

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1100				
Document ID: 9602963				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Luncheon Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (7 pages)	04/21/1996	P1/B(1) KBN 7/13/2018
001b. memcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (2 pages)	04/21/1996	P1/B(1) KBN 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1100

FOLDER TITLE:

9602963

2015-0782-M
rs1532

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: BLACKER

DOC DATE: 01 MAY 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: BERGER APPROVED RECOM 2

DUE DATE: 04 MAY 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLACKER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKER

FICKLIN

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSTMH

DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 96050121 FOR DECISION
X 96050616 BERGER APPROVED RECOM 2

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 5/2

8:15pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2963
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG re A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>H</u> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>ml</u>	<u>NOTE</u>
Lake	_____	_____	<u>FD</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>Jens</u>
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>DRS 5/3</u>	<u>N/R</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

File for record
only.

51 APR 95 2:05 PM

Exec Sec Office has diskette 1/2

May 1, 1996

ACTION

SANDY BERGER
 MEMORANDUM FOR ~~ANDREW SENS~~
 FROM: COIT BLACKER *AMB*
 SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin at their luncheon meeting on April 21, 1996.

RECOMMENDATION

- authorize Andrew Sens to*
1. That you sign the memorandum at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Pickering at our Embassy in Moscow. *you approve filing* **Approved** _____ **Disapproved** _____
 2. That the attached Memorandum of Conversation ~~be filed~~ for the record.

Approve *ml* _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the State Department
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The President
Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Russia
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff to the President
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
James Collins, Ambassador-at-Large to the
New Independent States
Ashton Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Coit Blacker, NSC (Notetaker)

Russia

President Yeltsin
I. S. Ivanov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Yu. M. Vorontsov, Russian Ambassador to
the United States
Yu. M. Baturin, President's National
Security Assistant
D. B. Ryurikov, President's Foreign
Policy Assistant
A. A. Kokoshin, Deputy Defense Minister
G. E. Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
N. N. Spasskiy, Head, North America
Department, MFA

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: April 21, 1996, 12:50 -- 2:15 p.m.
The Kremlin

The President: (To Yeltsin) Thank you for the tour. I would not have believed it if I hadn't seen it myself. (U)

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.01)
3/13/2018 KBH

President Yeltsin: You're welcome. It is splendid, especially in the evening when we have candles. (U)

We don't have to make speeches today, just a toast to my good friend, the President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton. (I wish you) every success. We are witnessing his current success; the whole world is. (S)

We affirmed during our negotiations that we will be conducting an honest, equal partnership. We have already decided many issues, which we will take up at the press conference. (S)

The President: Before we start, I would like, on behalf of the American delegation, to offer a toast to President Yeltsin's physical and political health -- and with real gratitude for the summit we've just had and for our partnership, now and in the future. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thanks, Bill. (U)

It goes without saying that all our political sentiments are turning around the upcoming election. You have already started your political campaign, although your election is still far away. I would like briefly to describe our situation. (S)

All in all, 49 candidates applied for candidacy. One million signatures are required. There were among them some who were not serious, who didn't belong. Today we have only six candidates. Every candidate has his own constituency. No one will be able to succeed except two: myself and Zyuganov. All others will get no more than ten percent. But they can add their votes to his or subtract them from mine. So now I have to work with four candidates and make them favorable to me, especially if we go to a second round. I have set firmly the task of winning in the first round. So I would ask you not to embrace Zyuganov in advance. (S)

The President: You don't have to worry about that. We spent fifty years working for the other result. (S)

President Yeltsin: Our people understand what is at stake. They understand that a return to communism would be a blow to them and to the entire world. Zyuganov uses the tactic of claiming he is a social democrat. This won't fly. He would cancel reforms and abolish privatization. (S)

Of course, Russia cannot afford to have him as president. Russia has been reforming for centuries but never carried them all the way through. Peter the Great, for example. Catherine. And

Stolypin. But they didn't succeed. At that time, the social democrats worked against reform. (S)

The power set up today is such that my rating has been going up for the last month and a half. The Big Eight meeting will add to my rating. This summit on nuclear safety and security is a great thing. People who are undecided will have to make up their minds now and this will help. (S)

The President: I noticed that you've gotten thinner. But you need to eat something. (U)

President Yeltsin: I do not eat a lot in the morning or at night; during the day I eat, certainly. I eat about half of (what I'm served). This is roast duck (pointing to what is being served). People thought all grouse had been shot under Khrushchev. This is a small one. They were hunted all over the Soviet Union. Some did manage to survive, however, and now they are growing in number. (U)

The President: Is there a special hunting season now? (U)

President Yeltsin: Khrushchev hunted them year-round. There is no grouse season any more. (U)

Let us take up the election campaign. There is a U.S. press campaign suggesting that people should not be afraid of the communists; that they are good, honorable and kind people. I warn people not to believe this. More than half of them are fanatics; they would destroy everything. It would mean civil war. They would abolish the boundaries between the republics (of the former Soviet Union). They want to take back Crimea; they even make claims against Alaska. Let us say you have to imagine that there is something wrong with what they have to think with. (S)

There are two paths for Russia's development. I do not need power. But when I felt the threat of communism, I decided that I had to run. We will prevent it. (S)

On Chechnya, we have sufficiently discussed this matter. Do you agree? (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: I would like to say a few words about CIS integration. This has started, and it is very interesting. We have now had the experience of living in separate quarters. It does not feel very good. Russia is leading this process of integration, although we have our own difficulties. Integration

is the process of restoring the economic ties among us. For instance, we build our submarines out of five ports; four were rendered inoperative (by the breakup of the Soviet Union). Now we have only one, at Murmansk. (S)

Today we have advanced greatly with Belarus and concluded a treaty with them, sanctified by the Patriarch that it should be eternal. As Slavic and Orthodox people and as neighbors, this integration process keeps moving forward. We have abolished state borders and custom duties between our two countries and agreed on the parameters for our foreign trade. We have agreed to establish a special supranational council and committee. The same thing is taking place at a lower level with Kazakstan and Kyrgystan. (S)

We hope to have political stability in these countries; integration will also help to advance reforms. We will establish a joint interparliamentary committee. We have in mind something similar to the EU. (S)

We discussed ABM and CFE issues, so I won't address these now. (S)

I would ask the President of the United States to support the results of our reform efforts -- that Russia has become a democratic country, a country based on laws -- and to support Russia's becoming a full member of the G-7. We turn to you, Bill. There are certain nuances that are worth considering, but our people will be enthusiastic at this. (S)

I understand that we will not be able to have a meeting on this before our election. Even without such a meeting, Yeltsin will become president of Russia again. But it would add 10 percent to my vote. (S)

You know, Bill, in this Russian campaign you are a factor. This is not well known, perhaps, but psychologically this is very important. (S)

The President: I'm aware that there are some people eager to stir up resentment against the West and against the U.S. in particular. There's an even bigger feeling that we have had all this "partnership" with the West but what difference has it made? So I've been trying to find a way to say to the Russian people "this election will have consequences," and we are clear about what it is we support. But I don't want to say something that could be used against you. (S)

This is your first real election. I think it was Aristide who said that it's the second election that's really important. I'm

trying to handle this in the most appropriate way. In my own home state, where I was governor, in our whole history there was only one politician from outside who ever had a positive effect on an election. And that was during the Great Depression. In 1984 President Reagan was wildly popular in my home state and came to Arkansas to campaign against me. But when the votes were counted he got 60 percent for president and I got 60 percent for governor. I'm trying to figure out a way to do this that will give you all the benefits and none of the disadvantages. Because Reagan asked them to do it, many voted against him. (S)

In the press conference I tried to sketch out reasons why people should vote for you, to say what would be most helpful. Also, I have watched your improvement in the polls with great interest, and I think this nuclear summit will help you a great deal. Ordinary people will see that you are doing the right things. It seems to me that the most powerful way for me to help is to be a genuine partner and to demonstrate that the policies you are following are the best ones for Russia. Otherwise, you become vulnerable to the charge that, "oh well, it's just politics," as opposed to the United States supporting policies that Yeltsin is responsible for. (S)

On the expansion of ties between Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgystan, I believe as you move closer it won't be a problem as long as it's in their interest, the decisions are freely entered into and their sovereignty is respected. I have no problem with that. We have such special relationships with several of the smaller Caribbean countries. (S)

On the question of the G-7, "the Eight" business, my own thinking on this, and of the others, although I haven't had a chance to check with them today, the point is that the growing success of Russia, its involvement with the world, have made Russia more important. We're doing a lot of work at the Eight. And all of us agree there needs to be some way to recognize the importance of Russia in these discussions. (S)

Here's the problem -- we've had our people, Strobe can tell you, meet four times on this -- the G-7 has an ongoing and important role in the world. The regular meetings of the finance ministers are the closest things we have to coordinated fiscal policy among the world's richest countries; the Western world can't grow if we were fighting about this all the time. So far, this effort has not been opposed by any of the rapidly growing economies elsewhere because they realize someone has to do this. (S)

The question before us is simple. How to do what Russia needs, while keeping this other function going? We would come under

great pressure to expand beyond the G-7 or G-8 by Mexico, South Korea, Brazil, for instance, if we were to do anything. (S)

We're looking for ways to build up the Eight. There is a strong consensus among the G-7 to maintain its economic coordinating function. So the question is how to elevate the political function of the P-8? (S)

President Yeltsin: So I wonder about your specific proposal for enhancing Russia's role in the G-7? (S)

The President: I want to come back to you before Lyons with a G-7 position on this. Give me a little time to work this and to get back to you before Lyons. There is no doubt that the P-8 has strong support, as evidenced by the nuclear summit; there's a clear need to institutionalize it. At the same time, there is clear support for the continuation of the G-7. We want to ensure that the Eight becomes in the public mind not some "little brother" of the G-7 but something important on its own merits. (S)

President Yeltsin: I understand the G-7 having a special role. On the other hand, we also have to take into account that Russia will be on the rise. We should not forget that some 12 countries are hanging around our neck; we are the largest lender in the CIS. In two months, we will declare the ruble fully convertible. All this moves us closer to the terms of reference of the G-7. Give us opportunities to gain some experience. (S)

Well, you know, had this come up before lunch, we probably wouldn't have had any lunch at all. What is important is that we're working to find approaches, a way out. I cannot agree to the "7 Plus 1" formula; I also understand that we cannot reach the level of a full G-8. You have to keep in mind that we are a great power, which affects how people think about this. So, we need to be very elegant about this, very elegant. (S)

The President: One more thing. You know how we -- the President of France, the President of the U.S. -- feel about your reelection. But I'm the one who has to count the votes and solve the problems. I love it. But it's my job. I agree with the formulation that you have just announced. This is a big deal to me. And I will do my very best to work it out in a way that's helpful to you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. Agreed. (S)

The President: One more thing: regarding plutonium and what can be done with the idea of plutonium-consuming reactors. We're ready to begin discussion of a joint project. (S)

President Yeltsin: We have a project that uses plutonium and uranium in one fuel that can be used in reactors. If you combine these in one brick, you can prevent it from being used for weapons purposes and it can be a fuel source. We have some 800 tons of plutonium. (S)

The President: My expert on this is Dr. Carter. We should have Carter and (Deputy Defense Minister) Kokoshin discuss this. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, we have common problem of destroying plutonium. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2963

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0732-M-1

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation between
the President and Russian President Yeltsin (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the luncheon meeting
between the President and Russian President Yeltsin on April 21,
1996, in the Kremlin, is provided for the information of
Secretary Christopher and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It may also
be sent via NODIS channels to Ambassador Pickering. (S)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

Per SB do not
circulate. File for
record only.

Dohse
May 3, 96

→ Andy — 5/3
It'd rather
not circulate
at all.
Is that possible?

Done

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: X6

~~SECRET~~

*not possible
please duck*

trying to handle this in the most appropriate way. In my own home state, where I was governor, in our whole history there was only one politician from outside who ever had a positive effect on an election. And that was during the Great Depression. In 1984 President Reagan was wildly popular in my home state and came to Arkansas to campaign against me. But when the votes were counted he got 60 percent and I got 60 percent. I'm trying to figure out a way to do this that will give you all the benefits and none of the disadvantages. Because Reagan asked them to do it, many voted against him. (S)

In the press conference I tried to sketch out reasons why people should vote for you, to say what would be most helpful. Also, I have watched your improvement in the polls with great interest, and I think this nuclear summit will help you a great deal. Ordinary people will see that you are doing the right things. It seems to me that the most powerful way for me to help is to be a genuine partner and to demonstrate that the policies you are following are the best ones for Russia. Otherwise, you become vulnerable to the charge that, "oh well, it's just politics," as opposed to the United States supporting policies that Yeltsin is responsible for. (S)

On the expansion of ties between Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgystan, I believe as you move closer it won't be a problem as long as it's in their interest, the decisions are freely entered into and their sovereignty is respected. I have no problem with that. We have such special relationships with several of the smaller Caribbean countries. (S)

On the question of the G-7, "the Eight" business, my own thinking on this, and of the others, although I haven't had a chance to check with them today, the point is that the growing success of Russia, its involvement with the world, have made Russia more important. We're doing a lot of work at the Eight. And all of us agree there needs to be some way to recognize the importance of Russia in these discussions. (S)

Here's the problem -- we've had our people, Strobe can tell you, meet four times on this -- the G-7 has an ongoing and important role in the world. The regular meetings of the finance ministers are the closest things we have to coordinated fiscal policy among the world's richest countries; the Western world can't grow if we were fighting about this all the time. So far, this effort has not been opposed by any of the rapidly growing economies elsewhere because they realize someone has to do this. (S)

The question before us is simple. How to do what Russia needs, while keeping this other function going? We would come under

JAD.

Piper says 60% as
governor of Arkansas
and 60% as President
of Russia.

Walt.

great pressure to expand beyond the G-7 or G-8 by Mexico, South Korea, Brazil, for instance, if we were to do anything. (S)

We're looking for ways to build up the Eight. There is a strong consensus among the G-7 to maintain its economic coordinating function. So the question is how to elevate the political function of the P-8? (S)

President Yeltsin: So I wonder about your specific proposal for enhancing Russia's role in the G-7? (S)

The President: I want to come back to you before Lyons with a G-7 position on this. Give me a little time to work this and to get back to you before Lyons. There is no doubt that the P-8 has strong support, as evidenced by the nuclear summit; there's a clear need to institutionalize it. At the same time, there is clear support for the continuation of the G-7. We want to ensure that the Eight becomes in the public mind not some "little brother" of the G-7 but something important on its own merits. (S)

President Yeltsin: I understand the G-7 having a special role. On the other hand, we also have to take into account that Russia will be on the rise. We should not forget that some 12 countries are hanging around our neck; we are the largest lender in the CIS. In two months, we will declare the ruble fully convertible. All this moves us closer to the terms of reference of the G-7. Give us opportunities to gain some experience. (S)

lunch
Well, you know, had this come up before lunch, we probably wouldn't have had any luck at all. What is important is that we're working to find approaches, a way out. I cannot agree to the "7 Plus 1" formula; I also understand that we cannot reach the level of a full G-8. You have to keep in mind that we are a great power, which affects how people think about this. So, we need to be very elegant about this, very elegant. (S)

The President: One more thing. You know how we -- the President of France, the President of the U.S. -- feel about your reelection. But I'm the one who has to count the votes and solve the problems. I love it. But it's my job. I agree with the formulation that you have just announced. This is a big deal to me. And I will do my very best to work it out in a way that's helpful to you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. Agreed. (S)

The President: One more thing: regarding plutonium and what can be done with the idea of plutonium-consuming reactors. We're ready to begin discussion of a joint project. (S)

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1101				
Document ID: 9603149				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on CTBT, Chcechnya... (4 pages)	05/07/1996	P17(b)(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)	05/07/1996	P17(b)(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1101

FOLDER TITLE:

9603149

2015-0782-M
rs1533

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 08 MAY 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 7 MAY CALL W/ PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOLDGEIER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKER
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
GOLDGEIER
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: PACKAGE SENT "EYES ONLY" DELIVERY TO MIKE GUEST AT STATE SECRETARIAT

DISPATCHED BY ARS DATE 5/8/96 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS
001
002

Z 96050721 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
X 96050811 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 96050811 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960508 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9603149
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 5/7 LA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Harmon</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
<u>Dohse</u>	_____	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
<u>Sens</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
<u>Soderberg</u>	_____	_____	_____
<u>Berger</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>SNS</u>	_____
<u>Lake</u>	_____	_____	_____
<u>Situation Room</u>	_____	_____	_____
<u>West Wing Desk</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>AK 5/8</u>	<u>D</u>
<u>Records Mgt.</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>TOP 5/8</u>	<u>DNR</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

7 MAY 95 2:13 PM

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

eyes only
 - Mike Guest
 Not for
 Distribution

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9603149
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 5/7 LA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>U</i> Harmon	<u>1</u>	<i>JA</i>	
Dohse			
Sens	<u>2</u>	<i>ASS</i>	
Soderberg	2		
Berger	<u>3</u>	<i>CRB</i>	
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<i>18V 5/8</i>	<i>D</i>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<i>18V 5/8</i>	<i>DNR</i>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

eyes only
- Mike Guest
Not for
Distribution

COMMENTS:

7 MAY 95 2:25 PM

Exec Sec Office has diskette *YE*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3149

May 8, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (U)

The attached memorandum of telephone conversation of the May 7
call between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for
the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary
Talbot ONLY. (S)



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 3/13/2013
2015-0782-M-2

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on CTBT, Chechnya, Economics, CFE and Russian Election

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dmitriy Zarechnak
Notetakers: James Goldgeier, Carlos Pascual, Steve Pifer

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 7, 1996, 8:34-8:55 a.m. EDT, Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)

The President: Good morning. Hope you're doing well. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, there's a struggle. We're struggling on. Well, you understand that I've been traveling and meeting and talking with people. My election campaign is like yours in the U.S. Then there is the matter of finances, which is not proceeding very well. (C)

I'd like to share my impressions of China. The visit was a success, and as I promised you I told them that the United States wanted to improve relations with China. Jiang Zemin told me to tell you that they are waiting for practical deeds for improving relations. In this context, he mentioned Taiwan several times. (C)

And the second question was Chinese participation in the CTBT. We discussed the subject with him and he said Beijing would take part in the CTBT. China would support a speedy conclusion to the Treaty. We reflected this in our joint statement where we said China would take part. Therefore, I fulfilled my promise to the Eight to raise this. (C)

The President: Thank you. Boris, as I had promised, I sent you a letter on Chechnya after I spoke with King Hassan. He said he would be in direct contact with you. I hope he can help you and will be able to play a constructive role. (C)

President Yeltsin: Good. I have not yet seen the letter from you. I don't know why the letter has taken so long to get to Moscow. (S)

The President: I'll check here on my side; maybe you can check with your people. I sent it to you on April 27 right after I spoke with King Hassan. Hassan said he would do whatever he could to help end the fighting and is interested in helping you. I will do whatever I can to help. We have an OSCE representative in Grozny, and I think he's being helpful. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. I intend to take a risk and fly down to Chechnya. I will try to have all three parties at the negotiating table. When I say all three parties, the troika, I mean the Chechen government, the field commanders -- since there is no Dudayev and no successor now -- and the Federal government, that is, the Chernomyrdin state commission. I hope they'll be sitting at the table by the time I leave. Hassan might be of great help. (S)

The President: That is a very courageous decision. Everyone will see you are trying to bring about peace and restrain the military action. That's good. If there is anything else I can do, let me know. I'm ready. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. Thank you for your help with Hassan II, and if anything else can be done, I'll tell you. (S)

And I have another question, Bill. Please understand me correctly. Bill, for my election campaign, I urgently need for Russia a loan of \$2.5 billion. (S)

The President: Let me ask this: didn't it help you a lot when the Paris Club rescheduled Russia's debt? I thought that would have caused several billions of dollars to flow into your country. (S)

President Yeltsin: No. It will be coming in the second half of the year. And in the first half of the year, we will only have \$300 million due to conditions set by the IMF. You know when Mr. Camdessus was here I talked to him. But he said only \$300 million in the first half and \$1 billion in the second half. But the problem is I need money to pay pensions and wages. Without resolving this matter of pensions and wages, it will be very difficult to go into the election campaign. You know, if we could resolve this subject in a way with him providing the \$2.5 billion in the first half, we could perhaps manage. Or if you could do it under your banks with Russian government guarantees. (S)

The President: I'll check on this with the IMF and with some of our friends and see what can be done. I think this is the only way it can be done, but let me clarify this. I had understood that you would get about \$1 billion from the IMF before the election. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, no, only \$300 million. (S)

The President: I'll check. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The President: Now if I could raise CFE. I know we made important progress in Moscow on a CFE flank solution. I appreciate your flexibility. It seems to me that we're now down to a final set of issues on numbers: total numbers of armored combat vehicles to be allowed and whether some equipment in the flank area could be exempted from counting against the ceiling. (S)

On Sunday, Mamedov previewed to Pickering the Russian position on counting rules. My experts say there are some problems with the exemptions he suggested; Pickering will get back to him. I hope we can resolve this by May 15. My experts are ready to come to Vienna early to make this happen. (S)

President Yeltsin: (interjecting after the first portion of the President's CFE comments were interpreted; the second portion -- from "On Sunday ..." was not interpreted) Yes, we're ready to move on this. We're ready to discuss both numbers of 3,800 and 4,000. (S)

The President: We'll keep working on this. Pickering will get back to Mamedov soon. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good, Bill. (S)

The President: One more thing before you go -- I know you are very busy. I was very pleased to see that you quickly dismissed the suggestion that the elections be postponed. This election will be the milestone for Russian democracy. I believe you are right to trust in the wisdom of the Russian voters. Your statement is receiving enormous favorable publicity in the United States and around the world. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, you understand that I am the guarantor of the Constitution and will abide by the Constitution. There cannot be any possibility of postponing the election. Some will express their personal opinion and let them. Maybe they should be fired. (S)

The President: Every now and then I have people around me who express themselves as well. (S)

President Yeltsin: I have people around me with personal views. (S)

The President: One more thing on your request about the money issue. Who is your principal advisor on this matter? I will get him a detailed report. I know you are busy, so tell us who we should contact with the best information possible on this. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, you know that my best, trusted, most qualified person is Deputy Chairman Davydov. He knows about it. He's responsible for foreign economic matters. (S)

The President: Fine. I know you're busy. We will be in touch with Davydov soon. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thanks, Bill. (U)

The President: Have a good day. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3149

May 7, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: COIT D. BLACKER *AMB*

FROM: JAMES M. GOLDGEIER *Amey*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on May 7, 1996.

Concurrence by: *Amey for* Carlos Pascual

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of telephone conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott ~~and Ambassador Pickering in Moscow.~~ *only to*
2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *ADS* Disapprove _____

per SRB

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBN*NARA, Date *3/13/2013*
2015-0732-M-2

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION ~~RECEIPT~~

LOG 9603149
DATE 08 MAY 96

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 7 MAY CALL W/ PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2013

2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on CTBT, Chechnya, Economics, CFE and Russian Election

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dmitriy Zarechnak
Notetakers: James Goldgeier, Carlos Pascual, Steve Pifer

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 7, 1996, 8:34-8:55 a.m. EDT, Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)

The President: Good morning. Hope you're doing well. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, there's a struggle. We're struggling on. Well, you understand that I've been traveling and meeting and talking with people. My election campaign is like yours in the U.S. Then there is the matter of finances, which is not proceeding very well. (S)

I'd like to share my impressions of China. The visit was a success, and as I promised you I told them that the United States wanted to improve relations with China. Jiang Zemin told me to tell you that they are waiting for practical deeds for improving relations. In this context, he mentioned Taiwan several times. (S)

And the second question was Chinese participation in the CTBT. We discussed the subject with him and he said Beijing would take part in the CTBT. China would support a speedy conclusion to the Treaty. We reflected this in our joint statement where we said China would take part. Therefore, I fulfilled my promise to the Eight to raise this. (S)

The President: Thank you. Boris, as I had promised, I sent you a letter on Chechnya after I spoke with King Hassan. He said he would be in direct contact with you. I hope he can help you and will be able to play a constructive role. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3149

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (U)

The attached memorandum of telephone conversation of the May 7
call between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for
the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary
Talbott. ~~It may also be sent via NODIS channels to Embassy
Moscow for Ambassador Pickering. (C) (S)~~

only.

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~SECRET~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1108				
Document ID: 9604219				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russia President Yeltsin (2 pages)	06/18/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1108

FOLDER TITLE:

9604219

2015-0782-M

rs1534

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604219
RECEIVED: 18 JUN 96 09

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 18 JUN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 21 JUN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOLDGEIER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKER
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
GOLDGEIER
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY Jmg DATE 6-18-96 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9604219

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS
001
002

Z 96061814 FOR DECISION
X 96061817 SENS APPROVED RECOM
X 96061817 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960618 BURNS, W

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4219
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRB NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LA 6/15 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>JA</u> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>ADS</u>	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>6/18 LA</u>	<u>D</u> ✓
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>6.18 Jm⁹⁶</u>	<u>D</u> *
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: * Dispatched w/ Disk to State
 6.18.96
 Jm⁹⁶

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4219

June 18, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (U)

The attached memorandum of telephone conversation of the June 18 call between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It may also be sent via NODIS channels to Embassy Moscow for Ambassador Pickering. (U)



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko
Notetakers: James Goldgeier, Carlos Pascual

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 18, 1996, 9:02-9:12 a.m. EDT, Residence

The President: Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Congratulations. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. (U)

The President: I wanted to call and congratulate you on the first round. You are well-positioned for the second round. Congratulations. It was an extraordinary turnout. We continue to support reform and reformers, and we want to see the forces of reform and democracy prevail in Russia. I've been saying that all along and I will keep on saying that. I just wanted you to know, Boris, that I'll be thinking a lot about you in the next few weeks, and I look forward to seeing you in Lyons. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: Well Bill, actually, I'm quite satisfied with the formula for Lyons. But I'm having doubts about going. I'm not sure I should go five days before the second round election. I'm thinking about sending Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. (Ø)

The President: You should do what you think is best for you. Everyone will understand. We'll organize the meeting around what's best for you. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: Alright. (U)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2(1.05)

3/13/2018 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 1.6, X6

The President: Do whatever is best for you. The most important thing for you is to maximize your opportunities in the election. I've been following the changes of the last twenty-four hours and your bringing Lebed in. I understand what you are doing and hope it works for you. Also, I hope it helps with the continuity in our security relations, NATO, and especially Bosnia. And that it is beneficial for you politically. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well Bill, it is understandable in this situation that I had to join with Lebed because he came out third with 15 percent in the first round. (S)

The President: It makes sense to me from a political standpoint. I also hope it means continuity to our security relations. It looks like a smart political move to me. I'm pleased to see it. (C)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I hope the majority of his voters will go for me in the second round, which will mean victory for me. (S)

The President: Good. How are you feeling? (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, actually, three months of the pre-election race has taken its toll. I feel somewhat tired. You realize from your own experience that this is difficult. You are only just starting your own campaign; the heat is still ahead. (S)

The President: Yes. I saw the picture of you dancing with the girls in the band and you looked wonderful. I'm disappointed that no one sets up events like that for me in my campaign. (S)

President Yeltsin: (Enormous laugh). I got your point. (U)

The President: I know how hard you are working. You know we appreciate how much you're doing. The whole world has a lot riding on the elections. I know you'll keep going, keep the momentum going. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thanks very much, Bill, for your support. (S)

The President: Thank you, Boris. Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT.

LOG 9604219
DATE 18 JUN 96

SUBJECT: TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>0 + DISK</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4219

June 18, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: COIT D. BLACKER *CDB*

FROM: JAMES M. GOLDGEIER *JMG*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on June 18, 1996.

Concurrence by: Carlos Pascual *JMG for*

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of telephone conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Pickering in Moscow.
2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *AOS* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: X6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KSH* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-m-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1111				
Document ID: 9604660				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russia President Yeltsin (3 pages)	07/05/1996	P1/b(1) K8M 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russia President Yeltsin (3 pages)	07/05/1996	P1/b(1) K8M 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1111

FOLDER TITLE:

9604660

2015-0782-M
rs1535

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604660
RECEIVED: 05 JUL 96 11

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 05 JUL 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN 5 JUL

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 09 JUL 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOLDGEIER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKER
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
GOLDGEIER
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

Jm96

DATE

7.6.96

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSTMH

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-m-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS	Z 96070518 FOR DECISION
001	Z 96070609 SENS APPROVED RECOMS
002	X 96070609 SENS SCD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE

DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960705 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4660
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM RBS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG LA 7/5 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>WJ</i> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>AS</u>	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>JKA LA</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>JMA 7.6</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette WJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4660

July 5, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (U)

The attached memorandum of telephone conversation of the July 5 call between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott. It may also be sent via NODIS channels to Embassy Moscow for Ambassador Pickering. (Ø)



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/5/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRINARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Nik Sorokin
Notetakers: Carlos Pascual, James Goldgeier,
Evan Reade, Peter Huggins, Katherine
O'Loughlin, Deuce Martinez

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 5, 1996, 9:05-9:27 a.m. EDT, Residence

The President: Hello, Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: It's great to hear your voice! Congratulations. I know you're tired. I'm proud of how hard you fought back after being down in the polls. The Russian people expressed their pride in the progress you are making. I'm so happy and I wanted to call and tell you that I am proud of you. (✓)

President Yeltsin: Thank you Bill very much for your words of congratulations. I already received your initial congratulations and it was very pleasing. I am happy to hear your voice personally congratulating me. As you said earlier, this election was a triumph for democracy. The Russian people have made an historic choice for democracy and stability. I appreciate that throughout the campaign up to the last day, you said the right things and never sent the wrong signals. Rest assured, I will do the same for your campaign. There will be no interference in your internal affairs. But I know deep in my heart who I support and who I hope will win the election. (✓)

The President: Thank you very much. We have accomplished a lot over the last three years. With your new mandate, we can look forward to building on our record of mutual success, further advancing our shared vision for our relations and the rest of the world. I had a good discussion with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in Lyons. He did a good job there. The Moscow meeting between

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/5/06

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.06)
3/13/2018 KBH

Vice President Gore and Chernomyrdin comes at an ideal time; they are doing very good work together. I hope you can see the Vice President as well. He will come prepared to talk about a broad range of issues and will have ideas on what we can achieve in the coming months. (C)

President Yeltsin: I certainly do hope I will be able to see Vice President Gore when he comes here in, I think, ten days. Yes, Bill, thanks again, but there's something else I wanted to say. I urge you not to yield to what some of your opponents are saying about slashing down the level of U.S.-Russian cooperation. We have nothing to be shy about regarding the U.S.-Russian partnership. The voters have shown their support for it. My 14 percent lead is quite good, quite impressive, and given this mandate I will be able to continue to pursue the policies and good personal relations we have initiated together, and we will continue to follow these policies in the future. (C)

The President: I fully agree with what you say. My opponents have said all those things, but they don't know what they're talking about. The American people support what we are doing. Again, I am proud of your election victory. You came back from a low standing in the opinion polls in January. You showed tenacity and commitment. In early 1992, most polls had me in third place, but I won in November and they called me the "come-back kid." Now I have to hand the title over to you, Boris. You did a much better job than I did. (C)

President Yeltsin: All right, Bill. I believe in November you will certainly get a new mandate as well, and this will provide new opportunities to pursue a new agenda for our relationship. Already I have some new ideas that I will be happy to discuss with you any time. We have done a lot in a few years, and I believe there are other things we can be doing together without changing the fundamental course of our partnership. (C)

With regards to NATO, I have spoken to Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac and believe we can find a way out of this situation without putting you in an uncomfortable position. We can solve this problem in a way that is good for Russia and all others. I also believe we've had good contacts at the Primakov-Christopher and Chernomyrdin-Gore levels. More than that, I will be ready to play an active role by arranging a top-level meeting, inviting leaders here to discuss a number of things in our mutual interest in the run-up to the new stage of our relationship. (C)

And there's something else. There is a request I need to make of you. Now that it is clear that the people of the United States do not see Russia as a threat or source of global instability or expansion, this opens the chance to increase investment in

Russia. I will work with leaders of the U.S. business and financial communities, but I will need your strong support. I'm counting on your support and leadership with the business community to urge them to invest in Russia on a massive scale, both internal and external investment. We have some reserves for internal investment but need help with external investment. I'm counting on your strong support on this to encourage such levels of investment. (S)

The President: First of all, I fully agree with that and will do everything I can to encourage large-scale investment. I will talk to people here to encourage this. Bob Strauss is heading up a U.S.-Russia Business Development Council. I also will talk to my people to see what else can be done. (S)

On dealing with new issues and where we go from here, maybe Gore-Chernomyrdin can start to discuss this. Mamedov will be here in a few days. You might send anything you want to say with him, and we can start to get to work on them. I'm anxious to see you and to get working. Again, I am thrilled with the elections and hope you get some well-deserved rest. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. I can tell you this: on August 9th we are scheduling our Presidential inauguration. Pending this, I would like to do some work. But afterwards I would like to take a couple weeks of vacation. You know, I missed taking any time off during the fall and the spring. This presidential campaign and race has tired me. I traveled all over Russia for the past four months, speaking five to eight times a day. It is very tiring, well...I don't have to tell you what a campaign is like. (S)

The President: I'm glad you'll get some rest and we'll get together afterwards. We'll follow up on what we talked about. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you again for your kind words, feelings and support. I'm confident we'll continue to work together in the future as we have in the past. (S)

The President: Good bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good bye, all the best. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9604660
DATE 05 JUL 96

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>0 + DISK</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEGB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4660

July 5, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: COIT D. BLACKER *CSB*

FROM: JAMES M. GOLDGEIER *JMG*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on July 5, 1996.

Concurrence by: *JMG for* Carlos Pascual

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of telephone conversation to Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Ambassador Pickering in Moscow.
2. That the attached memorandum of telephone conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *AS* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 7/5/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KSM* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Nik Sorokin
Notetakers: Carlos Pascual, James Goldgeier,
Evan Reade, Peter Huggins, Katherine
O'Loughlin, Deuce Martinez

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 5, 1996, 9:05-9:27 EDT, Residence
- am a [signature]?

The President: Hello, Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: It's great to hear your voice! Congratulations. I know you're tired. I'm proud of how hard you fought back after being down in the polls. The Russian people expressed their pride in the progress you are making. I'm so happy and I wanted to call and tell you that I am proud of you. (C)

President Yeltsin: Thank you Bill very much for your words of congratulations. I already received your initial congratulations and it was very pleasing. I am happy to hear your voice personally congratulating me. As you said earlier, this election was a triumph for democracy. The Russian people have made an historic choice for democracy and stability. I appreciate that throughout the campaign up to the last day, you said the right things and never sent the wrong signals. Rest assured, I will do the same for your campaign. There will be no interference in your internal affairs. But I know deep in my heart who I support and who I hope will win the election. (C)

The President: Thank you very much. We have accomplished a lot over the last three years. With your new mandate, we can look forward to building on our record of mutual success, further advancing our shared vision for our relations and the rest of the world. I had a good discussion with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in Lyons. He did a good job there. The Moscow meeting between

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

CONFIDENTIAL

Vice President Gore and Chernomyrdin comes at an ideal time; they are doing very good work together. I hope you can see the Vice President as well. He will come prepared to talk about a broad range of issues and will have ideas on what we can achieve in the coming months. (C)

President Yeltsin: I certainly do hope I will be able to see Vice President Gore when he comes here in, I think, ten days. Yes, Bill, thanks again, but there's something else I wanted to say. I urge you not to yield to what some of your opponents are saying about slashing down the level of U.S.-Russian cooperation. We have nothing to be shy about regarding the U.S.-Russian partnership. The voters have shown their support for it. My 14% *percent* lead is quite good, quite impressive, and given this mandate I will be able to continue to pursue the policies and good personal relations we have initiated together, and we will continue to follow these policies in the future. (C)

The President: I fully agree with what you say. My opponents have said all those things, but they don't know what they're talking about. The American people support what we are doing. Again, I am proud of your election victory. You came back from a low standing in the opinion polls in January. You showed tenacity and commitment. In early 1992, most polls had me in third place, but I won in November and they called me the "come-back kid." Now I have to hand the title over to you, Boris. You did a much better job than I did. (C)

President Yeltsin: All right, Bill. I believe in November you will certainly get a new mandate as well, and this will provide new opportunities to pursue a new agenda for our relationship. Already I have some new ideas that I will be happy to discuss with you any time. We have done a lot in a few years, and I believe there are other things we can be doing together without changing the fundamental course of our partnership. (C)

With regards to NATO, I have spoken to Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac and believe we can find a way out of this situation without putting you in an uncomfortable position. We can solve this problem in a way that is good for Russia and all others. I also believe we've had good contacts at the Primakov-Christopher and Chernomyrdin-Gore levels. More than that, I will be ready to play an active role by arranging a top-level meeting, inviting leaders here to discuss a number of things in our mutual interest in the run-up to the new stage of our relationship. (C)

And there's something else. There is a request I need to make of you. Now that it is clear that the people of the United States do not see Russia as a threat or source of global instability or expansion, this opens the chance to increase investment in

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Russia. I will work with leaders of the U.S. business and financial communities, but I will need your strong support. I'm counting on your support and leadership with the business community to urge them to invest in Russia on a massive scale, both internal and external investment. We have some reserves for internal investment but need help with external investment. I'm counting on your strong support on this to encourage such levels of investment. (S)

The President: First of all, I fully agree with that and will do everything I can to encourage large-scale investment. I will talk to people here to encourage this. Bob Strauss is heading up a U.S.-Russia Business Development Council. I also will talk to my people to see what else can be done. (S)

On dealing with new issues and where we go from here, maybe Gore-Chernomyrdin can start to discuss this. Mamedov will be here in a few days. You might send anything you want to say with him, and we can start to get to work on them. I'm anxious to see you and to get working. Again, I am thrilled with the elections and hope you get some well-deserved rest. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. I can tell you this: on August 9th we are scheduling our Presidential inauguration. Pending this, I would like to do some work. But afterwards I would like to take a couple weeks of vacation. You know, I missed taking any time off during the fall and the spring. This presidential campaign and race has tired me. I traveled all over Russia for the past four months, speaking five to eight times a day. It is very tiring, well...I don't have to tell you what a campaign is like. (S)

The President: I'm glad you'll get some rest and we'll get together afterwards. We'll follow up on what we talked about. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you again for your kind words, feelings and support. I'm confident we'll continue to work together in the future as we have in the past. (S)

The President: Good bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good bye, all the best. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1121				
Document ID: 9606243				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001: telcon	re: Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (2 pages)	09/15/1996	P1/b(1) KBI 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1121

FOLDER TITLE:

9606243

2015-0782-M
rs1536

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9606243
RECEIVED: 16 SEP 96 11

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 17 SEP 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES YELTSIN ON 15 SEP 96

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 19 SEP 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

FICKLIN

FORT

NSC CHRON

PIFER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015 0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS
001
002

Z 96091616 FOR DECISION
X 96091718 LAKE APPROVED RECOM
X 96091718 DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE

DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960917 STATE

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 9/17
6:15a

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0243
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>WJ</i> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>3</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>
Sens	<u>1 B</u>	<u>ADS</u>	<u>B</u>
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>Cy</u>	_____
Lake	_____	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>sa 9/17</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>(R) 9/17</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

SA
al?
↓

National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 9/17
6:15a

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0243
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SL A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>H</i> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>3</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>
Sens	<u>1 B</u>	<u>ADS</u>	<u>B</u>
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>Cy</u>	_____
Lake	_____	Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>la 9/17</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>(R) 9/17</u>	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

*SAB
OK?*
↓

Exec Sec Office has diskette yo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6243


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 17, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the
President and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia is provided for
the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy
Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may
also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for Ambassador Pickering.
(Ø)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 09/15/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6243

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin of
Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Steve Brennan,
Peter Huggins, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME: September 15, 1996, 11:04-11:13 a.m.
AND PLACE: Residence

President Clinton: Hello. Hello Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello Bill. Greetings. (U)

President Clinton: It's nice to hear your voice. Hillary and I
are thinking of you as you prepare for your surgery. I hope
Naina is doing well. Thank you for the beautiful decanter set
for my birthday. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. As you know, there are some
small misfortunes here with me. (C)

President Clinton: I know. I wanted to give you best wishes for
your successful surgery and speedy recovery. Our thoughts and
prayers are with you. I talked to Helmut and was glad to hear
from him that you are brave and in good spirits. Boris,
announcing your surgery was a bold stroke; it builds confidence.
But most important, I wish you well. (C)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. I believe it would be a
good idea if experts from the U.S. could come to consult for the
operation. (C)

President Clinton: We would like to help you with that. We
would be happy to help you in any way we can. The whole world

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 09/15/06

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015 - 0782 - M-2 (1.03)
3/13/2018 KBN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

would like to help you. I suppose we should know who to contact there if you want us to help with that. (S)

President Yeltsin: On 26 and 27 September here in Moscow there will be a scientific conference on heart surgery. Experts from all over the world, including the U.S., will be coming. I think that your specialists are here. I would be willing to consult with them personally if you don't mind. (S)

President Clinton: I think that's a fine idea. What I would like to do is to find out who is coming from the U.S. to make sure the best doctors are there to give you the widest possible choice. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, thank you. How are your elections, Bill? (S)

President Clinton: So far I am ahead. I just hope I can do as well as you. (S)

President Yeltsin: So, this is not yet the finish line. Let's just hope. We all believe in you and I hope you and I will work together soon. (S)

President Clinton: That is what I hope too. We have a lot to do together. I want you to know that during this period I have talked with Helmut and Jacques Chirac and we have agreed to do what we can to help you through, to keep things on track during your hospital stay, and do what we can to avoid creating problems for you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. Thank you, Bill. (U)

President Clinton: I will let you go back to your rest. I just wanted to let you know that we are thinking of you and make sure we've got the best folks coming over to your conference. Hillary and I are saying our prayers for you and hoping for the best. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. Please convey my greetings to Hillary. We wish you every success in the election campaign. We all want you to win. (S)

President Clinton: Okay. I'll go to work on that. You work on getting better. Bless you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, it is agreed Bill. Best wishes. (U)

President Clinton: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6243

September 16, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~ANDREW D. SENS~~ *SANDY BECKER*
THROUGH: STEVE PIFER *SP*
FROM: KI FORTW
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia,
September 15, 1996

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation of the September 15 phone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

cancel Andy to sign
That you ~~sign~~ the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *[initials]* Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Sandy - see Pifer memo. ok? ADI

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 09/15/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBN* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9606243
DATE 17 SEP 96

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & PRES YELTSIN ON 15 SEP 96
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 7224
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 0 + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KRM Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

6243

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. William J. Burns *Caps*
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the
President and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia is provided for
the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy
Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may
also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for Ambassador Pickering.
(2)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 09/15/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1132				
Document ID: 9607896				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (3 pages)	12/05/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1132

FOLDER TITLE:

9607896

2015-0782-M

rs1537

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9607896
RECEIVED: 05 DEC 96 13

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 06 DEC 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
TELCON

TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 09 DEC 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOHSE
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
FORT
NSC CHRON
PIFER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY SP

DATE 12/6

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS

Z 96120520 FOR DECISION

001

X 96120615 DOHSE APPROVED RECOM

002

X 96120615 DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 961206 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7896
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG OK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>ML 10/16</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>17 w/ DESK</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7896
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (RRS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG EX A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>10/16</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>17 w/ DESK</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette YES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7896


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 6, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for the Charge.


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 12/4/06

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRYNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7896

December 5, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER *SP*

FROM: KI FORT *VF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, December 5,
1996

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation of
the December 5 phone conversation between the President and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *DFH* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (b)

Declassify On: 12/4/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRYNARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with President Boris Yeltsin of
Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetakers: Katherine O'Loughlin,
Larry Wright, Trey Whitworth,
Ki Fort, Carlos Pascual,
Mike Hamel

DATE, TIME December 5, 1996, 9:35-9:50 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Clinton: Hello? (U)

President Yeltsin: Bill, hello. (U)

President Clinton: Hello, Boris. It's wonderful to hear your
voice. (U)

President Yeltsin: It has been quite some time since I've heard
your voice; I'm happy to hear you. (U)

President Clinton: I'm so happy your surgery was successful and
that you are on the road to recovery. We just had Ambassador
Vorontsov here for the welcoming home ceremony for the person who
was on the Russian space mission, and we talked about how well
you are doing. Al and Viktor also had a good meeting in Lisbon.
(U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I am grateful to you for the letter you
sent with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin; it was a pleasure to read.
The contents of it fully correspond with my views, and I want to
have cooperation with you, with America, not just as good as it
was in the past, but stronger. I instructed Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin and Foreign Minister Primakov to prepare proposals
on that account, and no NATOs should prevent our cooperation and
mutual activity. I agree with you that we should pay more

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 12/4/06

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2(1.09)
3/13/2018 KBH

attention to our economic relations, including investment in Russia. I am very happy and satisfied you spoke about the Eight in your agenda. I believe the fact that because Russia's policy was, as it was played a supportive role in the election campaign.

(S)

I would like to say that one thing I miss is a personal meeting with you. I agree we can shame our skeptics and show them our partnership can work together in 1997. For that purpose, we should meet not later than March, and it makes no difference to me whether it is in your country or mine. (S)

I thank you for your continuous feelings and expressions of those feelings during the period of my surgery and recuperation. Your doctors are good -- great experts. They did a great deal. They were always there before and during the operation, and afterwards. I will never forget what you did for me. (S)

Maybe we should instruct the Chernomyrdin-Gore Commission to prepare, no later than February, the subject matter for an early meeting between you and me, because that would have significance for the next four years, and for the future as well. (S)

President Clinton: Boris, I think that is a wonderful idea. Because of your election, my election and your successful surgery, we have an historic opportunity to secure a free and peaceful future for our countries and all the world. The personal relationship between us is very important. I agree we can do even better than before. I agree we should meet early next year. Since I have a Latin American trip already scheduled for early next year, it would be better for me if you could come here, if you feel up to it. I would love to have you here in March, as you said. (S)

President Yeltsin: I have nothing against that. Let us meet in March in your country. In December, I will be back on the job. The doctors met yesterday and told me by December I would be capable of traveling great distances by plane and shouldering great amounts of work. (S)

President Clinton: That's good news to me, to our country, and to the world. I look forward to seeing you, and it is great hearing you sound so good today. Hillary told me to say hello, and she is pleased you'll be strong enough to give her a big hug when you come here. (S)

President Yeltsin: But please do embrace her on my behalf. (U)

President Clinton: I will be happy to do that. Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good, Bill. We shall plan for our meeting in March, have we agreed on that? (~~C~~)

President Clinton: Yes. Agreed. (~~C~~)

President Yeltsin: And in February the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission will take place? (~~C~~)

President Clinton: Yes. (~~C~~)

President Yeltsin: And they will prepare the whole agenda, so we can have a fruitful meeting. It was a pleasure talking to you, and I should tell you frankly, I miss you personally. (~~C~~)

President Clinton: I miss you too, Boris. Look forward to seeing you, and I expect we will be talking between now and March. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good, Bill. (U)

President Clinton: Thank you, good-bye, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good-bye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9607896
DATE 06 DEC 96

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON BTW PRES & RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>1 + DISK</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBN Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1604				
Document ID: 9701341				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	02/27/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	re. Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	02/27/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1604

FOLDER TITLE:

9701361

2015-0782-M
rs1538

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9701341
RECEIVED: 28 FEB 97 12

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: HARMON

DOC DATE: 03 MAR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
HS
SUMMIT

TELCON
START

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA 27 FEB 97

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 04 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
FORT
NSC CHRON
PIFER

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY JMH DATE 3-3-97 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSTMH DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9701341

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 KERRICK
001
001 HARMON
002

Z 97030113 FOR DECISION
Z 97030320 KERRICK APPROVED RECOMS
Z 97030320 FOR SIGNATURE
X 97030320 HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 970303 BURNS, W

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1341
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG Tmb A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>2</u>	<u>PA</u>	
Dohse			
Kerrick	<u>1</u>	<u>(D) OK w. L. Ho's</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>he 7/3</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>Tmb 3.3</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

9711 12/10/83

Exec Sec Office has diskette yfs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


1341

March 3, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin (e)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the
President and Russian President Yeltsin is provided for the
information of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. It must
be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our
Embassy in Moscow EYES ONLY for the Chargé. (e)


Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/28/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-17-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: Elaine Florio, Katherine O'Loughlin, Wylma Robinson, David Higgins, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 27, 1997, 11:51 a.m.-12:09 p.m.
The Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

President Clinton: Hello, Boris. How are you? (U)

President Yeltsin: Moving ahead, bit by bit. My health seems to be all right now, so I have been working full swing now. I am getting ready aggressively for Helsinki. In fact, we are going to have some difficult sessions over there, but we shouldn't forget about our partnership, mutual understanding and interaction. I have taken a look at the message you sent with Madame Albright and basically our views coincide. Of course, we have to clarify certain details in the course of our talks there. I agree that we should have three subjects for our agenda: European security; START and ABM; and new economic cooperation. And certainly there will be quite a few other compelling questions that go along in our talks and I am fully prepared to discuss all of these issues. (✓)

President Clinton: That's great, Boris. I had a full report from Madeleine on your meeting last Friday; she enjoyed it very much. I am looking forward to our meeting in Helsinki and I know we can move our historic relationship forward as we have in the past. I know we can come to a common understanding on these issues. Our experts are working intensively and I am convinced that we can work out something on all these matters. (✓)

President Yeltsin: Indeed. Not only Russia and the United States are waiting for this meeting, but also all the countries in Europe and the entire world. And a lot will depend on it -- whether we continue on the road of partnership or back to the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/28/07

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2(1.10)
3/13/2018 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

times of the Cold War, which we absolutely cannot afford to do.
(S)

President Clinton: Absolutely not. Strobe Talbott and a strong team will be coming to Moscow next week to focus on NATO and Russia. I know what your position is and I am not asking you to embrace enlargement, but I think we can define a NATO-Russia relationship that will serve both sides' interests, and make Russia a true partner of NATO and assure Russia a major role in Europe. Also, before Strobe arrives, our arms control team experts will be there to discuss START and the ABM Treaty and it seems to me that we are not far apart on guidelines for START III, though ABM Treaty issues remain more difficult. At any rate, we should make an all-out effort to use Helsinki to settle the main issues and get arms control negotiations back on track.
(S)

I also want to raise one issue on START III, in particular. Your experts suggested that you and I agree in Helsinki on a joint instruction to our experts and then wait until Denver to conclude a final START III framework agreement. I think that is a little slow. I think we should be more ambitious. Let's tell our experts we want START III guidelines finished so that we can announce them in Helsinki. And when Denver comes around, there will be more good news and more important announcements that will be good for Russia. So I was thinking that we should go ahead and announce START III in Helsinki and I think we should tell them that. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree with you, Bill. Let us prepare the START III framework agreement in Helsinki. (S)

President Clinton: That's good news. Now let me say on economic issues, I think we already have a good draft joint statement and we ought to be able to finalize that in the next two weeks. In my new budget, I have asked for significant new funding for cooperative projects like people-to-people and expert-to-expert exchanges. And in general, I have asked for more money for the region and I will push hard for this and for new U.S. investment. I know that this is important for your nation's transition in this period. More and more are recognizing that Russia's economy is growing and my budget reflects that, and I think we need to make a strong economic statement in Helsinki. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, I have taken a very close look at the results of Mr. Chernomyrdin's visit to the United States and am acquainted with his report and with the workings of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. I am very satisfied with the decisions on several of these issues, including trade cooperation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and starting up investment; therefore, I am satisfied with all of this. (S)

President Clinton: I need to raise one more issue very briefly and that is the space station. When Al Gore and Viktor Stepanovich met, Chernomyrdin said Russia would make its contribution to the space station and I understand it's been authorized, but the money has not been received by the contractors who are building it. I think the international space station is important for our relationship. Some people in my Congress oppose it, and they may pull the money and give it elsewhere. So if there is anything you can do in the next few days, I think the space station is something worth doing together. I think it reinforces Russia's position as a world leader. I think it also has symbolic value for our relationship, and the substantive value is very great. I hate to bring it up at your level. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I will put things in order in that regard. I will correct this situation. We will pay and continue to contribute to that program. (S)

President Clinton: Thank you, Boris. I can't wait to see you in Helsinki. It will be a good meeting. You sound great and I know we will have a good meeting. (S)

President Yeltsin: I was very happy to talk to you, to hear you voice. I am really looking forward to meeting with you in Helsinki and thank you once again. Good-bye. (S)

President Clinton: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9701341
DATE 03 MAR 97

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW PRES & PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA 27 FEB 97
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>ORG + DISK</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1341

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 28, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD L. KERRICK

*(K) will
Admin chgs*

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER *SP*

FROM: KI FORT *KF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, February 27, 1997

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
February 27 telephone conversation between the President and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you approve the Harmon-Burns memo at Tab I transmitting
the Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

2. That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be
filed for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 2/28/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBNARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0781-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1341

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin (4)

*- Standard
Language*

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the
President and Russian President Yeltsin is provided for the
information of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. It must
be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our
Embassy in Moscow for the Charge. (4)

Joyce A. Harmon
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRYNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/28/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: ^Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: ^Elaine Florio, Katherine O'Loughlin, Wylma Robinson, David Higgins, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 27, 1997, 11:51 a.m. - 12:09 p.m.
The Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

President Clinton: Hello, Boris. How are you? (U)

President Yeltsin: Moving ahead, bit by bit. My health seems to be all right now, so I have been working full swing now. I am getting ready aggressively for Helsinki. In fact, we are going to have some difficult sessions over there, but we shouldn't forget about our partnership, mutual understanding and interaction. I have taken a look at the message you sent with Madame Albright and basically our views coincide. Of course, we have to clarify certain details in the course of our talks there. I agree that we should have three subjects for our agenda: European security; START and ABM; and new economic cooperation. And certainly there will be quite a few other compelling questions that go along in our talks and I am fully prepared to discuss all of these issues. (C)

President Clinton: That's great, Boris. I had a full report from Madeleine on your meeting last Friday; she enjoyed it very much. I am looking forward to our meeting in Helsinki and I know we can move our historic relationship forward as we have in the past. I know we can come to a common understanding on these issues. Our experts are working intensively and I am convinced that we can work out something on all these matters. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States

President Yeltsin: Indeed. Not only Russia and the U.S. are waiting for this meeting, but also all the countries in Europe and the entire world. And a lot will depend on it -- whether we continue on the road of partnership or back to the times of the Cold War, which we absolutely cannot afford to do. (C)

President Clinton: Absolutely not. Strobe Talbott and a strong team will be coming to Moscow next week to focus on NATO and Russia. I know what your position is and I am not asking you to embrace enlargement, but I think we can define a NATO-Russia relationship that will serve both sides' interests, and make Russia a true partner of NATO and assure Russia a major role in Europe. Also, before Strobe arrives, our arms control team experts will be there to discuss START and the ABM Treaty and it seems to me that we are not far apart on guidelines for START III, though ABM Treaty issues remain more difficult. At any rate, we should make an all-out effort to use Helsinki to settle the main issues and get arms control negotiations back on track. (C)

I also want to raise one issue on START III, in particular. Your experts suggested that you and I agree in Helsinki on a joint instruction to our experts and then wait until Denver to conclude a final START III framework agreement. I think that is a little slow. I think we should be more ambitious. Let's tell our experts we want START III guidelines finished so that we can announce them in Helsinki. And when Denver comes around, there will be more good news and more important announcements that will be good for Russia. So I was thinking that we should go ahead and announce START III in Helsinki and I think we should tell them that. (C)

President Yeltsin: I agree with you, Bill. Let us prepare the START III framework agreement in Helsinki. (C)

President Clinton: That's good news. Now let me say on economic issues, I think we already have a good draft joint statement and we ought to be able to finalize that in the next two weeks. In my new budget, I have asked for significant new funding for cooperative projects like people-to-people and expert-to-expert exchanges. And in general, I have asked for more money for the region and I will push hard for this and for new U.S. investment. I know that this is important for your nation's transition in this period. More and more are recognizing that Russia's economy is growing and my budget reflects that, and I think we need to make a strong economic statement in Helsinki. (C)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, I have taken a very close look at the results of Mr. Chernomyrdin's visit to the U.S. and am acquainted with his report and with the workings of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. I am very satisfied with the decisions on several of these issues, including trade cooperation and starting up investment; therefore, I am satisfied with all of this. (S)

President Clinton: I need to raise one more issue very briefly and that is the space station. When Al Gore and Viktor Stepanovich met, Chernomyrdin said Russia would make its contribution to the space station and I understand it's been authorized, but the money has not been received by the contractors who are building it. I think the international space station is important for our relationship. Some people in my Congress oppose it, and they may pull the money and give it elsewhere. So if there is anything you can do in the next few days, I think the space station is something worth doing together. I think it reinforces Russia's position as a world leader. I think it also has symbolic value for our relationship, and the substantive value is very great. I hate to bring it up at your level. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I will put things in order in that regard. I will correct this situation. We will pay and continue to contribute to that program. (S)

President Clinton: Thank you, Boris. I can't wait to see you in Helsinki. It will be a good meeting. You sound great and I know we will have a good meeting. (S)

President Yeltsin: I was very happy to talk to you, to hear you voice. I am really looking forward to meeting with you in Helsinki and thank you once again. Good-bye. (S)

President Clinton: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1609				
Document ID: 9702044				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Morning Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin (11 pages)	03/21/1997	P1/b(1) K8H 7/13/2018
001b. memcon	re: Afternoon Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin (4 pages)	03/21/1997	P1/b(1) K8H 7/13/2018
001c. memcon	re: Private Dinner with Russian President Yeltsin (6 pages)	03/21/1997	P1/b(1) K8H 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1609

FOLDER TITLE:

9702044

2015-0782-M
rs1539

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 15 APR 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
MEMCON

SUMMIT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN 21 APR

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 28 MAR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE


FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
PIFER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-17-2

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY



DATE

4/16

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9702044

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 97040119 FOR DECISION
X 97041607 BERGER APPROVED RECOM
X 97041607 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 970415 BURNS, W

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2044
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM FRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>B</u> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>A-TAB I</u>
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>B</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	<u>Deputy Natl Sec Advisor</u>	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>has seen</u>	<u>D with diskette</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Handwritten:
 Read
 4/2/97
 7pm

'97 APR 1 PM 5:29

Exec Sec Office has diskette yo _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 2, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

Issue: MEMCONs from Helsinki

Sandy,

Request your concurrence to release the attached MEMCONs. Please take a close look at the MEMCONs from the morning and afternoon sessions. Steve Pifer prepared them using Strobe's notes, but since you were in the room, you can attest to whether anything was missed. Thanks.

