STATE 0F INDIANA IN ) ) THE MARION SUPERIORCOURT FILED ss: COUNTY 0F MARION) CAUSE CITIZENS ACTION COALITION OF INDIANA and No: 49001—1706-PL—025778 September 24, 2018 CLERK OF THE COURT MARION COUNTY RB ) ) JENNIFER WASHBURN. ) > Plaintiffs, Hon. Heather A. Welch, Judge ) ) v. ) OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR § 0F THE STATE 0F INDIANA, ) ) Defendants. - ) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Comes now this matter before the Court on Indiana ("CAC") and Jennifer Citizens Action Coalition of Plaintiffs’, Washburn ("Washburn"), Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant, Office of the Governor of the State of Indiana ("Governor"). Plaintiffs filed their filed its Response in Motion for Opposition to (“Response”) on July 20, 2018. Defendant asked is this Court also treating Defendant’s Plaintiffs submitted a Reply on August 8, 2018. A In Summary Judgment on May Plaintiffs’ Motion for the request for to grant relief Summary Judgment section of summary judgment in its Response as a cross-motion in Support of their hearing on this matter Motion for was 21, 2018. Defendant for its Response, favor; therefore, the Court Summary Judgment. Summary Judgment held on August 22, 2018. ("Reply") During the hearing, counsel for the Plaintiffs and Defendant agreed that the issues before this Court are questions of law for the Court. Having been fully briefed on the matter, the Court finds On December follows: UNDISPUTED FACTS I. 1. now as 27, 2016, Plaintiff JenniferWashburn presented a written request to the General Counsel and Assistant General Counsel of the Governor’s Office pursuant to the Indiana Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”), Indiana et seq. ONashburn a. Aff., Documents reflecting communications (including meeting minutes or documents reflecting meetings) between the Office of the Indiana Governor Michael Pence and its employees or agents, and Donald J. Trump for President (or any of its employees or agents), Donald J. Trump, The Trump Organization and related entities and persons, from November 14, 2016, through and including November 29, 2016, which are related to (1) any way, Carrier, UTC Climate, Controls & Security, Gregory Hayes, and/or United Technology, or any of their related agents or employees; Documents reflecting communications between the (2) Governor’s Office and any other Indiana governmental entity or employee referencing or relating to Trump or Carrier during the same c. (3) in time period; Documents reflecting 2. between the Documents to or reference the Trump communications with any Third Party not referenced above which references both Trump and Carrier (4) reflecting during the same Generally, Washburn's listed parties news media. (Washburn 3. between communications Governor’s Office and Carrier which relate during the same time period; and d. 5-14-3-1, 4, Ex. A). 11 or reference b. Code and Aff. On January 3, 1] time period. APRA Carrier, request was based on the negotiations which were widely publicized in the national 10). 2017, the Communications Director for the Office of Governor Mike Pence responded to the APRA request, offering to “try to produce records as quickly and completely as possible." (Washburn Aff. 11 5, Ex. B). all On 4. fifty first or around January 9, 2017, Eric governor ofthe state of Indiana. (Ex. Holcomb was sworn 1, Aff. of into office as the Joseph R. Heerens (“Heerens Aff.”), 1] 6). During the early months ofthe Holcomb administration, the current 5. Governor‘s Office had more than fifty APRA requests pending related to former Governor Michael Pence’s private and other email accounts. (Heerens The Governor’s 6. for Office has a staff of four attorneys, a myriad of Iegal functions for the requests (x) As of July Aff., 1m On pending APRA February request. Sagamore & Distinguished (e.g., 6, Beesley ("Beesley Aff."), 11 6). 2017, Washburn requested a status update on the (Washburn Aff. 1] 6, Ex. C). replied on February 8, 2017, stating that she would “research the status" of the request and reply “[w]e are currently transitioning administrations. Part ofthat‘process includes reviewing records requests. We will you as soon as reasonably possible.” (Washburn Afi. 10. the APRA Aff. 11 8, is On April 3, 1] 7, in the process of pending public research the status of your requestIs] and be in touch with Ex. D). 2017, Washburn repeated her request for a status update on request, which by that time had Ex. E). APRA 2018, the Governor’s Office employs thirty-eight people on a The Deputy General Counsel 9. 8). 3, 4). fuII-time basis. (Ex. 1, Aff. of Brian K. 8. fl are responsible reviewing and responding to managing the office's awards program Hoosier Awards). (Heerens 7. office... who Aff, been pending for three months. (Washburn On 11. demanding Public that April 13, 2017, the Governor responded Washburn provide “clarification” of to Washburn by her request, noting that the Indiana Access Counselor (“PAC”) had published numerous advisory opinions on the subject of the degree of “reasonable particularity" required under ‘fl 9, APRA. (Washburn Aff. Ex. F) On June 12. 