Case 1:17-cv-05839-AJN-BCM Document 48 Filed 03/27/18 Page 1 of 26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
EQUAN YUNUS,
No. 17-CV-5839 (AJN)(BCM)
Plaintiff,
-againstANDREW CUOMO, Governor of the State of New
York, and ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, Acting
Commissioner of the New York State Department
of Corrections and Community Supervision, in
their official capacities; JOAN LEWISROBINSON, Parole Officer, DEREK JONES,
Bureau Chief, RODNEY YOUNG, Regional
Director, RODNEY SMITH, Senior Parole Officer,
DENISE GRANNUM, Senior Parole Officer, and
YOLANDA VAZQUEZ, Parole Officer—in their
individual and official capacities,

SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Defendants.

Plaintiff Equan Yunus by his attorneys, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP,
alleges as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

After 15 years in prison, and more than a-year-and-a-half on parole, Plaintiff

Equan Yunus has served, and continues to serve, his punishment for the crime he committed:
kidnapping for ransom.
2.

Mr. Yunus, however, is now receiving punishment meant for a crime he has not

committed: a high-risk sex offense.
3.

Although it is undisputed that Mr. Yunus has never committed sexual misconduct

and there has been a judicial finding that there is “virtually no likelihood” he ever will, New
York still requires that he register a sex offender. The result is that Plaintiff is subject to a raft of

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life restrictions that, while they may be appropriate for someone convicted of a sex-related crime,
have nothing to do with Mr. Yunus and harshly inhibit his ability to live with family and loved
ones, find work, and move on with his life as a law-abiding citizen.
4.

Specifically, parole officers (“POs”) assigned to Mr. Yunus’ case, including the

named parole-officer Defendants, have imposed blanket “sex offender” conditions of parole on
Plaintiff—the very same conditions designed to restrict high-risk sex offenders.
5.

These conditions have severely impinged on the little liberty Plaintiff has—

requiring him to live in a shelter, denying him access to his family, denying him access to
common technology, and restricting his ability to pursue his education or build a career.
6.

Plaintiff has made numerous efforts to explain to his parole officers and their

supervisors that such restrictions are inappropriate and unlawful as applied to him, that he was
not convicted of a sexual offense, and that it is only because of an indiscriminate legal
requirement that he must register as a “sex offender.” These complaints have fallen on deaf ears.
7.

Left with no choice, Mr. Yunus filed the instant suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

seeking to have this misleading and stigmatizing label removed and restrictive conditions
revoked so that he may continue to reform his life and reintegrate into free society.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

9.

Venue is proper in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2) because

1343.

many Defendants reside in this judicial district, all defendants reside in the state in which this
District is located, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred within

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this District in the State of New York.
PARTIES
10.

Plaintiff Equan Yunus is a parolee under the supervision of the New York State

Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). Although it is undisputed
that he has never committed sexual misconduct, he was forced to register as a sex offender and is
subject to highly restrictive parole conditions intended for high-risk sex offenders.
11.

Defendant Andrew Cuomo is the Governor of the State of New York. He is sued

in his official capacity.
12.

Pursuant to Article IV of the New York Constitution, the executive power of the

state is vested in the Governor, and it is the Governor’s responsibility to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. N.Y. Const. Art. IV §§ 1, 3.
13.

The Governor is an appropriate defendant in a case challenging the

constitutionality and enforcement of a state statute.
14.

Defendant Anthony Annucci is the Acting Commissioner of DOCCS. DOCCS is

responsible for registering sex offenders and maintaining and publishing New York’s sex
offender registry. See N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-b. He is sued in his official capacity.
15.

Acting Commissioner Annucci is an appropriate defendant in a case challenging

the constitutionality and enforcement of New York’s Sex Offender Registration Scheme.
16.

Defendant Joan Lewis-Robinson is a Parole Officer employed by DOCCS at 82

Lincoln Avenue, Bronx NY 10454. She is sued in her official and individual capacities.
17.

Defendant Rodney Young is a Regional Director employed by DOCCS at 82

Lincoln Avenue, Bronx NY 10454. He is sued in his official and individual capacities.

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18.

