, and order; 2) (U) completed CDC Checklist (FD-926); 3) (U) EC signed by the appropriate approving official (SAC or designee or appropriate HQ official) documenting approval to seek court authorization for the Title III application; and 4) (U) DOJ Memorandum directed to the AUSA entitled "Authorization for Interception Order Application." B) C) D) (U) The EOT and the ELSUR supervisor are responsible for confirming that ELSUR searches were properly conducted as set forth in the final applications submitted to the court. Because this review is not conducted until after the application and order have been submitted to the court, the SA and SSA are responsible for verifying that all required ELSUR searches have been conducted prior to submission of the application and affidavit to the court. Within 10 calendar days of obtaining court authority for the original and all extensions/renewals of the Title III intercept, the case agent must also submit to the EOT a signed copy of the: (i) affidavit, (ii) application, (iii) order, (iv) copy of the CDC Title III Checklist (FD-926); (v) SAC approval EC; and (vi) a copy of the DOJ Authorizing Memo. The EOT will be responsible for transmitting a copy of these documents to the Order Management Group in OTD. The Order Management Group will be responsible for indexing and uploading these documents into the! !These requirements also apply to the joint Title III operations discussed in section 18.7.2.13. b7E (U) Form FD-940 (Pre Title III ELSUR Search Request) must he used when requestjng a search of any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency's!___________, including the FBI's. D (U) All requests for ELSUR searches must be electronically placed in the corresponding investigative file and submitted with adequate time for the EOT to conduct the search and document the results. It is the responsibility of the affiant and the affiant's supervisor to ensure that all ELSUR checks have been properly completed prior to submission of the application and affidavit to the court. (U//FOU0)1 I SEARCHES---------------------------- ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION AND H.1.1.7 1 I H-5 UNCLASSIFIED-'FOR OFFICIAL USE O�JLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED-f'Ott OPFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b7E (U/J'I'lOOO) H.1.1.8 (U) ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AND EXAMPLES (U) Additional guidance regarding the conduct of pre-Title III ELSUR searches, including examples applying the policy set forth above, can be found at the DIOG· Resources site. H-6 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR Of:HCIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED-'FOil OfiflCIAL USE ONLY b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide I APPENDIX I: (U) ACCESSING STUDENT RECORDS MAINTAINED BY AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION ("BUCKLEY AMENDMENT") I. l (U) SUMMARY (U) The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974 (20 U.S.C. § 1232g, as amended by Public Law 107-56 (USA Patriot Act)), commonly referred to as the "Buckley Amendment," restricts the ability of educational agencies or institutions (collectively "schools") to release educational records or personally identifiable information contained in such records without the consent of the student or the student's parent. (U) FERPA defines "education records" as those records, files, documents and other materials which: A) (U) contain information directly related to a student; and B) (U) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution. (20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A)(i)). (U//FOUO) If operationally feasible, FBI employees should request the consent of the student or parent, as appropriate, in order to obtain covered records. During an Assessment, the FBI may ask school officials to provide certain information without the consent of the student or parent (see Section 18.5.6); during a Predicated Investigation, the FBI may compel production of education records, as set forth below. I.2 (U/� ACCESSING STUDENT INFORMATION OR RECORDS DURING AN ASSESSMENT (U//ffi'Be) During an Assessment, FBI employees may seek voluntary disclosure of certain student records and information about students from schools without the consent of the student or parent. I.2.1 (U) DIRECTORY INFORMATION (U//F't:ffiQ.) "Directory information" is information contained in an education record of a student "that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy." (34 C.F.R. § 99.3) Specifically, "directory information" includes, but is not limited to: the student's name, address, telephone listing, electronic mail address, photograph, date and place of birth, major field of study, dates of attendance, grade level, enrollment status (e.g., undergraduate or graduate, full­ time or part-time), participation in officially recognized activities or sports, weight and height of members of athletic teams, degrees, honors and awards received, and the most recent educational agency or institution attended. A school may disclose "directory information" from its records without prior consent if: (1) it has a directory information policy to disclose such information and (2) it has provided its students notice of the policy and the opportunity to opt out of having "directory information" disclosed. (See 34 C.F.R. § 99.37) (U//FOUO) The scope of information that can be released as directory information may be narrowed by the school. For instance, if a college chooses not to categorize students' names and addresses as directory information, it must not voluntarily disclose such information to the FBI 1-1 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED POR OPPICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (Krauss v. Nassau Community College, 469 N.Y.S. 2d 553 (N.Y. Sup. 1983)). Schools are also required to afford students (or parents, if the student is under 18) the opportunity to prohibit the release of directory information without their prior consent (or a court order). Note: the Buckley Amendment permits schools to release directory information (absent an objection from the student); it does not require them to do so. Directory information may be sought orally or in writing. l.2.2 (U) OBSERVATIONS (U//f\'OU8) FERPA governs the release of educational records. It does not govern the release of information gathered by a school official, based on his or her own observations. Accordingly, notwithstanding Buckley, a school official may disclose activity or behavior observed by the official. l.2.3 (U) LAW ENFORCEMENT UNIT RECORDS (U//�) Under FERP A, schools may disclose information from "law enforcement unit records" without the consent of the parent or student. This exemption is limited to records that a law enforcement unit of a school creates and maintains for a law enforcement purpose. "Law enforcement record" is narrowly defined as a record that is: (i) created by the law enforcement unit; (ii) created for a law enforcement purpose; and (iii) maintained by the law enforcement unit. (34 C.F.R. § 99.8(b)) If another component of the school discloses a student education record to the school's law enforcement unit, that record is not a "law enforcement unit record" because it was not