IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY
STATE OF MISSOURI

MISSOURI NATIONAL EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION,
And
FERGUSON-FLORISSANT NATIONAL
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
And
HAZELWOOD ASSOCIATION OF SUPPORT
PERSONNEL,
And
LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL 42,
And
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 610,
And
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 148,
And
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION, LOCAL 1,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
And

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No.
Div.

 STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION,

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FERGUSON-FLORISSANT SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
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HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT,
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THE CITY OF BEL-RIDGE,
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AFFTON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT,
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CITY OF CRESTWOOD,
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ST. LOUIS COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
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OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION –
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DIVISION OF PERSONNEL,
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MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL
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HEALTH,
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MISSOURI VETERANS COMMISSION,
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And
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MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
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And
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2

 ST. LOUIS COUNTY PROSECUTOR,

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Defendants.
SERVE:
Missouri Department of Labor and
Industrial Relations
Anna Hui, Director
421 E. Dunklin St.
P.O. Box 504
Jefferson City, MO 65102-0504
State Board of Mediation
Todd Smith, Chair
3315 W. Truman Blvd., Rm 211
P.O. Box 2071
Jefferson City, MO 65102-2071
Ferguson-Florissant School District
c/o Cindy Ormsby, Esq.
Crotzer & Ormsby, LLC
130 S. Bemiston Ave., Suite 605
Clayton, MO 63105
Hazelwood School District
c/o Cindy Ormsby, Esq.
Crotzer & Ormsby, LLC
130 S. Bemiston Ave., Suite 605
Clayton, MO 63105
The City of Bel-Ridge
Willie Fair, Mayor
8920 Natural Bridge
Bel-Ridge, Missouri 62121
Affton Fire Protection District
Nick Fahs, Fire Chief
9282 Gravois Road
St. Louis, Missouri 63123
City of Crestwood
Tony Kennedy, Acting Mayor
1 Detjen Drive
St. Louis, Missouri 63126

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 St. Louis Community College
Dr. Jeff Pittman, Chancellor
3221 McKelvey Rd.
St. Louis, Missouri 63044
Office of Administration - Division of Personnel
Sarah H. Steelman, Commissioner
301 W. High Street, Room 430
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101
Missouri Department of Mental Health
Mark Stringer, Director
1706 East Elm Street
Jefferson City, MO 65101
Missouri Veterans Commission
Grace Link, Executive Director
205 Jefferson Street, 12th Floor
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Missouri Department of Corrections
Anne Precythe, Director
2729 Plaza Drive
Jefferson City, MO 65102
St. Louis County Prosecutor
Robert P. McCulloch, Pros. Atty.
100 South Central Avenue, 2nd Fl
Clayton, Missouri 63105
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, and for their Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief state as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

The Union Plaintiffs—seven labor organizations representing a broad array of

public-sector employees—bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge the
constitutionality of a new law, House Bill 1413 (“HB 1413”), that enacts sweeping and

4

 unjustified changes to the State’s public-sector labor laws and that significantly burdens the
Missouri constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and their members.
2.

Plaintiff labor organizations bring suit on behalf of their members, and on their

own behalves. As explained more fully below, HB 1413 creates a new public-sector collectivebargaining regime that imposes a raft of harsh restrictions on a disfavored set of public-employee
labor organizations and their members, while completely exempting a more favored set of
public-employee labor organizations and their members from the same. As a result, HB 1413
strips many—but not all—public-sector employees of collective bargaining rights and
contractual protections, infringes on their rights to attain and retain union representation, and
denies them vital free speech, association, and petition rights. Similarly, the Plaintiffs and other
disfavored labor organizations will be hobbled in their ability to represent members, stripped of
contractual rights, burdened with intrusive and expensive record-keeping and disclosure
requirements, and denied vital free speech, association, and petition rights. These onerous and
discriminatory restrictions violate the rights of the Plaintiffs and their members under the
Missouri Constitution to organize and bargain collectively (Article I, Section 29); to free speech,
association, and petition (Article I, Sections 8-9); to protection against impairment of contracts
and retrospective operation of laws (Article I, Section 13); to equal protection (Article I, Section
2); and to protection against special laws (Article III, Section 40).
PARTIES
3.

Plaintiff Missouri National Education Association (“Missouri NEA”), a Missouri

not-for-profit corporation, is a state-wide organization affiliated with the National Education
Association, and is headquartered in Jefferson City, in Cole County, Missouri. Missouri NEA is
a “labor organization” within the meaning of new section 105.500(5), RSMo., which provides

5

 services to approximately 35,000 educators, administrators, and other persons working in public
K-12 education and higher education throughout the State, all of whom are “public employees”
within the meaning of new section 105.500(7), RSMo. The members of Missouri NEA belong to
208 local affiliates, some of which are party to collective bargaining agreements with public
employers that are “public bodies” within the meaning of new section 105.500.6, RSMo.
4.

Plaintiff Ferguson-Florissant National Education Association (“Ferguson-

Florissant NEA”) is a voluntary unincorporated association, a local affiliate of Missouri NEA,
and a “labor organization” within the meaning of new section 105.500(5), RSMo. It is
headquartered in St. Louis County, Missouri. Ferguson-Florissant NEA represents approximately
876 full-time certificated instructional and educational support personnel employed by
Defendant Ferguson-Florissant School District, all of whom are “public employees” within the
meaning of new section 105.500(7), RSMo.
5.

Plaintiff Hazelwood Association of Support Personnel (“Hazelwood ASP”) is a

voluntary unincorporated association, a local affiliate of Missouri NEA, a “labor organization”
within the meaning of new section 105.500(5), RSMo., and is headquartered in St. Louis County,
Missouri. Hazelwood ASP represents approximately 35 bus drivers employed by Defendant
Hazelwood School District, all of whom are “public employees” within the meaning of new
section 105.500(7), RSMo.
6.

Plaintiff Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local Union No. 42

(“LIUNA Local 42”) is a voluntary unincorporated association and a “labor organization” within
the meaning of the new section 105.500(5), RSMo. It is headquartered in the City of St. Louis,
Missouri, but represents bargaining units in St. Louis County. LIUNA Local 42 represents
approximately 2075 private- and public-sector employees in Missouri, the majority of whom are

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 not employed in public safety positions as defined in the new section 105.500(8), RSMo.
However, LIUNA Local 42 represents a police bargaining unit of approximately 20 persons
employed by Defendant City of Bel-Ridge, all of whom are “public employees” within the
meaning of new section 105.500(7), RSMo.
7.

Plaintiff Miscellaneous Drivers, Helpers, Healthcare and Public Employees Local

Union No. 610, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Teamsters Local 610”) is a voluntary
unincorporated association and a “labor organization” within the meaning of new section
105.500(5), RSMo., and is headquartered in Maryland Heights, in St. Louis County, Missouri.
Teamsters Local 610 represents approximately 1500 private- and public-sector employees in
Missouri, the majority of whom are not employed in public safety positions as defined by HB
1413. However, Teamsters Local 610 represents a firefighter bargaining unit of approximately
36 persons employed by Defendant Affton Fire Protection District, as well as a police bargaining
unit of approximately 21 persons employed by Defendant City of Crestwood, all of whom are
“public employees” within the meaning of new section 105.500(7), RSMo.
8.

Plaintiff International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148 (“Operating

Engineers Local 148”) is a voluntary unincorporated association and “labor organization” within
the meaning of new section 105.500(5), RSMo. It is headquartered in St. Louis County,
Missouri. Operating Engineers Local 148 represents approximately 1600 private- and publicsector employees in Missouri, including a physical plant unit of approximately 39 persons
employed by Defendant St. Louis Community College, all of whom are “public employees”
within the meaning of new section 105.500(7), RSMo.
9.

Plaintiff Service Employees International Union, Local 1 (“SEIU Local 1”) is a

voluntary unincorporated association and “labor organization” within the meaning of new

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 section 105.500(5), RSMo. It is headquartered in St. Louis County, Missouri. SEIU Local 1
represents approximately 7000 private- and public-sector employees in Missouri, the majority of
whom are not trained or authorized by law to render emergency medical assistance or treatment
as defined in new section 105.500(8), RSMo. However, SEIU Local 1 represents a patient care
professional unit of approximately 828 persons employed by Defendants State of Missouri
Office of Administration, Department of Mental Health, Department of Corrections, and
Veterans Affairs Commission. The majority of patient care professionals in this unit are trained
or authorized by law to render emergency medical assistance or treatment. Employees of the
Missouri Department of Mental Health and the Missouri Veterans Commission are “public
employees” within the meaning of new section 105.500(5), RSMo., but employees of the
Missouri Department of Corrections are excluded from coverage under new section 105.503.2,
RSMo.
10.