Defendant Derek Jones is a Bureau Chief employed by DOCCS at 82 Lincoln

Avenue, Bronx NY 10454. He is sued in his official and individual capacities.
19.

Defendant Rodney Smith is a Senior Parole Officer employed by DOCCS at 15

2nd Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11215. He is sued in his official and individual capacities.
20.

Defendant Denise Grannum is a Senior Parole Officer employed by DOCCS at 15

2nd Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11215. She is sued in her official and individual capacities.
21.

Defendant Yolanda Vazquez is a Parole Officer employed by DOCCS at 15 2nd

Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11215. She is sued in her official and individual capacities.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Conviction and Sex Offender Designation
22.

In 2002, Plaintiff pled guilty to the crime of kidnapping-for-ransom and was

sentenced to eighteen years of incarceration.
23.

The kidnapping arose in the context of the drug trade and had no sexual

component.
24.

Nonetheless, because one of Mr. Yunus’s victims was under seventeen years old

and was not his child, New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) still required him to
register as a sex offender upon his release from prison. N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-a.
25.

At his plea colloquy, Mr. Yunus was not informed that his conviction would

require him to register as a sex offender.
26.

During the fifteen years he was incarcerated, Mr. Yunus reformed his life.

27.

He attained a 4.0 average as an inmate-student at Bard College, received trade

certificates as a paralegal, computer operator, and in building maintenance, taught an investment

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management course to other inmates, and successfully pursued lawsuits pertaining to the
conditions of his confinement.
28.

Mr. Yunus has been drug free for seventeen years.

29.

Mr. Yunus has never been charged with, let alone convicted of, sexual

misconduct of any sort.
30.

Shortly before he was to be released on parole, a hearing was conducted on June

24, 2016, before the Honorable Michael J. Obus of the New York State Supreme Court to
determine what SORA-mandated risk level Mr. Yunus should be assigned. A transcript of this
hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
31.

Because New York Law requires that Mr. Yunus be designated as a sex offender

even though his conduct had no relation to sex, the only options available to the judge were to
designate Mr. Yunus as a Level-One (low risk), Level-Two (moderate risk) or Level-Three (high
risk) offender. Determining that Mr. Yunus is not a sex offender at all was not an option
available to Judge Obus.
32.

At the outset of the hearing, Judge Obus noted that he was “very familiar” with

the facts of Mr. Yunus’s case, having presided over his criminal trial. Ex. A at 20.
33.

As the hearing progressed, Judge Obus observed that there is “not only . . . no

allegation of sexual abuse in this case, but . . . also no suggestion of any history of sexual
misconduct on the part of the Defendant at all . . . [n]or is there any indication of any propensity
on the part of the defendant for sexual misconduct.” Id. at 21-22.
34.

In light of those observations, Judge Obus found that he was “satisfied that there

is virtually no likelihood that [Mr. Yunus] will commit a sex crime ever.” Id at 22.

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35.

Despite this finding that Mr. Yunus has never committed, and likely never will

commit, a sexual offense, Judge Obus had no choice, under the law, but to designate him a sex
offender.
36.

Judge Obus designated Mr. Yunus as a Level-One sex offender, the lowest

designation that New York allows.
37.

Mr. Yunus has never had the opportunity to challenge his sex offender

designation in an adversarial proceeding.
38.

This label, which bears no relation to his prior conduct, has caused Mr. Yunus to

suffer significant stigma in his community and be subject to many onerous restrictions on his
already severely restricted freedom as a parolee.
Imposition of Special Conditions of Parole
39.

On July 14, 2016, after fifteen years of imprisonment, Mr. Yunus was released on

40.

Upon his release, he was assigned special conditions of parole by Defendant

parole.

Rodney Smith.
41.

Defendant Smith imposed 48 of the most restrictive special conditions of parole

designed for high-risk sex offenders severely limiting, for example, where Mr. Yunus can live,
his ability to interact with his family, and his ability to use basic technology necessary to pursue
an education or a career. A copy of these restrictions is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
42.

Mr. Yunus informed Defendant Smith that he was only a Level-One sex offender

and that his prior conduct had nothing to do with sex. Defendant Smith responded that he gives
the same conditions of parole to all sex offenders, and that Mr. Yunus would need to “man up”
and deal with the restrictions.

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43.

