IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA
CA176/2017
[2018] NZCA 278
BETWEEN

EDWARD TAIHAKUREI DURIE
First Appellant
DONNA MARIE TAI TOKERAU HALL
Second Appellant

AND

HETA GARDINER
First Respondent
THE MĀORI TELEVISION SERVICE
Second Respondent

Hearing:

26 October 2017 (further submissions received 28 March 2018)

Court:

French, Winkelmann and Brown JJ

Counsel:

F E Geiringer, S J Price and G M Davidson for Appellants
W Akel and J W S Baigent for Respondents

Judgment:

31 July 2018 at 2 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A

The respondents’ application to adduce further evidence is declined.

B

The appeal is allowed in part.

References to “qualified privilege”,

“Lange v Atkinson”, and “reportage” are struck out from the respondents’
qualified privilege/public interest defence. The respondents’ defence of
public interest in respect of the first website story before the video clip was
posted is also struck out. The appeal is otherwise dismissed.
C

There is no award of costs.

____________________________________________________________________
DURIE & ANOR v GARDINER & ANOR [2018] NZCA 278 [31 July 2018]

 REASONS
French and Winkelmann JJ
Brown J

[1]
[104]

FRENCH AND WINKELMANN JJ
(Given by French J)
Table of Contents
Introduction
[1]
Background
[4]
The pleadings
[25]
The strike-out application
[30]
Is there a general public interest defence to defamation claims in New Zealand
and if so, what is its scope?
[35]
Legal background
[36]
Our analysis
[53]
Reportage
[69]
Other aspects of the new defence
[82]
Application to adduce further evidence
[88]
Should the defence be struck out on the facts?
[91]
Outcome
[100]

Introduction
[1]

Is there a public interest defence in New Zealand to defamation claims arising

from mass publications? And if so, what is its scope?
[2]

Those are the key questions posed by this appeal. They arise from an

interlocutory decision of Mallon J in the High Court, declining to strike out a defence
pleaded by a television broadcaster in proceedings brought by the appellants.1
[3]

As the Judge noted, the defence pleaded relies on developments in

the United Kingdom and Canada which to date have not yet been adopted by appellate

1

Durie v Gardiner [2017] NZHC 377, [2017] 3 NZLR 72.

 authority in this country.2

The current appeal thus affords this Court its first

opportunity to consider these developments, and how they might affect the landmark
decisions of Lange v Atkinson.3
Background
[4]

The appellants are prominent New Zealanders. Sir Edward Durie is a retired

High Court Judge and at all relevant times co-chair of the New Zealand
Māori Council.4 Ms Donna Hall is a lawyer with a high profile, specialising in Māori
legal issues. She is married to Sir Edward.
[5]

Sir Edward and Ms Hall issued defamation proceedings in the High Court

against the Māori Television Service (Māori TV) and against one of its senior news
reporters, Mr Heta Gardiner. The proceedings relate to a story broadcast on Māori TV
and put up on its website.
[6]

In total there were four publications:
(a)

A television broadcast as part of the Te Kāea news programme on
3 August 2015 between 5.30 and 6 pm (the Te Kāea broadcast).

(b)

A website story put up on 3 August 2015 at 6.01 pm (the first website
story).

2

3

4

At [36]. See in the High Court: Osmose New Zealand v Wakeling [2007] 1 NZLR 841 (HC);
Peters v Television New Zealand Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2004-404-3311, 1 October 2009; Lee v
The New Korea Herald Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2008-404-5072, 9 November 2010; Dooley v Smith
[2012] NZHC 529; Cabral v The Beacon Printing & Publishing Co Ltd [2013] NZHC 2684; and
Karam v Parker [2014] NZHC 737. Three decisions delivered since Mallon J’s decision in this
case are: Craig v Slater [2017] NZHC 735, [2017] NZAR 637; Hagaman v Little [2017] NZHC
813, [2017] 3 NZLR 413; and Low Volume Vehicle Technical Assoc Inc v Johnson [2017] NZHC
2846.
Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA) [Lange (No 1)]; and Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR
385 (CA) [Lange (No 2)].
As explained more fully by Mallon J, the New Zealand Māori Council is a statutory body with
“functions including promoting, encouraging and assisting Māori to advance their physical,
economic, industrial, educational, social, moral and spiritual well-being. It has been involved in
significant litigation on behalf of Māori in accordance with that function.” The Act that
established the New Zealand Māori Council provides for District Māori Councils, which have
members elected every three years, and those District Māori Councils elect the New Zealand
Māori Council members. See Durie, above n 1, at [4]–[9].

 (c)

An amended website story put up on 6 August 2015 (the amended
website story).

(d)

A television broadcast on a weekly current affairs programme
Native Affairs on 31 August 2015 (the Native Affairs programme).

[7]

In order to understand the issues, it is necessary to set out the sequence of

events leading to the publications in some detail. The following account, which the
parties agree is accurate, borrows extensively from Mallon J’s judgment.
[8]

On the morning of 3 August 2015, the head of Māori TV’s news and current

affairs Ms Maramena Roderick was contacted by a confidential source. The source
whom Ms Roderick regarded as reliable informed her of conflict within
the Māori Council. At Ms Roderick’s request, the source forwarded her a copy of an
email as well as a document purporting to be minutes of a Māori Council executive
meeting held on 28 July 2015.
[9]

The email was dated 31 July 2015 and had been sent to Ms Hall by Mr Maanu

Paul the other co-chair of the Māori Council. The email advised Ms Hall that her law
firm had been dismissed as the Māori Council’s legal representative in proceedings
regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and that she was to hand over her
file to another lawyer.
[10]

The minutes recorded resolutions and statements made at the 28 July meeting

which pre-dated the email. The minutes included statements that:
(a)

Ms Hall had not followed the Māori Council’s instructions. She should
be dismissed and a complaint made to the Law Society if evidence were
received that her firm was undermining the Council’s mana.

(b)

According to the Tāmaki Makaurau District Māori Council, Sir Edward
had a conflict of interest when briefing the Council’s legal business.
He had instructed Ms Hall to apply to put him back on the board of
the Crown Forestry Rental Trust as the Māori Council’s representative

 without Mr Paul’s knowledge or the consent of the executive.
Processes to mitigate the risk of conflict had not been put in place and
a legal services roopu should be formed to instruct and manage all legal
claims until the Law Society provided a clear directive on the conflict
issue.
(c)

The Te Tai Tokerau District Māori Council had complained Ms Hall
had set up two new Māori committees in that district without
consultation. If she had done this at the instance of Sir Edward, then
he needed to be held to account and if not Ms Hall was breaching
Māori Council tikanga. The executive resolved that the legal services
roopu undertake an investigation and report back.

(d)

The Māori Council’s legal team was the only legal team not ready to
proceed with an urgent hearing relating to a claim before the
Waitangi Tribunal.

(e)

Ms Hall was running a campaign that was damaging the Tāmaki
Makaurau District Māori Council’s mana and she and Sir Edward were
whipping up a level of hatred not witnessed before.

[11]

Ms Roderick regarded the matters in the email and minutes as of high public

interest and concern to Māori, having regard to the Māori Council’s leadership role in
Māoridom and its success in achieving significant change and development on behalf
of Māori over many years.

She considered the documents indicated a serious

breakdown of relationships within the Māori Council.
[12]

Ms Roderick then assigned the story to Mr Gardiner with a view to it being

broadcast that evening between 5.30 pm and 6 pm on Māori TV’s flagship news
programme Te Kāea.
[13]

Mr Gardiner made contact with Ms Hall at approximately 1.45 pm.

She claimed Mr Paul had no authority to dismiss her. When asked by Mr Gardiner if

 she would like to speak on camera to give her perspective, she said she was busy until
4 pm and to call her then.
[14]

Mr Gardiner then arranged to interview Mr Paul by telephone at 2.30 pm.

