Matthew Smith
Barrister

Thorndon Chambers
PO Box 1530
Wellington 6140
New Zealand
Tel:
Fax:

6th Floor
10 Customhouse Quay
Wellington

(64 4) 499-6040
(64 4) 499-6118

e-mail: matthew.smith@chambers.co.nz

14 May 2018

Legally Privileged & Confidential
TE WHĀNAU O WAIPAREIRA AND NGĀI TAI KI TĀMAKI: TAVERN
LANE DEVELOPMENT, PAPATOETOE, AUCKLAND – LEGALITY OF
CONDITIONS OF SALE OF LAND BEING PROPOSED BY PANUKU
A.

Context and Summary

1  

A development is proposed for Papatoetoe, Auckland. The land for development
is currently owned by Auckland Council (“the Council”). The proposed
developer is Ngāi Tai Waipareira Housing Ltd (“Ngāi Tai”), an entity in which
both Te Whānau o Waipareira and Ngāi Tai ki Tāmaki are interested, that was
created and is controlled by Tāmaki Makaurau Māori and that exists to develop
land in Auckland for the benefit of Tāmaki Makaurau Māori.

2  

The Council, through one of its Council-controlled organisations (“CCOs”),
Panuku Development Auckland (“Panuku”), is negotiating the sale of the
Council land for the purposes of the development. Panuku is proposing the
following conditions for the transfer of the Council’s land to Ngāi Tai:
2.1   Ngāi Tai must pay a performance bond of up to $500,000 (“Condition 1”).
2.2   There is to be no third party dispute option for that bond (“Condition 2”).
2.3   No more than 30.9% of the development can be used for the provision of
Social Housing, which is defined to include dwellings and units leased to
tenants (including those over the age of 55) whose rents are subsidised by
grants or rental subsidies from State or benevolent sources (“Condition 3”).

 2
3  

I am instructed that, from Ngāi Tai’s perspective, the practical effect of all three
Conditions is to adversely affect the economics of any development of the
Council land. Condition 1 requires it to commit more project capital upfront.
Condition 2 makes that capital vulnerable to be called on at any time, irrespective
of how (un)justified the call for it is. And Condition 3 restricts Ngāi Tai’s ability
to sell development housing units off the plans to social housing providers,
including (but not limited to) Housing NZ, at an early stage of the development
process, so as to assist Ngāi Tai with project finance for the housing development.

4  

I am further instructed that, from Ngāi Tai’s perspective, Condition 3 has adverse
social and cultural impacts, over and above the adverse economic impacts just
noted. In particular, it operates to frustrate Ngāi Tai’s desire to provide social
housing support to vulnerable Tāmaki Makaurau Māori at the higher level that
Ngāi Tai would like. Accordingly, Condition 3 does not improve and enhance the
lives of communities in need. It also frustrates Ngāi Tai’s desire to be a developer
for social housing outcomes, for which profit margins at the levels private
commercial developers may be accustomed to are not the barometer of success.

5  

Against this background, I have been asked to assess whether there are any legal
limits on the ability of Panuku to impose Conditions 1-3 on any transfer of the
Council’s land to Ngāi Tai for the purposes of housing development.

6  

In summary it is my opinion that:
6.1   Condition 1: There is a strong legal argument for Ngāi Tai that Panuku, in
its refusal to waive or at least to significantly reduce the commercial bond
that is required for this development, is acting contrary to the principles of
active protection and the right to development and, accordingly, contrary to
the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi / The Treaty of Waitangi (“Te Tiriti”)
that Panuku (and the Council) has committed to comply with.
6.2   Condition 2: If, contrary to what is suggested by the information made
available to me for the purposes of preparing this opinion, there is
justification for Panuku requiring a performance bond (of up to $500,000),
there is a strong legal argument for Ngāi Tai that Panuku, in its refusal to
agree to an independent dispute resolution process in respect of any calls
made on the bond, is acting contrary to the principles of active protection
and the right to development and, accordingly, contrary to the principles of
Te Tiriti that Panuku (and the Council) has committed to comply with.
6.3   Condition 3: There is a strong legal argument for Ngāi Tai that Panuku, in
its position that not more than 30.9% of the development can be used for
Social Housing (as that terms is defined in paragraph 2.3 above) is adopting

 3
a position contrary to the prohibition on discrimination in section 53 of the
Human Rights Act 1993 (and not justified under any of the exceptions to it).
7  

I set out below my reasoning in support of the opinions just summarised.
B.

