Case 1:17-cv-00736-TSE-IDD Document 121 Filed 08/14/18 Page 1 of 15 PageID# 6747

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

EXPRESS HOMEBUYERS USA,LLC,
Plaintiff,
Case No. l:17-cv-736
V.

WBH MARKETING INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff,a Virginia limited liability company engaged in the business ofbuying and selling
houses, brings this action against defendant, a Texas corporation engaged in the same business,
seeking cancellation of defendant's two trademarks,"We Buy Houses" and "Webuyhouses.com"
("the Marks"), on the grounds that both marks are generic and undeserving of trademark
protection. In response, defendant has counter-claimed that plaintiff has infringed on the Marks
and falsely designated the origin of plaintiffs services. Both parties have moved for summary
judgment on plaintiffs claim and defendant's counterclaims. This memorandum opinion

addresses whether the Marks are generic, and therefore ineligible for trademark protection.^
Because there are no disputed issues ofmaterial fact with respect to this question, plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment must be granted in part and defendant's cross-motion for summary
judgment must be denied in part.

'The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and plaintiffs pending motion to dismiss address defendant's
remaining counterclaims, which do not implicate the question whether the Marks are generic. Those will be
addressed and resolved by a separate order.
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1.

Given that summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine disputes of
material fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the ?rst step in the analysis is to identify the record facts as to
which no genuine dispute exists. In this regard, Local Rule directs a movant for summary
judgment to include in its submission a separately captioned section listing in numbered-paragraph
form all material facts as to which the movant contends no genuine dispute exists. The nonmovant
must then respond to each numbered paragraph, either admitting or contesting the putative
undisputed fact and citing admissible record evidence to establish a genuine dispute of material
fact. The nonmovant?s failure to respond to a fact listed by the movant constitutes an admission
that the fact is undisputed. R. Scheduling Order 1] 13. Where, as here, both parties have
moved for summary judgment, each party submitted its own statement of material facts as to which
that party contends there is no genuine dispute. In this case, both parties have complied with the
order and local rule. Accordingly, the facts recited here are derived from the parties? lists of
material facts and their respective responses.

0 Plaintiff Express Homebuyers (EHB) is a limited liability company organized

under Virginia law with its principal place of business in Spring?eld, VA. EHB

has been in the house-buying industry since 2003, operating chie?y in the

Washington, DC. metropolitan area. Lawrence Bradford Chandler is CEO.

0 Defendant We Buy Houses Inc. (WBH) is a Texas corporation with its principal

place of business in Southlake, TX. WBH provides educational and instructional

materials to home buyers and sellers and conducts its operations nationwide.

Jeremy Brandt is a citizen of Texas and is founder and CEO.

0 WBH owns the two registered marks at issue: ?We Buy Houses? and
?Webuyhouses.com.?

On July 11, 2001, Michael Payette ?led an intent-to-use Application No. 78,073,479 (the
?479 Application) with the US. Patent and Trademark Of?ce (PTO) for the mark 
BUY for real estate printed materials.

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In February 2003, while Payette?s ?479 Application was still pending, Webuyhouses.com,
Corp., owned by Howard Gordon, ?led Application No. 76,491,672 (the ?672
Application) to register the mark 

0 On May 26, 2004, Payette sold the ?479 Application for the WE BUY HOUSES mark to
Webuyhouses.com, Corp. The transaction was documented in a sale and assignment
agreement, which was recorded with the PTO on June 14, 2004. On December 2, 2005,
Webuyhouses.com, Corp. ?led a Statement of Use for the ?479 Application for WE BUY
HOUSES, alleging ?rst use as early as October 21, 2005.

In March 2006, Webuyhouses.com, Corp. entered a license agreement with Martin Price,
whereby Price operated, advertised, and marketed ?webuyhouses.com? and ?we buy
houses? as Gordon?s business partner.