Plaintiffs Missouri NEA, Ferguson-Florissant NEA, Hazelwood ASP, LIUNA

Local 42, Teamsters Local 610, Operating Engineers Local 148, and SEIU Local 1 (collectively,
"Union Plaintiffs") have standing to, and do, bring suit on their own behalves, as well as on
behalf of their many members. The members of the Union Plaintiffs would have standing to sue
in their own right; the interests that the Union Plaintiffs seek to protect are germane to their
purposes; and neither the claims asserted, nor the relief requested requires the participation of
their individual members. See, e.g., E. Mo. Coal. of Police v. City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d
755, 759 (Mo. 2012).
11.

Defendant Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (“the

Department”) is a department of the State of Missouri with a principal place of business in
Jefferson City, Cole County, Missouri. Under HB 1413, the Department is charged both with

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 enforcing several of the law’s new requirements that are challenged in this action, and with
promulgating regulations to implement those requirements. See, e.g., new sections 105.540,
105.595, RSMo.
12.

Defendant State Board of Mediation (“the SBM”) is a division of the Department

with a principal place of business in Jefferson City, Cole County, Missouri. Under HB 1413, the
SBM is charged both with enforcing several of the law’s new requirements that are challenged in
this action, and with promulgating regulations to implement those requirements. See, e.g., new
sections 105.525, 105.575, 105.598, RSMo
13.

Defendant Ferguson-Florissant School District is a public school district

organized under Missouri law and located in St. Louis County, Missouri. It is a “public body”
within the meaning of new section 105.500(6), RSMo. and responsible for implementing many
of the requirements of HB 1413.
14.

Defendant Hazelwood School District is a public school district organized under

Missouri law and located in St. Louis County, Missouri. It is a “public body” within the meaning
of new section 105.500(6), RSMo. and responsible for implementing many of the requirements
of HB 1413.
15.

Defendant City of Bel-Ridge is a municipality organized under Missouri law and

located in St. Louis County, Missouri. It is a “public body” within the meaning of new section
105.500(6), RSMo. and responsible for implementing many of the requirements of HB 1413.
16.

Defendant Affton Fire Protection District is a municipal corporation organized

under Missouri law and located in St. Louis County, Missouri. It is a “public body” within the
meaning of new section 105.500(6), RSMo. and responsible for implementing many of the
requirements of HB 1413.

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 17.

Defendant City of Crestwood is a municipality organized under Missouri law and

located in St. Louis County, Missouri. It is a “public body” within the meaning of new section
105.500(6), RSMo. and responsible for implementing many of the requirements of HB 1413.
18.

Defendant St. Louis Community College is a public two-year college organized

under Missouri law and has its principal place of operation in St. Louis County, Missouri. It is a
“public body” within the meaning of new section 105.500(6), RSMo. and responsible for
implementing many of the requirements of HB 1413.
19.

Defendants State of Missouri Office of Administration (“OA”), Missouri

Department of Mental Health (“DMH”), the Missouri Veterans Commission (“MVC”), and the
Missouri Department of Corrections (“DOC”) are Departments of the State of Missouri with
their principal places of business in Jefferson City, Cole County, Missouri. All four of these
Departments have a presence in St. Louis County. The OA represents the DMH, the MVC, and
the DOC in collective bargaining with the unit of patient care professionals represented by SEIU
Local 1. DMH and MVC are “public bodies” within the meaning of new section 105.500(6),
RSMo. DOC is excluded from the definition of “public body” under new section 105.500(6),
RSMo.
20.

Defendant Robert McCullough is the St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney and

has his principal place of business in St. Louis County, Missouri. Defendant McCullough is the
chief law enforcement officer for St. Louis County, Missouri, with responsibility for enforcing
the criminal penalties set forth in new section 105.555, RSMo. for St. Louis County. Defendant
McCullough is sued in his official capacity.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
21.

The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to section 527.010, RSMo.

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 22.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to section 508.010.2(2), RSMo., because at

least one of the Defendants named herein has its principal place of business in St. Louis County,
Missouri.
FACTS
I. The Missouri Bill of Rights Guarantees All Employees
The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
23.

Since its adoption in 1945, the Missouri Constitution has explicitly recognized

that “employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 29 (“Art. I, Sec. 29”). That right extends to all
employees, regardless of whether they work in the private or the public sector. IndependenceNat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131 (Mo. 2007) (“IndependenceNEA”).
24.

The Constitutional right to organize and bargain “through representatives of their

own choosing,” guarantees employees the freedom of choice in the selection of a bargaining
representative. It also entails a corresponding duty on the part of public-sector employers to
bargain in good faith. American Fed’n of Teachers v. Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d 360, 364-68 (Mo.
2012). That duty requires a public employer to make “a serious attempt to resolve differences”
through collective bargaining with its employees’ representative, id. at 367, and to “match [the
union’s] proposals, if unacceptable, with counter-proposals,” id. at 366 (quoting NLRB v.
American Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1951)). An agreement reached as a result of such
bargaining is a binding contract, which a public employer may not repudiate or alter unilaterally.
Independence-NEA, 223 S.W.3d at 140-41.

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 II. Plaintiffs’ Representation of Public Employees
Under Existing Public-Sector Labor Laws and Policies
25.

Although the right to collective bargaining is secured by the Constitution, the

Legislature and other public entities may establish procedures for the exercise of that right,
Independence-NEA, 223 S.W.3d at 136, provided that such procedures “satisfy the constitutional
requirements” of Art. I, Sec. 29, City of Chesterfield, 386 S.W.3d at 760.
26.

Prior to the August 28, 2018 effective date of HB 1413, the State’s public-sector

labor law, chapter 105, Title 108, RSMo., has provided those “procedures” for many public
employees. In broad terms, the existing law ensures that covered public employees may have the
right to form and join labor organizations, to bargain with the employer “relative to salaries and
other conditions of employment,” and to have the results of that bargaining reduced to a written
agreement. Sections 105.510–105.520, RSMo. (2017). Issues under the existing law “with
respect to appropriateness of bargaining units and majority representative status” are resolved by
the SBM.
27.

The State’s existing public-sector labor law does not cover certain categories of

public-sector employees. See section 105.510, RSMo. (exempting “police, deputy sheriffs,
Missouri state highway patrolmen, Missouri National Guard, all teachers of all Missouri schools,
colleges and universities”) (2017). Nevertheless, those employees and their chosen union
representatives enjoy all of the rights guaranteed under Art. I, Sec. 29, see Independence-NEA,
223 S.W.3d at 136, and frequently organize and bargain collectively under local ordinances or
policies that satisfy constitutional standards.
28.

Under these existing regimes of state and local law, Plaintiffs are the recognized

exclusive representatives of units of public employees. In some cases, that recognition has come
about through SBM-conducted elections, in other cases through an election conducted by another
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 entity, and in other cases through the employer’s voluntary recognition of the union’s
representative status based on a credible showing of majority support by the employees. Since
those initial recognitions, the Plaintiffs’ status as recognized exclusive representatives has
continued even though employees remain free to seek a change in their representative. And, each
of the Plaintiffs that currently has a collective-bargaining agreement with an employer, has
contractual provisions in that agreement providing that the Plaintiff will continue to serve as the
exclusive representative for the duration of that agreement. For example:
a. Plaintiff Ferguson-Florissant NEA was voluntarily recognized as the exclusive
representative of full-time certificated instructional and educational-support
personnel by Defendant Ferguson-Florissant School District. This recognition
has since been expressly included in the parties’ successive collective
bargaining agreements. The current collective-bargaining agreement between
Ferguson-Florissant NEA and Ferguson-Florissant School District is in effect
until June 30, 2019, and recognizes the Ferguson-Florissant NEA as the
exclusive representative for the duration of the agreement.
b. SEIU, Local 1 is the certified representative of patient care professionals in
the Departments of Mental Health, Corrections, and Missouri Veterans
Commission. SEIU Local 1’s most recent collective bargaining agreement for
the patient care professional unit, which expired on May 31, 2018, includes a
provision recognizing SEIU Local 1 as the exclusive representative of patient
care professionals in these three State Departments. SEIU, Local 1 has
repeatedly asked the Office of Administration for dates for bargaining a new

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 labor agreement, but to date the Office of Administration has failed to provide
dates.
c. Similar provisions assure the continued exclusive representative status of the
following Plaintiffs until the conclusion of the applicable collective
bargaining agreement: Plaintiff Hazelwood ASP (exclusive representative
status in effect under agreement until June 30, 2020); Plaintiff LIUNA Local
42 (exclusive representative status in effect under agreement until April 5,
2021); Plaintiff Teamsters Local 610-Affton Fire Protection District unit
(exclusive representative status in effect under agreement until December 31,
2020); Plaintiff Operating Engineers Local 148 (exclusive representative
status in effect under agreement until June 30, 2021).
29.