Plaintiff asked Defendant Smith if he could appeal and was told that Defendant

Smith’s decision was “final” and Mr. Yunus would be “locked up” if he did not agree to his
special parole conditions.
44.

Mr. Yunus was later assigned Defendant Yolanda Vazquez as his PO.

45.

Mr. Yunus explained to Defendant Vazquez that his conditions were

inappropriate for his Level-One designation and unrelated to his prior conduct.
46.

Like Defendant Smith, Defendant Vazquez told Mr. Yunus that she did not care if

the conditions related to his prior conduct, and that all sex offenders, regardless of Level, receive
the same harsh special conditions of parole.
47.

Mr. Yunus made the same complaint to Defendant Vazquez’s supervisor,

Defendant Denise Grannum. Defendant Grannum likewise told Plaintiff she did not care if his
special conditions were related to his prior conduct, and she rejected his request that his
conditions of parole be modified.
48.

During Plaintiff’s time under Defendant Vazquez’s supervision, Defendant

Vazquez told multiple people of importance in Mr. Yunus’s life that he was a sex offender,
including other persons at the shelter and administrators at his college, despite her having no
legal obligation to do so.
49.

As a result of this unnecessary dissemination, Mr. Yunus’s stigmatizing offender

status became well known at the shelter and at his college, causing him to be treated unfavorably
by many of the people he is forced to live with, as well as many of his professors and classmates
at school.
50.

Mr. Yunus was later transferred to the caseload of Defendant Joan Lewis-

Robinson.

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51.

Mr. Yunus again grieved his special parole conditions to his new PO and her two

supervisors—Defendants Derek Jones and Rodney Young.
52.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson, like Defendant Vazquez and Defendant Smith, told

Mr. Yunus that all sex offenders get the same special conditions irrespective of their risk level.
53.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson likewise told Mr. Yunus she was not interested in his

prior conduct and he would be subject to the same (harsh) special parole conditions as long as he
is a sex offender.
54.

Mr. Yunus’s attempts to appeal this decision and provide legal authority for his

position to Defendants Jones and Young fell on deaf ears. Both Defendants told Mr. Yunus that
he would be subject to whatever restrictive conditions Defendant Lewis-Robinson sought to
impose.
55.

To date, Mr. Yunus is still subject to these very harsh special conditions. A copy

of his current conditions of parole is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Residency Restrictions
56.

As a mandatory condition of parole, Mr. Yunus cannot live or ever be within

1,000 feet of any “school grounds.” Ex. C. ¶ 4.
57.

As a special condition of parole, Mr. Yunus cannot live or ever be within 300

yards of any place where children “congregate.” Ex. C. ¶ 17.
58.

Mr. Yunus has been provided with the following examples of places where

children may “congregate”: toy stores, parks, pet stores, schools, playgrounds, video galleries,
malls, bike trails, skating rinks, amusement parks, bowling parks, bowling alleys, pool halls. Ex.
C. ¶ 17.

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59.

This non-exhaustive list has not provided Mr. Yunus with any meaningful

guidance as to what is required for an establishment to be considered a place where children
“congregate.”
60.

DOCCS does not provide sex offenders with any information—such as maps

listing qualifying establishments or delineating relevant “exclusion zones”—that could assist
them in determining where they are eligible to live in light of their restrictions.
61.

For fear of being re-incarcerated, Mr. Yunus has been forced to over-police

himself and assume that any place where children could theoretically gather is a disqualifying
establishment and must be avoided.
62.

Despite these restrictions, Mr. Yunus submitted two residential addresses—his

fiancée’s residence at 2068 Daily Avenue, Bronx, New York 10460, and his uncle’s residence at
208 Arlington Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11207—to Defendant Vazquez in July and August
2016.
63.

Before submitting these addresses, Mr. Yunus met with his criminal defense

attorney, Sam Mendez, to ensure that they were compliant with his restrictions. Using Google
Maps, Plaintiff and Mr. Mendez determined that both addresses were, so far as they could
determine, more than 1,000 feet from a school and more than 300 yards from any place where
children might “congregate.”
64.

Mr. Yunus presented the maps he and Mr. Mendez used to Defendant Vazquez.

65.