0 The ?479 Application for WE BUY HOUSES became U.S. Registration No. 3,149,336
(the ?336 Registration), and the ?672 Application for WEBUYHOUSES.COM became
U.S. Registration No. 3,235,523 (the ?523 Registration) on September 26, 2006 and May
1, 2007, respectively.

0 Gordon acquired the Marks to prevent others from barring his companies? use of the
phrase ?we buy houses.? Price had the same view. Between 1997 and November 2012,
neither Gordon nor Price enforced the Marks even though both were aware of the
widespread use of the phrase ?we buy houses? in the real estate industry. Gordon and
Price actively encouraged other house-buying companies?many of which had names
containing the phrase ?We Buy Houses??to use the phrase ?we buy houses,? believing
that increased use of the phrase would create more traffic to the WEBUYHOUSES.COM
website. CD, Ex. 17, 79; Price Dep. at 169, 174-75, 187-88; Gordon Dep. at 253.

0 Between 1997 and November 2012, Gordon and Price advertised and marketed the
Marks in a non-source-identifying manner, saying that ?we buy houses? ?doesn?t signify
who you are. It signi?es what you do.? Price Dep. at 18:5-8; see also Gordon Dep. at
218-19 call BUY ?the three magic words,? which is why we patented
and then trademarked them, because they are recognized by everybody as what we 
Price understood that the phrase ?We Buy Houses? was being used on 10-50 million
websites, and he leveraged the widespread use of ?we buy houses? to make money by
selling leads from the WEBUYHOUSESCOM website to house-buyers. Price marketed
the website WEBUYHOUSES.COM to other house-buyers whose companies had ?We
Buy Houses? in their name or whose companies were otherwise in the house-buying
business.

0 In November 2012, Webuyhouses.com, Corp. assigned the ?336 Registration and the
?523 Registration to X5, a company owned by Brandt that did business in the house-
buying industry. X5 was aware at that time that other house-buying companies were
using the phrase ?we buy houses.?

0 X5 subsequently assigned the rights in both Marks to We Buy Houses Inc., effective
September 10, 2013.

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0 The prior and current owners of the WBH Marks have used ?we buy houses? to indicate
the nature or class of services offered, namely that they buy houses from consumers
looking to sell their homes. Prior to purchasing the WBH mark in 2012, Brandt?s
previous companies X5 and Cash Offer Corporation (COC) used the phrase ?we buy
houses? to indicate the nature or class of service they offered.

0 Real estate investors who buy houses are commonly referred to in the industry as ?we
buy houses companies,? and consumers share that understanding due to the ubiquity of
?we buy houses? road signs. competitors also use the ?we buy houses? phrase to
signal to customers that they are involved in the home-buying market.

0 Real estate professionals have used ?we buy houses? in newspaper advertising since
1898. CD, Ex. 124; Appx. 3; Arnold Decl. 113.2 A May 2016 search on
of BUY produces 52,295,853 results. CD Ex.
19. A Google search of ?we buy houses? yields hundreds of thousands of pages of
results.3 Numerous real estate professionals use ?we buy houses? in online marketing
and advertising. Appx. 1. Numerous Trademark applications and registrations include
the phrase ?We Buy Houses,? and several books include the phrase in the title or
otherwise to discuss the house-buying business. CD Ex. 18; Arnold Decl.

EBH uses the phrase ?we buy houses? in marketing and advertising, but it has never used
the phrase ?webuyhousescom.? Between 2003 and 2016, EHB received no complaints

 

2 WBH argues that this evidence from newspapers is unauthenticated and hence not properly admissible here. This
argument fails. Rule 902(b)(6), Fed. R. Evid., provides that such newspaper evidence is self-authenticating and
therefore admissible. See Bailey v. Black Entm ?t Televisions, 2010 WL 1780403, at *3 (ED. Va. May 3, 2010). A
number of other exhibits supporting this fact were authenticated by Robert Arnold. See Ex. 18, 19, and 124.
Accordingly, this evidence is admissible and undisputed.

