No. 18-2529
______________________________________________________
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
_______________________________________________________
NERINGA VENCKIENE, )
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
-v- )
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent-Appellee. )
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
No. 18 cv 3061, Hon. Virginia Kendall, Judge Presiding
____________________________________________________________
BRIEF AND APPENDIX
FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT
Michael D. Monico
Barry A. Spevack
Carly A. Chocron
MONICO & SPEVACK
20 South Clark Street
Suite 700
Chicago, Illinois 60603
312-782-8500
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

 Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
1
CIRCUIT RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Appellate Court No.: 18-2529
Short Caption: Venckiene v. United States
(1) Neringa Venckiene
(2) Michael Monico, Barry Spevack, Carly Chocron (Monico &
Spevack)
(3) i) N/A
(4) ii) N/A
Barry A. Spevack 8/31/18
/s/ Barry A. Spevack
20 South Clark Street
Suite 700
Chicago, Illinois 60603
312-782-8500
Fax 312-759-2000
bspevack@monicolaw.com
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2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Disclosure Statement ………………………………………. 1
Table of Contents ………………………………………. 2
Table of Authorities ………………………………………. 3
Jurisdictional Statement ………………………………………. 5
Issues Presented for Review ………………………………. 6
Statement of the Case ……………………………………….. 6
Summary of Argument ……………………………………….. 15
Standard of Review ……………………………………….. 18
Argument ………………………………………. 19
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A

 STAY BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS MADE A STRONG SHOWING OF
POSSIBLE SUCCESS ON THE MERITS, SHE WILL BE IRREPARABLY
INJURED ABSENT A STAY, NO OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES WILL
BE SUBSTANTIALLY INJURED AND A STAY IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE PUBLIC INTEREST …………………………… 18
A. Habeas Review of Magistrate Judge’s Order ……… 19
B. Private Bills Introduced to Congress ………………… 31
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
A STAY SO IT COULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S AND DISTRICT COURT ORDERS
IMPROPERLY EXPOSED PETITIONER TO ATROCIOUS
ATROCIOUS PUNISHMENTS AND PROCEDURES
IN LITHUANIA …………………………………………………………. 33
III. THE EXTRADITION PROCESS
SHOULD BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT VIOLATES FAIR NOTIONS
OF DUE PROCESS …………………………………………… 37
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3
Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………… 39
Rule 32(a) Compliance ……………………………………………… 40
Certificate of Service ……………………………………………. 40
Required Appendix …………………………………………… A-1
A. Table of Contents …………………………………………… A-1
B. Rule 30(d) Certification …………………………………. A-1
C. Magistrate Judge Order …………………………………. A-2
D. District Court Order ………………………………….. A-7
E. Secretary of State Ruling ………………………… A-42
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Arambasic v. Ashcroft, 403 F.Supp.2d 951
(D.S.D. 2005) ……………………………………………………… 23

 Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986) ……………… 27
Avila-Ramos v. Kammerzell, 2017 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 18670
(D.Col.) ………………………………………………………. 28
Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149 (1996) (per curiam) ………………. 27
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981) ………………………………….. 22-23, 25
Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980) …….. 38
Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925) …………………………. 26
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986) ………………. 19, 32
Guardado-Figueroa v. Kuta, 583 Fed.App. 550 (7th Cir. 2014) …. 28
In re Atias, 2014 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 70278 (E.D.Mo.) ………………. 28
In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984) …………………………. 33
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4
In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. 149 (1981) ……………………………………. 21
In re Extradition of Grace Chan Seong-I, 346 F.Supp.2d 1149
(D.N.M. 2004) ……………………………………………………….. 37
In re Extradition of Sindona, 450 F.Supp. 672
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) ………………………………………………………. 26
In re Extradition of Mirela, 2018 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 58056
(D.Conn.) ………………………………………………………………… 28-29
In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D.Cal. 1894) ………………………… 22
In re Hurtado-Hurtado, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 47638
(S.D.Fla.) ………………………………………………………………… 30
In re Requested Extradition of Joseph Patrick Doherty,
599 F.Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ……………………….. 24
In re Wepplo, 2010 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 34493
(N.D.Ohio) ……………………………………………………… 30-31
Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962) ………………. 26
Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1991) ………………. 25
LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 Fed.Appx. 816

 (11th Cir. 2016) ……………………………………………………………….. 19, 32
Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) ……………………………………………………………….. 20, 28-29
Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2000) ………………. 27-28
LoBue v. Christopher, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ……………… 24
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901) …………………………………. 36-37
Nezirovov v. Holt, 990 F.Supp. 606 (W.D.Va. 2014) ……………… 20
Nezirovic v. Holt, 2014 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 91684
(W.D.Va.) ……………………………………………………………….. 20
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) ………………………………… 18-20
Noriega v. Pastrana, 2008 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 7203
(S.D.Fla. 2008) …………………………………………………………….. 28
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5
Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588 (4th Cir. 2007) ………………….. 21
Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1977) ………………….. 38
Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896) ………………………………………. 18
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) ……………………. 21-23
Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam) ……………………………………………………………………… 19
SEIU Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 2012) ……………………. 19
Subias v. Meese, 835 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1987) ……………………. 24
Vo v. Benov, 447 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2006) ……………………………… 18
Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 1998)……………………………… 24
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission
v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841(D.C.Cir. 1977) …………………… 19
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an interlocutory appeal from the District Court’s order denying
Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Stay of Extradition. On February 21, 2018,
Magistrate Judge Daniel Martin certified Petitioner for extradition. See In re
Extradition of Neringa Venckiene, No. 18 CR 56 (N.D. Ill.). On April 23, 2018, the

 Secretary of State authorized Petitioner’s surrender to the Lithuanian government.
On
April 30, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. (R. 1).
On May 7, 2018, Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Stay of her surrender
until after the habeas petition has been decided. (R. 9). The District Court denied
Petitioner’s motion on July 12, 2018. (R. 32).
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Petitioner filed her notice of appeal on July 13, 2018 so the notice of appeal is
timely pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The District
Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as interlocutory injunctions are
immediately appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Calderon v. United
States
Dist. Court, 137 F.3d 1420, 1421 (9th Cir. 1998). “In determining the appealability of
an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we ‘look to its substantial effect
rather than its terminology.” Tagupa v. East-West Center, Inc., 642 F.2d 1127, 1129
(9th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d 662,663 n.1 (1st
Cir. 1969).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A STAY
BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS MADE A STRONG SHOWING OF POSSIBLE SUCCESS
ON THE MERITS, SHE WILL BE IRREPARABLY INJURED ABSENT A STAY, NO
OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY INJURED AND A STAY
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
II. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
A STAY IN SO IT COULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
THE SECRETARY OF STATE and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDERS
IMPROPERLY EXPOSED PETITIONER TO ATROCIOUS PUNISHMENTS
AND PROCEDURES IN THE REQUESTING JURISDICTION.
III. WHETHER THE EXTRADITION PROCESS SHOULD BE

 DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES FAIR
NOTIONS OF DUE PROCESS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. In Lithuania
Petitioner graduated from the Vilnius University in Lithuania with a law degree
in 1995 and worked as a judge from 1999 to 2012. R. 13-1 at 233. In 2007 she was
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7
promoted from Kaunas District Judge to Kaunas Regional Judge, a higher position
within the Republic of Lithuania’s court system. Id. She witnessed corruption and
scandal in the system on a continuing basis. “Fixing” cases was a common practice.
While she had witnessed this corruption before, Petitioner began speaking publicly
about it after her niece, then four years old (and referred to in this brief as “DK”),
mentioned to her grandmother (Petitioner’s mother) that she had been molested by
three men, each of whom enjoyed political privilege. Id., at 235.
Petitioner’s brother, Drasius Kedys (“Kedys”), was the girl’s father. He and the
girl’s mother, Laimute Stankunaite (“Stankunaite”), were not married. R. 13-1 at
235.
They were separated at the time of the events and Kedys had been granted full
custody.
Stankunaite had visiting rights. Sometime in 2008, DK claimed that during
visitations
she had been forced to lay beside Stankunaite and Andrius Usas, an assistant to the
Speaker of the Seimas (the Lithuanian parliament), at which time Usas “licked her
all
over.” Id. at 232, 235 A psychiatric evaluation determined that Petitioner’s niece
was
most likely providing truthful testimony about this sexual abuse, and Petitioner
claimed
that a journal article identified Usas as a middleman in a regional pedophilia
network
involving high-ranking officials in both Latvia and Lithuania. Id.; R 1-5 at 37.
Petitioner suspected Usas intended to harm her family and arrange for termination
of

 her judicial title in the interest of keeping the details of his involvement in the
pedophilia scandal quiet. R. 13-1 at 232, 235.1
1 The existence of a pedophilia network encompassing Lithuania and Latvia at the
time was wellpublicized.
See R. 13-1 at 247, 263.
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DK also accused Jonas Furmanavicius (“Furmanavicius”), a Kaunas Regional
Court Judge. R. 13-1 at 235. Kedys filed multiple complaints about Furmanavicius
that
were never investigated. Though it was widely known that Furmanavicius and Usas
were friends and though telephone records revealed contacts between
Furmanavicius
and Stankunaite, the three of them denied any relationship, and the Prosecutor
General
at the time, a law school classmate of Furmanavicius, was forced to resign from his
position based on negligent handling of the pedophilia allegations, only to be
subsequently hired as a judge. Id. at 235-36.2
In October 2009, Kedys disappeared and Furmanavicius and Stankunaite’s sister
were shot and killed. Kedys’ body was subsequently discovered on the bank of a
lagoon.
A government investigation declared his death accidental (alcohol induced
asphyxiation
caused by his own vomit) but an independent criminologist concluded the death
was not
accidental and there was no alcohol found in his system. His funeral drew thousands
of
Lithuanian citizens. That same month Usas threatened to use his judicial
connections to
get Petitioner fired and in March 2010 Usas made threats against her life. R. 13-1 at
235, 317. In June 2010, Usas was found dead. R. 13-1 at 234. There have been
reports
of between five and 13 others associated with the pedophilia scandal who were also
killed. R. 1-13 at 69. R. 1-16 at 80; R. 1-19 at 90; R. 1-28 at 125.
Upon Kedys’ disappearance Petitioner was awarded parental custody pending the

 investigation of a criminal pedophilia case with respect to the mother, Stankunaite.
R.
13-1 at 232. The Vilnius District Court found enough evidence existed to indict
Stankunaite in relation to her involvement in her daughter’s abuse. Id. at 236, 237.
2 The third suspect, known only as Aidas, was never specifically identified. R. 13-1
at 236.
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In January 2010, Parliament found that the pedophilia case had been negligently
investigated and that the manner of the investigation may have actually damaged
the
search for justice. R. 13-1 at 236.
In November 2010 in an interview with a journalist Petitioner publicly
condemned the court system as corrupt, leading the Chairman of the Judicial
Council to
subject Petitioner for ethical hearings and censure for “insulting the court.” R. 13-1
at
239. A pretrial criminal investigation into the subject based on her having allegedly
“humiliated” the court was discontinued on January 12, 2011, because the
prosecutor
general found no evidence she violated the law. Id. A month later, though the time
limit
had already expired, the head of the Judicial Council successfully petitioned to
extend
the statute of limitations on those proceedings so it could renew the criminal case
against her. Id. The trial proceedings would lay dormant for more than a year. Id. at
239-40.
In the meantime, Stankunaite asked for her parental rights to be restored. In
September 2010, the Parnevezys District Court suspended Stankunaite’s request
while
potential criminal charges against her based on the pedophilia allegations were still
being considered. R. 13-1 at 237. In the end, Stankunaite would never be indicted.
R.
13-1 at 237. In December 2011, despite the open criminal investigation and DK’s

 insistence she did not want to live with her mother, the Kedainiai District Court
ordered
Petitioner to transfer DK to Stankunaite. Id. at 236.
After two unsuccessful transfer attempts, one at a secondary school building and
another at Kaunas county police headquarters, it became clear DK would not go
voluntarily. R. 13-1 at 237. Petitioner became convinced a forced transfer would
violate
the Lithuanian Civil Code’s prohibition against children. Id. Several attempts by
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Stankunaite to pick up DK at Petitioner’s home failed because the child simply
refused
to leave.
On March 22, 2012, Bailiff Sonata Vaicekauskiene petitioned the Kedainiai
District Court for clarification as to whether force could be used on any obstacles in
the
way of enforcement of the court order. R. 13-1 at 237. On March 23, 2012, when
Petitioner was not at home, Stankunaite arrived at Petitioner’s mother’s house
accompanied by 25 police officers, some wearing masks, to effectuate a transfer.
Petitioner’s mother was knocked to the ground and Petitioner’s aunt was punched in
the
mouth, and though force was used against DK the effort was unsuccessful yet
again. Id.
The March 23d incident was videotaped and blasted over the internet; the matter
became a national nightmare. See R. 13-1 at 237; R. 1-13 at 69; R. 1-17 at 86; R. 120 at
93; R. 1-21 at 97. Lithuanians became aware of the pedophilia scandal and how
DK’s
father had died under suspicious circumstances. The home became the epicenter of
a
national effort to protect DK. Hundreds of people began camping out on the front
lawn.
The numbers grew as more “Kedys-ophiles” – a name bestowed by the media –
became
involved in providing support for DK’s safety and promoting transparency in

 government operations. Id. at 237.
As of May 15 there were reports of as many as 200 protestors camped out in front
of the home. R.13-1 at 300. On the morning of May 17, 2012, 240 police officers
arrived
prepared for violence, blocked off streets with barricades and in what the police
commissioner described as the largest civil operation in Lithuanian history waded
through the protestors and made their way to the house. R. 13-1 at 298-300.
Petitioner
asked supporters to allow officers inside; because force on the child was forbidden,
if DK
continued to refuse to leave the officers would be forced to retreat. R. 13-1 at 23738.
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Cameras had been installed on the premises to record of the events, but after
breaking
into the home police turned them off, forcibly disengaged DK as she clung to
Petitioner,
and then carried DK through the crowd and off the premises. Id. at 238. Petitioner
went
to the hospital after officers violently twisted her arms behind her back and injured
her
shoulder. R. 24-4 at 430.
Following the events of May 17 Petitioner became more outspoken. She
criticized the government’s handling of DK’s case and other matters relating to
government corruption, including weaknesses of the work of the court and law
enforcement agencies and the irrational force involved in the transfer of custody. R.
131 at 238-39. She published a book, Way of Courage, detailing important aspects of
the
pedophilia case and criticizing the judicial system, prosecution, and courts for their
negligence. Id. “Way of Courage” became a renegade political party with a growing
membership. It organized protests, circulated petitions, and fostered dialogues in
internet forums and blogs. Id.
On May 23, 2012, less than one week after the home invasion, citing Petitioner’s

