Cathy L. Lanier
Senior Vice President of Security
National Football League
Evolving Threats to the Homeland
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
September 13, 2018
Chairman Johnson, Senator McCaskill, and Members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on emerging and evolving threats to homeland security. As the
Committee requested, I will focus my testimony today on the significant and rising threat posed
by the malicious use of unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, to large gatherings of people,
including major sporting events.
As you may know, I joined the National Football League in September 2016 after more
than 26 years in local law enforcement in the District of Columbia. At the NFL, I oversee the
security policies and procedures that protect the nearly 2,000 professional players, the hundreds
of coaches and other staff associated with our 32 clubs, and the 17 million fans who attend our
games each year. Club security officials and I work closely with local law enforcement officials,
federal authorities, stadium owners, and many others to provide a safe and secure environment
for our fans to enjoy the games. In addition, I serve on the Homeland Security Advisory
Council, participate in the Department of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council Working Groups, and have a leading role related to security efforts and
recommendations for large-scale sporting events.
In the two years that I have been at the NFL, we have observed a dramatic increase in the
number of threats, incidents, and incursions by drones. Fewer than ten miles from here, a drone
flew over FedEx Field during pregame activities for Monday Night Football in 2014. That
operation violated the national security airspace around Washington, D.C., in addition to
violating the airspace restriction over NFL games. In 2018, the NFL recorded about a dozen
intrusions by drones at stadiums during games. And the NFL is not alone. In May 2017, a drone
flew through Petco Park in San Diego and then crashed during the seventh inning of a game
between the San Diego Padres and Arizona Diamondbacks.
An incident involving two NFL stadiums on November 26, 2017, dramatically
demonstrates the threat. On that day, I received a call from the stadium security director at
Levi’s Stadium, alerting me that a drone had just dropped leaflets over the seating bowl near one

 2
of the end zones. The NFL’s game day operations center alerted other stadiums, including the
nearby Oakland Raiders, which also had a game the same day. When the operator sought to fly
the drone over the Oakland Coliseum, local law enforcement was ready for him. They quickly
identified the operator and arrested him. The subsequent investigation revealed that the operator
had undertaken extensive efforts and planning in advance of the incident. The operator had
customized the drone for dropping leaflets, and he had conducted test flights to refine the drone’s
operations.
We are all very fortunate that the drone over Levi’s Stadium dropped only leaflets.
Drones today are capable of inflicting much greater damage. In 2015, the Federal Aviation
Administration and Connecticut police investigated a drone equipped with a handgun. In 2017,
ISIS reportedly used drones armed with grenades against Iraqi armed forces. Last year, Mexican
authorities seized a drone equipped with a significant amount of explosives and a remote
detonator.
As the Committee knows, various threat assessments conducted by the U.S. government
and others have recognized that large gatherings of people are enticing targets for malicious
actors. Consistent with those assessments, the Federal Aviation Administration and Congress
have imposed restrictions on the airspace above large sporting events.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal Aviation
Administration established flight restrictions over stadiums and other large gatherings. Congress
subsequently strengthened and codified these requirements. The current version of the
temporary flight restriction prohibits all aircraft operations over certain sporting events from one
hour before until one hour after the event, from ground level to 3,000 feet, and within a radius of
three nautical miles. In addition to NFL games, this flight restriction applies to Major League
Baseball games, NCAA Division One football games, and NASCAR Sprint Cup, Indy Car, and
Champ Series races. The flight restrictions designate the airspace as National Defense Airspace,
and any operator who knowingly or willfully violates the flight restriction may be subject to
criminal penalties.
The temporary flight restrictions above stadiums and other sporting events apply broadly
to all aircraft operations, including both general aviation and commercial aircraft, and flights
under both visual flight rules and instrument flight rules. Importantly, the flight restrictions
apply to all aircraft, whether manned or unmanned. The Federal Aviation Administration has
worked extensively to educate the aviation community about the flight restrictions. Air traffic
control personnel and licensed pilots have worked cooperatively to respect this protected
airspace. As a result, the temporary flight restrictions over sports events have largely worked as
intended, keeping commercial and civil aircraft away from stadiums during games.
Drones present an entirely different challenge. Unlike traditional aircraft, unregulated
drones can be acquired easily and cheaply by anyone, anywhere, anytime. Highly sophisticated
drones are widely available at retail stores and online. Drones are sold to the general population
for use by unlicensed individuals, often with no awareness of airspace rules, flight restrictions, or
many other regulatory requirements related to aircraft. Drones are sold broadly without regard to
applicable flight restrictions. For example, although drone flights are prohibited throughout
Washington, D.C., numerous electronics stores and other retailers market drones in the city