Mr Paul confirmed the minutes were an accurate record of the meeting. After the
interview, Mr Gardiner texted Ms Hall confirming he had now interviewed Mr Paul
and wanting to make arrangements to interview her at 4 pm. She was not however
free of her commitments and could not be contacted until just after 5 pm.
[15]

Ms Hall emailed Mr Gardiner at 5.15 pm. She advised there were elections

pending for the Māori Council executive and until the election was held, the current
executive was only supposed to be acting in a caretaker role. The election was hotly
contested and causing some people to make regrettable statements. The meeting
recorded in the minutes was not a properly constituted meeting of the executive.
There were documents that easily showed the defamatory allegations in the minutes
were false, but it was not possible in the time available to provide a detailed response.
There would be a Māori Council meeting on 5 to 6 September at which Ms Hall was
confident the allegations would be shown to be false and not endorsed by
the Māori Council. Māori TV should not publish the allegations in the minutes
because it would be acting as the mouthpiece of people who were making deliberately
hurtful and false allegations for their own political purposes.
[16]

Mr Gardiner conferred with his producers. It was too late to add Ms Hall’s

statement to the story which was about to go on air. It was agreed that Mr Gardiner
would instead do a live piece at the end of the story to explain that Ms Hall’s statement
had just been received and to set out her statement.
[17]

The story was duly broadcast on Te Kāea on 3 August 2015 during the later

part of the programme’s 5.30 pm to 6 pm time slot. It was broadcast in Māori with
English subtitles.

There were also visuals showing extracts from the minutes.

An English transcript of the broadcast reads as follows:
The NZ Māori Council (NZCM) has [dumped] their legal counsel, Donna Hall
and her firm, Woodward Law from their TPPA claim. Heta Gardiner has this
exclusive report.

 Only last month, the Māori Council was fighting to stop the TPPA. But it’s
problems from within that are corroding the council. Today we learnt that
they’ve dumped their legal counsel.
[Maanu Paul] It’s come to our attention that Woodward Law wasn’t listening
to our directives, so we removed them.
Maanu Paul sent an email to Donna Hall last week advising that her firm,
Woodward Law, was being dismissed as its TPPA counsel. Neither parties are
disclosing much about the fallout. But Te Kāea has also obtained a copy of
last week’s council minutes, which outlines a severe breakdown in the
relationship. The minutes record say:
•

That Woodward Law be dismissed as NZMC legal counsel for the TPPA
Claim.

•

That if evidence is received that Woodward Law is undermining the mana
of the NZMC, then a complaint to the NZ Law Society be prepared and
filed.

•

A clear breach of the directives given to Woodward Law.

[Maanu Paul] We have the authority in these matters.
The minutes also record allegations that there is a conflict of interest with
Donna Hall and her husband Taihākurei Durie.
The council’s
Tāmaki Makaurau branch claimed that:
“Taihākurei as the husband of Donna Hall, the Principal of Woodward Law
has put himself under risk of certain conflict of interest unless processes
mitigating that risk were put in place. That did not happen. In other words,
Taihākurei instructed his wife to file an application to put himself back on the
CFRT Board without bringing the matter to the Executive. Had he done so
and resiled from voting, the conflict could have been dealt with appropriately.”
It claims that in 2014 Woodward Law filed an application for Taihākurei to be
given a second term as a Māori Trustee on the Crown Forestry Rental Trust
(CFRT) Board without the consent of the Māori Council. The minutes also
record Titewhai Harawira accusing Donna Hall of running a smear campaign
during the triennial elections and that:
“Titewhai has served on this DMC for over 40 years and has never witnessed
the level of hatred being whipped up by Donna Hall and Eddie [Taihākurei].”
So, is this the beginning of the end for this relationship?
[Maanu Paul] When the NZ Council meets next, they will decide on such
matters.
The council has resolved to form a legal services subcommittee to investigate
the allegations and meet with Woodward Law.
We cross now to our political reporter Heta Gardiner.
Donna Hall have to say today?

Heta, what did

 Rahia, I just spoke to Donna Hall and that is why she didn’t feature in my
story today, her statement came too late. It’s safe to say that Donna Hall is
livid. In regard to the members mentioned in our report, she says, “These are
not truly statements from the Executive but are rather the personal statements
of some disgruntled Māori Council members. There is no privilege that
attaches to these statements.” She goes on to say that at the meeting in
September she is confident that the allegations will be shown to be false.

[18]

The first website story was put up on Māori TV’s website at 6.01 pm on

3 August 2015. The original script from the Te Kāea broadcast was uploaded, but
without the video clip containing the summary of Ms Hall’s response. It had still to
be processed. The video clip became viewable about 7.41 pm. The online story was
in English only. It was identical to the Te Kāea broadcast with the exception of the
following:
(a)

reference in the second sentence of the broadcast to Mr Gardiner having
this exclusive report was not included in the website story;

(b)

the website story did not include quotation marks around the following
words:
In other words, Taihākurei Durie instructed his wife to file an
application to put himself back on the CFRT Board without
bringing the matter to the Executive. Had he done so and
resiled from voting, the conflict could have been dealt with
appropriately.

(c)

the website story included the following additional words:
Furthermore, the minutes reveal concerns from the council’s
Tai Tokerau branch that Donna Hall had set up Māori
committees in their district without consulting them and that:
“… we need to establish who is instructing Woodward Law to
go into other districts. If it is Taihākurei, then he needs to be
held to account. If it is Donna Hall is instructing herself, this
is another breach of the NZMC tikanga and processes.”

(d)

the website story did not include the direct comments from Mr Paul;
and

(e)

the website story did not include the cross to Mr Gardiner and his
summary of what Ms Hall had to say.

 [19]

Later in the evening of 3 August 2015, Mr Gardiner offered Ms Hall another

opportunity to be interviewed the next day to refute some of the accusations, but did
not receive a response.

The next communication was in fact a letter dated

5 August 2015 from a lawyer representing both Ms Hall and Sir Edward. The letter
contended the broadcast and website story were defamatory and, had Māori TV
allowed a reasonable time, could easily have been refuted by documentation.
The letter requested immediate removal of the website story together with a retraction
and apology.
[20]

On 6 August 2015 Māori TV updated the website story. This was to include

the last part of the Te Kāea broadcast in which Ms Hall’s response was discussed.
It also included (minutes after initially going online) the quotation marks missing from
the first website story.
[21]

On 5.42 pm on 7 August 2015, Māori TV removed the website story but did

not agree to the other demands in the lawyer’s letter. Its position as conveyed to
Ms Hall and Sir Edward’s lawyers was that further inquiries had indicated a very
different view to that advanced by Ms Hall and that Māori TV considered the story
was likely to develop. It therefore refused to agree not to re-publish the minutes.
It again invited Ms Hall and Sir Edward to be interviewed.
[22]

Ms Roderick considered the issues required further coverage in order she says

to give viewers a better understanding of the dispute. This led to the Native Affairs
broadcast on 31 August 2015. Ms Hall and Sir Edward declined to be interviewed,
but provided a statement denying the allegations and saying the resolutions passed at
the meeting were invalid and based on incorrect information. We interpolate here that
the appellants do not sue Māori TV in respect of this broadcast although it does form
part of a claim for aggravated damages.
[23]

There were no further developments until a meeting of the Māori Council on

16 April 2016 when Sir Edward was elected sole chairperson for a term of three years.
This was reported by Māori TV on its Te Kāea programme. The report also appeared
on Māori TV’s website. The story included an on-camera interview with Sir Edward,
and Mr Paul’s response to the election result.

 [24]

Other media reported on the election result. Earlier, four news outlets —

Fairfax Media, Radio New Zealand, Television New Zealand and Waatea News — had
published stories on 3 or 4 August 2015 about the Māori Council dismissing Ms Hall
and (in varying degrees) her response.
The pleadings
[25]

The statement of claim treats each of the first three publications (the Te Kāea

broadcast, the first website story and the amended website story) as separate causes of
action.
[26]

It contends that each publication contained statements that in their natural and

ordinary meaning were defamatory of Ms Hall and Sir Edward. The defamatory
meanings are identified as follows. In relation to Sir Edward, that he:
(a)

Acted in a position of conflict of interest by instructing his wife to apply
for his reappointment to the Crown Forestry Rental Trust without
notifying the Māori Council or seeking its consent.