Nevertheless, Defendant Vazquez rejected both proposed locations, claiming that

they were too close to a school.
66.

Defendant Vazquez could not explain where 1,000 feet was measured from in

making her assessment that Plaintiff’s proposed residences were too close to a school.

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67.

Defendant Vazquez could not explain why the maps Plaintiff presented indicating

that his proposed residences complied with his parole conditions were incorrect.
68.

When Defendant Lewis-Robinson became Plaintiff’s PO, he presented these two

potential residences and maps supporting their compliance with his conditions of parole to her.
69.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson also rejected both proposed residences, claiming that

they were too close to a school.
70.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson could not explain where 1,000 feet was measured

from in making her assessment that Plaintiff’s proposed addresses were too close to a school.
71.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson could not explain why the maps Plaintiff presented

indicating that his proposed residences complied with his parole conditions were incorrect.
72.

In December 2016, Plaintiff proposed that he live with his fiancée’s sister, Lisa

73.

Plaintiff provided Defendant Lewis-Robinson with Ms. Blake’s address and

Blake.

phone number.
74.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson made no attempt to contact Ms. Blake for multiple

months.
75.

Plaintiff submitted follow-up letters renewing his request to move in with Ms.

Blake in both April and August 2017.
76.

Finally, nine months after Mr. Yunus’s initial request, Defendant Lewis-Robinson

called Ms. Blake and proposed a date to visit here home. Ms. Blake was not available on the day
PO Lewis-Robinson suggested, and proposed an alternative date.

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77.

Rather than work with Ms. Blake to find an alternative date for a site visit,

Defendant Lewis-Robinson immediately rejected Mr. Yunus’s proposed move on the ground that
Ms. Blake was being “uncooperative.”
78.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson has told Plaintiff on multiple occasions that she

prefers all of her parolees to stay at the shelter for homeless men since it is easier to monitor
them at the shelter than at a private residence.
79.

Upon information and belief, all of the approximately 150-200 parolees under PO

Lewis-Robinson’s supervision reside at the shelter.
80.

The current shelter where Mr. Yunus is housed is located at 781 East 135th Street,

Bronx, NY, 10454. The shelter is directly across the street from a family shelter where multiple
families with young children live.
Cell Phone and Computer Restrictions
81.

Mr. Yunus’s parole conditions require that he not use a cell phone or computer

without his PO’s consent. Ex. C. ¶¶ 35, 39.
82.

Plaintiff is subject to an additional parole condition barring him from using “any

commercial social networking website.” Ex. C. ¶ 48.
83.

Mr. Yunus did not use a cell phone, a computer, or social media in the

commission of his crime of kidnapping-for-ransom.
84.

Mr. Yunus has never been charged with using a cell phone, computer, or social

media in order to commit a crime.
85.

Nevertheless, defendant Lewis-Robinson currently allows Plaintiff to use a cell

phone only for his education and to communicate with counsel.

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86.

He is not permitted to use his cell phone for any other purpose, including non-

academic use of the internet or social media.
87.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson currently allows Plaintiff to use only the computers

located at Borough of Manhattan College, and only for academic purposes and for purposes
related to this lawsuit.
88.

He is not permitted to use a computer for any other purpose, including non-

academic use of the internet or social media.
89.

Plaintiff is not permitted to use his personal computer for any reason.

90.

Due to his curfew restrictions, Plaintiff is rarely able to use the computer at

Borough of Manhattan College as he must return to the shelter right after class to comply with
his parole conditions.
91.

These restrictions limiting his word processing and internet access make it

virtually impossible for Mr. Yunus to pursue his education or full-time employment.
92.

Due to these restrictions, Mr. Yunus is not able to do research and writing

necessary to complete many schools assignments.
Family Restrictions
93.

Mr. Yunus’s parole conditions ban him from visiting or communicating with any

person under the age of eighteen. Ex. C ¶ 15.
94.

Defendant Lewis-Robinson has applied this condition to minors in Mr. Yunus’s

own family.
95.

She has told Plaintiff on many occasions that he will be “locked up” if he

communicates with any children, including family members.
96.

Plaintiff has two siblings, both of whom have minor daughters.

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97.

Due to these restrictions, Plaintiff has never met one of his nieces.