3 WBH argues that evidence ?om the Internet, including Google search results and other evidence relating to the use
of ?we buy houses? is unauthenticated and inadmissible. This argument also fails as Rule 901(b)(4), Fed. R. Evid.,
permits authentication by circumstantial evidence including ?[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns,
or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.? And courts have recognized
that this rule allows for authentication of the contents of websites. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534 (D. Md. 2007). In addition, a number of documents in the record are taken directly from the website,
which may bejudicially noticed. Advantek Marketing, Inc. v. Shanghai Walk-Long Tools Co., 2016 WL 9178079, at
*1 (CD. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016); see also Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Bristol?Myers Squibb Co., 72 F. Supp. 3d 521, 526
(D. Del. 2014) court may also take judicial notice of the prosecution histories, which are ?public records.??) (citing
Hockerson?Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Grp. Int Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).

Finally, with respect to the hearsay objection to the lntemet evidence, argument is misplaced. The Internet
evidence is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, namely that the companies advertising home-buying
services in fact buy houses. Rather, the evidence is submitted to establish that many third parties currently use and
have used the ?we buy houses? phrase for decades to describe their house-buying services, not to identify a source of
the services. See SMS Audio LLC v. Belson, 2017 WL 1533971, at *4 (SD Fla. Mar. 20, 2017) webpage,
introduced for the purpose of showing the information available on the lntemet on a particular day, is not 
Lorraine, 241 566 (?When analyzing the admissibility of electronically generated evidence, courts also have
held that statements contained within such evidence fall outside the hearsay de?nition if offered for a purpose other
than their substantive 

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that its use of ?we buy houses? was inappropriate, infringed on intellectual property, or
otherwise confused customers.

0 WBH directed real estate investors to remove the words ?we buy houses? from Facebook,
websites, blogs, Twitter, YouTube, and other marketing. CD, BX. 122. WBH requested
that YouTube remove marketing and advertising videos featuring the words ?we
buy houses.? WBH told real estate investors that by using ?we buy houses,? they were
attempting to confuse consumers and imitate WBH. Id. WBH told real estate investors
that use of ?we buy houses? in marketing content was trademark infringement. Brandt
told WBH executive Dev Horn, ?That?s how we roll. Facebook page Id. BX
120. Horn further stated that WBH needed to ?scare the sh*t? out of investors using ?we
buy houses? and that WBH should THOSE MOTHER 

0 Real estate investors informed WBH of the time and money it would take to remove ?we
buy houses? from their marketing, and that actions disrupted businesses.

11.

The summary judgment standard, which the parties do not dispute, is too well-settled to
merit extended discussion. As Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., makes clear, summary judgment is
appropriate where ?the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.? And it is settled that ?the burden on the
moving party may be discharged by ?showing??that is, pointing out to the district court?that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party?s case.? Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). On the other hand, if the record re?ects a genuine factual dispute,
summary judgment is precluded. A genuine factual dispute exists ?if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.? Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). But importantly, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest
upon mere allegations and denials, and must instead ?set forth speci?c facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.? Id. And further, these speci?c facts must be shown to exist in the record
in legally admissible form. Finally, ?[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
the [non-moving party?s] position will be insuf?cient; there must be evidence on which the jury

could reasonably ?nd for the [non-moving party].? Id. at 252.

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The Lanham Act permits a party to ?le a petition to cancel the registration of a mark at any
time if, inter alia, ?the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a
portion thereof, for which it is registered.? 15 U.S.C. 1064. The Act further provides that a court
may order the cancellation of the registration of a mark on the basis of such a petition. Id. 1119.

