COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Official Committee Hansard
PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
SECURITY

National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference)
Bill 2017, Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Bill 2017

THURSDAY, 15 FEBRUARY 2018

CANBERRA

BY AUTHORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 INTERNET
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 PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
Thursday, 15 February 2018
Members in attendance: Senators Fawcett, McAllister and Mr Dreyfus, Mr Hastie, Dr Mike Kelly, Mr
Leeser.
Terms of Reference for the Inquiry:
To inquire into and report on:
National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017 and Foreign Influence
Transparency Scheme Bill 2017.

 WITNESSES
BRADY, Professor Anne-Marie, Private capacity ................................................................................................ 1

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BRADY, Professor Anne-Marie, Private capacity
Committee met at 16:04
Evidence was taken via teleconference—
CHAIR (Mr Hastie): Welcome. I declare open this public hearing of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Intelligence and Security. Today's hearing encompasses the committee's inquiries into the National Security
Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017 and the Foreign Influence Transparency
Scheme Bill 2017. These are public proceedings, although the committee may agree to a request to have evidence
heard in camera or may determine that certain evidence should be heard in camera.
I remind all witnesses that in giving evidence to the committee they are protected by parliamentary privilege. It
is unlawful for anyone to threaten or disadvantage a witness on account of evidence given to a committee, and
such action may be treated by the Senate as a contempt. It is also a contempt to give false or misleading evidence
to a committee. In accordance with the committee's resolutions of 12 October 2016, this hearing will be broadcast
on the parliament's website and the proof and official transcripts of proceedings will be published on the
parliament's website. Those present here today are advised that filming and recording are permitted during the
hearing. I also remind members of the media who may be present or listening on the web of the need to fairly and
accurately report the proceedings of the committee. I now welcome Professor Anne-Marie Brady to give evidence
today via teleconference. Is there anything you wish to add about the capacity in which you appear today?
Prof. Brady: I am a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Canterbury in
Christchurch, New Zealand.
CHAIR: Although the committee does not require you to give evidence under oath, I should advise you that
this hearing is a legal proceeding of the parliament and therefore has the same standing as proceedings of the
respective houses. The giving of false or misleading evidence is a serious matter and may be regarded as a
contempt of parliament. The evidence given today will be recorded by Hansard. I am obliged to inform you that
parliamentary privilege attaching to your evidence does not apply outside Australia. I now invite you to make an
opening statement before we proceed to discussion.
Prof. Brady: I have a brief summary statement and then I'd be happy to answer questions from the committee.
China aspires to be a global great power and is seeking change in a global order. Under the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, Xi Jinping, China is now claiming a leadership role in global affairs
and pursuing an assertive foreign policy. Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy includes the expansion of CCP
political influence activity known in China as United Front Work. The CCP's United Front activity incorporates
the co-optation of elites, information management, persuasion and accessing strategic information and resources.
It has also frequently been a means of facilitating espionage. One of the key goals of United Front Work is to
influence the decision-making of foreign governments and societies in China's favour. Australia and New Zealand
appear to have been a test zone for many of the China's United Front efforts in recent years. The PRC's political
influence on activities in Australia and New Zealand has now reached a critical level. I want to make three main
points regarding this, and then I will answer questions from the committee.
First of all, the Turnbull government's recent brief statement speaking up against China's political influence
activities in Australia was very important and necessary, because it has broken the global cone of silence on this
serious issue, bringing it to public attention and allowing these matters of public interest into the public domain.
The next step is that Australia must develop an internally focused resilience strategy that will protect the
integrity of democratic processes and institutions. The government also needs to work hard to establish a genuine
and positive relationship with the Australian-Chinese community, independent of the United Front organisation
authorised by the CCP. It needs to find a way to protect this community's rights to freedom of speech and freedom
of association. Australia also needs to invest in an enhanced Australian-centred capacity of deep policy analysis
on the impact of China's ambitious foreign policy. It needs to examine how best to protect Australia's interests in
the changing global order.
Finally, the Turnbull government's new initiative to pass legislation to help deal with the problem has set a path
for other nations to follow. Other governments will greatly benefit from working with Australia to address the
challenge posed by China's foreign influence activity. China's attempt to guide, buy or coerce political influence
abroad is part of a global strategy of almost identical approaches. Cross-government cooperation, especially in
Australia's immediate region, the Asia-Pacific, is an important and necessary way to address and identify what is
going on.
CHAIR: Thank you very much, Professor Brady—a very, very interesting submission despite its brevity. I'd
like some more reflections on dot point 1 in your written submission, which is where you briefly describe:
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 Targeted efforts to co-opt the New Zealand business, political, and intellectual elite in order to get them to advocate for
Beijing's interests in New Zealand and internationally.