1, 2017, Washburn filed a complaint with the Governor’s denial of disclosure based on the lengthy delay its letter, belated demand for additional ”reasonable The PAC responded 13. in PAC producing documents and (Washburn particularity." over the Aff. 11, Ex. G). 1] with a formal inquiry response, rather than an advisory opinion, on June 16, 2017, stating that the matterwas not “ripe for the adversarial process” because additional particularity. similar” to (Washburn Specifically, the 14. Washbum PAC Aff. 11 did not In addition, stated that the the PAC (Washburn sufficient particularity." 15. Washburn declined to CAC’s requests were work with you Aff. 1] 12, amend believed that it its specificity satisfied the and limited PAC had “disagree[d] that the request the in “substantially held was was denied, but narrowing your request APRA request, not to because she particularity,” but rather temporal scope, she in good faith reasonably reasonable particularity requirement. (WashburnAff. Plaintiffs filed this action not Ex. H). disagrees with the PAC’s general definition of “reasonable because, given Governor's request for 12, Ex. H). rather the Governor’s Office has offered to 16. to the another request by the Associated Press, which the reasonably particular. meet acquiesce on June 29, 2017. 1] 13) STANDARDS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT II. Summary judgment the parties shows moving party is appropriate where the evidentiary matter designated by is that there entitled t0 a no genuine issue as is judgment as a matter of purpose of summary judgment factual dispute v. to is any material law. Ind. Trial to terminate litigation fact and that the Rule 56(0). “The about which there can be no and which may be determined as a matter of law." Sheehan Constr. Co. Continental Cas. Co., 938 N.E.2d 685, 689 ([nd. 2010). “lfthe facts are undisputed, [the Court should] determine the law applicable to the undisputed facts. Lim . v. White. 661 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). The Indiana Supreme Court has noted seeking summary judgment in Indiana, and‘such party opponent's claim before a court v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, summary judgment, may 1003-04 the court that there exists a “high bar” for a party may affirmatively negate an grant them judgment as a matter of law. Hughley (Ind. grant summary judgment for any APRA other party upon summaryjudgment filed by permits individuals to "inspect and copy the public records of any public Code. § 5-14-3-3(a)(1). The public agency and must provide the requested documents may all persons are entitled to full not “within a received by the agency." Ind. Code. § 5-14-3-3(b). "that is DISCUSSION agency" provided that the requestor identifies the records "with reasonable is for party." T.R. 56(8). III. Ind. moved 2014). Finally, “[w]hen any party has the issues raised by the motion although no motion for such must deny or particularity." interfere with a request reasonable time after the request The public policy behind and complete information regarding the APRA is affairs of government and the official acts of Code § employees." Ind. aspect ofthe APRA 5—14-3-1. request, those who represent them as public To the extent APRA that a public and officials agency objects to any places “the burden of proof for the nondisclosure of a public record on the public agency that would deny access to the record and not 0n the person seeking to inspect and copy the record. The Public Id. Access Counselor (PAC) oversees public access disputes and has the authority to respond to informal inquiries and “issue advisory opinions to interpret the public access laws upon the request of a person 0r a public agency.” Ind. 14-440(56). ln APRA matters of undefined matter is (Ind. Ct. APRA statute not binding on this Court. A. PAC’s interpretation given “considerable deference." Anderson Comm’rs, 983 N.E.2d 613, 618 interpretation of the interpretation, the App. 2013). That v. Code § on an Huntington Cty. Bd. of said, decisions involving are reviewed de novo, and any ruling by the Id. (citing Ind. Code § 5- an PAC is 5-14-3-9(f)). Whether Washburn’s requests are moot In its Response and designated evidence, Defendant Plaintiffs’ actions are response to moot on the basis that it raises the point that has already tendered the documents in Washburn’s request. Answering whether Washburn’s request has been satisfied to render Plaintiffs' complaint moot relies on thé Court being able to examine the requests and tendered documents to determine whether any further action taken by harms alleged by Plaintiffs. summary judgment, so of documents renders this Court can address the The documents provided have not been designated for the Court cannot say as a matter of law that Defendant's