Very respectfully,

Fred

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY _____ LOG # 2044
 URGENT NOT PROOFED _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK _____ DOCLOG T.M.W. A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
B Harmon			
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>A-TAB I</u>
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>R</u>	
Situation Room		<u>Dep. Natl. Sec. Advisor</u>	
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>has seen</u>	<u>D.W.H.</u>
Records Mgt			<u>diskette</u>
	<u>4 5</u>		<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 APR 1 PM 5:29

Exec Sec Office has diskette 4/2

Handwritten:
 Read
 4/2/97
 7pm

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 2, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

Issue: MEMCONs from Helsinki

Sandy,

Request your concurrence to release the attached MEMCONs. Please take a close look at the MEMCONs from the morning and afternoon sessions. Steve Pifer prepared them using Strobe's notes, but since you were in the room, you can attest to whether anything was missed. Thanks.

Very respectfully,

Fred

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 15, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memoranda of Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin (C)

The attached memoranda of conversation from the March 21 Helsinki summit meetings between President Clinton and President Yeltsin are provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott only. They may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Charge. These memoranda should be handled in NODIS channels. (C)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Memcon -- March 21 Morning Meeting
- Tab B Memcon -- March 21 Working Lunch
- Tab C Memcon -- March 21 Afternoon Meeting
- Tab D Memcon -- March 21 Private Dinner

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Morning Meeting with Russian President
Yeltsin: NATO-Russia, START, ABM/TMD (C)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Sandy Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State

Russia

President Yeltsin
Yevgeniy Primakov, Foreign Minister
Dmitriy Ryurikov, Foreign Policy Assistant
Yuriy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME March 21, 1997, 9:50-11:55 a.m.
AND PLACE: The Finnish President's Residence, Helsinki

The President: Together we've made a great deal of progress, first of all, in dealing with the consequences of the Cold War. Now both of us are in our second terms and need to decide what to do together. I believe our lasting legacy must be a partnership and framework of peace and security that our successors will embrace and that others might not otherwise embrace. And we need to prepare for how we keep changing the relationship and adding energy to it -- slash the number of weapons even further and do things now to promote trade and investment for Russia's development and achievement of our common goal of a secure and undivided Europe. (C)

Madeleine and Yevgeniy have worked hard and agreed on a strong joint statement, and I'm very pleased about that. It's a good text. I believe we are near agreement. But on some big issues only you and I can work and decide together, specifically on ABM/TMD demarcation and also determining the specifics of START. I propose that we review the text on European security, then turn our attention to START/ABM, followed by economic issues at lunch and then wrap up with one issue not on our current agenda, Nagorno-Karabakh. (C)

President Yeltsin: As you and I agree, the Helsinki summit has got strategic significance not only for our two countries but for Europe and the world. It is important so that in the future we will not look back and say we returned to the Cold War days. Sliding backwards is simply not acceptable. We are coming here not just to discuss things but to sign things. The five draft statements have been finalized. In truth, we were both voted into office for a second term, until the year 2000. Neither of us will have a third term. We want to move into 21st century with stability and tranquillity. The first document is on European security. I agree that Albright and Primakov moved toward accommodation in many areas, but there are still some issues pending. (C)

Our position has not changed. It remains a mistake for NATO to move eastward. But I need to take steps to alleviate the negative consequences of this for Russia. I am prepared to enter into an agreement with NATO not because I want to but because it is a forced step. There is no other solution for today. The principal issues for me are the following. The agreement must be legally binding -- signed by all 16 Allies. Decisions by NATO are not to be taken without taking into account the concerns or opinions of Russia. Also, nuclear and conventional arms cannot move eastward into new members to the borders of Russia, thus creating a new cordon sanitaire aimed at Russia. (C)

But one thing is very important: enlargement should also not embrace the former Soviet republics. I cannot sign any agreement without such language. Especially Ukraine. If you get them involved, it will create difficulties in our talks with Ukraine on a number of issues. We followed closely Solana's activities in Central Asia. They were not to our liking. He was pursuing an anti-Russian course. (C)

I understand the complexity of this issue, but we have no territorial or hegemonic claims on them or any other country. We are carrying out a well-tested policy with CIS countries and the Baltics, based on trust. We have various plans with countries of the former Soviet Union based on trust. That trust should remain. Our relations with the CIS and with the Baltic countries should be like yours within NATO. (C)

As I understand, you and I have differences that it would be difficult to include in the text of the agreement. Let's see what it looks like, what should be obligatory and what should not be. On things that did not get into the statement, perhaps we can find some other document or way of doing it. Perhaps it can be addressed orally. Are you going to seek ratification of this agreement by Parliaments or just by heads of government? We want

to know where we are going. We will address this calmly and rationally. (S)

We see how you and the Ukrainians are handling your relations. It does not help us in relations with Ukraine or resolve Russian-Ukrainian issues. We need U.S. restraint in dealing with Ukraine. I do not want to believe you are using pressure tactics. I am surprised by the activities of your congressional committees with regard to Ukraine. They are not helping a settlement of Russian-Ukrainian issues. (S)

Another problem: you are conducting naval maneuvers near Crimea. It is as if we were training people in Cuba. How would you feel? It is unacceptable to us. We are not going out to seize Sevastopol. Our only interest there is to maintain some infrastructure. We respect Georgia, Moldova and other countries and have no claims on their territory. We merely want to rent some facilities for our Black Sea fleet. (Ryurikov hands President Yeltsin a piece of paper.) (S)

I propose that in the statement we could accept the fact that Russia has no claims on other countries. In fact, regarding the countries of the former Soviet Union, let us have a verbal, gentlemen's agreement -- we would not write it down in the statement -- that no former Soviet republics would enter NATO. This gentlemen's agreement would not be made public. (S)

The President: Let me start by saying that I accept that there is now a new Russia that is not interested in taking over other countries. If you remember the last time we met, I told you that I was trying to create a new NATO that would not be a threat to Russia but that would permit the United States and Canada to stay in Europe and work with Russia and other countries to build an undivided, free Europe and to deal with other problems. (S)

I've tried to reassure you, the Russian government and the Russian people that I'm trying to change NATO. The most important steps in that regard are, first, the language in the statement on nuclear weapons -- the three no's. Second, the language on conventional forces, which reflects a very carefully considered position that we've worked out in NATO. Third, the fact of the NATO-Russia charter itself -- which will redirect the mission of NATO. Fourth, the proposal by NATO on adapting the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe tabled in Vienna. It calls for reducing overall levels and freezing equipment levels in several key areas. All of these are designed to change the impression of NATO as something directed against Russia. (S)

If Primakov and Solana can complete the text of a NATO-Russia charter, I'd like to see a signing, before Madrid, at a big

ceremony, so we can say to the world that there is a new NATO and a new Russia and that's the right spirit. ~~(S)~~

President Yeltsin: I agree. ~~(S)~~

The President: If we were to agree that no members of the former Soviet Union could enter NATO, it would be a bad thing for our attempt to build a new NATO, but it would also be a bad thing for your attempt to build a new Russia. I am not naive. I understand you have an interest in who gets into NATO and when. We need to make sure that all these are subjects that we can consult about as we move forward -- consult means talk about; it means making sure that we're aware of your concerns and that you understand our decisions and our positions and our thinking. ~~(S)~~

But consider what a terrible message it would be if we were to make the kind of supposedly secret deal you're suggesting. First of all, there are no secrets in this world. Second, the message would be, "we're still organized against Russia -- but there's a line across which we won't go." In other words, instead of creating a new NATO that helps move toward an integrated, undivided Europe, we'd have a larger NATO waiting for Russia to do something bad. Here's why it is bad for Russia, what you are proposing. Russia would be saying, "we have still got an empire, but it just can't reach as far West." ~~(S)~~

Second, it would create exactly the fear among the Baltics and others that you're trying to allay and that you're denying is justified. A third point: the deal you're suggesting would totally undermine the Partnership for Peace. It would terrify the smaller countries that are now working well with you and us in Bosnia and elsewhere. Consider our hosts here in Finland; President Ahtissari told me last night that we're doing the right thing in the attitude we're taking toward the future of enlargement. He said that Finland hadn't asked to be in NATO, and as long as no one tells Finland it can't join NATO, then Finland will be able to maintain the independence of its position and work with PFP and with the United States and with Russia.

~~(S)~~

I said a few days ago that I'd leave open the possibility of Russia in NATO and, in any event, of having a steadily improving partnership between NATO and Russia. I think we'll have to continue to work this issue, but we should concentrate on practical matters. However, under no circumstances should we send a signal out of this meeting that it's the same old European politics of the Cold War and the same old business, we're just moving the lines around a bit. Instead, the signal here should be to tell the world and tell Russia that it's a new NATO and a new Russia. There's evidence of that in the position that NATO

has taken on nuclear weapons and on conventional weapons, which is reflected in the joint statement. (S)

I see that "legally binding" means something different in our context. Opponents of the NATO-Russia deal in the Senate will tie it up for two years. So we really should go with the form that we've proposed in the joint statement. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree. (S)

The President: Good. We've got the right solution. Now, a more general matter. I've worked for the last four years when you were up and when you were down. I've always made an extra effort to help you in what I knew was a very difficult situation. Now we're at a point where we want the whole world to see how things have changed -- not how they've stayed the same. We should concentrate on what we've agreed -- on nuclear weapons and conventional forces, not on where we disagree. (S)

The deal you've proposed would confirm everyone's fears. It would make us both look weaker, not stronger. If we made the agreement you're describing, it would be a terrible mistake. It would cause big problems for me and big problems for you. It would accentuate the diminishment of your power from Warsaw Pact times. The charter will be a much more powerful and positive message. It's without precedent, and it's comprehensive, and it's forward-looking, and it's hopeful. It will move us toward a situation that's good for both of us. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I agree with what you've said but look at what will happen. We intend to submit this document to the Duma for ratification, and we hope it will be ratified. But the Duma will take two decisions. First, it will ratify the document, then it will attach a condition that if NATO takes in even one of the former republics of the Soviet Union, Russia will pull out of the agreement and consider it null and void. That will happen if today you do not tell me one-on-one -- without even our closest aides present -- that you won't take new republics in the near future; I need to hear that. I understand that maybe in ten years or something, the situation might change, but not now. Maybe there will be a later evolution. But I need assurances from you that it will not happen in the nearest future. (S)

The President: If I went into a closet with you and told you that, the Congress would find out and pass a resolution invalidating the NATO-Russia charter. I'd rather frankly that the Duma pass a resolution conditioning its adherence on this point. I'd hate for the Duma to do that, but it would be better

than what you're suggesting. I just can't do it. A private commitment would be the same as a public one. (C)

I've told you -- and you have talked to Helmut and Jacques, you know their thinking -- no one is talking about a massive, all out, accelerated expansion. We've already demonstrated our ability to move deliberately, openly. But I can't make commitments on behalf of NATO, and I'm not going to be in the position myself of vetoing NATO expansion with respect to any country, much less letting you or anyone else do so. (C)

I'm prepared to work with you on the consultative mechanism so as to make sure that we take account of Russia's concerns as we move forward. Another reason why I feel so strongly: look at Bosnia. That's the worst conflict in Europe since World War II. The Europeans couldn't solve it. The United States was finally able to take an initiative there, and Russia came in and helped. It took me years to build support. What if way in the future another Bosnia arises? If the NATO-Russia understanding is done right, then Russia would be a key part of the solution, working with the United States and Europe. (C)

But if we create a small version of a larger stand-off that existed during the Cold War, there won't be the needed trust. This process of integrating Europe is going to take years; we need to build up the OSCE -- it's not going to happen overnight. But if we make a statement now that narrows our options in the future, it will be harder to do the other good things we want to do. (C)

I know what a terrible problem this is for you, but I can't make the specific commitment you are asking for. It would violate the whole spirit of NATO. I've always tried to build you up and never undermine you. I'd feel I had dishonored my commitment to the Alliance, to the states that want to join NATO and to the vision that I think you and I share of an undivided Europe with Russia as a major part of it. (C)

President Yeltsin: Okay, then let us agree -- one-on-one -- that the former Soviet republics will not be in the first waves. Bill, please understand me, I am flying back to Russia with a very heavy burden on my shoulders. It will be difficult for me to go home and not seem to have accepted NATO enlargement. Very difficult. (C)

The President: Look, you're forcing an issue that doesn't need to drive a wedge between us here. NATO operates by consensus. If you decided to be in NATO, you'd probably want all the other countries to be eligible too. But that issue doesn't arise. We need to find a solution to a short-term problem that doesn't

create a long-term problem by keeping alive old stereotypes about you and your intentions. (S)

If we do the wrong thing, it will erode our own position about the kind of Europe we want. I hear your message. But your suggestion is not the way to do it. I don't want to do anything that makes it seem like the old Russia and the old NATO. (S)

(The two Presidents agree to move on to START.) (S)

President Yeltsin: On START, the issues are the timeframe and the numbers. We have agreed to 2,000-2,500 as the maximum figure. This was actually something we suggested in 1994. (There is some confusion and back-and-forth among the Russians about this.) But let us not dwell on this point: we agree to 2,000-2,500. (S)

On SLCMs, they are not mentioned in START II. I suggest the following compromise: we agree to the year 2007 to cover both START II and START III -- and the end of the year 2003 to cover warhead deactivation. On long-range SLCMs, they're effectively strategic weapons. They're an irritant because of verification problems. I suggest we do away with all cruise missiles, land- and sea- and air-based, and in this way put the whole issue of cruise missiles behind us. (S)

The President: So let me restate your proposal so I can be sure I understand it completely. You propose deactivation of warheads by the end of 2003, extension of START II implementation until the end of 2007 and full implementation of START III by 2007. (S)

Foreign Minister Primakov: A more rapid schedule for deactivation is impossible for both technical and financial reasons. What we have offered is the absolute minimal schedule. We need to build up our own destruction and deactivation capabilities on our own territory because they were in other countries. (S)

President Yeltsin: This will also cost \$10 billion. (S)

The President: I know I cannot agree to eliminate all our cruise missiles for reasons that have nothing to do with Russia. For example, we've got to think about Iraq and overall, we've got to think about minimum exposure of our own troops. We need to talk to our people about the other issues. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, we'll talk again. (S)

The President: In order to do all this, we should resolve the ABM/TMD issue. It will be difficult for me to get the Senate to go along with START III unless we resolve ABM/TMD. When Mr. Primakov spent over an hour with me the other day, we agreed on four points: reaffirmation of ABM, limits on testing targets, a consultative arrangement to assure that they don't violate the ABM Treaty and cooperation on TMD. (S)

If you asked me several years ago to look into a crystal ball and predict how at the end of the century we'd be spending our resources in the area of missile defense, I would have bet the money I've saved for my daughter's college education that we'd be worried largely about Russia or the Soviet Union. But now here we are, working together on so many things, and we're contemplating working together and sharing technology in this area, too. (S)

President Yeltsin: We have just three additional lines in the agreements -- in addition to the four elements where we agree, we need to say more about negotiating on high-velocity interceptors. (There is confusion and discussion on the Russian side.) (S)

The President: Well, it sounds as though we really haven't agreed on anything. (S)

(The President then goes through his ABM/TMD script carefully; following are his ABM/TMD points:

- ABM Treaty remains cornerstone of strategic stability. Reaffirmed this in our May 1995 Joint Statement, which established principles to guide resolution of ABM/TMD demarcation negotiations.
- Can take big step today towards strengthening ABM Treaty for future if we agree on joint statement that includes comprehensive and clear guidance to conclude negotiations on demarcation. Believe we are close to agreement on this.
- If can agree, this would be historic summit.
- Our proposed approach would:
 - Renew our joint commitment to ABM Treaty.
 - Complete demarcation arrangement by addressing today's TMD systems and technologies through constraints on testing targets and exchanging detailed information on our TMD programs.

- Establish consultative arrangement for future technologies and systems, so as to ensure they do not circumvent ABM Treaty.
- Expand our cooperation with Russia in theater missile defense.
- This last point, Boris, is especially significant. Know it has been point of interest and emphasis for Primakov and your Defense Ministry.
- Our Joint Statement on ABM commits us to explore cooperative defense efforts in at least three TMD areas: providing early warning support for TMD activities; cooperating in developing TMD technologies; and expanding joint TMD exercise program we have already begun.
- Important you appreciate our TMD programs are not aimed at Russia -- they are to protect our troops; just as your TMDs are intended to protect your forces. Helping you with early warning information now could help you deal with missile threats around your periphery.
- Beyond that, I can envision scenarios 10-15 years from now where Russian and American military units could be operating together -- perhaps in joint peacekeeping missions or even as partners in peace enforcement coalition -- and could come under attack from common foe armed with highly capable, short- or medium-range missiles.
- In world of proliferation dangers we both confront, this is not far-fetched. Should put priority on ensuring that in any such case our TMD systems complement each other and bolster our combined missile defense capabilities.
- As for current differences in our respective positions on demarcation, believe we can resolve how to handle current TMD systems. Let's leave future systems to our successors and not let best become enemy of good.
- It would serve both our countries' security interests if we can conclude demarcation agreement today. But I cannot agree to any further constraints on TMD testing or deployments, beyond those we have already agreed. Your proposed text leaves door wide open to continued disagreement over additional constraints your experts have been pressing.

- If you can agree that the elements that have been agreed by our experts constitute all that is required to meet Russia's concerns, we can conclude ABM/TMD agreement here in Helsinki.
- Language in joint statement would read: "the elements of this agreement will be..."; not as your experts propose: "will include." That's formula for continued stalemate at experts level. They have been at this for three years and cannot go further absent guidance from our level.
- If you and I now can settle this fundamental point, our experts can make the necessary changes in joint statement text. There is one sentence that references other possible elements that would have to be deleted.
- As leaders, we have worked on this issue for a long time. Now I am at our bottom-line. And without agreement, we risk new assaults from my Congress -- not only to stop the demarcation talks but to try to throw over the ABM Treaty itself.
- You have said that, without agreement on ABM/TMD, you cannot push START II in Duma. If this is true, I cannot go ahead with announcing our support for extension of START II and START III reductions.
- That would mean U.S. will stay at START I levels, and we will both have missed an historic opportunity for parity at lower levels, and at lower costs.
- Have opportunity to resolve this issue and make it stick. Let's seize this. Can put ABM/TMD issue behind us, pave way for quick action on START. Will both gain in terms of increasing security and strategic stability. This is not zero-sum game.
- Can we close on this based on what I've discussed?

End ABM/TMD talking points.) (C)

President Yeltsin: We need to do a bit more than that. (C)

The President: Then we can't have a statement. Look, Boris, we've resolved this issue two or three times, but it always comes back again and again. I have no confidence that the same thing won't happen this time if we simply turn it back over to the experts. There's no way you can draw a line today that answers every possibility that could arise tomorrow. If what we're

agreed to do so far isn't enough, then we can't agree to anything. You and I would look like fools, frankly, if we let this thing just keep bouncing back and forth between us and the experts. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, Bill, let us just add three lines to the agreement on non-testing of high-velocity systems. (S)

The President: Boris, as I told you, I don't want to make an agreement that satisfies your concerns about our defenses but that tries to address missile defenses that aren't even going to be invented, much less tested, in my lifetime. I don't want to rule out a theater missile defense that will protect our troops; it's that simple. I'm trying to develop a defense that will answer both our concerns and yours. (S)

Look, I do understand your point: you're saying that, if we take a shot gun to use against a target that requires only a rifle, we'll hurt ourselves. But I don't want to give up something that we may genuinely, for good reasons, need someday. (S)

Foreign Minister Primakov: We're already agreed on certain elements -- four elements. We've been told to accept only American terms and conditions and have gotten nothing in return, so what's needed are new instructions. (S)

President Yeltsin: We accept everything in the document that's now before us, but we just want instructions to expand the negotiations. (S)

Secretary Albright: It's important to seal what we've done already and agree to consult on further issues. (S)

The President: There are two issues that have come into focus here, and I want to go back to our experts on your proposal on 2003/2007. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. And, Bill, we agree to the text we have on European security. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Lunch with Russian President Yeltsin:
Economic Issues, Jackson-Vanik, Denver
Summit, Space Station, Nagorno-Karabakh (S)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Sandy Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
John Shalikashvili, Chairman, JCS
John Podesta, Deputy Chief of Staff
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Larry Summers, Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury
Jim Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Jim Collins, Ambassador-at-Large for the NIS
Jan Lodol, Principal Deputy for the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy
Steve Pifer, Senior Director for Russian,
Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs (NSC)

Russia

President Yeltsin
Yevgeniy Primakov, Foreign Minister
Oleg Davydov, Deputy Prime Minister
Yuriy Yarov, Deputy Head of Presidential
Administration
Dmitriy Ryurikov, Foreign Policy Assistant
Yuliy Vorontsov, Ambassador to the United
States
Vladimir Lukin, Member, Russian State Duma
Viktor Samsonov, Chief of the General Staff
Nikolay Afanasyevskiy, Deputy Foreign
Minister
Yuriy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Nikolay Spasskiy, Head, MFA USA Department

DATE, TIME March 21, 1997, 1:00-2:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Finnish President's Residence, Helsinki

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: X6 3/21/17

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
LP-WJC/DOS-16-1
05/26/2016 KDE

The President: When you gave your speech on March 6, I wrote down what you said: "I wish to hand over to my successor a country with a dynamically developing economy and with effective and just social protection, a country whose citizens confidently look to the future." That is a vision that I'd like to help you advance. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good. (U)

The President: As you know, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin are working on a lot of issues in this area. I am glad to see Chubays and Nemtsov on the economic team. Now you need concrete actions. What you need to do is to increase investment in Russia and Russia's full participation as a partner in international economic institutions. I believe and have said in the United States that the potential for Russia to have very, very high economic growth in the next few years is tremendous. (C)

But it is clear you cannot force investment in. As an American oil company executive said, pushing investment is like pushing on a rope. You cannot push it in; you have to pull it in. (C)

When Al and Viktor Stepanovich met, they agreed on tax priorities, energy laws that could attract \$50-60 billion in investment to Russia, steps against corruption and the Bilateral Investment Treaty. We will strongly support reactivating the IMF program. The IMF has done a lot and can do more. I know the difficulty of passing a new law in the Duma and that only you can provide the leadership. But we are ready to offer technical assistance. (C)

With your permission, I would like to invite the Deputy Treasury Secretary, Larry Summers, to describe what we can do to help investment in Russia. Then I would like to talk about some steps governments can take to help. (C)

Deputy Secretary Summers: We have spoken widely with potential investors in Russia. Four priorities seem to us to be important. First is passage of a new tax code through the Duma and improvement of tax administration, so that the taxation rates for entrepreneurial activity can come down. (C)

President Yeltsin: In March, the new tax code will be submitted to the Duma. (C)

Deputy Secretary Summers: We have more than 20 people in Moscow working now on this law and to improve its administration, which is crucial to implementation. The second and third priorities are support for legislation for production-sharing arrangements

and ratification of the Bilateral Investment Treaty, which is very important for investors. Finally, cooperation with the World Bank and others can mean private guarantees, and support for investment could be raised to improve the total flow of investment into Russia. (C)

These four concrete steps, along with vigorous efforts on corruption, which was part of your March 6 speech, would do much to attract capital, both from foreign investors and from Russians who have placed their money overseas. (C)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I agree. And I would like to ask you the following questions. What about your anti-dumping laws? And what about restrictions from the U.S. Department of Energy -- we purchased supercomputers from the United States for the purpose of destroying strategic nuclear missiles. But the sale was denied. This is not just. We are not sure what you call us: we are not enemies, but we are not yet friends. This is not right. (C)

Deputy Secretary Summers: I do money, not supercomputers. This is something we will have to look at. (C)

President Yeltsin: We hear talk about trade restrictions. (C)

The President: I will look into this. This may have something to do with our export restrictions. I will check and get back to you, perhaps even today. (C)

President Yeltsin: Good, Bill. How should I understand that Russia is viewed as a country that is not a market economy? As President, I have hard feelings on that. (C)

Deputy Secretary Summers: Russia has made great progress toward market reforms under your leadership. But "market economy" is a technical term in our trade law. In important ways, if Russia were labeled a "market economy," it would force you under various laws that are more restrictive on your products. The best way we can help Russia on its exports is through the World Trade Organization, which is an important priority for us. (C)

The President: Let's talk about the WTO. First, I am prepared to instruct my government to make available in 1997 funds to support \$4 billion in investment, the same amount as the total from 1992-1996. We agreed not to use the figure in the joint statement, but investors should know it. (C)

I am also asking Congress for a new aid package for the NIS for 1998. It will expand cooperation on investment problems like crime and taxes. I also hope to expand people-to-people

exchanges between groups of Americans and Russians. It will strengthen our partnership as people and the young come to know each other. (S)

I want to accelerate Russia's merger into the WTO, Paris Club and OECD. Membership is more than a question of investment or open markets. These organizations will define global trade and economic relations for the 21st century, and Russia need to be at the table. (S)

We agree on membership in the Paris Club in 1997 and WTO in 1998. Let me say that there is some opposition within my government to doing that, as we have refused to set dates for other countries, for example, China. But I took the view that Russia is a great democracy, and its economy is changing rapidly. This is a unique situation, and it is important to do this. (S)

However, what the United States does not have the power to do is to waive the membership conditions. We can support your membership based on your meeting membership conditions. You continue to make progress, and we believe that you can make it. We are ready to help; we will do everything that we can to help Russia meet the membership requirements and help you to become a member. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, we are not seeking any special conditions for joining the WTO and Paris Club. We will join on the basis of generally agreed conditions. (S)

The President: This is something we might ask the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to monitor closely. I am ready, prepared to invest time. We don't want you to fail and will do whatever is necessary to make sure you get in. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree. (S)

The President: I would like to raise two other matters that are of symbolic importance: Jackson-Vanik and the G-8. You and I have been talking for years about Jackson-Vanik, and you know that I want to see Russia graduated out of it. In preparation for this meeting, I took some soundings in the Jewish Community and in Congress, asking what we would have to do to graduate Russia from Jackson-Vanik. The only negative reaction I got back was that the Duma has passed a law on the waiting period for emigration for those involved in secret questions -- changing it from five to ten years. There is concern that this could limit emigration. It is a major obstacle now in the Congress. (S)

How can we define a process to move forward on Jackson-Vanik? The language in the joint statement is fine, but I want to move.

It is important that we treat this with care and with a minimal public profile. The change from five to ten years is a problem. Mr. Lukin was Ambassador in Washington; he knows how hard it will be to pass this through Congress if the Jewish groups are not at least neutral. I have said that I want this done. And I know how important this is in Russia. Perhaps you could return to five years for the waiting period. (S)

President Yeltsin: You know, I met Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel. He has no complaints about Jewish emigration. He thinks one million is enough! (S)

The President: Some days he would probably like to see you take some back! (S)

President Yeltsin: Some are even in his cabinet, such as Sharanskiy. (S)

The President: I saw on television when Sharanskiy returned. We need to consult on this and get a feel as to where things are. Let's set a process to get this done. It is an old problem that should have been solved. (S)

President Yeltsin: As to your proposal, I am quite satisfied with the talk about the new elements of cooperation. I am prepared to sign the joint statement. Therefore the joint statement is no problem; we could sign or declare it orally. As for the G-8, we can include it in the statement or not -- how do you like to handle it? (S)

The President: We propose that you come at the beginning of the meeting. There will be one press conference, and we will all leave at the same time. If there are some financial issues for the Seven, there would be a low-key meeting but no separate press conference. It would be done without a separate public meeting and be a small part of the summit. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good. (S)

The President: I have checked with the other countries, and they are okay with this. I called Hashimoto myself, and we had a long conversation. He asked me to tell you what he said. Japan historically has opposed Russia as part of the Eight, he said, but he wants to do it, as it will increase Russia's influence in the world, and Russia's influence is having a positive effect -- it is important. (S)

He said he felt that you are likely to make the most of this opportunity and work for a better partnership. He also wants to improve bilateral relations with Russia. He is not asking for

any specifics, but he does want to improve the relationship and resolve outstanding issues, including the Northern Territories. (C)

In my opinion, Hashimoto is the strongest leader that Japan has had for a long time. He makes decisions and is prepared to stick with them. He is also prepared to take risks. You have a good opportunity to discuss various questions with him. He is not like other Japanese leaders. (C)

As to how we should announce the question of the Eight, the other leaders have asked that we announce this at the press conference rather than in a joint statement. If it is in the joint statement, it looks like all of this was done in advance so that I will get the credit. If, however, it is done at the press conference, I can be spokesman for the group; it is better politically. (C)

President Yeltsin: Yes, this is agreed. (C)

The President: Larry, if there is any way that we could work out Paris Club membership by Denver, that would be a nice boost. (C)

Deputy Secretary Summers: It is possible, but it depends on what our Russian friends can do regarding that part of their debt that is military debt. These have a special character. (C)

President Yeltsin: We can note this but without any special mention or example of these debts. This could be mentioned. We will probably say this has a special character. (C)

The President: That means Russia is prepared to note? (C)

Deputy Prime Minister Davydov: No, what we have in it we will have. We would only like to say that we'd like to have some adjustment, but not right now. We will write off some debt on the decision of the Paris Club. Now we are in a situation of financial losses, because the Paris Club is proceeding with debt restructuring, but we are not taking part. This is costing us. (C)

President Yeltsin: We are owed over 100 billion in U.S. dollars. (C)

Deputy Secretary Summers: We want to do this as soon as possible. It would be helpful if the Russian negotiator forwarded data on all of Russia's debts. That would help. (C)

The President: You mean debts owed Russia, so that the Paris Club can calculate them in. (C)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (S)

The President: I would like to mention one or two other issues. The first is difficult to bring up, because we have discussed it before -- the space station. We have worked hard for partnership in this area and need to work on this. We have discussed the importance of Russia getting funding for this. I am afraid that Congress, if we do not get these funds soon, will do something to endanger the program. (S)

President Yeltsin: You called me, Bill, and I remember. I intervened, and this new timetable set by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission is to be fulfilled. (S)

The President: Strobe? (S)

Deputy Secretary Talbott: I believe the problem continues. (S)

President Yeltsin: We have a new timetable, and I can assure you that we will comply with it. (S)

The President: I want to expand our cooperation on foreign policy issues, including on regional conflicts. One is Nagorno-Karabakh. We now have an American-French-Russian tri-chair. But look at what is going on there. It would be in the interests of all to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. We have a large stake in this, and I am ready to work with you to get this off of dead-center. I want you to know that I have discussed this with Madeleine, and we are prepared to get involved. (S)

President Yeltsin: I think there is quite a good prospect, Bill. You should be more active in this issue. We will not be jealous. I am sure that your influence will be positive. This is a personal question for Ter-Petrosyan and Aliyev. I need to work more on this, because they are near to Russia, near to me. I should play a more active role. (S)

The fact that Ter-Petrosyan has made this personnel change without consulting us is a problem. When I get to him, I will have to sort this out. (S)

As for the substance of the conflict, it is the level of self-government for Nagorno-Karabakh. There is no solution between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The solution probably is autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh but within the framework of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, which should be preserved. Let's work in parallel. Probably you and I will have to invite Aliyev and Ter-Petrosyan for talks. (S)

The President: I agree. I have met with the two of them together twice. It seems to me that they will never get an agreement by themselves. Maybe if we put forward some ideas and were prepared to back them up, perhaps with some monitors. (C)

President Yeltsin: Good. (C)

The President: I know you need to rest, so perhaps we should break. (C)

President Yeltsin: I agree. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Afternoon Meeting with Russian President
Yeltsin: Joint Statements, Public Line on
NATO-Russia (S)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Sandy Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State

Russia

President Yeltsin
Yevgeniy Primakov, Foreign Minister
Dmitriy Ryurikov, Foreign Policy Assistant
Yuriy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME March 21, 1997, 4:00-4:50 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Finnish President's Residence, Helsinki

The President: There will be a chance over dinner to talk about
a variety of other issues, but we should take a few minutes right
here to talk about the press conference. (S)

I think we want to see if we can agree on how this event should
be seen by the world, by Russians, by others. So let's review
some of the language that we are both going to use in the press
conference. I'd like to read you some of my own statement so
that you can tell me whether it works for you. (S)

(Following some discussion back and forth about the timing and
the venue for signing the joint statements) (S)

President Yeltsin: I want three of the five documents signed:
European security, START and economics. (S)

The President: What about START and CWC? (S)

President Yeltsin: Fine, I am happy to sign all five. (S)

The President: I would like to return to the question of harmonizing our public statements. Boris, I think it's important that, in the way we talk about this, we not encourage people to say who won and who lost. I don't want people saying that Yeltsin won three and Clinton won two. (Ø)

I also think it is important that we use the press conference to underscore the magnitude of these decisions that you and I have made together, both in the area of economics and also in the area of arms control. We went a lot farther than we thought and certainly a lot farther than many other people thought would be possible. (Ø)

Let me now go through the language to make sure that it's consistent with your understanding of things and also with what you think would be the best interpretation of this meeting. By the way, I thought that your tough rhetoric over the last week was understandable given everything that you are dealing with. But I think it is now time that we try to change the atmosphere, and it would be helpful if we could agree on how we are going to talk about various issues, particularly the issue of relations between NATO and Russia. (Ø)

What I'm going to say in my opening statement is that I support NATO enlargement and you think it's a mistake. That's blunt. It's straight-forward. But I am then going to go on to say that we agreed on the importance of ... (Ø)

President Yeltsin: (interrupts) I would prefer slightly different language, Bill. I would like to say that we are opposed to enlargement, but in order to minimize the negative consequences, we accept the proposal for an agreement between NATO and Russia because it is in the interests of the Russian people. (Ø)

The President: I agree. That's pretty much the formulation used in the joint statement. (The President then goes back to reading the text. He reads at some length from the G-7/8 language.) (Ø)

I'm trying to avoid saying anything about G-7 issues that others might have an interest in. By the way, Boris, I think in the press conference we should avoid any answers to questions, any backgrounding with the press afterwards, anything in our public statements that uses the word "concessions." As I said before, I don't want people to score this as you versus me. I don't want them to say that Boris won on three issues and Bill won on two. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: Okay. But the question could come up that this economic package that you've proposed is sort of a bribe to get Russia to accept NATO enlargement. (C)

The President: Well, they won't be able to say that. On the investment side, there's nothing about this that is in any way a bribe. With the internal changes that we hope you will make in your economic system, Russia could become the number one -- one of the best investments in the world. And if it does do that, I want to make sure that American companies have opportunities to take advantage of that. It'll mean jobs for Americans. I wouldn't fulfill my responsibilities as President of the United States if I did not make sure that the United States was in at the beginning of this process. And, by the way, this is only partly about economics. If Russia continues to develop its economy, it's going to be a better partner in many other areas as well. (C)

(There's then some discussion about going over nasty questions that might come up at the press conference. Mr. Berger goes out to get a list of questions. Mr. Talbott comments that they could get difficult questions -- plenty of questions had already been suggested by Henry Kissinger.) (C)

President Yeltsin: Oh yes, that's Madeleine's teacher! (C)

The President: No, there's actually a serious point here, because we are under two lines of attack. There are some people who claim that NATO enlargement will ruin reform in Russia. I know that is rather similar to your line. But there is another line of attack that we hear from Kissinger and certain Republicans who like to say, look at all the concessions that Clinton has made. (C)

(Then there is a back-and-forth between the President and President Yeltsin over legally binding. The bottom line is that President Yeltsin accepts the exact formulation that is used in the joint statement.) (C)

President Yeltsin: It's important that we sign this document before Madrid. We need to get together the leaders of Russia and NATO to sign it. I would say in May. Jacques Chirac has suggested hosting the signing event in May. (C)

The President: Okay, if we can reach an agreement before then. May in Paris would be fine, and I'll come, but I don't think we should announce this today because we do not have an agreement on the charter. (C)

President Yeltsin: I agree. (C)

The President: Okay. Paris in May, but no announcement today.
(C)

(Mr. Berger then tries out some murder-board tough questions, and one of the questions is were there any secret deals in Helsinki.)
(C)

President Yeltsin: We wanted to have a secret deal, but we were rejected. (C)

The President: (laughing) I was prepared to make a secret deal on the vodka concession from Russia! (C)

Foreign Minister Primakov: There ought to be a secret deal to make Madeleine the next Secretary General of NATO. (C)

Mr. Berger: This is a historical moment. For the first time, the President of the United States and the leader of Russia are jointly preparing their answers for a press conference. (C)

(Mr. Berger then tries out on Yeltsin a question on Russia's membership in NATO.) (C)

President Yeltsin: The question was not discussed, and the issue does not arise. (C)

(Mr. Berger then tries out a question about authority to extend START II. He presses President Yeltsin on what his answer would be to the question of submitting START II to the Duma. President Yeltsin, after some misunderstanding about the actual question, says yes, he will press ahead with it.) (C)

President Yeltsin: We have done powerful work. (C)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.14)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Private Dinner with Russian President
Yeltsin: Middle East, China, Iran, Nuclear
Control (X)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The President
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State

Russia

President Yeltsin
Dmitriy Ryurikov, Foreign Policy Assistant

DATE, TIME March 21, 1997, 8:15-9:30 p.m.
AND PLACE: Finnish Official Guest Residence, Helsinki

President Yeltsin: It has been a good day. It has been a good finish (using the word meaning the finish of a race). (X)

The President: Yes, I agree, although the press will try to see if it can't catch us up on something. (X)

President Yeltsin: Well, given everything that we agreed, they won't be able to make any trouble or difficulty. (X)

The President: Are you tired? (X)

President Yeltsin: A little bit, but I am also feeling satisfied. (X)

The President: That is pretty much the way I feel, too. (X)

President Yeltsin: This was the first flight -- the first business trip -- I have taken since my operation. (X)

The President: What are your views of the Middle East? Will it be possible for Arafat to stop the violence in the Palestinian areas? (X)

President Yeltsin: When I met with Arafat recently, it was my impression that he had plenty of good-will and that he wants to

put an end to the cycle of violence and certainly not to encourage terrorism. (S)

You and I together did a very big job today. The skeptics wondered whether either of us were up to it. They speculated about how I was ill and about how you were ill, and yet despite all that, we still managed to have a good day. Let me offer a toast to your success, your leadership and to our accomplishments together here in Helsinki. (S)

I have a couple of gifts for you. And I hope that presenting these gifts in this particular setting would be allowed. (President Yeltsin presents the President with some silver tableware). This was only the third time that this very rare kind of folk art and silverwork have been presented to a foreign visitor. Once was in the reign of Alexander II, the other was in the reign of Nicholas II and the third time was a similar set that had been given to Charles DeGaulle. (S)

(President Yeltsin then presents the President with an elaborate wooden cane which breaks down into three pieces like a billiard cue and has a screw-off top revealing a telescope inside.) (S)

(The President gives President Yeltsin a gift -- a small Frederick Remington statue or a copy of a Frederick Remington statue of an Indian chief on horseback riding down a steep grade.) (S)

The President: You'll see that the horse is on very tricky footing here, but the rider is strong and a good horseman and knows how to stay in the saddle and not be thrown off stride or off the horse. And I think that's a pretty good metaphor for you, Boris, in the way you've been able to deal with difficult terrain. (S)

Let me offer a toast: I toast you for never giving up, never giving in to your opponents and always coming back. You're an inspiration to me and to many others around the world. (S)

(The President asks about China, and Yeltsin talks a little bit about Zhang Zemin coming in April, about a conversation that he had had with Zhang after the death of Deng, who he mistakenly referred to as Mao Zedong. And how Zhang had assured him that there is no unrest and no difficulties after Deng's death.) (S)

President Yeltsin: The Chinese are now on a new course of reform and democratization, and they're ready to cooperate more with the United States. I've talked to Zhang about this and will encourage them in that direction. In general, we need to have better cooperation among the three of us. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Russia and China have a common border, 5,500 kilometers long. We are beginning to draw down military forces along the border. That is, Russia is. Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan are preparing to de-escalate any tensions that might still exist along the border with China. (S)

The President: I note that the Indian Prime Minister is coming to Moscow soon. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, he is coming on Tuesday. The Indians are trying to get Russia to sell them missiles and rocket engines, which Russia will not do. But, at the same time, Russia is prepared to go ahead with the sale of an atomic power plant and two 877 class submarines. These are permissible, but we are not going to do anything that will allow India to build up its nuclear weapons potential. (S)

The President: India is a very important country, and they'll become more important over time. We need to unlock the tension between India and China and India and Pakistan, using as an example the way in which we've been able to reduce the tension between Russia and the United States. Tell the Indian Prime Minister that he and his neighbors can do that if Russia and the United States were able to defuse those kinds of tensions. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, I will tell him that. (S)

The President: Soon India will have the biggest middle class in the world, but that will only happen if India can develop its full potential by reducing the tension that exists between it and its neighbors. (S)

(The President then asks about Iran, clearly intending to raise the question of Russian arm sales to Iran.) (S)

President Yeltsin: The relations between Russian and Iran are essentially those as between a country and a close neighbor. I am opposed to the criticism that Russia sells missiles to Iran. We will never do that. We will sell them submarines, two of these 877 class submarines, and we will go ahead with the nuclear power station. (S)

But, we have not yet signed an agreement on an Iranian mine, and also there is apparently a contract in consideration for an enrichment plant. I have not decided yet, since there was some concern that enriched uranium could push Iran closer to having weapons-grade uranium. I want to avoid coming under fire from

those who would charge Russia with having helped Iran acquire nuclear technology or missile technology. (C)

The President: Some intelligence is troublesome, because it suggests that, in fact, some very dangerous technologies and particularly missile technologies have reached Iran from Russia, although it wasn't necessarily clear that this was coming from the Russian Government. It may have been from certain other organizations ... (C)

President Yeltsin: (interrupts) Categorically no. That technology could be coming from North Korea or China but not from Russia. I know, Bill, you have recently received such intelligence. The Israeli Prime Minister was here, too, and said something about all of this, but I have looked into it, and there is absolutely nothing of the kind. We're aware that Islamic fundamentalism poses a threat to us as well. (C)

My impression is that on your side there have been some efforts to build bridges to Iran. (C)

The President: I've always been willing to talk to them as long as when we talk to them terrorism is one of the issues on the agenda, but they always refuse. I can't be in the position of talking to the Iranians in ways that might make it seem that we're acquiescent in Iranian behavior that threatens our people, our friends and our allies -- that could make all of us more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. (C)

But you're in a different position, Boris. First of all, Iran is your neighbor, and I have some sense of Iran and its people. Long ago when I was living in Arkansas, our state university had many Iranian students. Even after the fall of the Shah, there were lots of Iranians in the United States. What divides us and Iran is this idea that it is part of the legitimate function of political power to fund terrorism around the world. (C)

President Yeltsin: Well, we have discussed this issue. But what I want to tell you is that we will never accept sending missile technology to Iran. (C)

The President: Tell me about your political situation, especially in the Duma. (C)

President Yeltsin: The Duma is now more prepared to cooperate with the Executive Branch, especially since I agreed this year that this would be the year of accord and reconciliation. I am prepared to cooperate with all parties and factions, and the Duma has begun to tone down their reaction to my policies. My hope is this will increase in the period ahead. Now it is easier to deal

with the Duma. I have more support in the Federation Council.
(X)

(President Yeltsin then talks about his new presidential aircraft, an Ilyushin-96.) (X)

President Yeltsin: It is a Boeing-class aircraft, very well made. It is a first edition for the President's personal use.
(X)

(The Presidents talk about how many times each has been to Helsinki, and the answer was three for each President. The President recalls his first visit to Helsinki nearly 30 years ago, around Christmas time, and remembers on Christmas Eve the beautiful patriotic local custom of people going out to the graves of war-fallen and digging little holes in the snow and putting paper bags with candles in them. And he remembers how beautiful the hill looked from the harbor where people were skating. He says it was a beautiful and peaceful way of remembering the sacrifices of the country's soldiers who had died in the war. It had stayed with him for 30 years.) (X)

(There is a fairly long period when President Yeltsin is called out of the room to take what looked like a telephone call, although that is not entirely clear. During that period, the President has a very relaxed conversation with Dmitriy Ryurikov and the two interpreters.) (X)

(When President Yeltsin returns, the Presidents compare notes on their experiences with their operations. The President talks about the procedures in the United States for passing power temporarily to the Vice President. President Yeltsin describes doing the same thing at the time of his heart operation, passing power over to Chernomyrdin and taking the power back. He makes fun of Chernomyrdin for not being used to having what he calls the "button" or the "nuclear football.") (X)

President Yeltsin: Chernomyrdin did not have very long to play with these toys. (X)

The President: Well let's hope none of us ever have to play too much with those toys. (X)

President Yeltsin: I have actually taken part in an exercise with the Russian "football" at one point that involved launching a warhead onto the Kamchatka Peninsula. (X)

(The President then describes the plot of the movie "Crimson Tide" and how it has demonstrated some of the dangers of being on

a nuclear-hair trigger, although he says his people have told him that the plot of "Crimson Tide" could not actually happen.) (S)

President Yeltsin: What if we were to give up having to have our finger next to the button all the time? We have plenty of other ways of keeping in touch with each other. They always know where to find us, so perhaps we could agree that it is not necessary for us to carry the chemodanchik (Russian term for their equivalent of the "football"). (S)

The President: Well, I'll have to think about this. All we carry, of course, are the codes and the secure phone. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, you and I are the only leaders who have to do this. (S)

(The President calls on Mr. Talbott to comment.) (S)

Mr. Talbott: Mr. President, given the responsibilities of your office and President Yeltsin's, it makes more sense for the two of you to have these devices with you at all times rather than to have the function assigned to a computer somewhere or to anyone else. (S)

The President: Well, if we do the right thing in the next four years, maybe we won't have to think as much about this problem. This issue of nuclear reduction is very important. If we were able to get to the place where our successors could go even lower than 2,000 nuclear weapons on all sides, then we would have to come to some understanding with the Chinese and the Indians and others, because it's absolutely crazy for countries as poor as those to have to waste so much money on nuclear weapons. (S)

(It was on that subject that the dinner ended.) (S)

(As the dinner breaks up, Mr. Talbott tells Mr. Ryurikov that President Yeltsin had spoken in error at the press conference when he said that there had been an agreement with the President that NATO would not use Soviet-built infrastructure on the territory of new member states of NATO. Ryurikov acknowledges that there had not been such an agreement.) (S)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

March 31, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR **SANDY BERGER**
~~GLYN DAVIES~~
FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*
SUBJECT: POTUS-Yeltsin Memcons

Attached at Tabs A-D are the memoranda of conversation from the President's March 21 meetings with Russian President Yeltsin. (I prepared the memcon from the lunch at Tab B; the other three were done by Strobe and reformatted here.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. That you *authorize Glyn Davies to* sign the Davies-Burns memo at Tab I transmitting the memoranda of conversation to Secretary Albright, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Charge Tefft in Moscow. *Approved* *Q* *Disapproved*
- 2. That the memoranda of conversation at Tabs A-D be filed for the record.

Approve *Q* Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Davies-Burns Memorandum
 - Tab A Memcon -- March 21 Morning Meeting
 - Tab B Memcon -- March 21 Working Lunch
 - Tab C Memcon -- March 21 Afternoon Meeting
 - Tab D Memcon -- March 21 Private Dinner

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KSH/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9702044
DATE 15 APR 97

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>ORIGINAL +</u>	DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1623				
Document ID: 9703720				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin: NATO-Russia, Arms Control... [partial] (3 pages)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. memcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] [partial] (1 page)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1623

FOLDER TITLE:

9703720

2015-0782-M

rs1540

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9703720
RECEIVED: 29 MAY 97 18

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 04 JUN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 27 MAY

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 04 JUN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

FICKLIN

NSC CHRON

PIFER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-2

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY SP

DATE 6/04

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC

2 OF

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 DAVIES
001
002

Z 97060222 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION
X 97060409 DAVIES APPROVED RECOM
X 97060409 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 970604 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MM LOG # 3720
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG DB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Brown Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>AB 6/2</u>	_____
Davies	<u>2</u>	<u>G 6/3</u>	<u>A</u>
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TMA 6.4</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D with disk</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 2 PM 4:10

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MH LOG.# 3720
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM ERS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Brown Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>MB 6/2</u>	
Davies	<u>2</u>	<u>8/6/3</u>	<u>A</u>
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TMA 6/4</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>		<u>D with disk</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUN 2 PM 4:10

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3720

June 4, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin (Ø)

The attached memorandum of conversation from the May 27 bilateral between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott only. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Charge. This memorandum should be handled in NODIS channels. (Ø)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: X6 5/27/17

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: ~~7~~ KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-17-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin:
NATO-Russia, Arms Control, Economics, Denver
Summit of the Eight, Afghanistan, Iran (C)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Steve Pifer, NSC staff (notetaker)

Russia

President Yeltsin
Yevgeniy Primakov, Foreign Minister
Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, Press Spokesman
Sergey Prikhodko, Foreign Policy Assistant
Nikolay Spasskiy, Head, MFA USA and Canada
Department (notetaker)

DATE, TIME May 27, 1997, 5:00-5:55 p.m.
AND PLACE: The American Ambassador's Residence, Paris

THE PRESIDENT: So, it has been a good day today. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I can say that my soul is at rest. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: You gave a fine speech. I do think that what is important now is to push full implementation of the NATO-Russia partnership. We have to have an early meeting of the Joint Council to make it work. (C)

Let me also say that I know that President Chirac said something to you regarding coming to Madrid. I don't have the same feeling as him -- it is entirely your decision. But I think it might work for you and for NATO. It's a decision that you have to make. We could organize the first day so that it is just NATO, dealing with internal adaptation and having the first countries invited to begin accession talks. The second day could be for the first NATO-Russia Joint Council meeting and a meeting with

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: X6 5/27/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

10-10501/DOS-116-1
05126116 KDE

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin: NATO-Russia, Arms Control... [partial] (3 pages)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1623

FOLDER TITLE:

9703720

2015-0782-M
rs1540

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

all countries in the Partnership for Peace to be called under the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. So there would be nothing about NATO alone on the second day. (C)

We could send a picture to the world embodying a united Europe, though that will only be possible if you come. But you know what is possible and what is not possible for you. We can organize it to help you. (C)

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

THE PRESIDENT: Should you decide that it might be a positive to do this, I'll do what I can to make it a positive. But, again, this is your decision. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Madrid will be July 8 and 9, that is, after Denver. Will there be enough time if I tell you at Denver? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Sure. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OK, then I will tell you at Denver. Today I am extremely glad and satisfied with the results. There are opponents. I have some, and Primakov does as well. But still, we managed to find a solution. I said I would never use the word "compromise" -- what we reached is a balanced result, and that is very helpful. It is important for NATO and Russia and the world as a whole. With this we will submit the Act to the parliament for ratification, and I think we will carry the parliament. (C)

FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV: We will not seek ratification but parliamentary approval. (C)

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

I have Albright and Primakov to thank for their huge work. People say they were invisible. I told my people to introduce them to the public -- they are allies. Primakov and Madeleine Albright have done an immense job. There were six rounds of negotiations and a 15-page document. This is immense. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I want to talk a bit about arms control. We made real progress at Helsinki. I hope our experts can complete an agreed statement on demarcation on ABM/TMD and the START II protocol. If we can get to closure on these documents, perhaps that will help with the Duma on START II. I want to be able to get on to START III. I also want to move on CFE adaptation and hope we can complete a framework agreement before Madrid. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Before Denver -- absolutely! Let us do this as soon as possible. Let us go to the Duma with NATO-Russia, START II, the CWC and START III together! (C)

FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV: It might be better to get NATO-Russia through and then advance on START II. Otherwise, we might get bogged down. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I will invite the chairman of the parliamentary chambers to discuss how to move quickly and throw the proposals into the parliament, and we will ratify START II. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: On CFE, we will give form and meaning to the Founding Act points in a framework agreement. (C)

On economics, I think you will be pleased with the format and your role at Denver. We will play down the Seven, and I hope we will be able to announce your entry into the Paris Club at Denver. There are still some questions on data on military loans and some negotiating on finances. We want to support you, though we need some work on these questions. On WTO accession, our teams are working hard. But you and Chubays and others will have to help with the passage of trade laws in the Duma. (C)

On the economic agenda in general, we are very pleased with your quick work on reform. The new team is impressive. The key issues outstanding for us are the production-sharing laws affecting the oil and gas sector and the Bilateral Investment Treaty. If these are successfully completed, then from the United States there will be an increase in investment. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

4

CONFIDENTIAL

On permanent graduation of Russia from Jackson-Vanik, I support this. But the only remaining issue in Congress is the Russian regulation that requires those with sensitive jobs to wait ten years instead of five years before emigrating. If you can find a way to go back to five years ... (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: There is no such rule in Russia, no such law and no such legislation! (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Strobe? (C)

MR. TALBOTT: I believe there is such a law, but we will clarify this with Mr. Spasskiy after this meeting. (C)

MR. SPASSKIY: Well, theoretically, such a law does exist that stipulates ten years. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (following some back-and-forth among Yeltsin, Primakov and Spasskiy) We will check on this. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I know you have important meetings coming up in Ukraine. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I am going there. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Kuchma was in Washington a short while ago. It is clear that he has great confidence in you and wants to resolve problems and improve relations. I was encouraged by what he said. I hope you make good progress. (C)

On Nagorno-Karabakh, I am very pleased with the recent Washington meeting of the Minsk Group co-chairs. They will travel to the region this weekend. We need to be ready to support them. It would be a very important thing if we could resolve Nagorno-Karabakh. (C)

I really appreciate what you said regarding detargeting weapons aimed at Europe. I think we should have our experts discuss this so that we do not mischaracterize it to the press; we want to ensure that we do not undermine a positive step. (C)

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

5

THE PRESIDENT: I am for it. There are some things that need to be done in the Duma to change your trade laws. But I am committed to Russian entry. The rules of the WTO require some legal changes, but otherwise we are in good shape. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Perhaps we can take one minor step on this before Denver. Maybe Primakov and Albright can make a minor joint step on this. This will be a step for the United States and Russia. Think about this; it would be very interesting. In addition, we should think of coordination in our bilateral relations besides NATO. Let us not forget these questions. Agreed? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Agreed. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I want to confirm my invitation for you to come to Russia for an official visit. There is a lot of interest in visits. If the time between them gets longer, it could raise questions regarding difficulties in the relationship. People watch our relationship very closely, so you should make a decision as to when to come. (C)

As for the Eight, naturally in Denver it should be a priority to transform the Seven into Eight and have a Denver G-8 meeting, a meeting of Eight in Denver. I talked to the Japanese Foreign Minister about this. He told Primakov that they will support it; in other words, there will be no more objections. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I called Hashimoto before Helsinki and told him how important this would be for Europe, Japan and Asia, and he told me how he can do this. As Primakov knows, representatives of various governments nibble at issues, but I think things will be fine in Denver. I believe that we have worked out a way. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hashimoto's attitude has improved in this respect, especially compared to the Japanese attitude three years ago. I will bring some general ideas on practical steps to Denver. The next question is recognizing Russia as a market economy. I wonder if there has been any progress? (C)

MR. BERGER: There are non-market economies and transition economies. But Russia might be worse off under U.S. law if it were categorized as a market economy, at least with respect to some tariffs and other things. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Russia is not a transition economy. We have transformed. It is a market economy. (C)

MR. BERGER: Your economy is more rational than our law. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT: I will look into this. I am not prepared on this subject but will check on it. The thing is, as we work through the WTO, if Russia moves toward an economy in transition and if that leads to more barriers on you, that is not good. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Fine. As for the Paris Club, your voice is very strong. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: As I said, certain people know the issues, and I suspect that we can get you qualified. But we have a couple of issues to work. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I intend to submit a proposal in Denver that in 1998 in Moscow there be a ministerial meeting of the Eight on world energy and energy technology. This is a very important question, and I hope you will support this. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: It sounds like a good idea. I will support it. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good, then I will launch it. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: It would be responsive to some key issues. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good. Are there other questions? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I have covered my issues. I want to ask if your people -- your Foreign Minister -- have any special insights into the Iranian election or Afghanistan. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: On Afghanistan, we have strengthened the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. We need to take steps. If the situation gets worse, there will be a flow of refugees. We have posts along the border with Afghanistan. In case there are some problems on the part of the new Afghan leadership, we will discuss them with you. (C)

As for the Iranian election, we assess it positively. We expect there will not be an upsurge in Islamic extremism and no desire to have nuclear weapons. We are waiting and for the time being will refrain from military and technical aid until the Iranian's demonstrate their policies. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: The United States has agreed to try to set with the European Union benchmarks to measure Iranian behavior. Our position is that we are open to dialogue and ready to meet, but we have to be able to discuss the issues that divide us: support for terrorism, actions against the Middle East peace process and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. I expect that the mandate of the new president may not lead to change in these

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7

CONFIDENTIAL

areas, but we're ready to talk if we can talk about these issues. It would be a great thing if Iran were to change its external policies. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Of course. (C)

FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV: Talbott and Pastukhov can feel their way together on Afghanistan and Iran. We can send people there. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We need to conduct our policies together. Then there will be no misunderstandings between us. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: And Secretary Albright will send a strong message to the Taliban not to destabilize the Central Asia region. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good. On Iran, now things may get quieter, and I hope you can accord Iran better treatment. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: If their policies change. It is hard to know how much authority their president has under Khameni. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Did you send them a message, to the president? (C)

MR. TALBOTT: Only through our press spokesman. (C)

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: We stated that we are interested in what will happen after the election. (C)

MR. BERGER: We will judge by their actions. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: But it was a press statement, not a message? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Our relationship with Iran is complicated by the investigation into the Khobar bombing. Some evidence suggests Iranian involvement. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OK. Well, I am sorry, but I think it is time to leave.