created by the law enforcement unit. Thus, a law enforcement unit cannot disclose, without student consent, information obtained from education records created by other component of the school, even if the record has been shared with the law enforcement unit. l.2.4 (U) HEALTH OR SAFETY EMERGENCY (U//FOUO) FERPA does not restrict the disclosure of educational records in connection with a health or safety emergency. The regulations provide that schools may disclose information from an education record "to appropriate parties in connection with an emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals" and that the exception is to be "strictly construed." As is the case with other emergency disclosure provisions (see 18 U.S.C. § 2702), it is up to the school to determine in the first instance whether disclosure is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or another individual. If it makes that determination, it is permitted to disclose educational records voluntarily and without the consent of the student or parent. I.2.5 (U) NON-STUDENTS (U//P'eOO) FERPA governs records of"students." A "student" is defined as a person on whom a school maintains educational records or personally identifiable information but does not include someone who has not attended that school. Files retained on rejected applicants may be provided without prior permission or notification. (Tarka v. Franklin, 891 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1989)) 1-2 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL U�E ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL OSE ONLf Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide I.3 PREDICATED INVESTIGATIONS (U/,q:;oUO) In addition to seeking voluntary production of records that can be voluntarily produced (see 1.2 above), in a Predicated Investigation, FBI employees may compel production of education records without notice to the student or the student's parents as follows: l.3.1 (U) FEDERAL GRAND JURY SUBPOENA (U//�) Schools shall disclose education records in response to a federal grand jury subpoena. In addition, the court may order the institution not to disclose to anyone the existence or contents of the subpoena or the institution's response. If the court so orders, then neither the prior notification requirements of 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9) nor the recordation requirements at 34 C.F.R. § 99.32 would apply (see DIOG Section 18.6.5). l.3.2 (U) ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS (U//FOU8) Schools may disclose education records in response to an administrative subpoena. Administrative subpoenas may be issued in narcotics investigations (see DIOG Section 18.6.4.3.2.1), sexual exploitation or abuse of children investigations (see DIOG Section 18.6.4.3.2.2), and health care fraud investigations (see DIOG Section 18.6.4.3.2.3). As with federal grand jury subpoenas, the issuing agency may, for good cause shown, direct the school not to disclose the existence or contents of the subpoena or the institution's response. If the subpoena includes a nondisclosure directive, the school is permitted to request a copy of the good cause determination. I.3.3 (U) FJSA ORDER FOR BUSINESS RECORDS (U//FOUO) See DIOG Section 18.6.7. I.3.4 (U) Ex PARTE ORDERS (U/fFOUO) The USA Patriot Act amended FERPA to permit schools to disclose personally identifiable information from the student's education records to the Attorney General or his designee without the consent or knowledge of the student or parent in response to an ex parte order issued in connection with a terrorism investigation. Such disclosures are also exempt from the Buckley Act requirements that disclosure of information from a student's records be documented in the student's file. 1-3 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FO� OEBICIAL USE 0�.fLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED fi'OR OFFICIAL us� O�TLY b6 b7C Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide APPENDIX J: (U) CASE FILE MANAGEMENT AND INDEXING J J .1 (U) INVESTIGATIVE FILE MANAGEMENT J.1.1 (U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN (00) (U//FOUO) Generally, the Office of Origin (00) is determined by: A) (U//FOUO) The residence, location or destination of the subject of the investigation; B) (U/!retfE)) The office in which a complaint is first received; C) (U//�) The office designated by FBIHQ as 00 in any investigation; D) (U//F'l'.:)80) The office in which the Foreign Police Cooperation investigation is opened (163 classification); E) (U//�) The office in which the Domestic Police Cooperation investigation is opened (343 classification); F) (U//�) The office in which the recovery of the vehicle occurred in an Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles (ITSMV) investigations; G) (U//�) The office in which the contempt of court occurred; H) (U//f.QIJQ) The office in which there is a violation of an order, judgment, or decree issued from any judicial district in an FBI civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) investigation; I) (U//PSYO) The office in which the subject was convicted in investigations involving parole, probation, and mandatory release violators; J) (U//�) The office in which the escape occurred, in Escaped Federal Prisoner and escaped deserter investigations; K) (U/�) The New York Field Office in courier investigations; L) (U//YOUO� FBIHQ in all applicant, Background Investigation - Pardon Attorney's Office (73 classification) investigations; M) (U//F'OUO) FBIHQ in OPM security referral (140A and 140C classification) investigations; N) (U//�) FBIHQ, Counterterrorism Division (CTD), Counterterrorism Watch Unit in all Counterterrorism Major Cases (900 classification); 0) (U//FOUOJ FBIHQ, Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) in all National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) cases (252A through 252E classifications); and P) (U//F'Ot,Q.) FBIHQ, Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) in OPR investigations (263 classification). (U//� When special circumstances exist, however, the origin may be assumed by the field office which has the most compelling interest. Uncertainties and disagreements must be resolved by the appropriate FBIHQ operational division. J-1 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED 'FOK OFFICIAL USE O�lLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide J.1.2 (U) INVESTIGATIVE LEADS AND LEAD OFFICE (LO) (U//r'OUO) Leads are sent by EC, or a Lead Request document, to offices and assigned to individuals/organizations in order to aid investigations. When the 00 sets a lead to another office, that office is considered a Lead Office (LO). (U//POUO) There are only two types of investigative leads: "Action Required" and "Information Only." J.1.2.1 (U) ACTION REQUIRED LEAD (U//fU y Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide I b7E - ---------.