Under these existing regimes of state and local law, Plaintiffs also negotiated and

reached agreement on wages, benefits, and a broad array of terms and conditions of employment.
One of the terms contained in many of the Plaintiffs’ agreements deals with payroll deduction,
also known as dues checkoff, which is a common and convenient arrangement under which
employers automatically deduct union dues from member paychecks and forward those dues
directly to the union. Payroll deduction provisions have been negotiated by and are included in
the collective bargaining agreements between Plaintiff LIUNA Local 42 and Defendant City of
Bel-Ridge; Plaintiff Operating Engineers Local 148 and Defendant St. Louis Community
College; and Plaintiff Ferguson-Florissant NEA and Defendant Ferguson-Florissant School
District. Dues deduction was also included in the labor agreement, since expired, between SEIU,
Local 1 and the State of Missouri. Plaintiff Missouri NEA receives dues from many of its

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 members through payroll deduction arrangements negotiated directly between its local affiliates
and public employers.
30.

As is traditional in both the private and public sectors, Plaintiffs’ agreements also

frequently address issues related to employee hiring, promotion, assignment, direction, transfer,
scheduling, discipline, and discharge. And in some cases, they address if and how the terms of
the agreement should be applied in times of fiscal emergencies. For example:
a. Plaintiff Ferguson-Florissant NEA’s collective bargaining agreement with
Defendant Ferguson-Florissant School District includes provisions for “just
cause” and progressive discipline for educational support personnel, for paid
release time for union officers and representatives to conduct certain union
business, and for protocols for conducting employee transfers and layoffs. The
agreement also includes a provision limiting the employer’s ability to
unilaterally modify the contract only to “emergency situations where … the
District and the community has suffered serious damage due to natural
disasters, acts of war or terrorism, or pandemic.” In the “event of a serious
financial situation that could not have been anticipated,” the parties are to
“discuss the situation and collaborate on possible solutions.” In such cases, the
contract further provides that the original terms of the contract are to be
“reinstated” when “the District is able to resume normal operations and has
achieved financial solvency.”
b. Plaintiff Hazelwood ASP’s collective bargaining agreement with Defendant
Hazelwood School District includes provisions detailing the process by which
unit employees can bid for bus routes, requiring layoff in reverse seniority

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 order, and recall from layoff in seniority order, and granting officers release
time to conduct certain union business.
c. Plaintiff LIUNA Local 42’s collective bargaining agreement with Defendant
City of Bel-Ridge includes provisions limiting the employer’s ability to
discipline or terminate unit employees except for “just cause,” and granting
employees on the union’s bargaining team release time for collectivebargaining activity.
d. Plaintiff Teamsters Local 610’s collective bargaining agreement with
Defendant Affton Fire Protection District includes provisions requiring “just
cause” discipline, specifying the requirements for promotion, and detailing
unit employee assignments.
e. Plaintiff Operating Engineers Local 148’s collective bargaining agreement
with Defendant St. Louis Community College includes provisions requiring
“just cause” discipline, conducting layoffs in reverse seniority order, and
granting recall from layoff in seniority order.
f. Plaintiff SEIU Local 1’s recently expired collective bargaining agreement
with Defendant State of Missouri includes provisions requiring “just cause”
discipline and discharge and mandating that work-assignment decisions,
layoffs, and recalls be conducted according to seniority.
31.

The Plaintiffs also engage in traditional forms of speech, association, and protest

to advance their positions in collective bargaining negotiations. For example, in 2017, Plaintiff
Teamsters Local 610 and its members engaged in a demonstration at a city council meeting of
Defendant City of Crestwood to voice their opposition to a pay proposal and to demand action on

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 ongoing collective-bargaining negotiations. Similarly, Plaintiff SEIU Local 1 has specifically
bargained a provision in its now expired collective-bargaining agreement allowing employees to
“participate in informational rallies so long as it is done during non-work time.”
II. Public Employees’ Political and other
Free-Speech Activities Under Existing Law
32.

Both unions and corporations are generally prohibited under Missouri law from

making political contributions directly to candidates or party committees. See Mo. Const. art.
VII, § 23.3(3). Nevertheless, current law allows unions to fund and participate in a broad array of
other political activities. For example, unions can spend general treasury funds to support or
oppose ballot measures. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–95 (1978);
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295–300 (1981). They can also
use those funds to engage in independent speech supporting or opposing political candidates or
to make contributions to political committees that engage in such independent speech. See
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); Free & Fair Election Fund v. Mo. Ethics
Comm'n, 252 F. Supp. 3d 723, 748–49 (W.D. Mo. 2017). Unions in Missouri are also permitted
to make contributions to political action committees, see Mo. Const. art. VII, § 23.3(12), and to
transfer dues funds to the union’s own connected political action committee, see Mo. Ethics
Comm’n Advisory Op. No. 2017.08.CF.016 (Aug. 25, 2017).
33.

Pursuant to these existing laws, some of the Plaintiffs have spent funds consisting

of member dues on political activities. For example, Plaintiff Operating Engineers Local 148
made multiple contributions to the campaign against Missouri Proposition A, a referendum
involving the state’s recently enacted “right to work” law. Plaintiff MNEA made contributions
from its general treasury to its Ballot Issue Crisis Fund and wishes to continue doing so.

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 However, HB 1413 mandates annual written authorizations from every member prior to the
expenditure of funds for or contributions in support of ballot measures.
III. House Bill No. 1413 Enacted Radical
Changes to the State’s Public-Sector Labor Law
34.

On June 1, 2018, then-Governor Eric Greitens signed HB 1413 into law. This

legislation, effective August 28, 2018, enacted extensive and drastic changes to the State’s
public-sector labor law, in large part by significantly revising chapter 105, Title 108, RSMo.
A. HB 1413 Arbitrarily Exempts Some
Public-Sector Employees and Unions
35.

For a favored group of public-sector unions and employees, HB 1413 will have no

effect whatsoever. That is because HB 1413 completely exempts a new category of “public
safety labor organizations” as well as all public-sector employees “who are members of [such] a
public safety labor organization” from its coverage. New section 105.503, RSMo.; see also id.
new section 105.501 (defining a “public safety labor organization” as any union that wholly or
primarily represents persons (a) trained or authorized by law or rule to render emergency medical
assistance or treatment, or (b) vested with the power of arrest for criminal code violations). In
addition, HB 1413 completely exempts the Department of Corrections and its employees from its
coverage. See new section 105.500(6) (excluding the Department of Corrections from the
employers, or "public bod[ies]," subject to HB 1413’s restrictions); see also id., new section
105.503 (providing that HB 1413’s core provisions “shall not apply” to the Department of
Corrections and its employees). For the sake of clarity, this Petition hereafter refers to all
exempted public-sector unions and employees simply as “public safety” unions.
36.

The carve-out favoring “public safety” unions was added to HB 1413 at the

eleventh-hour in an evident attempt to save the legislation from defeat. Though HB 1413 initially

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 was introduced on December 1, 2017, the wholesale exception for “public safety labor
organizations” was not added to the legislation until the very end of the process, as part of the
May 16, 2018, Senate Substitute. The State Senate approved this significant addition that very
same day, and the House of Representatives followed suit the following day.
37.

Plaintiffs do not qualify as favored “public safety labor organizations” under HB

1413 because they do not wholly or primarily represent persons trained or authorized by law or
rule to render emergency medical assistance or treatment, or vested with the power of arrest for
criminal code violations. Nor do Plaintiffs—other than SEIU Local 1—represent employees of
the Department of Corrections. Plaintiff SEIU Local 1 occupies the anomalous position of
representing some patient care professionals employed by the Department of Corrections (who
are excluded from HB 1413’s coverage) in a broader unit that also includes employees of the
Department of Mental Health and the Veterans Commission (who are subject to HB 1413’s
rollbacks).
38.

As described in greater detail below, the result of HB 1413’s wholesale

exemption of favored “public safety” unions is to preserve bargaining and association rights to
those unions and the employees they represent alone, while subjecting all other unions (the
“penalized” unions) to such draconian restrictions as to place them, and the employees they
represent, at a permanent and insurmountable disadvantage in terms of organizing, bargaining
and the carrying out of their usual union functions.
B. Restrictions on Public Employees’ Ability to Choose and
Retain Representation by Penalized Unions
39.