Here, plaintiff seeks invalidation of defendant?s Marks because the Marks are or have
become generic. The Fourth Circuit has explained that a mark ?cannot acquire trademark
protections unless the mark is distinctive, that is, unless it serves the traditional functions of
?distinguishing the applicant?s goods from those of others? and identifying the source of the
goods.? Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publishing, 364 F.3d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc, 505 US. 763, 768 (1992)). As the Fourth Circuit further noted,
the ?antithesis? of a distinctive mark is ?a ?generic? mark which merely employs ?the common
name of a product or service . . . Id. (quoting Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp, 81 .3d
455, 464 (4th Cir.1996)). A mark becomes generic where ?the primary signi?cance of the mark
[is] its indication of the nature or class of the product or service, rather than [its] indication of
source.? Glover v. Ampak, Inc. 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1996). Generic marks cannot be protected
as trademarks because generic marks do not signify the source of the services provided and do not
distinguish the particular product from other similar products in the market. Retail Servs., 364
F.3d at 538 (citing Two Pesos, 505 US. at 768). The purpose behind requiring a trademark to be
distinctive is that ?if a business were permitted to appropriate a generic word as its trademark, it
would be ?dif?cult for competitors to market their own brands of the same product.?? Id. (citing

Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S. 0.5. ix-It, Inc, 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir.1986)).

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Where, as here, a mark has been registered by the PTO, the fact of registration is prima
facie evidence that the registered mark is not generic. See 15 U.S.C. 1115(a). As the Fourth
Circuit has explained, ?[b]ecause the PTO may not register a generic mark, the fact that a mark is
registered is strong evidence that the mark satis?es the statutory requirements for the
distinctiveness necessary for trademark protection.? Retail Servs., 364 F.3d at 542. This
presumption of validity ?require[s] the party challenging the mark to produce suf?cient evidence
to establish that the mark is generic by a preponderance of the evidence.? Id. (citing Glover, 74
.3d at 59). If the party challenging the registration presents suf?cient evidence that the marks are
generic, then the presumption of validity of the trademark is rebutted. Id. In some circumstances,
the existence of a certi?cate of registration may be suf?cient to create a question of material fact
as to whether a mark is generic. Importantly, however, ?the certi?cate of registration alone does
not immunize? a registration from summary judgment, and suf?cient evidence that the mark is
generic will justify the award of summary judgment in favor of a party seeking cancellation of a
mark. Id. at 544.

To rebut the presumption that Marks are not generic, EHB must offer proof that
?the primary signi?cance of the mark [is] its indication of the nature or class of the product or
service, rather than an indication of source.? Glover, 74 F.3d at 59. Furthermore, the evidence
must demonstrate this generic understanding of the mark from the viewpoint of the ?relevant
public.? Retail Servs., 364 .3d at 544. The Fourth Circuit has cited a number of sources of
evidence in deciding whether the presumption of validity is rebutted, including ??purchaser
testimony, consumer surveys, listings and dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers, and other
publications.?? Id. (quoting Glover, 74 F.3d at 59). Other sources include ?evidence of ?generic

use by competitors, generic use of the term by the mark?s owners, and use of the term by third

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parties in trademark registrations.?? Id. (quoting Nartron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305
F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2002)).

With these principles in mind, analysis now turns to the Marks in question??we buy
houses? and ?webuyhousescom.? The parties do not dispute that the relevant consuming public
in this case is home-selling consumers and house-buying professionals or investors. Therefore,
the question is whether the phrase ?We Buy Houses? is generic or distinctive from the viewpoint
of this relevant public.