Relevant legal framework

8  

As the Council is acting through Panuku it is necessary to identify what, if any,
legal limits there are on Panuku in the context of negotiating a development
agreement with Ngāi Tai in respect of a transfer of currently Council-owned land.

9  

The legal principles that relevantly govern Panuku’s actions lie in three sources.
They are the corporate responsibility documents of Panuku; (linking through from
those documents) the principles of Te Tiriti as developed and applied in decisions
by the courts and by the Waitangi Tribunal (“the Tribunal”); and nondiscrimination provisions in the Human Rights Act. Accordingly:
9.1   My analysis begins in Section B1 with a summary of Panuku’s corporate
responsibility documents. In the present context, these are relevant in two
ways. First, they identify the objects and purposes which are to guide
Panuku in its actions. Second, and closely related, they commit Panuku to
comply with the principles of Te Tiriti in its actions affecting Māori.
9.2   That leads into Section B2, which summarises court and Tribunal decisions
on Te Tiriti principles of ‘active protection’ and ‘the right to development’.
9.3   Finally, Section B3 considers the meaning and effect of section 53 of the
Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in the provision of land,
housing, and other accommodation, and the exceptions to that prohibition.

10  

Conditions 1 to 3 are then assessed in Section C against this legal framework.
(B1)

11  

Corporate responsibility documents of Panuku

Panuku as a CCO is governed by Part 5 of the Local Government Act 2002. In it
section 59 sets out the “principal objectives” of CCOs. The first of those
objectives is to “achieve the objectives of its shareholders… as specified in the
statement of intent” (subsection (1)(a)). Panuku’s current statement of intent is its
Statement of Intent 2017-2020. This document identifies Panuku’s strategic
objectives as including to “facilitate… iwi… investment and collaboration into the
sustainable redevelopment of brownfield urban locations”.1 Panuku’s Statement
of Intent 2017-2020 goes on to identify “Key projects and initiatives” for
1

Statement of Intent 2017-2020, at p. 9.

 4
“delivering on Māori outcomes”. These include “Achieving better outcomes for
and with Māori” and “Enabling Māori commercial development opportunities”,2
including through Panuku “Working in partnership with Māori to enable
investment in commercial and housing opportunities”,3 and making a
“Contribution to Māori outcomes” which is stated to include the outcome of
“Significantly lift Māori social and economic wellbeing”.4
12  

Panuku has elaborated on these statement of intent obligations in its policy on
“Māori Engagement”.5 This significant document relevantly:
12.1   Acknowledges “through the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the
importance of land to Māori” that Panuku’s “particular relationship” with
Tāmaki Makaurau Māori is “one of partnership in management and
development of this essential element”.6
12.2   States that “Panuku recognises that through this collaborative partnership
approach, Māori can contribute to the successful exercise of the Panuku
mandate in four key areas”, one being “Enabling commercial investment,
including partnership in commercial and housing opportunities”.7
12.3   Identifies amongst the “Strategic Context” in which Panuku operates the
direction to CCOs in the Independent Māori Statutory Board (IMSB) Māori
Plan for Tāmaki Makaurau to “contribute to… Effective Māori capacity”
and the Auckland Plan objective for CCOs of “Transformational shift:
significantly lift Māori social and economic wellbeing”.8
12.4   States that Māori can contribute to the successful exercise of the Panuku
mandate in ways that include “working towards joint strategic outcomes”
and “enabling commercial initiatives and development partnerships”.9
12.5   Identifies as the second of four “Panuku Engagement Goals and Actions”:10
GOAL
2.
Commercial
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

OBJECTIVE
•   Māori are informed and
encouraged to

Statement of Intent 2017-2020, at p. 14.
Statement of Intent 2017-2020, at p. 14.
Statement of Intent 2017-2020, at p. 14.
Policy dated 28 October 2015.
At p. 1, section 2.
At p. 1, section 2.
At p. 2, section 4.
At p. 4, section 6.
At p. 6, section 6.