 3
without notifying customers that a local flight would break the law. Unlike licensed pilots who
must undergo specific training and are required to check for flight restrictions before each flight,
many drone operators are untrained and simply unaware of the flight restrictions that apply to
stadiums.
In our experience, the vast majority of game-day drone incursions are caused by
hobbyists seeking to obtain a unique picture or video, perhaps to post on social media. Some of
these operators know that their actions are unlawful, but others do not. Even if the operator is
not set on causing harm, drone operations at stadiums present significant risks. For example, the
Federal Aviation Administration generally prohibits drone operations over people because a
wayward or malfunctioning drone can cause serious bodily injury if it crashes into a crowd.
Drones can also cause confusion for fans who do not know whether a drone is a threat or part of
the program. Ironically, after the incident at the 49ers game last November, some fans reported
that they thought the drone was dropping free merchandise and they rushed toward it.
Stopping unauthorized drone flights at stadiums is currently extremely challenging.
Drones are small and easily portable. Unlike manned aircraft, drones can be launched quickly
and in close proximity to a stadium, such as from a stadium parking lot. The Federal Aviation
Administration established the three-mile radius of the stadium flight restriction to allow
authorities to have some warning about an aircraft that was purposefully violating the airspace,
hopefully before the aircraft was in a position to threaten the stadium and fans.
Several stadium security directors have told me that they are regularly approached by
vendors selling drone countermeasure equipment. The vendors acknowledge, and the security
directors readily know, that using such devices is illegal. The current state of the law, however,
leaves security officials with an unenviable choice: Procure equipment whose use would be
illegal, or remain unequipped to respond to a security threat that could endanger tens of
thousands of people.
To help the clubs in this difficult environment, the NFL has developed and published best
practices and standards for responding to drone incidents. These best practices, which are
incorporated into our overall best practices for stadium security, include suggested procedures
for notifying local and federal authorities, strategies for locating the operator, and recommended
safety procedures if the device lands on the field or in the stands.
In addition, the NFL has increasingly engaged the Federal Aviation Administration and
other policymakers on the development of new policies, procedures, and approaches related to
reducing the threat posed by drones. We support the Federal Aviation Administration’s efforts
to adopt and implement a remote identification requirement for all, or nearly all, drones sold or
operated in the United States. Federal officials, air traffic control operators, and local law
enforcement officers need a simple and easy method to identify a drone and its operator when a
device is spotted in a dangerous location or in violation of an established flight restriction. Any
class of drones excluded from such a requirement must be very narrow and limited to drones that
do not present any possible security threat to a large gathering of people. In addition, for the
FAA to implement such a robust remote identification requirement, Congress must revise the
hobbyist exemption in section 336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.
Although this provision was undoubtedly well intentioned at the time it was adopted, it is too

 4
broad for today’s environment. The current hobbyist exemption permits far too many drones to
be flown by far too many unlicensed and untrained pilots. As I noted earlier, the vast majority of
the incursions at NFL stadiums are by such hobbyists.
Further, we support the aims of S. 2836, the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018,
which would extend drone interdicting authority to the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of Justice. The bill represents an important step forward in helping to provide
greater protections of our homeland.
Under the legislation, the Department of Homeland Security would be required to
conduct research, testing, training, and evaluation of counter-drone equipment. This will
promote and accelerate technologies that will help law enforcement identify, mitigate, and
interdict illicit or hostile drones that threaten security, including in environments that present
geographic challenges – such as densely populated, urban areas.
The bill also provides federal law enforcement officials at the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Justice the authority to take the necessary steps to mitigate and
counteract the threat posed by drones in certain circumstances. Such circumstances include when
a governor or state attorney general requests that federal law enforcement officials provide
support for state, local, or tribal law enforcement to ensure the security of mass gatherings. This
provision correctly recognizes that local law enforcement officers stand at the frontlines and are
primarily responsible for providing safety and security at locations where drones present risks,
including large amateur and professional sporting events, such as NFL games.
Importantly, however, this provision only permits local officials to request assistance
from federal officials, and experience has taught us that there simply are not enough federal
resources and personnel to provide security at all events that need protection, including the 256
NFL games that occur across the country in a season. For example, the Department of
Homeland Security reviews between 12,000 and 15,000 events annually for a Special Event
Assessment Rating (SEAR), and the Department has historically approved fewer than 20 events
annually for SEAR 1 or SEAR 2. Notably, the Super Bowl has been a SEAR 1 event.
In my experience in Washington after the September 11 terrorist attacks, I observed a
similar challenge – there simply were not enough federal resources to handle the significant
increase in antiterrorism initiatives and activities. After September 11, we were able to solve
that problem by expanding our use of joint terrorism task forces. The task forces permitted local
law enforcement officials to exercise authorities as if they were federal officials. We need a
similar approach to drone interdiction authorities.
The NFL, therefore, believes that expanding federal drone interdiction authority is an
important step, but it is insufficient to address the security needs of the NFL in protecting our
stadiums and fans from the threat posed by drones. The NFL strongly encourages Congress to
consider additional reforms that would provide authorities to local law enforcement officers,
with appropriate training and expertise, to detect and intercept drones that pose a known and
identifiable threat to an NFL game in violation of the flight restrictions that Congress and the
Federal Aviation Administration have established. Additional reforms could include the
following:

 5
▪

Permit the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security to delegate
drone countermeasure authorities to state and local law enforcement protecting a
large sporting event covered by a temporary flight restriction.

▪

Require the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security to consult
with state and local law enforcement, and incorporate state and local law
enforcement personnel into the implementation of drone countermeasure
programs.

▪

Establish a pilot program to include state and local law enforcement personnel in
the programs developed pursuant to the legislation.

The NFL looks forward to continuing to work with Congress, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and others on our shared goal of ensuring the safety and security of the players,
coaches, fans, and staff who attend our games. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today,
and I would be pleased to answer your questions.