Considerations for the
Recombination of BOEM & BSEE

Overview
On May 19, 2010, through Secretary’s Order 3299 (SO 3299), the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) ordered the reorganization of the Minerals Management Service (MMS)1, an agency
with approximately 1,800 employees and an operating budget of approximately $377 million,
into three separate bureaus with distinct missions. The purpose of SO 3299 was to address “real
and perceived conflicts between the resource management, safety and environmental oversight
and enforcement, and revenue collection responsibilities,”2 and improprieties reported by the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The restructuring was accomplished with the assistance
of an independent consulting firm under contract for approximately $7.8 million. By October
2011, the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR), the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (BOEM), and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) were
in existence. New ethics standards were established as a deterrent to conflicts of interest and
behavioral improprieties.3
After careful review, it is apparent that the reorganization resulted in challenges that BOEM and
BSEE continue to confront to this day. Recombining the two bureaus could increase
efficiencies and reduce costs in managing the OCS program, but will also cause implementation
challenges. This memorandum reviews the issues associated with both the past reorganization
and the potential recombination of BOEM and BSEE.
Background
The Secretary is responsible for the administration of mineral exploration and development of
the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) in accordance with the OCS Lands Act of 1953. The
Act empowers the Secretary to perform a number of duties to carry out the policy objectives,
which include:
•

•

1

providing for “expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental
safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and
other national needs;” and
ensuring that “operations in the [OCS are] conducted in a safe manner by well-trained
personnel using technology, precautions, and techniques sufficient to prevent or minimize

U.S. DOI, Secretary’s Order 3299, Establishment of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Bureau of
Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue. May 19, 2010.
2
Implementation Plan in Response to the Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board’s September 1, 2010
Report to the Secretary of the Interior. September 4, 2010 (page 3).
3
Ethics Guide for DOI Employees, January 2009.

 the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well control, fires, spillage, physical obstruction to
other users of the waters or subsoil and seabed, or other occurrences which may cause
damage to the environment or to property, or endanger life or health.”4
Within DOI, the MMS was created by Secretary’s Order 3071 on January 19, 1982, with
responsibility for managing the nation’s natural gas, oil and other mineral resources on the OCS
and collecting revenue generated from mineral development5. From its inception through 2015,
MMS and its successor agencies collected over $260 billion in revenues and distributed them to
States, Tribes, counties, and the federal treasury. MMS activities were carried out from a
headquarters office in Washington, DC, and regional offices in New Orleans, LA (Gulf of
Mexico), Camarillo, CA (Pacific) and Anchorage, AK (Alaska). District offices in New Orleans,
Houma, Lafayette and Lake Charles in Louisiana, and Lake Jackson, TX were and continue to be
subunits of the Gulf of Mexico Region. Revenue and royalty collection and distribution were
managed primarily from an office in Denver, CO, with audit offices at various locations.
In 2006, the OIG initiated an inquiry into allegations of misconduct by personnel in the Denver
office responsible for the Royalty in Kind (RIK) program. The inquiry led to three separate
investigations into allegations against more than a dozen employees that concluded in September
2008. One individual pled guilty to a criminal charge and the cases for two individuals were
referred to the Department of Justice, which declined to prosecute. The OIG summarized the
situation as “a culture of ethical failure”.6 The OIG report contained four recommendations
directed at the RIK program: (1) Take appropriate administrative and corrective action; (2)
Develop an enhanced ethics program designed specifically for the RIK program; (3) Develop a
clear, strict code of conduct for the RIK program; and (4) Consider changing the reporting
structure of RIK. This was followed by a separate investigation in 2008 into allegations of MMS
employees in the Lake Charles, LA, district office accepting gifts from oil and gas production
company representatives. One individual was terminated following the investigation.7
On April 20, 2010, the worst oil spill in U.S. history occurred following the blowout of the
Macondo well and the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon rig. In response to this
event and the OIG reports identifying the ethical issues mentioned above, then-Secretary of the
Interior Ken Salazar issued Secretary’s Order 3299 on May 19, 2010, which dissolved MMS and
initiated the process for creating ONRR to manage royalty and revenue, BSEE to regulate
offshore energy development, and BOEM to manage resource evaluation, planning and leasing.8