THE PRESIDENT: Good-bye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 2, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN DAVIES

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of May 27
POTUS-Yeltsin Meeting

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of conversation from the President's May 27 meeting with Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you sign the Davies-Burns memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of conversation to Secretary Albright, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Charge Tefft in Moscow.
2. That the memorandum of conversation at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve *8/3* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Davies-Burns Memorandum
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3720

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin (C/S)

The attached memorandum of conversation from the May 27 bilateral between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott only. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Charge. This memorandum should be handled in NODIS channels. (C/S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: X6 5/27/17

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KBY NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] [partial] (1 page)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 1623

FOLDER TITLE:

9703720

2015-0782-M
rs1540

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On permanent graduation of Russia from Jackson-Vanik, I support this. But the only remaining issue in Congress is the Russian regulation that requires those with sensitive jobs to wait ten years instead of five years before emigrating. If you can find a way to go back to five years ... (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: There is no such rule in Russia, no such law and no such legislation! (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Strobe? (C)

MR. TALBOTT: I believe there is such a law, but we will clarify this with Mr. Spasskiy after this meeting. (C)

MR. SPASSKIY: Well, theoretically, such a law does exist that stipulates ten years. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (following some back-and-forth among Yeltsin, Primakov and Spasskiy) We will check on this. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I know you have important meetings coming up in Ukraine. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I am going there. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Kuchma was in Washington a short while ago. It is clear that he has great confidence in you and wants to resolve problems and improve relations. I was encouraged by what he said. I hope you make good progress. (C)

On Nagorno-Karabakh, I am very pleased with the recent Washington meeting of the Minsk Group co-chairs. They will travel to the region this weekend. We need to be ready to support them. It would be a very important thing if we could resolve Nagorno-Karabakh. (C)

I really appreciate what you said regarding detargeting weapons aimed at Europe. I think we should have our experts discuss this so that we do not mischaracterize it to the press; we want to ensure that we do not undermine a positive step. (C)

EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4d

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

12-10581005-110-1 K0605126110

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT: I am for it. There are some things that need to be done in the Duma to change your trade laws. But I am committed to Russian entry. The rules of the WTO require some legal changes, but otherwise we are in good shape. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Perhaps we can take one minor step on this before Denver. Maybe Primakov and Albright can make a minor joint step on this. This will be a step for the United States and Russia. Think about this; it would be very interesting. In addition, we should think of coordination in our bilateral relations besides NATO. Let us not forget these questions. Agreed? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Agreed. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I want to confirm my invitation for you to come to Russia for an official visit. There is a lot of interest in visits. If the time between them gets longer, it could raise questions regarding difficulties in the relationship. People watch our relationship very closely, so you should make a decision as to when to come. (C)

As for the Eight, naturally in Denver it should be a priority to transform the Seven into Eight and have a Denver G-8 meeting, a meeting of Eight in Denver. I talked to the Japanese Foreign Minister about this. He told Primakov that they will support it; in other words, there will be no more objections. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I called Hashimoto before Helsinki and told him how important this would be for Europe, Japan and Asia, and he told me how he can do this. As Primakov knows, representatives of various governments nibble at issues, but I think things will be fine in Denver. I believe that we have worked out a way. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hashimoto's attitude has improved in this respect, especially compared to the Japanese attitude three years ago. I will bring some general ideas on practical steps to Denver. The next question is recognizing Russia as a market economy. I wonder if there has been any progress? (C)

MR. BERGER: There are non-market economies and transition economies. But Russia might be worse off under U.S. law if it were categorized as a market economy, at least with respect to some tariffs and other things. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Russia is not a transition economy. We have transformed. It is a market economy. (C)

MR. BERGER: Your economy is more rational than our law. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9703720
DATE 04 JUN 97

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>ORIGINAL +</u>	DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1629				
Document ID: 9704607				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memcon	re: Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin. European Security and Madrid, Arms Control... [partial] (8 pages)	06/20/1997	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018
001b. memcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] [partial] (1 page)	06/20/1997	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1629

FOLDER TITLE:

9704607

2015-0782-M
rs1541

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 17 JUL 97
SOURCE REF: 3

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 20 JUN MTG W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 08 JUL 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
PIFER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY DPB DATE 7/13/97 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 97070512 FOR DECISION
X 97071714 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 97071714 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE

DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 970717 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

*Rec'd
7/5
11:30am*

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4607
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>9/3 edit</u>	
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>8/17</u>	<u>A</u>
Kerrick		<u>See note</u>	
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>topo on</u> <u>V.P. 7</u> <u>attached</u> <u>7/7/97</u>
Berger		<u>[Signature]</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>7/17</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>7/17</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

97 JUL 3 PM 7:53

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Log # 4607

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm D To JS Date 7/4

Suggest you approve
since you were present

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

National Security Council
The White House

KCW
7/5
11:30am

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4607
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (TZ) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(P) 7/3 Edit</u>	
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>G 7/17</u>	<u>A</u>
Kerrick		<u>(W) See note</u>	
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>(J)</u>	<u>(SPO on 7/17/97)</u>
Berger		<u>(B)</u>	<u>(P) 7/17/97</u>
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(7/17)</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>(AS 7/17)</u>	<u>(J)</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUL 3 PM 7:53

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


4607

July 17, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin

The attached memorandum of conversation from the June 20 bilateral between the President and President Yeltsin in Denver is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary Talbott only. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Charge. This memorandum should be handled in NODIS channels.



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: X6 6/20/17
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBYNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin:
European Security and Madrid, Arms Control,
Economics, Iraq, Russian-Iran Missile
Cooperation, Japanese-Russian Relations (C)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

The President
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury
Erskine Bowles, Chief of Staff
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Gene Sperling, Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy
Dan Tarullo, Assistant to the President for
International Economic Policy
Mike McCurry, White House Press Secretary
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Lawrence Summers, Deputy Treasury Secretary
Jim Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
James Collins, Ambassador for the NIS
Steve Pifer, Senior Director, NSC (notetaker)

Russia

President Yeltsin
Anatoliy Chubays, Deputy Prime Minister
Yevgeniy Primakov, Foreign Minister
Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, Yeltsin Press
Spokesman
Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Sergey Prikhodko, Yeltsin Foreign Policy
Assistant
Ambassador Vorontsov

DATE, TIME June 20, 1997, 1:05-2:05 p.m.
AND PLACE: The Gold Room, The Brown Palace, Denver

(The meeting opened with ten minutes of press pool sprays.)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: X6 6/20/17

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
LP - WSC/DOS - 16-1
05/26/2016 KDE

THE PRESIDENT: You look in good shape. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Isn't my suit a little larger? Something is lacking here (pats stomach). (U)

THE PRESIDENT: It's like losing old friends! (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I lost 30 kilograms. But my brain is working fast, and I would say that now I am moving with more energy. I am a bit older. But I will not break from anything that we have agreed upon. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: You look good. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I prefer that women would tell me that! (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I think this will be a good meeting -- good in substance and in its feeling. There is a good spirit surrounding it. I have a number of issues related to our bilateral relationship but, if you would like to go first, that's alright. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I have a most unusual question. We have the idea of holding a children's Olympic games in Russia in 1998. It would help if you could support it. The International Olympic Committee is for this, so we only need your support. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I have never stood in your way! (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: My congratulations on resolving all of the issues regarding the Paris Club. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: That was very good news. When we talked in Helsinki, I hoped that we could do this quickly -- and Helsinki was only 13 weeks ago. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, and I have also resolved a number of issues with Ukraine, including the Black Sea Fleet. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I was very pleased by that. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Many questions have been resolved. We also managed to resolve the Transdniester problem in Moldova after I invited the parties to come to Moscow. We are also working in the Minsk conference process, with our troika. I ask you to be more energetic on Nagorno-Karabakh. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with that. We've discussed this many times. We finally have a process in place. You and I and Chirac need to persevere. Settling Nagorno-Karabakh would solve a lot

of problems today and save us from a number of problems in the future. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good. My second question relates to our bilateral relationship. There are so many problems that before I entered here I said that I might only have time to enumerate to Bill the number of issues to discuss -- only time to enumerate. There is not enough time to resolve all of these. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, shall I start? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Sure. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: We are working -- and I know that Madeleine and Primakov are working -- on the CFE adaptation effort. I'm encouraged. I think that it is important to resolve this before the NATO meeting in Madrid. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We'll be meeting each other every day! I am very interested in resolving the CFE question. I believe Primakov and Mrs. Albright have to work closely. We need to resolve this by Madrid. You know the issue, so I will not go into it. (S)

I know that we needed some brief pause after Paris. But it turns out that bureaucrats are bureaucrats. They cannot even resolve who will chair the Permanent Joint Council. So we need to resolve this at the highest level. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Regarding Madrid, as I have said before, you have to decide based on your interests. But given the scope of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, I believe that you should have some senior representative at Madrid -- Primakov or someone else. It should be a serious person to represent your interests at what will be seen as a serious event. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (Following an exchange between Yeltsin, Chubays and Primakov) We will have a person there who will have the status of a Deputy Prime Minister. We will let you know his name. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Regarding arms control, in Helsinki we talked about resolving ABM/TMD demarcation and having a START II extension protocol. On ABM/TMD, our experts will meet again on July 21. I believe we should push them to finish their work and then get the START II protocol finished in a manner that will help with ratification, so that you can go on to ratify START II, and then we can move on to START III, which is important for the United States, Russia and the world. I am anxious to fulfill my

commitment to you to get on with START III. Thus the START II protocol is very important. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I am not as up on the issues as I should be on the protocol. We -- along with Yevgeniy Maksimovich -- will have to give a push. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: My goal is START III, which is consistent with your economic needs and with our security needs. (S)

FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV: I have received instructions from my President to accelerate work on this. But we need constructive instructions on your side, not just previous positions. We are prepared to come together on the protocol, but this needs a push from both sides. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Sandy Berger passed me a note reminding me that I missed the issue you raised about the bureaucrats and the NATO-Russia Council. I will check and push this along. (S)

I wanted to mention a couple of economic issues. Congratulations on getting into the Eurobond market this last week and raising two billion dollars. We have some very good conditions -- that, this meeting in Denver and the fact that the Paris Club negotiation is done. The WTO should be next. I know Ambassador Barshefsky is ready to work. We need to intensify our efforts and need to keep these things going. (S)

Another economic issue is your suggestion for a Moscow-hosted energy meeting. I want to reiterate that I support this, and I know that Secretary Pena is coming to Moscow soon -- in July -- and can meet with Nemtsov. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good. Once our Ministers are agreed, we can let them extend that agreement to others. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: There is some reluctance on the part of the others to agree to this meeting. I don't know why. When you and I have our bilaterals with the others, let's ask them why they won't participate in this. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Japan is for it, and Italy is for it, too. Japan is interested in Sakhalin projects. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: We just need to push the others. Someone down in the bureaucracy is saying don't do it. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: One other difficult issue that you and I have discussed before -- the law on religion. I know you vetoed such a law before. I know it's difficult when you have to veto; I have been in the same position. But I received a letter from Senator Lugar, who is a real friend of Russia, expressing concern that religions not be restricted. This would also be a problem for us with Jackson-Vanik. I know this is a domestic question for you. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I am unaware of this issue. I will try to sort this out. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: The law was just passed. People are calling on me to talk to Yeltsin since Yeltsin vetoed a similar law before. (S)

I have two other things. The press asked a question on Iraq, and you gave a good answer. Here is the problem: we have tried to show some flexibility in the 1996 resolution on oil and in modification of the no-fly zone so that some helicopter flights could occur. In response, Ekeus informs the UN that in his effort to do inspections to check on weapons of mass destruction he's being completely shut out in ways that are very problematic. (S)

It seems to me that the UN Security Council must take some action. This could be the beginning of a test of wills to see if Saddam can get out from under some sanctions. We want a resolution to show that we take a strong view on this. I hope we can get that without a veto. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: If it is something, a warning, not a decision on new actions, but a warning that condemns Iraqi activities, we could go along with it. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: The Secretary of State says that the UN Security Council resolution has limited travel sanctions on those believed involved in weapons-of-mass-destruction work but only on them. Without that, it is hard to see how the resolution will change Iraqi behavior; there will be no incentive. The inspection team must be allowed to do its job. The inspections may not be 100 percent effective, but they can slow the weapons-of-mass-destruction work in Iraq. So I hope you will consider this and see if you can avoid a veto and work with us. (S)

FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV: In New York they are discussing the text of the resolution. If the course involves actions of some kind or some sanctions, we cannot support it. It is not needed. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: How many would be on the list affected by the travel sanction? (S)

MR. BERGER: It's a generic list -- the UN would have to decide. (S)

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: The Iraqis are not paying attention. This is the way to target the group that is particularly problematic. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: This would not hurt them economically or be like the punishments inflicted by other sanctions. Ekeus is a patient man, but he came back and says he is being stonewalled. We need to work this today, since the vote will be tomorrow. It would have a negative impact on the atmosphere if we had a problem or split on this issue. (S)

I have one last thing. I know Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov had an extensive discussion on intelligence reports that we have that Russians -- not you -- are providing cooperation with Iran on SA-10 missiles and ground-to-ground medium-range ballistic missiles. We hope the elections will lead to a new course in Iran, but we also have the evidence that we see. I can't imagine anything more destabilizing than an Iranian capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction over intermediate-range distances. (S)

You've always been responsive on this, and I don't doubt the truth of your actions. The only thing that I ask is let's continue to share information, and you do your best to see if entities in Russia are not working in line with your policy. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We have always been honest in our relations, and I implement my promises. There is no weakening of my agreement in Helsinki on no new agreements with Iran. There will be none. We implement what we agreed. You know we have contracts going back to 1985, 1987 and 1989. Deliveries are being made under the terms of those contracts, but nothing in the way of complete missiles, just parts of missiles. (S)

Because of our clumsy democracy, we allow enterprises to have direct contacts with Iran, and they make agreements. They are not supplying whole missiles; they cannot do that. But it is possible certain enterprises can provide parts of missiles -- warheads or tail sections, for example -- but not full missiles. (S)

I established a commission to check into this. They did not provide me with adequate information. I will establish another commission to check the points that you raised and will write you

later. I tell you, there are no new deliveries being made. I received a letter from Madeleine Albright and set up the commission. They reported to me; they possibly did not do the job in good faith. Therefore I will set up a different commission with higher responsibilities and with greater status. I will report back to you. (S)

You know, Bill, during your visit to Russia, we should launch a major Russian-American initiative for the 21st century about what the United States and Russia will enter the 21st century with -- regarding humanitarian issues, science, the social sciences and so forth. This should cover what we want to see and what we can do in the 21st century. We will need a group of intellectuals to develop a powerful document so that we can sign it in Moscow. I have in mind that your visit must be in line with your other visits and must have something powerful. (S)

I also have proposed to discuss pension reform in general at G-8 ministerials. This issue is a problem for all countries, more so for some than others. (S)

I discussed today with Hashimoto greater cooperation in the Far Eastern region, because today our trade with Japan is low. If we wait, we might not have time to seize the chance. We need greater cooperation with Japan and Korea. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I talked to Hashimoto yesterday. I think he wants a genuinely better relationship. I think he understands that, after the NATO-Russia progress, there should be progress on the Russia-Japan front. He understands Japan has a lot to gain. I believe the Japanese are a bit concerned about your relationship with China, that it may be to Japan's disadvantage. (S)

Hashimoto is open and can be completely honest. He is a straight-talker: if he says he will do something, he will do it. There is a possibility for Russia to have a positive relationship with Japan, at least as positive as that with China. Japan is looking for some indication of Russian interest or for a process to improve the relationship. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I have worked hard for good relations with China, and we have made progress. We are lowering arms all along our long border. As for Japan, I will work with Hashimoto for a closer relationship. Perhaps we can spend a weekend together, maybe at Baikal. We need steps to improve our relations. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I will work on him. Let me know what you propose that I can do. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: When you come to Moscow, we have to have a strong substantive program. ~~(C)~~

THE PRESIDENT: We need to do some work. ~~(C)~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It could take about half a year. That would mean coming in early 1998, maybe on New Year's day. ~~(C)~~

THE PRESIDENT: I've been in Moscow on New Year's before. ~~(C)~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay. Well, good-bye for now. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: We'll see you later. (As Yeltsin exited, he and the President had a brief exchange about the order of business for the summit, starting with that evening's dinner discussion.)
~~(C)~~

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9704607
DATE 17 JUL 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 20 JUN MTG W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: 1+ DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 2, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~GLYN DAVIES~~ *SAMUEL BERGER*

FROM: STEVE PIFER *SP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of June 20
POTUS-Yeltsin Meeting

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of conversation from the President's June 20 bilateral with Russian President Yeltsin on the margins of the Denver summit.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That *authorize Glyn Davies to* ~~you~~ sign the Davies-Burns memo at Tab I transmitting the memorandum of conversation to Secretary Albright, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Charge Tefft in Moscow.
2. That the memorandum of conversation at Tab A be filed for the record.

Approve *SP* Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Davies-Burns Memorandum
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

later. I tell you, there are no new deliveries being made. I received a letter from Madeleine Albright and set up the commission. They reported to me; they possibly did not do the job in good faith. Therefore I will set up a different commission with higher responsibilities and with greater status. I will report back to you. (S)

You know, Bill, during your visit to Russia, we should launch a major Russian-American initiative for the 21st century about what the United States and Russia will enter the 21st century with -- regarding humanitarian issues, science, the social sciences and so forth. This should cover what we want to see and what we can do in the 21st century. We will need a group of intellectuals to develop a powerful document so that we can sign it in Moscow. I have in mind that your visit must be in line with your other visits and must have something powerful. (S)

I also have proposed to discuss pension reform in general at G-8 ministerials. This issue is a problem for all countries, more so for some than others. (S)

I discussed today with Hashimoto greater cooperation in the Far Eastern region, because today our trade with Japan is low. If we wait, we might not have time to seize the chance. We need greater cooperation with Japan and Korea. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I talked to Hashimoto yesterday. I think he wants a genuinely better relationship. I think he understands that, after the NATO-Russia progress, there should be progress on the Russia-Japan front. He understands Japan has a lot to gain. I believe the Japanese are a bit concerned about your relationship with China, that it may be to Japan's disadvantage. (S)

Hashimoto is open and can be completely honest. He is a straight-talker: if he says he will do something, he will do it. There is a possibility for Russia to have a positive relationship with Japan, at least as positive as that with China. Japan is looking for some indication of Russian interest or for a process to improve the relationship. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I have worked hard for good relations with China, and we have made progress. We are lowering arms all along our long border. As for Japan, I will work with Hashimoto for a closer relationship. Perhaps we can spend a weekend together, maybe at Baikal. We need steps to improve our relations. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I will work on him. Let me know what you propose that I can do. (S)

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1651				
Document ID: 9707450				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 11	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (6 pages)	10/30/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (6 pages)	10/30/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1651

FOLDER TITLE:

9707450

2015-0782-M
rs1542

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9707450
RECEIVED: 01 NOV 97 14

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 10 NOV 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 30 OCT

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 07 NOV 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: COURTNEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
COURTNEY
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

SWD

DATE

11/10

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH

CLOSED BY: NSSWD

DOC

2 OF

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KGINARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002
002 STATE

Z 97110319 FOR DECISION
X 97111013 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOMS
X 97111013 RICE SGD MEMO
X 97111013 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE

DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 971110 STATE

National Security Council
The White House

11/4
. 215

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 74/50
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PPS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 18 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>B</u> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1/5</u>	<u>@ 11/3 11/20</u>	<u>A-Tab I</u>
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>@ 11/4</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Berger	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	<u>[Signature] 11/10</u>	<u>D-with</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>7</u>	<u>SWP 11/10</u>	<u>diskette</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 NOV 3pm 4:40

Exec Sec Office has diskette [Signature]

National Security Council
The White House

11/4
215

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7450
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 18 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
K Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1/5</u>	<u>11/3 11/10</u>	<u>A-Tab I</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>11/4</u>	
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Berger	<u>4</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>6</u>	<u>11/10</u>	<u>D-with</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>7</u>	<u>SWP 11/10</u>	<u>diskette</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 NOV 3 pm 4:40

Exec Sec Office has diskette [Signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7450


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 10, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the October 30
telephone conversation between the President and President
Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of
State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via
NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow
for the Ambassador. (C)


Glyn T. Davies
Fed: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 11/02/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetaker: Pete Huggins, Jim Smith,
Doug Mueller, Bonnie Glick
Tony Campanella, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME October 30, 1997, 12:52 - 1:21 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good evening, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'm very glad to be able to talk to you on the phone. Thanks for making the call. You know, I started missing your voice. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I miss you too. I'm a little hoarse today, hope you can hear me. Congratulations on your new grandson. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you very much. I now have a big family -- eleven members, with five grandchildren. You know the development of Russia and my family go hand-in-hand. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Your family is certainly going to make its contribution. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Sure, why not. Well, it's not going to be a very significant contribution, but it will have an impact. I think we will prevail on quality rather than quantity. (Laughter) How are things with you, Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I'm doing fine here. Jiang Zemin just left.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 11/02/07

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0732-M-2 (1.15)
3/13/2018 KSM

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I know this and that must have been a very exciting moment. I hold in very high esteem his visit to your country, and I believe his visit is a breakthrough in terms of world politics. Also, I am planning to visit China on November 9. So we'll be able to synchronize our watches, you and I, as far as China is concerned. And what was your assessment of this visit? Was it good? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I believe it's been very positive. I think it will help settle down opinions on China in this country and in the Congress, and we got a good agreement with them on nuclear cooperation. That was very important to me, so I think it was a positive meeting. I wish that...(interrupted) (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This is a positive thing not only for you and the United States, but for Russia and the entire world. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I think so. One of the funniest moments came yesterday during a press conference. A Chinese journalist asked me if I was concerned about your going to China and a closer relationship between Russia and China. And my answer was that during the Cold War, when Russia and China had problems, it made the United States happy, but now we all have to get along and work together because we have too many common challenges and opportunities. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you for this assessment. I believe the cooperation you mentioned is intended to achieve the same objective that we share -- cooperation and peace are the two objectives we share, you and I. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, I want to take just a few minutes to talk directly with you. I know you saw the Vice President in September and I had a good talk with Primakov in New York. It is important that we keep in personal contact. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Primakov told me about his meeting. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: It was good. I thank you for your invitation to come back to Russia next year after START II is ratified. I think we got a lot done in Helsinki and I want to chart a real course for the future. The Russian economy is doing better and I hope to get more U.S. investment in Russia in the future, and there's been other good news. I'm glad your people are more optimistic about ratification of CWC, and I wanted to ask you what you thought about prospects for the Duma ratifying START II

and your ideas on meetings next year. I'm looking forward to coming there next year. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, in the first place I want to thank you for the close attention you are paying to the problem, because I believe this is our common child and we have to bring it up together. And you know of course, that Mrs. Albright and Mr. Primakov signed several protocols related to ABM. So I don't think the Duma has any objections now about having the treaty ratified. But the only thing that is uppermost in its mind, and I think they would like to rush that thing, is approval of the budget for 1998. It helped a lot that Chernomyrdin and I got people from different factions of the Duma together and had very serious conversations with them, and as a result, most objections were cleared away. I believe that next week the budget will be approved and next on the agenda will be START II. (C)

On the subject of START III, I believe it's time to set up a joint working group of experts to start working on the text of the treaty. I think that we have first to determine the number of people we want on each side in the joint group and then we'll have to appoint heads of the two groups from each side, you and I. And I am not sure what you think about this, but I would think that if we could appoint Primakov and Albright as heads of the respective groups of experts of the two sides, then we'd have the appropriate level; and another thing, they have developed good rapport between themselves. If you find that agreeable, then we could release this to the press, even today. What do you think? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Boris, for what I have to do here with our Congress, because we need their support for START III, we have to be it a careful in what we say, because we agreed not to begin actual negotiations of START III until START II was ratified. It might cause more problems if we say we will push other meetings now. I would recommend we tell the press that we are going to accelerate the experts' talks, and then let me talk to our people about your suggestion on how we should organize the working group. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, understood, I get your point -- have to be careful not to have START III negotiation before we have START II ratification. This is the order that we agreed with you; first START II ratification, then proceed with work on START III. Also, not to lose time, we will not be engaged in actual (START III) negotiations, but the organizational aspects

of the problem -- we should set up the working group and name heads of that group. (S)

Currently I have developed good contacts with the state Duma and I have this feeling of confidence that the Duma will ratify the text of the START II treaty. We could discuss at this point the size of the membership of each expert group -- let's say eighteen on each side, sixteen total -- and appoint as heads Albright and Primakov, no negotiations. Now this is an organizational thing, it will take some time to complete. In the meantime, START II could be ratified. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Great. (U)

Boris, there is one other specific matter I need to raise. I have a letter on its way to you about Iranian ballistic missiles. If Iran gets them, it will be dangerous for Russia and destabilizing for the Middle East and Europe. This is a real test for us. I took to heart your assurance you are working hard to stop the flow, but I believe we have to do more. I made some specific proposals in the letter that I hope you will consider seriously. (S)

I also believe it is important that the next round of talks between Ambassador Wisner and Mr. Koptev take place as soon as possible; I heard there is a delay in the dates, and I hope we can fix that. This has become an urgent question here, and I'm fighting off irresponsible efforts in Congress that would be detrimental to what we're trying to do together. So I hope you'll read the letter and get back to me on the specific suggestions. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (Interrupts the translation midway through, just at reference to the President's letter) No, Iran is not going to get any missiles from us, there is no way they can get them. I know you have full trust and confidence in Wisner just as I have full trust in Koptev. We are ready to cooperate, to accept here a group of your experts. We will be giving them full access to our archives and all other documents, and they'll be most welcome here to do work and research. There will be no obstacles on our side. We want the group here. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I understand you are doing all you can and there will be no missiles. Your assurances are most important. We're still concerned about related technology transfers. I'll send you the letter and Wisner and Koptev will work through it. We'll work through it. (S)

you the letter and Wisner and Koptev will work through it. We'll work through it. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good, Bill, agreed. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say Hillary is really looking forward to her trip to Russia. She is going to visit your home town and hopes Naina is going to join her there. Hillary wants her trip to highlight for the American people how much reform and change are taking place throughout Russia under your leadership. She is very excited about the trip and I only wish I could be there with her. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you for these kind words and please give my warm regards to Hillary. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, there is one more thing I want to clarify. Are we in agreement or not that we will set up a working group of experts to work on START III? Are we going to do that now or not? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I think that we ought to do that, if we can say we are going to explore all aspects, lay the groundwork toward as much mutual understanding as possible. But in this country, it would cause a lot of problems if I seemed to be negotiating START III before START II is ratified. If we can characterize the work of the working group as something other than negotiating the treaty then it will be all right. As long as we can set it up without making it look like we are actually negotiating, I think we're OK. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Ok, so I understand it this way: we will first push in a very vigorous way for early ratification of START II, then also promptly proceed with setting up these working groups on START III. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great Boris, thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you. It's been very pleasant for me to have this opportunity to talk to you on the phone, and I'm looking forward to our next meeting. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Me too. I can't wait to see you, and if you ever want to talk to me, any time day or night, I'm always glad to talk to you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And of course we'll have lots of things to discuss when we meet. And a hug for Mrs. Clinton once again. I've been remiss as far as initiating telephone calls and conversations from my side. I'll make it up to you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Great, Boris. Good-bye friend. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good-bye. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: See you, good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9707450

REFERRAL

DATE: 10 NOV 97

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: BURNS, W
SOURCE: DAVIES
DATE: 10 NOV 97
SUBJ: MEMCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 30 OCT

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 11 NOV 97

COMMENT:


 FOR

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9707450
DATE 10 NOV 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 30 OCT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 7224 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>1</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBY Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

November 3, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER


FROM: WILLIAM COURTNEY

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President
Boris Yeltsin on October 30, 1997


Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation from the October 30 phone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve  Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KKM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7450

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin (U)

The attached memorandum of conversation from the October 30
phone conversation between the President and President Yeltsin
is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and
Deputy Secretary Talbott. It may also be sent to Ambassador
Collins at Embassy Moscow. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 11/02/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Russian President Yeltsin (u)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetaker: Pete Huggins, Jim Smith,
Doug Mueller, Ki Fort,
Bonnie Glick, Tony Campanella

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 30, 1997, 12:52 - 1:21 EST
The Oval Office
pm,

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good evening, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'm very glad to be able to talk to you on the phone. Thanks for making the call. You know, I started missing your voice. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I miss you too. I'm a little hoarse today, hope you can hear me. Congratulations on your new grandson. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you very much. I now have a big family -- eleven members, with five grandchildren. You know the development of Russia and my family go hand-in-hand. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Your family is certainly going to make its contribution. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Sure, why not. Well, it's not going to be a very significant contribution, but it will have an impact. I think we will prevail on quality rather than quantity. (Laughter) How are things with you, Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I'm doing fine here. Jiang Zemin just left. He was here yesterday. (u)

Classified by: Glyn T. Davis

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I know this and that must have been a very exciting moment. I hold in very high esteem his visit to your country, and I believe his visit is a breakthrough in terms of world politics. Also, I am planning to visit China on November 9. So we'll be able to synchronize our watches, you and I, as far as China is concerned. And what was your assessment of this visit? Was it good? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I believe it's been very positive. I think it will help settle down opinions on China in this country and in the Congress, and we got a good agreement with them on nuclear cooperation. That was very important to me, so I think it was a positive meeting. I wish that...(interrupted) (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This is a positive thing not only for you and the United States, but for Russia and the entire world. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think so. One of the funniest moments came yesterday during a press conference. A Chinese journalist asked me if I was concerned about your going to China and a closer relationship between Russia and China. And my answer was that during the Cold War, when Russia and China had problems, it made the U.S. happy, but now we all have to get along and work together because we have too many common challenges and opportunities. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you for this assessment. I believe the cooperation you mentioned is intended to achieve the same objective that we share - cooperation and peace are the two objectives we share, you and I. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, I want to take just a few minutes to talk directly with you. I know you saw the Vice President in September and I had a good talk with Primakov in New York. It is important that we keep in personal contact. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Primakov told me about his meeting. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: It was good. I thank you for your invitation to come back to Russia next year after START II is ratified. I think we got a lot done in Helsinki and I want to chart a real course for the future. The Russian economy is doing better and I hope to get more U.S. investment in Russia in the future, and there's been other good news. I'm glad your people are more optimistic about ratification of CWC, and I wanted to ask you what you thought about prospects for the Duma ratifying START II

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and your ideas on meetings next year. I'm looking forward to coming there next year. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, in the first place I want to thank you for the close attention you are paying to the problem, because I believe this is our common child and we have to bring it up together. And you know of course, that Mrs. Albright and Mr. Primakov signed several protocols related to ABM. So I don't think the Duma has any objections now about having the treaty ratified. But the only thing that is uppermost in its mind, and I think they would like to rush that thing, is approval of the budget for 1998. It helped a lot that Chernomyrdin and I got people from different factions of the Duma together and had very serious conversations with them, and as a result, most objections were cleared away. I believe that next week the budget will be approved and next on the agenda will be START II. (C)

On the subject of START III, I believe it's time to set up a joint working group of experts to start working on the text of the treaty. I think that we have first to determine the number of people we want on each side in the joint group and then we'll have to appoint heads of the two groups from each side, you and I. And I am not sure what you think about this, but I would think that if we could appoint Primakov and Albright as heads of the respective groups of experts of the two sides, then we'd have the appropriate level; and another thing, they have developed good rapport between themselves. If you find that agreeable, then we could release this to the press, even today. What do you think? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Boris, for what I have to do here with our Congress, because we need their support for START III, we have to be a bit careful in what we say, because we agreed not to begin actual negotiations of START III until START II was ratified. It might cause more problems if we say we will push other meetings now. I would recommend we tell the press that we are going to accelerate the experts' talks, and then let me talk to our people about your suggestion on how we should organize the working group. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, understood, I get your point-- we have to be careful not to have START III negotiation before we have START II ratification. This is the order that we agreed with you; first START II ratification, then proceed with work on START III. Also, not to lose time, we will not be engaged in actual (START III) negotiations, but the organizational aspects

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of the problem-- we should set up the working group and name heads of that group. (C)

Currently I have developed good contacts with the state Duma and I have this feeling of confidence that the Duma will ratify the text of the START II treaty. We could discuss at this point the size of the membership of each expert group-- let's say eight-ten on each side, sixteen total-- and appoint as heads Albright and Primakov, no negotiations. Now this is an organizational thing, it will take some time to complete. In the meantime, START II could be ratified. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Great. (U)

Boris, there is one other specific matter I need to raise. I have a letter on its way to you about Iranian ballistic missiles. If Iran gets them, it will be dangerous for Russia and destabilizing for the Middle East and Europe. This is a real test for us. I took to heart your assurance you are working hard to stop the flow, but I believe we have to do more. I made some specific proposals in the letter that I hope you will consider seriously. (C)

I also believe it is important that the next round of talks between Ambassador Wisner and Mr. Koptev take place as soon as possible; I heard there is a delay in the dates, and I hope we can fix that. This has become an urgent question here, and I'm fighting off irresponsible efforts in Congress that would be detrimental to what we're trying to do together. So I hope you'll read the letter and get back to me on the specific suggestions. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (Interrupts the translation midway through, just at reference to the President's letter) No, Iran is not going to get any missiles from us, there is no way they can get them. I know you have full trust and confidence in Wisner just as I have full trust in Koptev. We are ready to cooperate, to accept here a group of your experts. We will be giving them full access to our archives and all other documents, and they'll be most welcome here to do work and research. There will be no obstacles on our side. We want the group here. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I understand you are doing all you can and there will be no missiles. Your assurances are most important. We're still concerned about related technology transfers. I'll send you the letter and Wisner and Koptev will work through it. We'll work through it. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good, Bill, agreed. (X)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say Hillary is really looking forward to her trip to Russia. She is going to visit your home town and hopes Naina is going to join her there. Hillary wants her trip to highlight for the American people how much reform and change is taking place throughout Russia under your leadership. She is very excited about the trip and I only wish I could be there with her. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you for these kind words and please give my warm regards to Hillary. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, there is one more thing I want to clarify. Are we in agreement or not that we will set up a working group of experts to work on START III? Are we going to do that now or not? (X)

THE PRESIDENT: I think that we ought to do that, if we can say we are going to explore all aspects, lay the groundwork toward as much mutual understanding as possible. But in this country, it would cause a lot of problems if I seemed to be negotiating START III before START II is ratified. If we can characterize the work of the working group as something other than negotiating the treaty then it will be all right. As long as we can set it up without making it look like we are actually negotiating, I think we're OK. (X)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Ok, so I understand it this way: we will first push in a very vigorous way for early ratification of START II, then also promptly proceed with setting up these working groups on START III. (X)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great Boris, thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you. It's been very pleasant for me to have this opportunity to talk to you on the phone, and I'm looking forward to our next meeting. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Me too. I can't wait to see you, and if you ever want to talk to me, any time day or night, I'm always glad to talk to you. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~⁶

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And of course we'll have lots of things to discuss when we meet. And a hug for Mrs. Clinton once again. I've been remiss as far as initiating telephone calls and conversations from my side. I'll make it up to you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Great, Boris. Good-bye friend. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good-bye. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: See you, good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1654				
Document ID: 9707804				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 1	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (3 pages)	11/16/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)	11/16/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1654

FOLDER TITLE:

9707804

2015-0782-M
rs1543

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9707804
RECEIVED: 17 NOV 97 12

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 18 NOV 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN *16 NOV*

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 22 NOV 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

FORT

NSC CHRON

Ficklin

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY *SP* DATE *11/19* BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-m-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 97111721 FOR DECISION
X 97111907 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 97111907 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 971118 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7204
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PR A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
b Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>11/18</u>	_____
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>8/11/18</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>11/18</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
Berger	<u>4</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>11/18</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

NOV 17 PM 6:53

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7204
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PHS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG PHS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>b</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	1	① 11/18	
Davies	3	8 11/18	
Kerrick	2	① 11/18	
Steinberg	3	copy	
Berger	4	copy	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	① 11/18	D
Records Mgt.	5		D

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

'97 NOV 17 PM 6:33

Exec Sec Office has diskette *lyo*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7804

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 18, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin (Ø)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the November 16 telephone conversation between the President and President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (Ø)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 11/16/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7804

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President
Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetakers: David Higgins, Mariann
Papadimitriou, Larry
Wright, James Smith,
Pat O'Shaughnessy, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME: November 16, 1997, 2:04 - 2:15 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Malibu, California

THE PRESIDENT: Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks for taking my call. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'm very glad to have a word with you, to be on the line with you. I'd like to transmit best regards from Hillary, who visited Sverdlovsk with Naina. It was a good program, and they had a very good meeting. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hillary had a good time. I appreciate your making her feel welcome. I wanted to talk to you briefly about Iraq. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'm all ears. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I'd like to make my points, then listen to you. I think Iraq's actions are a very serious challenge to the UN, the UN Security Council, and the security of the Persian Gulf. We have to find a way to make sure Saddam Hussein doesn't rebuild Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5

Declassify on: 11/16/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-m-2 (1.17)
3/13/2018 KBH

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: What's your proposal, Bill? What's your proposal? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I want to make sure you understand that I want to find a diplomatic way to resolve this. I hope that you will do all you can to get Saddam to let the inspectors back in. I have some specific ideas that I want Madeleine to speak to Primakov about, but I want you to understand that from my point of view, I can't rule out the use of force under any circumstances, because he's threatened to shoot down our airplanes. Boris, UNSCOM has destroyed much more weaponry than the Gulf War did, it's destroyed almost 7,000 tons of chemical weapons agents, and discovered a biological weapons program. This is a very serious thing, but I want to find a diplomatic solution. I have some specific ideas that I want Madeleine to speak to Primakov about in the next few days, and I'd like you to help me convince Saddam to find a diplomatic solution. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, good, Bill. I understand you. Right now, a few minutes ago, Primakov spoke on the phone to Mrs. Albright, so I understand your point and agree with you. I'll write a letter to Saddam Hussein about the need to resume UNSCOM inspections, saying that they should have conditions for working in their normal way, but we should work through the auspices of the Security Council to deal with one problem at a time. For instance, this nuclear thing - no problem; we'll remove that, and move on to the next (problem). We'll proceed like that one step at a time, piece by piece. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I hope we can resolve these issues. We'll work out the details of a proposal and get back to you. I want to make sure you know I don't want a big, violent confrontation. If there's any chance to avoid that, there's a good chance Saddam will listen to you. I don't want a confrontation, but we owe it to the world to get rid of these weapons, before they end up used in the Gulf or in the hands of some terrorist. I'll do everything I can to work together toward a satisfactory conclusion, and I hope it's a nonviolent one. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good, Bill. Like I said, I'm going to send a letter to (Saddam) Hussein at once, within a couple of hours, mentioning many issues on the agenda; the Commission needs normal conditions to operate, and there will be other issues as well. Primakov and Albright will be in contact with each other on a constant basis. Perhaps they can come up with a joint document. And you and I will do our best. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT: That's great, Boris, and I will stay in touch. Thank you and give my best to Kuchma. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Oh yes, I will send your best regards. We have a meeting with him today. My best to you, Bill. Goodbye. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye, Boris. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7804

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 17, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

(10) FN

FROM: KI FORT *WF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, November 16, 1997

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
November 16 telephone conversation between the President and
Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 11/16/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBM/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7804

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President
Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetakers: David Higgins, Mariann
Papadimitriou, Larry
Wright, James Smith,
Pat O'Shaughnessy, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME: November 16, 1997, 2:04 - 2:15 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Malibu, California

THE PRESIDENT: Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks for taking my call. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'm very glad to have a word with you, to be on the line with you. I'd like to transmit best regards from Hillary, who visited Sverdlovsk with Naina. It was a good program, and they had a very good meeting. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hillary had a good time. I appreciate your making her feel welcome. I wanted to talk to you briefly about Iraq. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'm all ears. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I'd like to make my points, then listen to you. I think Iraq's actions are a very serious challenge to the UN, the UN Security Council, and the security of the Persian Gulf. We have to find a way to make sure Saddam Hussein doesn't rebuild Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify on: 11/16/07

Class by: GTD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.18)
3/13/2018 KBH

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9707804
DATE 18 NOV 97

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1655				
Document ID: 9707985				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telecon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (6 pages)	11/22/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telecon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (2 pages)	11/22/1997	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 1655

FOLDER TITLE:

9707985

2015-0782-M

rs1544

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9707985
RECEIVED: 24 NOV 97 09

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 26 NOV 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA IRAQ
 IRAN UN
 START TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN *22 NOV*

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH DUE DATE: 29 NOV 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
STATE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
COURTNEY
FORT
NSC CHRON
RIEDEL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY *SMD* DATE *11/26/97* BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRM/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015 - 0782 - M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9707985

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002
002 STATE

Z 97112615 FOR DECISION
Z 97112618 KERRICK APPROVED RECOMS
X 97112618 DAVIES SGD MEMO
X 97112618 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 971126 STATE

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7985
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRB NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG W A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>JCP</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>R 11/24</u>	_____
Davies	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>R 11/24</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>R 11/24</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>SM 11/26</u>	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 NOV 25 pm 8:12

Exec Sec Office has diskette W

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 26, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the November 22
telephone conversation between the President and President
Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of
State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via
NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the
Ambassador. (S)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 11/24/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President
Yeltsin (✓)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetakers: Lyle Harrison, Jeff Rathke,
Cindy Lawrence, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME: November 22, 1997, 9:00 - 9:43 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. I wanted to talk to you briefly about where we go on Iraq. First I wanted to tell you I appreciate your personal efforts. I think we need to work hard to stay together on these issues. We need to see cooperation on the ground and in the air, including especially an end to efforts to block or hamper inspection of chemical and biological sites and an end to threats to U2 flights. (✓)

In terms of the composition of UN inspection teams, let me make clear my priorities. First, that the teams be autonomous and free to pursue their professional obligations. Secondly, they need to be composed of properly trained technical experts. (✓)

I know you want to send more humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. I agree they deserve our help. (✓)

In terms of certifying whether the Iraqis are complying on nuclear and missiles inspections, from my point of view, it is purely a question of fact and professional judgment. I don't believe the United States, Russia, or any other country, should make it happen or not make it happen on political grounds. That

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 11/24/07

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.19)
3/13/2018 KBM

is why we have trained professional experts. We've made more progress there, but whether it's sufficient is what the team is there for. They should decide. (S)

Let me emphasize again. I never said that we should not be able to help the Iraqi people. But we should be able to finish the work. Biological and chemical inspections are more difficult than the missile or nuclear ones. They (Iraqis) must give more access to the sites. We have shown through diplomatic efforts, backed by credible force, that we can work to solve this question. You've played a role in that; I hope we can work closely together on next steps. (S)

~~PRESIDENT YELTSIN~~: Good, Bill. I think that we have acted correctly together, and now for the time being the threat of crisis is no longer there. When I was meeting here with Aziz, I stated that the one-sided actions on the part of Iraq, such as disbanding of the commission, were not acceptable, and we have agreed to resume activity of the commission in the composition that was there, including American participants. And I also believe, Bill, that they feel the hardships. The situation is quite difficult for them because its making peoples' lives very hard. Maybe Bill, we could come to an agreement with you on which issues have been solved and which remain outstanding, and proceeding from that basis, we could lift some part of the embargo. Of course, we have to come to an understanding on U-2 flights and other similar things. (S)

On the whole, I have the impression that the Iraqis themselves have become tired of their policies and want to return to the community of normal states. I think now the time has come when we should not push them away, but should let the situation get back to normal as it is among other states. (S)

I think that the record of the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Geneva was good, and the statement they issued also was a good achievement. It is necessary that Madame Albright should continue to maintain contact with Mr. Primakov to prevent any kind of repetition of this situation. (S)

Bill, I would like to ask you to make together (with us) some kind of concession, a small concession in the Security Council, just a small concession in their direction. Hussein expressed his willingness and readiness to cooperate. In other words, he has shown willingness to use peaceful diplomacy methods. So slowly, the heavy military hardware could be withdrawn from that

area. I mean the ships and the phantoms. What do you think about that? (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I agree we need to keep working together and agree on the need to give relief to the Iraqi people. However, I think it is quite important over the next few days that Saddam allow UNSCOM to operate, to show his good faith. After all, he did kick the inspectors out and they have just returned. It's important that we see they can do their jobs. (Ø)

Secondly, in terms about what you said about certifying that they have complied, my understanding is that the inspectors are closer to finishing on the missile and nuclear side than on the biological or chemical side; as to whether they have really finished their tasks, we should let the team tell us this. For example, one of the best people on the UNSCOM missile team is a Russian, Mr. Smidovich. They know what needs to be done to finish. If in fact, they are close to completion, they need to tell us so. If there is more to do, then we can agree on accelerating the work. (Ø)

But Boris, I just want to take a minute to talk about the chemical and biological issues. I think you should have your people give you the list of chemical agents that Saddam Hussein admitted to having in 1989, which he says he destroyed, but has no records on, although he has lists on other things. Also, look at what he admitted to just in 1995 -- just two years ago. No other country in the world has a major chemical and biological program and has actually used it against others as the Iraqis have used it on Iran and the Kurds. When UNSCOM inspectors were forced to leave, it was just as they were about to get access to a suspected biological site. Even if Saddam were in a position where he couldn't use it on anyone else, he could sell it to terrorists or to American, European, Japanese or Russian organized crime networks. And just a little bit of this can do a lot of damage, as we saw in the Tokyo subway attack a couple of years ago. We should watch this closely. (Ø)

You asked for a small gesture on this. Keep in mind that we have Resolution 986, which we all supported. We can expand humanitarian relief as a gesture -- if they cooperate -- if we see we're going to get access. The faster they cooperate, the more we can work out. This is important for the future stability of the world that we're trying to create. But I think it's important to concentrate on the biological and chemical

issue. We can't take it lightly. To me this is a very serious issue. We need to find a way for the inspectors, whoever they may be, to be trained and to do their jobs. This is my overwhelming concern. Nothing would make me happier than to have Iraq restored as a responsible member of the community of nations. But we need to focus on this. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, I agree. I have another question which does not have anything to do with Iraq. Bill, I am aware that the State Department made a decision and the Embassy here held a meeting whose agenda included measures to prevent the "exit" (opening) of Russia to the East. I think that is unacceptable in relations between partners. It is up to each country to decide what kind of relations it wants, especially in trade and commerce. Each country should decide with which country to trade. Besides, we agreed we would solve such things between you and me, even over the phone. And we believe we should solve them together through diplomacy. And this is sustained by the fact that understanding between Albright and Primakov is good, and that is very important. (C)

You are right Bill. The crisis with Iraq is over, but we should be prepared to work together and to prevent any new happening or similar event. And then, on another subject Bill, I do miss you. I think it is high time we meet again, and it is time for you to come here to Russia. I think the appropriate time would be if you came early next year. What is the most convenient time for such a visit? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me respond to the first issue. I don't know what the State Department issue is. But let me assure you, I want you to be more involved in Asia, not less. I'm on my way to Vancouver right now for APEC. I want you to be in APEC, and I hope we can work out WTO as well. I want Russia more involved in the Asia-Pacific region. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (interrupts the translator): Then you should tell Collins about that. You should reprimand him. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say a word about Iran. I also was pleased about the arrest of the Iranian trying to obtain missile blueprints. It is a constructive step. Strobe has given Primakov some specific ideas about next steps that we hope you will consider carefully. (C)

Finally, I am looking forward to coming to Russia, but I thought we both agreed it would be better if I came after the Duma ratified START II. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, then you plan to come after the ratification of START II by the Duma? (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Yes, I thought we talked about this before. I am very anxious to come, even in winter. But if I came before (START II ratification), then it might lead to press coverage solely about that. It might complicate your efforts, with nationalists and opponents in the Duma arguing that my coming intensified pressure on you. It would put you in a difficult position. But it might be better for you and for the range of our relations not to have this cloud over our meeting. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay. I agree with you. It is necessary that the Duma wind up work on the budget as soon as possible and then they can begin consideration of START II. When I met with representatives of the Duma we came to an understanding about that sequence. (S)

But we should also take note of the fact that since we have not met for quite some time; some politicians may take that as a sign of difficulties in our relations; we should not provide any grounds for such thinking or allegations. (S)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I agree and I hope that we will get some good press in Russia for acceptance of Russia in APEC and the U.S. role in that. That should do away with the speculation. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you. I will see you soon, I hope. (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Yes. I hope so. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Tell me, by the way, was Hillary satisfied with her visit? (U)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Yes, she loved it, especially the time she spent with Naina. She told me about it in great detail. She also said that, like me, you also have a better wife than you deserve. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: That's very good. Please give my best regards to Hillary. I embrace you, Bill, and please telephone

me if any changes take place. But don't delay this meeting between us, because such a delay is immediately interpreted as some kind of cooling off between the United States and Russia, although this is not true. The fact is that relations are growing and becoming stronger. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree. We'll be together soon. Goodbye Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9707985

REFERRAL

DATE: 26 NOV 97

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: BURNS, W

SOURCE: DAVIES

DATE: 26 NOV 97

SUBJ: TRANSMITTAL MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 28 NOV 97

COMMENT:


(FOR)

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9707985
DATE 26 NOV 97

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 7224 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>1</u>	

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBN Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7985

November 25, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER *(B) TEA*

THROUGH: WILLIAM COURTNEY *OK*

FROM: KI FORT *WF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, November 22, 1997

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
November 22 telephone conversation between the President and
Russian President Yeltsin.

Concurrence by: Bruce Riedel *WR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 11/24/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBN* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President
Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetakers: Lyle Harrison, Jeff Rathke,
Cindy Lawrence, Ki Fort ✓

DATE, TIME: November 22, 1997, 9:00 - 9:43 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. I wanted to talk to you briefly about where we go on Iraq. First I wanted to tell you I appreciate your personal efforts. I think we need to work hard to stay together on these issues. We need to see cooperation on the ground and in the air, including especially an end to efforts to block or hamper inspection of chemical and biological sites and an end to threats to U2 flights. (C)

In terms of the composition of UN inspection teams, let me make clear my priorities. First, that the teams be autonomous and free to pursue their professional obligations. Secondly, they need to be composed of properly trained technical experts. (C)

I know you want to send more humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. I agree they deserve our help. (C)

In terms of certifying whether the Iraqis are complying on nuclear and missiles inspections, from my point of view, it is purely a question of fact and professional judgment. I don't believe the U.S., Russia, or any other country, should make it happen or not make it happen on political grounds. That is why

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 11/24/07

United States

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.20)
3/13/2018 KBH

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

we have trained professional experts. We've made more progress there, but whether it's sufficient is what the team is there for. They should decide. (e)

Let me emphasize again. I never said that we should not be able to help the Iraqi people. But we should be able to finish the work. Biological and chemical inspections are more difficult than the missile or nuclear ones. They (Iraqis) must give more access to the sites. We have shown through diplomatic efforts, backed by credible force, that we can work to solve this question. You've played a role in that; I hope we can work closely together on next steps. (e)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good, Bill. I think that we have acted correctly together, and now for the time being the threat of crisis is no longer there. When I was meeting here with Aziz, I stated that the one-sided actions on the part of Iraq, such as disbanding of the commission, were not acceptable, and we have agreed to resume activity of the commission in the composition that was there, including American participants. And I also believe, Bill, that they feel the hardships. The situation is quite difficult for them because it's making peoples' lives very hard. Maybe Bill, we could come to an agreement with you on which issues have been solved and which remain outstanding, and proceeding from that basis, we could lift some part of the embargo. Of course, we have to come to an understanding on U2 flights and other similar things. (e) ✓

On the whole, I have the impression that the Iraqis themselves have become tired of their policies and want to return to the community of normal states. I think now the time has come when we should not push them away, but should let the situation get back to normal as it is among other states. (e)

I think that the record of the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Geneva was good, and the statement they issued also was a good achievement. It is necessary that Madame Albright should continue to maintain contact with Mr. Primakov to prevent any kind of repetition of this situation. (e)

Bill, I would like to ask you to make together (with us) some kind of concession, a small concession in the Security Council, just a small concession in their direction. Hussein expressed his willingness and readiness to cooperate. In other words, he has shown willingness to use peaceful diplomacy methods. So slowly, the heavy military hardware could be withdrawn from that

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2014				
Document ID: 9800756				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (4 pages)	02/08/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (4 pages)	02/08/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2014

FOLDER TITLE:

9800756

2015-0782-M
rs1545

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9800756
RECEIVED: 02 FEB 98 16

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 2 FEB 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 07 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAPIRO

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
FORT
NSC CHRON
RICE, E

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

SP

DATE

2/06

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC

2 OF

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRYNARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9800756

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 KERRICK
001
002

Z 98020513 FOR DECISION
X 98020606 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 98020606 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980205 BURNS, W

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0756
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TMA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
B Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>Ⓟ 2/5</u>	<u>A-Tab I</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>Ⓢ 2/5</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>Ⓟ 2/5</u>	<u>D-unk</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		<u>diskette</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 FEB 5 AM 8:39

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY _____

LOG #

0756

URGENT NOT PROOFED _____

SYSTEM

PRS

NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK _____

DOCLOG

TMA

AO

b

SEQUENCE TO INITIAL/DATE DISPOSITION

Cosgriff

Rice

Davies

Kerrick

Steinberg

Berger

Situation Room

West Wing Desk

Records Mgt.

1/3

Ⓟ 2/5

A-Tab I

2

Ⓟ 2/5



4

Ⓟ 2/5

D-und
diskette

5

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS

'98 FEB 5 AM 8:39

Exec Sec Office has diskette *up*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0756

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 5, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Boris Yeltsin of Russia is provided for information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador.