(b)

Acted unlawfully and unprofessionally by not obtaining the
Māori Council’s consent to his bid for reappointment.

(c)

Breached his responsibilities to the Māori Council by not obtaining its
consent.

(d)

Acted dishonestly by not telling the Māori Council of his bid for
reappointment

(e)

Placed his own interests and those of his wife over those of the
Māori Council and Māori people.

(f)

Conducted himself so as to give rise to a reasonable cause to suspect he
acted improperly and without Māori Council approval to set up
committees in Tai Tokerau.

 (g)

Was running an unjustified smear campaign in an unprecedented
manner that involved whipping up hatred in relation to the elections.

[27]

In relation to Ms Hall, that she:
(a)

Conducted herself so as to justify being dismissed.

(b)

Failed to follow the Māori Council’s instructions.

(c)

Breached her professional ethical obligations.

(d)

Acted unlawfully.

(e)

Acted in a position of conflict of interest in making an application on
behalf of the Māori Council for her husband to be reappointed to the
Crown Forestry Rental Trust without notifying the Māori Council or
obtaining its consent.

(f)

Acted unprofessionally and unlawfully by not obtaining that consent.

(g)

Breached Māori Council tikanga by setting up committees without
consulting the local council.

(h)

Conducted herself so as to give rise to a reasonable cause to believe she
had undermined the mana of the Māori Council in a manner that
breaches Law Society obligations.

(i)

Conducted herself so as to give rise to a reasonable cause to believe she
had acted without instructions in setting up committees.

(j)

Was running an unjustified smear campaign in an unprecedented
manner that involves whipping up hatred in relation to the elections.

(k)

Breached her responsibilities to the Māori Council.

 (l)

Placed her own and her husband’s interests over those of the
Māori Council and Māori people.

[28]

The statement of claim seeks compensatory (including aggravated) damages

and punitive damages as well as a recommendation for publication of a correction.
[29]

The statement of defence contends the words do not bear the alleged

defamatory meanings. It also pleads other defences including the defence of honest
opinion and a defence described as “Qualified Privilege/Public interest defence”.
This latter defence, which Māori TV told Mallon J is its primary defence, is pleaded
in the following terms:
Qualified Privilege/Public interest defence
To the extent that the words complained of … were published, those
publications were protected by qualified privilege in that they were neutral
reportage, and/or subject to the Lange v Atkinson privilege; or an extension
thereto; and/or were responsible journalism/communications on matters of
public interest; or protected by a sui generis public interest defence.

The strike-out application
[30]

Sir Edward and Ms Hall applied to strike out the defence of honest opinion and

the qualified privilege/public interest defence on the grounds neither of those defences
could possibly succeed.
[31]

Much of the argument in the High Court focused on whether the qualified

privilege defence in the terms pleaded was as a matter of law available in this country.
After an extensive review of the authorities, Mallon J concluded that it was, 5 and
further that it could not be said the defence would inevitably fail on the facts.6
[32]

Justice Mallon also refused to strike out the honest opinion defence.7

The appellants have not appealed that part of her judgment and we therefore do not
address honest opinion any further.

5
6
7

Durie, above n 1, at [105].
At [112]–[114].
At [145].

 [33]

We turn now to consider the issues on appeal. It was common ground that

Mallon J’s review of the case law, the facts of each case and the rulings in each case
was comprehensive and accurate.8 We therefore do not consider it necessary for us to
traverse the authorities in the same detail, other than to provide a brief summary of the
relevant legal background.
[34]

It should also be noted that in this Court unlike the High Court, the appellants

were prepared to concede that some form of public interest defence might now exist
in New Zealand. The focus of the argument was therefore more on the boundaries of
such a defence and its application to the facts.
Is there a general public interest defence to defamation claims in New Zealand
and if so, what is its scope?
[35]

For convenience we again set out the defence as pleaded by Māori TV.
To the extent that the words complained of … were published, those
publications were protected by qualified privilege in that they were neutral
reportage, and/or subject to the Lange v Atkinson privilege; or an extension
thereto; and/or were responsible journalism/communications on matters of
public interest; or protected by a sui generis public interest defence.

Legal background
[36]

The classic definition of qualified privilege is that it arises where the maker of

the impugned communication has “an interest or duty, legal, social, or moral, to make
it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is made has a
corresponding interest or duty to receive it”.9 Where the privilege arises, it protects
false and defamatory assertions of fact. It is qualified as opposed to absolute because
the privilege may be lost if the plaintiff proves the maker of the statement took
improper advantage of the occasion of publication or was predominantly motivated by
ill-will.10

8

9
10

The appellants disputed some of Mallon J’s conclusions regarding what they say are the constraints
of reportage but ultimately these were not significant for the purposes of the appeal.
Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 (HL) at 334.
Defamation Act 1992, s 19.

 [37]

In the first Lange v Atkinson decision, this Court extended the scope of the

defence of qualified privilege as it had traditionally been understood by holding that
mass publications concerning Members of Parliament, or those wanting to be elected
to Parliament, were capable of attracting the defence if the allegations related to their
fitness for office.11
[38]

This was new because previously the courts had taken a narrow view of the

reciprocity of interest required as between communicator and recipient when it came
to generally published statements. With a few limited exceptions such as fair and
accurate reports of official statements, hearings and meetings, the courts had
consistently refused to recognise either that news disseminators had a duty to publish
matters which were of public interest and importance, or that the general public had a
legitimate interest in learning of such matters.12 In Lange however, this Court said a
strict concept of reciprocity was not essential.13
[39]

This Court did however reaffirm the traditional view as to when the privilege

would be lost, declining to follow Australian authority and import a new requirement
that a media defendant must prove it had acted reasonably in publishing the story.14
[40]

In the second Lange v Atkinson decision,15 this Court reconsidered its

approach16 in light of a later House of Lords decision Reynolds v Times Newspapers
Ltd which had taken a different view.17

This Court considered Reynolds was

distinguishable in the New Zealand context and accordingly reaffirmed its earlier
decision.18 In distinguishing Reynolds, the Court relied on such matters as the more
responsible media culture in New Zealand,19 the smaller population,20 and differences

11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Lange (No 1), above n 3, at 467–468.
See Truth (NZ) Ltd v Holloway [1960] NZLR 69 (CA); Dunford Publicity Studios Ltd v News
Media Ownership Ltd [1971] NZLR 961 (SC); and Brooks v Muldoon [1973] 1 NZLR 1 (SC).
At 441.
At 469–470. Compare Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 CLR 520.
Lange (No 2), above n 3.
At the direction of the Privy Council: Lange v Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC).
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL).
Lange (No 2), above n 3, at [37]–[41].
At [34].
At [35].

 between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the European Convention on
Human Rights.21
[41]

In Reynolds, the House of Lords had accepted the traditional approach was

inappropriately chilling free speech and that publication about matters of public
interest to the world at large should be capable of attracting qualified privilege.
However, it rejected the suggestion that a public interest privilege should be limited to
political information, the publication of which would be privileged whatever the
circumstances. That approach was considered unsound in two respects. First, in the
view of their Lordships there was no principled basis for distinguishing political
discussion from discussion of other matters of serious public concern. And secondly,
to ignore the circumstances of publication would mean inadequate protection for
reputation.22
[42]

Instead, the House of Lords held that when the mass media makes a claim for

privilege, the question of whether the duty/interest test is satisfied (or put more simply,
whether the public is entitled to know) must be answered on the facts of each case,
taking into account, the following non-exhaustive factors:23

21

22
23

(a)

the seriousness of the allegation;

(b)

the nature of the information;

(c)

the source of the information;

(d)

the steps taken to verify the information;

(e)

the status of the information;

(f)

the urgency of the matter;

At [28]–[30]; referring to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ETS 5 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953);
scheduled to and given the force of law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
Reynolds, above n 17, at 204.
At 205.