4

OCS Lands Act 43 U.S.C. 1332
U.S. DOI Secretary’s Order No. 3071, January 19, 1982.
6
Memo from DOI Inspector General to Secretary DOI, Subject: OIG Investigations of MMS Employees, September
10, 2008.
7
Memo from DOI Inspector General to Secretary DOI, Subject: Investigative Report -Island Operating Company,
et. al. May 24, 2010.
8
Implementation Report: Reorganization of the Minerals Management Service. Department of the Interior. July
14, 2010.
5

2

 The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) was named
as an interim organization for the offshore bureaus after ONNR was created in October 2010. 9
SO 3299 directed the restructuring of MMS into three separate entities with independent
missions:
•

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management: A new bureau under the supervision of the
Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management responsible for the sustainable
development of OCS conventional and renewable energy resources, including resource
evaluation, planning, and other activities related to leasing and resource management.

•

Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement: A new bureau under the supervision
of the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management responsible for ensuring
comprehensive oversight, safety, and environmental protection in all offshore energy
activities.

•

Office of Natural Resources Revenue: An office under the supervision of the Assistant
Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget responsible for the royalty and revenue
management function, including the collection and distribution of revenue, auditing and
compliance, and asset management.

In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, Secretary Salazar identified a need for creation of
a separate and independent safety and environmental enforcement entity. DOI listed the
following as the objectives of the restructuring10:
•

•
•
•
•
•

Eliminate real and perceived conflicts within the existing organization by creating
separate entities focused on each of the critical elements of MMS’s current mission,
namely responsible resource development; safety and environmental protection and
enforcement; and effective and appropriate revenue collection;
Provide each organization with the structure and necessary resources to successfully
achieve its individual mission and objectives;
Establish necessary checks and balances in the relationship among the three new entities,
so stakeholders can be assured that all mission elements are appropriately addressed;
Maintain critical linkages among the three organizations to provide a predictably
administered offshore energy and minerals development and regulatory program;
Support enhanced offshore renewable energy production; and
Provide effective and appropriate administrative support for each new entity without
creating unnecessary redundancy.

Certain reforms were emphasized as accompanying the reorganization:
9

U.S. DOI Secretary’s Order No. 3302, June 18, 2010.
Implementation Report: Reorganization of the Minerals Management Service, July 14, 2010

10

3

 •

Separating resource management from safety oversight to allow permitting engineers and
inspectors greater independence, more budgetary autonomy and clearer senior leadership
focus.

•

Providing a structure that ensures that robust environmental analyses are conducted and that
the potential environmental effects of proposed operations are given appropriate weight
during decision-making related to resource management.

•

Strengthening the role of environmental review and analysis in both organizations.

•

Increasing the inspection and engineering workforce to allow for more thorough review
of permits, and more analysis to ensure compliance with enhanced standards.

The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling made a
similar recommendation. Specifically, it recommended creation of “an independent agency
within the Department of the Interior with enforcement authority to oversee all aspects of
offshore drilling safety (operational and occupational), as well as the structural and operational
integrity of offshore energy production facilities….” The Commission’s report identified the
Macondo well failure as turning “a harsh spotlight on [MMS’s] bureaucratic inadequacies and
shortcomings,” which they listed as the lack of “a clearly articulated mission or adequate
guidance for balancing its different missions, … inefficient management and a tendency to defer
to industry,… an outdated organizational structure, a chronic shortage of resources, a lack of
sufficient technological expertise, and the inherent difficulty of coordinating with all the other
government agencies that had a statutory responsibility for some aspect of offshore oil and gas
activities.”11 While the Commission recommended reorganization, none of the problems it
identified required a reorganization to be addressed. Furthermore, none of the technical
investigations of the cause of the Macondo failure identified the MMS organizational structure as
contributing to the failure of the well. The creation of BOEM and BSEE as separate bureaus
went beyond what was needed to correct existing ethics and behavioral problems or real and
perceived conflicts of interest.
By 2017, the combined number of people employed to carry out the mission of the former MMS
had increased to 2,122 (a 20.5% increase when compared to MMS in 2010) and the combined
budget for the three bureaus grew to over $500 million (a 32.7% increase over MMS) (Table 1,
attached). The increase can be attributed to not only a need for more personnel to perform
critical operations such as inspections (e.g., the increase in personnel in district offices is
primarily a result of hiring more inspectors (Table 2, attached)) and an incentive pay program for
mission critical occupations such as petroleum engineers and geoscientists, but also a
redundancy of functions needed to manage headquarters and regional offices in separate bureaus.
11

Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling; Report to the President, National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, January 2011