Glyn T. Davies

For: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 2/1/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0732-m-2 (1.21)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitri Zarechnak
Notetakers: Jim Smith, Pat O'Shaughnessy,
Jeff Rathke, Cindy Lawrence,
Ki Fort, Bill Courtney

DATE, TIME February 2, 1998, 9:31-9:51 a.m. EST
AND PLACE: The White House

THE PRESIDENT: Hello. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello Boris. Thanks for taking my call, and let me begin by saying that I hope you had a great birthday yesterday. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Oh yes. Bill, I am really glad that we will talk now because we have not discussed things over the phone for quite awhile, although we have exchanged messages. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree. I would like to talk to you about Iran and Iraq and prove once again that you and I, when we work together, can solve even the toughest problems. Before turning to Iraq, let me say I was encouraged at the report of the recent Wisner-Koptev meeting and Gore-Chernomyrdin call. I understand you have put in motion a series of specific steps to stop leakage of technology to Iran and to others. It's important that you and I show our peoples, including the Duma and Congress, that the United States and Russia are working together on this issue. It's critical to implement the agreements because Iran's missile program is moving ahead. I was especially pleased by Chernomyrdin's issuance of a new decree to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/1/08

control exports of dual technology items; I hope you'll be able to publish the decree text soon and follow it with strict enforcement measures that will send a very strong signal of Russia's commitment not to help Iran develop missiles. Ambassador Collins is talking to Foreign Minister Primakov's people about the next steps that will serve both of our interests, so we just need to stay on top of this and keep working on it. Now on Iraq. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, in order to sustain our interest we should meet more often. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I agree with that. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: So Bill, we could have a hastily arranged meeting somewhere at a crossroads or on the way to another meeting to discuss our serious problems. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I will explore that, but I would like to talk about Iraq for a few minutes. I'm calling today primarily to discuss the situation in Iraq because we are really at a critical moment in our dealings with Saddam. I know Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov saw each other in Madrid on Friday and discussed this. I know you've talked to Jacques Chirac about this. I know we're all working so hard on this -- that's a positive development. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Saddam's restrictions of access make it impossible for UNSCOM to do its job anymore and that's alarming. In fact, it is his most serious challenge to UNSCOM since 1991. He is basically trying to destroy UNSCOM to protect his weapons programs and to get sanctions lifted prematurely. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill you know, I sent my representative there a few days ago to Iraq, to Hussein and today I sent him again for a second time with my message. He had discussions with Hussein for one hour and thirty minutes. Hussein's position today is let's meet with Butler and discuss our problems. There will be no problems with UNSCOM's operation. Furthermore, he can agree on a number of presidential facilities to be surveyed. So this was their discussion. I warned him again seriously in my message that I, we will not let him blow up peace in the world, and he says he will be ready for further diplomatic negotiations. Now I understand that he is seriously frightened by this situation,

and he understands that the world powers can take extreme measures. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, I think it is a good thing to press him on this. I have not given up on diplomacy, but it is very important that we maintain UNSCOM's fundamental integrity and effectiveness. A sham UNSCOM, or you might say a Potemkin UNSCOM, that's no better than no UNSCOM. We simply cannot allow Iraq to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction. And Boris, you know how dangerous little bits of VX and anthrax are. It is good you are pushing him. The more Saddam believes we're together on this, the more he believes in the possibility of force, the more chance diplomacy still might succeed, even though I am skeptical on this. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You know that we will be ready to apply pressure on him every day and to keep our representative, Viktor Posuvalyuk, there on a daily basis. We want to pressure him into accepting our conditions. We are going to act until his mind is set correctly. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: What I want is for us to agree today to stay in the closest possible touch on this. If it looks as though we've run out the string on diplomacy, we will need to talk again. As for what we and our people say publicly, I am not going to pronounce the diplomatic track dead. I am going to express skepticism about it, but I will say the diplomatic track is still open, and I hope you will stop short of ruling out force if diplomacy fails. Let me say separately, I do support a significant increase in the oil-for-food mechanism and an improvement in the way it works. I think this shows we are working in good faith here, but we have to be firm on the possibility of using force. I know you talked to Jacques on a UNSC resolution. I personally don't believe we need a new resolution, but a "material breach" resolution could be useful if we got all members to agree. If we pass such a resolution, it will enhance the chance that diplomacy and your efforts will work because he will believe force will be used. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Of course, I understand you. Well, you know let's try it this way, Bill. We'll apply pressure and you will apply pressure and we will try to agree on a single text. It will be the text of us both. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: We will work on that. I hope we can have a major summit later this year, but in terms of another meeting,

let's leave that open and let our diplomatic efforts go forward. I am encouraged by this call, and we will keep working on this. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, very good. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye Bill, and my best regards to your wife. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I will tell her you said hello and give my best to Naina. Bye, bye. (U)

(The President hangs up.)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And we need to define when we meet again. Let Primakov and Albright discuss things and agree upon a month later this year. (Pause) Goodbye. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.22)
3/13/2018 KBN

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitri Zarechnak
Notetakers: Jim Smith, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Jeff Rathke, Cindy Lawrence, Ki Fort, Bill Courtney

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 2, 1998, 9:31-9:51^{AM} EST
The White House

THE PRESIDENT: Hello. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello Boris. Thanks for taking my call, and let me begin by saying that I hope you had a great birthday yesterday. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Oh yes. Bill, I am really glad that we will talk now because we have not discussed things over the phone for quite awhile, although we have exchanged messages. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree. I would like to talk to you about Iran and Iraq and prove once again that you and I, when we work together, can solve even the toughest problems. Before turning to Iraq, let me say I was encouraged at the report of the recent Wisner-Koptev meeting and Gore-Chernomyrdin call. I understand you have put in motion a series of specific steps to stop leakage of technology to Iran and to others. It's important that you and I show our peoples, including the Duma and Congress, that the United States and Russia are working together on this issue. It's critical to implement the agreements because Iran's missile program is moving ahead. I was especially pleased by Chernomyrdin's issuance of a new decree to control exports of dual technology items; I hope you'll be able

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/1/08

Classified by: G Lynn T. Davis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to publish the decree text soon and follow it with strict enforcement measures that will send a very strong signal of Russia's commitment not to help Iran develop missiles. Ambassador Collins is talking to Foreign Minister Primakov's people about the next steps that will serve both of our interests, so we just need to stay on top of this and keep working on it. Now on Iraq. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, in order to sustain our interest we should meet more often. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I agree with that. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: So Bill, we could have a hastily arranged meeting somewhere at a crossroads or on the way to another meeting to discuss our serious problems. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: I will explore that, but I would like to talk about Iraq for a few minutes. I'm calling today primarily to discuss the situation in Iraq because we are really at a critical moment in our dealings with Saddam. I know Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov saw each other in Madrid on Friday and discussed this. I know you've talked to Jacques Chirac about this. I know we're all working so hard on this -- that's a positive development. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Saddam's restrictions of access make it impossible for UNSCOM to do its job anymore and that's alarming. In fact, it is his most serious challenge to UNSCOM since 1991. He is basically trying to destroy UNSCOM to protect his weapons programs and to get sanctions lifted prematurely. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill you know, I sent my representative there a few days ago to Iraq, to Hussein and today I sent him again for a second time with my message. He had discussions with Hussein for one hour and thirty minutes. Hussein's position today is let's meet with Butler and discuss our problems. There will be no problems with UNSCOM's operation. Furthermore, he can agree on a number of presidential facilities to be surveyed. So this was their discussion. I warned him again seriously in my message that I, we will not let him blow up peace in the world, and he says he will be ready for further diplomatic negotiations. Now I understand that he is seriously frightened by this situation,

and he understands that the world powers can take extreme measures. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, I think it is a good thing to press him on this. I have not given up on diplomacy, but it is very important that we maintain UNSCOM's fundamental integrity and effectiveness. A sham UNSCOM, or you might say a Potemkin UNSCOM, that's no better than no UNSCOM. We simply cannot allow Iraq to rebuild its weapons of mass destruction. And Boris, you know how dangerous little bits of VX and anthrax are. It is good you are pushing him. The more Saddam believes we're together on this, the more he believes in the possibility of force, the more chance diplomacy still might succeed, even though I am skeptical on this. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You know that we will be ready to apply pressure on him every day and to keep our representative, Viktor Posuvalyuk, there on a daily basis. We want to pressure him into accepting our conditions. We are going to act until his mind is set correctly. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: What I want is for us to agree today to stay in the closest possible touch on this. If it looks as though we've run out the string on diplomacy, we will need to talk again. As for what we and our people say publicly, I am not going to pronounce the diplomatic track dead. I am going to express skepticism about it, but I will say the diplomatic track is still open, and I hope you will stop short of ruling out force if diplomacy fails. Let me say separately, I do support a significant increase in the oil-for-food mechanism and an improvement in the way it works. I think this shows we are working in good faith here, but we have to be firm on the possibility of using force. I know you talked to Jacques on a UNSC resolution. I personally don't believe we need a new resolution, but a "material breach" resolution could be useful if we got all members to agree. If we pass such a resolution, it will enhance the chance that diplomacy and your efforts will work because he will believe force will be used. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Of course, I understand you. Well, you know let's try it this way, Bill. We'll apply pressure and you will apply pressure and we will try to agree on a single text. It will be the text of us both. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: We will work on that. I hope we can have a major summit later this year, but in terms of another meeting,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

0756

let's leave that open and let our diplomatic efforts go forward. I am encouraged by this call, and we will keep working on this. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, very good. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye Bill, and my best regards to your wife. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I will tell her you said hello and give my best to Naina. Bye, bye. (U)

(The President hangs up.)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And we need to define when we meet again. Let Primakov and Albright discuss things and agree upon a month later this year. (Pause) Goodbye. (Ø)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0756

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 2, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD KERRICK 

THROUGH: WILLIAM H. COURTNEY *WF*
jm

FROM: KI FORT *KF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin on
February 2, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on
February 2, 1998.

Concurrence by: Bruce Riedel *BR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State

Approve Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State Department

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 2/1/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBM* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9800756
DATE 05 FEB 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA ON 2 FEB 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2018				
Document ID: 9801337				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (4 pages)	02/23/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2018

FOLDER TITLE:

9801337

2015-0782-M
rs1546

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9801337
RECEIVED: 23 FEB 98 17

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 28 FEB 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA 23 FEB 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 28 FEB 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SILVA

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

FICKLIN

FORT

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY SP

DATE 3/02

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KGM NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 KERRICK
001
002

Z 98022719 FOR DECISION
X 98030208 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 98030209 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980228 BURNS, W

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1337
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>d</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1 13</u>	<u>(R) 2/27/28</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 2/28</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	<u>copy</u>	_____
Berger	_____	<u>copy</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TMA 2.28</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D-w/disk</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SRB TMA
 JS 2.28

COMMENTS:

98 FEB 27 PM 2:39

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 1337
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM FRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>d</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1 13</u>	<u>Ⓟ 2/27/28</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>Ⓟ 2/28</u>	
Steinberg		<u>copy</u>	
Berger		<u>copy</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TMA 2.28</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		<u>D-w/disk</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SRB } TMA
 JS } 2.28

COMMENTS:

'98 FEB 27 PM 2:39

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1337

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 28, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Boris Yeltsin of Russia

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Boris Yeltsin of Russia is provided for information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador.


Glyn T. Davies

FOR: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 2/22/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with
Russian President Boris Yeltsin (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Peter Afansenko
Notetakers: Pat O'Shaughnessy, Tom Corwell,
Bonnie Glick, Jeff Rathke, Jim Smith,
Rexon Ryu, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 23, 1998, 11:01 - 11:17 a.m. EST
The White House

THE PRESIDENT: Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hi, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hi, Boris, how are you? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, it's been some time since we talked,
so I've started missing you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: And I missed you, too. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And everything seems to be going okay, you
know we've seen an upsurge in January and February -- I mean
economic indicators. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I'm very pleased by that. Can we talk about
Iraq for a moment? (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Of course. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I've had a chance to review the memorandum of
understanding signed by Kofi Annan and Tariq Aziz. There is
much that is positive in the document, including its guarantee
of unconditional acceptance of the UN resolutions and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/22/08

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0782-m-2(1.23)
3/13/2018 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cooperation with UNSCOM on immediate and unconditional access to every site in Iraq. This is good. At the same time, there are details which are unclear about the role of UNSCOM and the special commission and how the inspection and reporting will actually work. We will listen carefully to Kofi Annan's explanation to the Security Council tomorrow to make sure it conforms to the standards of the five permanent members. I think it is important that we clarify the terms of the agreement and then test it out in the next few days, to be sure it is going to be honored. (S)

The one thing I want to ask you to consider, which may be difficult for you, is this: if we are all going to endorse this agreement, we have to make it clear to Saddam Hussein that we've resolved this, but we can't have another interruption every six months. I can't keep moving the fleet into the Persian Gulf every time there is a violation. We have to say that the next violation will have severe consequences. The easiest way to do it is to say that the next violation will constitute a material breach. We've done this twice now. We can't have any further violations. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. Well, I agree with what you said. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that's very good, because we need to continue to work together. I know how hard and firm your diplomats were in talking to Saddam Hussein. I think the fact that we pursued two different strategies helped us get this done. We need to find a way to stay together. We may have avoided a big problem or solved a big problem, but it will only work if they implement this agreement in good faith. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, I agree with what you said; through common effort we succeeded in avoiding the worst consequences, and we must make sure that Iraq fully complies with all Security Council resolutions. Russia and the U.S. strongly advocate that. I think this time, by taking a common stand, you through the pressure of your forces, we through diplomatic means, we have led Saddam Hussein to understand the gravity of the situation. There's no repeat performance anytime in the future. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think the way to do this is to work together in the Security Council tomorrow. If we can do that, we have a chance to succeed. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, yes, we will. I believe the results that have been accomplished through the active participation of the UN Secretary General and our common stand have provided a key to find a way out of an extremely difficult and complex situation. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do too, Boris. I hope you will tell Primakov to work with us to get some kind of statement that if there is another violation after this, it will be a material breach. I think that will ensure that Saddam complies with the agreement. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I'll immediately tell that to Primakov, and he will be cooperating with your side. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Great. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, I'm very glad that we've come to the end of the road in this way. Our hope is that the Security Council will draft a resolution that will underscore once again the importance of the step we have taken, the gravity of the situation, and the consequences we've managed to avert. It's very important for us to launch a mechanism to avoid situations like this, to rule out such a grave situation in the future. Well, Bill, I believe we now have quite a few questions, involving bilateral relations and international problems. I believe we need to meet. It is now your turn to come to Russia. What month do you think you'll be able to visit Russia? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me ask you this -- when we talked before we talked about coming after the Duma ratified START-II so we could begin discussing START-III. What's the state of play with that? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I don't think it will take very long to have it ratified. At maximum, two months. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me say, I will come as quickly as I can after that. I'm anxious to do this and will rearrange my schedule to do it. I would come in the middle of night, and I want to make a dramatic gesture to the rest of the world that would reaffirm our partnership. It would be better if they would do it in the near future, that I come after START-II, so we can begin work on START-III. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, that would be great. I will start putting pressure on the State Duma, and I don't think they can avoid feeling my pressure. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Great. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I may use this thing I've only rarely used in the past--only twice--maybe I'll appear personally before the Duma and put pressure on them so START-II can be ratified. I don't think they can avoid that. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great, Boris, thank you. I'm glad the economy is doing well. If we need to speak again in the next few days, I'll be available. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, agreed, Bill. A hug from me. Goodbye. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye, Boris, thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9801337
DATE 28 FEB 98

SUBJECT: MEMO OF TELCON W/ PRES BORIS YELTSIN OF RUSSIA 23 FEB 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u> + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1337

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 26, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD KERRICK *(P)*

THROUGH: WILLIAM H. COURTNEY *WF*

FROM: KI FORT *WF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, February 23, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone conversation
between the President and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia on
February 23, 1998.

Concurrence by: Bruce Riedel *WF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State Department
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 2/22/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *1381* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-m-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2027				
Document ID: 9802448				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 10	Position: i	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (4 pages)	04/06/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (5 pages)	04/06/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2027

FOLDER TITLE:

9802448

2015-0782-M

rs1547

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9802448
RECEIVED: 06 APR 98 14

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 10 APR 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 6 APR CALL TO PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 11 APR 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COURTNEY
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
FORT
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY DB

DATE 4/10

BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2 DISK

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBYNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 98040814 FOR DECISION
X 98041014 STEINBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 98041014 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980410 KENNEY, K

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2448
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG OWD A/O _____

B

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1/3</u>	<u>4/8/84/10</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(10) 4/8</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen <u>4/9/84</u> <u>@ 9:10pm</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TMA 4.10</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D = w/disk</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 APR 8 pm 1:35

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 2448

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG SWD A/O _____

B

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1/3</u>	<u>4/8/84</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>10/4/8</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TMA 4.10</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D = w/disk</u>

Deputy Natl Sec Adviser has seen
4/9/84
@ 9:10 AM

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 APR 8 AM 1:35

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2448

April 10, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the April 6 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (S)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 4/5/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBY/NARA, Date 3/13/2013
2015-0782-M-2

~~SECRET~~

A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (U)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Bob Ford,
Anthony Campanella,
George Chastain, James Smith

DATE, TIME April 6, 1998, 10:01-10:28 EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'm very glad to have this call from you, and very thankful for your latest letter, in which you say that you understand the intentions of the new government. I think we can get his nomination through - through our parliament - the nomination of Kiriyenko. He's a very vigorous politician, a very skillful politician, and I think he'll build good rapport with Gore. I've currently instructed Kiriyenko, who is acting head of the government, and Kokoshin, head of the Security Council, to deal with matters formerly in the purview of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. And so we're not departing in any way from or changing in any way our bilateral relationship and accords. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's very good news, because we hope that Al and the new Prime Minister would be able to carry on the work of our binational commission. I know he had very good relations with Kiriyenko in our commission and he has very high regard for him. (S)

SECRET

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 4/5/08

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0782-M-2 (1.24)
3/13/2018 KBH

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, he is a skilled professional. Tomorrow I plan to conduct a roundtable discussion with all the factions of the Duma in attendance. I hope I will prevail over them and get strong approval of his nomination, and I believe through joint efforts we will be able to resolve current problems, like the Kosovo problem in the framework of the Contact Group, and my belief is that we will not depart from the path which you and I have jointly set forward. (S)

As far as the START II treaty is concerned, the moment the new government is approved, we will move in the State Duma to discuss the terms of the new START II accord. And in the meantime, I would ask you, Bill, to abide strictly by the provisions of the START I accord. We have some fears that the U.S. is not complying fully with the provisions of accords that have been reached. (S)

I am satisfied with the meeting in Moscow that the energy ministers of the G-8 have just completed, and I think we'll have to raise this matter in Birmingham in a very serious way. (S)

Also, there's one more question I want to discuss with you, Bill. Our side was presented with this matter of the growing Russian intelligence presence in the U.S., and I believe, Bill, that we have to close down this issue because neither you nor I need to become enmeshed in a competition over who has more intelligence officers infiltrated in the country of the other side. And what is more, you are using some of the people of the special services of the other countries of the CIS and former Warsaw Pact and are using them against Russia. And also, you have opened offices of your representatives in CIS countries and this also is a blow against Russia...and let us get our special services to see how they can help each other. (S)

The next passage was incomprehensible due to bad phone line. Following fragments were subsequently provided by the U.S. interpreter:..((exchange information...accusing...identified as...remain active...organization... We were the ones who did the work and had three people arrested. ...Afghanistan and Spain and other countries of southern Africa, which had bought equipment for Iran, and Russia is not at fault for this.)) (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, let me just say first, what you said about START II - it's very important that we get ratification as soon as possible, and we'll follow through on our promises on START I. On the intelligence issue, we need to deal with it without its becoming a contentious public issue between us, and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

I hope we can bring numbers down to reflect our new relationship. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, let's reduce our numbers; let's do so by percentage points, in embassies and various other offices, then we can judge the public mood in the two countries. In other words, I accept what you just suggested. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Okay, our people will get together on it. Also, I'd like to raise an issue that I know our people talked about earlier today: the issue of Russian entities' cooperation with Iran on missile technology. The interception of specialty steel destined for Iran is potentially a disastrous setback for our relationship; it's a violation of your own laws, and also there's a pending vote in Congress on this issue. I'm aware that some arrests have been made, and we'll study the report very carefully. It has the potential to jeopardize so much that we've done together and so much that we hope to do together. It's important we not let this critical moment get away from us. I'm aware of the report that your people have given us, but we personally have to ride herd on this and guide our governments toward common goals. I don't want any act of Congress or action in your country to destroy our relationship. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, as far as the interception is concerned, unfortunately, I learned of this only today. Already, I've instructed the security service to investigate this matter. You never mentioned the subject of specialty metals; you mentioned missile technology, but you never mentioned specialty metals. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: But Boris, I believe that's part of ballistic missile technology, because without specialty metals, they can't do what they want to do. But I appreciate your response. It's important we continue to work together. I think a prompt resolution is quite important. I'm encouraged by what you said. I don't want this to interrupt the relationship we've got and the progress we're making. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, Bill, I agree. Today, the moment I learned about this (incident), I issued written instructions to the security services to investigate what happened. And I agree, let's work together, let's stand together on this, as you suggested. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great. I think more work needs to be done. Our Congress has legislation pending that would really

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

hurt our relationship, so I don't want it to pass. A quick and vigorous resolution could help us prevent this. So we could turn a bad situation to our benefit by the vigorous pursuit of this matter by your government. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say just one word on Kosovo. Albright and Primakov are working on it, and I think it's like Bosnia and Iraq; we have to keep working until we get negotiations between Milosevic and Kosovo. Otherwise, Milosevic's policies will make the Kosovar Albanian community more radical and violent, and we'll have a terrible mess on our hands. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, here we see eye to eye with you, Bill. Primakov has instructions I gave him to hold Milosevic under constant pressure, to press him constantly. And if there's any need, I can pitch in, as well. We will have to work on in the Contact Group, and you and I will have to resolve that. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Great. I just wanted to mention a couple of other things briefly. I'm glad you had a good meeting with Jacques Chirac and Helmut Kohl; it got a good message out. The second thing I wanted to mention is my recent trip to Africa. I'm convinced the international community can do more to assist them in many ways. I wanted to bring this up with you, because President Mandela brought up to me that too often during the Cold War, they felt like pawns in the struggle between us. Maybe there's something you and I can do to lift the positive impact the U.S. and Russia can have on the people of Africa. Maybe we can talk about it when I see you in Birmingham. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I agree with what you just said, and we just had a visit with President Nujoma of Namibia. I told him that by the end of the year, and following your example, I would also pay a visit to one or two African countries. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Good. I'll see you in Birmingham. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, Bill. Hugs from me. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9802448
DATE 10 APR 98

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 6 APR CALL TO PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>1 + DISK</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KSM Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2448

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 6, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: WILLIAM H. COURTNEY *WFC*
FROM: KI FORT *KF*
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, April 6, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the
April 6 telephone conversation between the President and Russian
President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve *[Signature]*

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *[Signature]*

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 4/5/08

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KBNARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-m-2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2448

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the April 6 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (S)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 4/5/08

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KRYNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M 2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (u)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: ~~##~~ Peter Afanasenko
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Bob Ford,
Anthony Campanella,
George Chastain, James Smith

DATE, TIME: April 6, 1998, 10:01-10:28 EDT
AND PLACE: Oval Office

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I'm very glad to have this call from you, and very thankful for your latest letter, in which you say that you understand the intentions of the new government. I think we can get his nomination through - through our parliament - the nomination of Kiriyenko. He's a very vigorous politician, a very skillful politician, and I think he'll build good rapport with Gore. I've currently instructed Kiriyenko, who is acting head of the government, and Kokoshin, head of the Security Council, to deal with matters formerly in the purview of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. And so we're not departing in any way from or changing in any way our bilateral relationship and accords. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's very good news, because we hope that Al and the new Prime Minister would be able to carry on the work of our binational commission. I know he had very good relations with Kiriyenko in our commission and he has very high regard for him. (S)

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, he is a skilled professional. Tomorrow I plan to conduct a roundtable discussion with all the factions of the Duma in attendance. I hope I will prevail over them and get strong approval of his nomination, and I believe through joint efforts we will be able to resolve current problems, like the Kosovo problem in the framework of the Contact Group, and my belief is that we will not depart from the path which you and I have jointly set forward. (S)

As far as the START II treaty is concerned, the moment the new government is approved, we will move in the State Duma to discuss the terms of the new START II accord. And in the meantime, I would ask you, Bill, to abide strictly by the provisions of the START I accord. We have some fears that the U.S. is not complying fully with the provisions of accords that have been reached. (S)

I am satisfied with the meeting in Moscow that the energy ministers of the G-8 have just completed, and I think we'll have to raise this matter in Birmingham in a very serious way. (S)

Also, there's one more question I want to discuss with you, Bill. Our side was presented with this matter of the growing Russian intelligence presence in the U.S., and I believe, Bill, that we have to close down this issue because neither you nor I need to become enmeshed in a competition over who has more intelligence officers infiltrated in the country of the other side. And what is more, you are using some of the people of the special services of the other countries of the CIS and former Warsaw Pact and are using them against Russia. And also, you have opened offices of your representatives in CIS countries and this also is a blow against Russia...and let us get our special services to see how they can help each other. (S)

The next passage was incomprehensible due to bad phone line. Following fragments were subsequently provided by the U.S. interpreter:..((exchange information...accusing...identified as...remain active...organization... We were the ones who did the work and had three people arrested. ...Afghanistan and Spain and other countries of southern Africa, which had bought equipment for Iran, and Russia is not at fault for this.)) (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, let me just say first, what you said about START II - it's very important that we get ratification as soon as possible, and we'll follow through on our promises on START I. On the intelligence issue, we need to deal with it without its becoming a contentious public issue between us, and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I hope we can bring numbers down to reflect our new relationship. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, let's reduce our numbers; let's do so by percentage points, in embassies and various other offices, then we can judge the public mood in the two countries. In other words, I accept what you just suggested. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Okay, our people will get together on it. Also, I'd like to raise an issue that I know our people talked about earlier today: the issue of Russian entities' cooperation with Iran on missile technology. ~~X~~The interception of specialty steel destined for Iran is potentially a disastrous setback for our relationship; it's a violation of your own laws, and also there's a pending vote in Congress on this issue. I'm aware that some arrests have been made, and we'll study the report very carefully. It has the potential to jeopardize so much that we've done together and so much that we hope to do together. It's important we not let this critical moment get away from us. I'm aware of the report that your people have given us, but we personally have to ride herd on this and guide our governments toward common goals. I don't want any act of Congress or action in your country to destroy our relationship. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, as far as the interception is concerned, unfortunately, I learned of this only today. Already, I've instructed the security service to investigate this matter. You never mentioned the subject of specialty metals; you mentioned missile technology, but you never mentioned specialty metals. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: But Boris, I believe that's part of ballistic missile technology, because without specialty metals, they can't do what they want to do. But I appreciate your response. It's important we continue to work together. I think a prompt resolution is quite important. I'm encouraged by what you said. I don't want this to interrupt the relationship we've got and the progress we're making. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, Bill, I agree. Today, the moment I learned about this (incident), I issued written instructions to the security services to investigate what happened. And I agree, let's work together, let's stand together on this, as you suggested. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great. I think more work needs to be done. Our Congress has legislation pending that would really

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

hurt our relationship, so I don't want it to pass. A quick and vigorous resolution could help us prevent this. So we could turn a bad situation to our benefit by the vigorous pursuit of this matter by your government. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say just one word on Kosovo. Albright and Primakov are working on it, and I think it's like Bosnia and Iraq; we have to keep working until we get negotiations between Milosevic and Kosovo. Otherwise, Milosevic's policies will make the Kosovar Albanian community more radical and violent, and we'll have a terrible mess on our hands. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, here we see eye to eye with you, Bill. Primakov has instructions I gave him to hold Milosevic under constant pressure, to press him constantly. And if there's any need, I can pitch in, as well. We will have to work on in the Contact Group, and you and I will have to resolve that. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Great. I just wanted to mention a couple of other things briefly. I'm glad you had a good meeting with Jacques Chirac and Helmut Kohl; it got a good message out. The second thing I wanted to mention is my recent trip to Africa. I'm convinced the international community can do more to assist them in many ways. I wanted to bring this up with you, because President Mandela brought up to me that too often during the Cold War, they felt like pawns in the struggle between us. Maybe there's something you and I can do to lift the positive impact the U.S. and Russia can have on the people of Africa. Maybe we can talk about it when I see you in Birmingham. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I agree with what you just said, and we just had a visit with President Nujoma of Namibia. I told him that by the end of the year, and following your example, I would also pay a visit to one or two African countries. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Good. I'll see you in Birmingham. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, Bill. Hugs from me. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

~~SECRET~~

-- End of Conversation --

*move to
page 4*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2036				
Document ID: 9803457				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001: telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (5 pages)	05/12/1998	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2036

FOLDER TITLE:

9803457

2015-0782-M
rs1548

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 15 MAY 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON
12 MAY 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 18 MAY 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: COURTNEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
FORT
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

JP

DATE

5/18

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTMH

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER

Z 98051518 FOR DECISION

001

X 98051808 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

002

X 98051809 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980515 KENNEY, K

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3457
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG FD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>CP</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>R 5/14 5/15</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>R 5/15</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>copy</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Berger	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>R 5/15</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D + DISK</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 MAY 14 AM 2:13

Exec Sec Office has diskette YFS _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3457
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (R) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (D) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>CP</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>(R) 5/14 5/15</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 5/15</u>	
Steinberg		<u>copy ✓</u>	
Berger		<u>copy</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(D) 5/15</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		<u>D + DISK</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 MAY 14 PM 2:13

Exec Sec Office has diskette CS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3457


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 15, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation of the May 12 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (S)

for 
Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/12/98

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetaker: Larry Wright, Tom Crowell, Bonnie Glick, James Smith, Sean Rice, Ki Fort, Jon Elkind

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 12, 1998, 11:01 - 11:27 EDT
Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Hi, Boris. It's nice to hear your voice, and I'm glad we have this chance to talk before we see each other in Birmingham. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes. It's been a year since we met last, and of course, we have quite a few things to discuss. (U)

The President: Yes, absolutely. Before we get into the conversation, let me congratulate you on your new government. Strobe Talbott and Sandy Berger and Leon Fuerth were there last week, and were very impressed with your team. It sends a strong message that you're committed to economic progress and is good news for our partnership. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: Yes, thank you, Bill. Indeed we have a very good team, a closely-knit government team, who will continue working with your administration. So I think everything will work out fine. (Ø)

The President: That's good news. I'm very pleased Sandy Berger and Andrey Kokoshin agreed on a plan to deal with the Iranian proliferation issue. I welcome the recent public statements you

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/12/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.23)
3/13/2018 KBH

and others have made pledging that Russia will strictly control exports to prevent assistance to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, as well as your agreement that a G-8 statement on export control would be beneficial. I hope we can work this out at Birmingham. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, it's a very good thing, and I agree. I accept it fully. (S)

The President: I also agree to find new ways to coordinate our nonproliferation efforts, such as the bilateral "hot line" to exchange information. But I do want to say we're having kind of a hot debate in Congress coming up the week after the G-8. Some are pushing new legislation that could harm our cooperation, and I want to be in a very strong position to beat them back. There are things that I believe are important for Russia to do before Birmingham. I'd like to mention them very briefly: (S)

First, I hope you can approve and issue regulations necessary to implement the January 22 executive order. Second, I hope you can use your executive order to issue official instructions to end all cooperation between Russian entities and the Iranian missile program. And third, I hope that based on previous government decrees you can issue instructions to end nuclear cooperation with Iran other than Bushehr. (S)

Now, if you can do these things, I will be in a better position to resist pressures for inflexible legislative sanctions here in the United States. I also want to point out there's a real upside here. If there's not a rupture in our relations, the space launches we will do alone will be worth \$3.5 billion over the next five years. I want to be able to focus on our positive future agenda, such as START II and START III, and economic issues. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I agree with you, and would be prepared to proceed with these instructions. (S)

The President: That's good news. You know, we've always solved the tough issues together and we have agreed on this before and there is so much we can do in Birmingham and beyond. So that's good news. If you can do these things, I believe I can head off destructive actions in Congress. And I will do my part if you can do yours. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

President Yeltsin: You can already start working in this direction, and resist pressure from Congress, because I am already prepared to sign a document with you. (S)

The President: Thank you. Let me, if I could, say a couple of things. First, thank you for your stand opposing the Indian nuclear test. I've also expressed my deep concern to the Indian Prime Minister, and I've written the Prime Minister of Pakistan urging restraint and that he not follow up with a nuclear test of his own. This is a disturbing development, and it gives more urgency to our efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

(S)

If there's any way the Duma can ratify START II before adjournment, I want to come to Moscow and work on START III. This issue between India and Pakistan puts even more responsibility on us to do the right thing, lessen the threat of nuclear weapons, and set a good example for the rest of the world. (S)

President Yeltsin: You know, this year I'm planning to visit India, and I hope I will be in a position to exercise influence on them concerning that issue. We've a lot of common ground as far as cooperation between Russia and India is concerned, and I don't think they'll be able to refuse and not comply with what I'm asking them to do. (S)

The President: Great, Boris. I just wanted to mention one other thing. A couple of weeks ago, I went down to Houston to see the space center. The ISS (International Space Station) is a real asset in our cooperation. I know you're working to assure the needed funding and I know it's going to work, but my understanding is that funding is not yet on line. It's going to be a tremendous plus for our people in the future, and a lot of people don't realize the big benefits that will come from this.

(S)

That's the only issue I wanted to mention, and I wonder if there's anything you wanted to talk to me about. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, I already promised you to do everything in my power to make this international space station project a success, so you have no need to worry. We will make our own contribution and comply with all the commitments we have assumed. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

The President: Great. I can't wait to see you in Birmingham.
(U)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The President: Is there anything else we need to discuss? (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, I think we need an exchange of views on the Balkans. I think what we need to do is compare notes on that issue, so no one can reproach us that we're moving in different directions on the issue. And there's also one question that I want to raise with you, which concerns the destruction of chemical weapons. Unfortunately, there have been problems with (financial) assistance from you, but we very much want to carry out large scale destruction of chemical weapons.
(S)

And I also think, Bill, that you and I should find time to define a framework concept for START III. We need to agree to a framework so that subsequent negotiations (on START III) will be based on the understanding that we reach in Birmingham. (S)

The President: I agree we'll have a good long talk on all these things in Birmingham. And I agree we need to stay together on the Balkans. I think the trick on Kosovo is to get negotiations going that will keep Kosovo within the Yugoslav framework, but with some degree of autonomy and work out a balance there. You've had to deal with lots of similar issues like this. We have a Contact Group position that we should apply pressure on Belgrade, while offering incentives leading to an achievable path toward normalizing their relations with the rest of the world.
(S)

On chemical weapons, let's talk more in Birmingham, and I'll have work done on that here beforehand and we'll talk about what we can do. You know when we get together, I like to talk about whatever's on your mind, and whatever's on my mind, and we'll talk about START II and the negotiations and all that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Bill. I agree. It's okay with me and in Birmingham. I'm sure we'll have quite a few things to talk about, and we'll explore your positions and my positions. (S)

The President: Good, Boris. We'll have a nice long talk, and thank you for this conversation before then. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, Bill, and say hello to Hillary. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~₅

The President: I will. Give my best to Naina, and I'll see you in Birmingham. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, and see you in Birmingham. (U)

The President: Goodbye, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3457

May 13, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER *(R) F*

THROUGH: WILLIAM H. COURTNEY

FROM: KI FORT *WF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation of
the May 12 telephone call between the President and Russian
President Yeltsin.

Concurrence by: Gary Samore; Jon Elkind *WF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 5/11/08

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KSH* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9803457
DATE 15 MAY 98

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBN Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3457

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation of the May 12 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (S)

Not below the DAS level (?).

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

✓
468

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/12/98

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0732-M-2

~~SECRET~~

MIR

MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2038				
Document ID: 9803714				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	05/21/1998	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	05/21/1998	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2038

FOLDER TITLE:

9803714

2015-0782-M
rs1549

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9803714
RECEIVED: 21 MAY 98 16

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 26 MAY 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW POTUS & PRES YELTSIN ON 21 MAY

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 27 MAY 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COURTNEY
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
FORT
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

FA

DATE

5/26

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER

Z 98052613 FOR DECISION

.001

Z 98052616 KERRICK APPROVED RECOMS

002

X 98052616 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980526 KENNEY, K

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3714
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (P) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (P) A/O

B

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1/3</u>	<u>G 5/27/85</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(P) 5/23</u>	<u>w/edite</u>
Steinberg	<u>com</u>	_____	_____
Berger	<u>/com</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TMA 5.26</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>(P) Steve</u>	<u>D disk</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SRB } TMA
 JS } 5.26

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

3714

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # _____
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 67 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
B Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>8</u>		
Davies	<u>1/3</u>	<u>5/27/85</u>	
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>5/23</u>	<u>w/edite</u>
Steinberg	<u>com</u>		
Berger	<u>/com</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TMA 5-26</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>File</u>	<u>D disk</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: SRB } TMA
 JS } 5-26

COMMENTS:

98 MAY 22 09 25
 Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3714

May 26, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of conversation of the May 21 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. (C)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KRN/NARA, Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetakers: Larry Wright, Bonnie Glick,
James Smith, Peter Huggins, Jenny McGee,
Pat O'Shaughnessy, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 21, 1998, 10:41-1052 a.m. EDT, Oval
Office

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, Boris. Thank you for taking my call. I know you have a lot of things going on over there. I hate to bother you, but I have to talk to you. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Let's do so. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I am working very hard to keep Pakistan from reacting to India's nuclear tests with one of its own, and so far have been successful. Now India is making the situation more difficult. In the last 48 hours, the Indians have stepped up their warlike talk on Kashmir, and the Pakistanis could be pushed beyond the point of restraint. I am very worried about that, so I called to ask you to call the Prime Minister of India at the earliest possible moment to stress the danger stemming from India's rhetoric and actions. I know other countries may press India, but Russia has a special relationship with India, and you have special stature there. I'm doing all I can to keep the Pakistanis from testing, but I need some help with the Indians. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: O.K., I promise you, Bill, that I will immediately do this, but at the same time, I would like to ask

you to do the same thing with the Pakistanis, because vis-à-vis Pakistan, I don't have the same kind of influence you do. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I will do that. You may be sure I will do that. Also, we're looking at what can be done with the Security Council to discourage anything destructive on Kashmir. There is a chance for a presidential statement urging respect for the cease-fire and a resumption of dialogue. If that comes up, will Russia support that? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I will support you on this, Bill, and I repeat that I intend immediately to get in contact with the Prime Minister of India and have a talk with him. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great. I just wanted to mention one more thing. We talked about this missile sanctions bill in our Congress. Some people are trying to bring it up today or tomorrow. I want you to know I am fighting it hard and if it passes, I will veto it and Sandy will call Kokoshin. You've got your opponents in the Duma, and I've got mine in the Congress, but we just have to keep working this together and we can do it. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, let's agree on the following: I'll talk now with the Indian Prime Minister, and I'll try to do all I can to persuade them. But at the same time, you do all you can to pressure Pakistan in order to provide certain assurances to India. I think I'll be able to reach some kind of agreement with them. I agree with you that acting together we must prevent this conflagration from flaring up. (S)

And one more point: Today I had a meeting with the leaders of our Parliament and the Parliament's main speakers, and we discussed the problem of START II. We reached firm agreement that on June 2 our Parliament will deal with the ratification debate and we hope it will succeed. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's wonderful news. Thank you. Thank you, my friend. Goodbye. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I embrace you, Bill. How did you spend your time in England? Was it good? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: It was great. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very well. I embrace you. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9803714
DATE 26 MAY 98

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW POTUS & PRES YELTSIN ON 21 MAY
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIG +DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KRM Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3714

May 22, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER 

THROUGH: WILLIAM H. COURTNEY 

FROM: KI FORTV 

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, May 21

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the May
21 telephone conversation between the President and Russian
President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 5/20/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRINARA, Date 3/13/2018
1015 - 0782 - M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Colge - if only for Sand D,
should this go to post
(then post sees it and EOR
doesn't?)

See exhibit

TXCj

for Exec Sec - please note
that, on part, we have
not usually distributed
these beyond Dep Sec St - which
is why the note above did not
usually include ~~it~~ ref to
"DAS levels or below" K1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3714

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of conversation of the May 21 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. ~~It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador.~~ (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 5/20/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M. 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: # Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: Larry Wright, Bonnie Glick, James Smith, Peter Huggins, Jenny McGee, Pat O'Shaughnessy, Ki Fort

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 21, 1998, 10:41-1052 EDT, Oval Office
a.m.

THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, Boris. Thank you for taking my call. I know you have a lot of things going on over there. I hate to bother you, but I have to talk to you. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Let's do so. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I am working very hard to keep Pakistan from reacting to India's nuclear tests with one of its own, and so far have been successful. Now India is making the situation more difficult. In the last 48 hours, the Indians have stepped up their warlike talk on Kashmir, and the Pakistanis could be pushed beyond the point of restraint. I am very worried about that, so I called to ask you to call the Prime Minister of India at the earliest possible moment to stress the danger stemming from India's rhetoric and actions. I know other countries may press India, but Russia has a special relationship with India, and you have special stature there. I'm doing all I can to keep the Pakistanis from testing, but I need some help with the Indians. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: O.K., I promise you, Bill, that I will immediately do this, but at the same time, I would like to ask you to do the same thing with the Pakistanis, because vis-à-vis Pakistan, I don't have the same kind of influence you do. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 5/20/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.30)
3/13/2018 KBN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I will do that. You may be sure I will do that. Also, we're looking at what can be done with the Security Council to discourage anything destructive on Kashmir. There is a chance for a presidential statement urging respect for the ceasefire and a resumption of dialogue. If that comes up, will Russia support that? (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I will support you on this, Bill, and I repeat that I intend immediately to get in contact with the Prime Minister of India and have a talk with him. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great. I just wanted to mention one more thing. We talked about this missile sanctions bill in our Congress. Some people are trying to bring it up today or tomorrow. I want you to know I am fighting it hard and if it passes, I will veto it and Sandy will call Kokoshin. You've got your opponents in the Duma, and I've got mine in the Congress, but we just have to keep working this together and we can do it. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, let's agree on the following: I'll talk now with the Indian Prime Minister, and I'll try to do all I can to persuade them. But at the same time, you do all you can to pressure Pakistan in order to provide certain assurances to India. I think I'll be able to reach some kind of agreement with them. I agree with you that acting together we must prevent this conflagration from flaring up. (C)

And one more point: Today I had a meeting with the leaders of our Parliament and the Parliament's main speakers, and we discussed the problem of START II. We reached firm agreement that on June 2 our Parliament will deal with the ratification debate and we hope it will succeed. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: That's wonderful news. Thank you. Thank you, my friend. Goodbye. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I embrace you, Bill. How did you spend your time in England? Was it good? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: It was great. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very well. I embrace you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEE 2

Case Number: 2014-0999-M; 2015-0782-M

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2039				
Document ID: 9803752				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.60)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President Boris Yeltsin of Russia (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State
Peter Afanassenko, Interpreter

President Boris Yeltsin
Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Deputy Chief of
Presidential Administration
Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign Minister
Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 17, 1998 -- 11:47 a.m. - 12:33 p.m.
Birmingham, England

The President: I told Tony Blair we had to find some way to compromise on this matter of Japan or Russia as G-8 host in 2000. I've asked Jacques if he'd be willing to do something around the millennium, and he said yes. I'm working on it and will keep working on it. Maybe there's some way we could do something in Russia in the year 2000, for the reasons that you said [in the wrap-up session of the G-8], but also something in Japan. [The President gives Yeltsin his G-8 lapel pin.] (S)

President Yeltsin: That's a good idea. We'll have two meetings instead of one, and that won't disrupt the sequence for Canada and so on and so forth. (S)

The President: Depending on what happens, we might think about devoting one meeting to international economics and one to international security issues, or perhaps we can do it in some other way. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. We'll go forward gradually to prepare for that format. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 5/22/08

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

The President: Good -- let's see what makes sense. (S)

President Yeltsin: You know, Bill, people are starting to criticize us for the weakening of our relationship. I've been under fire for this, and so have you. I don't think you agree with this characterization, and I assure you I don't either. I hope that you, like I, will push back against the idea that there are deep and irreconcilable tensions in our relations. You know, one reason people have come to this conclusion is that it's been a long time since we met. Sure, we met in Helsinki, in Paris, in Denver last year. But that's not the same thing as a real official visit. We're looking forward to your making a proper visit in July. And I'm counting on your bringing Hillary with you. That's my condition for the Summit! (S)

The President: I'm aware of that. She certainly wants to come. (S)

First, congratulations on your new government. It's a strong team -- young, impressive, capable. The Vice President is off to a good start with Kiriyenko. It's good to see you in such excellent health, but it's also good to see you putting together a government made up of fine young people. (S)

President Yeltsin: I've been glad to see how the mass media, both at home and abroad, as well as a lot of world leaders have paid attention to this point. He [Kiriyenko] is a young but skillful politician. I told him to take the baton from Al Gore in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and hold on to it firmly. The Commission has worked well; it's done a good job. (S)

I'll tell you, I've treated Chernomyrdin very well. I've let him keep his salary, his dacha, his car, his bodyguard. All the perks that he had as Prime Minister he has today as a pensioner. In this respect, I've put in place a radical change from the way we used to do things. It used to be when a top-level person resigned, he became a non-person overnight and everyone was kicking him in the shins and so forth. I know your own procedure for dealing with former political leaders is more civilized, but in the case of Chernomyrdin, I think we've gone you one better. (S)

The President: He was loyal to you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. He was always good about seeking my advice, and he's a decent person. But it sometimes happens in the history of a society that the people get tired of this or

that official, and you've got to change things -- start from scratch -- in order to restore momentum. (C)

On START II, the Duma is now fully engaged. It's full-speed ahead. It's not gathering dust. We're hard at work in various committees of the Duma as well as within the government. You and I have to make sure that that we don't let any harm come to this project. As I understand it you'll come to visit us in July only if we ratify START II in June -- that this is a condition of your coming. (C)

The President: Well, I think we've got yet another reason to want to get on with START III. The Indian nuclear test may give you an additional argument with which to push START II over the line. We don't know what the Pakistanis will do, but the whole situation puts more pressure on us to lead the world back from the brink. The whole situation just shows that other countries can hire scientists. If there's anything I can do to help [on Duma ratification], I'll do it, although I understand it's a Russian decision. (C)

President Yeltsin: Here's a paper setting forth our ideas for START III. [Hands over paper.] (C)

The President: Please move forward quickly on this so that we can get on with START III. That will help create a climate for India to sign the CTBT, and it will give you additional leverage with the Indian government when you go there. (C)

President Yeltsin: I'm going in December. (C)

The President: I think India has made a terrible mistake. But I also think India should get credit for 50 years of democracy. We need to help them see that they should not define greatness in a way that gives everyone else headaches. The ruling party there seems particularly to feel that earning the full respect of the world depends on India's being a nuclear power. Before I go [to South Asia], and before you go, we need to prepare and coordinate our approaches. (C)

President Yeltsin: Right! (C)

The President: We're making progress on nonproliferation, weapons of mass destruction and Iran, but I'm worried about a vote coming up in our Senate. I think we've got some good channels going -- the Vice President and Kiriyeenko, Madeleine

and Primakov, Sandy and Kokoshin, Gallucci and Koptev. I've got high confidence in these folks, and they're doing a good job. But they've got to know, and we've got to keep reminding them, that you and I are personally committed to this and making it work and not letting it slip backward. There have been some problems with implementation, as you know, so you've got to send a clear signal that implementation has got your total support.

(S)

President Yeltsin: Absolutely. I'll do that. (S)

The President: Otherwise we'll get a bad vote in the Senate that will infuriate your Duma. (S)

President Yeltsin: As a friend and as someone who has worked closely with you, I assure you that I'm absolutely intent on doing everything in my power for full implementation of all the agreements we've made and not to depart from them or slip backward from them. You're right that we've got a lot of problems to grapple with in this area, but we've also made a lot of headway in a short period of time. (S)

The President: We have, but we've got to keep it up. The coming week is going to be especially important. So let's have as much positive activity as possible. Senator Lott has got 82 co-sponsors for his bill. Anything good we can do this week will be especially helpful. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (S)

The President: On Kosovo, Primakov and Ivanov have done a good job working with Madeleine and our people. There's no way to resolve this whole problem unless we continue to work together. It's like in Bosnia: we've finally gotten the sides talking to each other on the basis of the idea that Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia [YELTSIN whispers to his team, 'Albanian part of Yugoslavia?'], and we've got to stay on top of it together. That's the only way to keep them from killing each other -- for us to work together, directly with each other and in the Contact Group, which is very effective and important. What's happened with them starting these talks is a big deal; it could mean finally finding a way out of a very dangerous situation. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, and we're working constantly with Milosevic. He's a stubborn guy, not easy to work with. But you can make deals with him. We've been exchanging messages, making

phone calls, doing everything to push him to engage with the Albanian community in Kosovo. (S)

The President: Dick Holbrooke had a good set of meetings down there. He's got his own unusual chemistry with Milosevic. But all this works because of what Milosevic has heard from you and Primakov and your team. Our goal is to keep a fence around them [the parties] so that they talk to each other and don't fight. (S)

One other thing: we're working together through the UN to keep a force in Macedonia. That arrangement has been satisfactory to you and satisfactory to us. Some people, though, want to terminate that force. I don't want to see that happen. I want to stay together in keeping a UN force in there. The situation is too fragile to leave completely. (S)

President Yeltsin: On this, our positions are identical. I support what you've said. We'll work together along this line. There's no disagreement. It would be bad if NATO were to engage in there as a presence. NATO would be an elephant in the china shop. (S)

The President: The key thing is that the UN force not evaporate, since that would force us to come up with some other force. Let's have Mr. Mamedov and Strobe work on this and other things of that kind. They have been conducting our Strategic Stability Dialogue under Madeleine and Primakov. They have a common language -- or maybe two. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, they understand each other. We know Mr. Talbott. Not everything that he does thrills us, but overall he's solid and works hard. (S)

The President: That's about as much as I can say for him too, and I've known him for 30 years. (S)

President Yeltsin: I've got a lot of other things that my people have prepared me to talk about. What don't I just give you these [he hands over his cards]. (S)

The President: Okay, and here are ours [Mamedov comments with mock astonishment, "And they're classified *confidential!*."] (S)

You know, Boris, we really are working with the stuff of history here. I'm convinced that 20 years from now, when the Russian economy is booming, people will look back and say we

were right; we did the right things. I just hope you get all the credit you deserve while you're still around, because you've done a terrific job of leading your country during one of the two or three most important moments in Russian history. (S)

President Yeltsin: You and I have an excellent relationship, Bill -- more than just a friendship. It's what I would call co-leadership. We've had the fundamental convictions, the courage and the stamina to abandon old stereotypes as well as moving forward with agreements on deep reductions in global strategic nuclear arms and conventional arms too. (S)

For my part, I'm going to keep reducing our armed forces. I plan to cut them from 2.6 million to 1.2 million. That's actually quite fantastic when you think about it -- a reduction of nearly 2 million from where it used to be. And not only that: I'm also trying to find apartments and jobs for the military people who are leaving the armed forces. Dealing with this problem is not easy. It means not just cutting our forces but also providing means of livelihood for the people affected. (S)

The President: That's very impressive. (S)

President Yeltsin: A word on China, which we touched on only briefly earlier [in the G-8]. We're working effectively with China. The forces along both sides of our border -- which is 7,500 kilometers, even longer than yours with Mexico -- have been cut by half. (S)

The President: I'd like to develop this whole issue of what we can do together with China. Let's have Mr. Berger pursue this with Mr. Kokoshin and Strobe with Yuri before I go to China. Russia, China and the United States might consider a joint approach toward the problem of India and Pakistan. We need to give this careful thought, but it could conceivably include getting them into the CTBT and even reinvigorating the peace process for Kashmir. Both countries have a lot of poverty -- they can't afford this constant tension and conflict. If we could help them reconcile some of their differences, it would be a huge thing for your security; it would spur economic growth in Russia and China. (S)

President Yeltsin: A troika! We could bring our influence to bear on India and Pakistan. (S)

The President: All the more reason for us to do so given the historic problems between Russia and China, and also given the way the Cold War affected our relations with India, and Pakistan was something of a special case too. Now we have a chance to come up with a common strategy to solve one of the biggest problems in the world. (S)

President Yeltsin: Maybe we could meet, the three of us, somewhere on the Russian-Chinese border. I could raise this with Zhang Zemin when I see him. (S)

The President: Well, there's a lot more thinking we should do together, the two of us, through Mr. Berger and Mr. Kokoshin and Strobe and Mamedov, before I go to China. We'll have our people come up with a strategy that we can agree to before I go to China. (S)

President Yeltsin: Good. [To Mamedov] Got it? [Mamedov: "yes."] (S)

The President: This is a big deal, Boris. (S)

President Yeltsin: It sure is -- drawing China into our bilateral orbit. It's truly a task for the next millennium. We'll be in retirement when this come to fruition. Maybe we'll set up a club or a foundation of former heads of state. I don't think either of us wants to spend his retirement planting potatoes in the garden. (S)

The President: I'd thought about setting up an institute of some kind. (S)

President Yeltsin: So you're already making plans along the lines of what I suggested? (S)

The President: I haven't had much time for thinking about that. But whatever I do, there will be a place for you. (S)

President Yeltsin: [Laughs.]

Final banter about hunting bear, boar and geese and how a retired president wouldn't have to worry quite so much about animal-rights activists. (S)

The President: Boar and bear are serious -- they can fight back, so you've got a fair fight. (S)

President Yeltsin: I've gone one-on-one with a bear. It was exciting. He was only 20 meters from me. You've got to be a pretty good shot -- right for the heart. [Does an imitation of the bear.] I like goose hunting, but not when they're just sitting there on the water -- only when they're in the air and it's a real test of skill. Getting START II ratified is nothing compared to that! (X)

You know, Bill, people keep saying that we're losing confidence in each other, that our partnership is running aground. Let's make sure they know we're doing fine. With the policy you've pursued toward Russia these past five years, you really can't lose, and in the time remaining to you in office you can score more points. (X)

As for me, I'm criticized for tilting too much toward you. They keep calling me a westernizer. [He uses the word from the 19th century debate between the westernizers and the slavophiles.] (X)

The President: Time will bear you out. (X)

President Yeltsin: Yes. The two of us have set out together to build an alliance [soyuz] based on full confidence in each other. I don't doubt your good faith and you don't doubt mine. (X)

The President: That kind of mutual trust and confidence makes all the difference. We've seen that in Northern Ireland. The whole problem there has been lack of trust. Personal chemistry really matters. Another example is the Middle East. Rabin gets killed, and Arafat and Netanyahu just don't trust each other. If there's no trust, nothing good can happen. (X)

[They conclude, with YELTSIN giving an embrace.]

-- End of Conversation --

3752

President Yeltsin: I've gone one-on-one with a bear. It was exciting. He was only 20 meters from me. You've got to be a pretty good shot -- right for the heart. [Does an imitation of the bear.] I like goose hunting, but not when they're just sitting there on the water -- only when they're in the air and it's a real test of skill. Getting START II ratified is nothing compared to that! (C)

You know, Bill, people keep saying that we're losing confidence in each other, that our partnership is running aground. Let's make sure they know we're doing fine. With the policy you've pursued toward Russia these past five years, you really can't lose, and in the timing remaining to you in office you can score more points. (C)

← time
|

As for me, I'm criticized for tilting too much toward you. They keep calling me a westernizer. [He uses the word from the 19th century debate between the westernizers and the slavophiles.] (C)

The President: Time will bear you out. (C)

President Yeltsin: Yes. The two of us have set out together to build an alliance [soyuz] based on full confidence in each other. I don't doubt your good faith and you don't doubt mine. (C)

The President: That kind of mutual trust and confidence makes all the difference. We've seen that in Northern Ireland. The whole problem there has been lack of trust. Personal chemistry really matters. Another example is the Middle East. Rabin gets killed, and Arafat and Netanyahu just don't trust each other. If there's no trust, nothing good can happen. (C)

[They conclude, with YELTSIN giving an embrace.]

-- End of Conversation --

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-m-2 (1.60)
3/13/2018 KBM

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2039				
Document ID: 9803875				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 3	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telecon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (4 pages)	05/28/1998	P1/b(1) KGM 7/13/2018
001b. telecon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)	05/28/1998	P1/b(1) KGM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2039

FOLDER TITLE:

9803875

2015-0782-M
rs1550

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9803875
RECEIVED: 28 MAY 98 11

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 02 JUN 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCALL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 28 MAY 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 03 JUN 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
FORT
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY SP

DATE

6/03

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC

2 OF

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBA/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9803875

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 98060119 FOR DECISION
X 98060306 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 98060306 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980602 KENNEY, K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3875
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG B A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>SS</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>113</u>	<u>② 6/2 6/2</u>	<u>edit</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>② 6/2</u>	
Steinberg		<u><i>copy</i></u>	
Berger		<u><i>copy</i></u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TTS 6/2</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

SRB, JS, TS, 56-2
 COMMENTS 2/12

Exec Sec Office has diskette *ye* _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3875
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TS A/O _____

SRB

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>113</u>	<u>R 6/2 6/2</u>	<u>edit</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>10 6/2</u>	
Steinberg		<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>	
Berger		<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TTS 6/2</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

SRB, JS, TS
 COMMENTS: 12
56-2

Exec Sec Office has diskette *[Handwritten initials]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3875


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 2, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (Ø)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the May 28 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. (Ø)


For: Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 6/1/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9803875
DATE 02 JUN 98

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 28 MAY 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u> + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Kyrill Borissow
Notetaker: Cindy Lawrence

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 28, 1998, 11:53 a.m. - 12:14 p.m. EDT,
Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, hello. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. I'm glad you called. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I have a couple of questions to ask you. The first question is related to Pakistan. We have to agree with you on how to react. And the second question I would like to ask you is the following: I would like you to support me with regard to financial issues. I would like to ask you, Bill, one way or another to state that the Russian leadership and government and president will handle the situation, which has now developed, and that you are sure of that. And second, I would like you to address your investors who work here in Russia so that they will not panic and do not leave Russia with their investments, that they do not take away their investments, as we have the necessary reserves. And there is no catastrophic situation here. We need your support. People in the world must know that you support us and that you are sure that Russia will handle the situation, that everything will be in order. Well, the situation is difficult. Did you get me, Bill? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hear you. Let me just briefly say something about Pakistan. Since they have done these tests, obviously you and I have to redouble our efforts to stop the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 5/28/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.31)
3/13/2018 KBH

nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent and we have to work together. Just a few moments ago I was told that Primakov and Madeleine Albright agreed that there should be a special security meeting on South Asia among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, all five of us, at the ministerial level. So that is very good news. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I know about that. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's good. I think the main problem in the short run is that now that they have completed these tests, both India and Pakistan may be planning to conduct tests of longer-range missiles. We should urge both India and Pakistan not to go forward and not to do anything to alarm the other side. I have talked to Sharif five times, including twice in the last 15 hours, and he has told me India's threatening rhetoric has intensified the pressure on Pakistan to do what it is doing, so I think we have to work hard to tone down what the Indians are saying.