 remarks back in November 2010 (“humiliating the court”) and the events on May
17,
the prosecutor general asked parliament to remove Petitioner’s judicial immunity. R.
13-1 at 240. An indictment was returned charging her with “humiliation” and
interference with the transfer. Id.
In June 2012 a Public Commission consisting of former parliamentarians,
prominent attorneys, university professors, and signers of the Lithuanian
Independence
Act analyzed and condemned the May 17 event, finding that officers had violated
the
rights of Petitioner and DK and used excessive force on both of them and against
their
numerous supporters. R. 13-1 at 238. The report cited the illegal removal of the
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cameras that were in no way interfering with the transfer and the illegal
encroachment
on private property. Id.3
On June 26, 2012, Petitioner was stripped of her judicial immunity based upon
her public criticism. R. 13-1 at 232. A week later Petitioner resigned from her 13year
position in the Kaunas courts because she could not in good faith continue working
as a
judge without immunity. Id. She became the inspiration for the Way of Courage
political party which operated in opposition to the well-established political parties
in
parliament, their platforms, and their acquiescence to corruption at various levels of
government and the legal system. Id. The impetus for Way of Courage were the
rising
levels of visible corruption in government. It was also an attempt to find the truth in
DK’s pedophilia case. Way of Courage campaigned on anti-corruption principles and
judicial reform. Its protests and rallies gained thousands of supporters at its peak.
Tremendous support was shown for Petitioner’s brother and her family in light of the
pedophilia scandal. R. 13-1 at 234.
In October 2012 the nascent Way of Courage political party won seven seats in

 the Seimas. R. 13-1 at 235. Petitioner was elected the party chair. Id. At 240. On
December 28, 2012 the prosecutor general petitioned the Seimas to remove her
parliamentary immunity and allow for her arrest, once again based on the charges
relating to DK’s transfer and “humiliating the court.” The prosecutor added new
allegations not included back in May, to wit: biting and kicking Stankunaite during
the
3
The report can be found at
ttp://www.tiesos.lt/index.php/tinklarastis/straipsnis/conclusionsof-the-lithuanianpublic-commission-to-investigate-the-act-of-v.

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removal of DK.4 Id. at 240. Her parliamentary immunity was removed on April 9,
2013. Id. at 240-41. Fearing for her personal safety Petitioner came to the United
States
with her now 18-year-old son. She applied immediately for asylum5 and has lived
and
worked openly and without incident in Crystal Lake, Illinois.
B. In the United States
Five years passed. On January 26, 2018, the United States Government filed a
complaint for extradition. The request listed the following Lithuanian offenses:
(a) complicity in the commission of a criminal act (unlawful collection of
information about a person’s personal life; i.e., stalking)6;
(b) unlawful collection of information about a person’s private life i.e.,
stalking7;
(c) hindering the activities of bailiff8;
(d) failure to comply with a court decision not associated with a penalty9;
(e) causing physical pain;10 and,
(d) resistance against a civil servant or a person performing the functions of a
public administrator.11 R. 18 at 300 (Case No. 18 CR 056).
4 The specific charges, summarized, were: humiliating the court in November 2010;
failing to

 comply with a court order to transfer her niece; violating her duty as her niece’s
guardian by
causing the child psychological stress; refusing to allow police into the home and
physically
assaulting an officer and Laimute Stankumante.
5 Venckiene filed an application for asylum in August 2013, shortly after arriving in
the United
States. In re Neringa Venckiene, A205953658. A ruling is not anticipated until July
2019. 6 In violation of Lithuanian Criminal Code Article 25. The charge was based on
allegations that
supporters had followed suspected pedophiles and tracked their movements. 7 In
violation of Lithuanian Criminal Code Article 167. See fn. 4, above. 8 In violation of
Lithuanian Criminal Code Article 231. 9 In violation of Lithuanian Criminal Code
Article 245.
10 In violation of Lithuanian Criminal Code Article 140(1)
11 In violation of Lithuanian Criminal Code Article 286.
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On February 21, 2018, Magistrate Judge Daniel Martin held a hearing on the
Government’s extradition request. At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Martin
found
that the papers submitted by Lithuania established the following:
(a) As to the offense of “complicity in the commission of a criminal act”
(stalking), a finding of no probable cause;
(b) As to the offense of “unlawful collection of information about a person
(stalking), a finding of no probable cause;
(c) As to the offense of “hindering the activities of a … bailiff,” a finding of
probable cause;
(d) As to failure to comply with a court’s decision not associated with a
penalty, a finding of probable cause;
(e) As to causing physical pain, a finding or probable cause; and,
(d) As to resistance against a civil servant or a person performing the
functions of public administration for which extradition is sought,” a finding of
probable

 cause. R. 35 at 60-62 (Case No. 18 CR 056); R. 18 at 301 (Case No. 18 CR 056); R.
14 at
290-91 (Case No. 18 CR 056).
Petitioner responded by submitting documents to the Secretary of State asking
the Office to exercise its discretion not to extradite her. R. 1-3 at 25. On April 23,
2018,
The Secretary of State rejected her request. R. 1-2 at 24. On April 30, 2018,
Petitioner
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus challenging both Judge Martin’s and Secretary of
State’s orders. R. 1. The matter was assigned to Judge Kendall.
C. Request for a Stay
Petitioner’s habeas petition included a request for a stay, R. 1 at 20, that she
followed up with a more formal motion. R. 9 at 149. The Government opposed the
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15
request. R. 11 at 176. After reviewing the parties’ written filings, Judge Kendall
denied
the motion to stay. Applying the traditional four-factor test, Judge Kendall found that
1)
Petitioner was unlikely to succeed on the merits; and that 2) though she had
presented a
strong case for irreparable harm it could not overcome her weak case on the merits.
The
Judge found that the opposing party and the public’s interests in the prompt
execution
of an extradition order justified denying a stay on those two grounds as well. R. 32
at
570-71.
The Judge also declined to enter a stay based on two separate bills introduced in
the House of Representatives that if passed would permit Petitioner to have free
movement and continued ability to work in the United States until a final order on a
pending asylum petition was issued. Specifically, on June 25, 2018, Representative
Smith from New Jersey introduced a bill “related to the pursuit of justice against
Lithuanian public officials accused of sexually molesting her young niece.” R. 29-1
at

 486. Two days later, Representative Hultgren from Illinois introduced a similar bill. R.
29-1 at 493. Both bills are similarly short-titled as “Give Judge Venckiene her Day in
Court Act.” R. 29-1 at 486; R. 29-1 at 493. The District Court felt there was no way
to
predict how long consideration of either bill would take much less make any
assumptions about the possibility of passage and therefore denied the stay on that
ground as well.
The instant appeal is from the District Court’s denial of a stay.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner, Neringa Venckiene, while a Judge in the Republic of Lithuania,
learned that her four-year-old niece had been sexually molested by various
individuals
in the Lithuanian legislature and judiciary while in her mother’s care. Venckiene’s
and
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16
her brother’s complaints were ignored. In 2009 two of the accused were shot and
killed;
Venckiene’s brother’s dead body was discovered sometime afterwards. Venckiene
was
appointed her niece’s legal guardian.
Negligent and diffident investigation into the allegations of pedophilia and the
death of Venckiene’s brother led Venckiene to spearhead a grass roots campaign in
Lithuania that angered powerful members of the legislature and judiciary who
accused
her of humiliating the court and branded her an abscess on the judicial system.
When
the courts ordered Venckiene to return her niece to the mother who had allowed the
molestation to occur, the child resisted. In May 2012 over 200 police officers waded
through over 100 demonstrators to break into the home and grab the child while
she
clung to Venckiene. The matter became a national obsession.
Lithuania responded by removing Venckiene’s judicial immunity, effectively
forcing her off the bench. In response, Venckiene helped form a political party to
fight

