Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 1 of 11 1 THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 9 ABDIQAFAR WAGAFE, et al., on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, 10 11 12 13 14 Plaintiffs, v. DONALD TRUMP, President of the United States, et al., Defendants. No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR: MAY 4, 2018 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 2 of 11 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 3 Page 7 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 1 A. The Deliberative Process Privilege Does Not Apply Where, As Here, Plaintiffs Allege That The Government Has Engaged In Unconstitutional Discrimination........................................................................................................ 1 B. Plaintiffs’ Need For Information Outweighs Any Interest In Keeping the Information Secret. ................................................................................................ 4 8 C. 4 I. II. 5 6 9 III. The Emrich Declaration Is Insufficient To Satisfy Defendants’ Burden Of Establishing Entitlement To The Privilege. ........................................................... 5 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 6 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) – i 139676344.1 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 3 of 11 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Page 3 CASES 4 Bernat v. City of California City, No. 1:10-CV-00305, 2010 WL 4008361 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) ..........................................6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Children First Found., Inc. v. Martinez, No. CIV. 1:04-CV-0927, 2007 WL 4344915 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007)..............................3, 5 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) ...................................................................................................................2 Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) .......................................................................................................................3 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Office of Comptroller of Currency, 145 F.3d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1998), on reh’g in part, 156 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ..................................................................................................................................1, 2, 3 Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ...............................................................................................6 Rodriguez v. City of Fontana, No. EDCV 16–1903–JGB, 2017 WL 4676261 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017) ................................5 Thomas v. Cate, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (E.D. Cal. 2010)......................................................................................2 Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (S. Ct.) .....................................................................................................................4 Welby v. United States Dep’t of Health, No. 15-CV-195 (NSR), 2016 WL 1718263 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2016) .....................................3 21 22 23 24 25 26 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) – ii 139676344.1 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 4 of 11 1 I. 2 INTRODUCTION The deliberative process privilege “has no place . . . in a constitutional claim for 3 discrimination.” In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Office of Comptroller of Currency, 145 4 F.3d 1422, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Subpoena I”), on reh’g in part, 156 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 5 1998) (“Subpoena II”). The privilege is thus inapplicable where, as here, Plaintiffs have alleged 6 invidious discrimination based on religion and national origin. And even if the privilege applied, 7 Plaintiffs’ need for information outweighs any interest in keeping their deliberations secret, 8 particularly in light of the parties’ protective order. Finally, Defendants’ declaration invoking the 9 privilege is insufficient. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel should be granted. 10 11 12 13 14 II. A. ARGUMENT The Deliberative Process Privilege Does Not Apply Where, As Here, Plaintiffs Allege That The Government Has Engaged In Unconstitutional Discrimination. 1. Defendants’ efforts to distinguish Subpoena I are unavailing, and this Court should follow its persuasive reasoning. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the deliberative process privilege “was fashioned in 15 cases where the governmental decisionmaking process is collateral to the plaintiff’s suit.” 16 Subpoena I, 145 F.3d at 1424 (emphasis added). “If the plaintiff’s cause of action is directed at 17 the government’s intent, however, it makes no sense to permit the government to use the privilege 18 as a shield.” Id. The privilege thus “has no place . . . in a constitutional claim for discrimination.” 