HB 1413 dramatically recasts—and severely restricts—the process for public

employees to select or retain a penalized union like the Plaintiffs as their exclusive
representative. In particular, HB 1413 invalidates the means by which many penalized unions
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 were initially recognized as representatives, and it subjects those unions to an immediate and
burdensome requirement to conduct an “initial” certification election as though they had no prior
representative or bargaining relationship with the employees and employer. And for all penalized
unions that retain their certification after an initial election, HB 1413 imposes an unjustified and
burdensome requirement that they be recertified triennially.
40.

HB 1413 categorically prohibits public employers from voluntarily recognizing a

penalized union, regardless of how strong and undisputed the level of employee support for that
union, see new section 105.575, RSMo. Instead, such union—which include Plaintiff FergusonFlorissant NEA and LIUNA Local 42—can only be certified as an exclusive bargaining
representative following an “initial” election conducted by Defendant SBM.
41.

To hold such an “initial” election, a penalized union must submit cards containing

the signatures of at least thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit, and the State
Board of Mediation must confirm that showing of support. See new section 105.575(1)-(2). And
to prevail in the “initial” election, a penalized union must receive—not just a majority of the
votes actually cast in the election—but a majority of the votes of all employees eligible to vote.
In other words, HB 1413 treats non-votes in an initial representation election as “no” votes
against the proposed representative. This barrier to employee choice of a union representative is
unprecedented under Missouri law and applies only to penalized unions, even though public
safety unions retain much broader rights to bargain and, hence, bind the employees they
represent.
42.

If a penalized union prevails in such an initial certification election, it must still

stand for a recertification election every three years. See new section 105.575(12). As with the
initial certification election, the penalized union must receive—not just a majority of the votes

20

 actually cast in the election—but a majority of all employees eligible to vote in order to retain its
status as exclusive representative. Again, this considerable procedural hurdle to representation
applies only to penalized unions and no other unions.
43.

In all elections, the penalized unions must pay a fee to participate. See, new

section 105.575(15). By contrast, the favored unions seeking to represent a bargaining unit and
groups seeking to decertify a penalized union do not pay a fee.
44.

Some penalized unions—such as Teamsters Local 610 (City of Crestwood unit)—

were initially recognized as a result of a representation election conducted by an entity other than
the SBM because the SBM had no authority at the time to hold elections for those units.
Defendant Smith asserted in a July 3, 2018 letter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A
and incorporated herein by this reference, that the Board will interpret and enforce “the new law
to require that a party seeking recertification must have been initially certified by the [SBM].”
Based upon his interpretation, a penalized union that originally attained status as exclusive
representative through a non-SBM-conducted election must face an immediate “initial
certification” election in which it must be approved by a majority of all eligible voters. And if
that union prevails in the initial certification election, it must stand for a recertification election
every three years thereafter. See new section 105.575(12).
45.

Even a penalized union that was initially recognized as a result of an SBM-

conducted representation election—such as Plaintiff Hazelwood ASP—must still stand for its
first recertification election by August 28, 2019, and for subsequent recertification elections
every three years thereafter within two weeks of the anniversary date of the initial certification.
See new section 105.575(12), RSMo. If such a penalized union is a party to a collective-

21

 bargaining agreement that expires after August 28, 2020, its first recertification may occur any
time prior to, but in no event later than, August 28, 2020. See id.
46.

Plaintiff SEIU Local 1 would be required to stand for its first recertification

election by August 28, 2019, and for triennial recertification elections thereafter. However,
because of the exemption of the Department of Corrections from HB 1413, the nature of the unit
to be recertified remains unclear.
47.

The requirements for certification elections described above in paragraphs 39 - 44

apply regardless of whether the penalized union is a party to an existing collective-bargaining
agreement that recognizes it as the exclusive representative beyond HB 1413’s August 28, 2018
effective date or (for a penalized union that was certified pursuant to an earlier SBM-conducted
election) beyond August 29, 2020. Several of the plaintiffs are parties to such agreements.
48.

Because voluntary recognition and recognition following an election conducted

other than by the SBM are both common methods by which public employers have historically
recognized unions, the requirements for certification elections described above in paragraphs 39
- 44 will immediately injure numerous public employees, including many represented by
Plaintiffs. These employees will be stripped of exclusive representation by their unions and
forced to request initial certification through the burdensome SBM initial certification and
election procedure under which their unions may retain representative status only if a majority of
all employees in the unit vote for representation. At the very minimum, these employees will be
denied the union representation that they have enjoyed (in some cases for many decades) while
the time-consuming process of initial certification elections unfolds. And the Plaintiffs that are
parties to existing collective-bargaining agreements that recognize their status as the exclusive
representative will have those agreements substantially impaired, if not completely nullified.

22

 49.

HB 1413’s favored “public safety” unions will suffer none of these harms.

Because neither the initial certification elections described above in paragraphs 39 - 44, nor the
triennial recertification elections apply to them, the employees they represent will continue to
enjoy the services and representation of the union without the need to overcome the burdensome
majority of the unit, rather than majority of the voters, threshold.
C. The Evisceration of Collective Bargaining Rights for Penalized Unions and the
Employees they Represent
50.

HB 1413 effectively eviscerates collective bargaining rights of penalized unions

and the employees they represent both by granting employers unilateral rights to rewrite or void
a bargained for agreement with penalized unions and by drastically reducing the subjects that
may be bargained. These restrictions discriminate against penalized unions and the employees
they represent and are so onerous as to render collective-bargaining by penalized unions all but
meaningless.
51.

HB 1413 prohibits penalized unions from bargaining collectively over “the right

to hire, promote, assign, direct, transfer, schedule, discipline, and discharge public employees”
and “work rules and standard operating procedures,” by reserving all of these basic employment
matters to the exclusive control and prerogative of a public employer. New section 105.585.1,
RSMo. HB 1413 also restricts penalized unions’ ability to bargain for so-called “release time”
provisions, which are common and allow for one or more bargaining unit employees to receive
regular pay for conducting certain union business. Such arrangements may now be bargained
only for the limited “purposes of grievance-handling, advisory committees, establishing a work
calendar, and internal and external communications.” New section 105.585.5, RSMo. As noted
above in paragraph 30, many of the Plaintiffs’ existing collective bargaining agreements include
provisions addressing one or more of these now-unlawful topics, meaning that those provisions
23

 will be rendered unlawful when modified or upon expiration or renewal after the effective date
of HB 1413. Such subjects of bargaining have long been considered mandatory subjects of
bargaining and part of good faith bargaining. See, Ledbetter, 387 S.W.3d at 364-68.
52.

HB 1413 also requires penalized unions to ratify proposed collective bargaining

agreements before the agreement is presented to the public employer. After the union has
ratified, HB 1413 grants the public employer the unilateral right to reject or rewrite or void
altogether any portion of the already-negotiated and ratified agreement. New section 105.580.5,
RSMo. Should the public employer do so, it may negotiate a replacement provision or simply
unilaterally rework the final agreement as it so chooses. See id. HB 1413 further grants a public
employer authority to open up and unilaterally revise a ratified collective bargaining agreement’s
“economic terms” “in the event of a budget shortfall.” New section 105.580.6, RSMo. And HB
1413 grants public employers the right to unilaterally modify “for good cause” the “economic
terms” of a collective bargaining agreement with a penalized union whenever the public
employer “deems it necessary,” and bargaining over the issue has failed to resolve the issue to
the employer’s satisfaction within thirty days time. Id.
53.

The combined import of HB 1413’s restrictions on collective bargaining for

penalized unions (described above in paragraphs 50 - 52) is effectively to eviscerate collective
bargaining rights for such unions and the employees they represent. Not only do those
restrictions remove most commonplace employment matters from the scope of bargaining, but
they subject bargaining over the few issues that remain to the employer’s unilateral nullification
or revision, making the bargaining process little more than a charade. Further these provisions
purport to void altogether existing contract provisions for which Plaintiffs have already
bargained.

24

 54.

Yet again, HB1413’s favored “public safety labor organizations” will suffer none

of these harms. They will continue to enjoy the full sweep of bargaining rights under existing
law, their contracts will remain intact, their employers will not be permitted to unilaterally
rewrite or void a collectively bargained agreement and the employees they represent will
continue to enjoy the full benefits of the agreements that their unions have reached.
D. Restrictions on the Rights of Public Employees Represented
by Penalized Unions to Speak Freely and Petition
55.

HB 1413 also enacts sweeping restrictions on the free speech and association

rights of public employees who are represented by a penalized union.
56.