98.

Due to these restrictions, Plaintiff has only met his other niece on two brief

occasions (once while he was incarcerated), and he has not seen her since his special conditions
of parole were imposed.
99.

Because he cannot be present with their children, Plaintiff has not seen one of his

siblings since his release and is rarely able to see the other.
100.

Mr. Yunus’s mother has passed away, and he is very close with his uncle, who is

his closest living relative on his mother’s side of my family.
101.

Mr. Yunus’s uncle lives with his wife and his grandchildren. He has invited Mr.

Yunus to live with them and to assist with his reentry.
102.

Plaintiff is unable to pursue that invitation as long as his minor cousins are living

with his uncle, and he has not even met his young cousins due to this special parole condition.
103.

Because he cannot be present with their grandchildren, Mr. Yunus is also rarely

able to spend time with his uncle or aunt.
104.

For example, in 2017, Mr. Yunus asked Defendant Lewis-Robinson if he could

attend his uncle’s Thanksgiving dinner. She responded that he could attend, but that he would go
to prison if there were any children there.
105.

Mr. Yunus of course did not attend, and did not spend Thanksgiving with his

family.
Employment Restrictions
106.

In October or November 2016, Defendant Lewis-Robinson arbitrarily shortened

the times at which Mr. Yunus could be out of the shelter from 7:00 am to 9:00 pm to 8:00 am to
8:00 pm.

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107.

Mr. Yunus was told that his curfew was changed “because he is a sex offender.”

108.

At that time, Mr. Yunus had been designated as a “sex offender” since July 2016,

and he had never violated the curfew to which he was then subject without the permission of his
PO.
109.

Plaintiff was offered a job at Access-a-Ride paying $30,000 per year. That job

would have required Mr. Yunus to leave the shelter at 7:00 a.m. in order to be on time for work.
Because of the change in curfew imposed by PO Lewis-Robinson, which forbade Mr. Yunus
from being on the streets before 8:00 am, Plaintiff was not able to accept a full-time job offer at
Access-a-Ride.
110.

When Mr. Yunus explained this situation to Defendant Lewis-Robinson, she

ignored him for days. Eventually, she told him that she did not care if he lost the job and she
would not give him permission to leave the shelter at 7:00 am.
111.

Upon information and belief, Defendant Lewis-Robinson denied Mr. Yunus the

opportunity to purse a full-time job in order to assert her power over him.
112.

This unnecessary scaling-back of Plaintiff’s curfew also has given Mr. Yunus less

time to study at school (the only place he can use a computer), and his GPA has dropped as
result.
113.

Between his cell phone restrictions, computer restrictions, and curfew, it is nearly

impossible for Mr. Yunus to pursue his education or obtain a full-time job.
114.

From his studies while incarcerated, Mr. Yunus is passionate about the fields of

web development, law, and finance. Under his current special parole conditions, he cannot
pursue a job in any of those fields.

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115.

As a result, Mr. Yunus has had to settle for part-time, low-paying, seasonal work,

such as greeting customers during tax season at H&R Block.
116.

Mr. Yunus has been unable to find new employment that is compliant with his

special conditions after tax season ends in mid-April 2018.
117.

This limited ability to pursue employment has both harmed Mr. Yunus financially

and prevented him from obtaining a job that could further a career after he is released from
parole.
118.

Mr. Yunus has described the educational and professional difficulties these

restrictions cause to Defendant Lewis-Robinson many times. She has consistently responded
that she does not care about his or any parolees’ education or employment and that her priority is
sex and drug treatment because that is where DOCCS makes its money.
Interference with Relationship
119.

As another special condition of parole, once Mr. Yunus enters into a “relationship

with a consenting adult,” he is required to inform that person that he is a sex offender. Ex. C.
¶ 24.
120.

It is not apparent to Mr. Yunus what qualifies as a “relationship” under this term,

and he was left to guess when he would have to disclose to his now fiancée that he is a “sex
offender.”
121.

Mr. Yunus ultimately made the required disclosure, and it has caused strain on his

relationship with his fiancée.
122.

In addition to disclosing his offender status to his fiancée, Mr. Yunus was forced

to disclose the sexual nature of his relationship to PO Lewis-Robinson in detail.