 (g)

whether comment was sought from the plaintiff;

(h)

whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story;

(i)

the tone of the article; and

(j)

the circumstances of the publication, including the timing.

(The Reynolds factors).
[43]

Applying those criteria to the facts before them, the Law Lords held that

because the article in question had made serious allegations about the behaviour of the
Irish Prime Minister in Parliament without mentioning his explanation, the allegations
were not ones the public was entitled to know and thus the publication was not one
that should in the public interest be protected by qualified privilege. The newspaper’s
appeal was accordingly dismissed.24
[44]

As noted by Mallon J, the approach in Reynolds was both wider than Lange

and narrower. It was wider because it was not confined to publications about Members
of Parliament or politics, but narrower because of its responsible journalism factors.25
[45]

We would add however that to a significant extent the latter point of distinction

between Reynolds and Lange may be more apparent than real. That is because in the
second Lange decision, this Court explained that the assessment of whether the
occasion is privileged — that is, determining the existence of the required shared
interest between publisher and public — was not just about the subject matter. It also
included an inquiry into the circumstances or context of the publication, including
actual content. In other words, not every statement about a politician pertaining to the
performance of his or her role would be automatically privileged.26
[46]

All of the Reynolds factors are capable of being described as being part of the

circumstances and context of the publication and it is therefore arguable that if the

24
25
26

At 206.
Durie, above n 1, at [83].
Lange (No 2), above n 3, at [13] and [21]–[23].

 Lange approach were applied to the facts of Reynolds, the result would be the same.
Significantly, in a subsequent decision of this Court it was confirmed that the
seriousness of the allegation — the first Reynolds factor — should be taken into
account in determining whether the Lange defence was available.27
[47]

Following Reynolds, the House of Lords and United Kingdom Supreme Court

emphasised in two further decisions — Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl and
Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd — that the Reynolds factors were not a series of
hurdles, but an illustrative guide as to what might constitute responsible journalism
and that it was not for the courts to micromanage the editorial practices of media
organisations.28 It appears this was a response to criticism that although the defence
was meant to foster free expression and a free press, the Reynolds factors were being
applied in such a way that made it almost impossible for the defence to ever succeed.29
[48]

Another important feature of the post-Reynolds English case law was the

emergence of the concept of neutral reportage or reportage.30 It was held in several
cases that mass publication of the fact of an allegation made by someone else was
capable of attracting privilege without requiring the publisher to verify whether the
allegations were well founded, provided the reporting of the allegation was without
adoption of the allegation or embellishment. This represented a significant departure
from the well-established rule that someone who repeats a defamatory allegation is no
less liable than the person who originated it.31 (The repetition rule).

27
28

29

30

31

Vickery v McLean [2006] NZAR 481 (CA) at [17]–[18].
Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359; and Flood v Times
Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273.
See Eric Barendt “Reynolds revived and replaced” (2017) 9 JML 1 at 1; Jason Bosland
“Republication of Defamation under the Doctrine of Reportage: The Evolution of Common Law
Qualified Privilege in England and Wales” (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 89 at 90–
91; Kate Beattie “New Life for the Reynolds ‘Public Interest Defence’? Jameel v Wall Street
Journal Europe” (2007) 1 EHRLR 81; Andrew Scott “The Same River Twice? Jameel v Wall
Street Journal Europe” (2007) 12 Comms L 52; Jacob Rowbottom “Libel and the Public Interest”
(2007) 66 CLJ 8; David Hooper “The Importance of the Jameel Case” (2007) 18 Ent LR 62; and
Andrew T Kenyon “Lange and Reynolds Qualified Privilege: Australian and English Defamation
Law and Practice” (2004) 28 MULR 406 at 412 and 423–424.
Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1634 at [65] and [67]–
[68]; Jameel, above n 28, at [62] per Lord Hoffmann; Roberts v Gable [2007] EWCA Civ 721,
[2008] QB 502 at [53] and [60]; Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 972,
[2008] 1 All ER 750 at [48]–[50]; and Flood, above n 28, at [77]. And see Godwin Busuttil
“Reportage: A Not Entirely Neutral Report” (2009) Ent LR 44 at 45; and Bosland, above n 29.
See Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (HL) at 260.

 [49]

It will be recalled that “reportage” is part of Māori TV’s pleaded defence.

[50]

There has since been legislative amendment in the United Kingdom with the

enactment of s 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. Section 4 states:

[51]

4

Publication on matter of public interest

(1)

It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show
that—
(a)

the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a
statement on a matter of public interest; and

(b)

the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the
statement complained of was in the public interest.

(2)

Subject to subsections (3) and (4), in determining whether the
defendant has shown the matters mentioned in subsection (1),
the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case.

(3)

If the statement complained of was, or formed part of, an accurate and
impartial account of a dispute to which the claimant was a party,
the court must in determining whether it was reasonable for the
defendant to believe that publishing the statement was in the public
interest disregard any omission of the defendant to take steps to verify
the truth of the imputation conveyed by it.

(4)

In determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe
that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest,
the court must make such allowance for editorial judgement as it
considers appropriate.

(5)

For the avoidance of doubt, the defence under this section may be
relied upon irrespective of whether the statement complained of is a
statement of fact or a statement of opinion.

(6)

The common law defence known as the Reynolds defence is
abolished.

The explanatory notes describe the provision as based on the Reynolds

common law defence and as intended to reflect the principles established in that case
and subsequent cases. Section 4(3) concerns reportage.32
[52]

Meantime in Canada, in 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada also had occasion

to consider the same issues in the landmark decision of Grant v Torstar Corp.33
32

33

Explanatory Notes at [29] and [32]. These were written by the Ministry of Justice, and were not
endorsed by Parliament.
Grant v Torstar Corp 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 SCR 640.

 It concluded that the law of defamation in Canada should be modified to recognise a
new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest. Such a
defence would, the Court said, represent “a reasonable and proportionate response to
the need to protect reputation while sustaining the public exchange of information that
is vital to modern Canadian society”.34 As will become apparent, we have found the
Torstar decision particularly helpful.
Our analysis
[53]

The law of defamation seeks to strike a just balance between two cherished

rights — the right to protection of reputation (intimately related to the protection of
personal privacy)35 and the right to freedom of expression which includes the freedom
to impart and receive information and ideas. Striking the balance is “a value judgment
informed by local circumstances and guided by principle”.36
[54]

In the Lange decisions, this Court altered that balance in favour of freedom of

speech. It did so essentially because it considered the existing law gave insufficient
recognition to the media’s critical role in a modern democracy as the channel for
exchange of news and opinions among the public as a whole. The value of informed
political public debate was seen as high. This Court must also have been mindful of
the public interest in effective investigative journalism, something which the current
law of qualified privilege was seen as impeding by preventing the publication of true
(but not provably true) stories.
[55]

The Court was not prepared to follow Reynolds and extend the scope of the

privilege beyond political discussion. It considered that to do so would be to alter the
structure of the law of qualified privilege in a way which would add to uncertainty and
reduce the role of the jury in defamation trials. 37 The Court also considered that
introducing a responsible journalism test was not warranted in this country due to
important differences between the New Zealand media and the English media. The

34
35

36

37

At [86].
Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at 1179; quoted in Lange v Atkinson
[1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) [Lange (HC)] at 31; and Lange (No 1), above n 3, at 450.
Lange (HC), above n 35, at 43; cited with approval by this Court in Lange (No 1), above n 3,
at 432.
Lange (No 2), above n 3, at [24]–[25].

