Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 1 of 16 1 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 9 10 ABDIQAFAR WAGAFE, et al., Plaintiffs, 11 12 v. 13 DONALD TRUMP, President of the United 14 States, et al., 15 No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RESPONSIVE TO RFPS 40, 41 AND 44 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 2 of 16 1 2 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs’ latest Requests for Production of documents (RFPs) goes too far. They now 3 insist that Defendants produce documents to assist them in determining whether to file an 4 untimely motion for class certification. Moreover, the requests themselves, which essentially ask 5 for all documents connected in any way to either Executive Order 13,769 (First EO) or Executive 6 Order 13,780 (Second EO), are not in accord with the Court’s admonition that discovery requests 7 be “reasonably targeted at searching for evidence of ‘extreme vetting’ programs that ‘embody 8 CARRP in all but name,’” Order, ECF No. 104 at 5 (emphasis added). And even if the requests 9 were appropriately limited, the Supreme Court has held that the only section of the EO that 10 pertains exclusively to the putative class has expired. Plaintiffs’ novel class-discovery rationale 11 is also inconsistent with their prior representations to the Court; incorrectly portrays the 12 exceedingly broad RFPs at issue here as somehow narrower than previous requests limited to 13 documents with a logical connection to CARRP; and continues to conflate the named plaintiffs’ 14 roles as class representatives with their roles as individuals seeking adjudication of specific 15 benefit applications. 16 To start, Plaintiffs have framed RFP Nos. 40, 41, and 44 as class discovery concerning 17 what Plaintiffs have termed the putative “Muslim Ban” class (Defendants will refer to this as the 18 putative “Six Countries Class” as the class definition does not refer to religion, but instead 19 consists of applicants for immigration benefits from six specified countries). The time in which 20 this District permits classes to be certified expired October 1, 2017. Additionally, Plaintiffs 21 previously disclaimed any intent to certify that class absent further indication that adjudication of 22 immigration benefit applications had been suspended for nationals of those six countries. 23 Defendants do not object to conducting reasonable searches for documents that are also relevant 24 to the two certified classes, but to the extent Plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 40, 41, and 44 call for 25 production of documents pertaining only to the uncertified Six Countries Class, and would not 26 affect any of the certified class members, they are outside the scope of discovery under Rule 26. 27 With respect to Plaintiffs’ demand to search U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 28 (ICE) records, the request is not “reasonably targeted at searching for evidence of ‘extreme RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 2 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 3 of 16 1 vetting’ programs that ‘embody CARRP in all but name,’” ECF No. 104 at 5. Furthermore, 2 searching for evidence of alleged discriminatory adjudication of naturalization and adjustment- 3 of-status applications at agencies other than U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 4 and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) headquarters is disproportionate to the needs 5 of the case because any relevant documents—i.e., those that bear on adjudication of adjustment 6 and naturalization applications—will be captured in documents already collected or already 7 produced to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel should be denied in full. 8 II. BACKGROUND 9 On November 17, 2017, six weeks after the deadline to move for class certification 10 expired, Plaintiffs served their RFP Nos. 40-44, which they have denominated as class discovery. 11 RFP No. 40 requested “[a]ll Documents referring or relating to any interpretation or 12 implementation of the First EO or Second EO that would affect in any way” adjudication of 13 immigration benefit applications of, inter alia, individuals who are members of the Six Countries 14 Class. ECF No. 112 at 21. RFP No. 44 requested “[a]ll Documents referring or relating to any 15 screening, vetting, or adjudication program, policy, or procedure connected to Section 4 of the 16 First EO or Sections 4 or 5 of the Second EOs” that would affect in any way the immigration 17 benefit applications of members of, inter alia, the putative Six Countries Class. Id. at 25-26. In 18 accordance with the Court’s prior orders and the nationwide scope of the classes certified under 19 Rule 23(b)(2), Defendants agreed to produce documents of national scope, that affected 20 adjustment-of-status or naturalization applications, and concerned an articulable link to a 21 national security ground of inadmissibility. Despite the fact RFP No. 41 solely concerns claims 22 raised by a class that has not been certified and individual plaintiffs whose applications have 23 been adjudicated, Defendants nonetheless agreed to produce documents of national applicability 24 which would have applied to those Plaintiffs, in addition to documents from the individual 25 named Plaintiffs’ A-files. 26 27 28 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 3 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 4 of 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 III. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiffs Should Not Be Permitted Discovery Concerning a Class That Cannot Be Certified 1. Plaintiffs Are Not Now Engaged and Cannot Engage in Class Discovery Plaintiffs contend their RFPs concerning the putative Six Countries Class are “tailored to the prerequisites for class certification.” ECF No. 111 at 5. They go on to explain that “Plaintiffs declined to move for certification of the [Six Countries Class] at the outset precisely so that they could seek discovery to determine whether class certification would be appropriate and fruitful.” Id. at 5-6. Neither assertion is accurate and Plaintiffs are no longer permitted to engage in class discovery. The time to move for certification ended months ago. 11 a. Plaintiff’s Choice Not to Move For Certification Earlier Has Nothing to Do With Class Discovery 12 First, Plaintiffs’ tactical decision not to move for certification of the putative Six 13 Countries Class at the same time as the Naturalization and Adjustment-of-Status classes had 14 nothing whatsoever to do with class discovery. In their First Amended Motion for Class 15 Certification, Plaintiffs explained that they: 16 17 18 19 d[id] not seek certification of this additional class at th[at] time because, after the filing of the First Amended Complaint, the Acting Director of USCIS issued a memorandum indicating that Section 3(c) of the First EO would no longer operate to stop the processing of immigration benefits for those already in the United States. And, in any event, Section 3(c) of the First EO and the corresponding Section 2(c) of the Second EO have since been more broadly enjoined. 