w.

Ca'ti?cation under Section 1290 of the John S. McCain National Dd'ense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (DIV. A, PL. 115-232) Related to Military Assistance for Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

Pursuant to section 1290mm and of the John 3. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (DIV. A, PL- 115-23 hereby certify that

the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates are
undertaking?
(A) an urgent and good-faith e?'ort to support diplomatic e??orts to end the civil war in
Yemen;
(B) appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing
access for Yemenis to food, fuel.- medicine, and medical evacuation, including through
the appropriate use of Yemen?s Red Sea ports, including the port of Hudaydah, the
airport in Sana?a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and
(C) demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure
resulting from military operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the
Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, including by?
complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles
purchased or transferred from the United States; and
(ii) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and
civilian in?astructure; and
(2) in the ease of Saudi Arabia, the Government of Saudi Arabia is tmdertaking appropriate
actions to reduce any unnecessary delays to shipments associated with secondary inspection
and clearance processes other than the United Nations Veri?cation and. Inspection
Mechanism (UNVIM). 

This certi?cation shall be published in the Federal Register and, along with the/accompanying
Memorandum of Justi?cation, shall be reported to Cengress.

  

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MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION REGARDING CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO SECTION 1290 OF THE JOHN S. MCCAIN NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 (PL. 115-232)

The Secretary of State has made the certi?cations described in section 1290(c) of the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (PL. 115-232). The reasons
for the certi?cations are set forth in this Memorandum of Justi?cation.

The Administration has been clear that ending the con?ict in Yemen is a national security
priority. The Iranian regime has provided sophisticated weapons to the liouthis that they use to
threaten us. citizens residing in Saudi Arabia and other U.S. national security interests, conduct
attacks against partner nations, and imperil commercial shipping. Several Iranian-backed Houthi
missile attacks last year targeted locations in the region where Americans are present. In order to
enhance our partner?s self-defense and confront these threats, the Administration?s policy is to
focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional con?ict, countering the threat from the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria in Yemen (ISIS-Y) and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and
countering malign Iranian influence. The Administration ?rmly believes that the only solution to
the conflict in Yemen is a negotiated politieai-settlemerrt'under United Nations (UN) auspices in
accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2216. The Departments of State and
Defense have implemented the President?s guidance to provide limited defensive 91PM Which
enables the nations in the region to defend their borders and populations while negotiations lead
to a comprehensive political agreement between llouthis and Republic of Yemen Government
(ROYG).

Our support to the Saudi-led Coalition promotes US. national security priorities, including on
counterterrorism and countering Iran?s destabilizing behavior. The United States supports
Yemen?s territorial integrity and Coalition countries? ability to defend themselves from
cross-border incursions and missile attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthis. Saudi Arabia and the
UAE are strong counterterrorisrn partners. AQAP continues to pose a signi?cant threat to the
American people by plotting attacks against the US. homeland, while aims to use the
ungovemed spaces of Yemen to plot, direct, instigate, supply, and recruit for attacks in the
region. AQAP took territory in southern Yemen following the Houthi rebellion and subsequent
breakdown in governance in late 2014 and early 2015. With US. support. UAE military forces
expelled AQAP from the port city of Mulcallah inMay 2016. This cut a signi?cant source of
revenue of the tenorist group. UAE forces also conducted several successful counterterrorism
operations in Shabwah and Hadramawt governor-ates throughout 2017 and 2018.

Urgent and Good-Faith Diplomatic Efforts to End the Civil War

The Administration assesses that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are
undertaking urgent and good-faith diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Yemen The Saudis
and Emiratis continue to express their support publicly for the efforts of UN Special Envoy for
Yemen Martin Grif?ths? o?ice. The UN has repeatedly made clear - and the United States
supports that position - that there is no military solution to the crisis in Yemen. As of July 2018,
UN Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Grif?ths completed initial consultations with the key
parties to the con?ict, including the ROYG and the Houthis. He proposed holding the ?rst round
of direct consultations between the con?ict parties at September 6, 2018, in Geneva. Grif?ths?




.3.

goalis to create a ?amework for building trust before entering into comprehensive negotiations,
which the UN would convene, cOnsi'stent with UNSCR a 16. Re consultations will also
provide the parties with the opportunity to discuss con?dence-building measures and speci?c
plans to move the processforward. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain actively engaged in the
?Quad" (the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) and ?Quint? talks
(Quad plus Oman), which seek progress toward negotiations while the con?ict persists.