 corruption and seek justice for her niece and brother that won seven seats in the
Lithuanian parliament. Venckiene was elected Chair, but Lithuania responded to
that by
removing her parliamentary immunity and resurrecting ex post facto a statute of
limitations that had already run on the humiliation and other allegations. Fearful for
her safety and freedom in Lithuania, Venckiene came to the United States and
applied
for asylum. She settled into a productive and law-abiding life until the Lithuanian
government asked the United States to extradite her to face charges that she
obstructed
the legal process and failed to comply with a court order and committed batteries
on an
officer and the child’s mother in the heat of the May 2012 incident.
The Magistrate Judge certified Venckiene for surrender to Lithuania. Pending in
the District Court is Venckiene’s Petition for Habeas Corpus challenging the
Magistrate
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17
Judge’s order and a subsequent order by the Secretary authorizing her extradition.
This
appeal arises because the District Court declined to stay Venckiene’s extradition to
Lithuania until the proceedings in the United States – which includes the asylum
petition -- have run their courses.
Petitioner submits the charged offenses fall within the so-called political offense
exception to extradition. Those offenses arose in the course of a violent political
uprising
against government action. Several people were killed over a period of time and
Venckiene’s life was threatened in direct relation to her complaints about the
pedophilia. Venckiene maintains she will suffer irreparable harm if this Court fails to
reverse the denial of the stay because returning her to Lithuania will render the
habeas
corpus and asylum proceedings moot. The delay causes no harm to Lithuania and
the
public interest is in favor of not extraditing her before she can have a full hearing on
the

 merits, especially because Venckiene has reason to believe she will not merely be
treated
unfairly in Lithuania but that her physical safety and life would be in danger. She
had
already experienced an incident where her car was tampered with before she made
the
decision to leave Lithuania altogether.
In addition, in June 2018 two separate Congressmen introduced private bills in
the House of Representatives that would suspend these extradition proceedings
until
such time that Venckiene’s extradition and asylums petition were acted upon. As
with
the issue above, if the Court does not issue a stay Venckiene will suffer irreparable
harm
as the whole point of the Congressional bills will be mooted.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of State has already agreed that extradition is proper.
In making that ruling the Secretary of State relied upon the faulty ruling by the
Magistrate Judge, did not have before it the Congressional bills, and did not provide
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18
Venckiene with any kind of an explanation for the decision. For that reason as well
the
decision of the Secretary of State should not be followed.
The subject of this appeal affects only whether Venckiene is extradited. She will
remain in the custody of the United States Marshal pending the underlying
proceedings
unless she is granted a bond. That issue is not before this Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and
effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants. It calls for the exercise of judgment, which
must weigh competing interest and maintain an even balance. Landis v. N. Am. Co.,
299
U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The appellate court reviews denials of requests for a stay for

 abuse of discretion. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
Whether there was a violent political disturbance in the requesting country at the
time of the alleged acts and whether the acts were incidental to the disturbance,
however, are mixed questions of law and fact, Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509
(1896). Mixed questions of law and facts are reviewed de novo, Vo v. Benov, 447
F.3d
1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2006), but with deference to the Magistrate Judge’s finding of
facts.
Ornelas, 161 U.S. at 509.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A STAY
BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS MADE A STRONG SHOWING OF
POSSIBLE SUCCESS ON THE MERITS, SHE WILL BE IRREPARABLY
INJURED ABSENT A STAY, NO OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY INJURED AND A STAY
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST
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19
A. HABEAS REVIEW FROM THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER
Traditionally a court considers four (4) factors when deciding whether to grant a
stay: 1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; 2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a
stay;
3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties who have
an
interest in the litigation; and 4) where the public interest lies. Nken v. Holder, 556
U.S.
418, 434 (2009). The four factors are not prerequisites that must be met but are
interrelated considerations that must be balanced together. SEIU Local 1 v. Husted,
698
F.3d 341, 343 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Though the
first
two factors are often described as the most critical, the Court has also stated that a
stay

 may be granted upon a lesser showing of a substantial case on the merits when the
balance of equities identified in factors 2, 3 and 4 weighs heavily in favor of
granting the
stay. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 Fed.Appx. 816 (11th Cir. 2016), citing and quoting
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986). See also Ruiz v. Estelle,
650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (“An order maintaining the status quo
is
appropriate when a serious legal question is presented, when little if any harm will
befall
interested persons or the public and when denial of the order would inflict
irreparable
injury on the movant.), quoting Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v.
Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
When it comes to issuance of a stay, the first factor addresses the petitioner’s
likelihood of success on the merits. It is critical to note that at this point the Court is
not
required to find that ultimate success on the merits is a mathematical probability. If
that were the case the rule would not require as it does a prior presentation to the
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20
district judge whose order is being appealed. Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d at 565. A more
stringent requirement that the moving party must show her ultimate success at this
stage would put every case where a stay was requested on an expedited schedule
with
the parties required to brief the merits of the case in depth for stay purposes or
would
have the court attempting to predict with accuracy the resolution of often-thorny
legal
issues without adequate briefing and argument. Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962,
967 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Such pre-adjudication would defeat the purpose of
the stay, which is to give the court time to act responsibly rather than doling out
justice
on the fly. Cf. Nken, 129 S.Ct. at 1757 (in the context of appeal of order on the
merits).

 “The whole idea is to hold the matter under review in abeyance because the
appellate
court lacks sufficient time to decide the merits.” Nken, 129 S.Ct. at 1760. The same
considerations would apply here where the court is reviewing a denial of a stay
before
the district court has had an opportunity to fully consider the merits.
a. The Political Offense Exception Prevents
The Extradition of Petitioner
Petitioner’s principal argument on the merits is that Lithuania’s basis for seeking
Petitioner’s extradition falls within the “political offense” exception to the United
States/Lithuania extradition treaty, see Extradition Treaty Between the Government
of
the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania
(“Treaty”), which states that “Extradition shall not be granted for an offense for
which
extradition is requested is a political offense.” See Treaty, Art. 2. Commonly
incorporated into United States’ extradition treaties, the political offense exception
forbids the country from extraditing individuals based on offenses that are political
in
nature. It applies when the requisition for surrender had been made with a view to
try
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21
and punish someone for an offense of a political character. See Nezirovov v. Holt,
990
F.Supp. 606, 619 (W.D.Va. 2014). Although political motives of the requesting state
do
not control the answer to whether an offense is political in nature, the fact that
Petitioner was acting on protected political ideas, though not controlling, is
nonetheless
relevant as to whether she committed a non-extraditable political offense.
In Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit noted
that the political offense exception was premised on a number of justifications,
including the belief that individuals have a “right to resort to political activism to
foster

 political change.” Second, the political offense exception reflects a concern that
individuals should not be returned to countries where they may be subjected to
unfair
trials and punishments because of their political opinions. Id. Third, the exception
comports with the notion that governments should not intervene in the internal
political
struggles of other nations. Id. Political offenses come two packages. “Pure” political
offenses are fairly simple to identify: they are acts aimed directly at the
government,
such as treason, sedition, and espionage. Id. “Relative” political offenses are
otherwise
common crimes committed in connection with a political act, or common crimes
committed for political motives or in a political context. Id., 783 F.2d at 794. See
also
Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 596 (4th Cir. 2007).
The Quinn v. Robinson Court traced the political offense exception in the United
States back to In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. 149 (1981), wherein the Swiss government
asked
Great Britain to extradite a Swiss citizen who, with a group of other angry citizens,
stormed the palace gates and killed a government official – of whom the defendant
did
not know or have a personal grudge against -- in the process. The court denied
extradition, finding that defendant’s actions were incidental to and formed a part of
a
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22
political disturbance and holding that common crimes committed in the course of
and in
furtherance of a political disturbance would be treated as political offenses. Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d at 796, citing Castioni, 1 Q.B. at 156. From there Quinn v.
Robinson followed the doctrine to “the seminal case in this area,” In re Ezeta, 62 F.
972
(N.D.Cal. 1894), in which the Salvadoran government requested extradition of a
number of individuals accused of murder and robbery. The fugitives maintained they
had committed the crimes as part of an unsuccessful attempt to thwart a revolution.

 The court rejected the defense because the defendant’s actions occurred four
months
prior to the start of the armed violence. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 796, citing
Ezeta, 62 F. at 986.
The only Supreme Court case in the area, Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896),
involved the extradition of an individual for murder, arson, robbery and arson
committed in a Mexican border town about the time revolutionary activity was in
progress. The Court denied extradition because the conduct lacked a connection to
the
revolutionary activities. Id., 161 U.S. at 510. But since Ornelas American courts have
applied a two-fold requirement for political disturbance to constitute a political
offense:
1) the occurrence of an uprising or other violent political disturbance at the time of
the
charged offense, and 2) a charged offense “incidental to,” “in the course of,” or “in
furtherance of” that uprising. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 797.
Under those definitions, finding that Petitioner’s offenses were crimes committed
in the course of a political uprising is nothing if not self-evident. The offense
occurred
during a resistance movement protesting both political and judicial corruption that
arose out of the treatment of her niece’s pedophilia allegations and the suspicious
death
of her brother. The only hiccup in that analysis arises as of result of language in this
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23
Court’s decision in Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981), that would constrict the “uprising” component to such violent political
disturbances as “war, revolution or rebellion.” See Eain, 641 F.2d at 519. And see Vo
v.
Benov, 447 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Quinn v. Robinson as
requiring a conflict involving either a short period of either intense bloodshed or an
accumulation of violent incidents over a long period of time).
As an initial matter, there is ample evidence that the Petitioner will be able to

 prove that a political disturbance or “uprising” of some sort was occurring below
and
that the offenses generating the extradition request were unmistakably incident to
that
disturbance. Eain, 641 F.2d at 515-16. Accord, Arambasic v. Ashcroft, 403 F.Supp.2d
951, 957 (D.S.D. 2005). The District Court’s finding that Petitioner could not prevail
on
this ground because whatever pain she and her family has endured and suffered did
not
rise to the level of having resulted from a political uprising is unduly crimped.
An “uprising” begins somewhere, and by the time of the events this one had
already led to the deaths of several people and an organized police state action
against a
group of people who guarded the home where DK was staying as it were a fortress
being
held to repel a government invasion. The Lithuanian government regarded the
events
as an insurrection. The incident that led to the violent seizure of DK out of
Petitioner’s
arms was the second intense assault on the home; during the first Petitioner was
not at
home and the assault was unsuccessful and led to injuries to Petitioner’s mother
and
aunt. The second and successful assault left Petitioner in the hospital with shoulder
injuries. The lead-up to the assault saw the deaths of several people involved in the
pedophilia controversy. Petitioner’s life was threatened verbally and then physically
when she discovered her car had been sabotaged while she attended a rally. The
police
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24
refused to investigate. A newspaper reported that supporters attacked the
Lithuanian
president’s automobile. R. 13-1 at 303. These were a series of acts indicative of a
violent
uprising. It led to reports of marches and protests, calls for freedom to the girl,
freedom

 for Petitioner, and freedom for Lithuania. R. 13-1 at 301.
In the complaint for extradition filed by the United States it alleged that
Venckiene recruited and organized a group of people for the purpose of committing
unlawful surveillance and gathering of information about persons whom Venckiene
suspected were pedophiles. The members of the group called themselves the
"resistance
camp." Venckiene provided a list of names of targets and their families to the
resistance
camp, so that the group's members could gather information relating to the private
lives
of the targets for public disclosure. Subsequently, other members of the group
conducted surveillance of the targets in a manner such that the victims were aware
they
were being watched. R. 1 at 3 (Case No. 19 CR 56). It is hardly surprising that these
activities led to political violence especially when a newspaper article reported that
several members of her supporters called for blowing up the parliament and the
government and calling for a putsch or Maidan. Petitioner was accused of urging
followers to violently breach Lithuania’s sovereignty. R. 1-9 at 55; R. 13-1 at 304.
There have been other courts expressly rejecting the notion that the political
offense exception “is limited to actual armed insurrections or more traditional and
over
military hostilities.” In re Requested Extradition of Joseph Patrick Doherty, 599
F.Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The instant case clearly fits within that category.
The District Court’s requirement that an insurrection must arise to the level of
virtual
armed warfare is not necessary for a series of incidents to qualify as political
offenses.
Here, the police commissioner in a television interview described the May 17
operation
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25
as “the biggest operation in the [sic] Lithuanian history in a civil case,” occupying
80
Capital officers and 140 police officers prepared to close off streets, erect barriers
and

 prepare for riots and massive unrest. R. 13-1 at 298-300. That Petitioner’s offenses
were incident to this uprising is undeniable.
From all this a maverick political party – Way of Courage – was born. The seven
seats it won in Parliament in its first election effort stands as proof of the support it
received as a political force formed to fight corruption in the government of
Lithuania,
including its protection of high level officials accused of pedophilia. R. 29-1 at 510.
The
steps taken by the Lithuanian government to punish Petitioner, such as extending
an
expired statute of limitations and revoking Petitioner’s judicial and then
parliamentary
immunity, evinces the government’s view that it considered Petitioner and her party
a
danger. As the First Circuit once framed it, the political offense exception has
historically embraced offenses aimed either at accomplishing political change by
violent
means or at repressing violent political opposition. Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169,
172 (1st Cir. 1991). The offenses committed here arose in the process of
accomplishing
political change by violent means as necessary. Although the District gave little
credit to
media reports, at this stage of the proceedings they were certainly indicative of the
Lithuanian government and public view that Petitioner and her followers were
engaging
in nothing short of a putsch and effort to overthrow the existing government.
In the instant case, there is a “a direct link between the perpetrator [Petitioner], a
political organization's political goals [justice for DK], and the specific act
[obstruction
and/or battery in the midst of an uprising].” Eain, 641 F.2d at 521. It was aimed at
acts
that disrupt the political structure of a State, and not the social structure that
established the government, and not at the citizenry but at the government itself.
Id.
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26

 These was a reasonable basis to conclude that Petitioner had made a showing of
success
on the merits that these were political offenses committed in connection with a
political
uprising and that a stay should have been entered.
b. Lack of Probable Cause Prevents
The Extradition of Petitioner
The District Court erred in not granting a stay because there was sufficient
evidence to find that there was less than probable cause to find that Petitioner
committed a criminal act in Lithuania. In the instant case, that hearing has not
happened yet and a stay should be entered at least until that occurs.
An extradition proceeding is not a full-blown trial. Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311
F.2d 547, 556 (5th Cir. 1962). To sustain its claim for extradition, a requesting
country
must provide probable cause sufficient to furnish a good faith belief that a crime
was
committed by the person of whom extradition is sought. Id., at 562. In applying that
standard, courts distinguish between “contradictory evidence” and “explanatory
evidence.” Only the latter is relevant, and it includes evidence of vagueness and
improbability that destroys the probability of guilt. See, e.g., In re Extradition of
Sindona, 450 F.Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Once there is a full hearing on the
habeas petition the appellate court reviews the evidence to determine whether the
district court had reasonable grounds to believe probable cause exists. Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925).
At this point, Petitioner has presented sufficient evidence showing that probable
cause may not exist and that a stay should be entered. Petitioner is accused of
striking a
police officer and Stankunaite. There is a videotape of the incident and it does not
show
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27
such an event.12 Petitioner is accused of disobeying the court order to surrender DK
because of the events on May 17. Petitioner explained that during the events she
asked

 her followers to allow the officers inside the house. See, e.g., R. 20-1 at 40
(Transcript).
The fact that Petitioner asked her followers to allow the officers admission into
the house casts doubt on any statements that she struck anyone as well or
committed
anything more than a misdemeanor which is not an indictable offense. The above
facts
demonstrate that the issue of probable cause needs to be explored based on a full
hearing on the merits, not as part of a preliminary issue as a stay, the adverse
ruling of
which would moot the entire proceedings.
2. Irreparable Harm to Petitioner if
Stay Is Not Granted
The second factor – irreparable harm if a stay is not granted – is obvious in the
circumstances here. If a stay is not granted the appeal itself will become moot and
will
be dismissed because the extradition will have been carried out. Lindstrom v.
Graber,
203 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2000); Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
As this Court noted in Lindstrom:
The object of the habeas corpus proceeding, a proceeding directed against the
warden of the American jail in which Lindstrom was being held, and of the appeal
is, or rather was, to prevent Lindstrom from being sent back to Norway; he has
been sent back; and so he has nothing to gain from the further prosecution of the
appeal. E.g., Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 135 L. Ed. 2d 453, 116 S. Ct. 2066
(1996) (per curiam); Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 432 (7th Cir. 1998); LoBue
v. Christopher, 317 U.S. App. D.C. 277, 82 F.3d 1081, 1082 n. 1 D.C. Cir. 1996).
This assumes, but surely correctly, that there is no legal basis for our ordering
Norway to surrender Lindstrom back to us, since we have no jurisdiction over the
warden of the Norwegian prison in which he's incarcerated. Subias v. Meese, 835
F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1987).
12 There is evidence and suspicions the Lithuanian government either ignored or
edited the
videotape in a manner to harm Petitioner. R. 29-1 at 516.

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28
Lindstrom, 203 F.3d at 474. See also Guardado-Figueroa v. Kuta, 583 Fed. Appx. 550,
551 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Lindstrom). Thus, the irreparable harm factor weighs
heavily in Petitioner’s favor. See also Avila-Ramos v. Kammerzell, 2017 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 18670 (D.Col.), at *3 (denial of stay would moot appeal and thus deprive
petitioner of all potential remedy); In re Atias, 2014 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 70278 (E.D.Mo.),
at *4 (absence of stay could result in extradition without review of district court’s
order);
Noriega v. Pastrana, 2008 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 7203 (S.D.Fla. 2008) (once Noriega is
extradited to France the federal courts will lack jurisdiction and the case will be
mooted). See also In re Extradition of Mirela, 2018 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 58056 (D.Conn.),
at *3 (citing numerous District Court cases granting stay so that extradition matter
may
be heard on the merits).
In the circumstances of the instant case, irreparable harm is more than possible,
more than probable. See Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968. If the stay is not granted
Petitioner will be extradited and her challenge to extradition will be dismissed as
moot.
The District Court’s response is summed up by the Court’s conclusory statement:
“Vienckiene’s only irreparable harm – that her outstanding legal claims related to
her
extradition will become moot – is tempered by the fact that she may still present a
defense before the Lithuanian courts ….” R. 32 at 590. The District Court ignores the
evidence that the Lithuanian courts and authorities have not acted in any way that
would give comfort to the conclusion that Lithuania is likely to give her a fair
hearing.
To date, any protections Petitioner might have enjoyed under Lithuanian law has
been
sequentially picked off by the Lithuanian government: she originally enjoyed the
protection of a statute of limitations, but that was removed; she originally enjoyed
the
protection of judicial immunity, but then that was removed; she originally enjoyed
the

 Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
29
protection of parliamentary immunity, but then that was removed. Petitioner has
certainly made a showing that irreparable harm – the extradition to Lithuania before
she has a chance to proceed with her habeas – will not be tempered by due process
in
the requesting state. Petitioner has submitted at least some evidence to
demonstrate
that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in Lithuania beyond the mootness itself if
no
stay is granted. See Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 970.
Petitioner has presented evidence of possible physical harm as well. Several
people have written letters and would be willing to testify that returning Petitioner
to
Lithuania would put her life and safety at risk. See, e.g., R. 1-11 at 63; R. 1-16 at 80;
R.
1-18 at 87; R. 1-20 at 94; R. 1-21 at 99; R. 1-22 at 101; R. 1-25 at 115; R. 1-27 at
121.
In October 2012, after her immunities were revoked, an attempt was made on her
life by
sabotaging the wheels on her car. R. 13-1 at 314, 321. The police refused to
investigate.
R. 13-1 at 316. One of the alleged pedophiles, Usas, then an assistant to the
Speaker of
the Seimas (the Lithuanian parliament), had the audacity and with no apparent fear
of
repercussion to threaten Petitioner publicly by stating that “this woman (Neringa
Venckienė) and that man (Aidas Venckus) will have to put down their (portfolios),
and if
they are not underground as long as I live, other people will come along who will
drive
them to the end.” R. 13-1 at 317-18.
Petitioner has established a genuine fear of irreparable harm if she is returned to
Lithuania, both as the extradition itself and as to her safety should she arrive there.
In

 the letter she attached to her habeas petition she alleged that multiple criminal
cases
were opened up against her parents and against as many as 35 members of the
Way of
Courage party. Not only her life, but her son’s life has been threatened. R. 13-1 at
244.
The potential harm should she be extradited at this time is manifest and realistic.
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30
3. Harm to the Requesting Jurisdiction
On the other hand, there is no appreciable harm to Lithuania in any delay before
extraditing Petitioner. Petitioner left Lithuania in or about April 2013. The Petitioner
is
charged with striking a public officer and Stankunaite and hindering the turnover of
the
child. The child has been transferred. The alleged victims of the assault did not
suffer
serious injuries. Other than political retribution there would be is no obvious reason
for
returning Petitioner to Lithuania so she can be tried for an assault that occurred
more
than five years ago. Meanwhile, Petitioner came to the United States in 2013 yet the
United States government did not file its complaint for extradition until 2018. R. 1 at
1
(No. 18 CV 0056). See In re Wepplo, 2010 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 34493 (N.D.Ohio), at *8
(noting that Mexican government did not request extradition until nearly two years
after
it issued arrest warrant). There is no indication that Petitioner was hiding. In fact,
she
was living and working in plain view. If Lithuania considered the extradition a matter
of
urgency it would have moved sooner. It has articulated no basis that would call for
urgency now.
The basis for the extradition request is that Petitioner allegedly struck someone
or resisted a court order. These are not the sorts of offenses that demand exigency
and

 certainly Lithuania has not shown as much, so it is hard to see how some further
delay
will harm United States/Lithuanian relations. See Nezirovic v. Holt, 2014 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 91684 (W.D.Va.), at *6-*7. Coupled with the fact that during the delay
Petitioner
has established a fruitful and law-abiding life in the United States, the irreparable
harm
that will befall her is substantially outweighed by any harm to Lithuania. This is
especially so because Petitioner will remain in United States custody even if this
Court
reverses the District Court and grants her a stay. The issue of whether she should or
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31
could qualify for a bond is not before this Court. At present the potential harm to
Lithuania is virtually non-existent.
4. The Public Interest
Finally, with respect to the fourth factor it is in the public interest that Petitioner
be given a full, fair opportunity to litigate her extradition rights. See In re
HurtadoHurtado,
2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 47638 (S.D.Fla.), at *4. It is hardly in the public
interest to extradite a person whose offenses were fairly insignificant extraditable
crimes
stemming from protests against possible pedophilia, and ending in a clearly political
prosecution, before there is a full hearing on the merits.13
In addition, Petitioner is presently in custody and this appeal has no affect on
whether Petitioner could or should receive a bond during the stay. The public’s
interest
in the enforcement of the laws will not be impacted.
5. Summary
Petitioner believes she has made a substantial showing of success on the merits to
justify the entry of a stay. Even if that were close, the balance of the equities in the
other
three elements overwhelmingly support reversing the District Court.
B. PRIVATE BILLS INTRODUCED TO CONGRESS THAT WOULD