4

 During that same period, the number of personnel in all of DOI declined about 7% and the
enacted budget for the department increased about 1.3% (Table 1).
Almost six years after the establishment of BOEM and BSEE, there is now a track record on
which to consider the effectiveness of the reorganization.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been critical of the reorganization of MMS.
In February 2011, GAO placed DOI’s management of federal oil and gas resources on a “high
risk list” for three reasons including a broad reorganization of offshore oil and gas management.
GAO specifically mentioned inadequate plans to address human capital issues. 12 The
reorganization was removed from the high risk list in 2013, but reinstated in 2017 because
“Interior's restructuring of the [BSEE] has made limited progress addressing long-standing
deficiencies in the bureau's investigative, environmental compliance, and enforcement
capabilities,”13 one of the three critical functions of the new bureau. In March 2017, GAO
reported that action was needed to address leadership commitment deficiencies in oil and gas
oversight within BSEE.14
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report in July 2012 was less critical of the
reorganization.15 Another organization, the National Academy of Public Administration
(NAPA), was hired by BSEE in 2016 at a cost of $500,000 to conduct a review and prepare a
report in anticipation of adverse findings from an ongoing GAO review. NAPA assessed the
Bureau’s organizational progress during its first five years of existence. The NAPA report was
published in March 2017 to coincide with the release of GAO’s report and counter GAO’s
findings.16 NAPA stated that the reorganization was justified in part by “troubling patterns
where managers seemed to prioritize the dominant mission of meeting development targets at the
expense of regulatory compliance functions” as reported by the OIG and others; however, the
preparers provided no specific evidence to support this conclusion. NAPA found that over the
course of five years, “BSEE has developed and strengthened programs and capacities to fulfill its
mission.” NAPA recommended that “BSEE should remain a separate entity with high levels of
coordination with BOEM and ONRR.”
Benefits of Recombination

12

High-Risk Series. An Update. GAO 11-278 Report to Congressional Committees. February 2011 (page 37).
High-Risk Series. Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others. GAO 17-317
Report to Congress. February 2017 (page 136).
14
Oil and Gas Management: Stronger Leadership Commitment Needed at Interior to Improve Offshore Oversight
and Internal Management. GAO 17-293 Report to Congressional Addressees. March 2017.
15
Congressional Research Service, Department of the Interior (DOI) Reorganization of Ocean Energy Programs. July
11, 2012.
16
A Report by a Study Team of the National Academy of Public Administration for the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement: Strategic Organizational
Assessment, March 2017.
13

5

 •

•

•

Combining BOEM and BSEE would restore full life-cycle resource management,
oversight and stewardship into a single bureau with a common, coherent management
philosophy. While the two bureaus make a considerable effort to coordinate on crosscutting issues, differing priorities and cultures make resolution of some issues
challenging. For example, decisions on suspensions and unitization in one bureau can
impact the leasing program in the other. Both would benefit from a common strategy for
the long-term management of OCS resources and infrastructure.
A combined bureau would provide a single focal point for stakeholder engagement across
the entire OCS program. Stakeholders, both external and within DOI, continue to have
difficulty identifying which bureau to contact for specific issues.
The split into BOEM and BSEE divided some critical processes that make the work flow
less efficient and effective. To mitigate this problem, BOEM and BSEE signed six
Memoranda of Agreement, with 43 underlying Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
documents at the beginning of October 2011. The SOPs identified staff to ensure that the
documents would be revised as the bureaus evolved, and the bureaus agreed to develop
additional documents as needed. Nevertheless, none of the original documents have been
updated, and only one additional MOA and SOP were signed. In addition, not all of the
SOPs are still being followed. As a result, BOEM and BSEE continue to experience
disruptions of workflow, duplication of effort, communication errors, and a lack of
knowledge of processes in the other bureau. Industry has also reported inefficiencies in
processing requests when coordination and collaboration between personnel in separate
bureaus is needed to complete certain transactions. Realigning BOEM and BSEE in a
more efficient manner would rectify these problems.
This issue is reflected in the fact that, after almost six years, BOEM and BSEE are still
working to resolve ongoing coordination issues between the two bureaus. Examples
include:
o NEPA: BOEM is responsible for NEPA for both BOEM and BSEE. The purpose of
this structure is to have a single NEPA analysis cover both agencies’ actions, ensuring
consistency of conclusions and mitigation measures. However BSEE cannot use
BOEM’s NEPA analysis directly for its decisions and must take the additional step of
determining whether BOEM’s NEPA analysis is adequate for BSEE’s purposes. This
has led to disagreements about whether NEPA analyses need supplementing for
BSEE decisions, and reflects tension regarding whether BOEM should be a service
provider for such analyses, or the subject matter expert advising BSEE on NEPA
matters.
o Financial assurance, decommissioning, and bankruptcies: Responsibilities for
managing risks related to decommissioning liabilities are spread across the two
bureaus. BOEM is responsible for financial assurance and BSEE is responsible for
calculating decommissioning costs, overseeing decommissioning activities, and
6