I hope you can convince Prime Minister Vajpayee to have his security forces back off in Kashmir. If we could get them to pull back from the line of control, it would send a signal to Pakistan that it could reduce the posture of its forces there. In any case, we have got to work very closely on this and be saying the same thing. And we have to try to get the Chinese to be more vocal in saying the same thing. That is why I think it is so important to have the P-5 meeting on this. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree with you, and I am prepared to act in unison with you. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great. Now on your economic issue, let me say first of all, I have supported all your efforts at reform since 1993 and I will continue to do so. But I think even more important than what I say to reassure investors is what you say to support your excellent economic team and their reform efforts. Your public statement of support today was very, very good and I hope you'll continue that. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Meanwhile, I have asked our Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin and his team to work with the IMF to do everything we can to support the agreement to send a clear signal to markets that Russia has a reform strategy that will work and will be implemented if you and the IMF are ready. I hope you can

announce agreement with the IMF this week. You know how these markets are, they go up and down in a week and you don't have time to react. We have pushed hard for the positive statements you have seen from the IMF in the last few days to calm down the markets and reassure investors. We will keep doing that. Also, if there's anything else we can do to help your team with practical aspects of your reform agenda, on tax administration reform for example, we are glad to do that. (Ø)

Let me say again, as you understand, part of this is an economic struggle, part of it is purely psychological and I am ready to weigh in personally to help, but we have got to have evidence to support our assertions that Russia is continuing to make progress on reforms. Then we can calm investors because they know what a great opportunity there is there. In the end, I think financial investors will respond if we can get a quick announcement of an IMF program and it's obvious that you are implementing it, and that you are working hard on tax collection. The other thing that would be very helpful is if the Duma would pass the tax code in this session. (Ø)

This past day or so should give you the leverage you need. Meanwhile, I will help in every way I can, and we will work at this together. You have a great team and your personal support for them will do more to calm the markets than anything else. And I will give a very positive statement of this conversation here, and we'll just keep working on it. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. Good, Bill. Thank you for this support, and that you understood the problem we are facing. That is the way we are going to act. We drew up the program in such a way that the IMF would trust us. All the more with your support. And with regard to taxes I held two meetings today and we intend to tighten our tax policy and also to strengthen our tax service. I believe we understood each other with regard to Pakistan and India and also on economic matters. We will work together because we are convinced when we work together we yield results, we have results. Do you agree with me? (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do. I think what you did with your team today was very good. You have to do it repeatedly. Emphasize you have to have results and are determined to get them. This is not just words, this is action, then I think we will be successful. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good, Bill. I am very glad we have such a position with you, and let us act jointly. Well, I embrace you. All the best to you. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. Hang in there. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Please give my regards to Hillary; don't forget to convey my regards. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I will. We were really glad to see you and Naina in Birmingham, and I will be following this every day. If you want to call again you can do so. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I will tell that to Naina. I hug you. Goodbye. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3875

June 1, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: WILLIAM COURTNEY

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL AND KI FORTNEY

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, May 28

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the May 28 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for record.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 6/1/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (✓)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Kyrill Borissow
Notetaker: Cindy Lawrence

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 28, 1998, 11:53 a.m. - 12:14 p.m. EDT, Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, hello. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. I'm glad you called. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I have a couple of questions to ask you. The first question is related to Pakistan. We have to agree with you on how to react. And the second question I would like to ask you is the following: I would like you to support me with regard to financial issues. I would like to ask you, Bill, one way or another to state that the Russian leadership and government and president will handle the situation, which has now developed, and that you are sure of that. And second, I would like you to address your investors who work here in Russia so that they will not panic and do not leave Russia with their investments, that they do not take away their investments, as we have the necessary reserves. And there is no catastrophic situation here. We need your support. People in the world must know that you support us and that you are sure that Russia will handle the situation, that everything will be in order. Well, the situation is difficult. Did you get me, Bill? (✓)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hear you. Let me just briefly say something about Pakistan. Since they have done these tests, obviously you and I have to redouble our efforts to stop the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 5/28/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2(1.32)
3/13/2018 KBN

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2045				
Document ID: 9804474				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (5 pages)	06/15/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (2 pages)	06/15/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2045

FOLDER TITLE:

9804474

2015-0782-M
rs1551

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9804474
RECEIVED: 19 JUN 98 12

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 22 JUN 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 15 JUN 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 25 JUN 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC

FICKLIN

NSC CHRON

WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY RP

DATE 6/23

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC

2 OF

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBN/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9804474

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 98062215 FOR DECISION
X 98062307 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 98062307 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980622 KENNEY, K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4474
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 8MD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>WP</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>113</u>	<u>① 9/19/22</u>	<u>ES/6/22</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>① 6/22</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>① 6/22</u>	<u>①</u>
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: _____

COMMENTS:

'98 JUN 19 pm 5:24

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4474
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWD A/O _____

JOP

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>113</u>	<u>AW/19/92</u>	<u>EF/6/22</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>0/6/22</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>W/6/22</u>	<u>3</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 JUN 19 AM 5:24

Exec Sec Office has diskette lybo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


4474

June 22, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (✓)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the June 15 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador only. (✓)


Glyn T. Davies
For: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 6/19/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Kyrill Borissow
Notetakers: Bob Ford, Cindy Lawrence,
Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 15, 1998, 1:21 p.m. - 1:57 p.m. EDT,
Oval Office

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It seems we agreed on the timing of our conversation; we did well. Well, I understand the major subject is now to be Kosovo. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think we should talk about Kosovo as well as the Russian financial situation. I wanted to get your assessment of where we stand and what we're going to do in the days ahead. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I see. But the most important thing, of course, is Kosovo. Well, as you certainly know, I decided to invite Milosevic to Moscow and he will be arriving tomorrow. I've prepared a plan for tomorrow's conversation with Milosevic. First, we meet one-on-one and then we shall be joined by our power ministers [Defense and Security] as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and others, and then I will turn things over to Mr. Primakov to discuss all the details. I am satisfied the Contact Group supported my initiative to receive Milosevic in Moscow. I believe this advances our joint efforts for the soonest possible settlement of the Kosovo problem. And this is also in line with our agreements reached in Birmingham. Frankly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 6/19/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-m-2 (1.33)
3/13/2018 KBH

speaking, I can tell you, Bill, I am planning to have a tough talk with Milosevic. (S)

I shall demand that the disproportionate use of force be stopped, but the most important thing is to get his agreement to negotiations. Any use of force by NATO is inadmissible. I think we should work here together in parallel: I will work to bring pressure on Belgrade, while you press the Kosovar Albanian leaders. And, if we both reach our goals and use all our possibilities, then we shall be able to find a solution to these problems as we have several times in the past. (S)

Of course, if the reaction from Belgrade will be a negative one, then we shall find another way of solving this situation together with the Contact Group and the United Nations. But anyway, Bill, I think it is inadmissible that the Security Council of the United Nations should sanction the use of force against a sovereign state which is trying to solve problems of its territorial integrity. And if there should be a strike by NATO against Yugoslavia without UN Security Council sanction, that would be considered a blow to cooperation between Russia and NATO. (S)

So, of course, we shall be working within the framework of the meeting of the Contact Group in London and the statement they signed there. (S)

And another matter: I don't want you to be upset because the ratification of START II has been postponed until autumn. On the 16th of June in the General Staff there will be a seminar with the participation of the Duma, members of the Duma in favor of the ratification of START II and in this seminar Mr. Primakov and Minister Sergeyev will take part. I believe this will help you personally because you are now getting a lot of pressure from your Congress. (S)

And let's agree that when we release information to the mass media about today's conversation, we shall state the commitment of the leaders of Russia and the U.S. to the ratification of the Start II treaty as we have discussed during today's conversation. (S)

As for India and Pakistan, I believe it should be the subject of a separate discussion. We should probably get in touch with each other at a later time, since I'm working on this matter and I know you're also doing something on this matter, so we can do together a lot of things in this area. (S)

Now, Bill, I am listening to you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, Boris, thank you for what you have said. Let me try to respond to each issue, beginning with Kosovo. (U)

We are supporting the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, but I believe Milosevic is endangering the integrity of Yugoslavia by refusing to have serious negotiations with the Kosovar Albanians. By taking action against the civilian population, he is giving aid and comfort to the separatists and making the situation more radical. (U)

Milosevic has great respect for you and I am encouraged you will tell him he has to end indiscriminate violence and engage in genuine dialogue. If he hears that from you, I believe there's a much better chance he will do it. Let me say also that the Contact Group, which has worked well together, has essentially said he must cease action against the civil population, withdraw security forces used for repression, allow international monitors free access, facilitate the return of refugees to their homes and allow open access for humanitarian organizations and supplies, and then have dialogue with the Kosovar Albanian leadership. I think these are reasonable demands and we must avoid the mistakes we made in Bosnia by waiting too long. I think you are critical to that. I have met here with Kosovar leaders, including Rugova and others, and told them what our position was and we told them they should negotiate for greater autonomy, not for independence. But we have got to stop Milosevic from a new round of ethnic cleansing and a whole new round of refugees. (U)

As to your comments about NATO. Let me say, first of all, that I think we should work together through the UN. Your support for the UNSC resolution would show our unity and if we are together, I think we can avoid having this situation require any intervention. A united effort will make it clear to Milosevic that he must take the lead in any negotiated solution, and if he does that, it will reduce the sense of the rest of the world that he is once again practicing ethnic cleansing. In terms of NATO, I very much hope no NATO action will be necessary. I think we should make sure the Permanent Joint Council between NATO and Russia is working together on this and being honest and open and candid. If we work together as we did in Bosnia, and if we act sooner, we can avoid a situation requiring any kind of intervention. I know Kokoshin is here and perhaps we will

discuss this more with him. The last thing I want to say about Kosovo is I am very grateful to you for seeing Milosevic, and after your meeting with him if you want to talk again, I would be available Tuesday or Wednesday at your convenience. It's up to you, but if you want to, I will certainly be available. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I shall call you, by all means. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great. Very briefly, I agree with everything you said about START II and the statement you want to make, and if there's anything else I can say or do to help you lobby the Duma, I will obviously be ready do to so. Also, I assure you I have been supporting more IMF and World Bank funding for Russia if necessary. I know your people are engaged now in talks with the IMF, and I hope they can be completed swiftly and successfully. From what I have been able to learn, the key elements will be better cooperation between your new reformist government and the Central Bank, a better tax collection system, and more open information for investors. If we can make progress, more money will flow, but more important, more private investment will flow. Your new government is very exciting to people. If we make a little progress on these fronts, we can turn this situation around. A lot of what's happened in Russia with investments and stocks is a function of what's going on in Asia spilling over. You just have to push back the other way and show the leadership and character of your government, which is evident to me. You can do it, and I will continue to support it. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, well, I believe your understanding of our situation is correct. We are holding on for now, but of course, the situation is rather complicated. What is in question is not a very large amount of money, something around \$5 billion dollars. The most important thing here is that the G7 statement reflects the confidence of leading countries that Russia will be able to deal with the situation so investors can have no fear investing in the Russian economy. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: That's good. Good luck with your meeting with Milosevic and I look forward to hearing from you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I shall call you myself. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. (U)

[After a brief technical problem during which President Yeltsin's comments were inaudible, the conversation resumed.]

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Then we shall be joined by our power ministries, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and then solve these problems together, and at this third stage, let Primakov and others discuss all the details. Of course, you know that Milosevic is a stubborn person, so it will not be easy for me to deal with him tomorrow. I shall act along the lines we agreed with you, so as to bring pressure to bear on Milosevic and try to get agreement from him to negotiations with the Kosvar Albanians, and on your side, you pressure the Kosovar Albanians and get from them an unequivocal statement also, saying they will seek a seat at the negotiating table. (✓)

Of course, I shall do everything to ensure our mutual interests. And for financial matters, of course we shall resist as long as we can and try to find solutions and take measures so as to bring us to a successful result. If it gets too hard for us, I shall call you. (✓)

THE PRESIDENT: That is great, Boris. I'll talk to you in a couple of days. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I was also glad to talk to you, Bill. Thank you for your initiative of this conversation. Please accept my hugs and all the best to you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Alright. Thank you, Boris. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9804474
DATE 22 JUN 98

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 15 JUN 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KRM Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4474

June 19, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER *(S) [Signature]*

THROUGH: WILLIAM COURTNEY

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AWP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, June 15, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 15 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

Concurrence: Jock Covey *Jock*

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 6/19/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Kyrill Borissow
Notetakers: Bob Ford, Cindy Lawrence, Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 15, 1998, 1:21 p.m. - 1:57 p.m. EDT, Oval Office

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It seems we agreed on the timing of our conversation; we did well. Well, I understand the major subject is now to be Kosovo. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think we should talk about Kosovo as well as the Russian financial situation. I wanted to get your assessment of where we stand and what we're going to do in the days ahead. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I see. But the most important thing, of course, is Kosovo. Well, as you certainly know, I decided to invite Milosevic to Moscow and he will be arriving tomorrow. I've prepared a plan for tomorrow's conversation with Milosevic. First, we meet one-on-one and then we shall be joined by our power ministers as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and others, and then I will turn things over to Mr. Primakov to discuss all the details. I am satisfied the Contact Group supported my initiative to receive Milosevic in Moscow. I believe this advances our joint efforts for the soonest possible settlement of the Kosovo problem. And this is also in line with our agreements reached in Birmingham. Frankly speaking, I can

[Defense and Security]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify on: 6/19/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015 - 0782 - M - 2 (1.34)
3/13/2018 KBH

discuss this more with him. The last thing I want to say about Kosovo is I am very grateful to you for seeing Milosevic, and after your meeting with him if you want to talk again, I would be available Tuesday or Wednesday at your convenience. It's up to you, but if you want to, I will certainly be available. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I shall call you, by all means. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great. Very briefly, I agree with everything you said about START II and the statement you want to make, and if there's anything else I can say or do to help you lobby the Duma, I will obviously be ready do to so. Also, I assure you I have been supporting more IMF and World Bank funding for Russia if necessary. I know your people are engaged now in talks with the IMF, and I hope they can be completed swiftly and successfully. From what I have been able to learn, the key elements will be better cooperation between your new reformist government and the Central Bank, a better tax collection system, and more open information for investors. If we can make progress, more money will flow, but more important, more private investment will flow. Your new government is very exciting to people. If we make a little progress on these fronts, we can turn this situation around. A lot of what's happened in Russia with investments and stocks is a function of what's going on in Asia spilling over. You just have to push back the other way and show the leadership and character of your government, which is evident to me. You can do it, and I will continue to support it. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, well, I believe your understanding of our situation is correct. We are holding on for now, but of course, the situation is rather complicated. What is in question is not a very large amount of money, something around \$5 billion dollars. The most important thing here is that the G7 statement reflects the confidence of leading countries that Russia will be able to deal with the situation so investors can have no fear investing in the Russian economy. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: That's good. Good luck with your meeting with Milosevic and I look forward to hearing from you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I shall call you myself. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. (U)

[After a brief technical problem, the conversation resumed.]

*during which President Yeltsin's
comments were inaudible*

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the June 15 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. ^{also} ~~may be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador and must be distributed via NODIS channels.~~

(S)

¹
only.

IT

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

ben kennick -
"Power Ministers" is a Russian
term of art that refers to their
Defense and Security Ministers. I've
clarified this in bracketed text.
I ~~also~~ also amplified the text
referring to the technical difficulties.

EE

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2045				
Document ID: 9804476				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (2 pages)	06/16/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2045

FOLDER TITLE:

9804476

2015-0782-M
rs1552

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9804476
RECEIVED: 19 JUN 98 12

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 20 JUN 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 16 JUN 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 25 JUN 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
WEISS ✓

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

JP

DATE

6/22

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KSNARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER

Z 98062207 FOR DECISION

001

X 98062207 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

002

X 98062207 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980620 KENNEY, K

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4476
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SUN A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>JEP</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u> <u>13</u>	<u>(R)</u> <u>6/19</u> <u>6/20</u>	<u>File</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D)</u> <u>6/20</u>	
Steinberg		<u>copy</u> ✓	
Berger		<u>copy</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(D)</u> <u>6/20</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		<u>D+DISK</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

35 JUN 19 5:24

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4476
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SWD A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>JEP</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u> 13	<u>(R)</u> 6/19 6/20	<u>File</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(O)</u> 6/20	
Steinberg		<u>copy</u>	
Berger		<u>copy</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>(R)</u> 6/20	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		<u>D + DISK</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:
 38 JUN 19 5:04


Exec Sec Office has diskette yps

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (✓)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the June 16 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador only. (✓)


Glyn T. Davies
For: Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 6/19/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KRM/NARA, Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetakers: Tom Crowell, Nick Dowling, Bonnie Glick, Joel Schrader, James Smith, Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 16, 1998, 10:50 a.m - 10:58 a.m. EDT, Oval Office

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. It's nice to hear your voice. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, I've done a lot of things today. We had a very difficult and, I would say, harsh talk with Milosevic. We have worked out a document, a bilateral statement, where Milosevic confirmed practically all of the points contained in the Contact Group document. So we will send you the bilateral statement. He has supported all the main points; that is to say, holding talks and trying to find a settlement through political means. So you may congratulate me. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do congratulate you. I want to see the statement - I can't wait to see it. I think the real questions I have are if he said when will he withdraw his security forces and will he engage in political talks with the Kosovars immediately. What is the timetable there? (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You will find all this in the statement. You shall see everything in the statement. I believe this is a good document. We have managed to do a lot of things there,

although I believe we could have gone a bit further on some points. But he is a very difficult person to talk to. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: You've obviously done a good day's work, and you've moved the ball forward quite a lot. Thanks very much. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, it is part of our joint effort with you. The next important thing to do here is to find a peaceful settlement. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think it would be helpful if now, when we look at the next steps, if Primakov could follow up with a phone call to Madeleine, since Strobe Talbott will meet him in Copenhagen on Monday. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, I'll tell Primakov. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Good. Thanks, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9804476
DATE 20 JUN 98

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u> + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504


4476

June 19, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER 

THROUGH: WILLIAM COURTNEY

FROM: ANDREW WEISS 

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, June 16, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June
16 telephone conversation between the President and Russian
President Yeltsin.

Concurrence: Jock Covey 

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 6/19/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4476

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the June 16 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. ^{also} It ~~may~~ be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador ~~and must be distributed via NODIS channels.~~
(C) ^{only.}

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 6/19/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGH/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2048				
Document ID: 9804971				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (4 pages)	07/10/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2048

FOLDER TITLE:

9804971

2015-0782-M
rs1553

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9804971
RECEIVED: 10 JUL 98 16

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 11 JUL 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 10 JUL 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 16 JUL 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

SP

DATE

7/13

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KRI* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 WEISS	Z 98071309 PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
002 BERGER	Z 98071309 FOR DECISION
002	X 98071309 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
003	X 98071309 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
003	980711	KENNEY, K	

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4971
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (F) A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>J</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>(P) 7/11 7/11</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(P) 7/11</u>	
Steinberg		<u>copy</u>	
Berger		<u>copy</u>	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>SWD 7/11</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: *J*

COMMENTS:

'98 JUL 10 PM 9:02

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4971
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG R A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>J</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>P 7/11 7/11</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>P 7/11</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>SMD 7/11</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.			<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

798 JUL 10 am 9:02

Exec Sec Office has diskette yo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

4971

July 11, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the July 10 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies
Glyn T. Davies
for: Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/10/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2004
By KGM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dimitry Zarechnak
Notetakers: Jim Smith, Jeff Rathke,
Lyle Harrison, Doug Baylel, Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME July 10, 1998, 1:19 p.m. - 1:38 p.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, how are you doing? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I'm doing great. I had a good trip to China and I'm just working on things here, spending a lot of time keeping up with the IMF proposal for Russia, and hope we can get it worked out quickly. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, Bill, soon is the word and it is not enough to describe the urgency of the situation. Otherwise, if we do not get a decision soon, by the end of next week, it would mean the end of reform and basically the end of Russia. The consequences would be catastrophic and drastic, not only for Russia but for the global financial system as well. The IMF envisages a process of three weeks, but three weeks is too long for us. The question is not approval of the program. The program is already familiar to the IMF team and basically agreed. We need the decision in one week -- by July 16. Because here on the line is not only my authority and honor, but also yours and the entire international community. (Ø)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 7/10/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0732-M-2 (1.36)
3/13/2018 KBM

THE PRESIDENT: I understand you had a conversation with Camdessus. My understanding is that if details are completed, a very substantial program could be announced on Monday. [Note: At this point during translation, President Yeltsin interrupts and says "Yes, yes." Yeltsin's additional comments are not translated by the Russian side.] What is essential is that you do what must be done on the tax system and the anti-crisis program, use your full personal leadership to get it through the Duma, and if not, use the full legal powers of the presidency. I agree we have to do this in a hurry. It is my understanding they are ready to announce this on Monday. (Ø)

U.S. INTERPRETER: Mr. President, they did not let me finish interpreting. The main thing is, he understands the program is ready, but the question is time. They are saying it can't be implemented by the end of July, and they really need it to happen by July 16. Would you like me to finish the stuff about taxes? (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I would. [Interpreter finishes.] (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I will do so. I will do everything in my power. I already put Gazprom -- brought them -- in line and made them get their act together. They have paid all their tax debts. I will also put all other major debtors into line because the government doesn't have the necessary clout to do so. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but Boris, let me make sure I understand the situation. If the IMF announces the details of the program on Monday, how quickly can the Duma act -- or you act with your executive authority -- to comply with the Russian requirements? My understanding is they are prepared to release the money whenever you implement whatever you have pledged you are going to do. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: The Duma is discussing this program right now, but the thing is that some draft laws are being accepted outright and other draft laws are still being discussed. I have two options open to me. First, I go to Duma personally, which I have never done before, and tell them they are playing with the destiny of the country and the economic future of the country, and this is no time for jokes. If they do not come to their senses, I have a second option. According to the constitution, I can dissolve the Duma because they cannot come to a decision. I will decide this issue by July 16. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: I think on the second question, that is a judgment only you can make, but on the first, the members of the Duma need to know they are playing with the future of the nation. On the second question, they should have helped out before. I know about problems with parliaments. My own Congress over here doesn't like to listen to me. But when the country's future is at stake, people just have to put aside their personal politics and do what is right. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: That is right. That is right. Of course, I will first take step number one. I will go to the Duma and tell them exactly those words. They will have to make a decision no later than July 16. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I think if you can push the decisions quickly, I will obviously do everything I can to get the money released quickly. If the IMF announces on Monday, we can get the Board to approve it. I will do everything I can do to get this done as quickly as possible. You know I will. But I cannot control what they do unless the Russian actions are forthcoming. Those people have to help you. They cannot leave you out there all by yourself trying to save the country. The Duma has to support you better. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, I understand, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me ask you -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN (interrupting): I think I will manage to cope with the Duma, and they will have to adopt this program. Then we will be able very soon to adequately resolve this issue. Of course, under your leadership and with your support. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I will do everything I can. You know I will. I know that when those people believe you are serious, in the end they will give in to your will. A lot of members may not understand how grave the situation is. You can do it. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, indeed. I will try. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me mention one other thing very quickly. We have continued to work with Kokoshin on this problem of stopping Russian firms cooperating with the Iranian missile program. We've made some progress, but Congress is still threatening to override my veto of the sanctions bill. I hope Berger and Kokoshin can keep working on it. The more that can be done in

Russia the better I can work with Congress on this. And the problem is not yet solved. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Would you run that by me again, what sanctions are we talking about? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: The Congress, we have talked about this in the past, the Congress passed a bill to impose sanctions on Russian firms that cooperate with the Iranian missile program. I vetoed the bill. But if they bring it up to a vote, they have the votes to override my veto. We have worked with your government through Kokoshin to demonstrate that Russia is doing everything that can be done to stop this cooperation, but the evidence is at least some of these firms continue to cooperate. I just wanted to say that I am doing everything I can do to stop the veto override, to keep this from coming into law. You need to encourage your people to keep working with Sandy Berger on it. We have to work as hard as we can. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay, I promise to look attentively at each and every point where we can enforce compliance and reduce or restrict cooperation between Russian and Iranian companies. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Okay, well, see you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Best regards to Hillary. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks, good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9804971
DATE 11 JUL 98

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 10 JUL 98
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KRM Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 10, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER *(D) [initials]*

THROUGH: KI FORT *for*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, July 10, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the July 10 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

F. he for record ✓
(2)

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2055				
Document ID: 9805782				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 8	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (6 pages)	08/14/1998	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (4 pages)	08/14/1998	P1/b(1) KBM 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2055

FOLDER TITLE:

9805782

2015-0782-M
rs1554

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 18 AUG 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN 14 AUG

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 22 AUG 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: KUNIN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
KUNIN
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

SP

DATE

8/19

BY HAND

W/ATCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 98081820 FOR DECISION
X 98081907 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 98081907 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980818 KENNEY, K

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5782
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG FE A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>h</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>Ⓚ 8/18 8/18</u>	<u>Ⓚ 8/18 8/18</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>Ⓚ 8/18</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>Ⓚ 8/18</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>		<u>D+DISK</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Geltser Memo 8/14

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5782
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PBS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG FE A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>b</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>(A) 8/18 8/18</u>	<u>(A) 8/18</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 8/18</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>(D) 8/18</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>		<u>D+DISK</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Geltser Memo 8/14

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5782

August 18, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (✓)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the August 14 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador only. (✓)

Glyn T. Davies
Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary
RDC:

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 8/17/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5782

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (✓)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Kyril Borissow
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Sean Tarver,
Frank Jarosinski, Robert Ford, Daniel Kunin,
Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME August 14, 1998, 10:30 a.m.- 11:06 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for taking my call. Hillary and I are really looking forward to our visit in September. I hope that you are getting a chance to rest, though I know that you are working even on vacation. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Of course Bill, this is a common job, common work we do, and we follow each other closely, and this is the only way we can move forward. I am looking forward to our meeting in Moscow. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Me, too. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think that this time we have made very good preparations on economic points, and the Gore-Kiriyenko Commission has done a very good job, and the political aspects have been prepared by Mr. Primakov and Madame Albright. I think the preparations and discussions within the Commission are encouraging, and through their work they facilitate things significantly for us, Bill. However, we will face very complex and difficult issues when we meet. We will discuss our joint

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify on: 08/17/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (141)
3/13/2018 K0M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

statement concerning challenges on security on the threshold of the 21st century. But I think that there are no questions that we cannot resolve through our joint efforts, you and me. I think the next meeting will prove to the entire world that we are quite capable of resolving these issues. What is your view?
(Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I agree with the statements you made. But I am concerned about the financial situation around the world. I have been following Japan, China, South Korea and others. I know you face a lot of pressure in Russia, both economic and political. I think the program Kiriyenko and Chubays put in place is absolutely critical to find a path out of the financial crisis. You have made the right choice but markets are very volatile and still somewhat negative. I just called in part to get your feeling about what is happening and what needs to be done, because I want to be out there advocating the right course. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You see, Bill, of course, I am very worried and very concerned over this whole financial situation in our financial markets. And I think that your decision will be of very critical importance, and I am referring to the decision by the IMF about the second tranche of the loan to Russia. I think that decision should come no later than September 15. If that is done, if the decision is taken by that date, it will send a major signal and important message, you see, Bill. If your markets were to cooperate in the proper way, and American investors were not to place any limits on Russian ventures, we will continue our cooperation. I think this is the only way forward out of the current situation. You see, Bill, the most important thing now in my view is for the U.S. Treasury Department to recommend that American investors not place any limits on economic operations with Russian economic actors. We should all work to restore normal operations. I think that this is of the utmost importance and the only way we can move forward. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Boris, first of all, you know that I want to be as supportive as I can, and I have tried to be. I think that in order to -- the problem with getting money from the IMF is that it is not enough money to make a difference unless it changes the confidence of the world investment community. In order for it to work, I think that it is very important in Russia that you and Kiriyenko be seen as working together hand in hand very strongly because people take their cues from you more than anyone else. The second thing is that we have to do

something to get your Duma to help you, to support you more, and perhaps there is something that I can do to help you during my visit in September. I could meet with them in small groups if you want, I don't know. But an early release of funds from the IMF will only help if it lifts confidence. Let me also say that I sent our best expert, David Lipton, to Moscow to meet with Gaydar. I hope that you will talk to him to get a sense of possible actions you could take to work through this. I think this is an urgent problem. I want to support and help you to make it work, but in order for it to work, there has to be a feeling in the world community that there is a very aggressive Russian response. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, I have already discussed this matter with Gaydar the other day, and he agreed we should involve him in a more active fashion. I agree with you, Bill, that we should pursue a more energetic and vigorous line here. I believe it would be worthwhile for us to take steps jointly with the Duma and face the Duma together. That would be a real shocking situation for them, the members of the Duma, and I think it will be a sure win for us. You know, members of Duma are not accustomed to seeing their own President on their premises, but if the President of the U.S. comes to Russia and together with the President of Russia, you and I go to the Duma and address them, I think that it would be a very strong move on our part. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: I think we ought to do whatever has the most positive effect on them. Whatever I can do to get them to vote for you and your program. That is what I want to do. You and your people can think about it, and we can work it out. The other thing I want to say here is that it will probably be necessary for more movement to be generated before September 15th, before the IMF meets again and even before I come over there. I don't know what exactly can be done. I know that you are trying to bring the Duma back, and I think that is a good sign, and I will be as supportive as I can. But our people are worried that the financial markets are changing so much that it won't last until I get there, and that is the real problem, and that it won't last until the IMF releases the money. [Note: Yeltsin interrupts and says, "I agree" in Russian.] I just wanted to get your ideas about what I can do to help and to tell you that I will support you as much as I can. I think the world has a lot at stake in Russia's success, and the U.S. has a lot at stake in Russia, and I wanted to encourage you and get your ideas. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree. You see, Bill, you know my reaction and attitude, we, of course, spend all the time working together closely cooperating in pursuing a common policy. I think this is the way we should work in the future as well. The most important thing in my view is to take this major political step that I referred to earlier. If we decide to go to the Duma together, perhaps we could call it a revolution, a small one, but a revolution, I think. But you see, Bill, I think that we should keep the whole thing under wraps, it should be kept secret. No one should learn what we are planning to do. I think our telephone line is reliable and will not let out this secret. Everything should be done to keep it secret and under wraps. No one should have any idea what we are going to do.

(Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know, between now and then -- I think you have a very good team and access to some very good advisors. Gaydar has very good ideas, which he discussed with our man Lipton. I think you ought to consider bringing them in and giving them a quick deadline in the next few days to give you new options in dealing with this crisis so that we can get to September without anything bad happening. It's all psychological. It's a question of taking moves that change the psychology of these markets. I think they can come up with other ideas, and you have very good people, but you have to keep trying things to stop the slide until I get there in September.

(Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree with you Bill, and I have already started working in that direction. I have already talked with Gaydar, and he agrees to work together. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: That's great. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: He agreed to work together, not necessarily as a member of government, but agreed to work with us to pursue the same line, the same ideas. (Ø)

THE PRESIDENT: We will keep working with you and do everything we can to be supportive. If you want me to go to the Duma I will, and I can't wait to see you. I would like to say a brief word about Kosovo. Violence continues, and a humanitarian crisis is looming. It is clear that Milosevic has not kept his promise to you. His attempts to impose a military solution have already driven more than 200,000 civilians from their homes. We are working hard with the Kosovar Albanians. Our Ambassador, Chris Hill, hopes that they will announce a negotiating team

this week. But it will be extremely difficult to get talks underway and keep them going if this harsh offensive continues. Many of us believe if the situation continues to deteriorate we will be forced to respond with or without the United Nations. I don't want that to happen. The only way to avoid this is if Milosevic knows that we are united. Only you and I and our two countries can do this. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, of course, we should not be complacent and make pretense that everything is okay and the situation is under control. It is still a very dangerous situation, and tensions are running high in Kosovo and around it, but I know in recent days some joint efforts have achieved some positive developments, and in our talks with Milosevic and your talks with the Albanians we have started the monitoring efforts which are underway and functioning. The international humanitarian organizations have free access to all of Kosovo and we should continue this cooperation and do all we can to prevent a military solution to the problem of this conflict. We need to take a balanced approach and in a balanced manner try to influence all the parties in the conflict. The most important thing now is to prevent a military solution to the conflict and to continue to cooperate on other efforts as well. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with that, but I think that is exactly what Milosevic is trying to achieve. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think we should persevere in this effort and should be firm in this policy and try to bring it to a logical conclusion. I am referring to a peaceful resolution to this crisis, all the more, since we are in agreement. When we are in agreement, there is no problem we can't successfully resolve. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree, but I ask you to remember that I think that if Milosevic believes he has a green light from Russia for a military solution, it will be much harder to get him to negotiate. You will have to keep the heat on him and get him to negotiate. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree with you in the sense that we should keep him under control at all times. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, I will stay in touch. Stay in good health. Enjoy your remaining days. I will see you in September. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I am very glad to have had this conversation with you Bill, and I am looking very much forward to our meeting. What is your view: should we give information about this conversation to the press? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that we should tell the press that we talked about Russian economic challenges and about your vigorous efforts to deal with them and we talked about Kosovo. I think we have to say something about what we said. We pledged to continue to work together and made plans for my trip there in September. That would be my guess. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I am glad that our views are identical on this matter, and we will continue to proceed in this direction. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Great. I will see you soon. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I hug you, Bill. I give you a good warm hug. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris, goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 17, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER (10) *rw*

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: DANIEL KUNIN and ANDREW WEISS *AKW* (2)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, August 14, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the August 14 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the Department of State
- Tab A Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 17, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER (10) *FB*

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL (CP)

FROM: DANIEL KUNIN and ANDREW WEISS (AKW) (DP)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, August 14, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the August 14 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the Department of State
- Tab A Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (Ø)

^e That attached Memorandum of Conversation of the August 14
telephone conversation between the President and Russian
President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the
Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It may also be
sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador only. (Ø)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

*(It must be distributed
via NODIS channels
and not below the
Deputy Assistant
Secretary (DAS)
level.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (U)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: ~~K~~ Kyril Borissow
Notetakers: Cindy Lawrence, Sean Tarver, Frank Jarosinski, Robert Ford, Daniel Kunin, Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 14, 1998, 10:30 a.m.- 11:06 a.m. EDT, Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for taking my call. Hillary and I are really looking forward to your visit in September. I hope that you are getting a chance to rest, though I know that you are working even on vacation. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Of course Bill, this is a common job, common work we do, and we follow each other closely, and this is the only way we can move forward. I am looking forward to our meeting in Moscow. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Me, too. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think that this time we have made very good preparations on economic points, and the Gore-Kiriyenko Commission has done a very good job, and the political aspects have been prepared by Mr. Primakov and Madame Albright. I think the preparations and discussions within the Commission are encouraging, and through their work they facilitate things significantly for us, Bill. However, we will face very complex and difficult issues when we meet. We will discuss our joint statement concerning challenges on security on the threshold of

Need class info

the 21st century. But I think that there are no questions that we cannot resolve through our joint efforts, you and me. I think the next meeting will prove to the entire world that we are quite capable of resolving these issues. What is your view?

(S)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I agree with the statements you made. But I am concerned about the financial situation around the world. I have been following Japan, China, South Korea and others. I know you face a lot of pressure in Russia, both economic and political. I think the program Kiriyenko and Chubays put in place is absolutely critical to find a path out of the financial crisis. You have made the right choice but markets are very volatile and still somewhat negative. I just called in part to get your feeling about what is happening and what needs to be done, because I want to be out there advocating the right course. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You see, Bill, of course, I am very worried and very concerned over this whole financial situation in our financial markets. And I think that your decision will be of very critical importance, and I am referring to the decision by the IMF about the second tranche of the loan to Russia. I think that decision should come no later than September 15. If that is done, if the decision is taken by that date, it will send a major signal and important message, you see, Bill. If your markets were to cooperate in the proper way, and American investors were not to place any limits on Russian ventures, we will continue our cooperation. I think this is the only way forward out of the current situation. You see, Bill, the most important thing now in my view is for the U.S. Treasury Department to recommend that American investors not place any limits on economic operations with Russian economic actors. We should all work to restore normal operations. I think that this is of the utmost importance and the only way we can move forward. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Boris, first of all, you know that I want to be as supportive as I can, and I have tried to be. I think that in order to -- the problem with getting money from the IMF is that it is not enough money to make a difference unless it changes the confidence of the world investment community. In order for it to work, I think that it is very important in Russia that you and Kiriyenko be seen as working together hand in hand very strongly because people take their cues from you more than anyone else. The second thing is that we have to do something to get your Duma to help you, to support you more, and

perhaps there is something that I can do to help you during my visit in September. I could meet with them in small groups if you want, I don't know. But an early release of funds from the IMF will only help if it lifts confidence. Let me also say that I sent our best expert, David Lipton, to Moscow to meet with Gaydar. I hope that you will talk to him to get a sense of possible actions you could take to work through this. I think this is an urgent problem. I want to support and help you to make it work, but in order for it to work, there has to be a feeling in the world community that there is a very aggressive Russian response. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, I have already discussed this matter with Gaydar the other day, and he agreed we should involve him in a more active fashion. I agree with you, Bill, that we should pursue a more energetic and vigorous line here. I believe it would be worthwhile for us to take steps jointly with the Duma and face the Duma together. That would be a real shocking situation for them, the members of the Duma, and I think it will be a sure win for us. You know, members of Duma are not accustomed to seeing their own President on their premises, but if the President of the U.S. comes to Russia and together with the President of Russia, you and I go to the Duma and address them, I think that it would be a very strong move on our part. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think we ought to do whatever has the most positive effect on them. Whatever I can do to get them to vote for you and your program. That is what I want to do. You and your people can think about it, and we can work it out. The other thing I want to say here is that it will probably be necessary for more movement to be generated before September 15th, before the IMF meets again and even before I come over there. I don't know what exactly can be done. I know that you are trying to bring the Duma back, and I think that is a good sign, and I will be as supportive as I can. But our people are worried that the financial markets are changing so much that it won't last until I get there, and that is the real problem, and that it won't last until the IMF releases the money. [Note: Yeltsin interrupts and says, "I agree" in Russian.] I just wanted to get your ideas about what I can do to help and to tell you that I will support you as much as I can. I think the world has a lot at stake in Russia's success, and the U.S. has a lot at stake in Russia, and I wanted to encourage you and get your ideas. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I am very glad to have had this conversation with you Bill, and I am looking very much forward to our meeting. What is your view: should we give information about this conversation to the press? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think that we should tell the press that we talked about Russian economic challenges and about your vigorous efforts to deal with them and we talked about Kosovo. I think we have to say something about what we said. We pledged to continue to work together and made plans for my trip there in September. That would be my guess. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Okay. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I am glad that our views are identical on this matter, and we will continue to proceed in this direction. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Great. I will see you soon. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I hug you, Bill. I give you a good warm hug. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris, goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9805782
DATE 18 AUG 98

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u> +	DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KRH Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2056				
Document ID: 9805956				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 8	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (4 pages)	08/25/1998	P1/b(1) K8H 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	[Duplicate of 001b, incomplete copy] (2 pages)	08/25/1998	P1/b(1) K8H 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2056

FOLDER TITLE:

9805956

2015-0782-M
rs1555

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 17 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 01 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

JP

DATE

9/18

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 98091713 FOR DECISION
X 98091806 DAVIES APPROVED RECOM
X 98091806 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980917 KENNEY, K

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5956
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 77C A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>K</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>X</u>	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>8/9/17</u>	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>8/20/17</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	<u>D</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:
 98 SEP 17 11:16

COMMENTS: *Yeltsin Telecom 8/25*

Exec Sec Office has diskette isp _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 5956
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>h</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<i>x</i>		
Davies	<i>1</i>	<i>8/9/17</i>	
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<i>2</i>	<i>8/20/17</i>	<i>D</i>
Records Mgt.			<i>D</i>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:
 '88 SEP 17 09:11:46

COMMENTS: *Geltser Talcom 8/25*

Exec Sec Office has diskette *isp*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
with ~~SECRET~~
Attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5956

September 17, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the August 25 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador only. (C)



Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
with ~~SECRET~~ Attachment
Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 8/26/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dmitry Zarechnak
Note Takers: Larry Wright, Matt Sibley,
Jonathan Elkind, Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME August 25, 1998, 9:39 a.m. - 10:08 a.m. EDT
AND PLACE: Martha's Vineyard

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hi, Boris, thank you for taking my call. I just wanted to talk to you directly during this momentous period before I come over there. I know the pressure must be enormous with so much at stake for Russia. Strobe is coming to Moscow this week, and I hope you can find time to meet with him. He will have my latest thinking about our upcoming meeting. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, we have undertaken a very thorough preparation for the upcoming meeting and we analyzed all of the previous positions, and we also analyzed the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and also we went through some of the positions we could suggest as far as fighting terrorism is concerned. Of course, we will be prepared to discuss Afghanistan, Sudan, the troubles in Iraq, and the situation in Kosovo. In other words, we have carried out a very thorough preparation for the meeting. Of course, we don't want it to become an opportunity for mutual recriminations, but a chance for constructive work -- new ideas and proposals we can stand by jointly, you and I. And because of the great significance and importance of that particular issue, I have returned Chernomyrdin to head the government, so he can continue with Gore to work jointly in a constructive way. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/26/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.43)
3/13/2018 KBH

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that sounds very good. Let me say, I think it is very important that this summit produces concrete results that the world can see. We have made real progress on arms control, the sharing of early warning data on ballistic missile launches and disposing of excess plutonium for nuclear weapons. And we have to make sure those agreements are finalized, too.

(S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: That is correct. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I also want to comment on the other issues you raised. I think we can turn them into symbols of cooperation rather than points of conflict. Strobe will go into the details of the issues of Iran, Iraq and Kosovo. I think we have worked hard on Iran and have a chance to demonstrate real progress. Your people are working on investigations of Russian entities that have been cooperating with Iran's missile program. If the results could be announced before I get to Moscow, it would set the right tone for the meeting. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, I agree. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. On Iraq, Saddam is defying the memorandum of understanding he agreed to with Kofi Annan. As you know, I have taken no unilateral action on this, because I want to sustain both the unity of the Security Council, and also its credibility. He must reverse course and reinstate the inspection program. It is curious to me that he did this at a time when he was very close to going from inspection to monitoring on his atomic energy program. I don't know why he picked this time. If the message came directly from you that he must resume the inspections under the Memorandum of Understanding with Kofi Annan, it would be something we can reinforce as a united front, rather than a point that divides us. On Kosovo, I think we have a chance to make a difference that could save thousands of lives. You know there are already 200,000 refugees, and we are only a few weeks from winter, so the humanitarian situation is precarious. Milosevic believes he can attack the Kosovars without consequence, thus ignoring the commitment he made to you in Moscow. There are about 200,000 people displaced from their homes, and 10,000 hiding in the mountains, who could literally freeze to death. I think it is time for us to send a clear signal that he can't use indiscriminate force against civilians. Strobe has ideas about how we might do this. It is important we stick together on this, and it also is important that we don't create another Bosnia over there. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, indeed, on this we have some untapped possibilities. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I hope so, because we really are going to have to work on it. The only other issue I wanted to mention is the one that I know is taking most of your time and that is the economy. A few weeks ago, you told me that the future of Russian reform is at stake and that is probably truer now than ever. I just wanted to say, the more certainty you can put in the situation the better it would be. I am sending one of my top economic experts before the meeting. I think it is important our teams work together so we can have frank discussions about economic matters next week. Hopefully, we will be able to say some things that will be helpful and reassuring at the end of our meeting. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree with what you said on that general subject. This is very visible to the entire world, and the situation in the world has had an impact on the financial situation in Russia. On our side, we have taken appropriate measures, stabilizing measures, which have been vetted by the International Monetary Fund. We need to continue working very hard on that problem. One more issue I want to raise before you: while you are in Moscow, we will have to look into the next century, twenty-first century, and formulate new ideas, particularly joint security in the twenty-first century. We also have to outline the issues you and I have successfully dealt with and resolved. We will transfer power to the next generation of politicians. You and I will also pass on a group of problems and issues that we should have jointly resolved, so in the twenty-first century, there is no doubt that this group of problems has been resolved by us. If you look at it from that angle, in Moscow we could come up with a joint document on that subject. What would you say on that? As far as the mass media is concerned, I don't think there is any reason for you to worry, Bill. I will make sure that the press takes an objective position with respect to both you and I. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is encouraging. I hope we can reach agreement. Let me just say on the terrorism issue, I just wanted to make one brief comment on the action in Afghanistan and Sudan. I sent our former UN Ambassador, Bill Richardson, to Afghanistan to meet with the Taliban to ask them to expel Usama bin Laden. Then before I took any action, the Saudi Arabians went at a very high level to Afghanistan to ask for the same thing. They have helped the Taliban quite a lot, as you know. They refused to do so. The evidence is absolutely conclusive - that he killed almost 300 people and wounded 5,000 more to blow up two American embassies and that he had plans to blow up between one to three more and had other plans to kill others, including the acquisition of chemical weapons. We did what we had to do to protect our people and discourage such things in the future. The

more we can do to work together on the issues of security and terrorism, since you and all other countries will have to face terrorism in the next 20 years, the better it will be. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think in Moscow, we will have time for a very thorough exchange of views on this subject. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I am looking forward to it. Well, thank you for this conversation, Boris. I'm looking forward to seeing you. I will do whatever I can so we can work together in ways to support you and strengthen Russia at this important time. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, indeed, we need to support each other now. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: All right, I will see you soon. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think you and I have enough will and also our past relationship and very good rapport that we can build on so we can continue our discussions in Moscow and come up with appropriate and relevant solutions. I'm very glad I had this conversation with you at this time. It has really put me in a better mood and eased my feelings. You can be assured that I will extend to you warmth and hospitality, as my friend, while you are in Moscow. And you will see no signs going against you in the streets of Moscow, you can be sure of that, too. So until I see you and there is very little time left, let's make use of that time so we can make very effective and constructive preparations so we can have a truly good meeting. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Good. Good-bye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, a hug from me until I see you next time. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. I will see you soon. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 16, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, August 25, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the August 25 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State

Approve *G 9/17 for* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Department of State

Tab A Memorandum of the Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5956

With ~~SECRET~~ Attachment WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (Ø)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the August 25 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador only. (Ø)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 8/26/08

with ~~SECRET~~ Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~KBM~~ NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dmitry Zarechnak
Note Takers: Larry Wright, Matt Sibley, Jonathan Elkind, Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: August 25, 1998, 9:39 a.m. - 10:08 a.m. EDT
Martha's Vineyard

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Hi, Boris, thank you for taking my call. I just wanted to talk to you directly during this momentous period before I come over there. I know the pressure must be enormous with so much at stake for Russia. Strobe is coming to Moscow this week, and I hope you can find time to meet with him. He will have my latest thinking about our upcoming meeting. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, we have undertaken a very thorough preparation for the upcoming meeting and we analyzed all of the previous positions, and we also analyzed the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and also we went through some of the positions we could suggest as far as fighting terrorism is concerned. Of course, we will be prepared to discuss Afghanistan, Sudan, the troubles in Iraq, and the situation in Kosovo. In other words, we have carried out a very thorough preparation for the meeting. Of course, we don't want it to become an opportunity for mutual recriminations, but a chance for constructive work -- new ideas and proposals we can stand by jointly, you and I. And because of the great significance and importance of that particular issue, I have returned Chernomyrdin to head the government, so he can continue with Gore to work jointly in a constructive way. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~ *Classified by: Glyn T. Davis*
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 8/26/08

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2015 - 0782 - M-2 (144)
3/13/2018 K84

terrorism, since you and all other countries will have to face terrorism in the next 20 years, the better it will be. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think in Moscow, we will have time for a very thorough exchange of views on this subject. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I am looking forward to it. Well, thank you for this conversation, Boris. (I'm) looking forward to seeing you. I will do whatever I can so we can work together in ways to support you and strengthen Russia at this important time. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, indeed, we need to support each other now. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: All right, I will see you soon. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think you and I have enough will and also our past relationship and very good rapport that we can build on so we can continue our discussions in Moscow and come up with appropriate and relevant solutions. I'm very glad I had this conversation with you at this time. It has really put me in a better mood and eased my feelings. You can be assured that I will extend to you warmth and hospitality, as my friend, while you are in Moscow. And you will see no signs going against you in the streets of Moscow, you can be sure of that, too. So until I see you and there is very little time left, let's make use of that time so we can make very effective and constructive preparations so we can have a truly good meeting. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Good. Good-bye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, a hug from me until I see you next time. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Boris. I will see you soon. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9805956
DATE 17 SEP 98

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBK Date: 3/13/2018

2015-0782-m-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2058				
Document ID: 9806300				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (4 pages)	09/12/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (3 pages)	09/12/1998	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2058

FOLDER TITLE:

9806300

2015-0782-M
rs1556

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806300
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 98 13

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 16 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 19 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

SP

DATE

9/16

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSSWD

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: *KRM/NARA*, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER

Z 98091512 FOR DECISION

001

X 98091609 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

002

X 98091610 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980916 KENNEY, K

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6300
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>AMJ</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>(R) 9/15 9/15</u>	<u>(R) [Signature]</u>
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(R) 9/15</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>RC 9/16</u>	<u>D - w disk</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

1986 SEP 15 11:41:22
COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6300
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TC A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>AND</i> Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>Ⓟ 9/15 9/15</u>	<u>Ⓟ</u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>Ⓟ 9/15</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TC 9/16</u>	<u>D - w/ disk</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

'98 SEP 15 10:22
COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette 405

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6300

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 16, 1998


MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY

Executive Secretary

Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (✓)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the September 12 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (✓)


Glyn T. Davies
FOR: Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5b, d

Declassify On: 9/13/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-11-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6300

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 14, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

(Handwritten initials: K, Fe, ASW br)

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, September 12, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the September 12 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve (D) Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve (D) Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5b, d

Declassify On: 9/13/08

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m.2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin on September 12 (Ø)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreter: Dmitry Zarechnak
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Liz Rogers,
Cindy Lawrence, Matt Sibley, Joel Schrader

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 12, 1998, 11:32 - 11:59 a.m. EDT;
Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for taking my call. I wanted to begin by thanking you for my visit to Russia. It was wonderful to see you, and congratulations on getting Primakov through the Duma. Madeleine Albright thinks highly of him. You can be proud that you handled the political crisis under tremendous pressure, and you held true to your role of being the father of Russian democracy. (Ø)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Mr. Primakov is, as we say, an Americanist. He has been an American expert since long ago when he was part of the Academy of Sciences. I wanted very much for Chernomyrdin to get this post but it was not to be, and I decided not to press his nomination and to submit the nomination of Mr. Primakov. And he got the vote of the overwhelming majority. (Ø)

And also there are several new names in the government. The Chairman of the Central Bank is Mr. Gerashchenko. And also there is a new name as deputy chairman of the government,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5b, d
Declassify On: 9/13/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0732-M-2 (1.45)
3/13/2018 KBH

Mr. Maslyukov. And I already mentioned the appointment of the new head of the Central Bank, Mr. Gerashchenko. The two of them stand firmly for the continuation of reforms, there should be no doubt about that, and there will be no deviation from our past toward continuation of reforms. (C)

Of course, there was a lot of debate in the Duma, but then I decided to weigh in in a very serious way, and they realized either they would be dissolved, the entire Duma, or they would approve my nomination. They also gave their approval because they know Mr. Primakov very well and know he is a worthy candidate to be Prime Minister. (C)

I appointed Mr. Ivanov as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prior to that appointment, he was Deputy Foreign Minister. Of course, you know him well, and on many occasions you have had the opportunity to talk to him. And I have a request of you. I want you to have a meeting with him so you can see for yourself he also stands very firmly for the continuation of our course. (C)

Well, so much for the current situation in Russia. So far there has been little movement on the economic front, but we have managed to halt the slide of the ruble exchange rate, and gradually the market has calmed down. Now that we have the appointment of the chairman of the government in place, the situation will take a rapid turn for the better. (C)

Well, I think you and I, we have to decide to continue the work of the tandem of Gore-Primakov. The tandem was already in place in the past, and it's just a new name that appears in combination with the spirit of past work. I believe it should continue working as before. And we have now lined up a schedule, the two of us, for the next things to be addressed, and Mr. Ivanov will be responsible for the implementation of those scheduled events. And if you have time please be so kind as to receive him. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I hope I can see him and I will do my best to do so. I also think it is a good idea to continue the Commission with the Vice President and Primakov. (C)

I would like to mention a couple of other things. First, I hope you will also find the right counterpart for Sandy Berger. He and Kokoshin did good work together on export controls and we have to continue to make progress on that front so I can get support here in America for Russia and your economic recovery.