tender this proceedings moot. Furthermore, Defendant’s argument rests of documents disclosed a modified request made by filed. is to The present Summary Judgment motion concerns Washburn’s December 2016 request, which R. Evid. 408, the Court response as part of settlement proceedings which took Plaintiffs place after this case had been in Plaintiffs have not Pursuant to altered. Ind. not permitted to consider actions taken as part of settlement matter. Thus, this Court negotiations to determine the validity of the claims in this hereby strikes the portions of the Defendant’s which discuss settlement and brief Defendant’s Exhibit 3 which discusses settlement. Based on the designated evidence on this matter that the Court Defendants have not produced any documents related request. Defendants have not submitted any DENIES consider, Washburn’s December 2016 documents subject the Court cannot find that as a matter of law that Therefore, the Court hereby to may Plaintiffs’ to the early request, so requests are moot. the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of mootness. B. Whether Washburn’s requests were “reasonably to ' APRA Washburn’s December “documents related issue of the to APRA request consisted of four separate categories of communications” between announced closure communications” could have at the As has been noted by other meanings, it is groups with regard to the “documents related this Court‘s to understanding based August 22 hearing that such a request included email exchanges between the parties APRA. different of the Carrier plaint. While different on what the parties discussed defined within particular” pursuant listed. courts, “reasonable particularity" At least one court has noted that a request will is not specifically be considered to have been made with reasonable party to identify what is “if particularity sought and enables the the request enables the trial court to determine whether there has been sufficient compliance with the request.” Jent N.E.2d 30, 33 The statute ([nd‘ Ct. App. 2012) (citing In re does not define “reasonable subpoenaed Fon‘ v. Police Dep’t, 973 Wayne WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d Jent at 33. particularity." In ’I, 6 (Ind. 1998)), the most recent appellate court decision examining the issue, the Court of Appeals looked to Indiana Code § 5-14-3-1, which states and place the burden this policy public “[t]his agency that chapter shall be of prooffor the nondisclosure of a public record would deny access to the record inspect and copy the record.” Anderson 613, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting expound on the meaning Without a clear v. .C. to and not on the person seeking PAC have generally relied The Anderson Court § 5-14-3-1). of “reasonable particularity." definition, the has built pools of emails, the PAC PAC Specifically, with regard t0 emails, the has advised that requests up 2). Furthermore, elements are largely context elements my fluctuate “Also inherent in in this APRA: a specific sender, to four specific See PAC PAC Informal Inquiry, the specific, in that the generality or on a case-by-case basis.” Id. The the reasonable particularity discussion 3). For large sender and Informal Inquiry noted that “These accuracy of those PAC is PAC for finding email Informal Inquiry, 14-INF-30, receiver conversations would remain reasonably particular. 17-INF-17, did not on the interpretations of the Court of on the presence of four elements date frame, and subject. (See to Id. requests to be “reasonably particular” within the meaning of recipient, on the Huntington Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 983 N.E.2d Appeals and teased out additional meaning. appears construed to implement liberally also recognized that a standard of practicality. If first or last names are used as key words for search parameter, whether those names are unique or It is often helpful for that superfluous. Plaintiff particularity” an agency if if it would depend on there are several individuals captured a requester gives a finite unwanted emails are not produced.” in a search. subject matter for context so Id. argues that Washburn's requests comply with the “reasonably standard as interpreted by the Court of Appeals and PAC. Plaintiff’s request seeks 15 days of communications between the Governor and parties including the Trump Organization and United Technology regarding Carrier. Given the level of attention received on that issue, negotiations involving Plaintiffs argue that the Defendant could not have misunderstood what they are seeking. Per the PAC’s four factor email test, the specific are the Trump sender Organization, Carrier, is the Office of the Governor, the specific recipients UTC and/or United Technologies, the timeline November 29, 2016, and the subject Washburn's request, the recipient is 2016, and the subject is Trump. is is & Security, is paragraph three of the Office ofthe Governor, the specific from November 14, 2016 through to November 29, (Ex. A, Washburn Aff., Ex B.). Defendant's response highlights that the parties identified by sufficiently specific to satisfy the not list reasonably specific standard. specific individuals, but includes Carrier, “related Party.” Indiana employs persons and Gregory Hayes, from November 14, 2016 through to Carrier. Additionally, for sender specific Carrier, the timeline is Climate, Controls Plaintiffs Plaintiffs' are not request does “employees and agents” of the Governor and entities” of the Trump O'rganizations, and "any Third has approximately 28,000 state employees, and the governor’s thirty-eight individuals. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ office request failed to identify specific senders and recipients for email specifically and thus is not “reasonably particular." Based on the review by the PAC, the first and particularity" standard. of the Court of third Appeals opinions and subsequent decisions paragraphs Washburn’s requests meet the “reasonable The requests generally identify the information sought and do include a sender, recipient, subject matter, and temporal limitation. Specifically, the Court finds that communications between the Office of the Governor Mike Pence and Carrier, UTC Climate, Controls & Security, Gregory Hayes, and/or United Technologies regarding Carrier as well as communications between the Office of the Governor to Carrier regarding President November 29, Trump during for the 2016 are reasonable weeks specific to satisfy of requirement in all cases, especially address identify in all when to 2016- specific email recipients, the Court believes that should not agency should know exactly where specific email 14, APRA. While the Court understands that Washburn did not addresses of senders and November the subject matter is be a so narrow that the public search for the requested records. Requiring a cases would cut against the public policy of APRA. Public agencies inherently are comprised of several individuals that execute the functions of the agency. These employers may move around administration frequently. on the agency public to to If likely to of be reassigned not believe show why a request should need a working knowledge employees most request. The Court does or not be an agency’s within an APRA, which places filled, staff requires members and be ablé be involved with the task or project which the burden is of the to identify the four subject to the the request concerns a specific subject matter within a sufficiently limited period of time, the public agency should be able to identify the emails from any of the agency’s employees which would be subject to a request. This is particularly true with electronically stored information. In this instance, the Organization, Carrier, members thirty-eight email accounts, staffing levels for the fifteen days that agency would be asked if to provide emails sent to the of United Technologies from the July 2018 employee figure one Trump of approximately representative of typical is Governor. Defendant would need only review emails sent between relate to Carrier. While the emails could have gone t0 unknown persons within the Trump Organization, Carrier, or United Technologies, the starting pool concerns emails sent from the Governor. However, Washburn’s other requests concerns regarding “reasonable and any Indiana Governmental requests as Washburn in particularity”. entity, paragraphs 2 and 4 do present valid Communications between the Governor employee, 0r Third Party are far did not identify a specific recipient entity 0f the more general communication. This type of request vastly expands the potential pool of emails beyond the actors that were_ involved with the Carrier situation. reasonably particular parameters When requests 1 to and 3 comply Plaintiffs’ Plaintiffs' govern its its burden to request Motion for Motion for more search. considering the specific facts of this case, this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ with the “reasonable particularity” standard but that Plaintiffs’ requests 2 and 4 do not comply with the Defendant has met this standard. Thus, this Court hereby Summary Judgment as Summary Judgment as to to requests 1 requests 2 and GRANTS and 3 and DENIES the 4. This Court further DENIES the Defendant's Cross-Motion for GRANTS In Summary Judgment on the Defendant’s Cross-Motion for requests Summary Judgment on 1 and 3 and requests 2 and 4. Jent and Anderson, the Court of Appeals “likened the reasonable particularity requirement to the discovery rules. Jent 973 N.E.2d ét 33; and Anderson, 983 N.E.2d at 617. Having identified the portions of Washburn’s request that meet the reasonably particular standard, the Court responsive to requests through counsel, to 1 and facilitate particularity deficiencies in Orders Defendant to identifying and tum over records 3. The Court encourages both parties to the transfer of documents as well