20 ECF No. 49 at 3 n.1 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs stated that they reserved the right “to seek 21 certification of the additional class if circumstances change again.” Id. (emphasis added). The 22 Court relied on this assertion in its order certifying the Naturalization and Adjustment-of-Status 23 classes. ECF No. 69 at 8 n.2 (noting the putative class “relate[s] to the effect of Section 3(c) of 24 E.O. 13769 [and] Section 2(c) of E.O. 13780,” and noting that Plaintiffs did not move to certify 25 it “[d]ue to recent court orders”). 26 As their own words show, Plaintiffs did not refrain from moving to certify the putative 27 Six Countries Class “precisely so that they could seek discovery,” ECF No. 111 at 5-6, but rather 28 “because, after the filing of the First Amended Complaint, the Acting Director of USCIS issued a RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 4 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 5 of 16 1 memorandum” they found satisfactory, and because the relevant provisions of the Executive 2 Orders had been enjoined in separate litigation. ECF No. 49 at 3 n.1; ECF No. 69 at 8 n.2. 3 Absent a change in circumstances concerning the applicability of the Executive Orders to the 4 adjudication of immigration benefit applications, Plaintiffs expressed no intent to move to certify 5 the putative Six Countries Class. Plaintiffs have failed to identify any relevant change in 6 circumstances in adjudication of immigration benefit applications since the Scialabba 7 Memorandum was issued over a year ago. Plaintiffs’ post-hoc rationalization is a rather 8 transparent attempt to obtain material unrelated to the matters at issue in this case. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 b. The Six Countries Class Challenges Suspension of Adjudication Under a Provision of the Second EO That Is Now Moot Indeed, to the extent any circumstance has changed, it only confirms that USCIS has not and cannot suspend adjudication of immigration benefit applications for individuals from the six countries identified in the Second EO. Plaintiffs alleged that any such suspension would occur pursuant to Section 2(c) of that Executive Order. See ECF No. 69 at 8 n.2; ECF No. 49 at 3 n.1; ECF No. 47 at 51 ¶¶7-8. The Supreme Court has since held that Section 2(c) expired on September 24, 2017, and that challenges to it are now moot. IRAP v. Trump, 138 S. Ct. 353 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017) (Order) (“Because that provision of the Order ‘expired by its own terms’ on September 24, 2017, the appeal no longer presents a ‘live case or controversy.’”). There is no merit to Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Defendants are “simply rehashing the mootness arguments they already made,” ECF No. 111 at 1, or that the Court’s order of June 21, 2017 (ECF No. 69), which pre-dated both the expiration of Section 2(c) and the Supreme Court’s binding interpretation of it, is the law of the case. To the extent the Court’s prior orders cover this ground at all, it has been overtaken by subsequent events and the Supreme Court’s intervening decision. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining the law of the case doctrine is discretionary, and that an “intervening change in the law” and “other changed circumstances” are appropriate grounds for departure). c. The Discovery Sought Is Not Tailored to Rule 23’s Requirements Even if Plaintiffs’ assertion that they have been ruminating on the possibility of class certification for nearly a year is taken as true, their discovery requests are hardly “tailored to the RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 5 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 6 of 16 1 prerequisites for class certification.” ECF No. 111 at 5. As noted above, Plaintiffs have described 2 the claims of the putative Six Countries Class as “relating to the effect of Section 2(c) of the 3 Second EO.” ECF No. 49 at 3 n.1. Yet their discovery requests cast an exponentially wider net. 4 For example, RFP No. 40 requests “all Documents referring or relating to any interpretation or 5 implementation of the First EO or Second EO that would affect in any way . . . the adjudication 6 of immigration benefit petitions” by members of the Six Countries Class. This request is not 7 limited to naturalization and adjustment-of-status applications, is not limited to Section 2(c) of 8 the Second EO, and provides for no limitation on how incidental or remote the effect at issue 9 may be. This is not “tailored” to anything, much less the specific requirements for class 10 certification. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that RFP Nos. 40, 41, and 44 have 11 anything to do with class discovery—or with class certification at all—is inconsistent with the 12 both the actual language of the requests, and their own prior representations. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 d. Plaintiffs Did Not Propound Their Purported Class Discovery Until After the Time to Move for Class Certification Expired In any event, it is too late to engage in class discovery, as the applicable rules required a motion for certification to be filed by October 1, 2017. Rule 23(c)(1)(A) requires that class certification be accomplished “[a]t an early practicable time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). The Western District of Washington “has given effect to this timing requirement by providing a 180day window for plaintiffs to move for class certification after filing a class action complaint.” Blough v. Shea Homes, Inc., No. 12-cv-1493, 2014 WL 1400990, *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2014) (citing L. Civ. R. 23(i)(3)). “These rules allow a clear definition of the action to emerge at a sufficiently early stage such that the parties can shape the litigation in accordance with the parameters of the putative class.” Id.; cf. Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that “unlike the local rules of some district courts, the local rules of the District of Nevada do not impose a particular deadline for filing a motion for class certification”). Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves have recognized that a named Plaintiff whose individual claims have become moot can only act as a class representative “[i]f the named 28 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 6 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 7 of 16 1 plaintiff can still file a timely motion for class certification.” ECF No. 111 at 5 (citing Pitts, 653 2 F.3d at 1091). 