 Court quoted a statement from the former Minister of Justice to the effect that media
intrusion into the daily lives of New Zealanders was “rather tame” compared with the
situation in the United Kingdom and that the standard of New Zealand journalism was
superior.38 New Zealand, the Court said, had “not encountered the worst excesses and
irresponsibilities of the English national daily tabloids”,39 noting also that the
circulation of the British national papers far exceeded that of any New Zealand
newspaper.40
[56]

Eighteen years later however, we consider it is again time to strike a new

balance by recognising the existence of a new defence of public interest
communication that is not confined to parliamentarians or political issues, but extends
to all matters of significant public concern and which is subject to a responsibility
requirement. Although the existence of such a defence was rejected in Lange, we
consider that subsequent societal and legal developments justify recognising it now.
In particular, we point to the following:
(a)

Significantly greater power resides outside the political sphere than it
did at the time Lange was decided and there is increased public
expectation in the accountability of non political groups. As noted by
the authors of The Law of Torts in New Zealand, there are many types
of public figures, other than politicians and state employees, who are
involved in the formation of policy or who in other ways have a major
impact on the economy and the lives of New Zealanders.41 In those
circumstances it is illogical to confine the defence to political
discussion. This is, we consider, reflected in several High Court
decisions where inroads were made by judges who clearly felt overly
constrained by the limits of the Lange defence.42 The recognition of a

38

39
40
41

42

At [34]; quoting Sir Douglas Graham, who was then Minister of Justice, in Karl du Fresne
Free Press, Free Society (Newspaper Publishers Assoc of New Zealand, Wellington, 1994) at 26
and 34.
At [34].
At [35].
Ursula Cheer “Defamation” in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (7th ed,
Thompson Reuters, Wellington, 2016) 839 at 930.
See Cheer, above n 41, at 931–934; and the cases above n 2.

 new public interest defence is in our view a logical extension of those
cases.
(b)

The significant changes in mass communication arising from new
technologies whereby statements can be published in seconds to a mass
audience potentially numbering in the millions. Comparisons between
the reach of a defamatory statement in New Zealand as opposed to that
in England are plainly no longer relevant considerations.

(c)

The emergence of social media and the “citizen journalist” which has
radically changed the nature of public discourse. Bloggers and those
who comment on blogs, tweeters, and users of Facebook and other
social media are modern phenomena largely unknown to the Court in
Lange. While the mainstream New Zealand media may still be as
responsible as the Court in Lange considered it was, the proliferation
of unregulated bloggers and other commentators who can be reckless
means that the imposition of a responsibility requirement is highly
desirable and a necessary safeguard for reputation and privacy rights.
It would also provide much needed clarity and certainty in an
unregulated world. The other alternative would be to deny the defence
altogether to anyone other than the mainstream media but we do not
consider that drawing such a distinction would be justified either as a
matter of logic, policy or principle. Non-media commentators have an
important role to play.

(d)

The increasing prominence of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
including the right to freedom of expression in our jurisprudence; the
greater exploration of the boundaries of that right and a closer
consideration of the right to privacy, all of which in combination justify
extending the scope of the defence beyond political discussion by
mainstream media but subject to a responsibility requirement.

 (e)

The diminishing importance of the jury in defamation trials,43 which
undermines concerns expressed in Lange about the effect of Reynolds.

(f)
[57]

The developments in other common law jurisdictions.

Finally, we note there is nothing in the Defamation Act 1992 which would

preclude recognition of such a defence.44
[58]

Building on the English and Canadian case law, we consider the elements of

the new defence should be:

[59]

(a)

the subject matter of the publication was of public interest; and

(b)

the communication was responsible.

On both issues, the defendant bears the onus of proof. As already mentioned,

in light of new technologies which enable anyone to communicate to the world at
large, it is a defence that should be available to all who publish material of public
interest in any medium. We therefore follow the approach taken in Torstar and do not
style the defence as one of responsible journalism, but rather responsible
communication on a matter of public interest.45
[60]

We acknowledge the difficulties of applying some aspects of the responsibility

criteria to non-media defendants who communicate defamatory material in quite
different ways to the mainstream media.46 However we do not consider these to be
insuperable. They are capable of being worked out on a case by case basis as has
occurred in England.

43

44
45
46

Section 11 of the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) abolished the right to trial by jury; and see the
discussion in Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 2853 (QB), [2014] EMLR 32 at
[58]–[71] and [76]–[79]; and Cook v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2011] EWHC 763 (QB)
at [114]. See also Craig v Slater, above n 2, at [38] where Toogood J held the complexity of the
qualified privilege defences advanced necessitated a judge alone hearing.
See further at [79] below.
Torstar, above n 33, at [96]–[97].
Barendt, above n 29, at 11–12.

 [61]

What then should be the respective roles of judge and jury in relation to the

new defence?

On this issue, there was a divergence of opinion in Torstar.

The majority held it was for the trial judge to decide whether the communication
relates to a matter of public interest, but for the jury to determine whether it was
responsible.47 Dissenting solely on this point, Abella J considered both elements
should be determined by the judge.48 Her view is consistent with the approach in
Reynolds.49 In Lange, the issue was left open.50
[62]

All counsel in this case agreed that in the event we decided to recognise a new

defence of public interest, we should adopt the approach advocated by Abella J.
We have come to the same view for the following reasons:
(a)

Unlike the Canadian Supreme Court, we are not constrained by any
specific legislative provisions. The majority in Torstar considered that
to deny a central role to the jury breached a provision in the Ontario
Libel and Slander Act 1990.51

(b)

The issues of public interest and responsibility are so interconnected it
is desirable they be determined by the same decision maker. As noted
by Abella J, there is very little conceptual difference between the two
elements of the defence.52

(c)

Determining whether a communication has met the applicable standard
of responsibility involves mixed questions of fact and law. It is a highly
evaluative exercise better suited to judicial assessment.

(d)

Requiring juries to determine whether a communication was
responsible is likely to result in lengthy and complicated jury questions.
Defamation jury trials are already notorious for their complexity, length

47
48
49

50
51
52

At [100] and [128]–[135].
At [142]–[143].
Reynolds, above n 17, at 205D–E per Lord Nicholls, 215–216 per Lord Steyn, and 236F–237 per
Lord Hope; see also Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2005] EWCA Civ 74, [2005] QB
904 [Jameel (CA)] at [70].
Lange (No 1), above n 3, at 470–471; and Lange (No 2), above n 3, at [25].
Torstar, above n 33, at [131]–[133]; referring to Libel and Slander Act RSO 1990 c L-12, s 14.
At [142].

 and cost. Recognition of a new defence should not compound that
problem.
(e)

Concerns expressed by the majority in Torstar that the English
approach entails a complex back and forth between the jury
determining the primary facts and the judge determining responsibility
can be minimised by appropriate trial management.53

(f)

Those concerns are strongly outweighed by the obvious advantages of
having a reasoned decision from a judge about whether the media has
acted responsibly.

(g)

The Abella J approach is consistent with a growing recognition that
because defamation trials are often so complex, it is inappropriate for
juries to be expected to determine mixed questions of fact and law.54

[63]

Accordingly, in a case tried by a jury in New Zealand, it will be for the

trial judge to determine whether the two elements of the defence are established based
on the primary facts as found by the jury.
[64]

In determining whether the subject matter of the publication was of public

interest, the judge should step back and look at the thrust of the publication as a whole.
It is not necessary to find a separate public interest justification for each item of
information. As already mentioned, public interest is not confined to publications on
political matters. It is also not necessary the plaintiff be a public figure.
[65]

Defining what is a matter of public interest in the abstract with any precision

is a notoriously difficult exercise.

Trial judges are however likely to find the

discussion of public interest in Torstar of assistance. There it was said that to be of
public interest the subject matter should be one inviting public attention, or about
which the public or a segment of the public has some substantial concern because it

53
54

See Torstar, above n 33, at [134].
See above n 43.

 affects the welfare of citizens, or one to which considerable public notoriety or
controversy has attached.55
[66]

As regards determining whether the communication was responsible, that is to

be determined by the judge having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the
publication.
[67]

Relevant circumstances to be taken into account may include:
(a)

The seriousness of the allegation — the more serious the allegation, the
greater the degree of diligence to verify it.

(b)

The degree of public importance.

(c)

The urgency of the matter — did the public’s need to know require the
defendant to publish when it did, taking into account that news is often
a perishable commodity.56

(d)

The reliability of any source.