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123.

This forced disclosure was irrelevant to any prior misconduct and an extreme

invasion of Mr. Yunus’s privacy.
124.

In addition to this disclosure, Mr. Yunus’s other sex offender conditions have

caused a significant strain on his relationship, as he has not been permitted to live with his
fiancée, and between his curfew, cell phone, and computer restrictions, is barely able to see or
even communicate with her.
Motor Vehicle Restrictions
125.

An additional special condition of parole prevents Mr. Yunus from driving or

riding in a motor vehicle. Ex. C. ¶¶ 31-32.
126.

This condition imposes a significant burden on Mr. Yunus, as he is effectively

limited to the subway and walking as his means to get around New York City.
127.

This condition often puts him solely at the mercy of the subway system when he

must travel long distances and, especially given his restricted curfew, limits his ability to meet
his educational, professional, and parole obligations around New York City during his limited
hours of freedom.
Other Restrictions
128.

Mr. Yunus is also subject to numerous other conditions of parole that bear no

relationship to his prior conduct. For example, he is:
 Banned from possessing photographic or video recording equipment, Ex. C ¶
21.
 Banned from purchasing sexually explicit magazines or tapes, Ex. C ¶ 13;
 Banned from having a pet, Ex. C ¶ 19;
 Banned from having a Post Office box, Ex. C ¶ 37.

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129.

Mr. Yunus has never been charged with using photographic or video recording

equipment, sexually explicit materials, an animal, or a Post Office box in the commission of a
crime.
General Abuses of Discretion
130.

In addition to the restrictive conditions described above, Defendants have

continually abused their discretion to make Plaintiff’s life as difficult as possible.
131.

Plaintiff has been forced to attend substance abuse treatment and is being drug-

tested at least weekly, and often more than once-per-week, despite the fact that he has been drug
free for seventeen years. These sessions take multiple hours a day and impede Mr. Yunus’s
ability to attend his classes or obtain a job.
132.

Upon information and belief, Defendant Lewis-Robinson forces Plaintiff and

other parolees to attend drug treatment irrespective of individual circumstances because she
believes it is financially lucrative to DOCCS if she does so.
133.

As recently as March 9, 2018, Mr. Yunus reported for his weekly meeting with

his PO at the shelter where he lives and was forced to wait around the shelter for four hours
before Defendant Lewis-Robinson would meet with him. No explanation for this delay was
given.
134.

Once they met, Defendant Lewis-Robinson proceeded to inappropriately question

him about this lawsuit—a clear attempt to remind him of her immense power over his life.
Prior Grievances
135.

In addition to the verbal complaints described above, Mr. Yunus has submitted

written complaints with legal citations to Defendant Lewis-Robinson regarding his improper
offender designation and unlawful conditions of parole.

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136.

Following that written complaint, Defendant Young, the regional director

overseeing Mr. Yunus’s supervision, informed him that nothing would be changed and he should
“get his relief in court.”
137.

In addition, DOCCS issued a directive entitled “parole grievance procedures” on

March 7, 2018.
138.

In Section 5(d)(2), entitled “non-grievable issues” the directive sets forth that

there is no internal mechanism for a parolee to grieve “Parole Board imposed conditions and
mandatory conditions of community supervision.”
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of Procedural Due Process: 42 U.S.C.§ 1983)
(Defendants Cuomo and Annucci)
139.

Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs above as

if fully set forth herein.
140.

A reputational injury—such as a stigmatizing public designation or status—

coupled with the “impairment of some additional interest” is a sufficient deprivation of liberty to
come within the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doe v.
Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 998 (2d
Cir. 1994)).
141.

Mr. Yunus’s designation as a sex offender has caused him reputational injury.

142.

The registration requirements imposed by SORA and mandatory restrictions

attendant to the designation as a sex offender constitute the “impairment” of many additional
interests, such as Plaintiff’s right to be free from onerous registration requirements, to visit with
his family, to pursue a career, and to obtain an education.

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143.

By infringing on Mr. Yunus’s liberty interest without providing him any

opportunity to challenge that designation in an adversarial proceeding, the State of New York
and DOCCS have violated Mr. Yunus’s rights to Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
144.