ACTION
•   Identify
opportunities,

 5
investment /
partnership

•  
•  

•  

•  

participate in
partnerships
Unlocking potential
from Auckland’s assets
Contribution Māori
wellbeing and effective
Māori capacity (IMSB
Māori Plan objectives)
Developing strong
Māori communities
(council MRF [ie,
Māori Responsiveness
Framework] driver)
Enable Māori outcomes
(council MRF driver)

•  

•  
•  

•  

•  

developing strategic,
proactive investor
relationships
Individual MOUs
between Panuku and
iwi to highlight and
guide individual
relationships
Clarifying
commercial
investment pathway
Facilitating iwi
partnerships in
significant initiatives
eg: Housing for Older
People
Te Toa Takatini –
Whai Painga
programme, Whare
for Life
Iwi investment fund

13  

Panuku’s September 2016 Corporate Responsibility Framework includes
statements that are to a similar effect as those referred to above.11

14  

Significantly, these strategic objectives are not merely procedural in nature, that
is, they do not stop at imposing process-based obligations on Panuku to
meaningfully consult with Māori. They go further than that, identifying an
obligation on Panuku positively to assist Tāmaki Makaurau Māori to achieve
outcomes that are beneficial to Tāmaki Makaurau Māori, including in financial /
economic terms. That objective, reflected in the Panuku corporate responsibility
documents that are referred to above, is consistent with how the Council says it
“expects” its CCOs to contribute to and align with the Council’s objectives and
priorities. For example, the Council states in its CCO Accountability Policy, in
Chapter 13.3 of the Long-term Plan 2015-2025, that it expects CCOs to contribute
to achieving identified outcomes from the Auckland Plan, which relevantly
include “A Māori identity that is Auckland’s point of difference in the world”.

15  

In that context, the Council has also recognised that it has legal responsibilities to
Māori under Te Tiriti, which it has described as “distinct from the Crown’s
[responsibilities] and fall[ing] within a local government Tāmaki Makaurau
context”.12 The Council’s “duties, obligations and commitments” to Tāmaki
11
12

Refer to p. 15.
Auckland Council Significance and Engagement Policy (December 2014) at p. 5, section 1.
To the same effect, the Auckland Council Governance Manual states at section 13.1(d) that
“The council is committed to operating in a manner that recognises and respects the

 6
Makaurau Māori are said by it to include to “contribute to Māori capacity” and to
“enable and promote Māori well-being”.13 “[W]here appropriate” the Council
also “aim[s] to achieve best practice in working with mana whenua as partners”.14
16  

Further, the IMSB in its Schedule of Issues of Significance to Māori in Tāmaki
Makaurau and Māori Plan 2017 identifies under “Wairuatanga” that “Māori
businesses are uniquely identifiable, visible and prosperous”, and under
“Kaitiakitanga” that “Māori businesses are improving and enhancing the quality
of their people, asset and resource base”.15 The IMSB’s “Issues of Significance”
also include that “Māori are a critical and active part in the economic development
of a more productive, high value economy for Auckland”, with corresponding
actions including “Review its procurement policy, strategy and processes to
enable Māori businesses to participate in Auckland Council procurement
opportunities, including labour inclusions, supplier diversity, direct contracting,
and requests for proposals and tenders to ensure Māori outcomes are included”.16

17  

Finally it is relevant to Te Tiriti obligations that Panuku has undertaken to comply
with that its company purposes include, in clause 3.1 of the constitution, to
“encourage economic development”.17
According to clause 3.2 of the
constitution, this may but need not involve Panuku making a profit.18 Panuku’s
constitution can also be noted for clause 5.4, on “Treaty of Waitangi”, stating:19
The Company must comply with all applicable statutory and regulatory obligations
relating to Māori and the Treaty of Waitangi, including those in the Local
Government Act 2002.

(B2)
18  

Recognised principles of Te Tiriti

The corporate responsibility documents that are referred to in Section B1 above
make clear that Panuku needs to comply with Te Tiriti principles. They also

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

significance of te Tiriti… To honour this commitment, the principles of te Tiriti / the Treaty
should be used as a guide to inform the council’s approach when making decisions about
matters affecting Māori”.
Auckland Council Significance and Engagement Policy (December 2014) at p. 8.
Auckland Council Significance and Engagement Policy (December 2014) at p. 9.
At p. 17, second and third table columns.
At p. 27.
Constitution of Panuku Development Auckland Ltd, at p. 4.
Constitution of Panuku Development Auckland Ltd, at p. 4.
Constitution of Panuku Development Auckland Ltd, at p. 5.