Could you expand on that and perhaps give us some examples?
Prof. Brady: I can give you some examples of carefully selecting former senior politicians and inviting them
to be in high-profile roles in state-owned enterprises. There are efforts to work with local government because
local governments—and, in Australia, the state governments—have a lot of ability to engage and make decisions
that actually have national strategic importance. Then there are the efforts to bring the political and intellectual
elite in New Zealand society to be engaging with and participating in promoting China's talking points or, if not,
to be excluded from debates and the conversation on China. That's happened in New Zealand and it's also
happened in Australia to some extent, although you have a much more diverse political environment in that regard
because your government has spoken loud and clear about its concern about China's political influence activities.
That is steel in the backbone of quite a few of your people and the chance to speak up about what they know.
CHAIR: I guess that leads to my next question, which is about China's One Belt and One Road policy and the
way New Zealand has responded to it. Australia will do so in the future. One of the lines I've heard recently is that
we should embrace the strategic framework and wait for details later. Is that the pitch in New Zealand as well?
Prof. Brady: The details about that road initiative are available in Chinese if you look closely enough and you
move beyond the big PR events like the one that was held in May in China last year to promote the Belt and Road
Initiative. The agenda is quite clear. The New Zealand government does have concerns about the Belt and Road
Initiative, but New Zealand hopes to be able to shape the process to try to ameliorate its negative impact and to try
to steer it in a direction when it comes to the specifics of better environmental protection and things like that. That
was under the previous government, I have to say. The current government—the Labour-New Zealand FirstGreen coalition government—has not formally declared a position on the Belt and Road Initiative. So actually we
have the situation where we have some bodies that have been set up under the previous government to promote
the Belt and Road Initiative, and they still exist, but the current government hasn't made a formal statement on the
Belt and Road Initiative yet.
CHAIR: Thank you, Professor Brady. I'll hand over to Mr Dreyfus.
Mr DREYFUS: Thanks very much, Professor Brady, for your submission and for appearing before us. You've
clearly studied the activities of China and New Zealand and thought about the way in which the government of
China and the Communist Party of China have been operating in New Zealand. If I could just say, by way of
preamble, the package of bills that this Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has before it
is really directed at covert activities of foreign principals, foreign governments, foreign corporations and foreign
state-owned corporations. Quite a lot of your submission deals with activities in the open, as it were. Because
you've followed what's happening here in Australia, you will have understood that the bills we're looking at try to
engage not so much with the open activities, but with the covert activities that are not in the open in order to bring
them out into the open. Have you given any thought to what methods you think might be useful, be they legislated
or otherwise, to make more open or more overt the activities of foreign governments in our democracies?
Prof. Brady: I think you need to look at all your legislation that polices ministers' behaviour or politicians'
behaviour about declaration of their business interests and making sure there is a clear separation from the
personal and then the official role. You need to look to your cabinet manual. There's a lot of existing legislation
on the books in Australia, as there is in New Zealand, that could be tightened or could perhaps just be actually
applied. One of the areas that I've been really concerned about is the Chinese language media in Australia and
New Zealand and other countries. There's a Chinese government policy that was announced in the last year or so
to harmonise or to merge the Chinese language media with the media within China. That's not the ownership but
the content has to be in line now with the line that's followed in China. That means that a monopoly has been
created, and it's different from the way we normally think about monopolies in the media which have been around
ownership. That might be one area that the Australian government could look into: how to address an issue where
you have a foreign government trying to assert control over one sector of your media.
Mr DREYFUS: Can you tell us a little bit more about that? How is that done? The proposition that Chinese
language media in Australia or in New Zealand be in line with, I suppose you're saying, official Chinese
government lines in China, is that to follow a particular news outlet in China, such as the People's Daily or some
other news outlet?
Prof. Brady: It started simply by providing free content from Xinhua News service. That's the official news
service of China. Xinhua News service will set the line on how a particular politically sensitive issue will be
covered. Originally the Chinese language media in Australia and New Zealand was indigenous; it was a local