1 Here, no such timely motion can be filed. 3 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) was filed on April 4, 2017. ECF No. 4 47. The 180 days permitted by Local Civil Rule 23(i)(3) expired on October 1, 2017. Plaintiffs 5 did not move to extend this deadline. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not even serve the RFPs they 6 claim are aimed at class discovery until November 17, 2017—more than a month after the time 7 to file a motion for certification under Local Rule 23(i)(3) had already expired. ECF No. 112 ¶ 2. 8 They have now had over 300 days in which to move for certification, but have not done so. 9 Plaintiffs’ insinuation that now—more than a year since their original complaint was filed—they 10 have not had “‘a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery prior to moving for class 11 certification’” teeters on the outlandish. See ECF No. 111 at 5 (quoting Clausen Law Firm, 12 PLLC v. Nat’l Acad. of Continuing Legal Educ., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1272-73 (W.D. Wash. 13 2010)). The language of Local Rule 23(i)(3) is mandatory, and to the extent Plaintiffs purported 14 to “reserve the right” to file a motion for certification at a later time, it is valid only to the extent 15 it complies with the applicable rules. If, as one court explained, Plaintiffs could decide for 16 themselves “whether to comply, then the purpose of the rules would be lost.” Stewart v. Screen 17 Gems-EMI Music, Inc., No. 14-cv-4805, 2015 WL 13648928, *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2015). 18 It also bears noting that the putative Six Countries Class—which includes all citizens of 19 those countries who have or will have any application for an immigration benefit pending before 20 USCIS—is far larger than the two certified classes, which are limited to only those adjustment- 21 of-status and naturalization applications subject to the CARRP policy. Allowing discovery into 22 matters that relate only to the putative Six Countries Class would defeat the primary purpose of 23 Local Rule 23(i)(3), to allow the “parties [to] shape the litigation in accordance with the 24 parameters of the putative class.” Blough, 2014 WL 1400990 at *2. 25 26 The Court should reject Plaintiffs’ attempt to tie their discovery request to a theoretical motion for class certification that—even if it were filed today—would be more than four months 27 1 28 Relatedly, Rule 23 requires that a representative plaintiff have a live individual claim “at the time the class action is certified by the District Court.” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975). As explained below, there are no named plaintiffs who have a live individual claim. RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 7 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 8 of 16 1 late in violation of the Court’s local rules, and inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ prior representations 2 about the factual and legal bases on which such certification would be sought. The Court should 3 not permit the scope of discovery to continuously expand. The local rules provide that the 4 parameters of this litigation have been set by Plaintiffs’ inaction. By now—more than a year into 5 this litigation—Defendants are entitled to fixed parameters of what can reasonably be expected 6 of them in discovery. 7 2. The Requested Discovery Is Not Relevant to “Any Party’s Claim or Defense” 8 Apart from their implausibility and impropriety as class discovery, Plaintiffs’ requests are 9 also substantively deficient as discovery more generally. Claims for Relief I, II, and III are raised 10 on behalf of Plaintiffs Wagafe, Ostadhassan, and Bengezi, and the putative Six Countries Class. 11 ECF No. 47 at 45-46. If the Court were to enter judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor on any of those 12 three claims, that judgment would run in favor of no one. It would afford the individual plaintiffs 13 no relief because their applications have already been decided, and it could not provide relief to a 14 class that does not exist. Thus, to the extent that RFP Nos. 40, 41, and 44 seek discovery relevant 15 only to the putative Six Countries Class (not otherwise relevant to either the Naturalization Class 16 or the Adjustment Class), or that is relevant only to Claims I, II or III, such discovery is not 17 relevant to any party’s claim because there is no certified Six Countries Class and the individual 18 plaintiffs’ claims have been adjudicated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (limiting discovery to 19 “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”). 20 First, the claims of the putative Six Countries Class are not legally cognizable as class 21 claims. A putative class, prior to certification, has no legal status. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. 22 Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016) (“a class lacks independent status until certified”); Sosna, 419 23 U.S. at 399 (“When the District Court certified the propriety of the class action, the class of 24 unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest 25 asserted by appellant”). Thus, the putative class is not a “party” for purposes of Rule 26(b) unless 26 and until it is certified, and discovery relating solely to it is improper. 27 28 Second, the individual named class members have no live claims in their individual capacities (as opposed to their representative capacities for the Naturalization and Adjustment- RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 8 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 9 of 16 1 of-Status classes). Each of them has had their individual claims adjudicated, so none has an 2 individual claim that adjudication of his or her benefit application is being unlawfully delayed, 3 due to CARRP or anything else. See Exs. A-E. Accordingly, all of the named plaintiffs’ 4 individual claims are moot. Pitts, 653 F.3d at 1089 (citing Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 5 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) and noting the Supreme Court held plaintiffs “no longer had live individual 6 claims because they had either received a probable cause determination or been released”). 7 Thus, the individual plaintiffs have no live “claims” and no discovery is relevant to their moot 8 individual claims for purposes of Rule 26(b). See Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) 9 Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding discovery concerning issues resolved by 10 stipulation were properly barred); Barthelemy v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1011 (9th 11 Cir. 1990) (summary judgment rendered discovery requests “a fishing expedition rendered 12 moot”). 