The use of the Marks on other websites and in newspapers by third parties to describe the
services offered and not the source of the services is compelling evidence that the phrase ?we buy
houses? is generic.4 See Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ?g, 364 F.3d 535, 545 (considering the
use of the term at issue by other websites on the Internet, including the descriptions offered for
those sites). Here, there is substantial evidence that the phrase ?we buy houses? is used extensively
on the Internet and in newspapers to connote a class of services provided, rather than a speci?c
source of those services. A search of newspaperscom, which aggregates uses of various phrases
in newspapers and newspaper advertisements yields more than 55 million matches for the phrase
?we buy houses,? showing that the phrase is used extensively by third parties as a descriptor of
services, not as an indicator of the source of the services. CD, Ex. 19. And a Google search of ?we
buy houses? yields hundreds of thousands of websites using the phrase, which shows, again, that
third parties extensively use the phrase to market real estate services and not to identify the source

of the services. Although some number of these results use the phrase in connection with 

 

4 WBH argues that this evidence is problematic because EHB has unclean hands. Speci?cally, WBH argues that
because EHB has encouraged residential real estate investors to use the term in their advertising, it has caused this
third-party use. But much of the evidence EHB submitted occurred far before EHB began its advertising campaign.
Indeed, newspaper articles referring to ?we buy houses? span as far back as 1898.

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business, it is clear that the phrase is used extensively by a variety of other businesses to describe
the class of services that they provide and not to identify the source of the services.

Signi?cantly, the Fourth Circuit has held in similar cases that such extensive third-party
use of a phrase or term is persuasive evidence that a phrase or word is generic, rather than
distinctive. See Retail Servs., 354 F.3d at 546 (holding that online search evidence of pervasive
third-party use of the term ?freebies? was persuasive evidence that the term is generic); Am.
Online, Inc. v. AT Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 818-19 (4th Cir. 2001) (evidence of extensive and
uninterrupted use of the phrase ?You Have Mail? supported ?nding that the phrase is generic).
This undisputed record evidence of widespread, generic use of the Marks is compelling and
convincing evidence that the phrase ?we buy houses? is generic.

Defendant argues that in spite of the substantial evidence that the relevant consuming
public uses the phrase generically, the Marks should be protected because they have become
distinctive through secondary meaning. To acquire secondary meaning, ?in the minds of the public,
the primary signi?cance? of the otherwise generic term must be ?to identify the source of the
product rather than the product itself.? Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464
(4th Cir. 1996). But the record in this case is devoid of any evidence to support this argument.
Defendant merely points to the uncorroborated assertion by its CEO, Brandt, that ?[w]hen people

hear the phrase ?we buy houses,? they think of our company.?5 Aff. Brandt 18. Such sparse and

 

5 Elsewhere in the record, Brandt also asserts, without corroboration, that ?Multiple times a week potential home
sellers have contacted WBH and expressed confusion because they had been in contact or had a negative experience
with another company (possibly EHB) that called itself ?We Buy Houses? and believed that this company was
WBH. licensees have also reported similar confusion . . . This statement need not be considered because
?[e]vidence establishing a likelihood of confusion simply ?do[es] not bear upon the question of whether 
trademark . . . [is] generic.?? Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ'g, 364 F.3d 535, 547 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ale
House Mgml., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 .3d 137, 144?45 (4th Cir.2000).

Defendant also argues that the addition of ?.com? to one of its Marks gives it Intemet-related distinctiveness.
However, the mere addition of ?.com? to an otherwise generic mark does not give it source-signifying
distinctiveness, especially where, as here, the mark is used in the website addresses of other retailers that provide the

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self-serving evidence is insuf?cient to create a genuine dispute concerning whether the Marks have
acquired secondary meaning in the face of plaintiff?s overwhelming and undisputed evidence that
third parties use and understand the Marks generically, i.e. as describing a service and not a source.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 242, 252 (1986) (?The mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the position will be insuf?cient?). See also Retail Servs.,
Inc., 364 F.3d at 547 (?Evidence of an acquired secondary meaning, however, has no relevance
unless the mark in question has been found not to be 