19 Id. “[I]f . . . the Constitution . . . makes the nature of governmental officials’ deliberations the 20 issue, the privilege is a non sequitur.” Id. 21 To be sure, as Defendants point out (Opp’n at 3), the deliberative process privilege applies 22 in challenges to administrative action under the APA. But the very reasons why the privilege 23 applies in APA actions highlight why it does not apply to claims alleging unconstitutional 24 discrimination. “When a party challenges agency action as arbitrary and capricious the 25 reasonableness of the agency’s action is judged in accordance with its stated reasons.” Subpoena 26 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE LAW ENFORCEMENT PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) – 1 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 5 of 11 1 II, 156 F.3d at 1279 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 2 (1971)). “Agency deliberations not part of the record are deemed immaterial.” Id. “That is 3 because the actual subjective motivation of agency decisionmakers is immaterial as a matter of 4 law—unless there is a showing of bad faith or improper behavior.” Id. at 1279-80 (emphasis 5 added). Accordingly, “the ordinary APA cause of action does not directly call into question the 6 agency’s subjective intent.” Id. at 1280. By contrast, “the deliberative process privilege is 7 unavailable” where “the cause of action is directed at the agency’s subjective motivation.” Id. See 8 also Thomas v. Cate, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1023 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 9 Defendants’ reliance on Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, is thus misplaced. See Opp’n at 3, 6- 10 7, 9. In that case, which does not involve the deliberative process privilege, the Court found that 11 “there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” before a plaintiff may inquire 12 into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers where “administrative findings . . . 13 were made at the same time as the decision.” 401 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added). By contrast, a 14 party may inquire into an agency’s decisionmaking process where there is no administrative 15 record to review. See id. (without “formal findings,” “it may be that the only way there can be 16 effective judicial review is by examining the decisionmakers themselves”). Here, Defendants 17 issued no administrative findings with respect to CARRP; indeed, CARRP’s very existence was 18 kept secret. But more importantly, Plaintiffs do not seek disclosure of the withheld materials on 19 the ground that Defendants’ decisions were arbitrary and capricious. Rather, Plaintiffs contend 20 that the privilege is inapplicable because they allege that Defendants engaged in unconstitutional 21 discrimination in enacting CARRP and its successor extreme vetting programs. 22 Defendants argue that “the special rule of [Subpoena I] applied where Congress had 23 specifically enacted a statute that require[d] a showing of the government’s intent.” Opp’n at 3 24 (alterations omitted). But the reasoning of Subpoena I is not limited to the specific facts of that 25 case. To the contrary, the D.C. Circuit observed that “the privilege has no place in a Title VII 26 action or in a constitutional claim for discrimination.” 145 F.3d at 1424 (footnote omitted). PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ)– 2 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 6 of 11 1 Defendants’ attempt to cast Subpoena I as a one-off, therefore, does not withstand scrutiny. 2 Indeed, as Plaintiffs noted in their motion to compel, courts across the country have found the 3 deliberative process privilege inapplicable in a wide variety of factual circumstances. In Children 4 First Found., Inc. v. Martinez, No. CIV. 1:04-CV-0927, 2007 WL 4344915, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 5 10, 2007), for example, the court found that the “deliberative process privilege [could] not stand” 6 where plaintiff alleged that the Department of Motor Vehicles violated its First and Fourteenth 7 Amendment rights by denying its application for a custom license plate. Defendants do not 8 distinguish that case or the others cited in Plaintiffs’ motion. See Dkt. # 152 at pp. 5-6. 9 As the Ninth Circuit has neither embraced nor rejected Subpoena I, this Court is free to 10 follow its persuasive logic. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion on the scope of the deliberative 11 process privilege should carry particular weight, as the D.C. Circuit frequently adjudicates such 12 claims in the FOIA context. See Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 13 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (FOIA Exemption 5 incorporates the deliberative process privilege); Welby v. 14 United States Dep’t of Health, No. 15-CV-195 (NSR), 2016 WL 1718263, at *4 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 15 Apr. 27, 2016) (“Courts in the Second Circuit frequently cite FOIA decisions from the D.C. 16 Circuit as it is a jurisdiction with considerable experience on FOIA matters.”) (alterations 17 omitted). The Court should follow Subpoena I and hold that the deliberative process privilege is 18 inapplicable where the government’s intent is at issue. 19 2. 20 Defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege discriminatory Plaintiffs allege discriminatory intent with respect to CARRP. 