as address the paragraphs 2 and 4 of Washburn’s request. Whether Defendant effectively rejected Washburn’s C. work together APRA request through undue delay . APRA, Having found thatWashburn’s requests were, the Court will in part, also address whether Defendant effectively rejected Washburn’s request through an undue delay answering the requests. in Washburn submitted her request on December responded on January indicating that they did not reasonably particular under 3, 2017 acknowledging 27, 2016, receipt of the and Defendant APRA request and would send responsive documents as soon as possible. Defendant send another response until April 13, with a request on the status of her Under APRA, Public APRA entities 2017, days afterWashburn followed up request. “may not deny or interfere” with a person’s right to inspect and copy public records. LC. § 5-14—3-3(b). To “provide the requested copies” or “allow the person to “reasonablé time after the request is that end, a public entity make copies" within a received by the agency.” Id. must What constitutes a “reasonable time” is not defined by the statute. reasonable time period under one circumstance PAC may has opined that a reasonable amount of time to not be reasonable What is a another. in produce records must take The into consideration factors such as: o the nature of the requests (whether they are broad or narrow), how and whether the records must be reviewed and edited to delete nondisclosable material is necessary to determine whether the agency has produced records within a reasonable timeframe.” o PAC old the records are, Advisory Opinion, 10-FC-1 60, 2 (August 9, 201 0). Additionally, the production of responsive records need not materially interfere with the regular discharge of the functions and duties of the public agency. 1, PAC Advisory Opinion, 17-FC-277, 3-4 (Feb. 2018). Plaintiffs Plaintiffs have argue that Washburn’s 3.5-month wait cited -to numerous PAC opinions weeks have been found to constitute undue is an instance of undue delay. that found that delays of only a matter of delay. In township trustee two months and eleven days to respond to a request for receipts and expenditures, financial disclosure reports from January In 14-FC-93, documents N,'" The PAC found 1, undue financial (August Square delay. Finally, Plaintiffs direct the Court to the concerning the Indianapolis Star's 9, 2010). PAC in “for Goshen, opinion APRA request for correspondence from then- Governor Pence's private email account, where Tony Cook, reporter Star,- 1 a township response time of approximately forty—four days pertaining to a ‘wetland permit issued for the Keystone constituted “all and appropriation records, budgets, and 2005, to the present.”10—FC-160, that a PAC gave a 2010 opinion; the for the Indianapolis waited nine weeks for a response with no status updates or piecemeal preproduction of documents. 16-FC-320 (Feb. 1, the Indianapolis Star on the timelines issue, the 2017). While the PAC PAC ruled against noted that a “nine—week deiay with no status updates and no piecemeal production of documents would normally run contrary to any reasonable interpretation of timeliness.“ According to exceeded what the Washburn argues Plaintiffs, PAC 3.5 36-month response time has found to be acceptable in responding to her response, Defendant argues that the month wait period not to be undue delay. the opinion concerning Mr. Cook's APRA PAC Washburn’s request far was narrowly tailored as to request. has found timelines Iongerthan the First, in request, the was to other cases. Furthermore, APRA PAC public agency, finding that the nine-week delay rationale, the in that the subject matter of her complaint not justify extraordinary delay In the at 3. Id. PAC Advisory Opinion 16—FC-320, PAC actually ruled in favor of the not an undue delay. Explaining its stated: [l]n its first few weeks, the Holcomb administration has been concerned with the business of establishing itself as head of the executive branch while also preparing for the 2017 legislative session. Given those responsibilities coupled with the task of being the custodian of a prior administration’s public records, a subsequent delay in the production was inevitable. Id. at 3. Pence to Since Washburn’s request similarly occurred during the transition‘from the to Holcomb Washbum is administrations, Defendant argues that that the delay reasonable and likely inevitable as a result 0f the the transition period. Defendant also notes that the seventeen weeks to PAC has be reasonable given the context of the Advisory Opinion, 17-FC-124. Finally, in in responding efforts of staff during found delays up to APRA request. See PAC the PAC's inquiry response to Washburn on her request, the administration, delay." (Ex. A, PAC has advised that "the 2016 election cycle, the change and the legislative Washburn session inevitably (and justifiably) in contributed to the Aft, Ex. H). PAC Before addressing the arguments, the