13 As neither the putative Six Countries Class nor the individual plaintiffs have live claims 14 in this action, discovery is only permissible to the extent it is relevant to the claims of the 15 Naturalization Class or Adjustment-of-Status Class. To the extent Plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 40, 41, 16 and 44 seek discovery not relevant to either of those classes, it is outside the scope of Rule 26(b). 17 B. Plaintiffs’ Demand to Search Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is Neither Relevant Nor Proportional to the Needs of the Case 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Discovery is broad, but it is not unlimited. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1); Schreib v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F.R.D. 282, 284 (W.D. Wash. 2014). Among other factors, the Court must consider whether a discovery request is: (1) relevant to a party’s claim; (2) proportional to the needs of the case; and (3) whether the burden or expense of discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Id. Here, Plaintiffs’ requests for discovery that relate solely to the Six Countries Class, including documents from ICE, fail each of these requirements. 1. Plaintiffs’ Demand for Documents In Possession of Agencies Other Than DHS and USCIS Are Neither Relevant to Their Claims Nor Consistent with the Court’s Orders a. RFP Nos. 40, 41, and 44 Are Not Reasonably Targeted at Searching for a Successor to CARRP 28 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 9 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 10 of 16 1 The Court has previously explained that it cannot enjoin a program that does not yet 2 exist. ECF No. 69 at 24 (“the Court cannot preemptively enjoin an ‘extreme vetting’ program”). 3 Thus, in order to avoid discovery that exceeds the Court’s jurisdictional limitations under Article 4 III, discovery requests must be “reasonably targeted at searching for evidence of ‘extreme 5 vetting’ programs that ‘embody CARRP in all but name.’” ECF No. 104 at 5; see also ECF No. 6 69 at 24 (“substantially similar program under a different name”). This limitation would allow 7 the Court, if necessary, to enjoin a program that “suffers from the same [alleged] legal 8 deficiencies” as CARRP itself. ECF No. 69 at 24. 9 In the pleadings, it has been established that CARRP is “an agency-wide policy for 10 identifying, processing, and adjudicating immigration applications that raise ‘national security 11 concerns.’” SAC, ECF No. 47 ¶55; Answer, ECF No. 74 ¶55. It has also been established that “a 12 national security concern arises when an individual or organization has been determined to have 13 an articulable link . . . to prior, current, or planned involvement in, or association with, an 14 activity, individual, or organization described in sections 212(a)(3)(A), (B), or (F), or 15 237(a)(4)(A) or (B) of the INA.” SAC, ECF No. 47 ¶62; Answer, ECF No. 74 ¶62. 16 Additionally, “CARRP distinguishes between two types of national security concerns: those 17 ostensibly involving ‘Known or Suspected Terrorists’ (‘KSTs’), and those ostensibly involving 18 ‘non-Known or Suspected Terrorists’ (‘non-KSTs’).” SAC, ECF No. 47 ¶64; Answer, ECF No. 19 74 ¶64. Thus, the distinguishing features of CARRP may be summarized as: (1) a USCIS 20 program; (2) concerning adjudication of immigration benefit applications; (3) involving a 21 national security concern; (4) as defined in sections 212(a)(3)(A), (B), or (F), or 237 (a)(4)(A) or 22 (B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 23 Plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 40, 41, and 44 are not “reasonably targeted” at searching for 24 documents of a program that “embod[ies] CARRP in all but name.” ECF No. 104 at 5; cf. id. at 4 25 (rejecting Defendants’ opposition to RFP No. 23 because it “seeks documents specifically related 26 to CARRP”). None of the RFPs at issue are limited to CARRP or to another program that 27 incorporates the hallmarks of CARRP. Not only are the requests not targeted at national security 28 concerns, they are not even limited to a direct connection to adjudication of immigration benefit RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 10 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 11 of 16 1 applications or, indeed, event to the relevant agencies and organizations. For example, RFP No. 2 40 demands “[a]ll Documents referring or relating to any interpretation or implementation of the 3 First EO or Second EO that would affect in any way the adjudication of immigration benefits 4 petitions” of any class member. 2 ECF No. 112, Ex. A at 15. This would appear to include all 5 documents related to any action being undertaken at any Executive agency, including law 6 enforcement agencies, which might potentially result in the discovery of derogatory information 7 that would later—regardless of how much later—be considered in an adjudication of any 8 immigration benefit sought by a class member or putative class member. This is not “reasonably 9 targeted” at a program “substantially similar” to CARRP, given the parameters of CARRP 10 established in the pleadings. Nor is it targeted at any anything in particular. It is targeted at 11 everything with any connection to any section of either EO. The relevant screening, vetting, and 12 adjudication programs, policies, and procedures are those implemented at USCIS to adjudicate 13 immigration benefit applications. b. RFP Nos. 40, 41, and 44 Are Not Relevant to the Claims at Issue and Searching Beyond DHS and USCIS Is Not Proportional to the Needs of the Case, and the Cost Exceeds the Benefit 14 15 16 Apart from the jurisdictional limitations on searching for evidence of programs that are 17 entirely outside the scope of the alleged illegality in the screening, vetting, and adjudication of 18 immigration benefit applications, Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are also not relevant to the claims 19 currently at issue in the case. As explained above, the individual plaintiffs have no further live 20 claims because their applications have been adjudicated, and the putative Six Countries Class has 21 no live claims because it is not certified and does not exist as such. Thus, the only claims at issue 22 for purposes of Rule 23(b)(1) are those of the Naturalization and Adjustment-of-Status classes. 