Saudi Arabia consistently articulates a vision for Yemen that includes a complete cessation of
crossborder hostilities, a secure Saudi-Yemeni border, substantially reduced Iranian in?uence in
the country, and a stable ROYG able to provide for its people. The Houthis, to date and during
several months of negotiations in 2016, have been unwilling to assurances
regarding Saudi Arabia?s legitimate security Concerns and have publicly stated their intent to
continue their attacks on Saudi territory and to attempt to strike UAE territory in the context of
ongoing hostilities- We have emphasized that all parties, including the ROYG, will need to

compromise. The Houthis will have to make clear and credible commitments to respect Saudi
security if they hope to retain a political role in chat. A durable resolution to the con?ict will
have to have the buy-in of key Yemeni parties, including the ROYG, the Houthis, and other
Yemeni actors.

Reducing the Risk of Harm to Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure 

The Administration assess that the KSA and UAE are undertaking demonstrable actions to
reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations
of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the UAE, including by complying
with the applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or transferred
from the United States, and that they are taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm
to civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Administration recognizes that civilian casualties
have occurred at rates that are far me high in. the Saudi-led Coalition's campaign in Yanen.. We
believe civilian casualties must be mitigated and reduced as much as possible for both strategic
and moral reasons. As a result, we are engaging the Saudi-led Coalition t) urge them to
strengthen measures that reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. The
Department of State and the Department of Defense (DOD) will continueto press Saudi Arabia
and the UAE on this issue levels. The Administration assesses that Saudi Arabia
and the UAE are tmdataking some actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian
infrastructure resulting ?orn Saudi-led Coalition military operations. The Saudi-led Coalition
incorporated a no-strike list (N SL) into its target development procedures and changed its rules
of engagement to incorporate some US. recommendations. The Saudi Ministry of Defense
committed to fund training forthe Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) on minimizing
civilian casualties as one component of a $750 million, multi-year Foreign Military Sales
training case. This training seeks to improve RSAF targeting capabilities and reduce the risk of
civilian casualties. As of May 2017, the US. government delivered a course for the RSAF that
included training on the law of armed con?ict (LOAC) and air-to-ground targeting processes. In
2016, the Coalition established the Joint Incident Assessment Team (J IAT) to investigate strikes
that result in collateral damage.

The United States Ins called on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to conduct thorough, transparent, and
expedient investigations in cases where airstrikes have caused harm to civilians and civilian



UNCLASSE ?0
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objects, and to make the results of those investigations public. These cases include the coalition
operations that reportedly resulted in civilian casualties on August 9, 2018, in Sa?ada, and on
August 23, 2018, in al-Durayhimi, and the targeting of civilian infrastrucmre such as water and
sanitation facilities which could exacerbate cholera outbreaks in Yemen The Saudi-led Coaltion
announced on September 1, 2018, that it would undertake such at investigation and hold those
responsible to account. It is important to note that cholera is enddnic in some parts of Yemen,
even in the absence of armed con?ict, and that Houthi entrenchments in Hudaydah have
damaged water lines there. That resultant damage is a more direct cause of the spread of cholera
in tint area. As part of its engagement with UN leadership to re?ne and implement its
humanitarian plan for Hudaydah, the UAE has allowed the UN to embed a civil-military advisor
in Abu Dhabi and has been receiving the N81. from Evacuation arrl Humanitarian Operations
Cell (EHOC) o?icials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. We continue to press the need for additional
actions to reduce civilian easua?lty incidents. Recent civilian casualty incidents indicate
insumcient implementation of reforms and targeting practices. Investigations have not yielded
accormtability measures. Additional information can be f0tmd in the classi?ed annex.

The Administration also assesses that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are complying with applicable
U.S.-laws-goveming the sale and transfer of arms, including the Arms Export Control Act, with
rare exception. Defense article sales to both countries are subject to US. end-use monitoring
requirements, allowing the Administration to verify that item5 have not been modi?ed. tampered
with, or transferred to a third party without prior authorization. The of State
adjudicates all potential arms transfers through a review process on a case-by-case basis and
through a consultative process with Congress, as required by law. US. support to the Coalition
allows it to pursue its mission of assisting the legitimate government of Yemen.