HB 1413 requires that every collective bargaining agreement between a public

employer and a penalized union prohibit “any … interference with the operations of any public
body,” as well as “picketing of any kind,” and further specify that employees who participate in
such “pickets” “shall be subject to immediate termination of employment.” New section
105.580.2, RSMo.
57.

The restrictions on and penalties for “picketing” and “interference” of any kind do

not apply to public employees who have declined union representation entirely or who are
fortunate enough to be represented by a favored “public safety” union.
E. Restrictions on the Rights of Penalized
Unions to Speak Freely and Petition the Government for Redress
58.

HB 1413 also enacts broad restrictions on the rights of penalized unions to engage

in constitutionally protected expressive and political activities.
59.

HB 1413 prohibits penalized unions from taking any action “intended to cause the

removal or replacement of any designated representative” of a public employer. New section
105.580.2, RSMo. The phrase “intended to cause the removal or replacement of any designated

25

 representative” of a public employer is not defined by statute. On its face, it would prohibit,
among other things, petitioning for the removal or reassignment of a supervisor for workplacerelated reasons, by way of a grievance or otherwise, no matter how inappropriate or unlawful the
supervisor’s conduct might be. It might even be construed as prohibiting any efforts to defeat an
elected public employer representative such as a school board member.
60.

Such activity is commonplace among public sector unions and reflects the

exercise of core protected rights of speech and petition. For example, MNEA locals have
endorsed candidates for school board, Teamsters Local 610 has endorsed candidates for the
Crestwood City Council, and Local 42 has also endorsed candidates for local office.
61.

Yet again, HB1413’s favored “public safety” unions are exempt from such

restrictions and remain free to engage in petitioning or political activity intended to cause the
removal or replacement of any public employer representative.
F. Restrictions on Penalized Unions’ Ability to Collect and
Spend Union Dues Paid by Public Employee Members
62.

HB 1413 also significantly restricts penalized unions (including Plaintiffs) in their

collection of members’ dues and their use of such dues to fund a range of constitutionally
protected political speech and activity.
63.

HB 1413 prohibits penalized unions from receiving any member’s dues through

payroll deduction, except where the non-exempt union has first obtained the member’s written or
electronic authorization, which must be renewed on an annual basis. See new section 105.505.1,
RSMo. Thus, upon HB 1413’s effective date of August 28, 2018, Plaintiffs Ferguson-Florissant
NEA, LIUNA Local 42, and Operating Engineers Local 148 will no longer be entitled to rely on
the dues checkoff provisions contained in their existing collective-bargaining agreements and

26

 will, instead, need to undertake the burdensome and time-consuming task of obtaining an
individual authorization each year from all of their members.
64.

HB 1413 also imposes a significant restriction on the ability of penalized unions

(including Plaintiffs) to make political contributions and expenditures. It prohibits such unions
from using any portion of any member’s dues to make either a political “contribution” or a
“political” expenditure,” as those terms are defined by section 130.011, RSMo., without first
obtaining the members’ “informed, written or electronic authorization,” which must also be
renewed annually. New section 105.505.2, RSMo. HB 1413 does not define what constitutes
adequate “informed … authorization.” Moreover, this annual advance authorization requirement
may not be waived even by a member who wishes to do so, and no employees’ dues may be
increased in lieu of payments for contributions or expenditures. See new sections 105.505(3)-(4),
RSMo.
65.

Yet again, HB 1413’s favored “public safety” unions are exempt from these

restrictions. They remain free to rely on collectively bargained dues checkoff provisions without
the need to obtain annual reauthorizations from each member for those deductions. They also
remain free to make political contributions and expenditures from dues funds without advance
authorization from each member.
66.

Indeed, HB 1413’s restriction on the political activity of penalized unions applies

to no other entity. Private corporations, unions that represent employees only in the private
sector, trade associations, and other membership organizations or non-profits all remain free to
use their treasury funds for political contributions and expenditures without advance
authorization from individual members or shareholders. In addition, charities that receive money

27

 through payroll deductions pursuant to Section 33.103, RSMo., may use that money to make
contributions and expenditures in support of ballot measures.
G. Imposition of Onerous Record-Keeping and
Reporting Requirements on Penalized Unions
67.

HB 1413 subjects all penalized unions representing public employees—regardless

of their size, available resources, or capacity—to a number of new, intrusive, and burdensome
record-keeping and reporting requirements.
68.

HB 1413 requires that all penalized unions “maintain financial records

substantially similar to and no less comprehensive than the records that are required to be
maintained in accordance with 29 U.S.C. Section 431(b) or any successor statute.” New section
105.505(6), RSMo. All penalized unions must provide those financial records “in a searchable
electronic format to every public employee it represents,” and must likewise retain records and
underlying data and documents “by which the records may be verified, explained, or clarified,”
for at least five years. Id., new section 105.505(7)-(8). This new recordkeeping and disclosure
requirement is not only burdensome, but vague, given that the federal law cited in this provision
of HB 1413, 29 U.S.C. § 431(b), does not require unions to “maintain” any record, much less in
a “searchable electronic format.” On the contrary, this provision of the federal LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”) requires only that unions covered by
the federal law file financial reports with the Department of Labor. It is therefore wholly unclear
whether HB 1413 requires penalized unions to maintain records that contain the same
information as would a report filed under 29 U.S.C. § 431(b), all of the many underlying
documents that would substantiate the information contained in a report filed under 29 U.S.C.
§ 431(b), or something else entirely.

28

 69.

HB1413’s reporting requirements are also vague and unclear concerning their

application to private sector unions that represent some public employees that have different
reporting requirements under federal law, including whether they are exempt from HB1413’s
disclosure requirements pursuant to new section 105.503-3, whether smaller labor organizations
may file the short form reports permitted by the LMRDA, or whether they may satisfy HB1413
by submitting their LMRDA reports.
70.

HB 1413 requires—in addition to the vague disclosure obligation identified in

paragraph 68— that every penalized union, apparently no matter how small, file annually with
the Department a financial report disclosing a wide range of financial information, including all
assets and liabilities; receipts of any kind; salaries and disbursements to officers and employees;
all direct and indirect loans; as well as an “itemization schedule” detailing the “purpose, date,
total amount, and type or classification of each disbursement … along with the name and address
of the entity receiving the expenditure” in a variety of categories (e.g., contract negotiation and
administration; organizing activities; litigation; public relations activities; training activities;
etc.). New section 105.533.2, RSMo. These reporting requirements extend well beyond the
requirements of the LMRDA.
71.

Along with this annual filing requirement, HB 1413 imposes expansive record-

keeping requirements, obligating every penalized union, officer and employee (other than
clerical and custodial employees) to maintain for at least five years comprehensive and detailed
records and underlying documentation (such as receipts) showing “with sufficient detail” the
information and data against which the reports can be “verified, explained, or clarified, and
checked for accuracy and completeness.” New section 105.545, RSMo.

29

 72.

HB 1413’s annual disclosure requirements are particularly onerous insofar as they

require extensive and intrusive information about a penalized union’s political activities,
including information that the union may not even have in its own possession. For example, the
annual financial report must disclose:
a. Detailed information regarding all expenditures for: political activities;
activities attempting to influence the passage or defeat of federal, state, or
local legislation, or the content or enforcement of federal, state, or local
regulations or policies; and voter education and issue advocacy activities.
New section 105.533(2)(6), RSMo.
b. The percentage of the reporting union’s total expenditures spent on the above
categories of political activity. New section 105.533(2)(7), RSMo.
c. The names, addresses, and activities, of any law firms, public relations firms,
or lobbyists whose services the reporting union used for any of the above
categories of political activity. New section 105.533(2)(8), RSMo.
d. The candidates, committees, and organizations to which the reporting union
contributed financial or in-kind assistance, as well as the amount provided.
New section 105.533(2)(9), RSMo.
e. Both the committees or political action committees with which the reporting
union is affiliated or to which it provides contributions and the amounts that
the reporting union contributed to such committees, as well as information
about all of those committees’ activities (i.e., the amounts and recipients of the
financial support that each committee provided)—information that is not
likely to be in the union’s possession. New section 105.533(2)(10), RSMo.

30

 73.

The penalties imposed for even inadvertent non-compliance with these many new

and onerous record-keeping and reporting requirements are draconian. Any delay in filing these
reports is punished with a $100 per day fine. HB 1413 also makes it a crime to make a
knowingly false statement or material omission from a report. It is likewise a crime to make a
knowingly false entry in records required to be kept by HB 1413, or to knowingly conceal,
withhold, or destroy such records. Both offenses can result in fines of up to $10,000, and
imprisonment for up to one year. See new section 105.555, RSMo.
74.

