SUMMARY

 

WGIEENE

CYBER STRATEGY



This page Ieff infem?ionally blank

INTRODUCTION
American prosperity, liberty, and security depend upon open and reliable access to information. The
Internet empowers us and enriches our lives by providing ever-greater access to new knowledge,
businesses, and services. Computers and network technologies underpin U.S. military warfighting
superiority by enabling the Joint Force to gain the information advantage, strike at long distance, and
exercise global command and control.
The arrival of the digital age has also created challenges for the Department of Defense (DoD) and
the Nation. The open, transnational, and decentralized nature of the Internet that we seek to protect
creates significant vulnerabilities. Competitors deterred from engaging the United States and our allies
in an armed conflict are using cyberspace operations to steal our technology, disrupt our government
and commerce, challenge our democratic processes, and threaten our critical infrastructure.
We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. These States have
expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that pose longterm strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our allies and partners. China is eroding U.S. military
overmatch and the Nation’s economic vitality by persistently exfiltrating sensitive information from
U.S. public and private sector institutions. Russia has used cyber-enabled information operations to
influence our population and challenge our democratic processes. Other actors, such as North Korea
and Iran, have similarly employed malicious cyber activities to harm U.S. citizens and threaten U.S.
interests. Globally, the scope and pace of malicious cyber activity continue to rise. The United States’
growing dependence on the cyberspace domain for nearly every essential civilian and military function
makes this an urgent and unacceptable risk to the Nation.
The Department must take action in cyberspace during day-to-day competition to preserve U.S.
military advantages and to defend U.S. interests. Our focus will be on the States that can pose strategic
threats to U.S. prosperity and security, particularly China and Russia. We will conduct cyberspace
operations to collect intelligence and prepare military cyber capabilities to be used in the event of crisis
or conflict. We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including
activity that falls below the level of armed conflict. We will strengthen the security and resilience of
networks and systems that contribute to current and future U.S. military advantages. We will
collaborate with our interagency, industry, and international partners to advance our mutual interests.
During wartime, U.S. cyber forces will be prepared to operate alongside our air, land, sea, and space
forces to target adversary weaknesses, offset adversary strengths, and amplify the effectiveness of
other elements of the Joint Force. Adversary militaries are increasingly reliant on the same type of
computer and network technologies that have become central to Joint Force warfighting. The
Department will exploit this reliance to gain military advantage. The Joint Force will employ offensive
cyber capabilities and innovative concepts that allow for the use of cyberspace operations across the
full spectrum of conflict.
1
DOD CYBER STRATEGY

 The 2018 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy represents the Department’s vision for addressing this
threat and implementing the priorities of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy for
cyberspace. It supersedes the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy.
The United States cannot afford inaction: our values, economic competitiveness, and military edge are
exposed to threats that grow more dangerous every day. We must assertively defend our interests in
cyberspace below the level of armed conflict and ensure the readiness of our cyberspace operators to
support the Joint Force in crisis and conflict. Our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and civilian
employees stand ready, and we will succeed.

STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN CYBERSPACE
The United States’ strategic competitors are conducting cyber-enabled campaigns to erode U.S.
military advantages, threaten our infrastructure, and reduce our economic prosperity. The
Department must respond to these activities by exposing, disrupting, and degrading cyber
activity threatening U.S. interests, strengthening the cybersecurity and resilience of key potential
targets, and working closely with other departments and agencies, as well as with our allies and
partners.
First, we must ensure the U.S. military’s ability to fight and win wars in any domain, including
cyberspace. This is a foundational requirement for U.S. national security and a key to ensuring
that we deter aggression, including cyber attacks that constitute a use of force, against the United
States, our allies, and our partners. The Department must defend its own networks, systems, and
information from malicious cyber activity and be prepared to defend, when directed, those
networks and systems operated by non-DoD Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI)1 and Defense
Industrial Base (DIB)2 entities. We will defend forward to halt or degrade cyberspace operations
targeting the Department, and we will collaborate to strengthen the cybersecurity and resilience
of DoD, DCI, and DIB networks and systems.
Second, the Department seeks to preempt, defeat, or deter malicious cyber activity targeting
U.S. critical infrastructure that could cause a significant cyber incident regardless of whether that
incident would impact DoD’s warfighting readiness or capability. Our primary role in this
homeland defense mission is to defend forward by leveraging our focus outward to stop threats
before they reach their targets. The Department also provides public and private sector partners
with indications and warning (I&W) of malicious cyber activity, in coordination with other Federal
departments and agencies.
Third, the Department will work with U.S. allies and partners to strengthen cyber capacity,
expand combined cyberspace operations, and increase bi-directional information sharing in
order to advance our mutual interests.