Although Mr. Yunus’s term of parole ends next year, his liberty deprivation will

extend far longer because, even as a Level-One offender, he will be required to register as a sex
offender and comply with various reporting requirements for an additional twenty years. N.Y.
Correct. Law § 168-h.
145.

By virtue of the forgoing, Defendants are liable for having substantially and

proximately caused the foregoing violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and his resultant
injuries.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of Substantive Due Process: 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(Defendants Cuomo and Annucci)
146.

Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs above as

if fully set forth herein.
147.

A state statutory requirement violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment if it bears no rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.
148.

The legislative purpose of SORA is “to protect the public from sex offenders.”

People v. Mingo, 12 N.Y.3d 563, 574 (2009).
149.

There has been a judicial finding by the state judge who oversaw Plaintiff’s

criminal case that there is “no likelihood that [Mr. Yunus] will commit a sex crime ever.”

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150.

Registering Mr. Yunus as a sex offender violates his rights to substantive due

process, as his registration bears no rational relationship to SORA’s legislative purpose of
protecting the public from those who have committed sexually-based offenses.
151.

By virtue of the forgoing, Defendants are liable for having substantially and

proximately caused the foregoing violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and his resultant
injuries.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of Due Process—Vagueness: 42 U.S.C.§ 1983)
(All Defendants)
152.

Plaintiffs restates and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs above

as if fully set forth herein.
153.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from

enforcing parole conditions that are unconstitutionally vague. A parole condition is
unconstitutionally vague if “a person of common knowledge must guess at its meaning.”
LoFranco v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 986 F. Supp. 796, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 175 F.3d 1008
(2d Cir. 1999).
154.

Mr. Yunus is subject to both mandatory and discretionary conditions of parole

that are unconstitutionally vague.
155.

Mr. Yunus’s mandatory parole condition that he not enter within 1,000 feet from

any school zone is unconstitutionally vague. Neither DOCCS nor the State of New York
provides adequate guidance as to from what point 1,000 feet is to be measured or provides
parolees with a list of “school grounds” throughout New York City or maps designating relevant
exclusion zones.

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156.

Mr. Yunus’s discretionary parole condition that he cannot be within 300 yards of

any place where “children congregate” is unconstitutionally vague. Neither DOCCS nor the
State of New York provides any guidance as to from what point 300 yards is to be measured or
provides parolees with a list of establishments where “children congregate” throughout New
York City or maps designating relevant exclusion zones. A person of common intelligence is
forced to guess as to what it means to be a place where “children congregate.”
157.

Mr. Yunus’s discretionary parole condition that he inform his parole officer when

he “establish[es] a relationship with a consenting adult,” and then disclose his sex offender status
to that person is unconstitutionally vague because a reasonable person of common intelligence
would have to guess at what point a person “establishes a relationship” with another person.
158.

By virtue of the forgoing, Defendants are liable for having substantially and

proximately caused the foregoing violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and his resultant
injuries.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of the First Amendment: 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(All Defendants)
159.

Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs above as

if fully set forth herein.
160.

Categorical bans on accessing social media use that are not narrowly tailored

violate the First Amendment. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
161.

Mr. Yunus’s mandatory parole condition that he not access “any commercial

social networking website” violates the First Amendment.
162.

Mr. Yunus’s discretionary parole conditions that he not be allowed to use a cell

phone or computer except for limited academic purposes and legal work violate the First

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Amendment, as a cell phone and computer are the only means by which Mr. Yunus can access
social media.
163.

By virtue of the forgoing, Defendants are liable for having substantially and

proximately caused the foregoing violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and his resultant
injuries.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of Due Process-Interference with Familial Relations: 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(Defendants Lewis-Robinson, Young, and Jones)
164.

Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs above as

if fully set forth herein.
165.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from

interfering with private family relationships. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499
(1977).
166.

By refusing to allow him to visit with his minor family members, including his

nieces and cousins, Defendant Lewis-Robinson has violated Mr. Yunus’s right to come together
with members of his family.
167.

By refusing lift this constitutional infringement despite Mr. Yunus’s complaints,

Defendants Young and Jones have also interfered with Mr. Yunus’s rights to come together with
members of his family.
168. Defendants’ conduct was willful, intentional, and in reckless disregard of the
Plaintiff’s civil rights.