Alleviating the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen

The Administration assesses that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking measures to alleviate the
hmnanitarian crisis in Yemen, and we continue to press all con?ict parties to facilitate rmfettered
access to humanitarian aid and commercial imports throughout the country. On January 22,
2018, Saudi Arabia announced its Yemen Comprehensive Humanitarian Operations (Y CHO)
plan, which included a $2 billion commitment to support the Central Bank of Yemen and a joint
Saudi-led Coalition commitment to provide $1.5 billion to support the humanitarian respOnsc for
Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAB contributed approximately $997 million toward the 
2018 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Yemen in March 2018-? more than one-third of the
amount that the UN projected is needed to reSpond to the health and food insecurity crises. The
YCHO plan established an air bridge for Coalitionoprovided aid between Saudi Arabia and
Marib, ensured access to Yemen from land borders such as the Al-Wadeyah crosSing, and
worked to beg?n increasing throughput capacity at ports controlled by the ROYG. While the
Administration is generally supportive of Saudi Arabia?s e?'orts to deliver htnnanitarian aid to
Yemenis;we1=ontinue to encourage them to make the plan as fulsorne as possible, t) ensure aid
reaches Yemenis throughout the country, and to take into accormt the views and ongoing work of
the UN and other humanitarian actors in Yemen.

The UAE also focuses (11 providing humanitarian assistance to ease the crisis Yemen?s

population is facing, particularly in the south. In 2018, the Emiratis provided more 
$3.81 billion in total humanitarian assiStance to Yemen, including nearly $467 million to




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Yemen?s HRP. The UAE also publicly released details (f a humanitarian plan for Hudaydah on
June 28, 20l8, and provikd an update on this e??ort to the UN Security Council on July 6, 2018.
The plan includes delivering humanitarian supplies through Hudaydah port and overland.
While the Administration is generally, supportive of the efforts to deliver htmanitarian
assistance, the Administration ins also encouraged the Emiratis to coordinate closely with the
UN and to consider NGO efforts in their planning to ensure humanitarian assistance is delivered
in the most transparent, effective, and ef?cient means possible. To inform this e?ort, US.
o?icials have met regularly with N00 and other humanitarian representatives and have provided
feedback on the UAE humanitarian plan to senior UAE of?cials.

Following the temporary closure of ports in November 2017 following an attempted Houthi
ballistic-missile attack on Riyadh's airport, the Saudi-led EHOC has continued to allow
commercial and humanitarian goods in Hudaydah and Saleef ports since December 2017. ,We
remain concerned about restrictions on EHOC-characterized ?dual-use? items, which include
water sanitation supplies like pipes and chlorine that are critical to averting cholera outbreaks.
Although the ports remain open, has reduced its average clearance time, imports have
yet to reach pre-November 2017 levels, because commercial shippers are uncertain about port

. security, lack access to trade credits, and are concerned about delays associated with Coalition
inspections. The UN Veri?cation and Inspection MeChanism (UNVIM) is working with the
Saudi-led Coalition to improve clearance and cargo discharge processes. The United States is
also supporting an expanded inspections proposal for UNVIM that may address Coalition
concerns about the smuggling of illicit weapons and components into Hudaydah port. The plan
aims to increase the number of inspections, improve inspections equipment, and enhance
facilities. Since January 2017, there have been two UN VIM monitors at the port in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, to assist with inspections. The EHOC has deployed a liaison of?cer to 
head of?ce in Djibouti to formalize coordination and resolve challenges more effectively.

Commercial flights into or out of Sana?aairport remain prohibited by the Saudi-led Codition,
cutting off access for Yemeni civilians to outsidernedical treatment and opportunities to seek
asylum or flee internal armed con?ict. The EHOC continues to approveUN Humanitarian Air
Service and International Committee?of the Red Cross ?ights in and out of the airport for the
transport of humanitarian aid, including medicine, and international humanitarian workers.
Border crossings between Saudi Arabia and Yemen remain open to commercial tra?ic, civilian
crossings, and transport of humanitarian aid including food, medicine, and shelter aid provided
by the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre.

Equally important as increasing the amount of imports is building a functioning and credible
financial system. The lack of liquidity, ine?cient management of foreign exchange reserves,
and irregular salary payments to civil servants are straining Yemen?s economy. The
Administration is working. with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to deliver technical assistance to the
Central Bank of Yemen (CBY). Reacting the bank?s functionality is an important ?rst step
toward revamping the Yemeni economy. The United States, with our Saudi, Emirati, and British
partners (a forum known as the Quad) worked with the ROYG last year to restore the 
acCem to foreign reserve held at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. This helped
restore some liquidity. The Quad works with CBY leadership, the International Monetary Fund,
and the UN Special Envoy?s o?ce to arrange the reuni?cation of the Aden and the Sana?a

UNCLASSELED

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branches of the CBY. If successful, this Will allow the CBY to set and enforce a monetary policy
and facilitate the payment of government employee salaries. The Quad alsoenlisted the IMF to
conduct a diagnostic of the CBY, which will lead to adonors meeting in Fall 2018. Saudi Arabia
provided a four-week technical training to CBY employees in December 2017 and provided 32
billion in foreign exchange to increase liquidity and credit and facilitate imports of basic
commodities. The CBY is wing some of the $2 billion to fund letters of credit for importers to
ensure availability of staple commodities and, hopefully, prevent an increase in prices.