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voice. But it's quite difficult running a paper in any circumstances, let alone in a foreign language, in Australia or
New Zealand, so offering that free content was a big subsidy, but what it meant was you immediately have
Beijing's brains in a Sydney or a Melbourne Chinese language paper or website. But it's gone beyond that now.
There are personnel being sent in from Chinese government media organisations to guide and instruct media
organisations in Australia and New Zealand. You've got an outpost of China Radio International that has set up a
company in Melbourne that has lots of affiliates in Australia and New Zealand and throughout the Asia-Pacific as
well. They're nominally private stations, but in fact their backer is China Radio International, which is the radio
station that presents China's voice globally. Those are just some examples of how the Chinese language media in
Australia has been brought into line, not necessarily with the ownership model; it's about controlling content. If
newspapers or websites step out of line, they'll be punished by advertising being taken away from them because
of the influence that the consulate and embassies have over Chinese businesses in Australia and New Zealand
who get advantages from being on good terms with the embassy, so there's a whole system of favours and
connections and obligations that are helping to enforce that.
Mr DREYFUS: Thanks very much, Professor Brady.
Senator McALLISTER: Thanks very much for your submission, Professor Brady. I'm interested in two
questions. In your submission, you go to this complicated question about how we ought to distinguish between
the ordinary exercise of soft power and cultural outreach that would generally be considered benign or even
beneficial in terms of cultivating relationships between nations and other kinds of behaviours that are corrosive to
civil society and democratic discourse. This is obviously of real material importance for our committee as we
consider legislative responses. I'm interested in whether you have any principles or frameworks you might point
to that try to draw that distinction.
Prof. Brady: Those things that are corrosive and corrupting—that is one guide. The difficulty in looking at
the cultural activity is that you've got two different partners. On the Australian side you've got a diverse
multicultural society that your cultural representatives reflect. On the Chinese side you've got a government
project to project China's voice internationally to tell a good story as China. So, there is a political hand
nowadays—particularly now this is very much the case—behind those cultural activities. But, you're right: it is
important to continue to engage, and Australia's going to continue to trade with China. But I think you just need to
look at those problem areas around the relationships with your past and present politicians, look at the media, look
at campaign donations. Those would be key areas that I would highlight that need to be looked at, and ensure that
there is a free and frank discussion about China related issues, that that is encouraged in the society. That's also
very important—a respectful, free and frank discussion.
Senator McALLISTER: That's helpful guidance in terms of the specifics of the relationship with China. But
the legislation that's before us seeks to craft a broadly applicable solution that would apply to all of our
relationships with any country that seeks to engage with Australia and Australian citizens. You pointed towards
coercion as being a feature of behaviour that we ought to clearly put on the other side of the red line. It's quite
helpful just to sort of think about what sorts of diplomatic efforts we might think are normal and what sorts of
diplomatic efforts we think are corrosive and how we should distinguish between the two of these. There are
obviously arguments being put to this committee by other submitters that this behaviour is entirely normal, and
I'm looking for your assistance in drawing a theoretical distinction between these two sets of activities.
Prof. Brady: Sorry—which behaviour is completely normal?
Senator McALLISTER: If it's to make people-to-people connections with other nations. People would
provide examples of that happening in other parts of our diplomatic relations and international relations.
Prof. Brady: It's quite normal obviously that Australia and New Zealand and other countries will have
cultural exchanges, but that's not the area of concern that I was raising in my paper. I was focusing on, for
example, the ways in which the Chinese language media and the Chinese community have lost their freedom of
association and freedom of speech over a number of years due to efforts to bring that community into line. I was
raising concerns about blurring of personal and political lines with politicians or other groups in society that have
a role in governance. Those are the concerns that I've been raising in my research.
Senator McALLISTER: Thank you, Professor Brady. That's extremely helpful. Thank you.
Mr LEESER: Professor Brady, you've been quite prolific in writing about China and its influence. We have
your submission, but we've also seen some articles that you've written in other places. Has that been difficult for
you personally? And have you felt any difficulties as a result of being outspoken against Chinese political
influence?