 7
provide a degree of practical guidance on what Panuku (and the Council) sees as
the purpose and outcomes of Te Tiriti consistent engagement with Māori.
19  

The views, and commitments, of Panuku (and the Council) also need to be seen
and understood in light of how the courts and the Tribunal have defined the scope
and content of Te Tiriti obligations, and most relevantly ‘the principle of active
protection’ and ‘the right to development’ – both of these being principles of Te
Tiriti that have been recognised by the Council as relevant to its operations.20

20  

Starting with the principle of active protection, this was described by the Court of
Appeal in the Lands/SOE Case as a duty or obligation of “active protection of
Māori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent [reasonably]
practicable”.21 Of particular relevance to the aspirations, and rights, of Māori to
economic development, the principle of active protection has been found by the
Court of Appeal to support Ngāi Tahu having a period of protection from
competition in the operation of its whale-watching business. 22 In a similar vein,
the Tribunal has observed that the principle of active protection:23
… may be interpreted as a positive and pro-active use of the discretion of the Crown
toward the Māori partner in the Treaty of Waitangi to return Māori lands
compulsorily taken, and no longer required for the purposes for which they were
taken, without requiring payment at market value.
(My bold emphasis.)

21  

And further:
… the Crown’s duty of active protection extended not just to ensuring that Māori
retained sufficient properties and taonga to participate in opportunities, but also to
ensuring that Māori were facilitated or assisted to do so. …24
... In addition to the Crown’s obligation to provide the means of fulfilling the
principle of mutual benefit, the principle of redressing past treaty breaches is also
relevant. Where there is a need to redress past breaches, active development
assistance from the Crown may form part of an appropriate remedy. The Māori
Development Corporation Report found in 1993, for example, that the Government’s
initiative in establishing the corporation in 1987 was consistent with the treaty, in that
it was a recognition of the need for positive economic assistance for Māori and
provided this assistance in the form of development banking services. This was seen
as consistent with the Crown’s duty of active protection inherent in the treaty. Where
20
21

22

23
24

Refer for instance to Auckland Council Governance Manual at section 13.1(b).
New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [Lands/SOE Case] [1987] 1 NZLR 641
(CA) at p. 664 (Cooke P).
Ngāi Tahu Māori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation [Whalewatching Case]
[1995] 3 NZLR 553 (CA), particularly at pp. 561-562 (Cooke P). Subsequently discussed
and affirmed in Ngāi Tai ki Tāmaki Tribal Trust v Minister of Conservation [2017] NZCA
613, [2018] 2 NZLR 453, particularly at paras. [48]-[50].
Te Maunga Railways Land Report (Wai-315, 1 August 1994) at p. 67.
He Maunga Rongo: Report on Central North Island Claims (Wai-1200, 16 June 2008,
Volume 3) at p. 894.

 8
Māori have lost properties and taonga and, as a result, have been unable to participate
in the national economy, and where the disparity between the rate of economic
progress of Māori compared with other New Zealanders can be attributed in some
measure to breaches of the treaty, then the Crown’s promotion of Māori business
is part of honouring its treaty obligations. …25
… the principle of active protection requires the Crown to assist Māori today to
develop their properties, where that is their wish. Such assistance should take the
form of facilitating equal opportunities to develop, and in particular by removing
obstacles to Māori development, such as title and governance problems, that have
been created by past actions of the Crown (see part III of this report). It may,
depending on circumstances, extend to other forms of positive assistance. …26
(My bold emphasis.)

22  

The Tribunal, in the He Maunga Rongo report (2008) that is quoted above, also
addressed Te Tiriti right to development, relevantly finding that this right includes
“positive assistance from the Crown where appropriate in the circumstances,
which may include assistance to overcome unfair barriers to development, some
of them of the Crown’s making” and “the opportunity for Māori to participate in
the development of Crown-owned (formerly Māori) or Crown-controlled
property, resources, or industries in their rohe, and to participate at all levels”.27
So understood, the right to development supported findings by the Tribunal that:28
… a reasonable treaty partner would consider modern tourism enterprises as
opportunities where positive assistance is appropriate and required, in consultation
with iwi and hapu. We accept that the Crown does not have an obligation to ensure
that iwi and hapu are always commercially successful in these enterprises. We
received ample evidence that iwi and hapu of this region do not expect to be
especially ‘fostered’ in the tourism sector. They are willing to manage their own
tourism businesses, for their own communities, and according to their needs and
preferences. What they do require is positive assistance to enable them to overcome
the barriers and constraints they continue to face in areas such as lending finance and
governance structures, which prevent them from participating equal in the field with
others in the tourism sector. This positive assistance may, in some cases,
appropriately extend to preference where Crown lands and resources are being made
available for tourism enterprises or where the Crown has a regulatory responsibility
for the utilisation of public resources for tourism enterprises.