23 Those two classes have the following claims: a Fifth Amendment procedural claim concerning 24 notice and opportunity to challenge processing under CARRP (Count IV); a substantive due 25 process right concerning suspension of adjudication of benefit applications (Count V); an equal 26 protection claim concerning suspension of adjudication of benefit applications (Count VI); an 27 2 28 RFP No. 44 contains a similarly broad request. Id. at 19-20 (“All documents referring or relating to any screening, vetting, or adjudication program, policy, or procedure connected to Section 4 of the First EO or Section 4 or 5 of the Second EO”). RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 11 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 12 of 16 1 allegation that CARRP creates criteria for adjustment of status and naturalization (Count VII); a 2 claim that CARRP was promulgated without procedures required under the Administrative 3 Procedure Act (Counts VIII and IX); and a claim that CARRP establishes criteria for 4 naturalization other than what Congress has enacted, in violation of the Uniform Rule clause 5 (Count X). In short, there are four claims concerning CARRP itself and two claims concerning 6 the purported suspension of adjudication of immigration benefit applications. 7 RFP Nos. 40 and 44 have nothing to do with the suspension of adjudication of 8 immigration benefit applications, and make no reference to CARRP, or any potential successor 9 to CARRP based on the facts about the program established in the pleadings. Plaintiffs suggest 10 “Defendants’ vetting has expanded beyond CARRP to similar programs that import extra- 11 statutory and discriminatory criteria into the vetting and adjudication of immigration benefits.” 12 ECF No. 111 at 9. But Plaintiffs’ allegation of similar discriminatory conduct cannot be the 13 relevant similarity. The Court has made clear multiple times that discovery must be tied to a 14 modification in a screening, vetting or adjudication program that fits the allegations in the 15 Complaint, i.e. programs related to alleged illegalities in the adjudication of immigration benefit 16 applications, otherwise the Court would be unable to enjoin it. Unlike RFP Nos. 23 and 24, RFP 17 Nos. 40 and 44 are not “reasonably targeted” at searching for documents relating to alleged legal 18 defects in programs concerning USCIS’s adjudication of naturalization and adjustment-of-status 19 applications. ECF No. 104 at 5; ECF No. 69 at 24. Again, Defendants recognize that discovery is 20 broad, but discovery into screening, vetting, and adjudication programs, policies, and procedures 21 should be limited to those that could plausibly constitute a modification to or extension of 22 CARRP as CARRP has been defined. At a minimum, it should be limited to programs related to 23 the handling and adjudication of naturalization and adjustment-of-status applications by USCIS. 24 Finally, with respect to the portions of RFP Nos. 40, 41, and 44 that specifically request 25 information from ICE, the documents sought are not reasonably targeted at identifying a 26 potential successor to CARRP. As explained above, CARRP is a USCIS policy concerning 27 adjudication of affirmative immigration benefit applications, and does not apply to ICE. To the 28 extent ICE has documents that have some bearing on adjudication of benefit applications they RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 12 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 13 of 16 1 are not relevant to any of the proposed classes. See SAC, ECF No. 47 ¶¶ 237 (defining each class 2 and putative class as limited to persons who “have or will have an application” for an 3 immigration benefit, naturalization, or adjustment of status “pending before USCIS.”). 2. Searching ICE Is Not Proportional to the Needs of the Case 4 5 For the same reasons, searching for responsive documents at ICE (or, indeed, anywhere 6 other than USCIS and DHS Headquarters) is not proportional to the needs of this case. Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (proportionality factors include “the importance of discovery in resolving the 8 issues” and “whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 9 benefit.”). The Court has twice agreed with Defendants that “[t]he main thrust of this case is the 10 legality of CARRP.” ECF No. 104 at 5 (citing ECF No. 69 at 15) (brackets in original). CARRP, 11 as has been established in the pleadings, is a USCIS “policy for identifying, processing, and 12 adjudicating immigration applications that raise ‘national security concerns.’” SAC, ECF No. 47 13 ¶55; Answer, ECF No. 74 ¶55. As explained above, nothing in Plaintiffs’ motion suggests that 14 any other program, including any program at ICE, is directed at assessing whether an applicant 15 for an immigration benefit may be described in the statutes relevant to the CARRP policy. 3. ICE Is a Non-Party to this Litigation 16 17 The difficulties noted above are compounded by the fact that ICE is not a party to this 18 litigation. Plaintiffs astutely observe that “ICE is a component of DHS, and DHS is a party to 19 this case.” ECF No. 111 at 11. But ICE has its own separate legal personality. See 5 U.S.C. 20 § 551 (defining “agency” to include “each authority of the Government of the United States, 21 whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency”) (emphasis added). If 22 Plaintiffs wanted to obtain discovery from ICE, then they could have named ICE as a defendant, 23 much as they named USCIS, which is also a component of DHS, as a defendant. They did not 24 do so. 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents Responsive to RFP Nos. 40, 41, 27 and 44 should be denied. Defendants will continue to search USCIS and DHS Headquarters for 28 documents relevant to the two certified classes, as previously noted in the response to the RFPs. RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 13 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 14 of 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Dated: February 20, 2018 Respectfully submitted, CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General EDWARD S. WHITE Senior Litigation Counsel, National Security & Affirmative Litigation Unit WILLIAM C. PEACHEY Director, District Court Section Office of Immigration Litigation TIMOTHY M. BELSAN Deputy Chief, National Security & Affirmative Litigation Unit 9 10 11 12 13 /s/ Aaron R. Petty AARON R. PETTY Trial Attorney, National Security & Affirmative Litigation Unit District Court Section Office of Immigration Litigation U.S. Department of Justice 219 S. Dearborn St. Chicago, IL 60604 Tel: (202) 532-4542 Fax: (202) 305-7000 Email: aaron.r.petty@usdoj.gov JOSEPH F. CARILLI, JR. Trial Attorney, National Security & Affirmative Litigation Unit 14 15 Counsel for Defendants 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 14 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 15 of 16 1 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 20, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with 3 the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to 4 the following CM/ECF participants: 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Harry H. Schneider, Jr., Esq. Nicholas P. Gellert, Esq. David A. Perez, Esq. Laura Hennessey, Esq. Perkins Coie L.L.P. 1201 Third Ave., Ste. 4800 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 PH: 359-8000 FX: 359-9000 Email: HSchneider@perkinscoie.com Email: NGellert@perkinscoie.com Email: DPerez@perkinscoie.com Email: LHennessey@perkinscoie.com Matt Adams, Esq. Glenda M. Aldana Madrid, Esq. Northwest Immigrant Rights Project 615 Second Ave., Ste. 400 Seattle, WA 98104 PH: 957-8611 FX: 587-4025 E-mail: matt@nwirp.org E-mail: glenda@nwirp.org Emily Chiang, Esq. ACLU of Washington Foundation 901 Fifth Avenue, Suite 630 Seattle, WA 98164 Telephone: (206) 624-2184 E-mail: Echiang@aclu-wa.org Jennifer Pasquarella, Esq. Sameer Ahmed, Esq. ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1313 W. 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 977-5211 Facsimile: (213) 997-5297 E-mail: jpasquarella@aclusocal.org RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 15 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120 Filed 02/20/18 Page 16 of 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 E-mail: sahmed@aclusocal.org Stacy Tolchin, Esq. Law Offices of Stacy Tolchin 634 S. Spring St. Suite 500A Los Angeles, CA 90014 Telephone: (213) 622-7450 Facsimile: (213) 622-7233 E-mail: Stacy@tolchinimmigration.com Trina Realmuto, Esq. Kristin Macleod-Ball, Esq. American Immigration Council 100 Summer St., 23rd Fl. Boston, MA 02110 Tel: (857) 305-3600 Email: trealmuto@immcouncil.org Email: kmacleod-ball@immcouncil.org Lee Gelernt, Esq. Hugh Handeyside, Esq. Hina Shamsi, Esq. American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 Telephone: (212) 549-2616 Facsimile: (212) 549-2654 E-mail: lgelernt@aclu.org E-mail: hhandeyside@aclu.org E-mail: hshamsi@aclu.org 19 20 21 22 /s/ Aaron R. Petty AARON R. PETTY Trial Attorney, National Security & Affirmative Litigation Unit 23 24 25 26 27 28 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL - 16 (2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation District Court Section 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 (202) 532-4542 Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 1 of 17 Exhibit A ALTERATION OR MISUSE OF THIS DOCUMENT is A FEDERAL OFFENSE AND PUNISHABLE BY LAW 0/ r? U. umwcy/ way c?l?bu' "7 .. .. FORM N-sso (REV. 10/12) Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 3 of 17 Exhibit Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/20718 Page 4 of 17 li.S. Department of Homeland Security Ili/e'lhltip and Immigration \cnico I?ll/l/ 251) \lurquctte \\enue. Suite 7111 \Iinltcupolis.\1\ 551111 US Citizenship and Immigration Services Date: OCT 27 2017 Mehdi Ostadhassan MSC1490609089 DECISION Dear Mehdi Ostadhassan: Thank you for submitting Form 1-485. Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. to US. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under section 245 ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). After a thorough review ofyour application and supporting documents and your testimony during your interview unfommately, we must inform you that we are denying your application for the following reason(s). Generally. to qualify for adjustment under INA 245. an applicant must: Be inspected and admitted 0r paroled into the United States; Be eligible to receive an immigrant visa: Be admissible to the United States for permanent residence; and Have an immigrant visa immediately available at the time the application is ?led. Statement of Facts and Analysis, Including Ground(s) for Denial You filed Form 1-485 based on being the bencliciaty ofan immigrant petition. USCIS received your Form 1?485 on Februaiy I 1. 2014. and on September 24. 2015. you appeared for an interview. INA Section 245 does not contemplate that all aliens who meet the required legal standards will be granted adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. since the grant ofan application for adjustment is a matter ofdiscretion and of administrative grace. not mere eligibility. Matter of NI?argues. 16 Dec. 314 (BIA 1977). An applicant has the burden ofshowing that discretion shoJIId be exercised in his or her favor. W. 17 Dec. 597 (BIA I980): M?Lof LEADE- Dec. 12 (BIA 1976): Matterol'Arai. 13 Dec. 494 (BIA 1970). In section 345. the Regional Commissioner. in Matter of Tanahan. 18 Dec. 339 (Reg. Comm. 1981). stated. in part. that "[Tlhc determination to grant permanent residence status under section 245 lies entirely within the discretion ofthe Attorney General [and Secretary of Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 5 of 17 Homeland Security]. An applicant who meets the objective prerequisites for adjustment of status is in no way entitled to that relief." Id. Where adverse factors are present in any given application for adjustment of status under section 245. it may be necessary for th applicant to offset these factors by showing unusual or even outstanding equities. Id. However. an absence ofmajor adverse factors alone does not warrant the grant ofadjustment of status. Matter ofBlas. l5 Dec. 626 (BIA 1974). The extraordinary discretionary relief provided in section 245 can only be granted in meritorious cases and is not designed to supersede the regular consular visa issuing process. In this case. USCIS has determined that your case presents significant adverse factors which are not offset by the equities. Accordingly. denies your L485 adjustment of status application as a matter of discretion for the following reasons. The consular oflice issued the F-l visa to you on July 30. 2009. and you were subsequently admitted to the United States on August 5. 200?). Case Document 120-1 Filed Page 6 of 17 notes that you have resided in the United States since 2009, you are married to a United States citizen, you have not been arrested or convicted of any crime in the United States, and you are a professor at the University of North Dakota. The Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID) was issued on April 5, 2017 and outlined the above- referenced derogatory information in accordance with 8 C.F.R. 103.2 5. On Ma 8 2017 CIS received our res onse throu your attorney of record. US Case 2:17-cv-000 AJ Document 120-1 Filed 02/2 Page 7 of 17 Case Document 120-1 Filed 0mm Page 8 of 17 After careful review of all the facts, USCIS has determined that your application for adjustment of status is denied as a matter of discretion. The evidence of record shows that when you ?led your application, your lawful nonimmigrant status had already expired. Therefore, you are not authorized to remain in the United States and should make arrangements to depart as soon as possible. Failure to depart may result in your being found ineligible for immigration bene?ts and inadmissible to the United States in the future. See section of the INA. You may not appeal this decision. However, if you believe that the denial of your Form [-485 is in error, you may ?le