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169.

By virtue of the forgoing, Defendants are liable for having substantially and

proximately caused the foregoing violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and his resultant
injuries.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Violation of Due Process—imposition of arbitrary conditions: 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(Defendants Lewis-Robinson, Young, Jones, Vazquez, Smith and
Grannum)
170.

Plaintiff restates and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs above as

if fully set forth herein.
171.

A state condition of parole violates a parolee’s right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment if it is “[not] reasonably related to a parolee’s past conduct[,] . . . [is]
arbitrary and capricious, and . . . [not] designed to deter recidivism and prevent future offenses.”
Robinson v. New York, No. 109 CV 0455, 2010 WL 11507493, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010);
see also Singleton v. Doe, 210 F. Supp. 3d 359, 372–73 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
172.

By refusing to consider alternative proposed residences in good faith, Defendants

have effectively created a condition of parole that Mr. Yunus must live at a DOCCS-designated
homeless shelter. This condition of parole is arbitrary, does not deter recidivism, and bears no
relation to Mr. Yunus’s prior conduct.
173.

The following restrictions all violate Mr. Yunus’s right to due process because

they are arbitrary and unrelated to Mr. Yunus’s crime of kidnapping-for-ransom or his charged
conduct when carrying out the crime. They also do not deter recidivism as he has never been
charged with a crime related to these conditions.
i.

Plaintiff’s limited access to a cell phone, Ex. C ¶ 35;

ii.

Plaintiff’s limited access to a computer, Ex. C ¶ 39;

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iii.

Plaintiff’s having to disclose to persons with whom he enters a “relationship” that
he is a sex offender and his having to disclose all “relationships” to his parole
officer, Ex. C ¶ 24;

iv.

Plaintiff’s inability to drive or ride in a motor vehicle in any capacity, Ex. C
¶¶ 31-32;

v.

Plaintiff’s inability to possess photographic or recording equipment, Ex. C ¶ 22’

vi.

Plaintiff’s inability to purchase sexually explicit magazines or tapes, Ex. C ¶ 14;

vii.

Plaintiff’s inability to own a pet, Ex. C ¶ 19;

viii.

Plaintiff’s inability to have a Post Office box, Ex. C ¶ 37.

174. Defendants’ conduct was willful, intentional, and in reckless disregard of the
Plaintiff’s civil rights.
175.

By virtue of the forgoing, Defendants are liable for having substantially and

proximately caused the foregoing violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and his resultant
injuries.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment against Defendants as follows:
(a)

Mandatory injunctive relief enjoining Defendants to:
i. relieve Plaintiff of his sex offender designation;
ii. remove Plaintiff’s vague residency restrictions and allow him to move in
with his fiancée at 2068 Daily Avenue, Bronx, New York 10460;
iii. relieve Plaintiff of restrictions on his cell phone and computer use;
iv. allow Plaintiff to visit and be in contact with minor family members;

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v. relieve Plaintiff of his obligation to inform any person with whom he
enters into a “relationship” of his status as a sex offender;
vi. relieve Plaintiff of or tailor his ban on driving or riding in a private
vehicle;
vii. remove Plaintiff’s restriction on owning photographic or video recording
equipment;
viii. remove Plaintiff’s restriction on owning pets;
ix. remove Plaintiff’s restriction on having a Post Office Box;
x. remove Plaintiff’s restriction on purchasing sexually explicit magazines or
tapes;
xi. remove Plaintiff’s restrictions on accessing social media.
(b)

Awarding such damages to Plaintiff as will fully compensate him for the
deprivations of his constitutional rights, as well as for the humiliation,
embarrassment, emotional distress, and lost employment opportunities suffered
due to Defendants’ discriminatory conduct;

(c)

Awarding punitive damages to Plaintiff;

(d)

Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in
prosecuting this action; and

(e)

Granting Plaintiff such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

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Dated: March 26, 2018
New York, New York

EMERY CELLI BRINCKERHOFF
& ABADY LLP
By: _________/s/__________________
Andrew G. Celli
David Berman
600 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10020
(212) 763-5000
Attorneys for Plaintiff Equan Yunus

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