23  

The Tribunal has more recently observed in the Te Kāhui Maunga report (2013):29
At its most basic, acknowledging a treaty right to development is, in our view, about
giving Māori a ‘fair go’, along with Pākehā . Like the CNI tribunal, we believe that it
includes the following:
…

25
26
27
28
29

He Maunga Rongo (above) at p. 910.
He Maunga Rongo (above) at p. 911.
He Maunga Rongo (above) at p. 912.
He Maunga Rongo (above) at pp. 1096-97.
Te Kāhui Maunga: The National Park District Inquiry Report (Wai-1130, 2013, Volume 1)
at p. 18.

 9
•   The right to positive assistance, where appropriate to the circumstances,
including assistance to overcome unfair barriers to participation in
development (especially barriers created by the Crown).
…
•   The opportunity, after considering the relevant criteria, for Māori to
participate in the development of Crown-owned or Crown-controlled
property or resources or industries in their rohe, and to participate at all
levels (such criteria include the existence of a customary right or an analogy
to a customary right, the use of tribal taonga, and the need to redress past
breaches or fulfil the promise of mutual benefit).

24  

These Tribunal findings, and the position taken in its reports more generally, are
consistent with the Lands/SOE Case proposition that the principles of Te Tiriti are
intended to support and empower Māori in the use of their resources to the fullest
extent reasonably practicable, extending to positive assistance where appropriate.
What that requires, in any given practical setting, is very fact and context specific.
(B3)

25  

Section 53 of the Human Rights Act

Finally I turn to the statutory prohibition on discrimination in the provision of
land, housing and other accommodation. It is contained in section 53 of the
Human Rights Act, which provides as follows:
53 Land, housing, and other accommodation
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, on his or her own behalf or on behalf or
purported behalf of any principal,—
(a) to refuse or fail to dispose of any estate or interest in land or any residential
or business accommodation to any other person; or
(b) to dispose of such an estate or interest or such accommodation to any person
on less favourable terms and conditions than are or would be offered to other
persons; or
(c) to treat any person who is seeking to acquire or has acquired such an estate
or interest or such accommodation differently from other persons in the same
circumstances; or
(d) to deny any person, directly or indirectly, the right to occupy any land or any
residential or business accommodation; or
(e) to terminate any estate or interest in land or the right of any person to occupy
any land or any residential or business accommodation,—
by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person, on his or her own behalf or on behalf or
purported behalf of any principal, to impose or seek to impose on any other person
any term or condition which limits, by reference to any of the prohibited grounds of
discrimination, the persons or class of persons who may be the licensees or invitees
of the occupier of any land or any residential or business accommodation.

26  

The combined effect of sections 53(1) and (2) is to prohibit the imposition of
conditions that would allow land or accommodation to (not) be disposed of to
groups defined by one or more of the grounds of unlawful discrimination. Those
grounds are set out in section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act and relevantly

 10
include age and employment status. “Employment status” is defined to mean
being unemployed or being a recipient of a welfare benefit or an ACC entitlement.
27  

The effect of section 53 of the Human Rights Act was considered in Anderson. 30
There the High Court held that a resource consent condition that restricted
occupation of a townhouse to persons over the age of 55 years infringed the
prohibition on age-based discrimination in section 53 and was unlawful.31 The
decision records that the age restriction was originally proposed to be registered as
a restrictive covenant on the certificates of title associated with the townhouse, but
that that did not occur. On the Court’s reasoning, had that occurred the restrictive
covenant is also likely to have been found to have infringed section 53.

28  

While they do not appear to have been relevant in the Anderson decision, it can be
noted that there are three specific exceptions to the prohibition on unlawful
discrimination that is contained in section 53 of the Human Rights Act. They are
in sections 54, 55 and 56 of that Act, and provide for exceptions in relation to
shared residential accommodation; hostels and establishments (such as hospitals,
clubs, schools, universities, religious institutions, and retirement villages) whose
accommodation is restricted to a particular type of person, such as those of the
same sex or in a particular age group; and for persons with particular disabilities.
C.