Court wishes to further add one more opinion thatthe Court believes to be relevant to this Motion. In PAC Advisory Opinion 17- FC-13, a predecessor opinion to the 17—FC-124 opinion which found a seventéen delay to be reasonable. (Pg. had filed staff an APRA members Office ofthe request 1, n. July in at the Office of 1). In 2016 PAC Advisory Opinion 17-FC-13, a requester for three years’ the Governor. PAC worth of all emails from a Advisory Opinion 17-FC-13 at Governor never responded, prompting a formal complaint on January 23, 2017. The Id. at 1. week Analyzing the request, the PAC filed list 2. with the of The PAC noted: current form, indeed lacks reasonable a request lacks reasonable particularity, the public agency is not required to conduct a vast search of all its records to produce each document which may fall within the broadly defined terms of the requester. Rather, it may deny the initial request and require the requester to craft a more specific request in which the documents sought are request, particularity. in its When happen and it appears as if Governor’s accepted the Complainant’s Office the Former request in its initial form readily identifiable. This did not Id. While recognizing that cenain exogenous circumstances such as the 2016 Election can justify a delay least provide a at 2-3. in responding, the reSponse that Because the PAC noted that the agency invites the requester to limit the Office ofthe Governor failed to provide was still obligated to at scope of the request. a response, the PAC determined that the requester could have reasonably inferred that the request was Id. denied and that the Office ofthe Governor had “acted contrary to the Access to Public Records Act by In this case, the Plaintiffs waited 3.5 months for what clarification or Defendant, is issue a written denial ofthe Complainant’s failing to update on the status of Plaintiffs had to their request. initial amounted To even request.” Id. t0 a request for get a response from continuously prompt Defendant for updates. While the Court sympathetic to the duties involved with the transition period and the legislative period, the 3.5-month period without any response or status update appears to be contrary to the purposes of APRA. case and the Upon prior decisions reviewing the arguments presented by counsel ofthe Defendant acted with undue delay PAC in provide updates on the status ofthe in this tendered for guidance, the Court finds that the response to Washburn’s request by request under Plaintiffs' APRA failing to but not for failing to produce the documents requested under APRA. Therefore, the Court hereby in part the Plaintiffs’ Motion for relates to status updates but Summary Judgment on hereby GRANTS in the issue of GRANTS undue delay as it part the Defendant's Cross-Motion for ~ Summary Judgment as it relates to production of motions. Popovich are accorded broad discretion v. document for requests 1 through 4_. ORDER IV. Trial courts all in reviewing discovery enforcement Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 7 N.E.3d 406, 412 (1nd. T.C. 2014). Thus, rather than impose monetary sanctions such as attorneys’ fees or direct Defendant to answer as written, the The Court orders disclosure within Court of the 30 days ofthis Court’s order as Production within 30 days and it.is it is will treat this as it would a discovery dispute. documents responsive to requests 1 and 3 a routine practice to respond to Requests for also routine in cases with large amounts of documents within that this time could one month from the date be enlarged upon request. This Court also orders that ofthis Order, the parties, through counsel, are to meet- and-confer and identify which parties Washburn’s particular. APRA The to Plaintiffs may have the relevant information germane to request 2 and 4 and narrow such requests so they are reasonably parties will also develop a schedule be disclosed for the public records to which would be reasonabie. The Court hereby Summary Judgment, the GRANTS Coun Defendant’s Cross-Motion for in part and DENIES also hereby GRANTS in in Summary Judgment and part Plaintiffs’ Motion for part and DENIES enters the relief in part as described above. The Court declines to assess costs and fees related to his action. So, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED this 24th day of September 2018. September 24, 2018 Hon. Heather A. Welch Marion Superior Court No. Date Distribution: William R. Groth Bowman FILLENWARTH DENNERLINE GROTH & TOWE, LLP Daniel P. 429 E. Vermont Indianapolis, IN Street, Suite 200 46202 Phone: (317) 353-9863 Fax: (317) 351-7232 E-mail: E-mail: wqroth@qutlabor1aw.com dbowman@qutlaborlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs 1 J. Lee McNeely, Attorney N0. 9542-73 MCNEELY STEPHENSON 2150 Intelliplex Drive, Suite ”100 Shelbyville, IN 46176 Phone: 317.825.51 10 Fax: 317.825.5109 J.L.McNeelv@msth.com Attorney for the Office of the Governor of the State of Indiana