It is especially important to follow through on your Iran commitment. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, as far as your point concerning continuation of the joint commission, I will tell Primakov what you said, and of course, he will find time to get in touch with him, with Mr. Gore, and outline the work to be done in the immediate future. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is important if the Commission is to be effective that at least Mr. Primakov should affirm and implement earlier agreements. It is important we not go back and redo commitments already made. We can just build on them and go forward, from our point of view that would be a very important thing. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, that is correct, and I share your view. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: The last item I wanted to mention specifically is that Strobe Talbott and Larry Summers are going to the G-8 meeting in London on Monday and will see Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov for strategic talks. Two things about that. I think it is very important that these talks be faithfully reported back to you and to Primakov because there will be a lot of effort made at the London conference to find ways to support Russia and economic transformation. I think it is important that we work closely on this and very important Primakov put in place people who understand the new global economy. (C)

I think as a friend I owe it to you to say the appointments you made raise concerns that Russia will return to the hyperinflation Russia suffered in 1992. The truth is no nation, including the U.S., can go it alone in today's global economy. We have to work together and restore growth, and we have got to have private investment, and IMF investment, and we have got to get international investors. We've got to get money coming into Russia instead of flowing out of Russia. I will do what I can, but I think it is important Primakov make some appointments of people who can give good advice and generate confidence and that the people you send to London report back faithfully these conversations. (C)

The only other point I have to make is that Strobe's talks with Mamedov will be very important. We have very high regard for him and very high level of trust. We will work hard to make the most of these talks. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well I understand your point Bill, and I will act as you suggest I should, especially since this is part of past practice established between you and me, and it has never failed us in the past, and we can build on these practices, and we can rely on experience of the past joint work and continue moving forward. There is no reason for you to feel worried in any way because there will be no backtracking away from reforms. We will move forward and on and on. (S)

As far as appointments are concerned, they are all reform minded people, faithful, and they will follow the course and do their best to have it implemented. You know me and Mr. Primakov very well. You know how loyal Primakov is to the reform course, so there is really no reason for you to feel concern. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Boris I think getting Primakov in there stabilized the government with a strong person, and that is good, but now that that problem is solved we have to solve the economic problem. I want to help. I see this as a real opportunity to revive the great legacy you have built, and I think we understand each other, and I will continue to work very closely with you through my people, and we will hope for the best with our people in London. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, I think we have covered a great deal of ground the last two weeks, and the past couple of days have been rough sailing. But we can say we have prevailed in the long run and have got the upper hand. Thank you for your support, and also thank you for your high appreciation of Mr. Primakov. You, of course know him very well, and his appointment will militate in favor of our continued cooperation. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Goodbye, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6300

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Boris Yeltsin on September 12 (C)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Interpreters: Dmitry Zarechnak ✓
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Liz Rogers,
Cindy Lawrence, Matt Sibley, Joel Schrader

DATE, TIME September 12, 1998, 11:32a.m. - 11:59a.m. EDT;
AND PLACE: Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for taking my call. I wanted to begin by thanking you for my visit to Russia. It was wonderful to see you, and congratulations on getting Primakov through the Duma. *Madeline* Madeline Albright thinks highly of him. You can be proud that you handled the political crisis under tremendous pressure, and you held true to your role of being the father of Russian democracy. (C) ✓

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Mr. Primakov is, as we say, an Americanist. He has been an American expert since long ago when he was part of the Academy of Sciences. I wanted very much for Chernomyrdin to get this post but it was not to be, and I decided not to press his nomination and to submit the nomination of Mr. Primakov. And he got the vote of the overwhelming majority. (C)

And also there are several new names in the government. The Chairman of the Central Bank is Mr. Gerashchenko. And also there is a new name as deputy chairman of the government,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5b, d
Declassify On: 9/13/08

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.46)
3/13/2018 KBH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Maslyukov. And I already mentioned the appointment of the new head of the Central Bank, Mr. Gerashchenko. The two of them stand firmly for the continuation of reforms, there should be no doubt about that, and there will be no deviation from our past toward continuation of reforms. (C)

Of course, there was ⁱⁿ a lot of debate in the Duma, but then I decided to weigh in a very serious way, and they realized either they would be dissolved, the entire Duma, or they would approve my nomination. They also gave their approval because they know Mr. Primakov very well and know he is a worthy candidate to be Prime Minister. (C) ✓

I appointed Mr. Ivanov as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prior to that appointment, he was Deputy Foreign Minister. Of course, you know him well, and on many occasions you have had the opportunity to talk to him. And I have a request of you. I want you to have a meeting with him so you can see for yourself he also stands very firmly for the continuation of our course. (C)

Well, so much for the current situation in Russia. So far there has been little movement on the economic front, but we have managed to halt the slide of the ruble exchange rate, and gradually the market has calmed down. Now that we have the appointment of the chairman of the government in place, the situation will take a rapid turn for the better. (C)

Well, I think you and I, we have to decide to continue the work of the tandem of Gore-Primakov. The tandem was already in place in the past, and it's just a new name that appears in combination with the spirit of past work. I believe it should continue working as before. And we have now lined up a schedule, the two of us, for the next things to be addressed, and Mr. Ivanov will be responsible for the implementation of those scheduled events. And if you have time please be so kind as to receive him. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I hope I can see him and I will do my best to do so. I also think it is a good idea to continue the Commission with the Vice President and Primakov. (C)

I would like to mention a couple of other things. First, I hope you will also find the right counterpart for Sandy Berger. He and Kokoshin did good work together on export controls and we have to continue to make progress on that front so I can get support here in America for Russia and your economic recovery.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is especially important to follow through on your Iran commitment. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, as far as your point concerning continuation of the joint commission, I will tell Primakov what you said, and of course, he will find time to get in touch with him, with Mr. Gore, and outline the work to be done in the immediate future. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is important if the Commission is to be effective that at least Mr. Primakov should affirm and implement earlier agreements. It is important we not go back and redo commitments already made. We can just build on them and go forward, from our point of view that would be a very important thing. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, that is correct, and I share your view. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: The last item I wanted to mention specifically is that Strobe Talbott and Larry Summers are going to the G-8 meeting in London on Monday and will see Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov for strategic talks. Two things about that. I think it is very important that these talks be faithfully reported back to you and to Primakov because there will be a lot of effort made at the London conference to find ways to support Russia and economic transformation. I think it is important that we work closely on this and very important Primakov put in place people who understand the new global economy. (S)

I think as a friend I owe it to you to say the appointments you made raise concerns that Russia will return to the hyperinflation Russia suffered in 1992. The truth is no nation, including the U.S., can go it alone in today's global economy. We have to work together and restore growth, and we have got to have private investment, and IMF investment, and we have got to get international investors. We've got to get money coming into Russia instead of flowing out of Russia. I will do what I can, but I think it is important Primakov make some appointments of people who can give good advice and generate confidence and that the people you send to London report back faithfully these conversations. (S)

The only other point I have to make is that Strobe's talks with Mamedov will be very important. We have very high regard for him and very high level of trust. We will work hard to make the most of talks. (S)

^{misc}
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9806300
DATE 16 SEP 98

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF MEMO OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBM Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

SEE ↓
Case Number: 2009-1292-M; 2015-0782-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2075				
Document ID: 9808654				
Row: 45	Section: 6	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

See ↓
Case Number: 2014-0546-M; 2015-0782-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2719				
Document ID: 9902107				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: V

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.41)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Yuri Shkeyrov
Notetakers: Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy,
Joel Schrader, James Smith, Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME March 24, 1998, 9:20 - 9:56 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, hello Bill. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking my call. I want to talk to you today about the situation in Serbia and Kosovo. I know you are aware already that Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder and the rest of the Europeans have decided we have to launch airstrikes against military targets in Serbia soon. My people have kept in very close touch with yours for many days now and have tried to talk openly about how the situation is developing and what we would be required to do. But as you know, Milosevic has stonewalled your negotiator and Dick Holbrooke, and he has continued to move his forces into Kosovo and to evacuate villages. He has left us no choice. I know that you oppose what we are doing, but I want you to know that I am determined to do whatever I can to keep our disagreement on this from ruining everything else we have done and can do together in the coming years. (S)

President Yeltsin: I'm afraid we shall not succeed in that. If you do that [unintelligible] our side very much. Because what was needed to have begun were political discussions again and again and again, instead of bombing and destroying people. Primakov is only the first step ... [unintelligible]. We have

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(b)
Declassify On: 3/25/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

many steps to aim against your decision, maybe inadmissible steps. (S)

The President: Let me just say this, Boris. I did everything I could do along with you to try to negotiate with Milosevic. He made an agreement last Fall and ended the trouble for awhile, and then he unilaterally violated the agreement. In violation of the agreement he made with us, he has massed 40,000 troops in Kosovo around the border and nearly 300 tanks, and he is running people out of their villages again. He won't even stop the violence, and this means he is going to recreate Bosnia all over again, and we're supposed to sit around and say that this is terribly unfortunate. Basically, it will be your decision if you decide to let this bully destroy the relationship we worked hard for six and a half years to build up. (S)

I have always been there for you, working hard with my people to support Russia economically. I came there last Fall. I was there in 1996 when a lot of people said I shouldn't go. You may decide to let this get in the way of our relationship, but I'm not going to because I do not think he is that important. I won't sit still while Europe is pleading with me to help them avoid another Bosnia. (S)

He made 2.5 million refugees there, and there are another 250,000 from Kosovo, and I'm not going to let him make another 2 million and impose those kind of burdens. I'm sorry he is a Serb. I wish he were Irish or something else, but he is not. He has constantly refused every plea to stop his aggression. He is not important enough for us to allow him to wreck the relationship between the U.S. and Russia and all the European support. It is not worth it. (S)

He has displaced 30,000 more people just since last Friday. He is killing innocent people. We have reports of summary executions. He has basically told Russian, EU, and American negotiators that he doesn't care what any of us think. If we don't do something, we are going to have another Bosnia all over again. We had a peace agreement at Rambouillet. No one wanted to take his land, his property away, but he wants to crush them militarily. I think we have to do something about it, but I do not believe it should get in the way of bigger issues of trying to make Russia stronger economically, politically, securing its role in the world in a positive way, and both of us reducing our nuclear arsenals. That's a lot more important than Milosevic. But if we let him destabilize the Balkans, that is all we will do for the next two years. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Bill, it is a great pity for me. We have been for so long working in each other's direction. We have done a great deal. I have reached agreement with the State Duma with regards to START II, and on the sixth of April, they were supposed to ratify that Treaty. This time around that will not happen, of course, under the circumstances. (S)

It is easy to throw bombs about. However, the long-term political search for a constructive solution to the situation, that's a different thing. But this is the only correct approach, the only correct way. If we pool our strengths together, we could turn Milosevic around. Their parliament made some appropriate decisions yesterday. (S)

The President: Well, let me just say this, I believe we should not give up on diplomacy. After what -- [Yeltsin interrupts] (S)

President Yeltsin: Of course, we are going to talk to each other, you and me. But there will not be such a great drive and such friendship that we had before. That will not be there again. (S)

The President: But the problem is, Boris, if you remember going back to Bosnia, remember what happened in Bosnia. After threatening a few airstrikes and him losing a few battles on the ground to the Croatian forces, and a few other things happened, then he was willing to talk about diplomacy. But right now, he is only too happy to have people come in and talk to him because he continues his invasion in violation of his own constitution and his own agreement.

How can you negotiate with someone while he's evacuating villages and has no intention of stopping, but he is happy to have you in for a talk and give you a cup of tea while he does it? That is why the Europeans feel even more strongly than the U.S. does. My God, they have nightmares they'll repeat Bosnia and all the instability and all the problems, and it will spread from Kosovo to Macedonia to Albania and engulf all of their southern flank. They are very, very worried about it. They are right to be worried about it. I think we should take this first round of action and then engage in diplomacy again. Then maybe Milosevic will listen. (S)

President Yeltsin: But this is an intolerable situation when something is done because of the position of one person. It is intolerable because of the hundreds of thousands of people who will suffer and die. We cannot be guided only because of his words, we should not proceed only from his position and actions. He should be surrounded by the people who will encourage the situation in the correct direction so that it would become intolerable for Milosevic to behave the way that he has until now. Foreign intelligence [services] should also play a part in that process. (S)

The President: If I thought that were true, that would be wonderful, but the truth is he has dislocated 25,000-30,000 people since last week. (S)

President Yeltsin: In the name of our future, in the name of you and me, in the name of the future of our countries, in the name of security in Europe, I ask you to renounce that strike, and I suggest that we should meet somewhere and develop a tactical line of fighting against Milosevic, against him personally. And we are wiser, we are more experienced, we can come up with a solution. That should be done for the sake of our relationship. That should be done for the sake of peace in Europe. It is not known who will come after us and it is not known what will be the road of future developments in strategic nuclear weapons. It is known, however, what will be when we are in power because we have taken the decision to decrease them, decrease them, decrease them. (S)

The President: Well, Boris, I want to work with you to try to bring an end to this, but I don't believe there is any way to call off the first round of strikes because Milosevic continues to displace thousands of people every day. I think we can get some of our people together in the next couple of days to try to dissuade him. I don't want this to be a great source of a split between Russia and Europe and Russia and the U.S. We have worked too hard. There are too many economic and political things for us to do together, and I regret this more than I can say. (S)

I could not believe after we got this agreement from the Kosovar Albanians that he not only refused to sign the agreement, but moved into their territory, but that is what has happened. What has to be done in the next day or so is clear. I hope we can stay in touch and find a diplomatic solution. I think you know what has to be done to find a diplomatic solution. Maybe after a first round of airstrikes, he will be ready to give diplomacy

a chance. Madeleine is ready to go back to work with Ivanov, back to the Contact Group. We should think several moves ahead, almost as if we are playing a chess game. (S)

This would be the time to come together to resolve this, but I can't go against the unified opinion of the Europeans, as well as my own view, that this man is not going to stop his military advance unless someone does something. Milosevic is still a communist dictator and he would like to destroy the alliance that Russia has built up with the U.S. and Europe and essentially destroy the whole movement of your region toward democracy and go back to ethnic alliances. We cannot allow him to dictate our future. (S)

I know this is a political problem for you at home, and I will do everything I can to put it right and restart the diplomacy at any point in this. I'd give anything not to have to make this telephone call today, but we have no choice. I hope between the two of us we will not let it destroy all the bigger issues before us and the world. (S)

President Yeltsin: I think that now we should try and seek at least some ways in order to retain, to save, some of what we have managed to develop during these years. But our people will certainly from now have a bad attitude with regard to America and with NATO. I remember how difficult it was for me to try and turn the heads of our people, the heads of the politicians towards the West, towards the United States, but I succeeded in doing that, and now to lose all that. Well, since I failed to convince the President, that means there is in store for us a very difficult, difficult road of contacts, if they prove to be possible. Goodbye. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

SEE 2

Case Number: 2014-0546-M; 2015-0782-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2724				
Document ID: 9902901				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 4	Position: 1	Stack: V

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.62)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
President Boris Yeltsin

Notetakers: Robert Ford, Michael T.
Manning, Roger Merletti, Matt Sibley,
Jim Smith, Andrew Weiss
Interpreter: Nikolai Sorokin

DATE, TIME April 19, 1999, 9:30 - 10:13 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

THE PRESIDENT: Hello Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good morning, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for taking the call. I wanted to talk to you about Kosovo today. Kosovo is clearly one of the greatest tests we have faced for the Europe you and I have worked to achieve, one which is free from communist dictatorships and is democratic and undivided. I appreciate your heartfelt messages and am glad to see you involved in this problem. (S)

We have solved some of the toughest problems by working together. The best diplomatic outcome is one Russia helps bring about. Russia is central in implementing a solution. The meeting that Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov had in Oslo went a long way in managing the differences between us and maximizing common ground. I value the way they are working together, and they must keep it up. At the same time, I am glad you are involving yourself in the search for a political settlement, and I think it's important that you appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin to be your personal envoy. Obviously, all of us here know Viktor well. We respect him and think he is a problem-solver, and he has never had a bigger problem than this one. I want to do whatever I can to support you in these

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/20/09

efforts. I want to appoint Strobe Talbott to work quietly and confidentially with Viktor. He already had a good meeting with Ambassador Jim Collins, and if you are agreeable, Jim will be back in touch with him to coordinate diplomatic efforts. Strobe will report to me and Madeleine, and I will see what I can do to help. I know, Boris, how high the stakes are. We're trying to achieve a lasting peace in the Balkans, but also an outcome that would ensure Russia a role in that peace and that would protect the legacy you and I have built by getting Russian and U.S. relations back on track, which we have worked on for the last six and a half years. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, at this difficult time in international affairs and in U.S.-Russian relations, we need to maintain constant contact. I have never met such a difficult, complicated issue as the ongoing NATO military action against Yugoslavia. Let me reiterate that the developments of the past few weeks confirm that the U.S. and NATO have made a big mistake. You have miscalculated the consequences of the situation itself. Milosevic will never capitulate. Instead of resolving the humanitarian problem, what has been achieved is a giant humanitarian catastrophe, and significant damage has occurred to U.S.-Russian relations. (S)

I'll tell you quite frankly that the anti-American and anti-NATO sentiment in Russia keeps growing like an avalanche. Great pressure is exerted on me and the Russian leadership as a whole in favor of taking measures to help Yugoslavia, all the more so since NATO has helped the Albanian fighters. We continue to oppose Russian involvement in the conflict, but our ability to counteract those demands are limited. (S)

We have to take emergency measures to try and switch to development of a peaceful, political settlement. I am satisfied that you accepted my proposal to have our foreign ministers meet. That was the first meeting since the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict. They succeeded in outlining the overall principles, as Minister Ivanov told me in Moscow, the overall application of which would enable us to achieve a breakthrough and turn around this situation. But to be able to achieve that, all violence and repression should be stopped in Kosovo, and the safe return of refugees should be ensured, regardless of their ethnicity. International humanitarian organizations should be given access throughout Yugoslavia and primarily Kosovo. (S)

We also share positions regarding the need for the resumption of work on a political framework agreement that would maintain

broad-based autonomy for Kosovo and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia in full accordance with international law. At most, the greatest differences between us have to do with the question of an international presence in Kosovo. We understand that without international support, no safe return of refugees can be possible, but the question of international presence should be dealt with and resolved, taking into account the political leadership of Yugoslavia. (S)

Please, believe me that it took us a great amount of effort to gain consent on the part of Milosevic for an international civilian presence, and I think we should be farsighted enough to build on these achievements. I appointed Mr. Chernomyrdin as my special envoy for Yugoslavia because he is a neutral person and has no other concerns. His primary concern will be Yugoslavia. We discussed the situation specifically in great detail. (S)

Bill, what I think is needed now with Kosovo is a strong Albanian leader, so we can get them both to the negotiating table -- Milosevic and the strong Albanian leader. Of course, we also need signals from NATO if we are to cut our losses in finding a way out of this situation. It is clear as day that Yugoslavia will not accept a military mission, particularly if it is a NATO-led mission, because for a long time they will be allergic to NATO. I think other avenues should be explored, and we should come up with a compromise that Milosevic will grudgingly have to accept. (S)

We think, obviously, such an option would be for UN blue helmets, based on Security Council resolutions. We think it would be necessary to have among the blue helmets a contingent of Russian forces. Should we accept this position and common understanding, I think we can instruct our foreign ministers to collaborate on this in detail. (S)

Now, there is one thing standing in the way of negotiations. That is, the bombardment, and the bombardment should be stopped. Of course, it is easily understood that it is hard to think of a settlement when bombs and missiles are exploding all around you. I think a proper pretext should be found for making a pause in the bombardment. It is completely up to you, of course. Such a step on your side would be the testimony of a statesman, wisdom, and an act of humanity. (S)

For our part, we will be prepared to fully cooperate with you and continue our pressure on Milosevic. As for Chernomyrdin, I gave him a special airplane to fly around to Muslim countries to

gain support for the Albanians. Then it will be a realistic thing to bring the Albanians and Serbs to the negotiating table. After that, we could address the whole settlement issue by joint effort -- the U.S., Russia, Yugoslavia and NATO. These are my proposals, Bill. What is your view? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: First, I think it is good we agreed on the common principles: the ending of attacks, withdrawal of forces, the safe return of refugees, access for humanitarian organizations. These create a foundation for a political solution that will allow the Serbs to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, provided we can ensure that Milosevic will implement it. (S)

Now, I think in order to implement these principles, there needs to be an international presence in Kosovo that has both a military and nonmilitary element. If there is no military element, the Kosovars will never return. The Serbs forces have burned all their villages, burned them alive, raped children, and there is no way they will come back without military protection. Here is the dilemma about a military force. I don't care what it is called, but if there is no NATO involvement, we won't be able to get the Albanians to disarm. We can get the KLA to disarm. We can get the KLA to disarm, and contrary to what you said, we are not arming them. There is a proposal in Congress to arm them. But I oppose having the U.S. or Russia getting arms in there and stirring up the water, so I have been resisting arming the Albanians. (S)

On the other hand, let me emphasize that I think it would be a grave mistake for there to be a military-diplomatic mission where Russians are not present. We need Russians to make this work. After all, there is a Serb minority in Kosovo, and they have to be protected, too, and know they are protected. It is imperative that Albanian refugees feel protected, that the Serb minority feels protected, and that we have a basis on which we can disarm the Kosovar Albanians. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: The problem that needs to be addressed is that there are many Serbs among the refugees. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think we can find a formula. I have said in every public statement that I have made that I want the force to have Russian participation and leadership and that I would personally not approve going into Kosovo unless our mandate includes protecting the Serbs as well as the Albanians in Kosovo. In terms of a pause in the bombing, NATO could and

would stop tomorrow if Milosevic started withdrawing his forces. The problem with stopping the bombing with no withdrawal at all is that we have been there before. Last October, we were promised that, and Milosevic broke his word before. Before we started bombing, he had 40,000 soldiers and 300 tanks and started to implement the plan he had drawn up last year and changed the military hierarchy so there'd be no opposition and went about flushing out the country. He has to do something to show this is more than just words. (S)

I would like to agree that we are getting much closer to an agreement. Let's instruct our teams to find a formula with a military component that is also sensitive to our concerns about NATO. Strobe can work with Viktor. It won't work unless Russia plays a leading role. There is no way in the world this will work, Boris, unless Russia plays a military and political role, and the Albanians and Serbs believe they will be protected in a formula where autonomy is genuine and the territory of Serbia is maintained. It cannot happen unless we find a way to do this together. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: But then, we were at a stage where Russia was not involved. Russia can, of course, put pressure on Milosevic. Bill, as I said before, Chernomyrdin will now go to several Muslim countries to try to help the Albanians. After that, he wants to go to Belgrade for a meeting with Milosevic, and after that to see you. I think it is a good option. What is a great concern to me is this anti-American sentiment we have in Russia, and that is what I am worried about. We have spent too many efforts in all areas to let them all collapse overnight. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: What about having Strobe come to Europe to meet with Chernomyrdin even sooner? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: That would be all right. That can be done. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think we ought to do that. I can see that we are close enough to get an agreement. I will have Ambassador Collins get in touch with Chernomyrdin to work it out. I feel quite good about this conversation, Boris. We just have to work hard and stay in close touch. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I feel that way too. I agree with you and think we can find our way out. We must find a way out. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: All right. We will do it. This is a good conversation. I'm glad to hear you, and I appreciate your involvement in this. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree although I find it increasingly difficult to resist sentiments here. I am subjected to violent attacks and assailed by the Communists. They insist that I send armaments and equipment and that I send our troops there. They are calling for an unleashing of a European and world-wide war, and I am absolutely opposed to that. Today I gave orders to repeal previous instructions to send seven ships to the conflict area, so we will have just one ship, a reconnaissance ship, to provide us with information. (S)

We will not provide them with our military equipment, though we are sending them humanitarian aid and doing it publicly in front of TV cameras. What we are sending are foodstuffs and consumer goods. We have already sent 100 cars and trucks with aid. Bill, just like you, I think we have had a good conversation and think we, too, have avenues to explore where we can reach a common ground. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree, Boris. Let's just keep working on it. Thank you very much. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: All right. Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Case Number: ^{See 2} 2014-0546-M; 2015-0782-M

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2725				
Document ID: 9903106				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: v

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2(1.63)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
President Boris Yeltsin

Notetakers: George Chastain, Doug Bailey,
Frank Jarosinski, Joel Schrader,
Andrew Weiss
Interpreter: Yuriy Shkeyrov

DATE, TIME April 25, 1999, 10:35 - 11:58 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: NATO Summit Trip Building

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, I am calling on Sunday, and this is a traditional day off for us. But it is not a day off for you and me. (U)

The President: No, not today. (U)

President Yeltsin: This is because of the situation in the Balkans and the continued military action by NATO against Yugoslavia. We have agreed with you to step up efforts in all directions to find a way out of the Kosovo tragedy. This is also an ecological problem because the Danube is flowing into the Black Sea and it is extremely important to us that the sky over Europe is not clouded over again. You know I have sent Chernomyrdin as my special envoy on this Yugoslav problem. You know him and trust him. (S)

The President: Yes, I do. (U)

President Yeltsin: Out of six points, we have negotiated five. [Note: reference to six points announced by Chernomyrdin after his meetings with Milosevic.] Out of the five points you named we have gotten Milosevic to agree to four of them. [Note: reference to five points discussed by Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov in Oslo.] There is only one point remaining.

(S)

[Note: reference to a continuing disagreement over an international security force.] We have agreed to [Note: reference to what has been agreed between Russia and the FRY] the following points: the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, then international assistance in the reconstruction of Yugoslavia's economy, including Kosovo and the region as a whole, and an international presence under UN auspices with the participation of Russia agreed to by Yugoslavia and here, of course, is meant a military presence. Then the pullout of troops and resuming work on the political regime on the future autonomy of the region. And then the reduction of the military and police forces in Kosovo accompanied by pullout of units along the border with Yugoslavia. And international assistance in reconstructing the Yugoslav economy including Kosovo and Europe as a whole because many countries have suffered including Russia. Launching of a peacekeeping operation would be under UN auspices, and Russia is prepared to take part in this. (S)

In our view, this is a big and important step forward. We are continuing our active efforts along those lines with Belgrade on format and composition and mandate for this operation. This is a difficult task, but we shall pursue it persistently in order to find a final solution to the problem. (S)

It is important that your special envoy, Talbott, whom I know quite well, get involved in our efforts, but this will not be enough. So, I propose we move the remaining issues for discussion of the war to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. This would give an opportunity for Mr. Gore to look good in his election campaign in relation to the situation in Yugoslavia and would produce a good result because Gore and Chernomyrdin know how to negotiate with each other. This Commission will work for some time and where it will work doesn't matter to me or Chernomyrdin. It could work in either Washington or Europe or Moscow or intermittently in all those places. (S)

Well, in other words, there are signs of the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable solution, and I count on your weight for its support, but what is important is that air raids

be suspended to provide a good background to the Commission for progress and acceptable results in getting the situation around Kosovo back on a political track. I believe we should set aside our emotions and work in a pragmatic way to arrange a political settlement against the background of discontinuation of air raids by NATO against Yugoslavia. At least for the time of the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, and in this case we will create the impression that everyone saved face in getting out of the tragic situation in Kosovo. (S)

I spoke with Chernomyrdin several hours ago but it was too early to talk to you because it was four in the morning in America. If we establish the position to refer the issues to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, it would create an opportunity for Gore to be the peacemaker. (S)

We are working in all areas and directions, including our government delegations and the visit to Belgrade by our Patriarch who had a successful mission. So we are attacking Milosevic from all sides, and there was also assistance from our Parliament. Let us forget at this stage all other issues and get to solving this one because this problem is worse than the others, and it is worth dozens of billions of dollars. (S)

When I talked with Chernomyrdin today he agreed to work in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on this issue. So we will not leave much room for maneuver to Belgrade and will keep them in our sights, also including their political network. So what is your reaction? I am waiting for it. (S)

The President: First of all, I want to thank you for making the vigorous efforts you and Viktor Stepanovich are putting into this. Secondly, I think your idea of the Vice President and Chernomyrdin working together on this might work, but I think that they probably ought to have a telephone conversation. Then Strobe Talbott should meet with Chernomyrdin early this week to see what is possible. (S)

On this specific thing that has been achieved so far in your work with Milosevic, I would like to make a couple of comments. On a commitment by the U.S. and Europe to regional development and intensive assistance to everyone affected, I completely agree. I have repeatedly said we have to build a positive future for Southeast Europe to prevent them from falling back into old hatreds. Now on the details. Based only on what you have said to me and what has been reported in the news on what

Milosevic has said, I would like to talk about the details --
(S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] So you do agree that Gore and Chernomyrdin resume their work? (S)

The President: I think that we should have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk on the phone tomorrow, and what I would like to do is to have Strobe Talbott fly to see Viktor Stepanovich Tuesday or tomorrow or whenever you want him to go. And let me comment now -- (S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Well, I thought that after today's conversation we can tell the media that myself and President Clinton have found a common point of view on how we can solve this problem together and then the details can be worked out later, and we will continue to work actively with Milosevic on all these questions. (S)

You know that I have decided not to send seven military ships to the Mediterranean as we have agreed, and I will continue to comply with what I promised. And what assistance we have given to Yugoslavia is only humanitarian in nature and delivered by road. There were some difficulties on the Hungarian border, but now these have been settled. Milosevic is insisting that we supply to Yugoslavia the antiaircraft system S-300, but we shall not give this system to him, and you can believe me on that.
(S)

The President: Thank you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Because it will not allow any planes close to the borders of Yugoslavia. Well, I am listening to you Bill.
(S)

The President: First of all, let me respond to what you said we can tell the press and then I have to talk a little about the details of the proposal. I think we should say as little as possible about the specifics of what we are going to do in the long run because I have not talked to Gore at all about this and, in all fairness, I have to talk to him. I think we should have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk tomorrow and have Strobe Talbott and Chernomyrdin talk the next day and see if we can work it out. (S)

It is fine for you to say we agreed to pursue a diplomatic solution at a very high level and that you and I are going to

personally work on it and maintain a high level of involvement. I at least need to have a brief conversation with the Vice President before I commit him to it. But I have no problem with your saying I am encouraged by your personal involvement and Chernomyrdin's. As you know, I do not believe there can be a settlement without Russia's leadership and involvement. (S)

Now, I would like to talk about two things very briefly. One is the peacekeeping force. I think it is, in theory, fine to have it be under the UN, and I also think Russia should be a strong part of it. Now I know that Milosevic does not want NATO to be any part of it. If I could design it the best way I could, I would have it look like the work we are doing in Bosnia. There are two things you should keep in mind as you work through it in coming days. The first is that I don't think the refugees will go home unless there is a NATO and an American presence. The second is, in order to make this work, the UCK and KLA have to disarm, and I don't believe anyone but NATO and the U.S. can do this. (S)

I would like to make another point, which is that there would have to be a large number of forces, and one of the things they will have to do is to protect the Serb minority from angry Kosovars seeking revenge once they are back in the country. I think you know me well enough to trust me when I say we will protect the Serbs as well as the Kosovars by working with you, but we are going to need a lot of forces to do that. (S)

The other thing that is unclear in the commitment that Milosevic made is to what extent the Serb forces would be withdrawn. But from newspaper accounts he said not all troops will be withdrawn. I do not believe the refugees will go home unless the Serb military and police and paramilitaries are gone. And keep in mind, if Russian forces are in there, that should help them deal with their legitimate concerns about maintaining the sovereignty issue. But they have to withdraw or there is no point in our doing this. The measure of success is bringing all the refugees home. (S)

Now, on the question of a bombing pause. There was a huge debate at the NATO meeting, well, not a debate, but a discussion, and there was a unanimous feeling that there could be a pause only if all the refugees could come home and secondly, agreement on an international security force and third that the Serbs must begin their withdrawal. I agree a bombing pause might be helpful, but we have to work on getting the security forces out and get the beginning of a withdrawal -- not

just you and me, but Milosevic also has to agree because all 19 members agreed to this, and I am bound by the decision the group has taken. And I think it is a good decision. You have made so much progress, we might be able to get this done in the next few days if we just work on it. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, we are continuing and shall continue to work actively with Milosevic as if we were converting him to another faith. And I believe that on this one point that was mentioned by you that we did not manage to get Milosevic to agree on, we shall be able to do so soon. I know Talbott, and I trust him, but now we should raise the levels of these contacts and I believe that these contacts should be on the level of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. We shall help and aid Chernomyrdin in working with Milosevic, so as to make Milosevic agree to the solution of the remaining issues. And finally, so that everyone gets the impression that it is you and me that stopped that war. This would influence the domestic political situation in your country and especially in this country, but what is most important is that it will help put an end to this conflict. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: You know that I am hearing concerns by our military who are talking about getting military servicemen to go and help Milosevic. You know I have condemned this in the strictest terms and convened my Security Council and said there should be no talk about that. Any General that speaks of sending troops to help Milosevic will be summarily dismissed from the military. (S)

The President: Thank you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, there is one commander in the Military District of the Far East, Colonel-General Chechevatov, who was going to get a battalion which would go to Yugoslavia to help Milosevic. I dismissed him from his post. All our law enforcement agencies and ministries are strictly under my command and report only to me. So there will be no surprises here, and no unexpected things will come. We shall maintain contacts with you at all times. (S)

Well, let us by today's conversation solve two problems with two tasks. Let us resume the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and instruct them to take up the Yugoslav problem. As soon as the Commission, at the very hour and minute it starts working, the

air raids should stop. Of course, Talbott will be involved in that as a member of the Gore team, and he will deal with technical matters, not the big politics. So let us decide on these two questions, and if we can announce this in the media, this will mark an end to the tragedy. (S)

The President: But -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] You understand, you see what a difficult situation I am in, and I am holding myself and stifling my emotions, and I am talking with you in a constructive way. I also am leaving room for our subsequent cooperation. Well, of course this cooperation should not be abruptly stopped by the many Russians who write me letters on this issue. Let us do this Bill, and we should consider our conversation today constructive and a useful one. (S)

The President: Well first -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Do you agree? (U)

The President: Boris, first of all, I agree this has been a useful conversation, and I am encouraged by your energy and personal involvement you have put into this. We cannot solve this without your leadership, but I have to make three points that make it impossible to make the announcement to the press as you suggested. I hope you will listen to me carefully. (S)

First of all, I cannot get Gore into this publicly until I at least talk to him about it. He has had very limited involvement at this point, and I owe it to him to have a conversation with him before I put him into the middle of this. I know you understand he has been my partner for six years now, and he is running for President, and I can't run. I don't want to do anything that involves him in this way without talking to him. (S)

The second thing is, as I said, we just voted -- all 19 leaders of NATO -- to have a pause only when agreement on the security force, refugee return, and when withdrawal of Milosevic's forces can begin. I cannot unilaterally change that, and I don't want to say in public anything that implies I have abandoned what the others have agreed to. (S)

Now, there is a third problem that you and I both have if we do this. We have got to decide how to deal with the European Union because they have been very involved in this and, if we resolve

this we need them to come up with most of the money to rebuild Southeast Europe and to provide economic aide for everyone involved. So if we do this -- (S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] You should -- (U)

The President: Let me finish -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Understand, Bill, the work of this Commission has an international reputation and they could invite both NATO leaders and Milosevic to take part. I can guarantee you that on the part of Milosevic. (S)

The President: Yes, I understand that but wait -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] And you can guarantee this on the NATO side and this would form the basis for the end of the war. (S)

The President: Yes, but what I am saying is -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] So, do not push Russia into this war. You know what Russia is. You know how it is equipped, but don't push Russia into this. (S)

The President: Wait a minute, Boris. I am agreeing with what you are trying to do, but what I am saying is you have got all of the Europeans here taking the lead in this initiative, and we have to figure out how to deal with this before dropping it on them in the newspaper. They are our allies and our friends, and they have to come up with most of the money to rebuild the region. We just can't have them wake up in the morning and read it in the newspaper no matter how good it would be for us and our countries. (S)

Boris, how about this. I would like to say today that we talked today for an hour, and that I thanked you for your leadership for peace, and that we agreed on further steps. And then have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk early tomorrow in the morning and work out the arrangements for next steps. Then we can have more to say tomorrow and that will give me more time to get the Europeans in a positive frame of mind. (S)

I am not trying to push you into this conflict, Boris, and I believe we can make this initiative work. But, I am no good to you, unless I can hold our group together and then in the end they can come up with the money to make this work. (S)

Boris, how about this. Suppose we say today you and I talked for an hour, and I agreed with you that we would work together to find a diplomatic solution to this conflict at the highest levels and that we will provide more details in the days ahead. That gives us time to figure out what to do with the Europeans and gives me time to talk to Gore, and time for Gore to talk to Chernomyrdin. But it has the benefit of getting your peace initiative out today, which I think is important. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, you can't deny the work of, let's not call it a commission, Gore and Chernomyrdin would be useful and could provide the basis for a solution. We should decide that the very moment the commission starts working, there will be an end to the air raids, and at the same time the troops in the Yugoslavian units will pull out of Kosovo, and we will get Milosevic to do this. You can depend on me to get Milosevic to do this. Then we should reestablish Kosovo autonomy so all the populations that inhabit the region, no matter the ethnic origin, Albanian or Serb, could get back there and live together. Serbs are also fleeing to save themselves from NATO air raids. (S)

You know that Kofi Annan is coming to Moscow, and I will meet him, and I will do so in a way that we have a common position. Just a moment. Well, in this way, we shall unlock the situation and give the commission a chance to work. And it will work only when air raids stop. Milosevic will not slip out from our influence -- he will do everything we tell him to do. I hope your line of communication is a closed one like mine. (S)

The President: Yes. Let me ask you something, Boris. I need to talk to Gore and do some more work on this. Can we talk again tomorrow, and then have Gore talk to Chernomyrdin tomorrow? (S)

President Yeltsin: Let them begin the work, and then we shall continue efforts to work together so it looks like we stopped the European war, the World War. I realize that ground forces do not carry nuclear weapons now but of course they are capable, and if you bomb the power plants and fuel sites that would mean that there will be ecological instability in Europe for a long time. Well, I am listening to you Bill. (S)

The President: Boris, this might work if we can get the agreement on the security force and the beginning of withdrawal, then we could get a pause. If we get an agreement on the return

of refugees, agreement on the security force and the beginning of a withdrawal, then we can have a pause in the bombing and a process that could work. I think it is very important what we say and how we say it. I know the Europeans would support that kind of process and would finance the reconstruction that needs to be done in Kosovo. It is important that you and I not say this will happen just because you and I agree, because Milosevic has to agree as well. That is why I believe you and I have to talk again after Gore and Chernomyrdin talk. (S)

President Yeltsin: We shall follow the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission every day and every other day. If there is something we don't like, we will give each other a call. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: I wanted to be sure that we have not planned [inaudible] our only aim is to stop the war so I believe that ... [inaudible] nothing that we can lose you and me can only gain from this. We can change our information for the media. [inaudible] (S)

The President: Sorry, I did not hear that. (U)

President Yeltsin: The first point will be Gore-Chernomyrdin, we can change the second point that it will be that we agreed on conditions without going into details and it is not excluded that if everything is as we planned and the official hierarchy then we sign the letter [inaudible] although even if they do not take [inaudible] I trust this very much ... [inaudible] So -- (S)

The President: Well I have a lot of confidence -- (U)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] So what do you think about that, Bill? (U)

The President: We lost telephone communication for about five minutes, I have not heard the last three translations. Can you repeat them, not Boris, just the translator. (U)

President Yeltsin: OK. We have agreed? (U)

The President: No. No. I have not heard the last three translations. Can we just have -- (U)

RUSSIAN INTERPRETER: Mr. President, you should be assured that we are not taking sides with Milosevic. My only aim is to stop the war and stop the air raids and form the political basis for all sides to negotiate. And that we should use the same approach to all the sides of the conflict no matter how great their force. But it is most important that we find a solution to this most painful problem. We should stop the air raids. That would form the basis for the political solution of this tragedy. (S)

So I say again, of the five points enumerated by Albright, we got Milosevic to agree to four of them, and we have a statement signed by him on that. So probably we might change our second point in our information to the media, to say the first point will be that Gore and Chernomyrdin are working on this problem and the second point is that we have agreed on the conditions of the cessation of the air raids without going into details. So I don't also exclude if everything goes okay that this could help Chernomyrdin climb up the service ladder. (S)

Well, we also got a written request from Milosevic forwarded by his people regarding the union between Russia and Belarus and Yugoslavia. I tried to delay this, and we are saying we are not ready for this. I can tell you confidentially that this will never happen. (S)

The President: That is good. Let me say this, Boris. I think we are a little closer here in that I have no problem saying we have clarified conditions for a bombing pause. The most important thing is to say we have talked for an hour and committed ourselves to pursuing peace and that in the days ahead we will explain how we are going to do it. I will say again, I will have to talk to Gore before I can put him in the middle of this. (S)

President Yeltsin: And also you should take into account anti-American feelings are growing in our society. I should put an end to this, but this will not be possible to do while the air raids continue. So that is now the risk for you or me to get this Gore-Chernomyrdin to work with Milosevic and NATO so they elaborate on a short document that could be signed publicly. (S)

The President: Boris, I will work on nothing else but this for the next day. I will send Strobe tonight and have Gore get on the phone with Chernomyrdin. I will do nothing else but this,

but we have to be careful not to say something else in public that might make it impossible to work. (S)

President Yeltsin: But you will tell this to Gore also? (U)

The President: Yes, I will tell him. As soon as I get off the phone with you, I will tell him. Okay? (U)

President Yeltsin: And I will instruct Chernomyrdin to start talks with Rugova. (S)

The President: Good. Thanks, Boris. I will see you. Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: I think our discussion was frank, constructive, and balanced. So we did not let out our emotions surface. (U)

The President: No, and we won't. (U)

President Yeltsin: We shall work for the future. (U)

The President: Goodbye friend, I will see you. (U)

President Yeltsin: I was more talkative than you. (U)

The President: Yes, but we are going to do this. I am very encouraged. If you are involved, we can do this. Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: So, let's agree on this. This call was my initiative and the next will be yours. (U)

The President: Yes, and it will be soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very well, Bill. (U)

The President: Bye bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.63)
3/13/2018 KSM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: President Clinton
President Boris Yeltsin-5

Interpreter: Yuriy Shkeyrov
Notetaker: George Chastain, Doug Bailey,
Frank Jarosinski, Joel Schrader,
Andrew Weiss #

DATE, TIME: April 25, 1999, 10:35-11:58 a.m. EDT,
AND PLACE: NATO Summit Trip Building

President Yeltsin
PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President
THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, I am calling on Sunday, and this is a traditional day off for us. But it is not a day off for you and me. (U)

no caps
THE PRESIDENT: No, not today. (U) *take out?*

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This is because of the situation in the Balkans and the continued military action by NATO against Yugoslavia. We have agreed with you and Russia to step up efforts in all directions to find a way out of the Kosovo tragedy. This is also an ecological problem because the Danube is flowing into the Black Sea and it is extremely important to us that the sky over Europe is not clouded over again. You know I have sent Chernomyrdin as my special envoy on this Yugoslav problem. You know him and trust him. (S) #

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Out of six points, we have negotiated five.
[Note: reference to six points announced by Chernomyrdin after

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

FIVE

his meetings with Milosevic.] Out of the five points you named we have gotten Milosevic to agree to four of them. [Note: reference to 5 points discussed by Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov in Oslo.] There is only one point remaining.

(S)

[Note: reference to a continuing disagreement over an international security force.] We have agreed to [note: reference to what has been agreed between Russia and the FRY] the following points: the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, then international assistance in the reconstruction of Yugoslavia's economy, including Kosovo and the region as whole, and an international presence under UN auspices with the participation of Russia agreed to by Yugoslavia and here, of course, is meant a military presence. Then the pullout of troops and resuming work on the political regime on the future autonomy of the region. And then the reduction of the military and police forces in Kosovo accompanied by pullout of units along the border with Yugoslavia. And international assistance in reconstructing the Yugoslav economy including Kosovo and Europe as a whole because many countries have suffered including Russia. Launching of a peacekeeping operation would be under UN auspices, and Russia is prepared to take part in this. (S)

In our view, this is a big and important step forward. We are continuing our active efforts along those lines with Belgrade on format and composition and mandate for this operation. This is a difficult task, but we shall pursue it persistently in order to find a final solution to the problem. (S)

It is important that your special envoy, Talbott, whom I know quite well, get involved in our efforts, but this will not be enough. So, I propose we move the remaining issues for discussion of the war to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. This would give an opportunity for Mr. Gore to look good in his election campaign in relation to the situation in Yugoslavia and would produce a good result because Gore and Chernomyrdin know how to negotiate with each other. This Commission will work for some time and where it will work doesn't matter to me or Chernomyrdin. It could work in either Washington or Europe or Moscow or intermittently in all those places. (S) (#)

Well, in other words, there are signs of the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable solution, and I count on your weight for its support, but what is important is that air raids be suspended to provide a good background to the Commission for progress and acceptable results in getting the situation around

Kosovo back on a political track. I believe we should set aside our emotions and work in a pragmatic way to arrange a political settlement against the background of discontinuation of air raids by NATO against Yugoslavia. At least for the time of the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, and in this case we will create the impression that everyone saved face in getting out of the tragic situation in Kosovo. (S)

I spoke with Chernomyrdin several hours ago but it was too early to talk to you because it was four in the morning in America. If we establish the position to refer the issues to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, it would create an opportunity for Gore to be the peacemaker. (S)

We are working in all areas and directions, including our government delegations and the visit to Belgrade by our Patriarch who had a successful mission. So we are attacking Milosevic from all sides, and there was also assistance from our Parliament. Let us forget at this stage all other issues and get to solving this one because this problem is worse than the others, and it is worth dozens of billions of dollars. (S)

When I talked with Chernomyrdin today he agreed to work in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on this issue. So we will not leave much room for maneuver to Belgrade and will keep them in our sights, also including their political network. So what is your reaction? I am waiting for it. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, I want to thank you for making the vigorous efforts you and Viktor Stepanovich are putting into this. Secondly, I think your idea of the Vice President and Chernomyrdin working together on this might work, but I think that they probably ought to have a telephone conversation. Then Strobe Talbott should meet with Chernomyrdin early this week to see what is possible. (S)

On this specific thing that has been achieved so far in your work with Milosevic, I would like to make a couple of comments. On a commitment by the U.S. and Europe to regional development and intensive assistance to everyone affected, I completely agree. I have repeatedly said we have to build a positive future for South-East Europe to prevent them from falling back into old hatreds. Now on the details. Based only on what you have said to me and what has been reported in the news on what Milosevic has said, I would like to talk about the details --

(S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] So you do agree that Gore and Chernomyrdin resume their work? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think that we should have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk on the phone tomorrow, and what I would like to do is to have Strobe Talbott fly to see Viktor Stepanovich Tuesday or tomorrow or whenever you want him to go. And let me comment now -- (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] Well, I thought that after today's conversation we can tell the media that myself and President Clinton have found a common point of view on how we can solve this problem together and then the details can be worked out later, and we will continue to work actively with Milosevic on all these questions. (S)

You know that I have decided not to send seven military ships to the Mediterranean as we have agreed, and I will continue to comply with what I promised. And what assistance we have given to Yugoslavia is only humanitarian in nature and delivered by road. There were some difficulties on the Hungarian border, but now these have been settled. Milosevic is insisting that we supply to Yugoslavia the anti-aircraft system S-300, but we shall not give this system to him, and you can believe me on that. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Because it will not allow any planes close to the borders of Yugoslavia. Well, I am listening to you Bill. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, let me respond to what you said we can tell the press and then I have to talk a little about the details of the proposal. I think we should say as little as possible about the specifics of what we are going to do in the long run because I have not talked to Gore at all about this and, in all fairness, I have to talk to him. I think we should have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk tomorrow and have Strobe Talbott and Chernomyrdin talk the next day and see if we can work it out. (S)

It is fine for you to say we agreed to pursue a diplomatic solution at a very high level and that you and I are going to personally work on it and maintain a high level of involvement. I at least need to have a brief conversation with the Vice President before I commit him to it. But I have no problem with

your saying I am encouraged by your personal involvement and Chernomyrdin's. As you know, I do not believe there can be a settlement without Russia's leadership and involvement. (S)

Now, I would like to talk about two things very briefly. One is the peacekeeping force. I think it is, in theory, fine to have it be under the UN, and I also think Russia should be a strong part of it. Now I know that Milosevic does not want NATO to be any part of it. If I could design it the best way I could, I would have it look like the work we are doing in Bosnia. There are two things you should keep in mind as you work through it in coming days. The first is that I don't think the refugees will go home unless there is a NATO and an American presence. The second is, in order to make this work, the UCK and KLA have to disarm, and I don't believe anyone but NATO and the U.S. can do this. (S)

I would like to make another point, which is that there would have to be a large number of forces, and one of the things they will have to do is to protect the Serb minority from angry Kosovars seeking revenge once they are back in the country. I think you know me well enough to trust me when I say we will protect the Serbs as well as the Kosovars by working with you, but we are going to need a lot of forces to do that. (S)

The other thing that is unclear in the commitment that Milosevic made is to what extent the Serb forces would be withdrawn. But from newspaper accounts he said not all troops will be withdrawn. I do not believe the refugees will go home unless the Serb military and police and paramilitaries are gone. And keep in mind, if Russian forces are in there, that should help them deal with their legitimate concerns about maintaining the sovereignty issue. But they have to withdraw or there is no point in our doing this. The measure of success is bringing all the refugees home. (S)

Now, on the question of a bombing pause. There was a huge debate at the NATO meeting, well, not a debate, but a discussion, and there was a unanimous feeling that there could be a pause only if all the refugees could come home, and secondly, agreement on an international security force, and third that the Serbs must begin their withdrawal. I agree a bombing pause might be helpful, but we have to work on getting the security forces out and get the beginning of a withdrawal -- not just you and me, but Milosevic also has to agree because all 19 members agreed to this, and I am bound by the decision the group has taken. And I think it is a good decision. You have made so

much progress, we might be able to get this done in the next few days if we just work on it. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, we are continuing and shall continue to work actively with Milosevic as if we were converting him to another faith. And I believe that on this one point that was mentioned by you that we did not manage to get Milosevic to agree on, we shall be able to do so soon. I know Talbott, and I trust him, but now we should raise the levels of these contacts and I believe that these contacts should be on the level of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. We shall help and aid Chernomyrdin in working with Milosevic, so as to make Milosevic agree to the solution of the remaining issues. And finally, so that everyone gets the impression that it is you and me that stopped that war. This would influence the domestic political situation in your country and especially in this country, but what is most important is that it will help put an end to this conflict. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: You know that I am hearing concerns by our military who are talking about getting military servicemen to go and help Milosevic. You know I have condemned this in the strictest terms and convened my Security Council and said there should be no talk about that. Any General that speaks of sending troops to help Milosevic will be summarily dismissed from the military. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, there is one commander in the Military District of the Far East, Colonel-General Chechevatov, who was going to get a battalion which would go to Yugoslavia to help Milosevic. I dismissed him from his post. All our law enforcement agencies and ministries are strictly under my command and report only to me. So there will be no surprises here, and no unexpected things will come. We shall maintain contacts with you at all times. (S)

Well, let us by today's conversation solve two problems with two tasks. Let us resume the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and instruct them to take up the Yugoslav problem. As soon as the Commission, at the very hour and minute it starts working, the air raids should stop. Of course, Talbott will be involved in that as a member of the Gore team, and he will deal with technical matters, not the big politics. So let us decide on

these two questions, and if we can announce this in the media, this will mark an end to the tragedy. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: But -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] You understand, you see what a difficult situation I am in, and I am holding myself and stifling my emotions, and I am talking with you in a constructive way. I also am leaving room for our subsequent cooperation. Well, of course this cooperation should not be abruptly stopped by the many Russians who write me letters on this issue. Let us do this Bill, and we should consider our conversation today constructive and a useful one. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well first -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] Do you agree? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, first of all, I agree this has been a useful conversation, and I am encouraged by your energy and personal involvement you have put into this. We cannot solve this without your leadership, but I have to make three points that make it impossible to make the announcement to the press as you suggested. I hope you will listen to me carefully. (S)

First of all, I cannot get Gore into this publicly until I at least talk to him about it. He has had very limited involvement at this point, and I owe it to him to have a conversation with him before I put him into the middle of this. I know you understand he has been my partner for six years now, and he is running for President, and I can't run. I don't want to do anything that involves him in this way without talking to him. (S)

The second thing is, as I said, we just voted -- all 19 leaders of NATO -- to have a pause only when agreement on the security force, refugee return, and when withdrawal of Milosevic's forces can begin. I cannot unilaterally change that, and I don't want to say in public anything that implies I have abandoned what the others have agreed to. (S)

Now, there is a third problem that you and I both have if we do this. We have got to decide how to deal with the European Union because they have been very involved in this and, if we resolve this, we need them to come up with most of the money to rebuild Southeast Europe and to provide economic aid for everyone involved. So if we do this -- (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] You should -- (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Let me finish -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] Understand, Bill, the work of this Commission has an international reputation and they could invite both NATO leaders and Milosevic to take part. I can guarantee you that on the part of Milosevic. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I understand that but wait -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] And you can guarantee this on the NATO side and this would form the basis for the end of the war. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I am saying is -- (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] So, do not push Russia into this war. You know what Russia is. You know how it is equipped, but don't push Russia into this. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Boris. I am agreeing with what you are trying to do, but what I am saying is you have got all of the Europeans here taking the lead in this initiative, and we have to figure out how to deal with this before dropping it on them in the newspaper. They are our allies and our friends, and they have to come up with most of the money to rebuild the region. We just can't have them wake up in the morning and read it in the newspaper no matter how good it would be for us and our countries. (S)

Boris, how about this. I would like to say today that we talked today for an hour, and that I thanked you for your leadership for peace, and that we agreed on further steps. And then have Gore and Chernomyrdin talk early tomorrow in the morning and work out the arrangements for next steps. Then we can have more to say tomorrow and that will give me more time to get the Europeans in a positive frame of mind. (S)

I am not trying to push you into this conflict, Boris, and I believe we can make this initiative work. But, I am no good to you, unless I can hold our group together and then in the end they can come up with the money to make this work. (S)

Boris, how about this: suppose we say today you and I talked for an hour, and I agreed with you we would work together to

that

find a diplomatic solution to this conflict at the highest levels and that we will provide more details in the days ahead. That gives us time to figure out what to do with the Europeans and gives me time to talk to Gore, and time for Gore to talk to Chernomyrdin. But it has the benefit of getting your peace initiative out today, which I think is important. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, Bill, you can't deny the work of, let's not call it a commission, Gore and Chernomyrdin would be useful and could provide the basis for a solution. We should decide that the very moment the commission starts working there will be an end to the air raids, and at the same time the troops in the Yugoslavian units will pull out of Kosovo, and we will get Milosevic to do this. You can depend on me to get Milosevic to do this. Then we should reestablish Kosovo autonomy so all the populations that inhabit the region, no matter the ethnic origin, Albanian or Serb, could get back there and live together. Serbs are also fleeing to save themselves from NATO air raids. (S)

You know that Kofi Annan is coming to Moscow, and I will meet him, and I will do so in a way that we have a common position. Just a moment. Well, in this way, we shall unlock the situation and give the commission a chance to work. And it will work only when air raids stop. Milosevic will not slip out from our influence -- he will do everything we tell him to do. I hope your line of communication is a closed one like mine. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Let me ask you something, Boris. I need to talk to Gore and do some more work on this. Can we talk again tomorrow, and then have Gore talk to Chernomyrdin tomorrow? (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Let them begin the work, and then we shall continue efforts to work together so it looks like we stopped the European war, the World War. I realize that ground forces do not carry nuclear weapons now but of course they are capable, and if you bomb the power plants and fuel sites that would mean that there will be ecological instability in Europe for a long time. Well, I am listening to you Bill. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, this might work if we can get the agreement on the security force and the beginning of withdrawal, then we could get a pause. If we get an agreement on the return of refugees, agreement on the security force and the beginning of a withdrawal, then we can have a pause in the bombing and a process that could work. I think it is very important what we

say and how we say it. I know the Europeans would support that kind of process and would finance the reconstruction that needs to be done in Kosovo. It is important that you and I not say this will happen just because you and I agree, because Milosevic has to agree as well. That is why I believe you and I have to talk again after Gore and Chernomyrdin talk. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We shall follow the work of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission every day and every other day. If there is something we don't like, we will give each other a call. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I wanted to be sure that we have not planned [inaudible] our only aim is to stop the war so I believe that ... [inaudible] nothing that we can lose you and me can only gain from this. We can change our information for the media. [inaudible] (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Sorry, I did not hear that. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: The first point will be Gore-Chernomyrdin, we can change the second point that it will be that we agreed on conditions without going into details and it is not excluded that if everything is as we planned and the official hierarchy then we sign the letter [inaudible] although even if they do not take [inaudible] I trust this very much ... [inaudible] So -- (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Well I have a lot of confidence -- (U)
extend line

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] So what do you think about that, Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: We lost telephone communication for about five minutes, I have not heard the last three translations. Can you repeat them, not Boris, just the translator. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: OK. We have agreed? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: No. No. I have not heard the last three translations. Can we just have -- (U)

RUSSIAN INTERPRETER: Mr. President, you should be assured that we are not taking sides with Milosevic. My only aim is to stop the war and stop the air raids and form the political basis for all sides to negotiate. And that we should use the same

approach to all the sides of the conflict no matter how great their force. But it is most important that we find a solution to this most painful problem. We should stop the air raids. That would form the basis for the political solution of this tragedy. (S)

So I say again, of the five points enumerated by Albright, we got Milosevic to agree to four of them, and we have a statement signed by him on that. So probably we might change our second point in our information to the media, to say the first point will be that Gore and Chernomyrdin are working on this problem and the second point is that we have agreed on the conditions of the cessation of the air raids without going into details. So I don't also exclude if everything goes OK that this could help Chernomyrdin climb up the service ladder. (S)

okay

Well, we also got a written request from Milosevic forwarded by his people regarding the union between Russia and Belarus and Yugoslavia. I tried to delay this, and we are saying we are not ready for this. I can tell you confidentially that this will never happen. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That is good. Let me say this, Boris. I think we are a little closer here in that I have no problem saying we have clarified conditions for a bombing pause. The most important thing is to say we have talked for an hour and committed ourselves to pursuing peace and that in the days ahead we will explain how we are going to do it. I will say again, I will have to talk to Gore before I can put him in the middle of this. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And also you should take into account anti-American feelings are growing in our society. I should put an end to this, but this will not be possible to do while the air raids continue. So that is now the risk for you or me to get this Gore-Chernomyrdin to work with Milosevic and NATO so they elaborate on a short document that could be signed publicly.

(S)

THE PRESIDENT: Boris, I will work on nothing else but this for the next day. I will send Strobe tonight and have Gore get on the phone with Chernomyrdin. I will do nothing else but this, but we have to be careful not to say something else in public that might make it impossible to work. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: But you will tell this to Gore also? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I will tell him. As soon as I get off the phone with you, I will tell him. OK? (U) *OKay*

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And I will instruct Chernomyrdin to start talks with Rugova. *(S)*

THE PRESIDENT: Good. Thanks, Boris. I will see you. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think our discussion was frank, constructive, and balanced. So we did not let out our emotions surface. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: No, and we won't. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We shall work for the future. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye friend, I will see you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I was more talkative than you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but we are going to do this. I am very encouraged. If you are involved, we can do this. Goodbye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: So, let's agree on this. This call was my initiative and the next will be yours. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and it will be soon. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very well, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Bye bye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Goodbye. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

SEE ↓
Case Number: 2014-0546-M; 2015-0782-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2727				
Document ID: 9903364				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: v

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.64)
3/13/2018 K8H

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Elizabeth
Rogers, Michael Manning, Sean Tarver,
Andrew Weiss
Interpreter: Peter Afanassenko

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 2, 1999, 10:18 - 10:31 a.m. EDT,
Residence

The President: Hello, Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

The President: Good afternoon. It is good to hear to hear your
voice. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very well, Bill. I decided to call you on
Sunday because this question is extremely important. As you
know, on my instructions, my envoy Victor Chernomyrdin engaged
in extremely difficult negotiations in Belgrade for many hours,
and there are some results of these negotiations. Moreover, I
believe that now real prospects have opened for making a
practical step in reaching a political settlement. That was
exactly the objective we agreed on with you. Not only the
people of the U.S., Yugoslavia, and Russia, but the entire world
needs this. Because of the very urgent nature of these
developments, I have instructed my special envoy Chernomyrdin to
go to Washington and deliver my personal message to you. I
would ask you, Bill, to receive him without delay and want you
to receive him tomorrow on May 3rd. That is all I have to say.
(S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

The President: First of all, Boris, I will be glad to see him and am pleased by everything you have been doing, by your personal involvement, and by how hard Viktor has worked. He and Gore have been in touch, and I want to thank you for all the good work that has been done and by all progress that has been made. I also want -- (S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Do you agree to receive Chernomyrdin on Monday? (U)

The President: Yes, I do. The Japanese Prime Minister will be here, and I will ask him to adjust our schedule, but I will be glad to receive him. I think it is important that he meet with Al Gore to keep the channel working there. (S)

President Yeltsin: He will relate to you all the details of the latest developments. (S)

The President: I can't wait to see him, but I think it's important that he see Al Gore, too, to keep that channel working. As you know, I am very impressed by the work he has been doing and by the progress that has been made. Also, I want to say again how important -- (S)

President Yeltsin: [interrupting] Can we agree now on the exact hour you will receive Chernomyrdin tomorrow? (S)

The President: No, it will have to be tomorrow afternoon, but I can see him. I would like him to see Al Gore first, and then I will see him and will give him plenty of time. I will have to look at my schedule, and we can get back to your people, perhaps later today. (S)

President Yeltsin: It is okay that he meet with Mr. Gore, but I ask you to receive Chernomyrdin personally and to receive from him my personal letter. That is what I'm asking. (U)

The President: Absolutely, I will do that. (U)

President Yeltsin: Chernomyrdin will need all the proper identification papers so everything is official and on a solid level. (U)

The President: Absolutely, there will be no problem with that. (U)

President Yeltsin: I think at the airport it will be desirable for an official, some representative, not necessarily a high level official, of the government to meet him at the airport. I have provided him with my personal plane. (S)

The President: Yes, I will have someone meet him. (U)

President Yeltsin: Are we agreed on this, Bill? (U)

The President: Yes, we are. (U)

President Yeltsin: I owe you a bear hug. (U)

The President: Yes, I want a bear hug. You remember, Boris, I think it's very important that we get out of this whole affair in a way that is good for peace in the Balkans and good for Russia, and good for our relations. I am very pleased you are involved in this and that Chernomyrdin is involved, and I look forward to seeing him tomorrow. We both have to be involved. (S)

President Yeltsin: This morning, I held a closed meeting of the Security Council, in the narrow composition, and Chernomyrdin attended that meeting. We agreed on further work with Milosevic, so we shall continue our activities. You mentioned to me it is useful when Russia is involved as an intermediary in this process. (S)

The President: Yes, it is very useful, and I believe the right sort of deal can truly bring this crisis to a conclusion, but the wrong kind of deal will prolong the crisis. But I believe you have to be involved, the U.S. has to be involved, and the Europeans have to be involved, not only in Kosovo, but we have to help in all of the Balkans and Southeast Europe. It is critical to the future of our relations. So you have to be involved in a leading role, and I am very pleased. We just have to get the right kind of deal here. (S)

President Yeltsin: Very well, Bill. (U)

The President: Alright, Boris, I will see him tomorrow. Thank you very much. (U)

President Yeltsin: He is leaving Moscow very shortly and looking forward to meeting with you tomorrow on May 3rd. (U)

The President: Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

3364

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: *The* President Clinton
Russian President Boris Yeltsin

Notetakers: Tony Campanella, Elizabeth
Rogers, Michael Manning, Sean Tarver,
Andrew Weiss

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 2, 1999, 10:18 - 10:31 a.m. EDT,
Residence

THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon. It is good to hear to hear your
voice. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very well, Bill. I decided to call you on
Sunday because this question is extremely important. As you
know, on my instructions, my envoy Victor Chernomyrdin engaged
in extremely difficult negotiations in Belgrade for many hours,
and there are some results of these negotiations. Moreover, I
believe that now real prospects have opened for making a
practical step in reaching a political settlement. That was
exactly the objective we agreed on with you. Not only the
people of the U.S., Yugoslavia, and Russia, but the entire
world needs this. Because of the very urgent nature of these
developments, I have instructed my special envoy Chernomyrdin to
go to Washington and deliver my personal message to you. I
would ask you, Bill, to receive him without delay and want you
to receive him tomorrow on May 3rd. That is all I have to say.