Saudi Arabia?s Efforts to Undertake Actions toReduce Unnecessary Delays to Shipments
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the Administration assesses that the Government is undertaking
necessary actions to reduce unnecessary delays to shipments associated with secondary
inspection and Clearance processes other than UNVIM. Since late November 2017,11udaydah
and Saleef ports remain open and operational. At the request of the ROYG, the Saudi-led
Coalition approves vessels? entrance into Yemen?s territorial waters; however, once vessels clear
the Coalition?s holding area, Houthis control the operations at the port where o?loading occurs.
Ras 158 port has been closed since June 2017; Certain ports that are under ROYG control, such
as Mukallah and Aden ports, also remain open and operational; however. humanitarian partners
have reported some delays at Aden port due to Coalition inspections of ships and low
management capacity. EHOC asSists the ROYG with clearances for Aden port in southern
Yemen. While the ?rst step is to clear vessels to enter the ports, all sides must ensue that
commercial and humanitarian goods can reach Yemenis who desperately need it without
unnecessary impediments. UNVIM and EHOC report that communication and coordination
between the two entities have improved. Additionally, UNVIM implemented in February 2018 a
process for vessels to inform UNVIM directly by email or phone of the vessel?s expected date of
discharge andnext port of call. UNVIM then communicates this to the EHOC and the
Coalition?s Western Fleet to avert any delay on vessels exiting the port

'Ih'ere hasbeen a notable trend in improved EHOC clearance times since mid-June 2018. The
average clearance time for the week ending July 31, 2018, was approximately 21 hours,
compared to 67 hours over the previous three months. Additionally, the average weekly number
of clearance requests ins risen from 6.48 to 6.83 when compared to the period from December
20, 2017, to June 12, 2018. - that is, from the period when restrictions were eased at the keyRed
Sea ports to when [JAE-backed Yemeni forces advanced toivards Hudaydah airport. As part of
Saudi Arabia?s YCHO plan, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed a memorandum
of understanding on February 5, 2018, for Saudi Arabia to supply mobile cranes at ROYG-
controlled ports of Aden, Mocha, and Mukalla to increase throughput capacity at those locations.
'Rre cranes are able to handle an output of 60 tons per day. In late July 2018, Yemen?s director
general of docks and ports announced Aden port?s Maiallaterminalwould extend its work hours,
from 8 am. to 10 pin. weekdays and 8 am. to 6 pm. weekends, to 8 am. to 4 am. seven days a
week. The move is expected to ease congestion at Aden port.

. The ROYG and Coalition forces paused military Operations to liberate Hudaydahand Saleef
ports after capturing Hudaydah airport to provide Space to the UN Special Envoy?s ,e??orts to
negotiate the; withdrawal of con?iCt parties from the critical city and ports. Although ROYG and
Coalition military operations have since restarted in Houthiocontrolled areas south of these
critical areas, ROYG and Coalition forces have continued to abstain from direct military actions

MEIER
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against Hudaydah and Saleef. Fighting in. these areas has had a signi?cant htunanitarian impact,
including civilian casualties, damage to critical infrastructme, and pOpulation displacement.

For the reasons outlimd, above, the Secretary of State has certi?ed that the Government of Saudi
Arabia and the Government of the UAB are undertaking the e?'ort. measures, and actions
described in section 1290(c); The Administration will continue to work closely with the Saudi-
led Coalition to ensure Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintain support for UN-led e?'orts to end the
civil war in Yemen, allow unimpeded access for the delivery of commercial and humanitarian
Support through as many avenues as possible, and tmdertake actions that mitigate the inipact of
the con?ict on civilians and civilian infrastructure. The Administration believes tint the support
that the United States provides to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is helping defeat ISIS-Y and AQAP
and counter Inn?s malign activities. The success of all these efforts hinges on the resolution of
this con?ict; thus, the Administration fully supports the work to reach a negotiated political.

. settlement under UN auspices.