Case 1:17-cv-00255-TSC Document 132 Filed 12/07/17 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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PARS EQUALITY CENTER, et al.,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00255-TSC
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DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official
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capacity as President of the
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United States, et al.,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________)
DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs have filed a supplemental memorandum requesting “expeditious entry of the
requested injunction” against both the Proclamation issued on September 24, 2017, as well as the
separate refugee-related policies announced in October 2017. See Pls.’ Suppl. Mem. (ECF
No. 131) at 1-2. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, however, the Supreme Court recently stayed in full
two injunctions directed against the Proclamation. See id.; see also Trump v. IRAP, No. 17A560,
2017 WL 5987435 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2017); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17A550, 2017 WL 5987406 (U.S.
Dec. 4, 2017). Particularly in light of those stay orders, this Court should likewise decline to enter
any injunctive relief, and may want to consider staying these matters until the proceedings in IRAP
and Hawaii have concluded.
1. With respect to the Proclamation, entry of an injunction would be directly contrary to
the Supreme Court’s stay orders in IRAP and Hawaii. As this Court previously recognized,
therefore, “[t]his court . . . has no authority to grant the relief requested.” ECF No. 101 at 4
(declining to enter relief broader than what the Supreme Court authorized in connection with EO2). There are no material differences between Plaintiffs’ arguments for an injunction here and the
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arguments of the plaintiffs in IRAP and Hawaii. Notably, the Supreme Court’s stay orders were
issued after the events described by Plaintiffs as justifying relief here. See ECF No. 131 at 3 ¶ 7.
2. Although the Supreme Court’s stay orders do not directly address the refugee-related
policies, the legal determinations underpinning those orders also foreclose relief as to those
policies. In deciding whether to stay an injunction, the Supreme Court considers the same factors
governing issuance of a preliminary injunction. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
Accordingly, when the Supreme Court granted the Government’s stay applications in IRAP and
Hawaii, the Court necessarily determined that the Government had demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits and that the Government’s national-security and foreign-policy interests
outweighed the plaintiffs’ interests.
Here, many of the legal claims and equitable interests that Plaintiffs rely on in their
challenges to the refugee policies are the same as those at issue in IRAP and Hawaii. If anything,
Plaintiffs’ arguments are even weaker here. For example, with respect to Plaintiffs’ Establishment
Clause claim against the Joint Memorandum, Plaintiffs have not even attempted to allege any
animus associated with the relevant decisionmakers for that policy—i.e., the Secretaries of State
and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence. In terms of the equitable
balance, moreover, the Government’s national-security interests relating to the entry of refugees
are equally weighty as the concerns regarding the entry of other foreign travelers. Yet the
Plaintiffs’ interests here are significantly weaker: they rely on the same interest in having their
family members admitted to the country, see ECF No. 131 at 2-3, but critically the challenged
SAO policy is only a temporary, 90-day measure, and approximately half of that time period has
already passed. The Supreme Court’s determination that the Government’s interests predominate
over the IRAP and Hawaii plaintiffs’ interests, at least for the length of time necessary for

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resolution of the issues by the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court, likewise means that the
Government’s interests in the refugee policies predominate over Plaintiffs’ interests for the next
45 days.
In short, the Supreme Court’s stay orders foreclose relief as to the refugee policies, because
on all of the relevant factors the Government is in the same (or stronger) position as in the
challenges at issue in IRAP and Hawaii. Accordingly, this Court should deny Plaintiffs’ requested
injunctions, or at a minimum stay consideration of those motions and these proceedings pending
completion of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court proceedings in IRAP and Hawaii.

Dated: December 7, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
CHAD A. READLER
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
HASHIM M. MOOPPAN
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
JESSIE K. LIU
United States Attorney
JENNIFER D. RICKETTS
Director, Federal Programs Branch
JOHN R. TYLER
Assistant Director, Federal Programs Branch
/s/ Daniel Schwei
DANIEL SCHWEI (N.Y. Bar)
MICHELLE R. BENNETT (Co. Bar No. 37050)
KEVIN SNELL (N.Y. Bar)
JOSEPH C. DUGAN (Ohio Bar No. 0093997)
Senior Trial Counsel / Trial Attorneys
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
20 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20530
Tel: (202) 305-8693
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Fax: (202) 616-8470
E-mail: daniel.s.schwei@usdoj.gov
Counsel for Defendants

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