Plaintiffs will be required to devote considerable time, energy, and financial

resources to complying with these new record-keeping and reporting requirements. These
demands will be extremely burdensome for all Plaintiffs, but particularly so for the smaller
unions. For example, Plaintiff Hazelwood ASP, which represents only 35 bus drivers employed
by Defendant Hazelwood School District, employs no professional staffers, and relies entirely on
elected member leaders for all governance, financial, and record-keeping functions, will be
extraordinarily hard-pressed to comply with these new demands. Plaintiff Missouri NEA has
local affiliates throughout the State of Missouri whose membership is small in comparison to the
size of the bargaining unit. Many do not even serve as exclusive bargaining representative. Yet
these local affiliates without staff are subject to the same onerous record-keeping and reporting
requirements as large labor organizations. Many of the local Missouri NEA affiliates will be
severely burdened by the record-keeping and reporting requirements of HB 1413.
75.

The considerable demands posed by these new record-keeping and reporting

requirements will impair Plaintiffs’ ability effectively to represent the employees in the
bargaining units they represent. The cost of complying with these requirements—in time, energy,
and money—will necessarily come at the expense of other vital union activities, such as

31

 collective bargaining, contract enforcement, the representation of individual unit employees in
employment matters, the provision of member benefits, etc. While these burdens will be felt
most acutely by smaller unions like Plaintiff Hazelwood ASP, they will adversely affect all
Plaintiffs.
76.

The daily fines and potential criminal penalties for non-compliance with the

record-keeping and reporting requirements will have a chilling effect. Plaintiffs will likely have
a harder time persuading their members (and in Missouri NEA’s case, their local affiliates’
members) to run for elected union office. Some of Missouri NEA’s smaller affiliates may well
shut down their operations rather than attempt to guess about the meaning of the burdensome and
unclear disclosure requirements and run the risk of fines and criminal penalties.
77.

Yet again, HB 1413’s favored “public safety labor organizations” are exempt

from these vague and onerous recordkeeping and disclosure requirements. They remain free to
devote the considerable resources that would otherwise be necessary for compliance with these
requirements to the representation of employees. They also remain free of the specter of fines
and criminal prosecution for even small or inadvertent missteps in attempting to comply with
them.
H. HB 1413’s Implementation and Enforcement Mechanisms
78.

HB 1413 gives the Department authority to enact regulations for the inspection

and examination, on the request of any person, of the information and data contained in any
report or other document filed with the Department. New section 105.540, RSMo.
79.

HB 1413 gives the SBM authority to promulgate rules “necessary to implement”

all of the provisions described in paragraphs 35 - 77, but no regulations will be in place on the
effective date or for some time thereafter given the requirements of the rulemaking process.

32

 Many of HB 1413’s core provisions may be enforced—not just by public

80.

employers, the relevant agencies, or prosecutors—but by virtually any public entity or indeed
citizen of the state. If a public employer or union violates, or is about to violate, any of the
provisions described in paragraphs 39 - 45 and 50 - 54, the Department, any “public body,” or
“any citizen of the state of Missouri” may bring a civil enforcement action in which a court may
award damages, injunctive relive, and attorney fees. New section 105.595, RSMo.
HB 1413 gives the “public employee [the union] represents” authority to enforce

81.

the union’s duty to provide financial records required “in a searchable electronic format.” New
section 105.505(7), RSMo. Similarly, any “member” can bring an action to enforce her right, for
“just cause,” to inspect records necessary to verify the information in the union’s annual
financial report. New section 105.505(7)105.533(3).
COUNT ONE: Claim for Violation of the Rights of Plaintiffs’ Members
Under Article I, Section 29 of the Missouri Constitution of 1945
82.

Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs of the Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
83.

The Bill of Rights of the Missouri Constitution declares that “employees shall

have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.” Art. I, Sec. 29. This right is fundamental, and governmental action infringing on it is
subject to strict judicial scrutiny to determine whether it is necessary to accomplish a compelling
state interest. See United C.O.D. v. State, 150 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Mo. 2004) (explaining that
rights are “fundamental” if they are “explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution”).
84.

The entire scheme by HB 1413 violates the Art. I, Sec. 29 rights of Plaintiffs’

public employee members, in multiple ways as detailed below:

33

 a. New section 105.575, RSMo., by voiding Plaintiffs’ status as exclusive
representative where Plaintiffs were recognized other than through an SBM
election, denies the members of those Plaintiffs their right to union
representation until and unless they comply with the new burdensome and
time-consuming initial certification procedures.
b. New section 105.575, RSMo., denies Plaintiffs’ members’ right to union
representation by creating arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional
procedural hurdles to public employees’ selection and retention of a union of
their choice by, e.g., prohibiting voluntary recognition of a penalized union
even where employee preference is clear and undisputed; denying public
employees union representation unless the union is supported by a majority of
eligible voters, rather than a majority of votes as union representation is now
and will continue to be determined for “public safety” employees represented
by a public safety labor organization; and by requiring public employees to
repeat and pay a fee for this unreasonably burdensome election process every
three years.
c. New section 105.580, RSMo., denies Plaintiffs’ members’ rights to bargain
collectively in good faith through the union of their choosing, by reserving to
public employers the unilateral right to rewrite and void agreements reached
with penalized unions.
d. New section 105.585, RSMo., denies Plaintiffs’ members’ rights to bargain
collectively through the union of their choosing, by reserving to public
employers that negotiate with penalized unions complete discretion over basic

34

 “terms and conditions of employment” that unions—including Plaintiffs—
have traditionally bargained over and that favored “public safety” unions may
still bargain over in any unit they represent. These terms and conditions
include such bread-and-butter matters as employee assignment and transfer
rights and procedures; employee discipline and termination standards and
procedures; layoff and recall protocols; and release time provisions.
e. New sections 105.505, 105.580. RSMo., deny Plaintiffs’ members’ rights to
union representation by imposing new, arbitrary and onerous restrictions on
the ability of Plaintiffs to collect and spend their members’ dues, as well as to
engage in otherwise lawful concerted activity in furtherance of organizing,
bargaining, and other forms of collective representation.
85.

These restrictions also operate to deny employees free choice in the selection of

an exclusive representative, by enacting a discriminatory two-tiered system of favored “public
safety” unions and penalized unions (like Plaintiffs), thereby coercing employees to choose a
“public safety” union if they are able to do so.
86.

Likewise, new section 105.585.2, RSMo., violates the Art. I, Sec. 29 rights of

Plaintiffs’ public employee members, by stripping them of their rights to engage in certain
expressive activities if they work under a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a
penalized union, thereby coercing them into choosing to be represented by a “public safety”
union or forgoing collective bargaining altogether. New sections 105.505, 105.533, and 105.535105.555, RSMo., violate the Art. I, Sec. 29 rights of all of Plaintiffs’ members—public- and
private-sector alike—by imposing new, onerous, and unjustified record-keeping and disclosure

35

 requirements, the cost of complying with which will unreasonably impede Plaintiffs’ effective
representation of all of their members.
87.

The restrictions described in paragraphs 84 - 86 significantly burden the right of

employees represented by Plaintiffs to “organize and bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing.” Art. I, Sec. 29. HB 1413 cannot survive the strict scrutiny applied to
statutes that burden fundamental rights. It does not serve a compelling government interest, and
in any event, it is not narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means for advancing a compelling
interest. Indeed, HB 1413 is so lacking in justification and so poorly tailored to any legitimate
governmental purpose that it cannot survive lower levels of scrutiny either.
88.

The amendments to chapter 105, Title 108, RSMo., enacted by HB 1413 are so

essential to, inseparably connected with, and dependent upon, the provisions that violate Art. I,
Sec. 29, discussed above, that it cannot be presumed that the General Assembly would have
enacted any valid provisions in the absence of the invalid ones, and the valid provisions, if any,
are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent. See
section 1.140, RSMo. In particular, the overarching discriminatory distinction drawn between
privileged “public safety labor organizations” that are entirely exempt from all of these new
provisions, and the penalized unions that are subject to them, runs through all of HB 1413’s
amendments to chapter 105, Title 108, RSMo. The General Assembly thus intended all of the
provisions of HB 1413 to discriminatorily fall on—and restrain and burden—penalized unions
and the employees they represent.
89.

Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed if the provisions of HB 1413 impairing their

rights under the Art. I, Sec. 29 are not enjoined. Not only is the deprivation of a constitutional
right a presumptively irreparable injury, but Plaintiffs will have no adequate remedy at law to

36

 compensate for the interruption, interference with, and diminution of its members’ union
representation caused by the enforcement of HB 1413.
COUNT TWO: Claim for Violation of Plaintiffs’ Rights Under
Article I, Sections 8 and 9 and Article VIII, Section 23.3(3) of the Missouri Constitution of
1945
90.

Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
91.

The Missouri Constitution of 1945 guarantees the right to freedom of speech and

association, and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Mo. Const. Art. I,
§§ 8-9 (“Art. I, Sec. 8-9”).
92.

New section 105.505, RSMo. violates Plaintiffs’ rights to free speech and

association by singling out penalized unions for speech restrictions applied to no other entities in
the state—namely, requiring that penalized unions obtain the annual, informed, written or
electronic consent of every member before using any portion of that member’s dues for political
purposes. This restriction is impermissible speaker-based discrimination, and there is no
compelling governmental interest that justifies denying Plaintiffs the right to expend general
treasury funds on political advocacy.
93.

New Section 105.505 also violates Plaintiffs’ and their members’ rights under

Article VIII, Section 23.3(3) by prohibiting the use of dues of a public employee to fund a
continuing committee absent authorization every 12 months. At the same time, other
organizations, such as trade organizations, are not required to obtain such authorizations for the
use of dues.
94.

The constitutional guarantees of free speech and association similarly protect

Plaintiffs against any unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements. See, e.g.,

37

 Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010). These protections are at
their acme in the case of compelled disclosures regarding political activities. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). New section 105.553, RSMo. violates Plaintiffs’ free speech rights by
singling out penalized unions for new mandatory disclosure requirements of political and other
expressive activity that apply to no other entities in the state, thereby subjecting them to
discriminatory, intrusive, burdensome and unjustified disclosure requirements including that they
submit annual, detailed disclosures regarding both their political activities and expenditures, as
well as the activities and expenditures of any continuing committees or political action
committees that Plaintiffs support.
95.

New sections 105.505, 105.533, 105.535, 105.545, and 105.555, RSMo. also

violate Plaintiffs’ free speech rights by singling out penalized unions and imposing on them
burdensome and intrusive record-keeping and reporting requirements that are both
discriminatory and unjustified by any governmental interest.
96.

New section 105.505, RSMo. violates Plaintiffs’ free speech rights by singling out

penalized unions and prohibiting them from engaging in “any conduct” intended to remove or
replace any “representative” of a public employer such as petitioning a public employer for the
removal or reassignment of a public servant, or working for the electoral defeat of an elected
public official.
97.

Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed if the provisions of HB 1413 impairing their

rights under Art. I, Sec. 8-9 are not enjoined. The deprivation of these core constitutional rights,
even momentarily, is an irreparable injury. Moreover, Plaintiffs will have no adequate remedy at
law to compensate for the burdens and chill on speech caused by the enforcement of HB 1413.

38

 COUNT THREE: Claim for Violation of the Rights of Plaintiffs’ Members
Under Article I, Sections 8 and 9 of the Missouri Constitution of 1945
98.

Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
99.

The constitutional right to free speech and association guarantees both the right to

engage in peaceful, non-obstructive picketing, see, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940), Katz Drug Co. v. Kavner, 249 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. 1952), as well as the right to organize
individuals to join a union. See, e.g., Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 2000 v. State, 214
S.W.3d 368, 372-73 (W.D. Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local No. 3808 v.
City of Kansas City, 220 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 2000).
100.

New section 105.585, RSMo. violates Plaintiffs’ free speech and association

rights by singling out penalized unions and prohibiting them and their members from engaging in
even peaceful, non-obstructive picketing, and by threatening Plaintiffs’ members with
“immediate termination” for engaging in any picketing “over any personnel matter.”
101.

New section 105.585, RSMo. likewise violates Plaintiffs’ free speech and

association rights by singling out penalized unions and prohibiting them, under pain of
immediate termination of the union’s members, from engaging in any activity deemed a “strike”
if it creates “any … interference with the operations of any public body.” This vague and
overbroad definition of the term “strike” encompasses constitutionally protected conduct that
cannot be restricted absent the most compelling governmental justification.
102.

The provisions of HB 1413 described in paragraphs 100 - 101 violate Plaintiffs’

members’ constitutional right to free association by enacting a discriminatory two-tiered system
of privileged “public safety” unions and penalized unions—such as Plaintiffs—thereby

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 disadvantaging Plaintiffs’ members in the exercise of their statutory and constitutional rights
solely based on their decision to associate with a penalized union.
103.

Plaintiffs’ members will be irreparably harmed if the provisions of HB 1413

impairing their rights under Art. I, Sec. 8-9 are not enjoined. The deprivation of these core
constitutional rights, even momentarily, is an irreparable injury. Plaintiffs’ members have no
adequate remedy at law to compensate for the burdens and chill on speech caused by the
enforcement of HB 1413.
COUNT FOUR: Claim for Violation of Plaintiffs’ Rights against Impairment
of Contracts and Retrospective Operation of Laws Pursuant to Article I, Section 13 of the
Missouri Constitution
104.

Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
105.

The Missouri Constitution of 1945 guarantees “[t]hat no … law impairing the

obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of
special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.” Mo. Const. Art. I, § 13 (“Art. I, Sec. 13”).
106.

New section 105.575, RSMo. violates the rights of Plaintiff Ferguson-Florissant

NEA, Hazelwood ASP, LIUNA Local 42, and Teamsters 610 under Art. I, Sec. 13 by impairing
their contractual rights to continued exclusive representative status by way of voiding all such
recognition provisions except those resulting from an SBM election. This impairment is
substantial, as the revocation of recognition will prevent Plaintiffs from meaningfully
representing their unit employees, and it cannot be justified as reasonable and necessary to serve
an important public purpose.
107.

New section 105.505, RSMo. violates the rights of Plaintiffs Ferguson-Florissant

NEA, LIUNA Local 42, and Operating Engineers Local 148 under Art. I, Sec. 13 by purporting

40

 to void the payroll deduction provisions for which they have collectively bargained, and impairs
their collectively-bargained contracts. This impairment is substantial, given the vital importance
of stable, ongoing, and predictable financing to union operations, and it cannot be justified as
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.
108.

New section 105.585, RSMo. violates the rights of Plaintiffs Ferguson-Florissant

NEA, Hazelwood ASP, LIUNA Local 42, Teamsters Local 610, and Operating Engineers Local
148 under Art. I, Sec. 13 by purporting to void the other provisions of collective bargaining
agreements addressing subjects that are now exclusively reserved by HB 1413 to the public
employer, impairing their collectively-bargained contracts. This impairment is substantial, given
that these Plaintiffs specifically bargained for these provisions, and that many of these provisions
deal with matters of acute concern to the public employees whom these Plaintiffs represent (e.g.,
employee discipline standards and procedures; layoff and recall protocol; job assignment bidding
procedures, etc.). This substantial impairment of these Plaintiffs’ contract rights cannot be
justified as reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.
109.

New section 105.585,RSMo. also violates the rights of Plaintiffs Ferguson-

Florissant NEA, LIUNA Local 42, and Teamsters Local 610 under Art. I, Sec. 13’s prohibition
of retrospective operation of laws, even in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement.
These Plaintiffs’ right to serve as the exclusive collective bargaining representatives of their
respective bargaining units was obtained through non-SBM elections or voluntary recognition
that was valid at the time. See, Independence NEA, supra. HB1413 purports to retrospectively
abolish that status and impose new duties and obligations to obtain it in violation of Art. I, Sec.
13. See, Jane Doe I v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006).

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 110.

Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed if the provisions of HB 1413 impairing their

contract rights and their rights against retrospective operation of laws in violation of Art. I, Sec.
13 are not enjoined. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to compensate for even the
temporary loss of the contractual protections that form the heart of their collective bargaining
relationship with their members’ employers.
COUNT FIVE: Claim for Violation of Plaintiffs’ Rights to Equal Protection
111.

Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
112.

The Missouri Constitution of 1945 provides, in relevant part, “that all persons are

created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law…” Mo. Const. art. I,
§ 2 (“Art. I, Sec. 2”).
113.

HB 1413 violates Art. I, Sec. 2 by impermissibly and arbitrarily creating two

classes of public-sector unions that are subject to wildly different legal regimes. The favored
new classification of “public safety” unions are free to continue the full sweep of collective
representation and bargaining rights under existing law. All other unions representing public
employees—the penalized unions—are subject to sweeping new requirements and restrictions.
114.