 determining if a well or facility has been decommissioned. Proactively managing
financial assurance for these liabilities requires substantial coordination between the
bureaus, from the initial decisions on supplemental assurance, through allocation of
resources for decommissioning in bankruptcy cases, to release of bonds once all
obligations are met. There is a critical need to work together more effectively and to
improve bankruptcy related coordination, communication and management to protect
the taxpayer's interests. Addressing decommissioning as a life-cycle issue would
facilitate discussions of alternate solutions to manage this risk.
•

•

The employees remained in the same buildings in the same geographic locations once the
reorganization was complete. The renewable energy function continued to perform all
actions within a single bureau despite being identified for split responsibilities in SO
3299. In addition, administrative functions including human resources, finance,
procurement, and information technology remained as shared services in support of both
bureaus. These facts highlight the strong interdependencies between the two bureaus and
suggest that the reorganization had little to no bearing on the need to separate the bureaus
to resolve “real and perceived conflicts of interest.”
Combining the two bureaus will create moderate savings from reduced overhead, which
will allow resources to be transferred to the field or put to other priority purposes.
Because BSEE provides BOEM with most of its administrative services (e.g., human
resources, finance, procurement, information technology) through a reimbursable
services agreement, duplicative services are limited. However, there is some duplication,
including executive offices in each headquarters and regional directorate, and
congressional, public affairs, budget, and a number of smaller administrative functions.
The extent of such savings would be determined as the bureaus work through the details
of the reorganization.

Challenges in Recombination
•

Any reorganization requires focused attention from management and the engagement of
employees. Several employees would need to be pulled from their usual jobs to help
design and plan for the new organization, and most other employees would be distracted
throughout the planning process and initial implementation. Thus, a reorganization
would divert resources and attention from accomplishing important policy/program
objectives (e.g., developing and implementing a new 5 Year Program; regulatory reform).
While these objectives would remain as priorities, they would compete for resources with
the reorganization, and thus likely not occur as quickly as they otherwise would.

•

The new bureau would need to establish a new organizational culture, which could
impede productivity as the reorganization is implemented. BOEM and BSEE have
developed separate cultures reflecting their different missions. BOEM focuses on
7

 resource management and science and BSEE on safety, oversight and compliance, and
these missions will be important to maintain in a new organization. A substantial portion
of the workforce never worked for MMS/BOEMRE (40% of BOEM employees; over
50% of BSEE employees are new to the bureaus since the split). They have no
experience with the combined bureau or its culture. This issue could hamper
collaboration in trying to develop a new, efficient organization.
•

There likely will be public criticism, especially from those who recommended the breakup of MMS or who otherwise oppose offshore oil and gas activities. A recent Bloomberg
article (https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-06-08/trump-said-to-mullcombining-agencies-separated-after-gulf-spill) included quotes from two members of the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
criticizing the possibility of recombining BOEM and BSEE. This opposition may not be
offset by strong public support from others. The same article quoted an industry leader as
saying this action is not among industry’s priorities. Some have already expressed
concern that reorganization could slow down approvals of industry actions.

Additional Considerations
Atlantic Region
For some time, BOEM staff have argued that the time is right for an Atlantic Regional office.
The Atlantic is the only geographic area that spans multiple BOEM responsibilities but has no
single office coordinating all of these activities. Currently, Atlantic-based field activities are
distributed among three of BOEM’s headquarters offices (Office of Renewable Energy
Programs, Office of Strategic Resources, Office of Environmental Programs) and the Gulf of
Mexico Region. This separation of functions makes overarching coordination on Atlantic
activities challenging. BOEM’s Atlantic OCS-related activities, specifically renewable energy,
marine minerals, and oil and gas geological and geophysical permitting, have significantly
increased over the past few years. As BOEM’s Atlantic OCS presence increases, so does the
need to develop strong, consistent, and cross-cutting Atlantic OCS policies that better integrate
programmatic needs, workforce expertise, scientific studies programs, and stakeholder outreach
strategies. With this increase in program activities, the need for a single office dedicated to the
regional interests of the Atlantic OCS has become critical. This need exists regardless of
whether the Administration chooses to have oil and gas lease sales in the Atlantic OCS, though
such a program would add to the need for a regional office. Creation of such an office would
more clearly separate headquarters and field functions and allow an opportunity to locate this
work outside of the immediate Washington D.C. area.
Organic Act