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Prof. Brady: Yes. I have had attempts by Chinese polar officials to silence my research. They've put pressure
on a series of New Zealand agencies, including my own university. And people I've been associated with in China
just last year were questioned by the Chinese Ministry of State Security about their association with me. I had a
break-in in my office last December. I received a warning letter this week that I was about to be attacked. And
yesterday I had a break-in at my house and I had three laptops, including one that I use for work, stolen, as well as
two phones. But valuables weren't stolen. The police are now investigating that.
Mr LEESER: Obviously you've been the victim of theft there, and crimes, but when you talk about other
sorts of pressure that you put on, what sort of pressure do they put on agencies and colleagues and the university?
How do they apply that pressure? What do you mean by 'pressure'?
Prof. Brady: The first example I mentioned was about pressure to do with my research. I have a book called
China as a Polar Great Power that came out last year. Two years before the book was published there was
pressure put on New Zealand diplomats, Antarctica, the mayor of Christchurch and my own university to pass on
the message to me to desist from my research and that China wasn't happy about my research. I've published very
little of that research, until the book came out, because what I had found in there—and that's actually something
I'll be talking about after 4.30 with another one of your parliamentary committees—was quite concerning, and I
wanted to release it all in one go. So, I had to remind these government agencies in New Zealand that we have
legislation that protects my work as an academic and in fact in New Zealand law my role as an academic is
defined as the critic and conscience of society. That legislation requires all government agencies to protect me in
doing that work and to protect my freedom of speech.
Mr LEESER: Yet it sounds like that law hasn't been as effective as it could be.
Prof. Brady: I think people forget that we have these laws. I think we've been a bit complacent in New
Zealand and probably in Australia too. I was a young person in the last years of the cold war era, and I now teach
a lot of students in New Zealand who I know have no idea what I'm talking about when I try to explain to them
the atmosphere of the cold war. The reason I raise that is that we had an awareness, those of us who lived through
the era, of the need for caution when you are dealing with countries like the People's Republic of China or the
Soviet Union. We understood that there were influence operations going on. So the laws were passed in New
Zealand and Australia to reflect those concerns and the issues that had to be dealt with. And we've still got those
laws on the books, but I think that in the last 30 years, as China's been engaged in the economic reforms and both
our countries have been involved in supporting that, we have—not by chance—fallen back into a particular
narrative about China that really stresses this economic powerhouse and underplays the fact that you still have the
same political system in operation and the same policies there that we had to be careful about in the previous era.
And then under General Secretary Xi Jinping the party, as they say, is back; the party has been working to find
a way to maintain its position in Chinese society, even though the political setup has changed. The economic unit
of the work unit, which was the main way that the party connected in with the individuals, has gone, because most
individuals in China don't work for government organisations anymore, and people don't watch mainstream
media. So, the party has had to work hard to reconnect with the Chinese people and maintain their hold over
them. That's why we're seeing the return of this United Front Work—really prioritising United Front Work as a
very effective tool, a so-called magic weapon, which was very useful to China in previous eras, when China was
in opposition, and can be used in this more assertive foreign policy as well as bringing the overseas Chinese
community and making sure that they are at the very least neutralised and don't become a hostile force that could
undermine the political situation in China.
Mr LEESER: I have one last question—and if this has been answered just say so, and I'll catch up with the
transcript. Academic colleagues in Australia have presented to this committee a view that we should exempt
academic work from the operation of these proposed laws. You're an academic, and you know about foreign
interference. Do you think we should be granting an exemption for universities from the operation of the
transparency scheme and the other laws?
Prof. Brady: You would be more familiar than I am with the detail of the legislation that you're proposing.