2
DOD CYBER STRATEGY

 The Department’s cyberspace objectives are:
1. Ensuring the Joint Force can achieve its missions in a contested cyberspace environment;
2. Strengthening the Joint Force by conducting cyberspace operations that enhance U.S.
military advantages;
3. Defending U.S. critical infrastructure from malicious cyber activity that alone, or as part
of a campaign, could cause a significant cyber incident;31
4. Securing DoD information and systems against malicious cyber activity, including DoD
information on non-DoD-owned networks; and
5. Expanding DoD cyber cooperation with interagency, industry, and international partners.

DEFENDING CIVILIAN ASSETS THAT ENABLE U.S. MILITARY ADVANTAGE
The Department must be prepared to defend non-DoD-owned Defense Critical Infrastructure
(DCI) and Defense Industrial Base (DIB) networks and systems. Our chief goal in maintaining an
ability to defend DCI is to ensure the infrastructure’s continued functionality and ability to support
DoD objectives in a contested cyber environment. Our focus working with DIB entities is to protect
sensitive DoD information whose loss, either individually or in aggregate, could result in an
erosion of Joint Force military advantage. As the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the DIB and
a business partner with the DIB and DCI, the Department will: set and enforce standards for
cybersecurity, resilience, and reporting; and be prepared, when requested and authorized, to
provide direct assistance, including on non-DoD networks, prior to, during, and after an incident.

1

“Defense Critical Infrastructure” refers to the composite of DoD and non-DoD assets essential to project, support,
and sustain military forces and operations worldwide (Department of Defense Directive 3020.40).
2
“Defense Industrial Base” refers to the Department, Government, and private sector worldwide industrial complex
with capabilities to perform research and development, design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems,
subsystems, components, or parts to satisfy military requirements (32 CFR Part 236).
3
“Significant cyber incident” refers to an event occurring on or conducted through a computer network that is (or a
group of related events that together are) likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign
relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the
American people (Presidential Policy Directive 41).

3

DOD CYBER STRATEGY

 STRATEGIC APPROACH
Our strategic approach is based on mutually reinforcing lines of effort to build a more lethal force;
compete and deter in cyberspace; expand alliances and partnerships; reform the Department; and
cultivate talent.

› BUILD A MORE LETHAL JOINT FORCE
Accelerate cyber capability development: The Department will accelerate the development of cyber
capabilities for both warfighting and countering malicious cyber actors. Our focus will be on fielding
capabilities that are scalable, adaptable, and diverse to provide maximum flexibility to Joint Force
commanders. The Joint Force will be capable of employing cyberspace operations throughout the
spectrum of conflict, from day-to-day operations to wartime, in order to advance U.S. interests.
Innovate to foster agility: The Department must innovate to keep pace with rapidly evolving threats
and technologies in cyberspace. We will accept and manage operational and programmatic risk in a
deliberate manner that moves from a “zero defect” culture to one that fosters agility and innovation
because success in this domain requires the Department to innovate faster than our strategic
competitors.
Leverage automation and data analysis to improve effectiveness: The Department will use cyber
enterprise solutions to operate at machine speed and large-scale data analytics to identify malicious
cyber activity across different networks and systems. The Department will leverage these advances to
improve our own defensive posture and to ensure that our cyber capabilities will continue to be
effective against competitors armed with cutting edge technology.
Employ commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) cyber capabilities: The Department excels at creating cyber
capabilities tailored for specific operational problems. In addition to these capabilities, we will make
greater use of COTS capabilities that can be optimized for DoD use.

› COMPETE AND DETER IN CYBERSPACE
Deter malicious cyber activities: The United States seeks to use all instruments of national power to
deter adversaries from conducting malicious cyberspace activity that would threaten U.S. national
interests, our allies, or our partners. The Department will prioritize securing sensitive DoD
information and deterring malicious cyber activities that constitute a use of force against the United
States, our allies, or our partners. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force stands ready to employ the
full range of military capabilities in response.
Persistently contest malicious cyber activity in day-to-day competition: The Department will counter
cyber campaigns threatening U.S. military advantage by defending forward to intercept and halt cyber
threats and by strengthening the cybersecurity of systems and networks that support DoD missions.
This includes working with the private sector and our foreign allies and partners to contest cyber
activity that could threaten Joint Force missions and to counter the exfiltration of sensitive DoD
information.
4
DOD CYBER STRATEGY

 Increase the resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure: The Department will work with its interagency
and private sector partners to reduce the risk that malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. critical
infrastructure could have catastrophic or cascading consequences. We will streamline our publicprivate information-sharing mechanisms and strengthen the resilience and cybersecurity of critical
infrastructure networks and systems.

› STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES AND ATTRACT NEW PARTNERSHIPS
Build trusted private sector partnerships: The private sector owns and operates the majority of U.S.
infrastructure and is on the frontlines of nation-state competition in cyberspace. In coordination with
other Federal departments and agencies, the Department will build trusted relationships with private
sector entities that are critical enablers of military operations and carry out deliberate planning and
collaborative training that enables mutually supporting cybersecurity activities.
Operationalize international partnerships: Many of the United States’ allies and partners possess
advanced cyber capabilities that complement our own. The Department will work to strengthen the
capacity of these allies and partners and increase DoD’s ability to leverage its partners’ unique skills,
resources, capabilities, and perspectives. Information-sharing relationships with allies and partners
will increase the effectiveness of combined cyberspace operations and enhance our collective
cybersecurity posture.
Reinforce norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace: The Department will reinforce
voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace during peacetime. The
United States has endorsed the work done by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security (UNGGE) to develop a framework of responsible State behavior in cyberspace. The
principles developed by the UNGGE include prohibitions against damaging civilian critical
infrastructure during peacetime and against allowing national territory to be used for intentionally
wrongful cyber activity. The Department will work alongside its interagency and international partners
to promote international commitments regarding behavior in cyberspace as well as to develop and
implement cyber confidence building measures (CBM). When cyber activities threaten U.S. interests,
we will contest them and we will be prepared to act, in conjunction with partners, to defend U.S.
interests.

› REFORM THE DEPARTMENT
Incorporate cyber awareness into DoD institutional culture: The Department will adapt its
institutional culture so individuals at every level are knowledgeable about the cyberspace domain and
can incorporate that knowledge into their day-to-day activities. Leaders and their staffs need to be
“cyber fluent” so they can fully understand the cybersecurity implications of their decisions and are
positioned to identify opportunities to leverage the cyberspace domain to gain strategic, operational,
and tactical advantages.
Increase cybersecurity accountability: Reducing the Department’s “attack surface” requires an
increase in cybersecurity awareness and accountability across the Department. We will hold DoD
personnel and our private sector partners accountable for their cybersecurity practices and choices.
5
DOD CYBER STRATEGY

 Seek material solutions that are affordable, flexible, and robust: The Department will reduce the time
it takes to procure software and hardware in order to keep pace with the rapid advance of technology.
We will identify opportunities to procure scalable services, such as cloud storage and scalable
computing power, to ensure that our systems keep pace with commercial information technology and
can scale when necessary to match changing requirements. We will also leverage COTS capabilities
where feasible to reduce our reliance on expensive, custom-built software that is difficult to maintain
or upgrade.
Expand crowd-sourced vulnerability identification: The Department will continue to identify crowdsourcing opportunities, such as hack-a-thons and bug-bounties, in order to identify and mitigate
vulnerabilities more effectively and to foster innovation.

› CULTIVATE TALENT
Sustain a ready cyber workforce: The Department’s workforce is a critical cyber asset. We will invest
in building future talent, identifying and recruiting sought-after talent, and retaining our current cyber
workforce. We will provide ample opportunities—both inside and outside the Department—for the
professional development and career progression of cyber personnel. We will create processes for
maintaining visibility of the entire military and civilian cyber workforce and optimizing personnel
rotations across military departments and commands, including maximizing the use of the Reserve
Components. The Department will also ensure that its cyber requirements are filled by the optimal
mix of military service members, civilian employees, and contracted support to serve mission
requirements.
Enhance the Nation’s cyber talent: The Department plays an essential role in enhancing the Nation’s
pool of cyber talent in order to further the goal of increasing national resilience across the private and
public sectors. To that end, we will increase our efforts alongside other Federal departments and
agencies to promote science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and foreign language (STEM-L)
disciplines at the primary and secondary education levels throughout the United States. The
Department will also partner with industry and academia to establish standards in training, education,
and awareness that will facilitate the growth of cyber talent in the United States.
Embed software and hardware expertise as a core DoD competency: To make it attractive to skilled
candidates, the Department will establish a career track for computer science related specialties
(including hardware engineers, software developers, and data analysts) that offers meaningful
challenges, rotational billets at other Federal departments and agencies, specialized training
opportunities tied to retention commitments, and the expansion of compensation incentives for the
Cyber Excepted Service (CES).
Establish a cyber top talent management program: The Department will establish a cyber talent
management program that provides its most skilled cyber personnel with focused resources and
opportunities to develop key skills over the course of their careers. The Department will use
competitive processes, including individual and team competitions, to identify the most capable DoD
military and civilian cyber specialists and then empower those personnel to solve the Department’s
toughest challenges.
6
DOD CYBER STRATEGY

 CONCLUSION
The arrival of the cyber era has created new opportunities and challenges for the Department and the
Nation. Open and reliable access to information is a vital U.S. interest, and our allies and competitors
alike should understand that we will assertively defend it. The 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy directs the
Department to defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war by building a
more lethal force, expanding alliances and partnerships, reforming the Department, and cultivating
talent, while actively competing against and deterring our competitors. Taken together, these mutually
reinforcing activities will enable the Department to compete, deter, and win in the cyberspace domain.

7
DOD CYBER STRATEGY