8

 MMS, BOEM and BSEE were all established by Secretarial Order. Their authorities come from
statutes that assign responsibility to the Secretary; the bureaus themselves do not have organic
legislation. While the lack of an organic act gives the Secretary the discretion to reorganize
these bureaus at will, it also makes it difficult to institutionalize any reorganization. Once the
reorganization proposal is complete, the Department could seek to institutionalize it by
proposing organic legislation.
An organic act has been proposed at various times in the past. While no one voiced any
significant opposition to the concept, it also lacked the active support that would have been
needed to move a bill forward.
Pro
•

Institutionalizes the new organization in legislation.

•

Provides stability going forward for the new bureau and its programs.

•

Provides an avenue for addressing other statutory changes, for example:
o Expanding OCSLA to cover US territories and possessions.
o Transfer ocean thermal energy conversion and deep seabed mining authorities
from NOAA to the new bureau, where they are a better fit with the mission.

Cons
•

Reduces Secretarial flexibility in the future.

•

Past Congressional proposals have often added provisions to draft organic legislation that
may not be consistent with the proposed reorganization or Administration policy.

•

The Bureau Director would likely become subject to Senate confirmation. Given the
controversial nature of the offshore oil and gas program, Senators might put holds on
confirmation votes to negotiate commitments regarding access (or lack thereof) to certain
parts of the OCS.

Options for how to proceed
BOEM and BSEE (as well as MMS) were created by Secretarial Order, so any reorganization
can be accomplished in the same manner. However, the Department would need the approval of
the appropriations committees since all options would include reprogramming funds.
This memorandum assumes that ONRR will remain within the Assistant Secretariat for Policy,
Management and Budget, and therefore, only considers options for the scope of recombining
BOEM and BSEE.
9

 First and foremost, if there is a decision to proceed with reorganization, it needs to be made
quickly, especially if the goal is to implement on October 1, 2018 (the first day of Fiscal Year
2019). The bureaus will need to conduct employee engagement, make decisions on
organizational structure and personnel, develop a new budget structure and FY 19 budget
proposal, and handle a myriad of time-consuming administrative matters that will have to be in
effect on day one. The sooner this work can get started, the smoother the transition will be.
Three options are considered below:
I.

“Light” Option – Combine HQ functions
The reorganization would be directed at headquarters structure and functions. Specifically, there
would be a single Directorate for the new bureau, and certain BOEM/BSEE offices (e.g.,
Congressional Affairs, Public Affairs, Budget, and administrative functions not already covered
by the shared service agreement) would be combined with an overall reduction in the workforce
among those offices. No changes would be proposed for mission functions and structure, nor for
Regional offices, though this could be revisited on a case-by-case basis after the new bureau is
established.
Pros:
•

Consistent with goal of reallocating resources from headquarters to front line offices.

•

Minimizes impact on front-line and mission offices, thus causing the least disruption
to delivery of services and implementation of Administration initiatives.

•

Of all the options, this would take the least time to implement. A realistic goal would
be to include the proposal in the FY 2019 President’s budget.

•

Preserves some of the major elements of the reforms
o Maintains increased resources for safety and enforcement
o Maintains the role of environmental review and analysis

Cons:
•

Retains a bifurcated organization at the regional level (i.e., two regional directorates)

•

Does not include any process streamlining or efficiencies, though these can be
addressed separately through regulatory reform and other initiatives.

10

 II.

“Moderate” Option – Combine HQ functions and management of regional offices

At the headquarters level, the changes would be identical to those in Option I. In addition, these
changes would be mirrored at the regional level, including: establishing a single Regional
Director in each region and combining certain functions from the respective Regional
Directorates (e.g., budget execution). Mission functions and structure would not be changed at
either the national or regional level as part of the initial reorganization, though some changes
would be made on a case-by-case basis after the new bureau is established. These later changes
would focus on those functions where BOEM and BSEE currently work together to ensure
efficient processes.
Pros
•

Consistent with goal of reallocating resources from headquarters to front line offices.