21 intent with respect to CARRP. Opp’n at 4. In so arguing, Defendants overlook the gravamen of 22 the Complaint. As Defendants acknowledge, Plaintiffs allege that “CARRP labels applicants 23 national security concerns based on vague and overbroad criteria that often turn on national origin 24 or innocuous and lawful activities or associations.” Dkt. # 47 ¶ 76. Plaintiffs allege that those 25 activities and associations include involvement in Muslim communities, such as donating to 26 Muslim charities and traveling to Muslim-majority countries. See, e.g., id. ¶ 170 (“USCIS may PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ)– 3 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 7 of 11 1 have subjected Mr. Ostadhassan’s adjustment application to CARRP because he has resided in 2 and traveled through . . . Iran . . . and because of his donations to Islamic charities and 3 involvement in the Muslim community.”); see also id. ¶¶ 62-76, 158-60, 190-96. Plaintiffs’ claim 4 that CARRP erects extra-statutory obstacles for Muslim immigrants puts the motivations behind 5 CARRP at issue. So do Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants delay or deny applications subject 6 to CARRP for pretextual reasons. See id. ¶¶ 84, 94. Moreover, Defendants err in attempting to 7 divorce CARRP from the EOs. Plaintiffs allege that CARRP and the EOs are part of the same 8 unlawful program, and that the EOs built upon and expanded CARRP’s unlawful vetting 9 procedures. See id. ¶¶ 18, 26-28, 132-141; see also id. ¶ 19 n.1. (“Plaintiffs’ reference to 10 ‘CARRP’ incorporates any similar non-statutory and sub-regulatory successor vetting policy, 11 including pursuant to . . . the Second EO.”). Indeed, this Court has understood that “Plaintiffs’ 12 case centers on their allegation that an extra-statutory policy based on discriminatory and illegal 13 criteria is blocking the fair adjudication of immigration benefits of which they are statutorily 14 eligible.” Dkt. # 69 at p. 17 (emphasis added). 15 Even if Plaintiffs’ allegations of discriminatory intent with respect to CARRP were 16 insufficiently clear, however, there can be no doubt that Plaintiffs have alleged discriminatory 17 animus with respect to the EOs. Defendants have claimed the deliberate process privilege over 75 18 documents related to the EOs. See Opp’n at 5 n.6. At a minimum, the Court should order 19 disclosure of those documents.1 20 B. 21 22 23 24 25 26 Plaintiffs’ Need For Information Outweighs Any Interest In Keeping the Information Secret. Even if the privilege applied, Plaintiffs explained in their motion to compel why their need for information outweighs any interest in maintaining total secrecy over the records at issue. See Dkt. # 152 at pp. 7-10. While Defendants disagree, it is notable that they say little about the Stipulated Protective Order. They state that the protective order “does not offer sufficient 1 Defendants’ suggestion that the Court should await the ruling of the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (S. Ct.), is misplaced, as that case will not determine the scope of the deliberative process privilege. PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ)– 4 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 8 of 11 1 protection for the national security and investigatory information revealed in the deliberations at 2 issue,” but that concern appears to relate to materials withheld under the law enforcement 3 privilege, not the deliberative process privilege. Opp’n at 10 n.13 (emphasis added). The Emrich 4 Declaration (see infra) is similarly lacking, as it offers nothing more than the conclusory assertion 5 that “a protective order would not mitigate the chilling effect and detrimental consequences that 6 would result” from disclosure under such an order. Dkt. # 174-3 ¶ 7. To the contrary, the 7 protective order provides that “confidential information” includes “any information not in the 8 public domain,” Dkt. # 86 ¶ 2, and that such information “shall not be disseminated outside the 9 confines of this case, nor shall it be included in any pleading, record or document that is not filed 10 under seal with the Court or redacted in accordance with applicable law.” Id. ¶ 4.1. Given this 11 protection, there is minimal risk that the limited disclosure of information relevant to this lawsuit 12 would hinder frank discussion within the government. 13 Defendants also claim that the balance weighs in their favor because CARRP-related 14 documents are purportedly not relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegations of discriminatory intent. 15 Plaintiffs have addressed that argument above, and also note that CARRP-related documents are 16 relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims for additional reasons—e.g., they may reveal the extra-statutory 17 criteria Defendants apply to delay and deny applications under CARRP. 18 C. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 The Emrich Declaration Is Insufficient To Satisfy Defendants’ Burden Of Establishing Entitlement To The Privilege. Faced with Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, Defendants belatedly submit a declaration from Matthew D. Emrich formally “assert[ing] the deliberative process privilege over documents previously withheld or redacted on that basis.” Dkt. # 174-3 ¶ 5. The Emrich Declaration is insufficient for three reasons. First, as noted, it does not adequately explain why “disclosure under a protective order would create a substantial risk of harm” to government interests. Rodriguez v. City of Fontana, No. EDCV 16–1903–JGB (KKx), 2017 WL 4676261, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017). While Mr. Emrich asserts that the protective order “would not mitigate the PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ)– 5 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 9 of 11 1 chilling effect” of disclosure, Dkt. # 174-3 ¶ 7, the protective order does not allow for public 2 disclosure of confidential information. Rather, the information may be shared only with a select 3 list of people, which includes the named Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ counsel and support staff, experts 4 and witnesses to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary, and the Court and its personnel. Dkt. # 5 86 ¶ 4.2. Mr. Emrich makes no attempt to explain why disclosing information only to those 6 individuals listed in the order would purportedly have a chilling effect on government 7 deliberations. Cf. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 662 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (explaining 8 with respect to the law enforcement privilege that in many situations it is “is disclosure to the 9 public generally, not simply to an individual litigant and/or her lawyer,” that would pose a risk). 10 Second, the declaration does not “show[] that the material for which the privilege is 11 asserted has been kept confidential.” Bernat v. City of California City, No. 1:10-CV-00305, 2010 12 WL 4008361, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010). 13 Third, Mr. Emrich asserts the deliberative process privilege over a large number of 14 documents that he groups into categories with generalized descriptions. See, e.g., Dkt. # 174-3 ¶¶ 15 9-13, 15-24, 29, 41, 68, 73, 75, 76. These generalized descriptions do not pass muster. The Court 16 has already ruled with respect to the law enforcement privilege that the Government must use the 17 privilege “deliberately” and be “exacting” with which documents fall within its scope; the same is 18 true here. Dkt. # 148 at p. 5. 19 In any event, given the belated production of the Emrich Declaration, Plaintiffs request the 20 opportunity to challenge each specific assertion of the privilege if the Court concludes the 21 privilege may be invoked in this case. In light of the new information, for example, Plaintiffs 22 would request the opportunity to show why specific withholdings/redactions are overbroad and 23 why their need for individual documents outweighs Defendants’ interest in secrecy. 24 25 26 III. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their motion to compel. In the alternative, they request the opportunity to challenge each privilege assertion in light of the Emrich Declaration. PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ)– 6 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 10 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 DATED: May 4, 2018 s/Jennifer Pasquarella (admitted pro hac vice) s/Sameer Ahmed (admitted pro hac vice) ACLU Foundation of Southern California 1313 W. 8th Street Los Angeles, CA 90017 Telephone: (213) 977-5236 Facsimile: (213) 997-5297 jpasquarella@aclusocal.org sahmed@aclusocal.org s/Matt Adams s/Glenda M. Aldana Madrid Matt Adams #28287 Glenda M. Aldana Madrid #46987 Northwest Immigrant Rights Project 615 Second Ave., Ste. 400 Seattle, WA 98122 Telephone: (206) 957-8611 Facsimile: (206) 587-4025 matt@nwirp.org glenda@nwirp.org 20 21 22 23 24 25 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Telephone: 206.359.8000 Facsimile: 206.359.9000 Email: HSchneider@perkinscoie.com NGellert@perkinscoie.com DPerez@perkinscoie.com LHennessey@perkinscoie.com s/Stacy Tolchin (admitted pro hac vice) Law Offices of Stacy Tolchin 634 S. Spring St. Suite 500A Los Angeles, CA 90014 Telephone: (213) 622-7450 Facsimile: (213) 622-7233 Stacy@tolchinimmigration.com s/Trina Realmuto (admitted pro hac vice) s/Kristin Macleod-Ball (admitted pro hac vice) Trina Realmuto Kristin Macleod-Ball American Immigration Council 100 Summer St., 23rd Fl. Boston, MA 02110 Tel: (857) 305-3600 Email: trealmuto@immcouncil.org Email: kmacleod-ball@immcouncil.org s/Hugh Handeyside Hugh Handeyside #39792 s/Lee Gelernt (admitted pro hac vice) s/Hina Shamsi (admitted pro hac vice) American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 125 Broad Street New York, NY 10004 Telephone: (212) 549-2616 Facsimile: (212) 549-2654 lgelernt@aclu.org hhandeyside@aclu.org hshamsi@aclu.org s/Emily Chiang Emily Chiang #50517 ACLU of Washington Foundation 901 Fifth Avenue, Suite 630 Seattle, WA 98164 Telephone: (206) 624-2184 Echiang@aclu-wa.org 18 19 s/ Harry H. Schneider, Jr. Harry H. Schneider, Jr. #9404 s/ Nicholas P. Gellert Nicholas P. Gellert #18041 s/ David A. Perez David A. Perez #43959 s/ Laura K. Hennessey Laura K. Hennessey #47447 26 PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ)– 7 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000 Case 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ Document 180 Filed 05/04/18 Page 11 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that on the date indicated below, I caused service of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL RE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE via the CM/ECF system that will automatically send notice of such filing to all counsel of record herein. DATED this 4th day of May, 2018, at Seattle, Washington. 7 8 By: s/David A. Perez David A. Perez Attorney for Plaintiffs Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Telephone: 206.359.8000 Facsimile: 206.359.9000 Email: DPerez@perkinscoie.com 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (No. 2:17-cv-00094-RAJ) – 1 Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, WA 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000