There is no conceivable permissible justification for this new legal distinction

between favored “public safety labor organizations” and penalized unions. It cannot be justified
with reference to any purported special characteristics of public safety employment, as it is not
based on either the identity of the public employees or the type of work they perform. Instead,
this pervasive favoritism in the exercise of employees’ constitutionally protected rights turns
solely on the type of union that the public employees join. Thus, even units of public employees
who are indisputably public safety employees—like the City of Bel-Ridge police first

42

 responders, the Affton Fire Protection first responders, and the State of Missouri patient care
professionals—are subject to HB 1413 because they have chosen to be represented by Plaintiffs
LIUNA Local 42, Teamsters Local 610, and SEIU Local 1, respectively, rather than a union that
“wholly or primarily” represents public safety employees. But by the same token, even units of
public employees who are indisputably not public safety employees—e.g., municipal janitors or
sanitation workers—who have chosen to be represented by a “public safety labor organization”
will remain exempt from the many restrictions and burdens of HB 1413.
115.

Plaintiffs and their members will be irreparably harmed if these provisions of HB

1413 impairing their rights under Art. I, Sec. 2 are not enjoined. The deprivation of these core
constitutional rights, even momentarily, is an irreparable injury. Moreover, Plaintiffs and their
members will have no adequate remedy at law to compensate for the discriminatory burdens and
chill on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights caused by the enforcement of HB 1413.
COUNT SIX: Claim for Violation of Prohibition Against Special Laws
Under Missouri Constitution Article III, Section 40
116.

Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege each and every allegation contained in the

foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.
117.

The Missouri Constitution of 1945 provides, in relevant part, that “The general

assembly shall not pass any … special law: … regulating labor …; granting to any … association
or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity; … [or] where a general law
can be made applicable.” Mo. Const. art. III, § 40 (27), (28), (30) (“Art. III, Sec. 40”).
118.

HB 1413 violates Art. III, Sec. 40 by arbitrarily and impermissibly distinguishing

between favored “public safety labor organizations” and penalized unions and by specifically
targeting penalized unions for severe restrictions and burdensome and intrusive requirements,
while exempting “public safety labor organizations” from all of the same. HB 1413 thus
43

 constitutes a “special law” that regulates labor (specifically, the rights of public employees
represented by non-exempt unions and their representatives); grants exclusive rights and
privileges to certain associations (specifically, the privileged “public safety labor
organizations”); and acts where a general law could have been made applicable (i.e., a general
public labor relations law).
119.

Plaintiffs and their members will be irreparably harmed if the provision of HB

1413 impairing their rights under Art. III, Sec. 40 are not enjoined. The deprivation of this
constitutional right, even momentarily, is an irreparable injury. Moreover, Plaintiffs and their
members will have no adequate remedy at law to compensate for the discriminatory burdens and
chill on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights caused by the enforcement of HB 1413.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
A.

Award Plaintiffs such preliminary injunctive and ancillary relief as may be

necessary to avert irreparable injury during the pendency of this action and to preserve the
possibility of effective final relief;
B.

Enter judgment declaring that the provisions of HB 1413 referenced in paragraphs

84 - 86 above violate Article I, Section 29 of the Missouri Constitution and, further, that these
violations render invalid all of HB 1413’s amendments to chapter 105, Title 108, RSMo.;
C.

Enter judgment declaring that the provisions of HB 1413 referenced in paragraphs

92 - 96 and 100 - 101 above violate Article I, Sections 8-9 and Article VIII, Section 23.3(3) of
the Missouri Constitution and enjoining the Defendants from enforcing those provisions against
the Plaintiffs and their members;
D.

Enter a judgment declaring that the provisions of HB 1413 referenced in

paragraphs 106 - 109 above violate Article I, Section 13 of the Missouri Constitution and

44

 enjoining the Defendants from enforcing those provisions against the Plaintiffs and their
members;
E.

Enter a judgment declaring that HB 1413’s amendments to chapter 105, Title 108,

RSMo., violate Article I, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution and enjoining the Defendants
from enforcing those provisions against the Plaintiffs and their members;
F.

Enter a judgment declaring that HB 1413’s amendments to chapter 105, Title 108,

RSMo., violate Article III, Section 40 of the Missouri Constitution and enjoining the Defendants
from enforcing those provisions against the Plaintiffs and their members;
G.

Enter a judgment (i) declaring that the entirety of HB 1413 is void because the

unconstitutional provisions of the legislation are inseparably connected with the remaining
provision and it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the remaining provisions
without the unconstitutional ones; and (ii) enjoining the Defendants from enforcing any
provision of HB 1413 against the Plaintiffs and their members;
H.

Enter a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from enforcing HB 1413 in a

manner that violates the rights of Plaintiffs or their members under Art. I, Sec. 29; Art. I, Sec. 89 and Article VIII, Section 23.3(3); Art. I, Sec. 13; Art. I, Sec. 2; or Art. III, Sec. 40.
I.

Award Plaintiffs’ costs incurred herein; and

J.

Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

45

 Respectfully submitted,
SCHUCHAT, COOK & WERNER
/s/
Sally E. Barker
Sally E. Barker (M.B.E. #26069)
Loretta K. Haggard (M.B.E. #38737)
George O. Suggs (M.B.E. #31641)
Christopher N. Grant (M.B.E. #53507)
1221 Locust Street, Second Floor
St. Louis, MO 63103
(314) 621-2626
FAX: (314) 621-2378
Emails: seb@schuchatcw.com
lkh@schuchatcw.com
gos@schuchatcw.com
cng@schuchatcw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
/s/
Alice O’Brien
Alice O’Brien (District of Columbia #454999)
Jason Walta (District of Columbia #479522)
1201 16th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036-3290
(202) 833-4000
Email: aobrien@nea.org
Email: JWalta@nea.org
Pro Hac Vice Motion pending
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

46

 SPECTOR, WOLFE, MCLAUGHLIN & O’MARA
/s/
Daniel M. McLaughlin
Daniel M. McLaughlin (M.B.E. #52750)
710 South Kirkwood Road
Kirkwood, MO 63122
(314) 909-0303
Email: dan@spectorwolfe.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Laborers’ International
Union of North America, Local 42
HAMMOND AND SHINNERS, P.C.
/s/
Greg A. Campbell
Greg A. Campbell (M.B.E. #35381)
Nathan A. Gilbert (M.B.E. #68093)
13205 Manchester Rd, Suite 210
Des Peres, MO 63131
(314) 727-1015
Email: gcampbell@hammondshinners.com
Email: ngilbert@hammondshinners.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 610 and International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 148

47

 3315 West Truman Boulevard
MICHEAL L. PARSON
Jefferson City, MO 65102-2071

0 AR 0 Phone: 573-751-3614 ANNA s. HUI
Fax: 573.751-0033 DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR
I ATI TODD SMITH
CHAIRMAN

Email: sbm@labor.mo.gov

July 3, 2018

Dear Ms. Scho?eld:
We are in receipt of your letter dated June 22, 2018.

As of August 28, 2018, House Bill 1413 which was passed by the legislature and signed into law by
the governor earlier this year will become effective. In Section 105.575.1, the new law requires the
following:

Any labor organization wishing to represent a bargaining unit as an exclusive bargaining
representative shall present to the board cards containing the signatures of at least thirty
percent of the public employees in the bargaining unit indicating that they wish to select the
labor organization in question as their exclusive bargaining representative for the purposes of
collective bargaining. (emphasis added).

The section also requires that ?Voluntary recognition by any public body of a labor organization as
an exclusive bargaining representative shall be prohibited. Recognition as an exclusive bargaining
representative may only be obtained by a labor organization through an election conducted under

this section.? (emphasis added).

Furthermore, Section 105.575.12 provides that:

All labor organizations that have previously been certified shall be recerti?ed during the
twelve~month period beginning on August 28, 2018, provided that any labor organization that
has a labor agreement that expires a?er August 28, 2020, may be recertified at any time prior
to, but in no event later than, August 28, 2020. (emphasis added).

The State Board of Mediation interprets the new law to require that a party seeking recertification
must have been initially certi?ed by the Board. While you assert that your organization was certi?ed
in 2010, that election does not appear to have been conducted by the Board.

Additionally, since a copy of your collective bargaining agreement was not included with your
correspondence, we are unable to determine the expiration date this agreement and whether recerti?cation is
required to be completed in 2019 or in 2020 as required by the new law.

If you have any further question, or should you desire to schedule an election, please do not hesitate to
contact us by phone or at the address above.

Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations is an equal opportunity employer/program.
800-735?2966 Relay Missouri: 711

MISSOURI
DEPARTMENT OF LA UR 
8: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS



 

 

 

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Todd Smith

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