(e)

Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff and accurately
reported — this was described in Torstar as a core factor because it
speaks to the essential sense of fairness the defence is intended to
promote. In most cases it is inherently unfair to publish defamatory
allegations of fact without giving the target an opportunity to respond.
Failure to do so also heightens the risk of inaccuracy. The target may
well be able to offer relevant information beyond bare denial.57

(f)

The tone of the publication.

(g)

The inclusion of defamatory statements which were not necessary to
communicate on the matter of public interest.

55
56
57

Torstar, above n 33, at [99]–[106].
Reynolds, above n 17, at 205B–C per Lord Nicholls.
Torstar, above n 33, at [116].

 [68]

The list of factors is not exhaustive and in some cases the circumstances may

be such that not all factors in the list are relevant.

In some cases, publishing

defamatory allegations from an unidentified source may not be responsible. In other
cases it may be responsible if for example the publisher had good reason to consider
the source reliable and the article made it clear it was relying on a confidential source
or sources. In short, the factors must be applied in a practical and flexible manner
with regard to the practical realities and with some deference to the editorial judgment
of the publisher, particularly in cases involving professional editors and journalists.
Reportage
[69]

The Court has not been able to agree whether reportage — the neutral reporting

of attributed allegations — should be regarded as a separate defence, distinct from the
new public interest defence. At [104] to [114] Brown J explains why he considers it
is conceptually different and also why its recognition is problematic. The majority of
us (French and Winkelmann JJ) however take a different view and what follows from
[70] to [81] is the opinion of the majority.
[70]

The majority agrees with the English and Canadian authorities that reportage

should not be regarded as a separate defence.58 In our view, it would be illogical to do
so when correctly analysed reportage can be seen to rest on both public interest and
responsible communication, the scope of what amounts to responsible being
necessarily tailored to the nature of the particular public interest at issue.
[71]

In the context of a situation where the public interest concerned lies in the fact

the allegation was made, rather than the truth of its contents, the publisher may be
relieved of the usual responsibility obligation of attempting to verify the contents as
distinct from verifying the making of the allegation but that is not the end of the
responsibility inquiry. The court will also consider whether, viewing the publication
as a whole, the publishers have made it clear they do not subscribe to any belief in the
truth of the allegation and have not adopted it as their own. Relevant considerations
will include whether the source of the information is disclosed in the publication and

58

Flood, above n 28, at [35]; relying on Roberts v Gable, above n 30, at [60]; and Torstar,
above n 33, at [121].

 the tone of the publication,59 including whether the allegations have been
embellished.60 Timing may also be relevant. If, for example, the allegation or its
context was stale or there was some other ulterior reason for the timing of the
publication, then reportage may not be available even if the report was otherwise full,
fair and neutral.61
[72]

To put it another way, the concept of neutral reportage rests on both elements

of the new defence. The fact it has its own label does not make it in substance a
separate defence.
[73]

In Torstar, the Supreme Court’s treatment of reportage suggests that the

existence of a dispute between the originator of the defamation and the person defamed
is required.62 Although that is also a requirement under the new statutory defence in
the United Kingdom,63 we would prefer not to circumscribe the concept in that way.
In our view, making the existence of a dispute a prerequisite is likely to divert attention
away from the core principle of public interest to unhelpful and potentially distracting
arguments about what constitutes a dispute, including whether a denial of an allegation
is sufficient to create a dispute. In principle and as a matter of logic, there is no reason
why a public interest defence could not in an appropriate case protect the disinterested
repetition of a unilateral allegation.64
[74]

In his separate judgment, Brown J expresses concern that allowing a reportage

defence lacks coherence and that in light of the repetition rule, it makes little sense
that a publisher can publish a defamatory statement without the belief in its truth and
be absolved from liability because the publisher indicates that it did not adopt the
allegation. However, as was pointed out in Roberts v Gable, the repetition rule only
concerns the scope of the defence of justification in report cases. 65 It does not limit

59
60

61

62
63
64
65

Roberts v Gable, above n 30, at [70].
Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 17 at [72]–[73]; Roberts v Gable, above n 30,
at [61(5)]; and Charman, above n 30, at [48].
Roberts v Gable, above n 30, at [70]. See generally Matthew Collins Collins on Defamation
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at [12.78]–[12.85].
See at [76] and [120].
Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 4(3).
Charman, above n 30, at [91] per Sedley LJ.
Roberts v Gable, above n 30, at [56]–[59] per Ward LJ; referring to Al-Fagih, above n 30, at [36].

 the scope of qualified privilege and (we would add) the scope of other defences based
on concepts of public interest.
[75]

A further concern raised by Brown J is that reportage could create a perverse

incentive for journalists not to engage in one of their fundamental roles, the
verification of important facts.66 This, and a related concern that it represents too great
an inroad into reputation and privacy rights are however, in our assessment, met by
the fact that reportage has been and is to be viewed as a special and relatively rare
situation.67
[76]

The reality is that, in the vast majority of cases, if there is public interest in an

allegation it will lie in the fact the allegation is or may be true (that is, its contents),
not in the fact it was made — a distinction which, contrary to Brown J, we consider is
intelligible and workable. Reportage will only be available in circumstances where
the public interest in the fact of the allegation is overwhelming and so compelling on
its own that urgent reporting of it is justified without further investigation.
A hypothetical example of such a situation might be the fact that the Governor-General
has alleged a senior Cabinet Minister is taking bribes, thereby triggering a possible
constitutional crisis.
[77]

The stakes for publishers — mainstream or otherwise — who do not attempt

to verify the truth of the defamatory allegation are high. They are likely to do so at
their peril and accordingly the incentive to make the attempt remains high.
[78]

Unlike Brown J, we also do not consider that recognition of reportage is in any

way inconsistent with the existence of qualified privilege defences under the
Defamation Act relating to the reporting of public meetings, inquiries, court hearings
and the like.68 In those cases, the public interest underlying the privilege derives from
the location where the statement is made, not the fact it was made.

66
67

68

At [105] below.
Flood, above n 28, at [77] per Lord Phillips; Alastair Mullis and Richard Parkes (eds) Gatley on
Libel and Slander (12th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2013) at 666; and Roberts v Gable,
above n 30, at [74].
Sections 16–18 and sch 1.

 [79]

The Defamation Act does not purport to be a code and,69 as Lange

demonstrates, the statutory qualified privilege defences have not precluded the courts
from expanding the scope of qualified privilege or recognising new categories of
qualified privilege. If, as Brown J accepts, the Defamation Act does not preclude us
from recognising a new defence of public interest, then there is in our respectful view
no logical justification for singling out reportage. We note too that the same statutory
defences relied on by Brown J were contained in the equivalent United Kingdom
statute in force at the time the first reportage cases were decided. 70 Yet, none of the
appellate judges involved in those cases ever expressed concern that the recognition
of such a concept ran counter to Parliament’s intention or created any tension requiring
reconciliation.71
[80]

To sum up, in the view of the majority as with the Reynolds approach, the new

defence thus involves a spectrum.72 At one end is reportage where the mere fact of
the statement being made is itself of public interest and is reported as being of public
interest. Further along the spectrum is a situation as in Flood which involved the
publication not only of the fact of the plaintiff’s investigation for corruption, but the
nature of the alleged corruption. There the House of Lords said the press could not
disclaim all responsibilities for checking their sources as far as practical, but provided
the article was of real and unmistakeable public interest and was fairly presented, the
press were not required to produce primary evidence of the information given by
sources.73 Further still along the spectrum that may however be necessary.
[81]

Finally, we record that although reportage need not be pleaded as a separate

defence, it should be pleaded as a particular of the public interest defence.

69

70
71

72
73

For example, s 16(3) of the Defamation Act provides “[n]othing in this section limits any other
rule of law relating to qualified privilege.”
Defamation Act 1996 (UK), sch 1.
The 2002 decision relied upon by Brown J, English v Hastie Publishing Ltd [2002] All ER (D) 11
(Feb) (QB), where some caution was expressed is a first instance decision.
Flood, above n 28, at [158] per Lord Mance.
At [158].