But I would say that from my research there are some areas of concern with universities where it might be good
to, at the very least, have a conversation about what's appropriate and what isn't. What I'm mentioning is where
quite a number of Australian universities have been engaging in military research work for the Chinese military,
the People's Liberation Army. There obviously have to be boundaries about what's acceptable and what kind of
partnerships are acceptable. I think the fact that this has developed is reflective of the complacency that there's
been over a number of years, as I mentioned, and also an oblivion, as I said—this narrative that was created where
people just focused on China as an economic powerhouse. China is a source of research funding and a generous
host of conferences and students.
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Mr LEESER: Does that not indicate that we should apply these laws to universities and academics?
Prof. Brady: I think you might need to have a look at it when it comes to matters like that.
Dr MIKE KELLY: You've raised issues that you might describe as tactics, techniques and procedures and, of
course, the angles of those that are not benign in terms of corruption, intimidation et cetera. It might be helpful,
too, if you could comment on a couple of examples of what the strategic objectives of China are in relation to the
employment of those techniques in terms of where they're inimical to the interests of, say, Australia and New
Zealand, just to show that this is a concern beyond benign engagement.
Prof. Brady: The United Front activities are like the party's arm and they contribute to the overall foreign
policy strategy. China has a much more assertive foreign policy. It has an agenda, like Antarctica, for example,
and that's what I want to talk about in the next half hour. To achieve its agenda in Antarctica, the South Pacific,
the South China Sea and the Arctic it has to have the support of other nations. It has to have the tacit acceptance
of Australia for its activities in the Australian Antarctic Territory. I know with Antarctic law, on some terms,
Australia can't do much about having any country operating in the Australian Antarctic Territory, but the
Antarctic Treaty system does permit countries to raise objections to other nations' activities. These United Front
activities, when it comes to your political elite, will be aimed at creating a positive public opinion promoting
China's global foreign policy agenda—that's a very important aspect to it.
Dr MIKE KELLY: You mentioned legislation. Does New Zealand have any legislation comparable to what's
been proposed in this committee's analysis?
Prof. Brady: Not yet. We're a couple of years behind you on this journey.
Dr MIKE KELLY: We had some reference to the One Belt One Road initiative. Do you see any similar
concerns in relation to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank?
Prof. Brady: There is some real concern about levels of debt for small developing nations that China's
partnering with, that they are getting burdened with debt. That's not just through the AIIB; it's through other banks
as well that are offering lending to countries in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean.
But China has an agenda. It wants to be part of a China centred economic order. I think that New Zealand,
Australia and other partner nations should be having frank conversations about what that will entail and where our
interests lie.
Dr MIKE KELLY: Thank you for that. I have one last question. You mentioned the need for strategies in
relation to community engagement. Have you any suggestions in relation to that strategy and is any of that
happening in New Zealand, as you have a significant Chinese community?
Prof. Brady: I have heard proposed by Professor John Fitzgerald that Australia could be part of a Pacific-wide
Chinese radio station. People still listen to radio and Australia, New Zealand and other countries could be
participating in and supporting that. So that's one way to do it. Also the Australian and New Zealand governments
can work to identify—and there is research on this that can help you—which organisations amongst the Chinese
community are genuinely community organisations and which ones are adhering closely to the PRC consulate.
That's another initiative. You should instruct your ministers not to participate in any further United Front
activities. Again, you can get good advice on this from specialists.
CHAIR: Thank you very much, Professor Brady. I don't think we have any additional questions for you, but if
we do we'll send them to you through the secretariat. We will give you a copy of the transcript of your evidence
and you'll have an opportunity to request corrections before we publish. Thank you again on behalf of the
committee for appearing today.
Prof. Brady: It was my great pleasure. Thank you all.
Committee adjourned at 16:37

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