a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider using Form 1-2903, Notice of Appeal or Motion. You must submit Form within 30 calendar days of service of this decision (33 days if the decision was mailed). lf USCIS does not receive the motion to reopen or reconsider within the required period, this decision will become ?nal. See Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations (8 CFR), sections 103.5 and Note: You must follow the most current ?ling instructions for Form which can be found at To access Form or if you need additional information, please visit the USCIS Web site at or call our National Customer Service Center toll free at 1-800-375-5283. You may also contact the USCIS of?ce havingjurisdiction over your current place of residence. Sincerely, 32 Leslie D. Tritten Field Of?ce Director cc: Attorney Case Document 120-1 Filed 02mm Page 9 of 17 Attachment (Applicable Law/Regulations) INA 245 ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS OF NONIMMIGRANT TO THAT 0F PERSON FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States or the status of any other alien having an approved petition for classi?cation as a VAWA self-petitioner may be adjusted by the Attorney General. in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe. to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (I) the alien makes an application for such adjustment. (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence. and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is ?led. 8 CFR 245.] General. Any alien who is physically present in the United States, except for an alien who is ineligible to apply for adjustment of status under paragraph or of this section. may apply for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States if the applicant is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and an immigrant visa is immediately available at the time of ?ling of the application. A special immigrant described under section of the Act shall be deemed. for the purpose of applying the adjustment to status provisions of section 245(a) of the Act. to have been paroled into the United States. regardless of the actual method of entry into the United States. 8 CFR l03.5 Motions to reopen or reconsider in other than special agricultural worker and legalization cases? (1) When filed by affected party? General. Except where the Board has jurisdiction and as othenvise provided in 8 CFR parts 3. 210. 242 and 245a. when the affected party ?les a motion. the of?cial havingjurisdiction may. for proper cause shown. reopen the proceeding or reconsider the prior decision. Motions to reopen or reconsider are not applicable to proceedings described in 274a.9 of this chapter. Any motion to reconsider an action by the Service ?led by an applicant or petitioner must be ?led within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider. Any motion to reopen a proceeding before the Service ?led by an applicant or petitioner. must be ?led within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen. except that failure to ?le before this period expires. may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and was beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. (ii) Jurisdiction. The of?cial having jurisdiction is the of?cial who made the latest decision in the proceeding unless the affected party moves to a new jurisdiction. In that instance, the new of?cial having jurisdiction is the of?cial over such a proceeding in the new geographical locations. Filing Requirements?A motion shall be submitted on Form and may be accompanied by a brief. It must be: (A) in writing and signed by the affected party or the attorney or representative of record. if any: (B) Accompanied by a nonrefundable fee as set forth in 103.7: (C) Accompanied by a statement about whether or not the validity of the unfavorable decision has been or is the subject of any judicial proceeding and. if so. the court. nature, date. and status or result of the proceeding: (D) Addressed to the of?cial havingjurisdiction: and (E) Submitted to the of?ce maintaining the record upon which the unfavorable decision was made for forwarding to the olTIcial havingjurisdiction. (iv) Effect of motion or subsequent application or petition. Unless the Service directs othenvise. the ?ling of a motion to reopen or reconsider or of a subsequent application or petition does not stay the execution of any decision in a case or extend a previously set departure date. (2) Requirements for motion to reopen. A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved in the reopened proceeding and be supported by af?davits or other documentary evidence. A motion to reopen an application or petition denied due to abandonment must be ?led with evidence that the decision was in error because: The requested evidence was not material to the issue ofeligibility: (ii) The required initial evidence was submitted with the application or petition. or the request for initial evidence or additional information or appearance was complied with during the allotted period: or The request for additional information or appearance was sent to an address other than that on the application. petition. or notice of representation. or that the applicant or petitioner advised the Service, in writing. of a change of address or change of representation subsequent to ?ling and before the Service's request was sent. and the request did not go to the new address. (3) Requirements for motion to reconsider. A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based on an incorrect application of law or Service policy. A motion to reconsider a decision on an application or petition must. when ?led. also establish that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence of record at the time of the initial decision. (4) Processing motions in proceedings before the Service. A motion that does not meet applicable requirements shall be dismissed. Where a motion to reopen is granted. the proceeding shall be reopened. The notice and any favorable decision may be combined. 6 Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/20@% Page 10 of 17 8 CFR 03.8 Effect of service by mail. Whenever a person has the right or is required to do some act within a prescribed period after the service of a notice upon him and the notice is served by mail. 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. 