---------------i (U) U//FOUO ___________________...::::::======::........I (U)I N.8.1 N.9 (U)FINALDISPOSITIONOFFT/ SERIALIZE� (U) TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION (U//FOUQ+ All FBI employees, detailees, and contractors who could potentially come in contact with FTI are required to complete annual training on the proper safeguarding of FTI. (U//�) Annually, each field office or division will certify, by EC to the SecD Strategy, Policy, and Information Security Unit that all appropriate individuals have completed the FTI training on Virtual Academy. (U/� The training provided before the initial certification, and annually thereafter, must also cover the incident response policy and procedures for reporting unauthorized disclosures and data breaches. 75 (U) See Publication 1075, subsection 8.4. N-1 3 UNCLASSIFIED - F'Oft OF'fllCIAL U5� ONLr Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOlt OPPICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY b6 b7C UNCLASSIFIED - f'Oit OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 0 APPENDIX 0: (U) RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT (RFPA) (U) (Note: The policy for the Right to Financial Privacy Act was not completed by the time of the DIOG publication. It will be linked in the DIOG once approved.) 0-1 UNCLASSIFIED - r!Oit OfiFICIAL USE O�JLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - F'Olt OF'F'ICIAL U5E ONLr Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�E ONLY b6 b7C Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide P APPENDIX P: (U) ACRONYMS A/EAD Associate Executive Assistant Director AD Assistant Director ADD Associate Deputy Director ADIC Assistant Director-in-Charge AFID Alias False Identification AG Attorney General AGG Attorney General Guidelines AGG-CHS Attorney General Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources AGG-Dom Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations AGG-UCO The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations AOR Area of Responsibility ARS Assessment Review Standards ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge ASC Assistant Section Chief ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives AUSA Assistant United States Attorney CALEA Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act CCRSB Criminal Cyber Response and Services Branch CD Counterintelligence Division CDC Chief Division Counsel C.F.R. Code of Federal Regulations CHS Confidential Human Source CHSPG Confidential Human Source Policy Implementation Guide P-1 UNCLASSIFIED - r!Olt OPPICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�t! ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide CIA Central Intelligence Agency CID Criminal Investigative Division CMS Collection Management Section CPO Corporate Policy Office CUORC Criminal Undercover Operations Review Committee CyD Cyber Division DAD Deputy Assistant Director DD Deputy Director DEA Drug Enforcement Administration DGC Deputy General Counsel DI Directorate of Intelligence DLAT Deputy Legal Attache DNI Director of National Intelligence DOD Department of Defense DOJ Department of Justice DOJ OEO Office of Enforcement Operations, DOJ DOS Department of State DPO Division Policy Officer b7E EAD Executive Assistant Director EC Electronic Communication ECF Electronic Case File ECPA Electronic Communication Privacy Act ECS Electronic Communication Service P-2 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL U3E ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide b7E EI Enterprise Investigation ELSUR Electronic Surveillance EO Executive Order EQT ELSUR Operations Technician ERS ELSUR Records System ESN Electronic Serial Number ESU DOJ OEO, Electronic Surveillance Unit ETR Electronic Technical Request FBIHQ FBI Headquarters FGJ Federal Grand Jury FGUSO Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations FICP Foreign Intelligence Collection Program FIG Field Intelligence Group PISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court FRCP Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure GC General Counsel HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act HSC Homeland Security Council ICE Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement ICM Investigative Case Management P-3 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide IINI Innocent Images National Initiative ILB Investigative Law Branch ILU Investigative Law Unit IOB Intelligence Oversight Board IOD International Operations Division IP Address Internet Protocol Address IPG Intelligence Policy Implementation Guide ISP Internet Service Provider ITSMV Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles JDA Juvenile Delinquency Act JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force LEGAT Legal Attache LHM Letterhead Memorandum LO Lead Office MAR Monthly Administrative Report MLAT Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties MOU/MOA Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement MSIN Mobile Station Identification Number NARA National Archives and Records Administration NCMEC National Center for Missing and Exploited Children NISS National Information Sharing Strategy NSB National Security Branch NSC National Security Council NSD National Security Division, DOJ P-4 UNCLASSIFIED - POlt OPPICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: September 28, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLi Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide NSL National Security Letter NSLB National Security Law Branch NSSE National Special Security Events NSUCOPG National Security Undercover Operations Policy Implementation Guide OCA Office of Congressional Affairs OCRS Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, DOJ OGC Office of the General Counsel OIA Otherwise Illegal Activity OIC Office of Integrity and Compliance 010 Office of Operations, DOJ OLC Office of Legal Counsel, DOJ 00 Office of Origin OPA Office of Public Affairs OTD Operational Technology Division PBDM Pattern Based Data Mining PCHS Potential CHS PCLU Privacy and Civil Liberties Unit PCTDD Post Cut-through Dialed Digits PFI Positive Foreign Intelligence PG Policy Implementation Guide PI Preliminary Investigation PIA Privacy Impact Assessment PIAB President's Intelligence Advisory Board PSA Performance Summary Assessments P-5 UNCLASSIFIED - r!Olt OrlfllCIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide PTA Privacy Threshold Analysis RA Resident Agency b7E RF Radio Frequency RFPA Right to Financial Privacy Act RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations RIG Regional Intelligence Group RMD Records Management Division SA Special Agent SAC Special Agent-in-Charge SC Section Chief SIA Supervisory Intelligence Analyst SIM Sensitive Investigative Matter SOG Special Operations Group SORC Sensitive Operations Review Committee SSA Supervisory Special Agent SSG Special Surviellance Group SSRA Supervisory Senior Resident Agent TFM Task Force Member TFO Task Force Officer TFP Task Force Participant TMD Technical Management Database TTA Technically Trained Agent UC Unit Chief P-6 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�.:LY Version Dated: September 28, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED -FOR Of:f:ICIA L USE ON! Y Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide UCE Undercover Employee UCFN Universal Case File Number UCO Undercover Operation UCRC Undercover Review Committee UDP Undisclosed Participation UNI Universal Index USA United States Attorney USAO United States Attorney's Office U.S.C. United States Code USG United States Government USIC United States