(S)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 4/26/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.64)
3/13/2018 KBM

~~SECRET~~

2

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, Boris, I will be glad to see him and am pleased by everything you have been doing, by your personal involvement, and by how hard Viktor has worked. He and Gore have been in touch, and I want to thank you for all the good work that has been done and by all progress that has been made. I also want -- (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] Do you agree to receive Chernomyrdin on Monday? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do. The Japanese Prime Minister will be here, and I will ask him to adjust our schedule, but I will be glad to receive him. I think it is important that he meet with Al Gore to keep the channel working there. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: He will relate to you all the details of the latest developments. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I can't wait to see him, but I think it's important that he see Al Gore, too, to keep that channel working. As you know, I am very impressed by the work he has been doing and by the progress that has been made. Also, I want to say again how important -- (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: [interrupting] Can we agree now on the exact hour you will receive Chernomyrdin tomorrow? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: No, it will have to be tomorrow afternoon, but I can see him. I would like him to see Al Gore first, and then I will see him and will give him plenty of time. I will have to look at my schedule, and we can get back to your people, perhaps later today. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It is okay that he meet with Mr. Gore, but I ask you to receive Chernomyrdin personally and to receive from him my personal letter. That is what I'm asking. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely, I will do that. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Chernomyrdin will need all the proper identification papers so everything is official and on a solid level. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely, there will be no problem with that. (U)

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I think at the airport it will be desirable for an official, some representative, not necessarily a high level official, of the government to meet him at the airport. I have provided him with my personal plane. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I will have someone meet him. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Are we agreed on this, Bill? (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we are. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I owe you a bear hug. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I want a bear hug. You remember, Boris, I think it's very important that we get out of this whole affair in a way that is good for peace in the Balkans and good for Russia, and good for our relations. I am very pleased you are involved in this and that Chernomyrdin is involved and I look forward to seeing him tomorrow. We both have to be involved. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This morning I held a closed meeting of the Security Council, in the narrow composition, and Chernomyrdin attended that meeting. We agreed on further work with Milosevic, so we shall continue our activities. You mentioned to me it is useful when Russia is involved as an intermediary in this process. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is very useful, and I believe the right sort of deal can truly bring this crisis to a conclusion, but the wrong kind of deal will prolong the crisis. But I believe you have to be involved, the U.S. has to be involved, and the Europeans have to be involved, not only in Kosovo, but we have to help in all of the Balkans and Southeast Europe. It is critical to the future of our relations. So you have to be involved in a leading role, and I am very pleased. We just have to get the right kind of deal here. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very well, Bill. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Alright, Boris, I will see him tomorrow. Thank you very much. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: He is leaving Moscow very shortly and looking forward to meeting with you tomorrow on May (3d). (U)

3rd

THE PRESIDENT: Great. Thank you. Good-bye. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

See ↓

Case Number: 2014-0546-M; 2015-0782-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2733				
Document ID: 9904358				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.65)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia (U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin
Notetakers: Robin Rickard, James Smith
Michael Manning, Roger Merletti, Stuart Kaufman
Interpreter: Kyrill Borissow
DATE, TIME AND PLACE: 7 June 1999, 11:07 - 11:14 a.m. EST,
Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Boris. Thank you for taking this call. I think we are on the verge of a very important achievement to get an end to the bombing and the return of refugees, as we discussed last April. As you remember, on that day you suggested that Viktor Stepanovich engage with the Vice President, and since then he has worked with Al Gore, President Ahtisaari and Strobe Talbott and has come up with an excellent plan, which President Milosevic accepted last Friday. (S)

President Yeltsin: I think, Bill, we have come a long way together, and the only thing remaining is for us to finalize this work. (S)

The President: I agree with that. If we can get agreement today on a UN Security Council resolution covering the peacekeeping force in the G-8 meeting going on now in Germany, I think everything will work out all right. I think it's important that Ivanov do everything possible to reach an agreement. Your role has been indispensable until now. This can all be over very quickly and will set the

stage for the G-8 meeting in Cologne in two weeks and a great Russian diplomatic triumph. (S)

President Yeltsin: I have been thinking a lot and with concern about the possibility of losing the positive experience we gained together with you. This would be extremely dangerous. (S)

The President: I agree with that. I have told our people, and I know the other Europeans have been told, that we need to reach agreement today, and I hope you can tell Ivanov this. If we can get agreement on a Security Council resolution, we can work the sequencing out, so they begin to withdraw, then we have a bombing pause, then we pass a resolution, then the peacekeeping forces go in, and we can all go to work. That's what we have to do. But we have to make sure nothing happens to make Milosevic think he can stall; we can't let him stall or backslide. If he had done what he told Chernomyrdin Friday, there would be no bombs falling today. We have to go forward, we need to pass the draft resolution today. I hope you will do all you can. The G-8 needs to approve it. (S)

President Yeltsin: I fully agree with you. If we fail to join our efforts together, we will certainly have failed. (S)

The President: I will call Madeleine right now and tell her to redouble our efforts. Will you do the same with Ivanov? (S)

President Yeltsin: Of course, of course, Bill, and immediately. (S)

The President: Good. Let's keep working at it, Boris. We can do this today, and it will be a great triumph for Russian diplomacy, and then when we get to the G-8 in Cologne, we will have something to celebrate rather than worry about. And I will lead the ovation. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, agreed. I agree with this. If any misunderstanding would exist between us, I would be able to get in touch and give the necessary instructions to my minister, Ivanov. (S)

The President: That is very good news. Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. Thank you for this conversation. (U)

see ↓
Case Number: 2014-0546-M; 2015-0782-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2733				
Document ID: 9904397				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: v

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 9, 1999

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-m-2 (1.66)

3/13/2013 KRM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver,
Roger Merletti, Don Cheramie

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 8, 1999, 8:58 - 9:13 a.m., EST
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yelstin: Hello, Bill, how are you? Well, Bill, Minister Ivanov has reported to me on the progress of the work on the UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo, and he told me that by and large his work has been completed. The text has been agreed upon in its main elements. I believe this is the result of my instructions to Ivanov and your instructions to your representative. And as a follow-on to our conversation of yesterday, immediately after our conversation, I got in touch with my Foreign Minister and told him that no matter what happens, he must stay there, don't come back. And I believe he was there, and he immediately began his work with his G-8 partners on all these things, and I believe he has done a good job, and this has been a success. What do you think, Bill? (S)

The President: First, I want to tell you, I appreciated our talk yesterday, and I'm thrilled that we reached agreement on the text of the UN Security Council resolution today. I think it shows that when we make our partnership work, we can do whatever we need to do. Strobe Talbott and his team are coming to Moscow soon to work with your team on the military details so we can have a formula to allow Russia to participate in the international security force. We made it work in Bosnia, and we

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 06/09/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

need to do it again and get the details worked out. We also have to get the military-technical agreement done with Serbia to make sure Milosevic honors his commitments to you and all of us so the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari diplomatic breakthrough will last. That way we can use next week's meeting in Cologne to put the spotlight on Russia's efforts and to make the peace work. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, just a second, Bill. When we talked this matter over with you, I think we agreed that if I give the necessary authority to Ivanov to complete the work on the resolution and to agree on the text as we have discussed with you, then the bombing will be stopped. (S)

The President: As soon as they begin to withdraw, then it will. Believe me, I am anxious to do that. And once he begins the withdrawal, then we will stop. That was the agreement Milosevic reached with Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari, and once he begins the withdrawals, then we will stop. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, I believe that perhaps there was a little bit of misunderstanding between us. As I recall our conversation, we agreed very firmly that once the UN Security Council resolution is agreed upon, it will be up to you to stop the bombing, and it will be up to me to get Ivanov to complete the work on the resolution. I recall our agreement included this element of cessation of bombing once a resolution is agreed upon. Do I understand that you are now drawing back? (S)

The President: No, Boris. Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin made an agreement with Milosevic that Milosevic would begin to withdraw, and when he began, we would end the bombing. He then said that he did not want to withdraw until there is a UN resolution. But the Serbs are now meeting with NATO military representatives to conclude the agreement. Once they finish, the Serbs can begin to withdraw, but under the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin agreement, they will begin the withdrawal and immediately the bombing will stop. And that could happen very, very soon. If Milosevic had followed through on the agreement he gave to Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari, then the bombing would have stopped yesterday. They are now meeting, and I think this can happen at any time. I think they are very close to a conclusion, even as we speak. Boris, don't worry, this is going to work out the way you and I agreed. As soon as this conversation is done, I will get back to my people who are working on this, and it will work out. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, I would like to emphasize once again that we firmly link the completion of work on the draft

resolution with the conclusion on the bombing of Yugoslavia. I can tell you very frankly that without this, we will not allow the Security Council resolution to go forward. I warned you about this, and do it again, quite frankly. (S)

The President: I understand that. We just have to get Serbia to sign off on the timetable right now, and we will begin. I will do with our people today what you have done with Ivanov. We will get this done, and I will get on it right now. Under the agreement, they have to agree to the timetable. We can stop the bombing and get on with the Security Council resolution. I will get on it right away. I won't waste a minute. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK. Then I will suggest that you call your military right now. Then we will get back in touch and see where we are. (S)

The President: Yes, let's do it. Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much. We are agreed. OK. My best wishes to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 9, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.66)
3/13/2018 KBM

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with President
Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Bonnie Glick, Sean Tarver,
Roger Merletti, Don Cheramie

DATE, TIME June 8, 1999, 8:58 - 9:13 a.m., EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. (U)

President Yelstin: Hello, Bill, how are you? Well, Bill, Minister Ivanov has reported to me on the progress of the work on the UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo, and he told me that by and large his work has been completed. The text has been agreed upon in its main elements. I believe this is the result of my instructions to Ivanov and your instructions to your representative. And as a follow-on to our conversation of yesterday, immediately after our conversation, I got in touch with my Foreign Minister and told him that no matter what happens, he must stay there, don't come back. And I believe he was there, and he immediately began his work with his G-8 partners on all these things, and I believe he has done a good job, and this has been a success. What do you think, Bill? (S)

The President: First, I want to tell you, I appreciated our talk yesterday, and I'm thrilled that we reached agreement on the text of the UN Security Council resolution today. I think it shows that when we make our partnership work, we can do whatever we need to do. Strobe Talbott and his team are coming to Moscow soon to work with your team on the military details so we can have a formula to allow Russia to participate in the international security force. We made it work in Bosnia, and we

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 06/09/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

resolution with the conclusion on the bombing of Yugoslavia. I can tell you very frankly that without this, we will not allow the Security Council resolution to go forward. I warned you about this, and do it again, quite frankly. (S)

The President: I understand that. We just have to get Serbia to sign off on the timetable right now, and we will begin. I will do with our people today what you have done with Ivanov. We will get this done, and I will get on it right now. Under the agreement, they have to agree to the timetable. We can stop the bombing and get on with the Security Council resolution. I will get on it right away. I won't waste a minute. (S)

President Yeltsin: OK. Then I will suggest that you call your military right now. Then we will get back in touch and see where we are. (S)

The President: Yes, let's do it. Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: Thank you very much. We are agreed. OK. My best wishes to you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

566 ↓

Case Number: 2014-0546-M; 2015-0782-M

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2734				
Document ID: 9904501				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.67)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with President Yeltsin of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

Interpreter: Peter Afansenko
Notetakers: George Chastain, Matt Sibley,
Sean Tarver, Robert Ford, Roger Merletti,
James Smith

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 10, 1999, 10:40 - 10:50 a.m. EST
Oval Office

President Yeltsin: Good afternoon, Bill. (U)

The President: Hello, Boris. I just called to thank you very much for your leadership in bringing this conflict to a conclusion. The withdrawal has begun, the bombing has stopped, and now we are waiting for passage of the UN resolution, but I am looking forward to working with you there. (C)

President Yeltsin: Well, I know we have common work. It was most difficult to achieve that. I am sorry if in some cases I was nosy. (C)

The President: No, I am just pleased that it happened and I am looking forward to our people working together on Kosovo and I'm looking forward to meeting you in Cologne at the G-8. It's a great triumph for Russian diplomacy, and now we have to work to help you achieve your other objectives with the economy and your continuing efforts at political reform. I just want to say again, we couldn't have brought this to a good conclusion without your leadership and the role Mr. Chernomyrdin played with President Ahtisaari. That was the key to breaking this open, and I am very grateful and I just wanted to call and thank you. (C)

President Yeltsin: I'm very glad about that. You know, it would have been a real tragedy for us if our ways had gone in different directions, because we have been working for many years. But I am very glad about the fact that we will be able to continue working together and cooperating. That is just great. So, I would like to hug and kiss you, and I am sincerely glad that in such a difficult situation our friendship wasn't broken. (S)

The President: Thank you, Boris. Our friendship will never be broken, as long as we are honest with each other. We had straight talks and we made it work, as we made it work in Bosnia, and I am looking forward to seeing you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, I am glad to hear that. So, we will all just work in the same way if the same situation arises. (S)

The President: Good, and I will see you soon in Cologne, I hope. (S)

President Yeltsin: I am embracing you very, very strongly and really glad to share your happiness. (S)

The President: Thank you, Boris. I will see you soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: That's okay. See you later. Goodbye, Bill. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2736				
Document ID: 9904842				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 8	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia (9 pages)	06/20/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	re. Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia (9 pages)	06/20/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
OA/Box Number: 2736

FOLDER TITLE:

9904842

2015-0782-M

rs1557

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 28 JUN 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 20 JUN 99

ACTION: SARGEANT SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 28 JUN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL
SARGEANT

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY



DATE

6/28

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9904842

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 99062517 FOR DECISION
X 99062812 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM
X 99062812 SARGEANT SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990628 KENNEY, K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4842
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG OK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>d</i> JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>6/25</u>	<u>edit made JB</u>
POWELL			
SARGEANT	<u>38</u>	<u>6/24</u>	<u>A-Tav I</u>
DAVIES			
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>(2)</u>	
STEINBERG	<u>copy</u>		
BERGER	<u>copy</u>		
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>TC 6/28</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

99 JUN 25 5:00
CC:

COMMENTS: Mem Con with Pres. Yeltsin
6/20/99

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4842
URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT . ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AWK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	<u>1</u>	<u>6/25</u>	<u>subject made</u> <u>JB</u>
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	<u>3</u>	<u>6/24</u>	<u>A-Tab I</u>
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>(1)</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>copy</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>TC 6/28</u>	<u>D</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Mem Con with Pres. Yeltsin
6/20/99

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 28, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Conversation with
Russian President Boris Yeltsin (C)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the June 20 conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary, and Ambassador Sestanovich. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. (C)


Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 6/25/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Albright
Samuel Berger
Deputy Secretary Talbott

President Yeltsin
Minister Ivanov
Minister Shapovalyants
Foreign Policy Advisor Prikhodko
Deputy Minister Mamedov
Russian Interpreter

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: Carlos Pascual

DATE, TIME June 20, 1999, 1:00 - 2:00 p.m.
AND PLACE: Renaissance Hotel (Russians Host),
Cologne, Germany

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Before we start, let's decide now to revive the Gore-Stepashin Commission. (U)

(Note: Ivanov prompts Yeltsin on Stepashin's name.) (✓)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Let's get them together as fast as they can. Let's also have Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov meet soon, too. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: This is our seventeenth meeting. We met in Helsinki once and you gave me a cane. The cane unscrewed and it had a spyglass. I still have it and all the gifts that you've given me. The best was a miniature painting of my mother. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 6/25/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0782-M-2 (1.47)
3/13/2018 KBM

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I brought you another present today. A good present; maybe not a personal present. But for purposes of our friendship, it is a good present. (U)

When I became president in 1992, I signed a decree to declassify all material related to President Kennedy's assassination, regardless of where the documents were, whether in the diplomatic, military or intelligence archives. It turned out to be quite an effort. We translated everything into Russian and declassified them all. We had to translate them to make the declassification. I present them to you today as a gift. I leave it to your discretion how to use them. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The subject of President Kennedy's assassination still fascinates the American people. There is still speculation about whether Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. Thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. All these are original copies. This is the material. (U)

(Note: President Yeltsin hands a plastic fold to President Clinton across the table and they shake hands.) (U)

THE PRESIDENT: This is wonderful. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: But if you hand it to someone, let it be very reliable hands. (U)

(Note: The folder is passed to Deputy Secretary Talbott at the time of President Yeltsin's comments. General laughter.) (U)

THE PRESIDENT: We have many things to discuss. Thank you for not giving up on the relationship and making sure we passed this very tough test. Our agreement on Kosovo is now complete. Our people are working to implement it. So I suggest we talk about securing the broader peace in Europe; about Russia's economic resurgence, and about reviving our work on arms control and nonproliferation. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree with this formulation of the issues. I also had in mind how we cut through a big knot. Our cooperation came to the brink of collapse with Kosovo. If we had not kept in touch and dealt honestly and openly with each other, it would have gone over the brink. We held that process back. (C)

We had several conversations -- not literally looking each other in the eye, but with our voices over the telephone -- and we kept things from going out of control. I tried to be polite on the phone. Please understand, I tried to be polite. (C)

In the course of our last conversation, I said in a straightforward way that our friendship had reached its limits, including our cooperation in Europe and the world. Then I said, let's see if we can continue to be friends, and you said yes. We decided we are going to do that and that's it. That's it. We've agreed. Why did we do that? Because everything depends on these two powerful countries. This is how we continued to be friends and to cooperate. (C)

The agreement reached in Helsinki indicates that if Russia and the United States act -- together -- we can always come to the right decisions. But only if we act together. Here in Cologne, let's pledge that we will do all we can to hold that line for the time remaining in our presidencies, even though it's not much time. Do you agree? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This is an official thing. (Looking to Prikhodko) Draw up the record. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have time. And one of the most important things we can do is our work on arms control. We will announce today that we will begin discussion on START III and the ABM Treaty. We need to get the Duma to act on START II. I really believe it is in both Russia and America's interest to get the ceilings lower. You and I have previously talked about missile defense issues, but let me pause for translation before we discuss this further. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (When START II ratification is translated.) Yes. (When START II and ABM discussions are translated.) Yes. (At the end.) Yes. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: We can ask our people to have parallel discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty. START III is one of the greatest gifts we can give our children. Whatever we do must be to the benefit of Russia as well as the United States. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: On what level can this parallel work be done? (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: We would have parallel consultations on START III and the ABM Treaty. These could not be formal without the ratification of START II. We would do this on a parallel track with START II ratification. This would be done by the relevant ministries at the level of experts. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I thought we could do it a little differently. I think we, as the two presidents, should act in this direction. (C)

(Note: There is an extended pause as President Yeltsin formulates his thoughts. There is not a sound in the room.)
(C)

My idea is that, perhaps by July 30, we connect together the two presidents and the two ministers of foreign affairs. And, by the way, they (the foreign ministers) are working together well. We'll have them report back to us (the two presidents) on the actual situation. You and I (directed to President Clinton) need to decide how to proceed. (C)

(Note: President Yeltsin asks to leave the room. We are told it is for a phone call from Prime Minister Stepashin.) (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: July 30 is a notional deadline. We will be working. But until START II is ratified, it will be hard to have detailed talks on START III. I don't see START II being ratified before the summer holiday break. The Parliament is now working on economic reform laws. The situation is difficult now for the government with the Duma. We can't allow ourselves the luxury of failing on START II; we must have a 100 percent guarantee of success. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: We made this proposal for two reasons. In all our previous meetings Boris Nikolayevich and I have said that we want to move on to work on START III. First, I felt this would help build confidence with the Duma. Second, I know you have legal concerns about the ABM Treaty given the research we are doing on national missile defense. So I thought it would help with START II if we showed our continued commitment to the ABM Treaty. I want to get START II ratified, and I thought it would help with START II if we have parallel discussions on START III and ABM. (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: That's right. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: So we are in agreement there. Will the Duma act on the economic issues? (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: On some items the Duma will be affirmative; on some, not yet. We discussed this when Stepashin came back from Cologne. We have some chance. (C)

(Note: President Yeltsin returns.) (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: What was the subject while I was away? While Kosovo was going on I was getting calls every night. It was impossible to sleep. (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: We agreed on the joint statement on strategic stability. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good. I read the text. It is good and not excessively combative. It deals with the issues at hand in a calm way. (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: We agreed to proceed with the START II and ABM discussions. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: If left with the experts, we won't get results. I want this to be done in a way so that we (Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin) are in the framework. We as the two presidents should be the ones who should make the decisions (on START III) and resolve the ABM issues. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And we don't have too much time, or someone else will come and get credit for our work. (General laughter.) (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. Or revise the text (on START III). (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I want to discuss the issue of nonproliferation and how it affects our cooperation on commercial space. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Agreed. (Then reflecting again on START III and ABM.) I think we should set up a special negotiating commission. In course, it can report to us on the progress made. Remember, this is the way we got progress on Kosovo by requiring Jackson and Zvarzin to report to us. We identified common ground and we agreed. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Under our law, in order to have more commercial space launches for satellites, we need to cooperate on cutting missile technology going to Iran. Gore and Primakov developed a plan, but Primakov never approved it because he never had his meeting with the Vice President. I ask you to review this plan. If it's acceptable, we can proceed with greater missile cooperation. If the original action plan is acceptable, we can go on. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Let's make this the first job for Gore and Stepashin. And the two foreign ministers can supervise the details of the work. Let's instruct Stepashin and Gore accordingly. I agree. We'll do the necessary. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Let's talk about economics. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: There is now an enormous positive feeling about Russia. The world feels like we worked to resolve the Kosovo problems. That has created broad positive feelings. So this is an opportune time to reinvigorate our work on Russia's economic revival. (C)

Now, the main reason I think it's important to close a deal with the IMF is that it sends a signal to the world's financial community. The international community trusts you and your government, but not the Duma. So closing this deal would be a good sign. (C)

After Kosovo, you could see renewed investment interest in Russia. You need to get private sector money back in. It could even be like the early years of our partnership in 1993 and 1994, and maybe even more. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (Nods positively throughout translation.) I personally will see to it. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Once that happens, once the IMF deal is closed, there will be a big movement to reschedule your Soviet-era Paris Club debt. I know you want this debt to be forgiven, and I support that. But the majority of that is not my debt to forgive. It's mostly German money. I'll keep talking to Schroeder. In fact, I'll see him tonight. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I also want to say, Bill, the Kosovo crisis put a lot of our problems in stark relief. We need to remove

all those irritants. They have constantly stood in the way, and they almost tripped us over. We need a program of action. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And in that context, I want to raise another economics issue. We've talked for five years about getting beyond Jackson-Vanik. I want to make it go away. But the problems I have to get it to go away are your Law on Religion and concerns about anti-Semitic actions by your nationalists and extremists. So when you go home, perhaps you can make a strong statement condemning anti-Semitism. I tell Congress the problem is not with you, but they say that if we take away Jackson-Vanik and another government comes in, what do we do? So I need some help on the religion front. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Specifically this statement can be made. Give me the material on who is making anti-Semitic statements, and I'll give them a big one! (To Prikhodko) Keep track of the issues we've resolved. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: We need to work on getting rid of all these problems in the relationship in this last year. When new people come into office, they're understandably afraid of making mistakes, so they're cautious. You and I need to worry about what's important. It could be a full year in office before others have the necessary confidence. So you and I need to get rid of these problems. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It is so important to resolve these issues. I express my firm commitment to do this with your help. On anti-Semitism, you give me the names, and I will grind them down. I will reign them in. (C)

(Note: The lights flash off.) (U)

THE PRESIDENT: The Germans must be watching us. (General laughter.) Anything else? (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. You made a big mistake in one of our calls. We need to find a way to streamline our consultative mechanisms. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Our joint action on Kosovo should have strengthened our trust and cooperation on the multilateral sphere for a long time to come. We need a collective mechanism to solve problems. We also need to increase the role of the UN.

I apologize for being so blunt, but you treat the UN in a very cool way. If we could jointly work on this, it would provide a big boost to the UN. It could be a body that resolves the issues that it is faced with. (S)

And then there is the OSCE problem. In any event, the OSCE should be at the top of a European system of security. We need a code of conduct for European states and European organizations. It is from this perspective that we approach the development of the OSCE charter. (S)

I don't want you to be concerned about our trying to move the United States to the side. It's just that if something happens in Yugoslavia, Europe should deal with this. Right now we have everyone piling on in one big mound. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree we should move to strengthen the UN and the OSCE. In KFOR, the United States has less than 15 percent of the forces. Even less with the addition of Russia. In Bosnia, we had 34 percent. The UN will have the lead in Kosovo on civilian implementation. We should work to strengthen the UN, strengthen the OSCE and strengthen the ability of Europeans to solve the problems of Europe. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, this is what I stand for -- not neglecting the fact that Russia is a European country. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is one of your great accomplishments. I would like to ask Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov to follow up on this. (S)

You know, in one call, I pointed out to you the difference between your actions in Chechnya and NATO's actions in Kosovo. (S)

(Note: An aide to President Yeltsin enters and says that President Yeltsin's plane is close to losing its time slot to depart for Moscow. President Clinton's last phrase on Chechnya and Kosovo is never translated.) (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We are always pressed for time. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I owe you a visit. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Any time. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: How many hours daylight are there now in Moscow?
(U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It's dark only for about three hours. Come over. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: We'll go over everything. ~~(C)~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Today, Talbott and Mamedov, you must put together an official record of what we have done -- a verbatim report. Don't forget to include among all the items the revival of the Gore-Stepashin Commission. ~~(C)~~

THE PRESIDENT: This is the only work I'm asking the Vice President to do. ~~(C)~~

(Note: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin come around the table and hug.) (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 25, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER ^{(2) FR}

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL ^{CR}

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian President
Yeltsin, June 20, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of June 20, 1999, in Cologne, Germany, between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve (D) Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve (D) Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4842

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal Memorandum of Conversation with
Russian President Boris Yeltsin (e)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the June 20
conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin
is provided for the information of the Secretary of State the
Deputy Secretary, and Ambassador Sestanovich. It must be
distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy
Moscow for the Ambassador. (e)

Glyn T. Davies
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 6/25/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KGMNARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-m-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Secretary Albright
Sandy Berger
Deputy Secretary Talbott

President Yeltsin
Minister Ivanov
Minister Shapovalyants
Foreign Policy Advisor Prikhodko
Deputy Minister Mamedov
Russian Interpreter

Interpreter: Peter Afanasenko
Notetaker: Carlos Pascual

DATE, TIME June 20, 1999, 1:00 pm - 2:00 pm
AND PLACE: Renaissance Hotel (Russians Host),
Cologne, Germany

(Note: President Yeltsin has a coughing fit just prior to the meeting; the meeting is briefly delayed while a doctor attends to him. Once he is ready, a pool spray enters the room.) (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Before we start, let's decide now to revive the Gore-Stepashin Commission. (U)

(Note: Ivanov prompts Yeltsin on Stephasin's name.) (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Let's get them together as fast as they can. Let's also have Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov meet soon, too. (U)

(Note: ~~press leave the room.~~)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)
Declassify On: 6/25/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.48)
3/13/2018 KBH

THE PRESIDENT: This is our seventeenth meeting. We met in Helsinki once and you gave me a cane. The cane unscrewed and it had a spyglass. I still have it and all the gifts that you've given me. The best was a miniature painting of my mother. (U)

~~(Note: President Yeltsin has another bout of coughing.) (C)~~

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I brought you another present today. A good present; may be not a personal present. But for purposes of our friendship, it is a good present. (U) ✓

When I became president in 1992, I signed a decree to declassify all material related to President Kennedy's assassination, regardless of where the documents were, whether in the diplomatic, military or intelligence archives. It turned out to be quite an effort. We translated everything into Russian and declassified them all. We had to translate them to make the declassification. I present them to you today as a gift. I leave it to your discretion ~~on~~ how to use them. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The subject of President Kennedy's assassination still fascinates the American people. There is still speculation about whether Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. Thank you. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. All these are original copies. This is the material. (U)

(Note: President Yeltsin hands a plastic fold to President Clinton across the table and they shake hands.) (U)

THE PRESIDENT: This is wonderful. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: But if you hand it to someone, let it be very reliable hands. (U)

(Note: The folder is passed to Deputy Secretary Talbott at the time of President Yeltsin's comments. General laughter.) (U)

THE PRESIDENT: We have many things to discuss. Thank you for not giving up on the relationship and making sure we passed this very tough test. Our agreement on Kosovo is now complete. Our people are working to implement it. So I suggest we talk about securing the broader peace in Europe, about Russia's economic resurgence, and about reviving our work on arms control and nonproliferation. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I agree with this formulation of the issues. I also had in mind how we cut through a big knot. Our cooperation came to the brink of collapse with Kosovo. If we had not kept in touch and dealt honestly and openly with each other, it would have gone over the brink. We held that process back. (S)

We had several conversations -- not literally looking each other in the eye, but with our voices over the telephone -- and we kept things from going out of control. I tried to be polite on the phone. Please understand, I tried to be polite. (S)

In the course of our last conversation, I said in a straightforward way that our friendship had reached its limits, including our cooperation in Europe and the world. Then I said, let's see if we can continue to be friends, and you said yes. We decided we are going to do that and that's it. That's it. We've agreed. Why did we do that? Because everything depends on these two powerful countries. This is how we continued to be friends and to cooperate. (S)

The ^{write out} agreement reached in Helsinki indicates that if Russia and the U.S. act -- together -- we can always come to the right decisions. But only if we act together. Here in Cologne, let's pledge that we will do all we can to hold that line for the time remaining in our presidencies, even though it's not much time. Do you agree? (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: This is an official thing. (Looking to Prikhodko) Draw up the record. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have time. And one of the most important things we can do is our work on arms control. We will announce today that we will begin discussion on START III and the ABM Treaty. We need to get the Duma to act on START II. I really believe it is in both Russia and America's interest to get the ceilings lower. You and I have previously talked about missile defense issues, but let me pause for translation before we discuss this further. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (When START II ratification is translated.) Yes. (When START II and ABM discussions are translated.) Yes. (At the end.) Yes. (S)

(Note: ~~President Yeltsin calls Prikhodko over. He clearly has difficulty using his fingers.~~) (C)

THE PRESIDENT: We can ask our people to have parallel discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty. START III is one of the greatest gifts we can give our children. Whatever we do must be to the benefit of Russia as well as the U.S. (C) *spell out*

(Note: ~~Lights are dimmed in the room, evidently in response to President Yeltsin's instructions to Prikhodko.~~) (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: On what level can this parallel work be done? (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: We would have parallel consultations on START III and the ABM Treaty. These could not be formal without the ratification of START II. We would do this on a parallel track with START II ratification. This would be done by the relevant ministries at the level of experts. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I thought we could do it a little differently. I think we, as the two presidents, should act in this direction. (C)

(Note: There is an extended pause as President Yeltsin formulates his thoughts. There is not a sound in the room.) (C)

My idea is that, perhaps by July 30, we connect together the two presidents and the two ministers of foreign affairs. And, by the way, they (the foreign ministers) are working together well. We'll have them report back to us (the two presidents) on the actual situation. You and I (directed to President Clinton) need to decide how to proceed. (C)

(Note: President Yeltsin asks to leave the room. We are told it is for a phone call from Prime Minister Stepashin.) (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: July 30 is a notional deadline. We will be working. But until START II is ratified, it will be hard to have detailed talks on START III. I don't see START II being ratified before the summer holiday break. The Parliament is now working on economic reform laws. The situation is difficult now for the government with the Duma. We can't allow ourselves the luxury of failing on START II; we must have a 100% guarantee to success. (C)

percent of

THE PRESIDENT: We made this proposal for two reasons. In all our previous meetings Boris Nikolayevich and I have said that we want to move on to work on START III. First, I felt this would help build confidence with the Duma. Second, I know you have legal concerns about the ABM Treaty given the research we are doing on national missile defense. So I thought it would help with START II if we showed our continued commitment to the ABM Treaty. I want to get START II ratified, and I thought it would help with START II if we have parallel discussions on START III and ABM. (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: That's right. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: So we are in agreement there. Will the Duma act on the economic issues? (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: On some items the Duma will be affirmative; on some, not yet. We discussed this when Stepashin came back from Cologne. We have some chance. (C)

(Note: President Yeltsin returns.) (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: What was the subject while I was away? While Kosovo was going on I was getting calls every night. It was impossible to sleep. (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: We agreed on the joint statement on strategic stability. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Good. I read the text. It is good and not excessively combative. It deals with the issues at hand in a calm way. (C)

MINISTER IVANOV: We agreed to proceed with the START II and ABM discussions. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: If left with the experts, we won't get results. I want this to be done in a way so that we (Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin) are in the framework. We as the two presidents should be the ones who should make the decisions (on START III) and resolve the ABM issues. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And we don't have too much time, or someone else will come and get credit for our work. (General laughter.) (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. Or revise the text (on START III).

(C)

THE PRESIDENT: I want to discuss the issue of nonproliferation and how it affects our cooperation on commercial space. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Agreed. (Then reflecting again on START III and ABM.) I think we should set up a special negotiating commission. In course, it can report to us on the progress made. Remember, this is the way we got progress on Kosovo by requiring Jackson and Zvarzin to report to us. We identified common ground and we agreed. (C)

(Note: ~~during the impasse on NATO access to the Pristina airport, the two presidents spoke June 13 and agreed that Generals Jackson and Zvarzin should address the problems on the ground and report back to the two presidents the next day. On June 14, the two presidents reached an understanding in principle to address the airport problem.~~) (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Under our law, in order to have more commercial space launches for satellites, we need to cooperate on cutting missile technology going to Iran. Gore and Primakov developed a plan, but Primakov never approved it because he never had his meeting with the Vice President. I ask you to review this plan. If it's acceptable, we can proceed with greater missile cooperation. If the original action plan is acceptable, we can go on. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Let's make this the first job for Gore and Stepashin. And the two foreign ministers can supervise the details of the work. Let's instruct Stepashin and Gore accordingly. I agree. We'll do the necessary. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Let's talk about economics. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: There is now an enormous positive feeling about Russia. The world feels like we worked to resolve the Kosovo problems. That has created broad positive feelings. So this is an opportune time to reinvigorate our work on Russia's economic revival. (C)

Now, the main reason I think it's important to close a deal with the IMF is that it sends a signal to the world's financial community. The international community trusts you and your

government, but not the Duma. So closing this deal would be a good sign. (C)

After Kosovo, you could see renewed investment interest in Russia. You need to get private sector money back in. It could even be like the early years of our partnership in 1993 and 1994, and maybe even more. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: (Nods positively throughout translation.) I personally will see to it. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Once that happens, once the IMF deal is closed, there will be a big movement to reschedule your Soviet-era Paris Club debt. I know you want this debt to be forgiven, and I support that. But the majority of that is not my debt to forgive. It's mostly German money. I'll keep talking to Schroeder. In fact, I'll see him tonight. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I also want to say, Bill, the Kosovo crisis put a lot of our problems in stark relief. We need to remove all those irritants. They have constantly stood in the way, and they almost tripped us over. We need a program of action. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And in that context, I want to raise another economics issue. We've talked for five years about getting beyond Jackson-Vanik. I want to make it go away. But the problems I have to get it to go away are your Law on Religion and concerns about anti-Semitic actions by your nationalists and extremists. So when you go home, perhaps you can make a strong statement condemning anti-Semitism. I tell Congress the problem is not with you, but they say that if we take away Jackson-Vanik and another government comes in, what do we do? So I need some help on the religion front. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Specifically this statement can be made. Give me the material on who is making anti-Semitic statements, and I'll give them a big one! (To Prikhodko) Keep track of the issues we've resolved. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: We need to work on getting rid of all these problems in the relationship in this last year. When new people come into office, they're understandably afraid of making mistakes, so they're cautious. You and I need to worry about what's important. It could be a full year in office before others have the necessary confidence. So you and I need to get rid of these problems. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It is so important to resolve these issues. I express my firm commitment to do this with your help. On anti-Semitism, you give me the names, and I will grind them down. I will reign them in. (C)

(Note: The lights flash off.) (U)

THE PRESIDENT: The Germans must be watching us. (General laughter.) Anything else? (C)

(Note: For the first time in the meeting, Yeltsin refers to his cards.) (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes. You made a big mistake in one of our calls. We need to find a way to streamline our consultative mechanisms. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Our joint action on Kosovo should have strengthened our trust and cooperation on the multilateral sphere for a long time to come. We need a collective mechanism to solve problems. We also need to increase the role of the UN. I apologize for being so blunt, but you treat the UN in a very cool way. If we could jointly work on this, it would provide a big boost to the UN. It could be a body that resolves the issues that it is faced with. (C)

And then there is the OSCE problem. In any event, the OSCE should be at the top of a European system of security. We need a code of conduct for European states and European organizations. It is from this perspective that we approach the development of the OSCE charter. (C)

Spell out I don't want you to be concerned about our trying to move the U.S. to the side. It's just that if something happens in Yugoslavia, Europe should deal with this. Right now we have everyone piling on in one big mound. (C)

Spell out percent
THE PRESIDENT: I agree we should move to strengthen the UN and the OSCE. In KFOR, the U.S. has less than 15% of the forces. Even less with the addition of Russia. In Bosnia, we had 34%. The UN will have the lead in Kosovo on civilian implementation. We should work to strengthen the UN, strengthen the OSCE and strengthen the ability of Europeans to solve the problems of Europe. (C)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, this is what I stand for -- not neglecting the fact that Russia is a European country. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is one of your great accomplishments. I would like to ask Secretary Albright and Minister Ivanov to follow up on this. (S)

You know, in one call, I pointed out to you the difference between your actions in Chechnya and NATO's actions in Kosovo. (S)

(Note: An aide to President Yeltsin enters and says that President Yeltsin's plane is close to losing its time slot to depart for Moscow. President Clinton's last phrase on Chechnya and Kosovo is never translated.) (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We are always pressed for time. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I owe you a visit. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Any time. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: How many hours daylight are there now in Moscow? (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: It's dark only for about three hours. Come over. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: We'll go over everything. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Today, Talbott and Mamedov, you must put together an official record of what we have done -- a verbatim report. Don't forget to include among all the items the revival of the Gore-Stepashin Commission. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: This is the only work I'm asking the Vice President to do. (S)

(Note: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin come around the table and hug.) (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9904842
DATE 28 JUN 99

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL MEMCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON 20 JUN 99
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
			PRINT LAST NAME: _____
			COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KSA Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT. ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2739				
Document ID: 9905128				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Andrew Weiss to Sandy Berger re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (1 page)	07/08/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	June 14, 1999 Telcon (4 pages)	ca. 07/08/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001c. telcon	Draft June 14, 1999 Telcon (4 pages)	ca. 07/08/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 [Yeltsin]
 OA/Box Number: 2739

FOLDER TITLE:

9905128

2006-1185-F

ke302

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 8, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin, June 14, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 14 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin. Due to the sensitivity of our discussions with the Russians prior to the Cologne Summit, which were treated as close-hold, we believe that no further distribution is required.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *IX* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Joel Ehrendreich, Roger Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)

The President: Good morning, Boris. Yesterday, you and I agreed to instruct our generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport and report back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed -- (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement with regard to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the airport of Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the understanding that this group, in the framework of the first stage, will remain at the airport and will be functioning in the interests of the international security force. And the cooperation of the group with the commanders of the international peacemaking force will be portrayed in an accord based on the Bosnia formula. (S)

The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning of the group, will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in the framework of coordination with General Jackson. Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers. They have discussed the problems of ensuring the security of the personnel of the Russian contingent. (S)

I instructed General Zavarzin to arrive at an agreement providing for the joint operation of the Slatina airport. An example of such joint use, of clear-cut use, could be the joint operation of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia. However, in this case the positions of control should be retained by Russia. (S)

And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or three days, completed the process of reaching an agreement on the principal issue of deployment in the course of the second stage of the full scope of the peacemaking operation of the Russian contingent under a joint command. Such agreement to Track 2, or the second stage, should be reached at the level of Ministers of Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and me before the meeting in Cologne. (S)

In this connection, I consider it very important for our Ministers of Defense to meet tomorrow or at the latest the day after tomorrow at a place acceptable for them. If Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minister of Defense Sergeyev would be prepared to welcome him in Moscow and meet him here. (S)

I proceed from the understanding that, having reached such agreements on the matters of principle regarding the settlement in Kosovo, that should enable us not to overburden the agenda of our conversation in Cologne. In that event, we would be in position to center our attention on Russian-American cooperation in other important areas. (S)

I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo, another problem. If measures, timely measures, are not taken then the settlement could be in danger, could be jeopardized. What is meant is the provocative actions of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the other members of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted to materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to Kosovo could and would result in chasing away the representatives of other nationalities. Regrettably, that is taking place. And the main responsibility is with the Albanian militants. This is a cause of my disenchantment, that the peacemakers in Kosovo, in fact, turn a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of that, when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to threaten the Russian peacekeepers. And you can imagine the consequences if these threats are translated into reality. Madame Albright assured Ivanov that appropriate work has been done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I should like to ask you to take this issue and keep it under your personal control. This is all I wanted to say. (S)

The President: First of all, let me say with regard to the Kosovo Liberation Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia,

and we told them we would not tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is important to understand why they wanted to do it. They believe the impasse at the airport will prevent an effective KFOR. They believe you came into Kosovo only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We made it clear we will not tolerate attacks on your forces. We have to get this resolved or we can expect trouble. We have to resolve the airport issue. (S)

Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is, it could be jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this is not what came out of the meeting between General Jackson and your general. So based on what you have said to me and the conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general has to get those instructions so we can resolve that matter today. (S)

President Yeltsin: But that was not our agreement. First, the agreement should be reached, and then we shall immediately issue instructions. (S)

The President: I agree. So what I am saying, if we are agreeing on this, let me go through the points, and see if we have agreement. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The President: First, there will be an interim deployment, short-term, using the Bosnian model that will include a Russian component at the airport. Second, impasses at the airport will be resolved. Russian troops will stay there, but there will be no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense ministers will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian participation so we can, you and I, have a meeting in Cologne and ratify that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Agreed. (U)

The President: I would like to -- (U)

President Yeltsin: I say outright and from the outset that I agree. (U)

The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two if I might. First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary Cohen and Minister Sergeyev meet in Helsinki because I know that we have discussed that with Mr. Stepashin, and I mentioned it to President Ahtisaari, and he has agreed to do it, so I think they should meet there. (S)

President Yeltsin: I agree and shall issue the appropriate instructions. (U)

The President: That is great. The other thing I wanted to say is that I will work hard on this. There must be a fair and responsible role for Russia in this united operation, and there are issues somewhat different than in Bosnia, and I have some ideas that I will give to Secretary Cohen and try to work through this so you will be pleased and so that the mission will be successful. But I think it is very important that we come to terms that will assure us that this mission will succeed. (S)

Therefore, we have to agree on terms for the unified command, but one that will be acceptable to you. I think we can do that. I commit to you we will ensure an equitable and responsible role of Russia worthy of your interests and capacity to contribute. There are things there that no one else can do, and we need you there. It is very important. (S)

President Yeltsin: Did you set forth all your items that you wanted to share with me? (U)

The President: Absolutely. (U)

President Yeltsin: Then I would like to tell you I fully agree, that I will issue appropriate instructions and then those instructions would be fully carried into effect. (U)

The President: Thank you so much, Boris. I look forward to seeing you in Cologne. We will work this out, and it will be a good thing. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good, very good. Bill, I am very glad we have elected such issues, which do not infringe on the interests of the other partner. (U)

The President: Good. Boris, I will see you soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: Until we meet. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. I embrace you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

W/H

Check
Margins

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Miles Murphy, Matt Sibley, Joel Ehrenreich, Roger Merletti, Doug Bayley, and Andrew Weiss

DATE, TIME: June 14, 1999, 10:06 - 10:32 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello. (U)

President Yeltsin: Good morning, Bill. (U)

The President: Good morning, Boris. Yesterday, you and I agreed to instruct our generals to meet and resolve the problem of command at the airport and report back to us on what they worked out. I was quite disappointed -- (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, they did. They met yesterday, and I gave instructions to hold the necessary negotiations in order to come to an agreement with regard to the regulations of the support team for the Russian presence at the airport of Slatina near Pristina. And we proceed from the understanding that this group, in the framework of the first stage, will remain at the airport and will be functioning in the interests of the international security force. And the cooperation of the group with the commanders of the international peacemaking force will be portrayed in an accord based on the Bosnia formula. (S)

The forces that are not there yet, to ensure the full functioning of the group, will be deployed upon reaching an agreement and in the framework of coordination with General Jackson. Generals Zavarzin and Jackson have already exchanged liaison officers. They have discussed the problems of ensuring the security of the personnel of the Russian contingent. (S)

I instructed General Zavarzin to arrive at an agreement providing for the joint operation of the Slatina airport. An example of such joint use, of clear-cut use, could be the

~~SECRET~~

2

joint operation of the Tuzla airport in Bosnia. However, in this case the positions of control should be retained by Russia. (S)

And it is of extreme importance to have, in the coming two or three days, completed the process of reaching an agreement on the principal issue of deployment in the course of the second stage of the full scope of the peacemaking operation of the Russian contingent under a joint command. Such agreement to Track 2, or the second stage, should be reached at the level of Ministers of Defense and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reported to you and me before the meeting in Cologne. (S)

In this connection, I consider it very important for our Ministers of Defense to meet tomorrow or at the latest the day after tomorrow at a place acceptable for them. If Secretary Cohen is prepared, then Minister of Defense Sergeyev would be prepared to welcome him in Moscow and meet him here. (S)

I proceed from the understanding that, having reached such agreements on the matters of principle regarding the settlement in Kosovo, that should enable us not to overburden the agenda of our conversation in Cologne. In that event, we would be in position to center our attention on Russian-American cooperation in other important areas. (S)

I should like to raise for your benefit, with regard to Kosovo, another problem. If measures, timely measures, are not taken then the settlement could be in danger, could be jeopardized. What is meant is the provocative actions of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. We continuously said, and all the other members of the G-8 agreed, that such a situation cannot be permitted to materialize in which the return of the Albanian refugees to Kosovo could and would result in chasing away the representatives of other nationalities. Regrettably, that is taking place. And the main responsibility is with the Albanian militants. This is a cause of my disenchantment, that the peacemakers in Kosovo, in fact, turn a blind eye to that occurrence. The result of that, when it went as far as this, is that the militants begin to threaten the Russian peacekeepers. And you can imagine the consequences if these threats are translated into reality. Madame Albright assured Ivanov that appropriate work has been done vis-a-vis the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army. I should like to ask you to take this issue and keep it under your personal control. This is all I wanted to say. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

The President: First of all, let me say with regard to the Kosovo Liberation Army, we did learn of a plot against Russia, and we told them we would not tolerate attacks on your forces, and they agreed not to do it. But it is important to understand why they wanted to do it. They believe the impasse at the airport will prevent an effective KFOR. They believe you came into Kosovo only to protect the Serbs, not to be part of the international force. We made it clear we will not tolerate attacks on your forces. We have to get this resolved or we can expect trouble. We have to resolve the airport issue. (S)

Now what you have said about the airport today is good. That is, it could be jointly operated and access be guaranteed, but this is not what came out of the meeting between General Jackson and your general. So based on what you have said to me and the conversation Al Gore and Stepashin had, the general has to get those instructions so we can resolve that matter today. (S)

President Yeltsin: But that was not our agreement. First, the agreement should be reached, and then we shall immediately issue instructions. (S)

The President: I agree. So what I am saying, if we are agreeing on this, let me go through the points, and see if we have agreement. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. (U)

The President: First, there will be an interim deployment, short-term, using the Bosnian model that will include a Russian component at the airport. Second, impasses at the airport will be resolved. Russian troops will stay there, but there will be no more deployments until we agree. Third, our defense ministers will meet to work out the long-term arrangements for Russian participation so we can, you and I, have a meeting in Cologne and ratify that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Agreed. (U)

The President: I would like to -- (U)

President Yeltsin: I say outright and from the outset that I agree. (U)

The President: Okay, I would like to make another point or two if I might. First of all, I would like to propose that Secretary Cohen and Minister Sergeyev meet in Helsinki because I know that we have discussed that with Mr. Mift Stepashin, and I mentioned it to President Ahtisaari, and he has agreed to do it, so I think they should meet there. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

President Yeltsin: I agree and shall issue the appropriate instructions. (U)

The President: That is great. The other thing I wanted to say is that I will work hard on this. There must be a fair and responsible role for Russia in this united operation, and there are issues somewhat different than in Bosnia, and I have some ideas that I will give to Secretary Cohen and try to work through this so you will be pleased and so that the mission will be successful. But I think it is very important that we come to terms that will assure us that this mission will succeed. (S)

Therefore, we have to agree on terms for the unified command, but one that will be acceptable to you. I think we can do that. I commit to you we will ensure an equitable and responsible role of Russia worthy of your interests and capacity to contribute. There are things there that no one else can do, and we need you there. It is very important. (S)

President Yeltsin: Did you set forth all your items that you wanted to share with me? (U)

The President: Absolutely. (U)

President Yeltsin: Then I would like to tell you I fully agree, that I will issue appropriate instructions and then those instructions would be fully carried into effect. (U)

The President: Thank you so much, Boris. I look forward to seeing you in Cologne. We will work this out, and it will be a good thing. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good, very good. Bill, I am very glad we have elected such issues, which do not infringe on the interests of the other partner. (U)

The President: Good. Boris, I will see you soon. (U)

President Yeltsin: Until we meet. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. I embrace you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~SECRET~~

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2739				
Document ID: 9905271				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telecon	June 13, 1999 Telecon (7 pages)	ca. 07/12/1999	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018
001b. memo	Andrew Weiss to Samuel Berger, re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (1 page)	07/12/1999	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018
001c. telecon	Draft of June 13, 1999 Telecon (1 page)	ca. 07/12/1999	P1/b(1) KBN 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 [Yeltsin]
 OA/Box Number: 2739

FOLDER TITLE:

9905271

2006-1185-F

ke303

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

INTERPRETER: Nikolai Sorokin
Notetakers: Joel Schrader, Jenny McGee, Miles Murphy, and Doug Bayley

DATE, TIME: June 13, 1999, 9:07 - 10:05 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Boris. Thank you for taking my phone call. (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill. (U)

The President: I think that we are at another important and promising moment in our partnership in Kosovo. We now have to work very hard to get a just and lasting peace there and for our militaries to work well together on the ground. I know that Al Gore talked with Prime Minister Stepashin yesterday about the difficulties in the last two days and our efforts to coordinate our roles in Kosovo. We need to take charge of the situation, both for the sake of our goals in Kosovo and so that we can show the world that we are working together. (S)

I understand that we have agreed on a short-term proposal to deploy forces together as soon as possible. This is an interim approach based on what you and I worked out for Bosnia. We know how that works, and it is the fastest way to get Russian and U.S. troops on the ground. Second, I know that Foreign Minister Ivanov has been working with Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott about some promising ideas to use next week to deal with the important and urgent outstanding challenges as well as solving our long-term problems in Kosovo. If we can get these ideas developed next week, we could have a very good meeting in Cologne, a week from today. (S)

I believe we should instruct our foreign ministers and ministers of defense to meet as soon as possible and work out these arrangements and show that Russia and the U.S. can cooperate in Kosovo and play our respective roles to make this essential peace work. (S)

There is one more matter I need to raise. We need to resolve the issue of the airport at Pristina as soon as possible. I hope you will give orders to General Zavarzin to work this out today with General Jackson, the KFOR Commander. Otherwise, the story of the airport will overshadow everything we are doing to bring peace to Kosovo and to protect the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. It will become the whole story and could possibly undermine what we are doing there and the chance for Russia and the G-8 to have a great success in Cologne. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I think that all three questions you have raised are only to be discussed among the two presidents. Namely, you and me. So we have the preliminary discussions among us, then we elaborate on this scheme. After we do that, we can give instructions to the group of generals. We can give instructions in the short term to elaborate on the final scheme, not the final scheme, but the one to be approved by us. Only when we approve that one will it become the final one. (S)

The President: Yes. As I understand it, I think we agree. As I understand it, our generals have worked out a short-term scheme to get us through the next few days, based on our operation in Bosnia. Then our ministers of defense will have to come up with a long-term plan, which we will approve. But we must have this short-term plan implemented immediately because we don't want a security vacuum to develop in Kosovo, especially because we have given our word that we will not let the KLA move in and take over any areas and frighten the Serbs who live there. It is important for me, Boris, as I know it is for you, to keep our word to the world community and protect all the citizens of Kosovo. We will have our ministers of defense and foreign ministers work on the short-term solution and bring it back to us for approval. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, I have one more option. It is for us two to meet in some hiding place. Well, it is for you and I to meet either on a boat or some submarine or some island so not a single person will disturb us, so you will not be agitated by anyone, and I will not be agitated by anyone or any person. (S)

The President: But Boris, my impression is our people have to work this out. We can meet, you and I, but we have to have some idea of where we are going first. We've got to have this short-term solution worked out and the airport issue. Otherwise, if we meet, the world will think there's some major crisis between the two of us, not just that we are meeting about Kosovo. (S)

President Yeltsin: When you and I meet, nobody will think anything of it. People trust us. And that is why I think that this option is quite attractive and beautiful and very trustworthy for the world. (S)

The President: Let me ask you this. Since I have to leave the day after tomorrow to go to Europe anyway, let's tell our people, the generals, to have already worked out a short-term solution, based on our partnership in Bosnia, for the next 11 days, so there will not be a vacuum in Kosovo. Let's give them the orders to implement the agreement on the short-term solution. Let's tell them to work out the airport solution. (S)

You and I can go somewhere in the vicinity of Cologne, around the G-8, because you are leaving Russia, and anyway, I will be there. Otherwise, I will have to cancel something on this European trip and that will look like some big crisis to the world. So let's tell the generals to work out the short-term issue, the airport, and then you and I will meet on the long-term plan. We can go off from Cologne somewhere and do that. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, but this is not a very clear plan. We have to elaborate on this and have an absolutely clear, detailed plan, like the first item, the second item, the seventh item, the tenth item. (S)

The President: Yes, but we have to have a plan to deliberate on. That is why I think it is important for our ministers to meet and come up with a plan. We can't just make it up as we go along. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, you see, all we need is to have just one assistant for both of us. Not more than that, not the whole bulk of 20 people. Only one or two assistants and those have to be very smart professional people who know the case and should be the people who trust us and whom we trust. (S)

The President: Boris, let me be as clear as I can. I am prepared to meet, but I am not prepared to meet as long as we have this impasse at the airport and no short-term solution for the next ten days. I will not wreck all that we have worked for in Kosovo and create a security vacuum where the KLA can come back in, and meet under those circumstances. (S)

The whole world thinks something crazy is going on. We have got to work out these two things. Before this happened, Russia was the toast of the world. People were saying Russia is back, peace has been solved, and Russia played a major role. Now the view of Kosovo may be we can't get KFOR in, what is the KLA going to do, and there is a standoff at the airport. I have no intention of meeting under these circumstances. It is not good. All the credit Russia got is at risk of being lost, and we will have a disaster at Cologne, instead of a triumph for Russia.