•

Relatively small impact on front-line and mission offices, thus limiting disruption to
delivery of services and implementation of Administration initiatives.

•

Although more time would be needed to address regional management issues,
including the proposal in the FY 2019 President’s budget would still be feasible.

•

Preserves some of the major elements of the reforms
o Maintains increased resources for safety and enforcement
o Maintains the role of environmental review and analysis

11

 Cons
•

III.

Does not initially include any process streamlining or efficiencies, though these can
be addressed separately through regulatory reform and other initiatives.

“Heavy” Option – Top-to-bottom organizational assessment
In addition to the changes discussed in Options I and II, DOI would undertake an in-depth
organizational assessment of both BOEM and BSEE with the intent of examining structure at all
levels of the bureaus and, potentially, streamlining processes. The outcome of such an
assessment would be a comprehensive restructuring plan that both addresses the structure of the
new bureau and recommends changes to business processes. This option could also be
accomplished in a phased approach – implement Option II promptly and have the new bureau’s
management oversee the organizational assessment after the new bureau is established.
Pros
•

Allows for the reorganization to tackle any and all issues that exist, or are perceived to
exist, throughout the offshore program.

Cons
•

Such a comprehensive approach would require most of management’s attention for at
least two years, resulting in less attention to other Administration initiatives. An
organizational assessment would also require substantial input from bureau subject matter
experts, who would be pulled away from mission delivery.

•

May be viewed as going beyond any issues that need addressing. Most stakeholder
concerns with the bureaus are with policy decisions, and any regulatory uncertainty such
decisions may cause. The core business processes – regular lease sales, lease
administration, review of exploration and development plans, review of drilling and other
permits, inspections – provide timely and efficient responses to the regulated community,
and the need for reengineering them across the board is not apparent. However, certain
processes may benefit from further examination, which can be addressed on a case-bycase basis.

•

This approach would have a major impact on employee morale and productivity.
Undertaking a top-to-bottom assessment sends the message that the front-line offices and
functions are “part of the problem” and need to be “fixed.” Having completed a major
reorganization almost six years ago, this will likely create some negative reaction among
the workforce.

12

 •

This comprehensive approach would be: (1) time-consuming – likely FY 2020 for
implementation; and (2) expensive – requiring a contractor to conduct a comprehensive
organizational assessment.

•

Until such time as the assessment is complete, this approach would likely create a public
reaction that we are undoing the post-Deepwater Horizon safety reforms.

13

  

 

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1: Budget and Personnel for DOI, MMS, BOEM, BSEE, and 
for 2010 and 2016 and the Percentage Chan Between Those Years.
Or anization Personnel Personnel Budget Budget 

2010 2016 Chane 2_ Change?
DOI 53,460 *49,671 $18.296.000.000 $18.527.000.000 1.26% 5
MMS 1,761 - 1 
BOEM - 585 - - $169,560,000 -
BSEE - 875 - - $204,671,000 -
ONRR - 662 - - $126,487,000 -
TOTAL - 2,122 20.5% - $500,718,000 32.7%

*Source: 0PM. Sizing Up the Executive Branch. Fiscal Year 2016 (page 7. Table 3).
Table 2: Number of personnel in different geographic locations for MMS in 2010 and
BSEE, BOEM and ONRR in 2016 and percentage change bv location.
2010 2016

Location MMS BSEE BOEM ONRR TOTAL Change
Washington. DC 76 43 37 80 5.3%
Sterling. VA 304 229 162 391 28.6%
Jefferson. LA 474 286 280 566 19.4%
Denver. CO 487 6 668 37.2%
New Orleans Dist. 26 53 53 103.9%
Houma District 22 44 44 100.00%
Lafayette Distiict 24 45 45 87.5%
Lake Charles Dist. 21 34 34 61.9%
Lake Jackson Dist. 19 34 34 79.0%
Paci?c 60 39 32 71 18.3%
Alaska Houston 73 17 17 -76.7%
Other 87 23 9 32 -63.2%
All Sites 1.761 875 585 *662 2.122 20.5%

 

 

*Note: 2016 ONRR numbers are not broken out by geographic location. This signi?cantly impacts the percent
changes in Washington. DC. Denver. Houston. and other sites. but does not affect the overall percent change.

14