Intelligence Community USPER United States Person, United States Persons, US PER, USPERs, US Person, US Persons, U.S. Person, U.S. Persons USPS United States Postal Service usss United States Secret Service VICAP Violent Criminal Apprehension Program vs Victim Specialist WITT Wireless Intercept Tracking Technology WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WMDD Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate P-7 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE 0�.fLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE 0�.fLY b6 b7C Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide Q APPENDIX Q: (U) DEFINITIONS (U//FOUO, Academic Nexus SIM: I I b7E (U) Aggrieved Person:! (U//fi'OUO) Assessments: The AGG-Dom authorizes as an investigative activity called an "Assessment" which requires an authorized purpose and articulated objective(s). The DIOG defines five types of Assessments that may be carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence. Although "no particular factual predication" is required, the basis of an Assessment cannot be arbitrary or groundless speculation, nor can an Assessment be based solely on the exercise of First Amendment protected rights or on the race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the subject, or a combination of only those factors. (U/�U� Closed Circuit Television (CCTV): a fixed-location video camera that is typically concealed from view or that is placed on or operated by a consenting party. (U) Consensual Monitoring: Monitoring of communications for which a court order or warrant is not legally required because of the consent of a party to the communication. (U) Electronic Communication Service: Any service that provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications. For example, telephone companies and electronic mail companies generally act as providers of electronic communication services. (U) Electronic Communications System: Any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo optical or photo electronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications. (U) Electronic Storage: Any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof, or any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication. In short, "electronic storage" refers only to temporary storage, made in the course of transmission, by a provider of an electronic communication service. b7E (U//FOUO) Electronic Tracking Device:I Q-1 UNCLASSIFIED- FOR OFFICIAL USE O��LY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL ugE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (U//ffiU01 Employee: For purposes of the AGG-Dom and DIOG, an "FBI employee" includes, but not limited to, an operational/administrative professional staff person, intelligence analyst, special agent, task force officer (TFO), task force member (TFM), task force participant (TFP), detailee, and FBI contractor. An FBI employee is bound by the AGG-Dom and DIOG. The FBI employee definition excludes a confidential human source (CHS). (U//FOUO) Enterprise: The term "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. (UhFOUO) Enterprise Investigation: An Enterprise Investigation (El) examines the structure, scope, and nature of the group or organization including: its relationship, if any, to a foreign power; the identity and relationship of its members, employees, or other persons who may be acting in furtherance of its objectives; its finances and resources; its geographical dimensions; its past and future activities and goals; and its capacity for harm. (AGG-Dom, Part 11.C.2) (U//FOUO) Enterprise Investigations are a type of Full Investigation and are subject to the same requirements that apply to Full Investigations described in Section 7. Enterprise Investigations focus on groups or organizations that may be involved in the most serious criminal or national security threats to the public, as described in Section 8. Enterprise Investigations cannot be conducted as Preliminary Investigations or Assessments, nor may they be conducted for the sole nurnose of collecting foreim intelligence. I I (U//FOlJO) Extraterritorial Guidelines: The guidelines for conducting investigative activities outside of the United States are currently contained in: (i) The Attorney General's Guidelines for Extraterritorial FBI Operations and Criminal Investigations; (ii) The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection; and (iii) The Attorney General Guidelines on the Development and Operation of FBI Criminal Informants and Cooperative Witnesses in Extraterritorial Jurisdictions (collectively, the Extraterritorial Guidelines); (iv) The Attorney General Procedure for Reporting and Use of Information Concerning Violations of Law and Authorization for Participation in Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence or International Terrorism Intelligence Investigations (August 8, 1988); and (v) the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Overseas and Domestic Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2005). Q-2 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (U//fi'OUS) FISA: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended. The law establishes a process for obtaining judicial approval of electronic surveillance, physical searches, pen register and trap and trace devices, and access to certain business records for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence. (U) For or On Behalf of a Foreign Power: The determination that activities are for or on behalf of a foreign power shall be based on consideration of the extent to which the foreign power is involved in control or policy direction; financial or material support; or leadership, assignments, or discipline. (U) Foreign Computer Intrusion: The use or attempted use of any cyber-activity or other means, by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power to scan, probe, or gain unauthorized access into one or more United States-based computers. (U) Foreign Intelligence: Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorists. (U) Foreign Intelligence Requirements: A) (U/tf-OU�National intelligence requirements issued pursuant to authorization by the Director of National Intelligence, including the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the National HUMINT Collection Directives, or any successor directives thereto; B) (U//ffiU� Requests to collect foreign intelligence by the President or by Intelligence Community officials designated by the President; and C) (U//FOUO+ Directions to collect foreign intelligence by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an official designated by the Attorney General. (U) Foreign Power: A foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States; a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States persons (USPERs); an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments; a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore; a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of USPERs; or an entity that is directed or controlled by a foreign government or governments. (U) Full Investigation: A Full Investigation may be opened if there is an "articulable factual basis" for the investigation that reasonably indicates one of the following circumstances exists: (U) An activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur and the investigation may obtain information relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such activity; A) (U) An individual, group, organization, entity, information, property, or activity is or may be a target of attack, victimization, acquisition, infiltration, or recruitment in connection with criminal activity in violation of federal law or a threat to the national security and the investigation may obtain information that would help to protect against such activity or threat; or B) (U) The investigation may obtain foreign intelligence that is responsive to a PFI requirement, as defined in DIOG Section 7.4.3. Q- 3 UNCLASSIFIED - 'FOK OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - F'Olt OFFICIAL OSE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (U) All lawful investigative methods may be used in a Full Investigation. (U) A Full Investigation of a group or organization may be opened as an Enterprise Investigation if there is an articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates the group or organization may have engaged, or may be engaged in, or may have or may be engaged in planning or preparation or provision of support for: A) (U) Racketeering Activity: 1) (U) A pattern of racketeering activity as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); B) (U) International Terrorism: 1) (U) International terrorism, as defined in the AGG-Dom, Part VII.J, or other threat to the national security; C) (U) Domestic Terrorism: 1) (U) Domestic terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) involving a violation of federal criminal law; 2) (U) Furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of federal criminal law; or 3) (U) An offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) or 18 U.S.C. § 43. (U) Human Source: A Confidential Human Source as defined in the Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources. (U) Intelligence Activities: Any activity conducted for intelligence purposes or to affect political or governmental processes by, for, or on behalf of a foreign power. (U) International Terrorism: Activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal, state, local, or tribal criminal law or would violate such law if committed within the United States or a state, local, or tribal jurisdiction; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear to be intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (U//¥OUO) National Security Letters: an administrative demand for documents or records that can be made by the FBI during a Predicated Investigation relevant to a threat to national security. The standard for issuing an NSL, except under 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, is relevance to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States person (USPER) is not predicated solely on activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. (U//FOUO) Operational Division or Operational Unit: "Operational" division or operational unit as used in the DIOG means the FBIHQ division or unit responsible for management and program oversight of the file classification for the substantive investigative matter (i.e., Q-4 UNCLASSIFIED - 'FOR OFFICIAL us� O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�.:LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide Assessment or Predicated Investigation). Previously referred to as the FBIHQ "substantive" division or substantive unit. (U//FOUO) Pen Register Device: Records or decodes dialing, routing addressing or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided that such information must not include the contents of any communication. (U//f?OUOJ Physical Surveillance (Not Requiring a Court Order): The deliberate observation by an FBI employee of persons, places, or events, on either a limited or continuous basis, in areas where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. Note: DIOG Section 18.5.8 makes a distinction between "casual observation" and physical surveillance, and specifies factors to be considered when determining whether a particular plan of action constitutes casual observation or physical surveillance. (See DIOG Section 18.5.8) (U) Preliminary Investigation: A Preliminary Investigation is a type of Predicated Investigation authorized under the AGG-Dom that may be opened (predicated) on the basis of any "allegation or information" indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security. Preliminary Investigations may be opened to detect, obtain information about or revent or b7E (U) Proprietary: A sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or other business entity operated on a commercial basis, which is owned, controlled, or operated wholly or in part on behalf of the FBI, and whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third parties. (U) Provider of Electronic Communication Services: Any service that provides the user thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications. (U) Publicly Available: Information that has been published or broadcast for public consumption, is available on request to the public, is accessible on-line or otherwise to the public, is available to the public by subscription or purchase, could be seen or heard by any casual observer, is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the public. (U) Records: Any records, databases, files, indices, information systems, or other retained information. (U) Relevance: Information is relevant if it tends to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. (U//FOUO) Remote Computing Services� l r (U//ffiUQ.) Sensitive Investigative Matter: An investigative matter involving a domestic public official, domestic political candidate, religious or domestic political organization or individual prominent in such an organization, or news media, or an investigative matter having academic nexus, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBIHQ and other DOJ officials. Q-5 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�E'. ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (U) Sensitive Monitoring Circumstance: Investigation of a member of Congress, a federal judge, a member of the Executive Branch at Executive Level IV or above, or a person who has served in such capacity within the previous two years; (Note: Executive Levels I through IV are defined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 5312-5315.) A) (U) Investigation of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or Attorney General of any state or territory, or a judge or justice of the highest court of any state or territory, concerning an offense involving bribery, conflict of interest, or extortion related to the performance of official duties; B) (U) A party to the communication is in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons or the United States Marshals Service or is being or has been afforded protection in the Witness Security Program; or C) (U) The Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General has requested that the FBI obtain prior approval for the use of consensual monitoring in a specific investigation. (U) Special Agent in Charge: The Special Agent in Charge of an FBI field office (including an Acting