(S)

We have to solve this first and then meet on the long-term issues. It is very important that Russia be seen as playing a major role in the peacekeeping operation. I have always done what I can to enhance the role of Russia. I have worked hard. I can't come to a meeting with these two issues outstanding, where it looks like we put peace in Kosovo on hold. It is not acceptable, and it is wrong. I am proposing three things. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, you and I, it is not for me to make arrangements. Without us nobody will make such arrangements, so let us agree we need to do something anyway whether you propose or let me propose, and you will agree, and then we need to have a discussion to narrow the gap and bring each other closer. (S)

The President: Boris, we can work out the long-term issue, but here is what it looks like to the rest of the world. Russia worked on a peace agreement with Ahtisaari. You and I were behind it. We made a peace agreement, and the UN endorsed it. The UN specifically provided for the introduction of the KFOR force and for implementation of this within the spirit of Rambouillet. That is what the UN said. Now it looks like, without any reference to that, Russia goes in and occupies the airport at Pristina and says, "We will stop the whole thing the UN said, and we are going to, even if it creates a vacuum and the KLA comes back in, instead of what we promised to do, we will move troops in immediately because we don't have everything worked out." (S)

Russia is going to stop this and wreck the peace. We were about to have at Cologne a celebration of Russia in the peace operation. Instead, we face day after day, international embarrassment that Kosovo will be wrecked. Our generals have already agreed on a short-term solution along the lines of our cooperation in Bosnia. We just need to get the operation up and going within Kosovo, and we need to work out this airport thing, and then you and I can meet in Europe and work out this long-term involvement of Russia. (S)

I want you to have involvement because it is important to give confidence to the Serbs in Kosovo. But if we go off and meet now and put this on hold, the whole world news will be about how Russia wrecked this, and the refugees can't come back, and you occupy the airport in Pristina. I don't think it is good for you, and it is not good for what we are trying to achieve, and it will be seen by the KLA as an open invitation to move into Kosovo and stir up trouble. They will completely lose any confidence that the world community wants to bring the refugees back. (S)

First, we need to tell our generals on the spot to resolve the airport, and second, resolve what is going to happen over the next ten days, based on what we did in Bosnia, and third, we ought to meet and work out the issue of the leadership of Russia during the peacekeeping operations. Otherwise, we are going to be in a terrible mess, which will destroy the credibility of the peace operation and do enormous damage to you and me. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, Bill, it will not work that way because we will find the people responsible and guilty of doing this. We will find those who initiated this whole thing. There is not such a person in the presidency, and we will find the one in the military who initiated this. Well, I propose for us to do the following, since the two of us are good friends and have always had very good relations. Let us take a day for a time out, a day for rest, and then on the basis of our conversation today, we will connect and talk tomorrow. We can arrange the particular time. We should arrange a phone conversation and continue our work, but in a more precise and concrete perspective. (S)

The President: Well, I would be happy to talk tomorrow. You know how much regard I have for you and how convinced I am we can always work out our differences, but I also believe it would be a good thing if our military commanders in Pristina can try to work out this airport issue because it is reaching the point

where instead of the triumph of our peace in Kosovo, the whole story is what is happening at the airport, and this is more about the problems of great countries than restoration of peace and the return of people to their homes. If today at least you can ask your general to meet with our general to work out this airport thing, I think that is very important. Otherwise, we can talk tomorrow about the other matters. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. Are your generals there? (S)

The President: General Jackson, the British general on the site, is the one we want to talk about it. General Zavarzin and General Jackson. (S)

President Yeltsin: Could you repeat the name of the general? (S)

The President: General Michael Jackson, the KFOR commander, and your commander there, General Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: Jackson. General Jackson. Can you repeat it and spell it out? (S)

The President: Jackson is our KFOR commander there, and I believe your general is Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: What is his name? Bill, could you repeat the last name of our general? (S)

The President: I don't care who. That is your choice, but I believe your general on the spot in Pristina is Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, now I have who you are talking about. So today we instruct them to work today, part of the night and part of the day tomorrow, and then they meet to report to us on the phone, let's say about five o'clock in the evening. (S)

The President: Okay. (U)

President Yeltsin: I didn't hear that, Bill. (U)

The President: Yes, that is fine. We should ask them to work today and report back to us in a few hours. (U)

President Yeltsin: So okay. Tomorrow at five o'clock in the evening your general reports to you, my general reports to me,

then one hour later we call each other and then decide on how our positions coincide. (S)

The President: Five o'clock your time. That is okay. (U)

President Yeltsin: Did we agree? (U)

The President: That is fine. I accept that. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, and we will tell the press we will continue our telephone conversation tomorrow. (U)

The President: Yes, that is good. (U)

President Yeltsin: Is it okay? (U)

The President: That is fine. Yes. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, then I am waiting. (U)

The President: Thanks, Boris. I will talk to you tomorrow. We will work this out. (U)

President Yeltsin: Yes, we will. We will anyway. (U)

The President: Goodbye. I will talk to you tomorrow. (U)

President Yeltsin: Goodbye, Bill. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

July 12, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER *DB*

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, June 13, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the June 13 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin. Due to the sensitivity of our discussions with the Russians prior to the Cologne Summit, which were treated as close-hold, we believe that no further distribution is required.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *DB* Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

where instead of the triumph of our peace in Kosovo, the whole story is what is happening at the airport, and this is more about the problems of great countries than restoration of peace and the return of people to their homes. If today at least you can ask your general to meet with our general to work out this airport thing, I think that is very important. Otherwise, we can talk tomorrow about the other matters. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay. Are your generals there? (S)

The President: General Jackson, the British general on the site, is the one we want to talk about it. General Zavarzin and General Jackson. (S)

President Yeltsin: Could you repeat the name of the general? (S)

The President: General Michael Jackson, the KFOR commander, and your commander there, General Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: Jackson. General Jackson. Can you repeat it and spell it out? (S)

The President: Jackson is our KFOR commander there, and I believe your general is Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: What is his name? Bill, could you repeat the last name of our general? (S)

The President: I don't care who. That is your choice, but I believe your general on the spot in Pristina is Zavarzin. (S)

President Yeltsin: Okay, now I have ~~here~~ who you are talking about. So today we instruct them to work today, part of the night and part of the day tomorrow, and then they meet to report to us on the phone, let's say about five o'clock in the evening. (S)

The President: Okay. (U)

President Yeltsin: I didn't hear that, Bill. (U)

The President: Yes, that is fine. We should ask them to work today and report back to us in a few hours. (U)

President Yeltsin: So okay. Tomorrow at five o'clock in the evening your general reports to you, my general reports to me,

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2748				
Document ID: 9906603				
Row: 46	Section: 5	Shelf: 1	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re. Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin (5 pages)	09/08/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (4 pages)	09/08/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...]).
 OA/Box Number: 2748

FOLDER TITLE:

9906603

2015-0782-M
rs1558

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: ANDREW WEISS

DOC DATE: 08 SEP 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: TELCON WITH PRES YELTSIN SEP 8

ACTION: BRADTKE DISAPPROVED RECOM 1

DUE DATE: 14 SEP 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WEISS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
WEISS

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTCG CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 99111920 FOR DECISION
X 99112206 BRADTKE DISAPPROVED RECOM 1

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: T LOG# 6603
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG T A/O _____

<u>PRW</u>	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	<u>done</u>
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 11/20</u>	<u>see ed. ts</u>
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>w 11/20</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>EW 11/20</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

NOV 19 09 7:57

COMMENTS: mem con w/ Russian Pres. Yeltsin
9/8

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: T LOG # 6603
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG T A/O _____

6603

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	<u>done</u>
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 11/20</u>	<u>see ed. ts</u>
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2</u>	<u>W 11/20</u>	_____
RUDMAN	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>EW 11/20</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

9990019 07 7:57

COMMENTS: men con w/ Russian Pres. YELTSIN
9/8

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: CARLOS PASCUAL *CPW/bv*

FROM: ANDREW WEISS *AW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, September 8, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the September 8 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Robert Bradtke to transmit the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State

Approve _____ Disapprove *ABW 11/20/99*

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *ABW 11/24/99* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation with
Russian President Yeltsin ~~(S)~~

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the September 8 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary, and the Ambassador-at-Large for the NIS. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. ~~(S)~~

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/19/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KSM/NARA, Date: 3/13/2013
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President
Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

NOTETAKERS: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford, Michael T. Manning,
Roger Merletti, Jim Smith, Andrew Weiss

INTERPRETER: Kyrill Borissow

DATE, TIME September 8, 1999, 11:42 a.m. - 12:21 p.m.,
AND PLACE: OEOB

The President: Hello, Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: How are you, Bill? (U)

The President: I'm fine. It's good to hear your voice. (U)

President Yeltsin: I am also fine, except for international relations. We cannot as yet agree fundamentally on the Russian-U.S. relationship. Certainly after our meeting in Cologne, a lot has been achieved. We have moved ahead on START, ABM, and have done several things regarding regional problems in a cooperative spirit. Certainly, there will be new contacts and meetings between yourself and Mr. Putin, chairman of our government, in Auckland, New Zealand; and there will be other meetings, including with Ivanov, our Foreign Minister, and Secretary Albright and with others. (S)

Bill, I have to speak, unfortunately correctly that the U.S.-Russian relationship increasingly suffers from the fact that pre-election campaigns are in progress in our two countries. I believe it is our task, yours and mine, to try our best to protect and limit interference in our relationship from attempts to play out political domestic cards and intrigues. There are some who even try to think of using these in order to affect international relationships. I am sure that you and I will continue to be above those attempts made in this area, and we'll deal with

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 11/19/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (149)
3/13/2018 KBM

this issue in the spirit of cooperation in order to counter such intrigues or rebuff these challenges. (S)

In this connection, as always, I will be direct and will state my deep concern over reports in the mass media that there were some attempts to launder money through the Bank of New York with Russian participation. This scandal has a clear political underpinning and motive. We need to jointly and quietly sort it out without heating up these passions. (S)

Our Interior Minister has agreed with the Director of the FBI that on 13 September we will send a high-ranking delegation to Washington to look into that matter, and that delegation will include representatives of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Minister of the Interior, and the Tax Police. So, now we must let them jointly look into the matter, and subsequently we will work out further initiatives. (S)

Now, for the fourth question on my agenda. I am aware that, in the U.S., concern has been expressed regarding the Russian bill being put together to counter money laundering. There is no ground for concern here. There is a need to counter corruption in Russia. Unfortunately, our Federal Assembly has adopted a not quite satisfactory law on this score, which I had to reject. Several articles directly contradict constitutional provisions of the Russian Federation and its international trading commitments. After all these contradictions are sorted out and amended, I will necessarily endorse this very important bill. (S)

I believe the issues regarding security and disarmament deserve close attention. It is important for the two of us this fall to try to ratify the START II Treaty, which would significantly help with the START III Treaty and also the ABM Treaty. You understand that there is not much progress in this area. You may recall on several occasions that I tried to make arguments that we need to shore up START III, which would be helpful regarding the ratification of START II. (S)

I will be frank with you again. I know the situation fully well regarding ideas in the U.S. to fundamentally undermine the ABM Treaty. This concern of mine is shared by other countries, including China, France, and others. As of yet, I have not received any reaction to my initiative in Cologne about setting up a global missile system for monitoring missile technologies, and I think that it would be helpful with respect to START and ABM if you did so. (S)

Shortly, in the next few days, you will have a meeting with Mr. Putin. Briefly at this time, I would like to tell you about him so you will know what kind of man he is. It took me a lot of time to think who might be the next Russian president in the year 2000. Unfortunately, at that time, I could not find any sitting candidate. Finally, I came across him, that is, Putin, and I explored his bio, his interests, his acquaintances, and so on and so forth. I found out he is a solid man who is kept well abreast of various subjects under his purview. At the same time, he is thorough and strong, very sociable. And he can easily have good relations and contact with people who are his partners. I am sure you will find him to be a highly qualified partner. I am very much convinced that he will be supported as a candidate in the year 2000. We are working on it accordingly. (S)

Now, the question of Chechnya and Dagestan. That is like a dessert in our conversation, last but not least. It has increasingly become the international center of terrorism. Billions and billions of dollars are thrown to it from different parts of the world. We can no longer be impatient with that situation. We have to respond after what they did in Dagestan. We had to counter those terrorist activities, and we threw them out of that territory. (S)

What they are doing now is again and again trying to collect money and arms to prepare mercenaries in special training camps in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other places. We are talking about mercenaries, murderers, and killers. Yesterday, we had a meeting of our Council of Defense where we decided to give them a very strong rebuffing. This is not about war. This is merely an opportunity to withdraw those bandits from our territory. (S)

I want you to support us morally, also politically. Obviously, we will appeal to the UN since we want to put an end to Chechen terrorism. I am well informed regarding your state of affairs and understand everything is moving smoothly, and I'm happy to know that. I am finished, Bill, and am all ears. (S)

The President: First of all, Boris, I want to thank you. This has been for me a very helpful review. I do support your efforts to stand up against terrorism in Dagestan and will continue to cooperate with you against terrorism and groups like Usama bin Ladin that train these people. I will do everything I can to help you stand against common threats. (S)

I know your biggest challenge will be to avoid hurting innocent civilians who will be caught in the crossfire. You

have to stand against terrorism, and you have to stand firm against the terrorists, and I will support your efforts. I still believe that over the long run, Russia will have a firmer position in Dagestan and Chechnya and with the Muslim minorities if more can be done to resolve problems between Azerbaijan and Armenia and Georgia. If there is anything I can do to help, I will. But I think we need to take away all these excuses terrorists may use. (S)

President Yelstin: That's very good. Thank you, Bill. (U)

The President: On the bilateral issues, let me say that I know Strobe Talbott is in Moscow talking with Mamedov. Madeleine is working with Ivanov, and Cohen is with Sergeyev working on START, ABM, and CFE issues. I hope we will get a CFE Treaty soon. We're making good progress. I will work with our people to get START III done. I'm trying to get to the point where the two of us can reach an agreement when the time comes, and I will do everything I can to do that. (S)

On the ABM Treaty, our people obviously are talking about that. I think the critical issue is to see if we can work out some way to share the benefits of any work on missile defense, which we both can use in the future against rogue states and terrorists. I want to find a way to share the benefits. Both our people are talking about this, and we need to continue the process. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, I believe we need to discuss this issue when we meet and have a one-on-one. I am waiting for you to come at any time you find convenient. (S)

The President: Thank you. I want to say a word about Kosovo. I think your troops are working well there, and we all are working together, just as I hoped. If we keep working there, we will have success just as we had in Bosnia. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes, Bill. This has worked out just right. (U)

The President: Yes. Now on these charges about money laundering and corruption, I agree with you. I think people are trying to make a big issue out of it. Specifically, what they are saying here is that Gore and I lost Russia because we were too close to you and your administration. That is the attack. I know you have been briefed on this. We have counterattacked vigorously that the relationship we've had is good for the U.S. and for the security of the world. (S)

President Yeltsin: That's correct. I agree with you. (S)

The President: But I think the best response for us, as always, is to deal with the issues in a forthright way, as you suggest. We need to show that we are taking the right steps to fight crime and corruption. I think the fact the high-level team will be here next week is good. The Moscow G-8 meeting on crime will help energize other partners, and we've got this bilateral working group on crime and corruption. The news you gave me today on the money laundering law is good news because a lot of people are trying to use your veto as evidence that Russia doesn't care about this issue. So if you can get a bill and get it signed soon, that will help a great deal. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, you might recall what happened last time regarding the law on religion. You might recall again that that was a very similar situation when they introduced provisions that went counter to the Constitution. That was done deliberately in the State Duma at the time. I also had to veto that bill, and we have the same story again. I have introduced certain changes that will do away with those provisions that are unconstitutional. In general terms, I support these laws. And when these elements will be cleared up, I stand ready to sign it and won't have any other problems with this law. (S)

The President: That's very good news. The only other thing I wanted to say was that we have had good contacts with Mr. Putin so far, and I look forward to meeting with him in Auckland. After that, we will stay in very close touch. I thank you for calling, Boris. (S)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill. I think this has been very helpful. The only thing is that sometimes they really need to connect us promptly. Otherwise, we will have a one- or two-day delay, and that does not help us address the global issues. (S)

The President: I agree, and I'll do better with that. (U)

President Yeltsin: Very good, Bill. Thank you. We will talk again. (U)

The President: Goodbye, and tell Naina I said hello. (U)

President Yeltsin: And best greetings to Hillary, too. Thank you. (U)

The President: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation with
Russian President Yeltsin [#] ₁₈

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the September 8 telephone conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary, and the Ambassador-at-Large for the NIS. It must be distributed via NODIS channels. It may also be sent to Embassy Moscow for the Ambassador. [#] ₁₈

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

Classified by: Robert Bradtke ^A
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 11/19/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin ^(S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Yeltsin

NOTETAKERS: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford, Michael T. Manning, Roger Merletti, Jim Smith, Andrew Weiss

INTERPRETER: Kyrill Borissow

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 8, 1999, 11:42 a.m. - 12:21 p.m., OEOB

Change to Initial copy

- THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Boris? (U)
- PRESIDENT YELTSIN: How are you, Bill? (U)
- THE PRESIDENT: I'm fine. It's good to hear your voice. (U)
- PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I am also fine, except for international relations. We cannot as yet agree fundamentally on the Russian-U.S. relationship. Certainly after our meeting in Cologne, a lot has been achieved. We have moved ahead on START, ABM, and have done several things regarding regional problems in a cooperative spirit. Certainly, there will be new contacts and meetings between yourself and Mr. Putin, chairman of our government, in Auckland, New Zealand ⁽ⁱ⁾ and there will be other meetings, including with Ivanov, ⁽ⁱ⁾ our Foreign Minister, and Secretary Albright and with others. ~~(S)~~

Bill, I have to speak, unfortunately correctly that the U.S.-Russian relationship increasingly suffers from the fact that pre-election campaigns are in progress in our two countries. I believe it is our task, yours and mine, to try our best to protect and limit interference in our relationship from attempts to play out political domestic cards and intrigues. There are some who even try to think of using these in order to affect international relationships. I am sure that you and I will continue to be above those attempts made in this area, and we'll deal with

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert ^(A) Bradtke
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 11/19/09

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2015-0782-m-2 (1.5D)
3/13/2018 KBH

this issue in the spirit of cooperation in order to counter such intrigues or rebuff these challenges. ~~(S)~~

*Heavy
Bl*

In this connection, as always, I will be direct and will state my deep concern over reports in the mass media that there were some attempts to launder money through the Bank of New York with Russian participation. This scandal has a clear political underpinning and motive. We need to jointly and quietly sort it out without heating up these passions.

~~(S)~~

Our Interior Minister has agreed with the Director of the FBI that on 13 September we will send a high-ranking delegation to Washington to look into that matter, and that delegation will include representatives of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Minister of the Interior, and the Tax Police. So, now we must let them jointly look into the matter, and subsequently we will work out further initiatives. ~~(S)~~

Now, for the fourth question on my agenda. I am aware that, in the U.S., concern has been expressed regarding the Russian bill being put together to counter money laundering. There is no ground for concern here. There is a need to counter corruption in Russia. Unfortunately, our Federal Assembly has adopted a not quite satisfactory law on this score, which I had to reject. Several articles directly contradict constitutional provisions of the Russian Federation and its international trading commitments. After all these contradictions are sorted out and amended, I will necessarily endorse this very important bill. ~~(S)~~

I believe the issues regarding security and disarmament deserve close attention. It is important for the two of us this fall to try to ratify the START II Treaty, which would significantly help with the START III Treaty and also the ABM Treaty. You understand that there is not much progress in this area. You may recall on several occasions that I tried to make arguments that we need to shore up START III, which would be helpful regarding the ratification of START II. ~~(S)~~

*next
line*

I will be frank with you again. I know the situation fully well regarding ideas in the U.S. to fundamentally undermine the ABM Treaty. This concern of mine is shared by other countries, including China, France, and others. As of yet, I have not received any reaction to my initiative in Cologne about setting up a global missile system for monitoring missile technologies, and I think that it would be helpful with respect to START and ABM if you did so. ~~(S)~~

Shortly, in the next few days, you will have a meeting with Mr. Putin. Briefly at this time, I would like to tell you about him so you will know what kind of man he is. It took me a lot of time to think who might be the next Russian president in the year 2000. Unfortunately, at that time, I could not find any sitting candidate. Finally, I came across him, that is, Putin, and I explored his bio, his interests, his acquaintances, and so on and so forth. I found out he is a solid man who is kept well abreast of various subjects under his purview. At the same time, he is thorough and strong, very sociable. And he can easily have good relations and contact with people who are his partners. I am sure you will find him to be a highly qualified partner. I am very much convinced that he will be supported as a candidate in the year 2000. We are working on it accordingly. (S)

AB

Now, the question of Chechnya and Dagestan. That is like a dessert in our conversation, last but not least. It has increasingly become the international center of terrorism. Billions and billions of dollars are thrown to it from different parts of the world. We can no longer be impatient with that situation. We have to respond after what they did in Dagestan. We had to counter those terrorist activities, and we threw them out of that territory. (S)

What they are doing now is again and again trying to collect money and arms to prepare mercenaries in special training camps in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other places. We are talking about mercenaries, murderers, and killers. Yesterday, we had a meeting of our Council of Defense where we decided to give them a very strong rebuffing. This is not about war. This is merely an opportunity to withdraw those bandits from our territory. (S)

I want you to support us morally, also politically. Obviously, we will appeal to the UN since we want to put an end to Chechen terrorism. I am well informed regarding your state of affairs and understand everything is moving smoothly, and I'm happy to know that. I am finished, Bill, and am all ears. (S)

~~THE PRESIDENT:~~ First of all, Boris, I want to thank you. This has been for me a very helpful review. I do support your efforts to stand up against terrorism in Dagestan and will continue to cooperate with you against terrorism and groups like Usama bin Ladin that train these people. I will do everything I can to help you stand against common threats. (S)

I know your biggest challenge will be to avoid hurting innocent civilians who will be caught in the crossfire. You

have to stand against terrorism, and you have to stand firm against the terrorists, and I will support your efforts. I still believe that over the long run, Russia will have a firmer position in Dagestan and Chechnya and with the Muslim minorities if more can be done to resolve problems between Azerbaijan and Armenia and Georgia. If there is anything I can do to help, I will. But I think we need to take away all these excuses terrorists may use. (S) HB

— PRESIDENT YELTSIN: That's very good. Thank you, Bill. (U)

— THE PRESIDENT: On the bilateral issues, let me say that I know Strobe Talbott is in Moscow talking with Mamedov. Madeline is working with Ivanov, and Cohen is with Sergeyev working on START, ABM, and CFE issues. I hope we will get a CFE Treaty soon. We're making good progress. I will work with our people to get START III done. I'm trying to get to the point where the two of us can reach an agreement when the time comes, and I will do everything I can to do that. (S)

On the ABM Treaty, our people obviously are talking about that. I think the critical issue is to see if we can work out some way to share the benefits of any work on missile defense, which we both can use in the future against rogue states and terrorists. I want to find a way to share the benefits. Both our people are talking about this, and we need to continue the process. (S)

— PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, I believe we need to discuss this issue when we meet and have a one-on-one. I am waiting for you to come at any time you find convenient. (S)

— THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. I want to say a word about Kosovo. I think your troops are working well there, and we all are working together, just as I hoped. If we keep working there, we will have success just as we had in Bosnia. (S)

— PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Yes, Bill. This has worked out just right. (U)

— THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now on these charges about money laundering and corruption, I agree with you. I think people are trying to make a big issue out of it. Specifically, what they are saying here is that Gore and I lost Russia because we were too close to you and your administration. That is the attack. I know you have been briefed on this. We have counterattacked vigorously that the relationship we've had is good for the U.S. and for the security of the world. (S)

— PRESIDENT YELTSIN: That's correct. I agree with you. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: But I think the best response for us, as always, is to deal with the issues in a forthright way, as you suggest. We need to show that we are taking the right steps to fight crime and corruption. I think the fact the high-level team will be here next week is good. The Moscow G-8 meeting on crime will help energize other partners, and we've got this bilateral working group on crime and corruption. The news you gave me today on the money laundering law is good news because a lot of people are trying to use your veto as evidence that Russia doesn't care about this issue. So if you can get a bill and get it signed soon, that will help a great deal. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Bill, you might recall what happened last time regarding the law on religion. You might recall again that that was a very similar situation when they introduced provisions that went counter to the Constitution. That was done deliberately in the State Duma at the time. I also had to veto that bill, and we have the same story again. I have introduced certain changes that will do away with those provisions that are unconstitutional. In general terms, I support these laws. And when these elements will be cleared up, I stand ready to sign it and won't have any other problems with this law. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: That's very good news. The only other thing I wanted to say was that we have had good contacts with Mr. ^{next} Putin so far, and I look forward to meeting with him in ^{time} Auckland. After that, we will stay in very close touch. I thank you for calling, Boris. (S)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Thank you, Bill. I think this has been very helpful. The only thing is that sometimes they really need to connect us promptly. Otherwise, we will have a one- or two-day delay, and that does not help us address the global issues. (S)

THE PRESIDENT: I agree, and I'll do better with that. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Very good, Bill. Thank you. We will talk again. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Goodbye, and tell Naina I said hello. (U)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: And best greetings to Hillary, too. Thank you. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

See ↓

Case Number: 2014-0974-M; 2015-0782-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2764				
Document ID: 9908997				
Row: 46	Section: 5	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: v

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.68)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin (8)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
President Clinton
Secretary Albright
National Security Advisor Berger
Deputy National Security Advisor Steinberg
Ambassador Sestanovich
Carlos Pascual

Russia
Russian President Yeltsin
Foreign Minister Ivanov
Kremlin Foreign Policy Advisor Prihodko
Defense Minister Sergeyev

Interpreter: Peter Afansenko
Notetaker: Carlos Pascual

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 19, 1999, 10:45 a.m.-11:40 a.m.
Istanbul, Turkey

President Yeltsin: We are in neutral territory here. I welcome you. (U)

The President: Neither of us has a stake here. It's good to see you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, what about those camps here in Turkey that are preparing troops to go into Chechnya? Aren't you in charge of those? I have the details. Minister Ivanov, give me the map. I want to show you where the mercenaries are being trained and then being sent into Chechnya. They are armed to the teeth. (Note: Yeltsin pulls out map of Turkey and circulates it.) Bill, this is your fault. I told Demirel yesterday that I will send the head of the SRV tomorrow and we will show him where the camps are located. These are not state-sanctioned camps. They are sponsored by NGOs and religious

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 12/11/09

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

organizations. But let me tell you if this were in Russia and there were but one camp, I would throw them all out and put the bandits in the electric chair. (S)

The President: Perhaps Demirel could help you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, he ought to. Tomorrow after I get back, I will send the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service here. (S)

Bill, did you hurt your leg? (S)

The President: Yes, but it is not bad. (S)

President Yeltsin: When one leg of the President hurts, that is a bad thing. (S)

The President: It lets me know I am alive. (S)

President Yeltsin: I know we are not upset at each other. We were just throwing some jabs. I'm still waiting for you to visit, Bill. I've said to you come to visit in May, then June, then July and then August. Now it's past October and you're still not there. (S)

The President: You're right, Boris, I owe you a visit. (S)

President Yeltsin: Last time I went to the U.S., Bill. (S)

The President: Well, I better set it up. I'll look at the calendar and find a time that's good for you and me. (S)

President Yeltsin: Call me and tell me the month and date. Unless I have another visit, I will do the maximum amount I can to do everything around your schedule. The main things I have are to go to China and India. (S)

The President: Boris, we still have lots to do together. (S)

President Yeltsin: You heard my statement on nuclear arms and on banning nuclear tests. I just signed a law on ratification of a new agreement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Isn't that right, Minister Ivanov? (S)

Minister Ivanov: You signed the documents that sent the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Duma for review. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, in any case, I still approved it. (S)

The President: Maybe I can get the Congress to agree still. They kept the Treaty even after they rejected it. So perhaps, there is still a chance. (S)

President Yeltsin: Or perhaps it's just the bureaucrats working and they haven't had a chance to send it back to you yet. I'm upset that you signed the law to change the ABM Treaty. (S)

The President: I signed no such law. People in Congress don't like the ABM Treaty. If Congress had its way, they would undermine the treaty. I'm trying to uphold it. But we need a national missile defense to protect against rogue states. We can't have a national missile defense that works without changing the ABM Treaty. But I want to do this cooperatively. I want to persuade you that this is good for both of us. The primary purpose is to protect against terrorists and rogue states. It would be ineffective against Russia. The system we're looking at would operate against just 20 missiles. And, Boris I want to figure out how to share the benefits. For all I know, in twenty years terrorists could have access to nuclear weapons. I know your people don't agree with me, but I'm not trying to overthrow the ABM Treaty. We're still trying to discover what's technically possible with national missile defense, but there are people in America who want to throw over the ABM Treaty. I have made no decisions yet. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, Bill. I got your note. It went into all these things in incredible detail. I read it and I was satisfied. I've not yet ceased to believe in you. (S)

I ask you one thing. Just give Europe to Russia. The U.S. is not in Europe. Europe should be the business of Europeans. Russia is half European and half Asian. (S)

The President: So you want Asia too? (S)

President Yeltsin: Sure, sure, Bill. Eventually, we will have to agree on all of this. (S)

The President: I don't think the Europeans would like this very much. (S)

President Yeltsin: Not all. But I am a European. I live in Moscow. Moscow is in Europe and I like it. You can take all the other states and provide security to them. I will take

Europe and provide them security. Well, not I. Russia will.

(S)

We will end this conflict in Chechnya. I didn't say all the things I was thinking (in his speech). I listened to you carefully. I took a break just beforehand. Then I listened to you from beginning to end. I can even repeat what you said.

(S)

Bill, I'm serious. Give Europe to Europe itself. Europe never felt as close to Russia as it does now. We have no difference of opinion with Europe, except maybe on Afganistan and Pakistan -- which, by the way, is training Chechens. These are bandits, headhunters and killers. They're raping American women. They're cutting off ears and other parts of their hostages. We're fighting these types of terrorists. Let's not accuse Russia that we are too rough with these kinds of people. There are only two options: kill them or put them on trial. There's no third option, but we can put them on trial, and sentence them to 20-25 years. (S)

How many Americans, French, British and Germans have I freed that were there in Chechnya under the OSCE? The Chechen killers don't like the language of the OSCE. Here's my Minister of Defense. Stand up. We have not lost one soldier down there. Tell them, Minister Sergeev. (S)

Minister Sergeev: We did not lose one soldier in Gudermes.

(S)

President Yeltsin: You see, Gudermes was cleansed without one military or civilian killed. We killed 200 bandits. The Minister of Defense is fulfilling the plan as I have said it should be. He's doing this thoughtfully. The soldiers only ask: don't stop the campaign. I promised these guys -- I told every soldier, marshal and general -- I will bring the campaign to fruition. We have these Chechens under lock and key. We have the key. They can't get in, they can't get out. Except maybe through Georgia; that's Shevardnadze's big mistake. And through Azerbaijan; that's Aliyev's mistake. They're shuttling in under the name of Islam. We're for freedom of religion, but not for fundamentalist Islam. These extremists are against you and against me. (S)

We have the power in Russia to protect all of Europe, including those with missiles. We'll make all the appropriate treaties with China. We're not going to provide nuclear weapons to

India. If we give them submarines, it will be only conventional diesel submarines, not nuclear. They would be from the 935 generation. (S)

You're going in that direction too. I'm thinking about your proposal -- well, what your armed forces are doing -- getting rid of fissile materials, particularly plutonium. We should just get rid of it. As soon as it's there, people start thinking of how to make bombs. (S)

Look, Russia has the power and intellect to know what to do with Europe. If Ivanov stays here, he will initial the CFE Treaty and I'll sign it under him. But under the OSCE Charter, there is one thing I cannot agree -- which is that, based on humanitarian causes, one state can interfere in the affairs of another state. (S)

National Security Advisor Berger: Mr. President, there's nothing in the Charter on one state's interference in the affairs of another. (S)

Secretary Albright: That's right. What the Charter says is that affairs within a state will affect the other states around it. (S)

President Yeltsin: Russia agrees to take out its property and equipment from Georgia in accordance with the new CFE Treaty. I have a statement on this. (looking toward Ivanov) Give it to me. I signed it today. Actually, it was late last night. I like to work late. (S)

The President: Me, too. (S)

President Yeltsin: I know you like to work late, Bill. When you call me, I calculate the time and I tell myself it's 4 a.m. and he's calling me. It lets you cleanse your brain and you feel great. I am not criticizing you, Bill. The President should be encouraged to work hard. (S)

The President: So, we will get an agreement on CFE. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. (S)

The President: That's very important. We've worked on this for seven years. (S)

President Yeltsin: Look, Ivanov has lost the statement in his own bag. He can't find the paper in his own bag.

On the Charter, we have to look at it from the beginning. The Charter's ready. However, when states begin to tie in the Charter with the final declaration that has wording unacceptable to us, that's when we'll say no. And responsibility for this will fall fully on the West. (S)

(Looking at Ivanov) Give me this thing. It is written on paper, Bill. I am ready to sign it. It is a declaration about what we're talking about. (S)

Secretary Albright: Some states want to record in the declaration your willingness to have an OSCE mission. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, not at all. We will finish this with our own forces. Chechnya is the business of the internal affairs of Russia. We have to decide what to do. After we cleansed Gudermes, the muslim mufti came and asked for help. He said I hate Basayev and he should be banned. These are the kinds of leaders we will put forward. I have thought this through carefully. (S)

The President: On the Chechen problem. I have been less critical than others. Even today, I asked the others how they would deal with this if it were their country. This is a political issue. It may be the best thing for you within Russia to tell the Europeans to go to hell. But the best thing for your relations with Europe for the long term is to figure out the policy that you want to have with Europe and to keep that in mind as you deal with Chechnya. (S)

President Yeltsin: (Gets up rapidly) Bill, the meeting is up. We said 20 minutes and it has now been more than 35 minutes.

(S)

The President: That's fine. We can say the meeting is over.

(S)

President Yeltsin: This meeting has gone on too long. You should come to visit, Bill. (S)

The President: Who will win the election? (S)

President Yeltsin: Putin, of course. He will be the successor to Boris Yeltsin. He's a democrat, and he knows the West. (S)

The President: He's very smart. (S)

President Yeltsin: He's tough. He has an internal ramrod. He's tough internally, and I will do everything possible for him to win--legally, of course. And he will win. You'll do business together. He will continue the Yeltsin line on democracy and economics and widen Russia's contacts. He has the energy and the brains to succeed. Thank you, Bill. (S)

The President: Thank you, Boris. It was good to see you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

organizations. But let me tell you if this were in Russia and there were but one camp, I ~~WASHINGTON~~ throw them all out and put the bandits in the electric chair. (S)

The President: Perhaps Demirel could help you. (S)

President Yeltsin: Well, he ought to. Tomorrow after I get back, I will send the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service here. (S)

Bill, did you hurt your leg? (S)

The President: Yes, but it is not bad. (S)

President Yeltsin: When one leg of the President hurts, that is a bad thing. (S)

The President: It lets me know I am alive. (S)

President Yeltsin: I know we are not upset at each other. We were just throwing some jabs. I'm still waiting for you to visit, Bill. I've said to you come to visit in May, then June, then July and then August. Now it's past October and you're still not there. (S)

The President: You're right, Boris, I owe you a visit. (S)

President Yeltsin: Last time I went to the U.S., Bill. (S)

The President: Well, I better set it up. I'll look at the calendar and find a time that's good for you and me. (S)

President Yeltsin: Call me and tell me the month and date. Unless I have another visit, I will do the maximum amount I can to do everything around your schedule. The main things I have are to go to China and India. (S)

The President: Boris, we still have lots to do together. (S)

President Yeltsin: You heard my statement on nuclear arms and on banning nuclear tests. I just signed a law on ratification of a new agreement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Isn't that right, Minister Ivanov? (S)

Minister Ivanov: You signed the documents that sent the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Duma for review. (S)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.68)
3/13/2018 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin (S)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
President Clinton
Secretary Albright
~~National Security Advisor Berger~~
~~Deputy National Security Advisor Steinberg~~
Ambassador Steve Sestanovich
Carlos Pascual

Russia
Russian President Boris Yeltsin
Foreign Minister Ivanov
Kremlin Foreign Policy Advisor Prihodko
Defense Minister Sergeyev

Interpreter: Peter Afansenko
Notetaker: Carlos Pascual

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 19, 1999, 10:45 a.m.-11:40 a.m.
Istanbul, Turkey

President Yeltsin: We are in neutral territory here. I welcome you. (U)

The President: Neither of us has a stake here. It's good to see you. (U)

President Yeltsin: Well, Bill, what about those camps here in Turkey that are preparing troops to go into Chechnya? Aren't you in charge of those? I have the details. Minister Ivanov, give me the map. I want to show you where the mercenaries are being trained and then being sent into Chechnya. They are armed to the teeth. (Note: Yeltsin pulls out map of Turkey and circulates it.) Bill, this is your fault. I told Demirel yesterday that I will send the head of the SRV tomorrow and we will show him where the camps are located. These are not state-sanctioned camps. They are sponsored by NGOs and religious

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 12/11/09

organizations. But let me tell you if this were in Russia and there were but one camp, I would throw them all out and put the bandits in the electric chair. O(S)

The President: Perhaps Demirel could help you. O(S)

President Yeltsin: Well, he ought to. Tomorrow after I get back, I will send the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service here. O(S)

Bill, did you hurt your leg? (S)

The President: Yes, but it is not bad. O(S)

President Yeltsin: When one leg of the President hurts, that is a bad thing. O(S)

The President: It lets me know I am alive. O(S)

President Yeltsin: I know we are not upset at each other. We were just throwing some jabs. I'm still waiting for you to visit, Bill. I've said to you come to visit in May, then June, then July and then August. Now it's past October and you're still not there. O(S)

The President: You're right, Boris, I owe you a visit. O(S)

President Yeltsin: Last time I went to the U.S., Bill. O(S)

The President: Well, I better set it up. I'll look at the calendar and find a time that's good for you and me. O(S)

President Yeltsin: Call me and tell me the month and date. Unless I have another visit, I will do the maximum amount I can to do everything around your schedule. The main things I have are to go to China and India. O(S)

The President: Boris, we still have lots to do together. O(S)

President Yeltsin: You heard my statement on nuclear arms and on banning nuclear tests. I just signed a law on ratification of a new agreement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Isn't that right, Minister Ivanov? O(S)

Minister Ivanov: You signed the documents that sent the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Duma for review. O(S)

President Yeltsin: Well, in any case, I still approved it. (S)

The President: Maybe I can get the Congress to agree still. They kept the Treaty even after they rejected it. So perhaps, there is still a chance. (S)

President Yeltsin: Or perhaps it's just the bureaucrats working and they haven't had a chance to send it back to you yet. I'm upset that you signed the law to change the ABM Treaty. (S)

The President: I signed no such law. People in Congress don't like the ABM Treaty. If Congress had its way, they would undermine the Treaty. I'm trying to uphold it. But we need a national missile defense to protect against rogue states. We can't have a national missile defense that works without changing the ABM Treaty. But I want to do this cooperatively. I want to persuade you that this is good for both of us. The primary purpose is to protect against terrorists and rogue states. It would be ineffective against Russia. The system we're looking at would operate against just 20 missiles. And, Boris I want to figure out how to share the benefits. For all I know, in twenty years terrorists could have access to nuclear weapons. I know your people don't agree with me, but I'm not trying to overthrow the ABM Treaty. We're still trying to discover what's technically possible with national missile defense, but there are people in America who want to throw over the ABM Treaty. I have made no decisions yet. (S)

President Yeltsin: Bill, Bill. I got your note. It went into all these things in incredible detail. I read it and I was satisfied. I've not yet ceased to believe in you.

I ask you one thing. Just give Europe to Russia. The U.S. is not in Europe. Europe should be the business of Europeans. Russia is half European and half Asian. (S)

The President: So you want Asia too? (S)

President Yeltsin: Sure, sure, Bill. Eventually, we will have to agree on all of this. (S)

The President: I don't think the Europeans would like this very much. (S)

President Yeltsin: Not all. But I am a European. I live in Moscow. Moscow is in Europe and I like it. You can take all the other states and provide security to them. I will take

Europe and provide them security. Well, not I. Russia will.

(S)

We will end this conflict in Chechnya. I didn't say all the things I was thinking (in his speech). I listened to you carefully. I took a break just beforehand. Then I listened to you from beginning to end. I can even repeat what you said. (S)

Bill, I'm serious. Give Europe to Europe itself. Europe never felt as close to Russia as it does now. We have no difference of opinion with Europe, except maybe on Afganistan and Pakistan --which, by the way, is training Chechens. These are bandits, headhunters and killers. They're raping American women. They're cutting off ears and other parts of their hostages. We're fighting these types of terrorists. Let's not accuse Russia that we are too rough with these kinds of people. There are only two options: kill them or put them on trial. There's no third option, but we can put them on trial, and sentence them to 20-25 years. (S)

How many Americans, French, British and Germans have I freed that were there in Chechnya under the OSCE? The Chechen killers don't like the language of the OSCE. Here's my Minister of Defense. Stand up. We have not lost one soldier down there. Tell them, Minister Sergeyev. (S)

Minister Sergeyev: We did not lose one soldier in Gudermes. (S)

President Yeltsin: You see, Gudermes was cleansed without one military or civilian killed. We killed 200 bandits. The Minister of Defense is fulfilling the plan as I have said it should be. He's doing this thoughtfully. The soldiers only ask: don't stop the campaign. I promised these guys--I told every soldier, marshal and general--I will bring the campaign to fruition. We have these Chechens under lock and key. We have the key. They can't get in, they can't get out. Except maybe through Georgia; that's Shevardnadze's big mistake. And through Azerbaijan; that's Aliyev's mistake. They're shuttling in under the name of Islam. We're for freedom of religion, but not for fundamentalist Islam. These extremists are against you and against me. (S)

We have the power in Russia to protect all of Europe, including those with missiles. We'll make all the appropriate treaties with China. We're not going to provide nuclear weapons to India. If we give them submarines, it will be only conventional

diesel submarines, not nuclear. They would be from the 935 generation. O(S)

You're going in that direction too. I'm thinking about your proposal--well, what your armed forces are doing--getting rid of fissile materials, particularly plutonium. We should just get rid of it. As soon as it's there, people start thinking of how to make bombs. O(S)

Look, Russia has the power and intellect to know what to do with Europe. If Ivanov stays here, he will initial the CFE Treaty and I'll sign it under him. But under the OSCE Charter, there is one thing I cannot agree--which is that, based on humanitarian causes, one state can interfere in the affairs of another state. O(S)

National Security Advisor Berger: Mr. President, there's nothing in the Charter on one state's interference in the affairs of another. O(S)

Secretary Albright: That's right. What the Charter says is that affairs within a state will affect the other states around it. O(S)

President Yeltsin: Russia agrees to take out its property and equipment from Georgia in accordance with the new CFE Treaty. I have a statement on this. (looking toward Ivanov) Give it to me. I signed it today. Actually, it was late last night. I like to work late. O(S)

The President: Me, too. O(S)

President Yeltsin: I know you like to work late, Bill. When you call me, I calculate the time and I tell myself it's 4 a.m. and he's calling me. It lets you cleanse your brain and you feel great. I am not criticizing you, Bill. The President should be encouraged to work hard. O(S)

The President: So, we will get an agreement on CFE. (S)

President Yeltsin: Yes. O(S)

The President: That's very important. We've worked on this for seven years. O(S)

President Yeltsin: Look, Ivanov has lost the statement in his own bag. He can't find the paper in his own bag. (S)

On the Charter, we have to look at it from the beginning. The Charter's ready. However, when states begin to tie in the Charter with the final declaration that has wording unacceptable to us, that's when we'll say no. And responsibility for this will fall fully on the West. (S)

(Looking at Ivanov) Give me this things. It is written on paper, Bill. I am ready to sign it. It is a declaration about what we're talking about. (S)

Secretary Albright: Some states want to record in the declaration your willingness to have an OSCE mission. (S)

President Yeltsin: No, not at all. We will finish this with our own forces. Chechnya is the business of the internal affairs of Russia. We have to decide what to do. After we cleansed Gudermes, the muslim mufti came and asked for help. He said I hate Basayev and he should be banned. These are the kinds of leaders we will put forward. I have thought this through carefully. (S)

The President: On the Chechnya problem. I have been less critical than others. Even today, I asked the others how they would deal with this if it were their country. This is a political issue. It may be the best thing for you within Russia to tell the Europeans to go to hell. But the best thing for your relations with Europe for the long term is to figure out the policy that you want to have with Europe and to keep that in mind as you deal with Chechnya. (S)

President Yeltsin: (Gets up rapidly) Bill, the meeting is up. We said 20 minutes and it has now been more than 35 minutes. (S)

The President: That's fine. We can say the meeting is over. (S)

President Yeltsin: This meeting has gone on too long. You should come to visit, Bill. (S)

The President: Who will win the election? (S)


President Yeltsin: Putin, of course. He will be the successor to Boris Yeltsin. He's a democrat, and he knows the West. (S)

The President: He's very smart. (S)

President Yeltsin: He's tough. He has an internal ramrod. He's tough internally, and I will do everything possible for him to win--legally, of course. And he will win. You'll do business together. He will continue the Yeltsin line on democracy and economics and widen Russia's contacts. He has the energy and the brains to succeed. Thank you, Bill. *D/S*

The President: Thank you, Boris. It was good to see you. *D(U)*

-- End of Conversation --



MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2767				
Document ID: 9909338				
Row: 46	Section: 5	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. telcon	re: Telcon with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (3 pages)	12/31/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018
001b. telcon	[Duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)	12/31/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 7/13/2018

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Yeltsin and Tel*...])
 OA/Box Number: 2767

FOLDER TITLE:

9909338

2015-0782-M

rs1559

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: BRADTKE

DOC DATE: 04 JAN 00
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

TELCON

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON DEC 31

ACTION: BRADTKE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 04 JAN 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PASCUAL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON
PASCUAL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY *JL*

DATE *1/4*

BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMTS

CLOSED BY: NSTCG

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *KSM* NARA, Date *3/13/2018*
2015-0782-M-2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001
002

Z 00010317 FOR DECISION
Z 00010419 BERGER APPROVED RECOMS 1 & 2
X 00010419 BRADTKE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 000104 STATE

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9338
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG ALL ALO

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>JTB</i> GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>SP 1/3</u>	<u>scr/er/HS</u>
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2 3</u>	<u>W 1/4</u>	<u>Tab-I plus</u>
RUDMAN	<u>3</u>	<u>MR 1/4</u>	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>EW 1/4</u>	<u>⊕</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>1/8 1/4</u>	<u>⊕</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

100 JAN 30 5:16
CC:

COMMENTS: Memo - Galtzin - 3 Dec

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9338
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG AWA/O

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>818</i> GIRE	_____	_____	_____
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>SP 1/3</u>	<u>scr/erits</u>
SARGEANT	_____	_____	_____
BRADTKE	<u>2 3</u>	<u>MR 1/4</u>	<u>Tab I plus</u>
RUDMAN	<u>3</u>	<u>MR 1/4</u>	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>EMU 1/4</u>	<u>JD</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	<u>1/4</u>	<u>JD</u>

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

00 JAN 3 PM 5:16
 CC:

COMMENTS: *Mencer - Geltsin - 3 Dec*

EXFC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE *yes*


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 4, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin, December 31, 1999 ~~(S)~~

The Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Russian President Yeltsin, attached at Tab A, is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only. ~~(S)~~



Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5 (c), (d)
Declassify On: 12/31/09

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KGM/NARA, Date 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Russian President Boris Yelstin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

NOTETAKERS: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford, Joel Ehrenreich,
and Sean Tarver

DATE, TIME: December 31, 1999, 09:02-09:22 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill? How do you do, Bill? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I just wanted to call you today. I know this has been a tough but courageous decision. I just wanted to say I read your statement this morning. I'm sad, but I am very proud of you. You have guided your country through a historic time and you are leaving a legacy that will leave Russians better off for years to come. I want you to know that we will work with Putin and the Russian people as they make their choice for the next democratically elected president, and you can be proud that you created a constitution that works and that it continues to guide this transfer today. (Ø)

I know that the democratic changes you led made it possible for Russia to be integrated into the international community. I was very proud when Russia joined the G-8, and I am proud of the work we did on arms control and other issues. I know we didn't finish everything we wanted to do on arms control, but we set the framework at Cologne, and I will continue to work with Putin on these objectives. (Ø)

Boris, I believe that historians will say you were the father of Russian democracy and that you worked to make the world a safer place, and I wanted you to know that Hillary and I are thinking of you and Naina. Thank you very much for all the times we have spent together and all the work we have done together. (Ø)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill, for the very kind words, for the sincerity that you expressed to me now. Of course, this was not an easy decision for me, and you, as no one else, can

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify on: 12/31/09

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2015-0782-M-2 (1.51)
3/13/2018 KBH

understand that. But I want to support Putin 100 percent and now I've given him three months, three months according to the constitution, to work as president, and people will get used to him for these three months. I am sure that he will be elected in the forthcoming elections; I am sure about that. I am also sure that he is a democrat, and that he is a person with a big soul, and that he is very strong and very intelligent and, on many occasions, I had a chance to know that myself. ~~(S)~~

Together with you, we did a lot to strengthen Russian-American cooperation. Thanks to our interaction, our personal efforts, and our contacts, we managed to overcome emerging problems. Of course, I will help Putin with everything, in all areas. Of course, he needs international experience. He needs international contacts, and I will, of course, help him with that. I will go with him. I will fly on board the plane. I will meet with you and him in order to transfer the viewpoint of Russia on different questions. And, of course, this will be done without breaking away from democracy, from pursuit of a market economy, from everything we managed to agree with you on, which includes the reduction of armaments and the issue of chemical weapons. ~~(S)~~

Of course, it is not very easy, and you understand it very well. Particularly, I have always been criticized that I am just trying to keep a grip on power. This proves that I have not just tried for power. If it is necessary for Russia, if it is necessary for democracy, I am able to sacrifice this half a year of presidential rule. And, of course, I will make use of what you just told me and, if I find myself in America, I will drop by at your place and, together, we will be able to remember all that we managed to achieve together, and we can discuss those questions of mutual interest to us. ~~(S)~~

And I want to tell you, Bill, that on the seventh, I will leave for Bethlehem in order to celebrate the bicentennial of Christianity, and this will also be a very important event. During this period, formally I will not be president, but I will be recognized as president, and I will try to put on the table something to make a contribution to the settlement in the Middle East. ~~(S)~~

I am very glad I was your friend, and I will continue to be your friend. I am very glad that Hillary and Niana had a very good relationship. I think that it should be continued. ~~(S)~~

The President: It will be continued. (U)

President Yeltsin: But, as for the rest, the President is President, and he is supposed to perform his duties. Putin is a

strong person and he will be able to cope with the task he has. And that was what I wanted to tell you and thank you very much, Bill. Thank you for this telephone call, which you made by your own initiative. I appreciate it very much, Bill. And I think that Russia should enter the third millennium with new politicians who are intelligent and strong, dynamic people. It is so and it will be like that. And, Bill, I would like to congratulate you and Hillary on the New Year and express my gratitude to you that you wished this happy New Year to Naina and myself. Thank you very much. (e)

The President: Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: And I embrace you cordially. You should believe me, it was done for Russia, for the sake of Russia, for its future. I would like from the bottom of my heart to embrace you. I want you to continue the celebration of Christmas and the New Year, because the New Year will come to our country in a few hours. All the best to you, Bill. I embrace you most cordially and I hope we will meet each other in the not too distant future. Okay, Bill. (e)

The President: Thank you, Boris. It is good to hear you sounding so strong and chipper and brave, as always. I can't wait to see you, and I promise to be a good partner with Putin. (e)

President Yeltsin: That is very good and very important. That is what I had in mind. (e)

The President: Great. Good bye Boris. Happy New Year. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, Bill. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 9909338

REFERRAL

DATE: 04 JAN 00

MEMORANDUM FOR: KENNEY, K

STATE SECRETARIAT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: KENNEY, K

SOURCE: BRADTKE

DATE: 04 JAN 00

SUBJ: MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON DEC 31

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 06 JAN 00

COMMENT:



FOR

JOHN W. FICKLIN

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9909338
DATE 04 JAN 00

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF TELCON W/ RUSSIAN PRES YELTSIN ON DEC 31
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ROOM 7224
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: DISK +1

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBY Date: 3/13/2018
2015-0782-M-2

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

December 31, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: CARLOS PASCUAL *CP*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin - Friday, December 31, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone conversation
between the President and Russian President Yeltsin on December
31, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Robert Bradtke to transmit the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation at Tab A to the Department of State.

Approve *me for* Disapprove _____

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve *me for* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Russian
President Yeltsin, December 31, 1999 (e)

The Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President
and Russian President Yeltsin, attached at Tab A, is provided
for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be
distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy
Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our
embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only. (e)

Robert A. Bradtke
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Russian President Boris Yelstin

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Russian President Yeltsin

NOTETAKERS: Jenny McGee, Robert Ford, Joel Ehrenreich,
and Sean Tarver

DATE, TIME: December 31, 1999, 09:02-09:22 p.m. EST
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Boris? (U)

President Yeltsin: Hello, Bill? How do you do, Bill? (U)

The President: I'm fine. I just wanted to call you today. I know this has been a tough but courageous decision. I just wanted to say I read your statement this morning. I'm sad, but I am very proud of you. You have guided your country through a historic time and you are leaving a legacy that will leave Russians better off for years to come. I want you to know that we will work with Putin and the Russian people as they make their choice for the next democratically elected president, and you can be proud that you created a constitution that works and that it continues to guide this transfer today. (C)

I know that the democratic changes you led made it possible for Russia to be integrated into the international community. I was very proud when Russia joined the G-8, and I am proud of the work we did on arms control and other issues. I know we didn't finish everything we wanted to do on arms control, but we set the framework at Cologne, and I will continue to work with Putin on these objectives. (C)

Boris, I believe that historians will say you were the father of Russian democracy and that you worked to make the world a safer place, and I wanted you to know that Hillary and I are thinking of you and Naina. Thank you very much for all the times we have spent together and all the work we have done together. (C)

President Yeltsin: Thank you, Bill, for the very kind words, for the sincerity that you expressed to me now. Of course, this was

not an easy decision for me, and you, as no one else, can understand that. But I want to support Putin 100 percent and now I've given him three months, three months according to the constitution, to work as president, and people will get used to him for these three months. I am sure that he will be elected in the forthcoming elections; I am sure about that. I am also sure that he is a democrat, and that he is a person with a big soul, and that he is very strong and very intelligent and, on many occasions, I had a chance to know that myself. (C)

Together with you, we did a lot to strengthen Russian-American cooperation. Thanks to our interaction, our personal efforts, and our contacts, we managed to overcome emerging problems. ~~And,~~ Of course, I will help Putin with everything, in all areas. Of course, he needs international experience. He needs international contacts, and I will, of course, help him with that. I will go with him. I will fly on board the plane. I will meet with you and him in order to transfer the viewpoint of Russia on different questions. And, of course, this will be done without breaking away from democracy, from pursuit of a market economy, from everything we managed to agree with you on, which includes reduction of armaments, the issue of chemical weapons. ~~on all these questions.~~ (C)

Of course, it is not very easy, and you understand it very well. Particularly, I have always been criticized that I am just trying to keep a grip on power. ~~And~~ This proves that I have not just tried for power. If it is necessary for Russia, if it is necessary for democracy, I am able to sacrifice this half of a year of presidential rule. And, of course, I will make use of what you just told me and, if I find myself in America, I will drop by at your place and, together, we will be able to remember all that we managed to achieve together, and we can discuss those questions of mutual interest to us. (C)

And I want to tell you, Bill, that on the seventh, I will leave for Bethlehem in order to celebrate the bicentennial of Christianity, and this will also be a very important event. During this period, formally I will not be president, but I will be recognized as president, and I will try to put on the table something to make a contribution to the settlement in the Middle East. (C)

I am very glad I was your friend, and I will continue to be your friend. I am very glad that Hillary and Niana had a very good relationship. I think that it should be continued. (C)

The President: It will be continued. (U)

President Yeltsin: But, as for the rest, the President is President, and he is supposed to perform his duties. Putin is a strong person and he will be able to cope with the task he has. And that was what I wanted to tell you and thank you very much, Bill. Thank you for this telephone call, which you made by your own initiative. I appreciate it very much, Bill. And I think that Russia should enter the third millennium with new politicians who are intelligent and strong, dynamic people. It is so and it will be like that. And, Bill, I would like to congratulate you and Hillary on the New Year and express my gratitude to you that you wished this happy New Year to Naina and myself. Thank you very much. (C)

The President: Thank you, Boris. (U)

President Yeltsin: And I embrace you cordially, and you should believe me, it was done for Russia, for the sake of Russia, for its future. And I would like from the bottom of my heart to embrace you. I want you to continue the celebration of Christmas and the New Year, because New Year will come to our country in a few hours. And all the best to you, Bill. I embrace you most cordially and I hope we will meet each other in the not too distant future. Okay, Bill. (C)

The President: Thank you, Boris. It is good to hear you sounding so strong and chipper and brave, as always. I can't wait to see you, and I promise to be a good partner with Putin. (C)

President Yeltsin: That is very good and very important. That is what I had in mind. (C)

The President: Great. Good bye Boris. Happy New Year. (U)

President Yeltsin: Okay, Bill. Good bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --