Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 1 of 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PARS EQUALITY CENTER,
IRANIAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
PUBLIC AFFAIRS ALLIANCE OF IRANIAN
AMERICANS, INC., et al.,

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-255
Hon. Tanya S. Chutkan

Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP et al.,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION AND PROPOSED
MODIFICATION OF SCOPE OF PROPOSED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Since Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Preliminary Injunction on October 12, 2017 (ECF
No. 107), there have been several developments that bear on the scope of the injunction
necessary to provide full relief to the Plaintiffs. These developments include a new executive
order and accompanying agency guidance that discriminate against refugees from Iran and other
Muslim-majority countries. The new executive actions are not covered by the pending
injunctions and will cause irreparable harm to certain Plaintiffs in the absence of further
injunctive relief. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully submit this supplement to the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, as well as a revised proposed order to enjoin the Defendants from
engaging in discriminatory conduct against Iranian and Muslim refugees. We submit this
supplement now both to advise the Court of these important developments, as well as to give the
Government ample time to respond prior to the November 2 hearing.

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 2 of 10

I.

FURTHER INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
1.

The Government has filed notices of appeal in Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 50

(D. Haw. Filed Oct. 24, 2017), ECF No. 391, and IRAP v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 361 (D. Md. filed
Oct. 20, 2014), ECF No. 223.
2.

On October 24, 2017, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Trump v.

Hawaii, No. 16-1540, and remanded that case to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as
moot the challenge to the March 6 Executive Order. Ex. 1.
3.

Also on October 24, the President issued a new Executive Order concerning the

United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). Ex. 2. At the same time, Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke, and Director of
National Intelligence Daniel Coats released a Memorandum to the President dated October 23,
2017, describing how that October 24 Executive Order will be implemented. Ex. 3.
4.

Read together, the September 24 Proclamation, the October 24 Executive Order,

and the October 23 Memorandum implement an effective ban on Muslim refugees.
a.

Although the October 24 Executive Order provides that (i) the 120-day

ban on the USRAP admitting new refugees is lifted, and (ii) refugees are not covered by
the September 24 Proclamation, the October 23 Memorandum states that a new ban will
remain in effect for at least 90 additional days for refugees from 11 particular countries.
b.

Nine of the 11 countries targeted in the October 24 Executive Order are

Muslim-majority countries. Five of those Muslim-majority countries were identified in
the September 24 Proclamation as well as the earlier iterations of the Travel Ban—Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen. The October 24 Executive Order also includes four
additional Muslim-majority countries—Egypt, Mali, Iraq, and Sudan. The two non2

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 3 of 10

Muslim-majority countries are South Sudan and North Korea. See Y. Torbati & M.
Rosenberg, Under Trump plan, refugees from 11 countries face additional U.S. barriers,
Reuters (Oct. 24, 2017).
c.

In addition, the October 23 Memorandum specifies that the Departments

of State and Homeland Security will “prioritize refugee applications” from other
countries (i.e., other than the 11 countries) and will “reallocate . . . resources” that would
otherwise be “dedicated to processing nationals” of the 11 countries “to process
applicants” from other countries.
d.

The October 23 Memorandum acknowledges that refugee applicants from

the 11 countries specified in the October 24 Executive Order were already required to go
through a heightened security-screening process called the Security Advisory Opinion
(SAO) process. The October 24 Executive Order found that “the refugee screening and
vetting process generally meets the uniform baseline for immigration screening and
vetting.” October 24 Executive Order § 2(b).
e.

In recent years, Iran and the eight other predominantly Muslim countries

have been responsible for approximately 45% of the total refugees admitted to the United
States, with the largest contingents coming from four countries: Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and
Syria (41%, 38%, and 45% of total refugees in 2016, 2015, and 2014 respectively were
from those four countries).
f.

The October 24 Executive Order and October 23 Memorandum follow the

administration’s announcement that, for the fiscal year starting October 1, 2017, the
United States would admit only 45,000 refugees—the smallest number admitted since

3

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 4 of 10

Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 and substantially (35%–60%) fewer refugees
admitted than in recent fiscal years.
g.

Taken together, the September 14 Proclamation, the October 24 Executive

Order, the October 23 Memorandum, and the reduction in refugee admissions effectively
bar refugees from the Muslim-majority countries that send the most refugees to the
United States. Although the ban is nominally for 90 days, when that period expires there
is a significant risk that all available spots in the USRAP for this fiscal year will already
be filled by applicants from other, non-Muslim countries. This means that that no Iranian
refugees, nor any refugees from the eight other Muslim-majority countries, will be
admitted to the United States for at least another full year. In addition, at the end of the
90 days, President Trump could simply issue a new order permanently codifying the new
refugee restrictions, just as he permanently codified the earlier Travel Bans in the
September 14 Proclamation.
h.

In other words, the Defendants’ actions constitute a subterfuge, a Muslim

Refugee Ban by another name, precisely of the type that President Trump promised
throughout his campaign and immediately before signing the January 27 Executive
Order. See Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 106) ¶ 64 (President Trump on the
refugee provisions: “If you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a
Christian, it was almost impossible . . . . And I thought it was very, very unfair. So we
are going to help them.”).
5.

The October 23 Memorandum directly impacts several Plaintiffs and individuals

similarly situated to the Plaintiffs. Specifically:

4

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 5 of 10

a.

Plaintiff Reza Zoghi is an Iranian political dissident who, after multiple

periods of imprisonment and torture, fled Iran with his family in 2013 and currently
resides at a refugee camp in Turkey. He, his wife, and his three-year-old daughter have
been referred by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to USRAP for
resettlement in the United States. Mr. Zoghi and his family have been through the SAO
screening, their final medical screening, their cultural orientation, and were awaiting
issuance of their travel documents when President Trump issued the March 6 Executive
Order. See ECF No. 93, Ex. 4.
b.

Plaintiff Jane Doe #8 is an lesbian refugee who fled Iran in 2014 after

experiencing repeated sexual assault, and currently resides in a refugee camp in Turkey
with her fiancée, Jane Doe # 9. Homosexuality is a crime in Iran, and can be punishable
by death. She was referred by UNHCR to USRAP for resettlement in the United States
in December 2016, when she had her first interview. She was awaiting her second
interview to be scheduled when the March 6 Executive Order issued. ECF No. 92, Ex. 2.
c.

Plaintiff Jane Doe #9 is a transgender refugee who fled Iran in 2014 after

experiencing physical assault and being expelled from school due to her sexual
orientation. She currently resides in a refugee camp in Turkey with her fiancée, Jane Doe
#8. She was referred by UNHCR to USRAP for resettlement in the United States in
December 2016, when she had her first interview. She was awaiting her second
interview to be scheduled when the March 6 Executive Order issued. ECF No. 92, Ex. 3.
6.

Although they are currently in the United States, the experience of several of the

other individual plaintiffs is illustrative of the plight of Iranian refugees generally. For example:

5

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 6 of 10

a.

Jane Doe #4 is an adherent of Efran-e-Halgheh (also known as the Circle

of Mysticism) who sought and received asylum in the United States because she feared
religious persecution in Iran, where members of her spiritual group have been killed by
Iranian officials. ECF No. 107, Ex. 13.
b.

Jane Doe #13 is a political activist who participated in the Green

Movement, and sought and received asylum in the United States after learning that the
Iranian government had tried and convicted her in absentia based on her political activity.
ECF No. 107, Ex. 14.
7.

In addition to these individual plaintiffs, Organizational Plaintiff Pars Equality

Center provides social and legal services to facilitate the social, cultural, and economic
integration of refugees into their communities in the United States. ECF No. 35-2, Ex. 1.
Generally, each of the Organizational Plaintiffs works to advance the interests of and fight
discrimination against Iranians and Iranian Americans, and have had to divert substantial
resources from their programs since President Trump first announced the Travel Ban. ECF No.
35-2.
8.

Neither the October 20 preliminary injunction in Hawaii nor the October 17

preliminary injunction in IRAP addresses the impact of the October 24 Executive Order or
October 23 Memorandum. Those injunctions, accordingly, provide no relief to the individual
refugee plaintiffs here—Reza Zoghi, Jane Doe #8, and Jane Doe #9.
II.

MODIFIED SCOPE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Currently, Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction (ECF No. 107-4) covers the Travel Ban enacted

in the September 14 Proclamation. In light of the foregoing, in addition to entry the proposed
injunction, Plaintiffs request that Defendants also be enjoined from suspending refugee
6

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 7 of 10

processing or barring admittance of Iranians and the eight other predominantly Muslim countries
referenced in the October 23 Memorandum.
III.

LEGAL GROUNDS FOR ADDITIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In addition to the arguments made in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of a

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 107-1) supporting extension of the injunction to cover refugees,
the following additional points support Plaintiffs’ request for further relief here.
1.

In addition to being “contrary to law” under the Administrative Procedure Act,

ECF No. 107-1 at 14-15, the October 23 Memorandum is also contrary to the antidiscrimination
provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(5). That provision states that that
refugee programs “shall be provided to refugees without regard to race, religion, nationality, sex,
or political opinion.” The October 23 Memorandum bars refugees from Iran and other
predominantly Muslim nations from availing themselves of the USRAP, a refugee program.
Against the backdrop of certain Defendants’ repeated statements reflecting animus against the
Iranian government and Muslims, this violates the plain language of the Refugee Act.
2.

In addition to violating the Equal Protection Clause, ECF No. 107-1 at 16-22, a

ban on Iranian refugees specifically or refugees from the other predominantly Muslim countries
generally is illogical and lacks any legitimate basis:
a.

The September 24 Proclamation contained an express carve-out for

refugees, such that refugees would not be covered by the Travel Ban. See September 24
Proclamation § 3(b)(iii). The October 24 Executive Order confirmed that the
“restrictions and limitations” of the September 24 Proclamation “do not apply to those
who seek to enter the United States through the USRAP.” See September 24
Proclamation § 1(g).
7

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 8 of 10

b.

The October 24 Executive Order notes that refugees go through extensive

screening and vetting, and concludes that “the improvements to the USRAP vetting
process are generally adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States . . .
the refugee screening and vetting process generally meets the uniform baseline for
immigration screening and vetting.” October 24 Executive Order § 2(a), (b).
c.

Since Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, President

Trump has repeatedly acknowledged the oppression of the Iranian people by the Iranian
government. For example, on October 13, the President stated: “The [Iranian] regime
violently suppresses its own citizens; it shot unarmed student protestors in the street
during the Green Revolution. . . . [W]e stand in total solidarity with the Iranian regime’s
longest-suffering victims: its own people.” Remarks by President Trump on Iran
Strategy, Oct. 13, 2017. Banning Iranian people attempting to flee the Iranian regime is
hardly “total solidarity” with those people but rather underlines the administration’s
unlawful anti-Muslim animus.
3.

The implementation of the October 23 Memorandum will cause Plaintiffs

irreparable harm. Given the administration’s painfully deep cuts to the number of refugee
admissions to the United States, the practical effect of the October 23 Memorandum is to
categorically bar refugee applicants from the affected countries. In particular, by the time the
90-day window ends, the refugee quota for the fiscal year will likely be entirely or substantially
filled.
4.

As described in the declarations or Mr. Zoghi and Jane Does # 8 and 9, the

situation for Iranian refugees in Turkey remains treacherous. Mr. Zoghi wrote that he lives “in
constant fear for [his] life” because “the Iranian Revolutionary guard has a lot of spies in Turkey
8

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 9 of 10

and easy access to Turkey,” and notes that Turkish authorities deported him back to Iran on one
prior occasion. ECF No. No. 93 Ex. 4. Both Jane Doe # 8 and Jane Doe # 9 note that their life
in Turkey is difficult because they are discriminated against on the grounds of their sexual
orientation; Jane Doe # 9 has also been sexually assaulted in Turkey. ECF No. 92-2 & 92-3.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should enter a preliminary injunction against the
discriminatory provisions of the September 24 Proclamation, as well as discriminatory
provisions of the October 24 Executive Order and October 23 Memorandum.

9

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117 Filed 10/25/17 Page 10 of 10

Dated: October 25, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John A. Freedman
John A. Freedman (D.C. Bar # 453075)
David P. Gersch (D.C. Bar # 367469)
R. Stanton Jones (D.C. Bar # 987088)
Nancy L. Perkins (D.C. Bar # 421574)
Ronald A. Schechter (D.C. Bar # 245019)
Robert N. Weiner (D.C. Bar # 298133)
Samuel M. Witten (D.C. Bar # 378008)
Sally L. Pei (D.C. Bar # 1030194)
Sonia Tabriz (D.C. Bar # 1025020)
Stephen K. Wirth (D.C. Bar # 1034038)
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
601 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 942-5000
(202) 942-5999 (fax)
john.freedman@apks.com

Cyrus Mehri (D.C. Bar # 420970)
Joanna K. Wasik (D.C. Bar # 1027916)
MEHRI & SKALET, PLLC
1250 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 822-5100
(202) 822-4997 (fax)
cmehri@findjustice.com
Kristen Clarke (D.C. Bar # 973885)
Jon Greenbaum (D.C. Bar # 489887)
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
1401 New York Ave., NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 662-8600
(202) 783-0857 (fax)
jgreenbaum@lawyerscommittee.org
Hassan Zavareei (D.C. Bar # 456161)
TYCKO & ZAVAREEI LLP
1828 L Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 973-0900
(202) 973-0950 (fax)
hzavareei@tzlegal.com

Christopher M. Odell (pro hac vice)
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
700 Louisiana Street, Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77002
(713) 576-2400
(713) 576-2499 (fax)
christopher.odell@apks.com

Adrienne D. Boyd (pro hac vice)
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
370 Seventeenth Street, Suite 4400
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 863-1000
(303) 832-0428 (fax)
adrienne.boyd@apks.com

Susan S. Hu (pro hac vice)
ARNOLD & PORTER
KAYE SCHOLER LLP
250 West 55th Street
New York, NY 10019
(212) 836-8000
(303) 836-8689 (fax)
susan.hu@apks.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs
10

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-1 Filed 10/25/17 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PARS EQUALITY CENTER et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-255
Hon. Tanya S. Chutkan

v.
DONALD J. TRUMP et al.,
Defendants.

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The Court, having considered Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”)
and any opposition thereto, and finding that good cause appears, orders as follows:
The Motion is hereby GRANTED.
1.

Defendants are hereby preliminarily restrained and enjoined from:
(a) enforcing Sections 2 and 3(c) of the Proclamation No. 9645 “Enhancing
Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States
By Terrorists or other Public-Safety Threats” (“September 24 Proclamation”), including
at any United States border or point of entry;
(b) applying Sections 2 and 3(c) of the September 24 Proclamation to deny,
revoke, delay, suspend, restrict or cancel any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa;
(c) applying Sections 2 and 3(c) of the September 24 Proclamation to delay,
suspend or cease immigrant or nonimmigrant visa application or issuance processing;

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-1 Filed 10/25/17 Page 2 of 3

(d) enforcing the October 24, 2017 Executive Order or the October 23, 2017
Memorandum from Secretary Tillerson, Secretary Duke, and Director of National
Intelligence Coates (“October 23, 2017 Memorandum”) or applying Sections 2 and 3(c)
of the September 24 Proclamation to deny, revoke, delay, suspend, restrict, or cancel any
refugee status or refugee applicant processing; and
(e) applying the October 24, 2017 Executive Order or the October 23, 2017
Memorandum to “prioritize refugee applications” from “non-SAO countries” or
“reallocate . . . resources that may have been dedicated to processing nationals” of SAO
countries “to process applicants from non-SAO countries.”
2.

Defendants are further ordered to:
(a) within 10 days, submit a report on the current status of the pending immigrant
and nonimmigrant visa and refugee applications of the plaintiffs and/or their family
members who are identified by name in the Second Amended Complaint;
(b) within 10 days, submit written guidance for employees, contractors, and
agents of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and any other U.S. government entity
necessary to ensure full and timely compliance with all terms of this Order to the Court
for its review and approval, and, when such approval is granted, immediately issue such
guidance;
(b) immediately rescind any guidance, directive, memorandum or statement
interpreting or applying the September 24 Proclamation that conflicts with any term of
this Order;
(c) immediately upon its issuance, prominently post a copy of the written
guidance required under paragraph 2(a) on government websites, including state.gov and
uscis.gov; and

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-1 Filed 10/25/17 Page 3 of 3

(d) within 10 days, update all relevant public guidance, documentation, and
FAQs to reflect the terms of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October __, 2017

____________________________
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

 EXHIBIT 1

Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-2 Filed 10/25/17 Page 2 of 2

(ORDER LIST: 583 U.S.)
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2017

CERTIORARI – SUMMARY DISPOSITION
16-1540

TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF U.S., ET AL. V. HAWAII, ET AL.
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a challenge to
the temporary suspension of entry of aliens and refugees under
Section 2(c) and Section 6 of Executive Order No. 13,780.

Because

those provisions of the Order have “expired by [their] own terms,”
the appeal no longer presents a “live case or controversy.”
v. Barnes, 479 U. S. 361, 363 (1987).

Burke

Following our established

practice in such cases, the judgment is therefore vacated, and the
case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot the challenge to
Executive Order No. 13,780.
340 U. S. 36, 39 (1950).

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. ,

We express no view on the merits.

Justice Sotomayor dissents from the order vacating the
judgment below and would dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.

 EXHIBIT 2

Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-3 Filed 10/25/17 Page 2 of 6

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release

October 24, 2017

Presidential Executive Order on
Resuming the United States Refugee
Admissions Program with Enhanced
Vetting Capabilities
EXECUTIVE ORDER

RESUMING THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM WITH ENHANCED VETTING
CAPABILITIES

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-3 Filed 10/25/17 Page 3 of 6
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and section 301
of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United States to protect its people from terrorist attacks
and other public-safety threats. Screening and vetting procedures associated with determining
which foreign nationals may enter the United States, including through the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program (USRAP), play a critical role in implementing that policy. Those procedures
enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who might commit, aid, or support acts of
terrorism, or otherwise pose a threat to the national security or public safety of the United States,
and they bolster our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the country.
(b) Section 5 of Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry into the United States), directed the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence to develop a uniform
baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures applicable to all travelers who seek to
enter the United States. A working group was established to satisfy this directive.
(c) Section 6(a) of Executive Order 13780 directed a review to strengthen the vetting process for
the USRAP. It also instructed the Secretary of State to suspend the travel of refugees into the
United States under that program, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to suspend decisions
on applications for refugee status, subject to certain exceptions. Section 6(a) also required the
Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security and in consultation with
the Director of National Intelligence, to conduct a 120-day review of the USRAP application and
adjudication process in order to determine, and implement, additional procedures to ensure that
individuals seeking admission as refugees do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the
United States. Executive Order 13780 noted that terrorist groups have sought to infiltrate several
nations through refugee programs and that the Attorney General had reported that more than 300
persons who had entered the United States as refugees were then the subjects of counterterrorism
investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(d) The Secretary of State convened a working group to implement the review process under
section 6(a) of Executive Order 13780. This review was informed by the development of uniform
baseline screening and vetting standards and procedures for all travelers under section 5 of
Executive Order 13780. The section 6(a) working group compared the process for screening and
vetting refugees with the uniform baseline standards and procedures established by the section 5
working group. The section 6(a) working group identified several ways to enhance the process for
screening and vetting refugees and began implementing those improvements.
(e) The review process for refugees required by Executive Order 13780 has made our Nation safer.
The improvements the section 6(a) working group has identified will strengthen the datacollection process for all refugee applicants considered for resettlement in the United States. They
will also bolster the process for interviewing refugees through improved training, fraud-detection
procedures, and interagency information sharing. Further, they will enhance the ability of our

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-3 Filed 10/25/17 Page 4 of 6
systems to check biometric and biographic information against a broad range of threat information
contained in various Federal watchlists and databases.
(f) Section 2 of Proclamation 9645 of September 24, 2017 (Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and
Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety
Threats), suspended and limited, subject to exceptions and case-by-case waivers, the entry into
the United States of foreign nationals of eight countries. As noted in that Proclamation, those
suspensions and limitations are in the interest of the United States because of certain deficiencies
in those countries' identity-management and information-sharing protocols and procedures, and
because of the national security and public-safety risks that emanate from their territory, including
risks that result from the significant presence of terrorists within the territory of several of those
countries.
(g) The entry restrictions and limitations in Proclamation 9645 apply to the immigrant and
nonimmigrant visa application and adjudication processes, which foreign nationals use to seek
authorization to travel to the United States and apply for admission. Pursuant to section 3(b)(iii) of
Proclamation 9645, however, those restrictions and limitations do not apply to those who seek to
enter the United States through the USRAP.
(h) Foreign nationals who seek to enter the United States with an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa
stand in a different position from that of refugees who are considered for entry into this country
under the USRAP. For a variety of reasons, including substantive differences in the risk factors
presented by the refugee population and in the quality of information available to screen and vet
refugees, the refugee screening and vetting process is different from the process that applies to
most visa applicants. At the same time, the entry of certain refugees into the United States through
the USRAP poses unique security risks and considerable domestic challenges that require the
application of substantial resources.
Sec. 2. Resumption of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. (a) Section 6(a) of Executive Order
13780 provided for a temporary, 120-day review of the USRAP application and adjudication process
and an accompanying worldwide suspension of refugee travel to the United States and of
application decisions under the USRAP. That 120-day period expires on October 24, 2017. Section
6(a) further provided that refugee travel and application decisions could resume after 120 days for
stateless persons and for the nationals of countries for which the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence jointly determine that the
additional procedures identified through the USRAP review process are adequate to ensure the
security and welfare of the United States. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have advised that the improvements to the
USRAP vetting process are generally adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United
States, that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security may resume that program,
and that they will apply special measures to certain categories of refugees whose entry continues
to pose potential threats to the security and welfare of the United States.
(b) With the improvements identified by the section 6(a) working group and implemented by the
participating agencies, the refugee screening and vetting process generally meets the uniform

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-3 Filed 10/25/17 Page 5 of 6
baseline for immigration screening and vetting established by the section 5 working group.
Accordingly, a general resumption of the USRAP, subject to the conditions set forth in section 3 of
this order, is consistent with the security and welfare of the United States.
(c) The suspension of the USRAP and other processes specified in section 6(a) of Executive Order
13780 are no longer in effect. Subject to the conditions set forth in section 3 of this order, the
Secretary of State may resume travel of qualified and appropriately vetted refugees into the United
States, and the Secretary of Homeland Security may resume adjudicating applications for refugee
resettlement.
Sec. 3. Addressing the Risks Presented by Certain Categories of Refugees. (a) Based on the
considerations outlined above, including the special measures referred to in subsection (a) of
section 2 of this order, Presidential action to suspend the entry of refugees under the USRAP is not
needed at this time to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people. The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, however, shall continue to assess and
address any risks posed by particular refugees as follows:
(i) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate to assess any
risks to the security and welfare of the United States that may be presented by the entry into the
United States through the USRAP of stateless persons and foreign nationals. Under section 207(c)
and applicable portions of section 212(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1157(c) and 1182(a), section 402(4) of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. 202(4), and other applicable authorities, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall determine, as appropriate
and consistent with applicable law, whether any actions should be taken to address the risks to the
security and welfare of the United States presented by permitting any category of refugees to enter
this country, and, if so, what those actions should be. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall administer the USRAP consistent with those determinations, and in
consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence.
(ii) Within 90 days of the date of this order and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
determine, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, whether any actions taken to
address the risks to the security and welfare of the United States presented by permitting any
category of refugees to enter this country should be modified or terminated, and, if so, what those
modifications or terminations should be. If the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, determines, at any time, that any actions taken pursuant to section 3(a)
(i) should be modified or terminated, the Secretary of Homeland Security may modify or terminate
those actions accordingly. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State shall
administer the USRAP consistent with the determinations made under this subsection, and in
consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General shall, in consultation with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in cooperation with the heads of
other executive departments and agencies as he deems appropriate, provide a report to the
President on the effect of refugee resettlement in the United States on the national security, public

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-3 Filed 10/25/17 Page 6 of 6
safety, and general welfare of the United States. The report shall include any recommendations
the Attorney General deems necessary to advance those interests.
Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise
affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary,
administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability
of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments,
agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,

October 24, 2017.

 EXHIBIT 3

Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-4 Filed 10/25/17 Page 2 of 8

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
OCT 2 3 20.17
FROM:

Rex W. Tillerson
Secretary
Department of State
Elaine Duke
Acting Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Daniel Coats
Director
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
RESUMING THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
PROGRAM WITH ENHANCED VETTING CAPABILITIES

In section 6(a) of Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States), you directed a review to strengthen the vetting
process for the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). You instructed the Secretary of
State to suspend the travel of refugees into the United States under that program, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to suspend decisions on applications for refugee status, for a
temporary, 120-day period, subject to certain exceptions. During the 120-day suspension period,
Section 6(a) required the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland
Security and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to review the USRAP
application and adjudication processes to determine what additional procedures should be used to
ensure that individuals seeking admission as refugees do not pose a threat to the security and
welfare of the United States, and to implement such additional procedures.
The Secretary of State convened a working group to implement the review process under
section 6(a) of Executive Order 13780, which proceeded in parallel with the development of the
uniform baseline of screening and vetting standards and procedures for all travelers under section
5 of that Executive Order. The section 6(a) working group then compared the refugee screening
and vetting process with the uniform baseline standards and procedures established by the
section 5 working group. This helped to inform the section 6(a) working group's identification
of a number of additional ways to enhance the refugee screening and vetting processes. The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have begun implementing those
improvements.
Pursuant to section 6(a), this memorandum reflects our joint determination that the
improvements to the USRAP vetting process identified by the 6(a) working group are generally
adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States, and therefore that the Secretary

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-4 Filed 10/25/17 Page 3 of 8

of State may resume travel of refugees into the United States and that the Secretary of Homeland
Security may resume making decisions on applications for refugee status for stateless persons
and foreign nationals, subject to the conditions described below.
Notwithstanding the additional procedures identified or implemented during the last 120
days, we continue to have concerns regarding the admission of nationals of, and stateless persons
who last habitually resided in, 11 particular countries previously identified as posing a higher
risk to the United States through their designation on the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) list.
The SAO list for refugees was established following the September Il th terrorist attacks and has
evolved over the years through interagency consultations. The current list of countries was
established in 2015. To address these concerns, we will conduct a detailed threat analysis and
review for nationals of these high risk countries and stateless persons who last habitually resided
in those countries, including a threat assessment of each country, pursuant to section 207(c) and
applicable portions of section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8
U.S.C. 1157(c) and 1182(a), section 402(4) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.
202(4), and other applicable authorities. During this review, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Homeland Security will temporarily prioritize refugee applications from other nonSAO countries. DHS and DOS will work together to take resources that may have been
dedicated to processing nationals of, or stateless persons who last habitually resided in, SAO
countries and, during the temporary review period, reallocate them to process applicants from
non-SAO countries for whom the processing may not be as resource intensive.
While the temporary review is underway, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State
will cooperate to carefully scrutinize the applications of nationals of countries on the SAO list, or
of stateless persons who last habitually resided in those countries, and will consider individuals
for potential admission whose resettlement in the United States would fulfill critical foreign
policy interests, without compromising national security and the welfare of the United States. As
such, the Secretary of Homeland Security will admit on a case-by-case basis only refugees
whose admission is deemed to be in the national interest and poses no threat to the security or
wel fare of the United States. We will direct our staff to work jointly and with law enforcement
agencies to complete the additional review of the SAO countries no later than 90 days from the
date of this memorandum, and to determine what additional safeguards, if any, are necessary to
ensure that the admission of refugees from these countries of concern does not pose a threat to
the security and welfare of the United States.
Further, it is our joint determination that additional security measures must be
implemented promptly for derivative refugees—those who are "following-to-join" principal
refugees that have already been resettled in the United States—regardless of nationality.' At
present, the majority of following-to-join refugees, unlike principal refugees, do not undergo
enhanced DHS review, which includes soliciting information from the refugee applicant earlier
When a refugee is processed for admission to the tJnited States, eligible family members located in the same place
as the refugee (spouses and/or unmarried children under 21 years of age) typically are also processed at the same
time, and they receive the same screening as the principal refugee. Each year, however, resettled principal refugees
also petition, through a separate process, for approximately 2,500 family members to be admitted to the United
States as following-to-join refugees. The family member may be residing and processed in a different country than
where the principal refugee was processed, and while most following-to-join refugees share the nationality of the
principal, some may be of a different nationality.

2

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in the process to provide for a more thorough screening process, as well as vetting certain
nationals or stateless persons against classified databases. We have jointly determined that
additional security measures must be implemented before admission of following-to-join
refugees can resume. Based on an assessment of current systems checks, as well as requirements
for uniformity identified by Section 5, we will direct our staffs to work jointly to implement
adequate screening mechanisms for following-to-join refugees that are similar to the processes
employed for principal refugees, in order to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.
We will resume admission of following-to-join refugees once those enhancements have been
implemented.

Rex W. Tillerson
Secretary
Department of State

Elaine Duke
Acting Secretary
Department of
Homeland Security

3

Dan Coats
Director
National Intelligence

 Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 117-4 Filed 10/25/17 Page 5 of 8

UNCLASSIFIED

Addendum to Section 6(a) Memorandum
Executive Order 13780, Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States
Section 6(a) of Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry into the United States), required a review of the United States Refugee
Admissions Program (USRAP) application and adjudication process during a 120-day period to
determine what additional procedures should be used to ensure that individuals seeking
admission as refugees do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States. The
Secretary of State (State), in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) and in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) established an interagency
working group (the Section 6(a) Working Group) to undertake this review.
This addendum provides a summary of the additional procedures that have been and will be
implemented. A classified report provides further detail of this review and enhancements. The
interagency working group has recommended and implemented enhanced vetting procedures in
three areas: application, interviews and adjudications, and system checks.
Internency Approach to the Review
To conduct the review, the Section 6(a) Working Group conducted a baseline assessment of
USRAP application and adjudication processes and developed additional procedures to further
enhance the security and welfare of the United States. The Section 6(a) Working Group ensured
alignment with other concurrent and relevant reviews undertaken under the Executive Order,
such as the review under Section 5, which established uniform baseline screening standards for
all travelers to the United States.
All individuals admitted through the USRAP already receive a baseline of extensive security
checks. The USRAP also requires additional screening and procedures for certain individuals
from 11 specific countries that have been assessed by the U.S. government to pose elevated
potential risks to national security; these individuals are subject to additional vetting through
Security Advisory Opinions (SA0s)1. The SAO list for refugees was established following the
September 11th terrorist attacks and has evolved over the years through interagency
consultations. The most recent list was updated in 2015. The Section 6(a) Working Group
agreed to continue to follow this tiered approach to assessing risk and agreed that these
nationalities continued to require additional vetting based on current elevated potential for risk.
Each additional procedure identified during the 120-day review was evaluated to determine
whether it should apply to stateless persons and refugees of all nationalities or only certain
nationalities.2
'The SAO is a DOS-initiated biographic check conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and intelligence
community partners. SAO name checks are initiated for the groups and nationalities designated by the U.S.
government as requiring this higher level check.
2 Stateless persons in this regard moans persons without nationality who last habitually resided in one of these
countries.
UNCLASSIFIED

I

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UNCLASSIFIED

Additional Procedures for Refugee Applicants Seeking Resettlement in the United States
Application Process:
• Increased Data Collection: Additional data are being collected from all applicants in
order to enhance the effectiveness of biographic security checks. These changes will
improve the ability to determine whether an applicant is being truthful about his or her
claims, has engaged in criminal or terrorist activity, has terrorist ties, or is otherwise
connected to nefarious actors.
• Enhanced Identity Management: The electronic refugee case management system has
been improved to better detect potential fraud by strengthening the ability to identify
duplicate identities or identity documents. Any such matches are subject to further
investigation prior to an applicant being allowed to travel. These changes will make it
harder for applicants to use deceptive tactics to enter our country.
Interview and Adjudication Process:
> Fraud Detection and National Security: DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) will forward-deploy specially trained Fraud Detection and National
Security (FDNS) officers at refugee processing locations to help identify potential fraud,
national security, and public safety issues on certain circuit rides to advise and assist
interviewing officers. With FDNS officers on the ground, the United States will be
better positioned to detect and disrupt fraud and identify potential national security and
public safety threats.
• New Guidance and Training: USCIS is strengthening its guidance on how to assess the
credibility and admissibility of refugee applicants. This new guidance clarifies how
officers should identify and analyze grounds of inadmissibility related to drug offenses,
drug trafficking, prostitution, alien smuggling, torture, membership in totalitarian parties,
fraud and misrepresentation, certain immigration violations, and other criminal activity.
USCIS has also updated guidance for refugee adjudicators to give them greater flexibility
in assessing the credibility of refugee applicants, including expanding factors that may be
considered in making a credibility determination consistent with the REAL ID Act. This
enhanced guidance supplements the robust credibility guidance and training USCIS
officers already receive prior to adjudicating refugee cases. Additionally, the updated
guidance equips officers with tactics to identify inadequate or improper interpretation.
> Expanded Information-Sharing: State and USCIS are exchanging more in-depth
information to link related cases so that interviewing officers are able to develop more
tailored lines of questioning that will help catch potential fraud, national security threats,
or public safety concerns.

UNCLASSIFIED
2

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UNCLASSIFIED
System Checks:
➢ Updating Security Checks: Measures have been put in place to ensure that if applicants
change or update key data points, including new or altered biographic information, that
such data is then subject to renewed scrutiny and security checks. This will add an
additional layer of protection to identify fraud and national security issues.
> Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs): Departments and agencies have agreed to expand
the classes of refugee applicants that are subject to SAOs, thereby ensuring that more
refugees receive deeper vetting.
•

USCIS' Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate is also expanding its
"enhanced review" process for applicants who meet SAO criteria. This includes
checks against certain social media and classified databases.

Additional Review Process for Certain Categories of Refugee Applicants
The Department of Homeland Security continues to have concerns regarding the admission of
nationals of, and stateless persons who last habitually resided in, 11 particular countries
previously identified as posing a higher risk to the United States through their designation on the
SAO list. The SAO list for refugees was established following the September 11th terrorist
attacks and has evolved over the years through interagency consultations. The current list of
countries was established in 2015.
As such, for countries subject to SAOs, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General,
will coordinate a review and analysis of each country, pursuant to existing USRAP authorities.
This review will include an in-depth threat assessment of each country, to be completed within
90 days. Moreover, it will include input and analysis from the intelligence and law enforcement
communities, as well as all relevant information related to ongoing or completed investigations
and national security risks and mitigation strategies.
This review will be tailored to each SAO country, and decisions may be made for each country
independently. While the temporary review is underway, the Secretaries of Homeland Security
and State will cooperate to carefully scrutinize the applications of nationals of, and stateless
persons who last habitually resided in, countries on the SAO list and will consider individuals for
potential admission whose resettlement in the United States would fulfill critical foreign policy
interests, without compromising national security and the welfare of the United States. As such,
the Secretary of Homeland Security may admit on a case-by-case basis only refugees whose
admission is deemed to be in the national interest and poses no threat to the security or welfare of
the United States.
In addition, during this review period, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security will temporarily prioritize refugee applications from non-SAO countries. DHS and
DOS will work together to take resources that may have been dedicated to processing nationals
of, or stateless persons who last habitually resided in, SAO countries and, during the temporary
UNCLASSIFIED
3

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UNCLASSIFIED
review period, reallocate them to process applicants from non-SAO countries for whom the
processing may not be as resource intensive. This means that refugee admissions for nationals
of, and stateless persons who last habitually resided in, SAO countries will occur at a slower
pace, at least during the temporary review period and likely further into the fiscal year, as the
deployment of additional screening and integrity measures have historically led to lengthier
processing times. While DHS prioritizes its resources in this manner until the additional analysis
is completed, OHS will interview refugee applicants as appropriate from SAO countries on a
discretionary basis.
Form 1-730 Refugee Following-to-Join Processing
A principal refugee applicant may include his or her spouse and unmarried children under 21
years of age as derivative refugee applicants on his or her Form 1-590, Registration for
Classification as a Refugee. When these family members are co-located with the principal, the
derivative applicants generally are processed through the USRAP and, if approved, travel to the
United States with the principal refugee applicant. These family members receive the same
baseline security checks as the principal refugee and, if found eligible, are admitted as refugees.
Alternatively, a principal refugee admitted to the United States may file a Form 1-730,
Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition, for his or her spouse and unmarried children under 21 years of
age, to follow-to-join the principal refugee in the United States. If DHS grants the petition after
interview and vetting, the approved spouse or unmarried child is admitted as a refugee and
counted toward the annual refugee ceiling. While the vast majority of eligible refugee family
members admitted to the United States each year accompany, and are screened with, the
principal refugee, principal refugees admitted to the United States file petitions for
approximately 2,500 family members to join them in the United States through the following-tojoin process. Following-to-join family members may be residing and processed in a different
country than where the principal refugee was processed, and while most share the nationality of
the principal refugee, some may be of a different nationality. In any given year, DHS receives
petitions for beneficiaries representing over 60 different nationalities. In recent years, the
nationalities most represented were Iraqi, Somali, Burmese, Congolese, Ethiopian and Eritrean.
The majority of following-to-join refugees do not receive the same, full baseline interagency
checks that principal refugees receive. Nor do following-to-join refugees currently undergo
enhanced DHS review, which includes soliciting information from the refugee earlier in the
process to provide for more thorough screening and vetting of certain nationals or stateless
persons against classified databases. DHS and State are expeditiously taking measures to better
align the vetting regime for following-to-join refugees with that for principal refugees by 1)
ensuring that all following-to join refugees receive the full baseline interagency checks that
principal refugees receive; 2) requesting submission of the beneficiary's 1-590 application in
support of the Form I-730 petition earlier in the process to provide for more thorough screening;
3) vetting certain nationals or stateless persons against classified databases; and 4) expanding
SAO requirements for this population in keeping with the agreed-to expansion for 1-590 refugee
applicants. These additional security measures must be implemented before admission of
following-to-join refugees—regardless of nationality—can resume. Once the security
enhancements are in place, admission of following-to join refugees can resume.

UNCLASSIFIED
4