8 CFR 212.5(e) (I) Automatic. Parole shall be automatically terminated without written notice upon the departure from the United States of the alien. or (ii) if not departed. at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized. and in the latter case the alien shall be processed in accordance with paragraph of this section except that no written notice shall be required. i) On notice. in cases not covered by paragraph l) of this section. upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of the district director or chief patrol agent in charge of the area in which the alien is located, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Of?ce of Juvenile Affairs, neither humanitarian reasons nor public bene?t warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States. parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole. When a charging document is served on the alien. the charging document will constitute written notice of termination of parole, unless otherwise speci?ed. Any further inspection or hearing shall be conducted under section 235 or 240 of the Act and this chapter. or any order of exclusion. deportation. or removal previously entered shall be executed. If the exclusion. deportation. or removal order cannot be executed within a reasonable time. the alien shall again be released on parole unless in the opinion of the district director. chief patrol agent. the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal. or the Director of the Of?ce of Juvenile Affairs the public interest requires that the alien be continued in custody. 8 CFR 274a. 4 Automatic termination ofemployment authorization. (I) Employment authorization granted under 274a. of this chapter shall automatically terminate upon the occurrence of one of the following events: The expiration date speci?ed by the Service on the employment authorization document is reached: (ii) Exclusion or deportation proceedings are instituted (however. this shall not preclude the authorization of employment pursuant to 274a.12(c) of this part where appropriate): or 'lhe alien is granted voluntary departure. (2) Termination of employment authorization pursuant to this paragraph does not require the service of a notice of intent to revoke: employment authorization terminates upon the occurrence of any event enumerated in paragraph of this section. However. automatic revocation under this section does not preclude reapplication for employment authorization under 9? 274a. 12(c) of this part. Revocation of employment authorization-- (I) Basis for revocation of employment authorization. Employment authorization granted under Sec. 274a.12(c) of this chapter may be revoked by the district director: Prior to the expiration date. when it appears that any condition upon which it was granted has not been met or no longer exists. or for good cause shown: or (ii) Upon a showing that the information contained in the application is not true and correct. (2) Notice of intent to revoke employment authorization. When a district director determines that employment authorization should be revoked prior to the expiration date speci?ed by the Service. he or she shall serve written notice of intent to revoke the employment authorization. The notice will cite the reasons indicating that revocation is warranted. The alien will be granted a period of ?fteen days from the date of service of the notice within which to submit countervailing evidence. The decision by the district director shall be ?nal and no appeal shall lie from the decision to revoke the authorization. Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/2m Page 11 of 17 Attachment A Employment Authorization Document Any employment authorization based upon this Form l-485 is automatically laminated if the expiration date on the employment authorization document has been reached pursuant to 8 CFR 274a. l4(a)( Since this Form [-485 has been denied. the condition upon which your employment authorization was based no longer exists. Any unexpired employment authorization based upon this Form M85 is revoked as of [8 days from the date of this notice pursuant to 8 FR unless you submit. within l8 days. proof that your Form l-485 remains pending. The decision by the district director shall be ?nal and no appeal shall lie from the decision to revoke the authorization. Your employment authorization document should be returned to the local USCIS of?ce. Advance Parole Document Pursuant to 8 FR any advance parole document based upon this Form [-485 is automatically laminated if the expiration date of the time for which parole was authorized has been reached. Since this Form [-485 has been denied. the purpose for which your advance parole document was issued has been accomplished. Any unexpired advance parole document issued to you based upon this Form [-485 is terminated as of the date of this notice pursuant to 8 CFR Your advance parole document should be returned to the local USC IS of?ce. Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 12 of 17 Exhibit Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 120-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 13 of 17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Citizenship and Immigration SUN ices Seattle Field Wee 12500 Tukwila International Blvd Seattle, I1c1 98169 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Date: NAY 0 9 2017 A MSC1590595951 Hanin Omar Bengezi 'C/o Jay Gairson, Attorney at Law Gairson Law LLC 4606 MLK Jr. Way S. Seattle, WA 98108 Dear Hanin Bengezi: NOTICE OF ACTION On February 5, 2015, you filed an Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, Form 1-485. This Notice of Action is to inform you that on May 9, 2017, your Application for Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, Form 1-485 was approved by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Your immigrant classification is IF1, Alien admitted as Fiancée, effective May 9, 2017. Sincerely, Cynthia Munita Field Office Director www.useis.gov Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 14 of 17 Exhibit WGYJ @13in 5 a; 9! (2&1ng mama" ymf??q?f?a (72w; (?red WW I I 1 .665: m; SEATTLE WASHINGTON WOJOOW 04/de - - MUSHTAQ ABED JIHAD Wax; RENTON WASHINGTON . ?66666 Ami/i; . gm Mm?eaa?z?cdm? 0%ow a HII i IMMIGRATION SERVICES . MAY22, 2017 ALTERATION 0R MISUSE OF THIS DOCUMENT \mg? IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE AND PUNISHABLE BY LAW . 2/ nf ng?bma?/J L?ym'rm? t:g4f1:\ 9 "s .w 14.9.4". (mm/?117 I- 1 ?u 6:96:11?" DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ll .. 21331-1: 3W3 .Mrl? ?6?53! FORM N-SSO (REV. Io/Iz) Case Document 120-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 16 of 17 Exhibit -CV I I '1 . 4 63(MJz/m/z. (K's'q/yh/M/C y/brw (ya/MM ?aw/o 45' a i?mr' - I MALE Zr?/m/ 7475/7 (Ii (a (1/1 (yJJ?aI/fwf/xzz/wFiled 02/20/18 . Page 17 of 17 Cbxz/x/{y ma' . SEA TTLE, WA SHIN TON PAKI TAN WW r1217? Jamey/(31021 SAJEEL MANZOOR ?ay/MW (1/3 NEWCASTLE, WASHINGTON ?ay/{y {1/4 0/ Mr (yuik?a??' Myra/(1mm, ?ak/y (waM?a/ /0 56 a Mfr/z 007% a/ a (wax/04y U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES RAJ Document 120 00094 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 01, 2017 Case 2:17 .sm?/uwwm Ar (I 1/71/11)? 0 I Mam 277/:7/4/1/1 . ?Tn/km ALTERATION OR MISUSE OF THIS DOCUMENT IS A FEDERAL OFFENSE AND PUNISHABLE BY LAW Dana nu mm