 EXEMPT PETITIONER FROM EXTRADITION UNTIL HER ASYLUM
PETITION IS RULED UPON FAVOR GRANTING A STAY
On June 25, 2018, Representative Smith from New Jersey introduced a bill in the
House of Representatives “related to the pursuit of justice against Lithuanian public
officials accused of sexually molesting her young niece.” R. 29-1 at 486. Two days
later,
13 The fact that this is a politically motivated prosecution may not be a basis to
deny the
extradition request but it is relevant in other ways, such as here, when evaluating
the public
interest.
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32
Representative Hultgren from Illinois introduced a similar bill. R. 29-1 at 493. Both
bills are similarly short-titled as “Give Judge Venckiene her Day in Court Act.” R. 291 at
486; R. 29-1 at 493. If passed, each bill would permit Petitioner to have free
movement
and continued ability to work in the United States until a final order on her asylum
petition is issued.
The District Court applied the same four-factor analysis but gave surprisingly
short-shrift to these bills when considering whether a stay was warranted. It noted
that
Petitioner had failed to make a showing that either bill was likely to be granted (and
correspondingly whether Petitioner would succeed on the merits) or present a
timeline
with respect to when that might happen. R. 32 at 591. The Court acknowledged that
Petitioner had no way of making a prediction as to the latter issue, unimpressed
with
Representative Smith’s statement that he was working to “fast-track” the bill
through
the Judiciary Committee for processing. R. 32 at 59-91. The Court then relied upon
its
earlier rejection of Petitioner’s claims of irreparable harm, lack of harm to the
objectors,

 and public interest. R. 29-1 at 591.
With respect to likelihood of success on the merits — which in this case would
mean likelihood either bill would be passed — the difficulty in the determination of
whether either bill would pass only makes the other three factors more important.
See
LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 Fed.Appx. 816 (11th Cir. 2016), citing and quoting GarciaMir
v. Meese, 781 F.2d at 1453 (though the first two factors are often described as the
most critical, a stay may be granted upon a lesser showing of a substantial case on
the
merits when the balance of equities identified in factors 2, 3 and 4 weighs heavily in
favor of granting the stay).
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
33
As noted, Congressman Smith represented that he was going to “fast-track” the
bill. To the extent the length of the process would be consideration in granting a
stay,
then the obvious solution would be to grant the stay for a definite period and revisit
the
issue if the matter has not been resolved with that time. Otherwise the Legislative
Branch should be given the opportunity to do its work before the issue becomes
moot.14
Certainly the other factors overwhelmingly favor a stay in these circumstances.
The irreparable harm is that Petitioner’s extradition petition and her asylum petition
would become moot if she is extradited. There is virtually no harm to the requesting
jurisdiction, which waited a substantial period before seeking Petitioner’s extradition
and where the crimes for which she is being sought are not substantial. And the
public
interest in a full airing of the issues before sending back to Lithuania an individual
who
had lived peacefully for several years now in the United States favors granting a
stay as
well.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
A STAY IN SO IT COULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE

 OF WHETHER THE ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY
OF STATE AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE FAILED TO
PROPERLY CONSIDER PETITIONER’S EXPOSURE
TO ATROCIOUS PROCEDURES AND PUNISHMENTS
After Judge Martin certified the order to extradition to the Secretary of State,
Petitioner filed objections with the Secretary of State asking the Secretary not to
extradite her. The Secretary rejected that request. App. 42. A court is required to
insure
an extradition order is not based on constitutionally impermissible factors, such a
race,
religion, sex, national origin, or political beliefs, and that it is done “in accordance
with
14 As an aside, granting the stay while Congress considers the bills does not
portend a possible
constitutional confrontation between the Executive and Legislative branches. Before
either bill
became law it would have to be signed off on by the President.
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
34
such other exceptional constitutional limitations as may exist because of
particularly
atrocious procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction.” In re
Burt,
737 F.2d 1477, 1486 (7th Cir. 1984).
The District Court held that Petitioner failed to raise, much less argue the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (N.Y., Dec. 10, 1984). But Petitioner
did argue that atrocious procedures or punishments exist in Lithuania which is no
different than CAT’s prohibition against inhumane and degrading treatment and
punishment. What Petitioner has alleges qualifies under both.
While acknowledging the Petitioner does not have to prove her case at this stage
of the proceedings the District Court still found insufficient articles and reports of
inhumane conditions in Lithuanian prisons that were certainly sufficient to elicit
further

 inquiry. Moreover, there is no shortage of international case law finding deplorable
and
unconscionable conditions in Lithuanian prisons and jails. See, e.g., Case of Abu
Zubaydah v. Lithuania (2018), found at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5b0fde3e4.pdf
(e.g., enhanced interrogation techniques; awarded damages); Case of Šcensnovicius
v.
Lithuania (2018), see http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-184520 (e.g.,
overcrowding
and deplorable conditions, dilapidated and dirty cells, lack of sufficient heating and
ventilation, confined 23 hours a day in 3 square meters over a thousand days); Case
of
Yusiv v. Lithuania (2016), found at http://en.efhr.eu/2017/01/19/case-yusivvlithuania-application-no-5589413-2016
(e.g., beatings and awarded damages); Case of
Savenkovas v. Lithuania (2009), found at en.efhr.eu › Law › ECtHR (e.g., cells dirty
and
overrun by cockroaches and rodents, sheets and beddings rarely washed); Case of
Karalevicius v. Lithuania (2005)
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
35
http://en.efhr.eu/download/ecohr/CASE_OF_KARALEVICIUS_v._LITHUANIA_24.0
4.2014_en.pdf (e.g., restricted living space; capacity 450, occupancy 950, confined
23
hours a day). And even the District Court noted there have been decisions from
other
countries denying extradition requests from Lithuania specifically based on
deplorable
jail conditions. Court turns down Lithuanian request to extradite Maltese man: Court
finds that he risked inhuman and degrading treatment if extradited, found at
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170518/local/court-turnsdownlithuanian-request-to-extradite-maltese-man.648339;
Lithuanian extradition request
turned down by High Court, found at https://www.rte.ie/news/2013/0415/381541lithuanian-extradition-request-turned-down/. This was certainly enough evidence to
generate a stay. And the European Court of Human Rights approved a damages