29  

Against the legal framework that is summarised in Section B above, I turn to
consider the legality of the three Conditions that Panuku has proposed in respect
of the transfer of land to Ngāi Tai for the purposes of the development.
(C1)

30  

My Legal Analysis

Condition 1: Requiring a performance bond of up to $500,000

I am instructed that the performance bond of up to $500,000 is at a level that
would ordinarily be sought from a (non-Māori) commercial developer. That
being so, it appears that Panuku has not considered whether no commercial bond
is appropriate in circumstances where Ngāi Tai is the developer and it is seeking
to develop the land as a Māori development entity and for the benefit of Tāmaki
Makaurau Māori, both financially / economically and socially / culturally. In
these circumstances, there is in my opinion a strong legal argument for Ngāi Tai
that Panuku, in its refusal to waive or at least to significantly reduce the
commercial bond for this development, is acting contrary to the principles of
active protection and the right to development and, accordingly, contrary to
principles of Te Tiriti that Panuku (and the Council) has committed to comply
with. As noted above, Panuku has undertaken to pursue amongst its objectives
30
31

Anderson v FM Custodians Ltd [2013] NZHC 2423, (2013) 15 NZCPR 123 (Duffy J).
See in particular at paras. [53]-[55].

 11
“enabling” Māori commercial and housing opportunities, and through that
achieving better economic and social “outcomes” for and with Tāmaki Makaurau
Māori. These commitments cannot have been intended as mere window dressing,
and as Māori safeguards courts would not allow them “to become a dead letter”.32
That is avoided by Panuku providing positive assistance to Ngāi Tai, by agreeing
to forego a performance bond in the particular circumstances of this development.
(C2)
31  

If, contrary to what is suggested by the information made available to me for the
purposes of preparing this opinion, there is justification for Panuku requiring a
performance bond (of up to $500,000), there is in my opinion a strong legal
argument for Ngāi Tai that Panuku, in its refusal to agree that an independent
dispute resolution process should exist to address any calls made on that bond, is
acting contrary to the principles of active protection and the right to development
and, accordingly, contrary to the principles of Te Tiriti that Panuku (and the
Council) has committed to comply with. In addition to my reasoning in paragraph
30 above, which equally supports my opinion on Condition 2, I am instructed that
Panuku has not explained why it is proposing to depart from what I understand to
be the common practice of including independent dispute resolution processes in
relation to commercial bonds in a development agreement. In my opinion, a
court, in a Te Tiriti setting such as the present one, is likely to infer from the
silence of Panuku on this point that it does not have any objectively good reason
for the position that it is taking.33 That is the inference that I too have drawn.
(C3)

32  

Condition 2: No independent dispute resolution process

Condition 3: Limiting social housing to not more than 30.9%

There is in my opinion a strong legal argument for Ngāi Tai that Panuku, in its
position that not more than 30.9% of the development can be used for Social
Housing (as that terms is defined in paragraph 2.3 above), is adopting a position
that infringes section 53 of the Human Rights Act, and that is not justified under
any of the exceptions in sections 54, 55 and 56. This is on the basis that the
Social Housing restriction is likely to have the effect (even if it is not its purpose)
of preventing persons who are unemployed, who rely on welfare benefits or who
rely on ACC entitlements, from being able to occupy houses in the development.
My reasoning in support of this conclusion is that there is likely to be an overlap,
perhaps significant, on the one hand between the growing number of people who
are unemployed or in receipt of State welfare assistance of the kind just noted, and

32

33

Environmental Defence Society Inc v Mangonui District Council [1989] 3 NZLR 257 (CA)
at p. 261 (Cooke J). To similar effect is the more recent decision of the Supreme Court in
respect of SOE obligations under Te Tiriti in Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2016]
NZSC 62, [2016] 1 NZLR 1056, particularly at paras. [65]-[76] (Elias CJ and Arnold J).
See for instance Ririnui (above), particularly at paras. [105]-[106] (Elias CJ and Arnold J).

 12
on the other hand the (also growing number of) people who rely to pay their rents
on grants or rental subsidies from the State or private / voluntary sector sources.
D.
33  

Summary and conclusion

I have summarised my opinion in Section A above. Please do not hesitate to
contact me if you have any questions about my opinion or its supporting reasons.
Yours sincerely

Matthew Smith