 Other aspects of the new defence
[82]

In the interests of doctrinal coherence, we consider that, as is the case in

Canada,74 the new defence should be a standalone defence and not part of the rubric
of qualified privilege.
[83]

Although the English version of the defence was identified in Reynolds as a

species of qualified privilege, this characterisation was subsequently considered
misleading by several Law Lords in both Jameel and Flood. As they pointed out,
correctly analysed, the Reynolds defence is a different jurisprudential creature from
the traditional form of privilege.75 It arises primarily because of the subject matter of
the publication — a matter of public interest — and not the occasion on which it is
published, as in the traditional form. Unlike the traditional form, there is also no
question of the “privilege” being defeated by showing the privilege was abused
(malice), because the propriety of the defendant’s conduct is built into the conditions
under which the material is privileged. This in turn impacts on the incidence of the
onus of proof. Under the traditional form of qualified privilege, it is for the plaintiff
to prove the privilege is lost because of malice on the part of the defendant, whereas
under the Reynolds defence and the defence recognised in this judgment, it is for
the defendant to prove he or she acted responsibly.
[84]

Where then does recognition of this new defence in New Zealand leave cases

involving parliamentarians and political discussion?
[85]

For the reasons already discussed, we consider the same sorts of considerations

which will apply under the new defence also apply currently under Lange in relation
to politicians, and therefore outcomes are likely to be the same. However, to leave
Members of Parliament or political discussion as a separate category to continue to be
governed at least nominally by qualified privilege would be highly unsatisfactory.
Such a distinction would not be justified in either principle or policy and it would
create confusion.
74
75

Torstar, above n 33, at [88]–[95].
Jameel, above n 28, at [46] per Lord Hoffmann (with whom Lady Hale agreed); and Flood,
above n 28, at [38] per Lord Phillips. Lord Phillips first applied the phrase “different
jurisprudential creature” in Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 2–5) [2001] EWCA
Civ 1805, [2002] QB 783 at [35].

 [86]

We therefore conclude that the form of qualified privilege recognised in

Lange v Atkinson should no longer be an available defence, being effectively
subsumed in the new defence of public interest. We direct that all references to
“qualified privilege” and “Lange v Atkinson” in Māori TV’s pleaded defence of
“Qualified Privilege/Public interest” should be struck out.
[87]

Before turning to apply the new defence to the facts of this case, it is necessary

for us to first address an application to adduce further evidence on appeal.
Application to adduce further evidence
[88]

Māori TV sought leave to adduce further evidence for the purposes of the

appeal. The proposed further evidence consisted of evidence relating to events after
the publication of the amended website story.
[89]

In our view, as a matter of principle, the conduct of the publisher for the

purposes of the defence must be assessed as at the time of publication.76 What was
the position as it appeared then to those responsible for publication? 77 Evidence of
subsequent events and conduct may lead to inferences about conduct at the earlier time
but Māori TV does not suggest that is the case here. The proposed evidence is
therefore irrelevant to this appeal and the application is accordingly declined.78
[90]

We now turn to consider whether on the pleaded facts and uncontested

evidence, there is no prospect of Māori TV establishing that the publications
concerned a matter of public interest and were the product of responsible
communication.
Should the defence be struck out on the facts?
[91]

In the High Court, the Judge’s focus was understandably very much on the

issue of whether the defence existed. Her consideration of whether the new defence

76
77
78

Mullis and Parkes, above n 67, at 655.
Flood, above n 28, at [122] per Lord Mance; and Jameel, above n 28, at [62] per Lord Hoffmann.
That is not to say the evidence will be irrelevant at the hearing.

 would inevitably fail on the facts of the case was therefore limited and did not consider
each publication separately as was required.
[92]

On appeal, it was common ground that all three publications were on a matter

of public interest. We agree, having regard to the leadership role of the Māori Council
in Māoridom and its importance in New Zealand society generally. That must be so
whether the thrust of the story is described as dissension within the Council as argued
by Māori TV, or whether the thrust is allegations of wrongdoing impacting on the
workings of the Māori Council as argued by the appellants.
[93]

The key issue in dispute on appeal is whether the second element of the defence

is reasonably arguable, that is to say whether the communications can tenably be
regarded as responsible communications.
[94]

In holding it was tenable, Mallon J classified the case as a reportage case and

held it was reasonably arguable the reporting was responsible and neutral. In our view
however, the case is not capable of being classified as a reportage case. One of the
most prominent assertions if not the most prominent assertion in all three publications
was that Ms Hall had been dismissed. As counsel for the appellants Mr Geiringer
submitted, this was portrayed as fact. For reportage to be tenable, it would need to
have been clearly and unequivocally conveyed as a central allegation from a third party
which Māori TV was not adopting.79
[95]

We would therefore strike out any reference to reportage in the pleaded defence

because it cannot possibly succeed.
[96]

We would also strike out as untenable a defence of public interest in relation

to the first website story for the period before the video clip was posted.80 The failure
to publish Ms Hall’s statement which Māori TV had in its possession is in our view
fatal to the defence. It was a fundamental failing.

79
80

Flood, above n 28, at [77].
See at [18] above.

 [97]

As regards the other publications, which did contain Ms Hall’s statement,

Mr Geiringer advanced the following further criticisms:
(a)

It was irresponsible for Māori TV to have proceeded to publish the story
without waiting a reasonable time for Ms Hall’s promised
documentation and more detailed statement. There was no urgency.
Delaying would have assisted Māori TV to find out the truth and correct
aspects of the story without compromising its timeliness. In those
circumstances, Māori TV could not be said to have taken reasonable
steps to verify the story.

(b)

It was irresponsible not to make any attempt to contact Sir Edward at
all.

(c)

In the absence of any transcript of the video clip being made available
in the first website story, once the video was posted, Māori TV should
have alerted readers that they needed to watch the video to see a
summary of Ms Hall’s response.

(d)

There was no attempt to contact the Māori Council secretary even
though Māori TV knew the validity of the meeting was in dispute.
The secretary was designated as the Council’s primary media contact.

(e)

The negligent omission of the quote marks in the first website story.

(f)

The video clip only summarised Ms Hall’s statement. It did not convey
the gist of it. It did not mention her claim to have documentary
evidence that would easily disprove the allegations. Nor that she
needed more time. Nor did it mention that her critics had ulterior
motives, nor the reasons she said the meeting was invalid.

[98]

We agree Māori TV appears to face some difficulties but it is important to bear

in mind that the assessment of “responsible communication” is not a tick box exercise

 and that the strike-out jurisdiction should only be exercised sparingly.81 The matters
raised by Mr Geiringer are, we consider, properly matters reserved for trial and not
grounds for strike out.
[99]

Māori TV claims for example that in the past Ms Hall has acted as Sir Edward’s

spokesperson and therefore it was reasonable for Māori TV to assume she would speak
on behalf of them both in this instance. It further contends that Ms Hall deliberately
delayed sending her response to Māori TV: that she sent her response to the
Dominion Post newspaper at 4 pm, but did not send the same response to Māori TV
until 5.15 pm, knowing the broadcast would be at 5.30 pm. Issues about urgency and
delays raise questions of degree that can only fairly be determined in the light of all
the evidence as a whole. We also consider it cannot be said on the evidence before us
that Māori TV made no attempts at all to verify the allegations.
Outcome
[100] The application for leave to adduce further evidence is declined.
[101] The appeal is allowed in part.

References to “qualified privilege”,

“Lange v Atkinson”, and “reportage” are struck out from the respondents’ qualified
privilege/public interest defence. The respondents’ defence of public interest in
respect of the first website story for the period preceding the posting of the video clip
is also struck out. The appeal is otherwise dismissed.
[102] As regards costs, we consider that this being fundamentally in the nature of a
test case, costs should lie where they fall. Accordingly, we make no award of costs.
[103] Finally, we would like to acknowledge the assistance we have gained from the
excellent submissions made by counsel on both sides.