Special Agent in Charge), except that the functions authorized for Special Agents in Charge by these Guidelines may also be exercised by the Assistant Director in Charge or by any Special Agent in Charge designated by the Assistant Director in Charge in an FBI field office headed by an Assistant Director, and by FBI Headquarters officials designated by the Director of the FBI. (U) Special Events Management: Planning and conduct of public events or activities whose character may make them attractive targets for terrorist attack. (U) State, Local, or Tribal: Any state or territory of the United States or political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or Indian tribe. (U//FOU0t Surveillance: A) (U//FOUO) Electronic surveillance (ELSUR) - under Title III and FISA is the non­ consensual electronic collection of information (usually communications) under circumstances in which the parties have a reasonable exoectation of orivacv and court orders or warrants are required. I B) (U//R)Uo+£onsensual monitoring of communications, including consensual computer monitoring, or electronic surveillance (ELSUR) - where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy is permitted in Predicated Investigations. These methods usually do not require court orders or warrants unless they involve an intrusion into an area where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy or non-consensual monitoring of communications but legal review is generallv required to ensure comoliance with legal requirements.I Q-6 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�t! ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (U//FOUO) Physical surveillance - is the deliberate observation by an FBI employee of persons, places, or events, on either a limited or continuous basis, in areas where there may or may not be a reasonable expectation of privacy. (See DIOG Section 18.5.8 for physical surveillance in situations not requiring a court order and a discussion of the distinction between physical surveillance and casual observation). Factors to consider in determining whether observations are casual observation or physical surveillance include: I b7E (U) Threat to the National Security: International terrorism; espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, and assassination, conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons; foreign computer intrusion; and other matters determined by the Attorney General, consistent with Executive Order 12333 or a successor order. (U//FOUO) Trap and Trace Device: Captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided that such information does not include the contents of any communication. (U//fi'OUO) Undercover Activity: An "undercover activity" is any investigative activity involving the use of an assumed identity by an undercover employee for an official purpose, investigative activity, or function. (U//fi'OU� Undercover Employee: An employee of the FBI, another federal, state, or local law enforcement agency, another entity of the United States Intelligence Community (USIC), or another foreign intelligence agency working under the direction and control of the FBI whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third parties by the maintenance of a cover or alias identity for an official purpose, investigative activity, or function. (U//FOUO) Undercover Operation: An "undercover operation" is an operation that involves a series of related "undercover activities" over a period of time by an "undercover employee." A series of related undercover activities consists of more than five seoarate substantive contacts bv an undercover employee with the individuals under investigation.! (U) United States: When used in a geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United States. Q-7 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 I b?E UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL OSE ONLr Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (U) United States Person (USPER): Any of the following, but not including any association or corporation that is a foreign power, defined as an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments: A) (U) An individual who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; B) (U) An unincorporated association substantially composed of individuals who are United States persons (USPERs); or C) (U) A corporation incorporated in the United States. (U) If a group or organization in the United States that is affiliated with a foreign-based international organization operates directly under the control of the international organization and has no independent program or activities in the United States, the membership of the entire international organization shall be considered in determining whether it is substantially composed of USPERs. If, however, the United States-based group or organization has programs or activities separate from, or in addition to, those directed by the international organization, only its membership in the United States shall be considered in determining whether it is substantially composed of USPERs. A classified directive provides further guidance concerning the determination of USPER status. (U) Use: When used with respect to human sources, means obtaining information from, tasking, or otherwise operating such sources. Q -8 UNCLASSIFIED-'FOtt OPFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY b6 b7C Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide R APPENDIX R: (U) SUPERSEDED DOCUMENTS AND NFIPM, MIOG, AND MAOP SECTION (U//fi'OUO) This guide supersedes the following FBI policies and procedures: MIOG Intro Section 2 2-1 NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMS R-1 UNCLASSIFIED - POtt: OPFICIAL USIZ OWLY DIOG Preamble Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED POlt OfifslCIAL USE O�TLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG Intro Section 2 2-2 OTHER PROGRAMS R-2 UNCLASSIFIED - fiOtt: OfsHCIAL USE O�iLY DIOG Preamble Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� O�JLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide R-3 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide R-4 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - ¥Oft Of'f'ICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG 1.2 Section 288 288-5.1.4 Section 2703(d) Order with Prior Notice to the Subscriber or Customer R-5 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�� O�llY DIOG 18.6.8 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�TLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG II Section 2 2-6.3 Execution R-6 UNCLASSIFIED- POR OPPICIAL USE O�q'LY DIOG 19 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide R-7 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� ON! y Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG II Section 4 4-2.2.2 Notification of USA and Juveniles Parents DIOG 19 MIOG II Section 6 6-2.1 Statements of All Witnesses, Such as FD-302s DIOG 18.5.6.4.15 MIOG II Section 6 6-5.1 Statements of All Witnesses, Such as FD-302s DIOG 18.5.6.4.15 MIOG II Section 7 S7 Interviews DIOG 18.5.6 MIOG II Section 7 7-6.1 Interviews of Complainants DIOG 18.5.6 R-8 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O��LY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POil