 judgment against Lithuania for poor detention conditions. R. 32 at 576, citing to R.
151. Once again, the article supports Petitioner’s fears and requires at least a hearing
on
whether the conditions in Lithuanian prisons should preclude
The District Court also refused to rely on news articles exhibits describing poor
conditions in Lithuanian prisons. R. 32 at 575-76. But these articles were presented
to
the Court at this preliminary stage of the lawsuit and were sufficient to at least
order a
stay until the evidence could be considered. Moreover, the United States
government
has not disagreed. The State Department in both 2017 and 2018 found that some
prison and detention center conditions in Lithuania to failed to meet international
standards. United States Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Lithuania
2016
Human Rights Report; Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Lithuania 2017
Human Rights Report. Prisoners complained of confined spaces, improper hygiene,
inadequate medical care, poor food, substandard sanitary conditions, and limited
supply
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
36
of personal hygiene products. In 2014 the Council of Europe’s Committee for the
Prevention of Torture (CPT) noted that natural light in most detention facilities and
prisons was inadequate and that in-cell toilets were partitioned only partly or not at
all.
Lithuania 2017 Human Rights Report, at 2.
The parties are basically at a pleading stage. Despite being critical of the quality
to evidence Petitioner raised in support of clear Eighth Amendment concerns, it was
willing to speculate broadly that Lithuania was likely to give her a fair shake. With
respect to atrocious procedures the District Court at one place suggested for
example
that Petitioner would be able to raise the same defenses in Lithuania that she raises
here. R. 32 at 570, 590. That ruling is contradicted by how Petitioner has been
treated

 to date: a statute of limitations has been removed, her judicial immunity has been
removed, her parliamentary immunity has been removed, she had been excoriated
as an
abscess on the system who has organized an insurrection fueled by her complaints
about
pedophilia and corruption. Petitioner suffered additional indignities and punishments
as well: a rather standard request for an extension of time to complete her doctoral
studies based on her brother’s death, the loss of DK, and her physical health from
the
tumultuous events was denied and she was eventually expelled even though she
had
little left but to complete her dissertation. R. 13-1 at 243.
The District Court rejected these concerns in part by citing Neely v. Henkel, 180
U.S. 109 (1901), which specifically held that the ex post facto clause cannot serve
as a
basis for deny extradition. R. 32 at 574-75. While that fact in isolation may not deter
extradition, the point is that in combination with other factors such as the patently
retributive removal of immunities in order to prosecute someone who at the time of
her
actions was protected from being charged with a crime, is evidence that Petitioner
will
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
37
not be able to present her defenses and will be subject to atrocious procedures in
the
Lithuanian court system. The ex post facto removal was not some general statute
applicable in the future to the general population of Lithuania, but rather a personal
effort directed at a single individual to punish a single “abscess” on the legal
system.
Thus, at this stage, Petitioner has presented ample evidence to justify a stay based
on the atrocious procedures and punishments she will face in Lithuania if she is
extradited.
III. THE EXTRADITION PROCEEDING
SHOULD BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT VIOLATES FAIR NOTIONS

 OF DUE PROCESS
Petitioner is of course aware that the extradition scheme used in the instant case
had operated for many years and survived various constitutional challenges. Neely
v.
Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901) (provisions of Constitution relating to fundamental
guarantees have no relation to crimes committed against the laws of a foreign
country).
(For a summary see, e.g., In re Extradition of Grace Chan Seong-I, 346 F.Supp.2d
1149
(D.N.M. 2004)). Nevertheless, Petitioner submits that allowing the Secretary of State
to
hide behind the convention of “no inquiry” is ripe for review. In this court cases like
In
re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir. 1984), have held that the Secretary’s
determinations are not reviewable so long as they are made without regard to
constitutionally impermissible factors such as “race, color, sex, national origin,
religion,
or political beliefs.” That protection is rendered a nullity if the “no inquiry” doctrine
blocks any way to determine whether the Secretary complied with those
requirements.
One glance at the Secretary’s decision squarely presents the issue. The
Secretary’s decision here reads, in its entirety:
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
38
The Department of State is in receipt of your communications of March 5,
2018, April 4, 2018, April 18, 2018, and April 19, 2018, regarding the extradition
of Neringa Venckiene to Lithuania.
Following a review of all pertinent information, including pleadings and
filings submitted on behalf of Ms. Venckiene in court, on April 20, 2018, the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs decided to authorize Ms. Venckiene’s
surrender pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3186 and the Extradition Treaty between
United States and Lithuania. The materials submitted to the Department up to
and including April 19, 2018, were considered in making that decision.
Ms. Venckiene may be subject to surrender at any time hereafter. Please

 consult with the assigned United States Department of Justice attorneys if you
have any questions.
R. 1-2 at 24. There is no way that anyone can glean from this letter that the
Secretary of
State fairly analyzed the documentation and reached a reasoned decision. There
may as
well be no process at all.
The District Court was not persuaded, however, that it had any right to peak
behind the Secretary of State’s ruling. The court rejected any argument that the
“noinquiry”
doctrine could be unconstitutional by relying on two cases, Peroff v. Hylton,
563 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1977), and Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th
Cir.
1980), both of which rely in part of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
554(a)(4), which exempts from hearing requirements the conduct of foreign affairs.
See
Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.ed at 1102-03 (“Congress has not sought to prescribe the
procedures by which the Executive’s discretionary determination to extradite should
be
exercised. It would be manifestly improper for this Court to do so.”). These courts
held
that the requirements of procedural due process were satisfied by the hearing
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (providing for the Magistrate Judge’s inquiry into
the
existence of a treaty and probable cause that the offense falls within the treaty).
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
39
Petitioner submits the District Court erred in not granting a stay in order to fully
explore the continued validity of these rulings. The fact is that certain limitations do
exist. They include a restriction against extradition based on unconstitutional
factors
including “political beliefs.” “Political beliefs” is not an issue before Magistrate Judge
and it makes no sense to include that protection and then render the Secretary’s
decision impenetrable. The Secretary is proscribed from ordering extradition on the

 constitutional grounds cited, including political beliefs, and those grounds exist for
the
protection of the citizenry. There has to be some mechanism to insure the Secretary
has
respected those limitations. The lack of any procedure is an abject violation of due
process.
The Secretary of State’s ruling here provides no comfort that the law has been
followed, and that individuals subjected to extradition are enjoyed the protections to
which they are entitled. For that reason as well the District Court order denying the
motion for stay should be reversed and the question of whether the extradition
process
violates due process should be considered in a full hearing.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully request that the District Court’s
order denying her motion for a stay be reversed, and for such other relief the Court
deems just.
Respectfully submitted,
NERINGA VENCKIENE
By: /s/ Barry A. Spevack
One of her attorneys
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
40
Michael D. Monico
Barry A. Spevack
Carly A. Chocron
MONICO & SPEVACK
20 South Clark Street, Suite 700
Chicago, Illinois 60603
312-782-8500
Fax 312-759-2000
bspevack@monicolaw.com
RULE 32(a) COMPLIANCE

 I certify that the instant brief complies with the type volume limitation of Circuit
Rule 32(c) because it contains less than 14,000 words measure by Word
I certify that the instant brief complies with the type face and type style
requirements of Federal Rule 32(a)(5) and (a)(6) and Circuit Rule 32(b) because it
has
been prepared using Word proportionately spaced Georgia Pro with 12-point font
type
face for text and 11-point font type face for footnotes.
/s/ Barry A. Spevack
One of Appellant’s Attorneys
August 31, 2018
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Barry A. Spevack, an attorney, states that he served a copy of the foregoing Brief
and Appendix on all parties through the Court’s ECF Filing System on August 31,
2018.
/s/ Barry A. Spevack
Case: 18-2529 Document: 14 Filed: 08/31/2018 Pages: 84
41