81

Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267; and Couch v Attorney-General
[2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 at [33].

 BROWN J
[104] I agree with the judgment of French and Winkelmann JJ concerning the
recognition of a new defence of public interest communication which is subject to a
responsibility requirement, in particular the analysis at [53]–[68] and [82]–[86]. I am
also in agreement with the disposition of the application to adduce further evidence
and the appeal itself. I write separately solely with reference to the proposed new
defence of reportage.
[105] In my view, the argument advanced by the appellants against the recognition
of a reportage defence as part of New Zealand law has much to commend it.
Considerations which I find persuasive include:82
•

First, such a defence lacks coherency. In view of the repetition rule it
makes little sense that a publisher can publish a defamatory statement
without the belief in its truth and be absolved from liability because it
indicates that it does not adopt the allegation.

•

Secondly, such a defence could create a perverse incentive for
journalists not to engage in one of their fundamental roles, the
verification of important facts. Alternatively, it could place a journalist
in the unenviable position of not knowing whether he or she should
seek to verify an allegation.

•

Thirdly, as experience with the hearsay principles tends to indicate,
drawing the distinction between allegations that are important for truth
and those that are important simply for the fact they are made could
prove elusive in practice.

[106] The majority considers that reportage should be viewed as a special and
comparatively rare situation,83 despite extending the defence beyond the limitation
82

83

The submission that the boundaries of the defence are far from clear also has merit.
The difficulties are highlighted in articles cited by the appellants: Nadine Zoë Armstrong
“The Emerging Defence of Reportage” (2009) 40 VUWLR 441; Bosland, above n 29; and
Busuttil, above n 30.
At [75] above.

 explicit in s 4(3) of the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) and implicit in Torstar.84 While
the mode of reporting by the mainstream media may not frequently lend itself to a
reportage defence, I am not confident that the same can be said of bloggers and other
commentators, the emergence of whom is a significant factor in the recognition of the
new defence of public interest communication.85
[107] A further consideration is the interface with New Zealand’s Defamation Act.
James Goudkamp observes that, whereas legislation has had little impact on the
definitional elements of most torts, defences have been heavily affected by statute.86
Defamation is a good example with the statutory defences of truth, honest opinion,
absolute privilege, qualified privilege and innocent dissemination.87
[108] The majority contends that if, as I agree, nothing in the Defamation Act
precludes recognition of a defence of public interest communication which is subject
to a responsibility requirement then there is no logical justification for singling out
reportage. However the fact is that the Act already provides by means of the defence
of qualified privilege88 a limited protection for the media (and others) who merely
relay to the public words written or spoken by others.89 In the case of the matters
specified in pt 2 of sch 1, it is a requirement that they be of public interest in any place
in which the publication occurs.90
[109] I do not consider that the majority’s rationale for the statutory qualified
privilege defence of mere reporting as deriving from the location where a statement is
made is of moment.91 Item 8 in pt 2 refers to a fair and accurate report of the
proceedings at a meeting held in New Zealand that (a) is bona fide and lawfully held
for a lawful purpose and for the furtherance or discussion of any matter of public

84
85
86

87
88
89
90
91

See at [73] above; and Torstar, above n 33, at [120]–[121].
At [56(c)] above.
James Goudkamp “Statutes and Tort Defences” in TT Arvind and Jenny Steele (eds) Tort Law and
the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the Dynamics of Legal Change (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2013) 31 at 31.
Respectively ss 8, 9, 13–14, 16, and 21.
Sections 16(2) and 18, and sch 1, pt 2.
Cheer, above n 41, at [16.11.02(2)].
Section 18(1).
At [78].

 concern and (b) is open to the public, whether with or without restriction. “Meeting”
is not defined.
[110] However in McCartan Turkington Breen (A Firm) v Times Newspapers Ltd
Lord Bingham of Cornhill explained that the phrase “public meeting” must be
interpreted in a manner which gives effect to the intention of the legislature “in the
social and other conditions which obtain today”.92 In his view “a press conference
attended by members of the press and perhaps other members of the public has become
an important vehicle for promoting the discussion and furtherance of matters of public
concern” and there was nothing in the nature of such a conference which took it outside
the ordinary meaning of public meeting.93 It follows in my view that the ambit of the
statutory defence is potentially broad and overlaps at least to some extent with the
proposed common law reportage defence.
[111] The majority also relies on the absence of any expression of judicial concern
that the recognition of reportage runs counter to Parliament’s intention.94 However in
England v Hastie Publishing Ltd, after noting Lord Bingham’s comments in McCartan
concerning the alternative role of the press as that of reporter, 95 Gray J expressed the
view that a court should be reluctant to hold that common law privilege is available to
a publication on the ground that it constitutes reportage in circumstances where so to
hold would confer greater protection on the publisher than Parliament had deemed
appropriate.96
[112] Those observations resonate with me. We did not hear argument on the issue
of the reconciliation of a reportage defence with the Defamation Act defences. I am
mindful of Andrew Burrows’ exhortation that statutes and common law must be seen

92

93
94
95

96

McCartan Turkington Breen (A Firm) v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 277 (HL) at 292 with
reference to the equivalent provisions in the Defamation Act (Northern Ireland) 1955.
At 292.
At [79].
McCartan, above n 92, at 291. Lord Bingham emphasised the distinction between cases where a
journalist is exercising a reporting function as opposed to the function of exploring factual
situations and reporting the outcome of such investigations. He explained that in the former, the
role of reporter, the press then acts in a very literal sense as a medium of communication.
English v Hastie Publishing Ltd, above n 71, at [21]. Noted in Jameel (CA), above n 49, at [21].

 as integrated parts of the whole law of obligations.97 The common law should not be
developed in a manner which is inconsistent with a relevant statute. To adapt Bennion
on Statutory Interpretation’s metaphor of the floor (the common law) and the rug
(a statute),98 as this Court observed in Vector Ltd v Transpower New Zealand Ltd “the
rug and the floor must run the same way”.99
[113] If reportage is to be recognised in New Zealand as a common law defence, then
I consider that it should be viewed as a discrete defence rather than merely as a special
manifestation of a public interest defence which has a responsible journalism
underpinning. I am attracted to the analysis of Sedley LJ in Charman v Orion
Publishing Group Ltd that the very dependence of a reportage defence on the bald
retelling of defamatory statements makes it forensically problematical to fall back
upon an alternative defence of responsible journalism.100 I agree with his view that
pleaders may need to decide which it is to be. I do not consider that the majority’s
proposal that reportage should be pleaded as a particular of the public interest defence
surmounts this difficulty.101 Hence I do not share the majority’s perception of the new
defence of public interest communication as one embodying the nature of a spectrum
which includes reportage, albeit at the furthest point on that spectrum.102
[114] Whatever may be the nature and extent of a reportage defence, I agree with the
conclusion at [94] and [95] that the present case is not capable of being classified as a
reportage case and that consequently any reference to reportage in the pleaded defence
should be struck out because it cannot possibly succeed. In those circumstances it is
my view that consideration of the issue of recognition of a new defence of reportage
and (if adopted) its ambit and characterisation should await a case where the issues are
squarely engaged.
Solicitors:
Darroch Forrest, Wellington for Appellants
Simpson Grierson, Auckland for Respondents
97

98

99
100
101
102

Andrew Burrows The Relationship Between Common Law and Statute in the Law of Obligations
(2012) 128 LQR 232 at 258. He considered that to “view them as if unmixed oil and water is a
profound mistake”.
Oliver Jones Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (6th ed, LexisNexis, London, 2013) at 168.
The metaphor is not repeated in the 7th edition: Diggory Bailey and Luke Norbury Bennion on
Statutory Interpretation (7th ed, LexisNexis, London, 2017).
Vector Ltd v Transpower New Zealand Ltd [1999] 3 NZLR 646 (CA) at [53].
Charman, above n 30, at [91].
At [81] above.
At [80] above.