OFFICIAL USE O�TLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG II Section 10 10-6.3.1 Fugitive or Criminal Cases R-9 UNCLASSIFIED - POlt OPPICIAL USE ONLY DIOG 18.6.10 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� O�JLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG II Section 10 UNCLASSIFIED 10-9.1 Definitions R-10 FOR OFFICIAL USE O�JL¥ DIOG 11.6.4 and 5, 18.7.2 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide R-11 UNCLASSIFIED - FO� OEEICIAI USE QNT Y Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL us� O�JLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide R-12 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - f:OR OFPICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG II Section 10 10-10.9.4 CCTV - Preservation of the Original Tape Recording DIOG 18.6.3.7 b7E MIOG II Section 11 11-1 ARREST TECHNIQUES R-13 UNCLASSIFIED - POit OFFICIAL USE O�iLY DIOG 19 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide R-14 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL U�� ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O��LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG II Section 14 14-16.9 Fingerprinting of Juveniles by Federal Agencies under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Hereinafter, the Act) R-15 UNCLASSIFIED FOR O'P'PICIAL OSE ONLY DIOG 19 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U5E'. ONLi Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide ········· ········ . . . . . . . . .:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:. .·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.$et.t10.n- -Tltle.· · · · · · · · · · · · · · +·H·H · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · DIO.G.· ·S.u�-rs.e.ss:10nJ· · · . . . .. . : : . . : : . . : : . . : : . . : : . . : : . . : : . . : : . . : : : : : : : : ��t��;: s : . : . : . : . : . : . : . : . : . : . : : : : : : : : : : : : .:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:Pift. . . . . . . . : MIOG II Section 16 16-4.8.4 Technical Devices in Physical Surveillance - Technical, Practical, and Legal Considerations (TTU) Paragraph # 1 only. DIOG 18 MIOG II Section 16 16-4.8.12 Tracking - Technical, Practical, and Legal Considerations (TTU) Paragraph # 1; Paragraph # 2, third sentence; Paragraph # 4, second sentence only. DIOG 18 MIOG II Section 23 23-2.4 Section 1681g. Disclosure to Consumers DIOG Appendix M FCRA R-16 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O��LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG II Section 23 23-2.8 Section 1681n, o, q, and r. Civil and Criminal Liability for Willful or Negligent Noncompliance DIOG Appendix M FCRA MIOG II Section 23 23-3.1 Information Desired from Outside the Field Office Territory DIOG 18.1.4, Appendix J MIOG II Section 23 23-6.3.3 Government Authority DIOG Appendix O RFPA R-17 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL U�E'. ONLr Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - f:OR O:FHCIAL USE O�.fLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide R-18 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFiCIAL USE o�u y_ Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide - -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- :::::::::: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- ::e�H: : : : : : : : !t! !"\it! - -_-_-_-_-_-_-$��t��n i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i$ec.t10.n:#Jtl� - -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_"I: i:i:i:i:i:i:i:i:__:_:_:_:_:_:_:_����: :!:�� �!:�:�!:�: :_:_:_:_:_:_ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : --MIOG II Section 23 23-6.10.2 Corporations or Other Legal Entities DIOG Appendix O RFPA MIOG II Section 23 23-6.14.1 Dissemination of Information Obtained DIOG Appendix O RFPA R-19 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MIOG II NFIPM Section 28 28-1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON METHODS OF OBTAINING DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS HELD BY THIRD PARTIES DIOG Appendix C Section 2 02-1: (U) General Investigative and Administrative Activities Appendix M for definitions: #2, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26 and 27. b7E R-20 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFPICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE O�q'LY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide NFIPM Section 2 02-15: (U) Physical Searches in Which a Warrant is Not Required DIOG 11.4, 18.6.12 b7E NFIPM Section 2 02-23: (U) The Role of Legal Attaches in Foreign Counterintelligence, Foreign Intelligence and Counterterrorism Investigations R-21 UNCLASSIFIED FOil Of'f'ICIAL USE ONLY See CD PG Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - roR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide NFIPM Section 2 02-38: (U) Investigations of Current and Former Military and Civilian Department of Defense Personnel DIOG 10, generally b7E R-22 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFPICIAL USE O�lLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - fiOR OFFICIAL U�E ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide NFIPM Section 2 02-57: (U) Alpha Designations R-23 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OPfi'ICIAL USIZ O�JLY CPD #0015D. See RPO web-page. Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE O�iLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide NFIPM Section 9 09-8: (U) Alpha Designations R-24 UNCLASSIFIED - FUR OFFICIAL us� ON! Y. CPD #0015D. See RPO web-page. Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POR OFHCIAL U�li OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MAOPII 1-1 MAOPII 1-1.4(#2and#3 a-f) MAOPII 1-3.5 SAC and A SAC Supervisory Responsibility Paragraphs#2and# 5. DIOG 3.4.C and Succession and delegation policy Supervisory File Reviews Paragraph#2and#3 ( a-f) -#2 Supervisory File reviews and#3 PSAs. DIOG 3.4.D Designation of Senior Resident Agent and Alternate Second and third sentences only - DIOG 3.4.C and succession and delegation policy ? R-25 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL us� O�JLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOtt OfiFICIAL USE OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MAOPII MAOPII 1-3.13.. 2 (1) 2-5.1 Supervision ofI nvestigations Paragraph (1) - DIOG 3.4.C and succession and delegation policy ? Opening Cases Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 (initial paragraph only before sub-letters), 4d, 4e, 4f, and 5 (first sentence only). DIOG various sections R-26 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U�E'. ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MAOPII 3-1 FBI Classifications/Sub-classifications and Program Groupings R-27 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CPD 001 SD. RPO/RAU is now responsible for this area by EC 66F-HQ1079817 serial 705. Link to RPO web-site. Supersede section 3.1 and all subparts. Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POil OFFICIAL USE O�TLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide MAOP II 3-4.8 Criminal Preliminary Inquires UNCLASSIFIED R-28 FOR OFFICIAL USE O�JLY Paragraph #1 only. DIOG Section 6.7 - PIS are authorized for 6 months; extension authorized for 6 additional months by SAC; and FBIHQ SC. Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED "FOR OPF'ICIAL USIZ O�TLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide Interested Agency Within a Field Office's Territory DIOG 12.4 9-4.2.9 Dissemination to the White House Complex Interview or CHS - DIOG 18.5.6. Paragraph (2) Superseded by AGG­ Dom, DIOG and AG Memo WH Contacts MAOPII 9-7.2 Information Concerning Threats, Possible Violence or Demonstrations Against Foreign Establishments or Officials in the MAOPII 9-8.2 Dissemination of Classified Information MAOPII MAOPII 9-3.4.3 us R-29 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY DIOG 14 DIOG 12, 14 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - POlt OPPICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide Supersede Paragraphs# 1a-c; 2a-c; 5; 6; 7; 9; 10a-c; 11-16; and 23-24. DIOG, various sections. MAOPII 10-9 General Rules Regarding Recording and Notification of Investigations MAOPII 10-12 Notes made During Investigations Interviews DIOG 3, 14 MAOPII 10-13, 10-13.1, 1013.2, 10-13.3, 1013.4 FD-302 DIOG subsection 18.5.6.4.15.1 b7E R-30 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide N/A EC __ Tax Return __. Information Other than Taxpayer Return Information to Terrorism-related Cases; delegation of Authority ........,....,,.._....,.,.._,.,.,.,._.,.,..... Appendix N b7E N/A N/A EC EC Least Intrusive Techniques in National Security and Criminal Investigations - EC issued by OGC on 12/20/2007, file number I I Authorized Investigative Methods in Assessments ECs issued by OGC dated 03/19/2004 and 9/18/2005 R-31 UNCLASSIFIED F'OR OFFiCIAL USE ONLY DIOG 4, 4.4, 18.1.1-2 b7E DIOG 18.3, 18.5 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL 0SE ONLr Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide N/A N/A EC EC Federal Grand Jury Subpoena EC issued by OGC dated 06/01/2007 Emergency Disclosure Provision for Information from Service Providers Under 18 U.S.C. Section 2702(b) iss11ed OGC 08/25/2005 file numberl. � _ EG N/A EC EC DIOG 18 Ian�,________. I N/A DIOG 18.5.9, 18.6.5 Electronic Recording of Confessions and Witness Interviews -Ec.,.....,.. · ......,........_.............._......._--1 03/23/�'-l.1.-1.11.1,j,.,.l.l.l.l.l,.l.l.l,l,l,i.U-"'l---,-,,,,..,....-,-----,----I and EC dated Procedural and Operational Issuance Guidance for Legislative Corruption - EC issued by CID on 08/08/2006, file number I I R-32 UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY DIOG 18 DIOG 18 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide N/A CPN 00541 N Recordkeeping Policy for ELSUR Administrative Information Resulting from Joint Criminal Investigative Operations DIOG 18.7.2.13 b7E N/A RAP Tool User Guide v1 .1 Resource Allocation Planning (RAP) Tool, User Guide v1 .1 - delete definition of task force officer and task force member on page 1 R-33 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFPICIAL IISE ON! Y DIOG3 Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide This Page is Intentionally Blank □ UNCLASSIFIED-FOR OFFICIAL SE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide S S.1 APPENDIX S: (U) LISTS OF INVESTIGATIVE METHODS INVESTIGATIVE METHODS LISTED BY NAME (ALPHABETIZED) (U) Administrative subpoenas. (Section 18.6.4) (U) CHS use and recruitment. (Section 18.5.5) (U) Closed-circuit television/video surveillance, direction finders, and other monitoring devices. (Section 18.6.3) (U) Consensual monitoring of communications, including electronic communications. (Section 18.6.1) (U) Closed-circuit television/video surveillance, direction finders, and other monitoring devices. (Section 18.6.3) (U) Electronic surveillance - PISA and PISA Title VII (acquisition of foreign intelligence information). 18.7.3) (U) Electronic surveillance -Title III. (Section _18_.7.2) (U) PISA Order for business records. (Section 18.6.7) (U) Grandjury subpoenas. (Section 18.6.5) (U) Grandjury subpoenas -to providers of electronic communication services or remote computing services for subscriber or customer information only in Type 1 & 2 Assessments. (Section 18.5.9) (U) Information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities. (Section 18.5.7) (U) Intercepting the communications of a computer trespasser. (Section 18.6.2) (U) Interview or request information from the public or private entities. (Section 18.5.6) (U) Mail covers. (Section 18.6.10) (U) National Security Letters. (Section 18.6.6) (U) On-line services and resources. (Section 18.5.4) (U) Pen registers and trap/trace devices. (Section 1_8.6.9) (U) Physical Surveillance (not requiring a court order). (Section 18.5.8) (U) Polygraph examinations. (Section 18.6.11) (U) Public information. (Section 18.5.1) (U) Records or information - FBI and DOJ. (Section 18.5.2) (U) Records or information - Other federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign government agency. (Section 18.5.3) U) Searches that Do Not Re uire a Warrant or Court Orde Inventory Searches Generally. (Section 18.6.12) S-1 UNCLASSIFIED -FOR OFFICIAL us� OWLY and Version Dated: March 3, 2016 b7E UNCLASSIFIED - FOlt OPPICIAL U9E ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (U) Searches - with a warrant or court order. (Section _1_8.7_.l) (U) Stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records. (Section 18.6.8) (U) Undercover Operations (Section 18.6.13) S.2 INVESTIGATIVE METHODS LISTED BY ORDER IN DIOG SECTION 18 _18_.5.1_ (U) Public information 18S2 (U) Records or information - FBI and DOJ. 18.5.3 (U) Records or information - Other federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign government agency. 18.5A (U) On-line services and resources. 18.5.5 (U) CHS use and recruitment. 18.5.6 (U) Interview or request information from the public or private entities. 18.5.7 (U) Information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities. 18.5.8 (U) Physical Surveillance (not requiring a court order). 18.5.9 (U) Grand jury subpoenas - to providers of electronic communication services or remote computing services for subscriber or customer information only in Type 1 & 2 Assessments. 18.6,l (U) Consensual monitoring of communications, including electronic communications. 1_8.6.2_ _ (U) Intercepting the communications of a computer trespasser. 18.6.3 (U) Closed-circuit television/video surveillance, direction finders, and other monitoring devices. 18.6A (U) Administrative subpoenas. 18.6.5 (U) Grand jury subpoenas. 18.6.6 (U) National Security Letters. 18.6. 7 (U) PISA Order for business records. 18.6.8 (U) Stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records. 18.6.9 (U) Pen registers and trap/trace devices. 18.6,10 (U) Mail covers. 1_8.6._1_1 (U) Polygraph examinations. 18.6.12 U Searches that Do Not Re uire a Warrant or Court Order Trash Cover b7E 1_8.6._13_ (U) Undercover operations. 18.7.1 (U) Searches - with a warrant or court order. S-2 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL U9E ONLY Version Dated: March 3, 2016 UNCLASSIFIED -fi'Ott: O'Pfi'ICIAL USE ONLY Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide 18. 7.2 (U) Electronic surveillance -Title III _18_.7 .3 (U) Electronic surveillance -PISA and PISA Title VII ( acquisition of foreign intelligence information). S-3 UNCLASSIFIED -POR OFFICIAL U�� ON! Y Version Dated: March 3, 2016