The Fourth Circuit has also made clear that ?evidence of the owner?s generic use, in
particular, ?is strong evidence of genericness.?? Retail Servs., Inc., 364 F.3d at 545 (quoting 2
McCarthy at 12.13). Here, the undisputed evidence shows that the previous owners of the Marks
used ?we buy houses? as a generic description of the services they offered, not to identify the
source of the services. For example, Gordon stated that he acquired the Marks so others could not
prevent him and his companies from using the ?we buy houses? phrase to describe their services.
Gordon Dep. 136-40. Similarly, Price stated that he ?didn?t care if other people were using [the
Marks] or not,? Price Dep. 139:10-11, and explained that he ?could have cared less about the
Id. at 212: 13-14. Between 1997 and November 2012, Price advertised and marketed
the ?we buy houses? Marks in a non-source identifying manner, using the Marks to ?signifIy] what
you do.? Id. at 168:5-8 (Price testi?ed that ?[We Buy Houses] doesn't signify who you are. It
signi?es what you See also id. at 167, 180 (advertising and marketing

WEBUYHOUSES.COM as the ?most powerful name in the house-buying business?). Gordon

 

same service as the mark owner. See In re I800Mattresses. com, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re
Hotels. com, 573 .3d 1300, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Here, the record contains substantial evidence of other house-
buying companies that have website addresses similar to ?webuyhouses.com.? Br. in Supp. of PI. Countercl. Def?s
Mot. For Summ. Appx. l.

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described the Marks in the same manner, stating that ?we buy houses? was recognized as an
indication of ?what we do? and not as the source of the house-buying services provided. Gordon
Dep. at 218-19. In other words, the prior owners of the Marks used ?we buy houses? to refer to the
real estate purchasing services that they and their licensees provided. The Fourth Circuit has made
clear that the mark owner?s own use of a trademarked phrase to refer to the nature or class of
services to which the mark applies is strong evidence that the Marks are generic. Retail Servs.,
Inc., 364 F.3d at 545; Am. Online, Inc., 243 F.3d at 819-20.

Finally, the record contains evidence from competitors on their generic use of the phrase
?we buy houses.? Nor is there doubt that this is relevant evidence. See Retail Servs., Inc. 364 F.3d
at 546 (considering declarations from competitors on the use of the mark at issue). The record
discloses that numerous real estate professionals use ?we buy houses? in online marketing and
advertising to describe the house-buying service they provide and not to the source of the service.
Appx. 1. (?We buy houses in ANY We pay CASH and you will not pay any
commissions, agents, or fees?). Chandler testi?ed that he uses the phrase ?we buy houses? to refer
to the home-buying services that EHB provides?that is, to ?tell the consumer what it is that 
EHB Dep. 227:3-4. And there is also signi?cant evidence that the ?we buy houses? label
identi?es ?real estate investors who buy houses? as a category of a type of service-provider and
not to identify any particular provider as a source of those services. See id. at 20111-8. this
industry real estate investors are often referred to as ?we buy houses? So the
market thinks that anyone who invests in houses is, quote, one of those ?we buy houses?
companies?). See also Appx. 1; Exs. 27, 29-39, 41-43, 46-48, 50, 75, 88-89, 123. This use of the
phrase ?we buy houses? by competitors and consumers to refer to a type of service provided, not

to a source of the service, further con?rms that the phrase is generic.

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In sum, this undisputed record evidence more than rebuts the presumption stemming from
the determination that the Marks are not generic. See Retail Servs., Inc. 364 F.3d at 546
(?Such one-sided evidence necessarily rebuts the presumption of The
overwhelming and unrefuted evidence in this case shows that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact as to the determination that the Marks at issue are generic, and accordingly, summary
judgment cancelling the marks is appropriate. This result is logical; when asked what services
they provide, EHB, WBH, and other competitors would naturally answer ?we buy houses.? And
allowing one member of the industry to trademark the phrase ?we buy houses? would be the
equivalent of allowing a professional football team to trademark ?we play football? or a fast-food
chain to trademark ?we sell burgers.? Those phrases are not distinctive identi?ers of a source of
goods or services. They merely describe the kind of services or goods provided by a business, and
accordingly those phrases cannot be trademarked. The same is true of ?we buy houses.?

Seeking to avoid this conclusion, WBH argues that even if the phrase ?we buy houses? is
generic, defendants are not using the phrase generically with respect to their business, which
Brandt describes as ?provid[ing] educational and instructional materials to home buyers and
sellers.? Brandt Decl. 1} 13. In essence, defendants argue that the fact that they connect their
network of real estate investors to sellers to purchase homes and do not themselves buy homes
transforms the use of ?We Buy Houses? from generic to descriptive.

The Fourth Circuit considered and rejected a similar argument in Retail Services. There,
the defendants contended that their use of the term ?freebies? was descriptive because they
provided ?information about no-cost or low cost promotional offers? as opposed to the generic use
of the term which connoted the giving away of products for free. Retail Servs. at 547. The Fourth

Circuit concluded that this ?razor-thin distinction? was ?not signi?cant? because ?[e]ven though

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defendants do not directly distribute free products or ?freebies,? their business nonetheless revolves
around ?freebies? in the generic sense of the word.? Id. This is so, according to the Fourth Circuit,
because defendants? business involved connecting consumers with free offers. Id. Similarly here,
although defendant may not be directly buying houses, defendant?s business nonetheless ?revolves
around? the use of the ?we buy houses? phrase in a generic sense, namely connecting home sellers
to home buyers.6

In sum, the undisputed record con?rms that the Marks at issue describe defendant?s
services but do not identify the source of the services. As such, the Marks are generic.

IV.

EHB also seeks summary judgment with respect to counterclaims. This
memorandum opinion addresses only the counterclaims that implicate the validity of the Marks
and turn on the determination that the Marks are generic. Speci?cally, WBH has counterclaimed
that EHB is liable for trademark infringement, in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 1 14(1),
and Virginia common law, and that EHB is liable for false designation of origin, in violation of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(A).

Under the Lanham Act, both trademark infringement and false designation of origin claims
require a trademark holder to prove (1) that it possesses a valid, protectable mark; (2) that the
opposing party used the mark; (3) that the Opposing party's use of the mark occurred in commerce;
(4) that the opposing party used the mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of goods or services; and (5) that the opposing party used the mark in a manner

likely to confuse consumers. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005); Lone Star

 

6 EHB also argues that the Marks at issue in this case were abandoned by WBH or otherwise improperly assigned.
Because the Marks are generic, that issue need not be addressed or decided here.

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Steakhouse Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Virginia, Inc. 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995)
must demonstrate that it has a valid, protectible trademark and that the defendant's
use of a colorable imitation of the trademark is likely to cause confusion among The
same test is applied under Virginia common law. Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d
150, 162 (4th Cir. 2014).

Here, defendant?s Marks are generic and thus neither valid nor protectable. 15 U.S.C. 
1064(3). Therefore, defendant?s counterclaims based on trademark infringement and false origin
fail as a matter of law, and summary judgment should be granted in favor of plaintiff on Counts I,
II, and IV of defendant?s First Amended Counterclaims.

V.

For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff?s motion for summary judgment must be
granted in part, and defendant?s motion for summary judgment must be denied in part.
Speci?cally, plaintiff?s motion for summary judgment must be granted as to Counts I and II of
the First Amended Complaint, which seek a judgment declaring that the Marks must be canceled
because they are generic. Defendant?s motion for summary judgment must be denied insofar as it
seeks dismissal of those Counts. Plaintiff?s motion for summary judgment must also be granted
as to Counts I, II and IV of defendant?s First Amended Counterclaims, as those Counts depend
on the validity of the Marks. Defendant?s motion for summary judgment must be denied insofar

as it seeks judgment in its favor on Counts I, II and IV.

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 . Case Document 121 Filed 08/14/18 Page 15 of 15 PagelD# 6761

An appropriate order will issue.

 

T. S. Ellis, 

 

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