UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. No. 15-cr-576 (KM) KEILA RAVELO, DEFENDANT SENTENCING MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT KEILA RAVELO GIBBONS P.C. One Gateway Center Newark, New Jersey 07102-5310 (973) 596-4500 Attorneys for Defendant Keila Ravelo On the memorandum: Lawrence S. Lustberg, Esq. John D. Haggerty, Esq. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ....................................................................................... 1 II. THE OFFENSE CONDUCT, CHARGES AND PLEA ................................................... 3 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 5 A. The Applicable Legal Standard ......................................................................................... 5 B. Step One ............................................................................................................................ 6 C. Step Two............................................................................................................................ 7 D. Step Three.......................................................................................................................... 8 1. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense ................................................................ 11 a. Ms. Ravelo’s Culpability Relative to Melvin Feliz and the Unwarranted Disparity That a Sentence in Excess of 48 Months Would Create ....................................................... 14 (1) Feliz Was the Architect and Prime Beneficiary of the Scheme and His Culpability Far Exceeds that of Ms. Ravelo ............................................................................ 15 (2) Sentencing Ms. Ravelo to a Term of Imprisonment In Excess of the 48 Months That Feliz and the Government Have Agreed Upon Would Create an Unwarranted Disparity .......................................................................................... 19 b. Ms. Ravelo’s Remorse ................................................................................................. 20 c. Ms. Ravelo’s Post-Offense Conduct ............................................................................ 23 2. The History and Characteristics of the Defendant .......................................................... 26 a. Personal Background .................................................................................................... 26 (1) Born to a Working-Class Family in the Dominican Republic With Dreams of an Education in the United States .............................................................................. 26 (2) History of Sexual Abuse and Low Self-Esteem ................................................... 27 b. A Dysfunctional, and Often Abusive, Relationship to Co-Defendant Melvin Feliz .... 28 (1) A Relationship Wrought with Problems from the Start ........................................ 28 (2) Physical and Emotional Abuse ............................................................................. 29 (3) Feliz’s Pattern of Deception, Culminating In the Revelation That He Had a Second Family Unbeknownst to Keila and Her Sons ........................................... 32 c. Ms. Ravelo’s Impressive Legal Career ........................................................................ 33 d. A Loving and Supportive Mother Who Has Made It Her Life’s Work to Support Her Sons .............................................................................................................................. 34 e. Ms. Ravelo’s Poor Health and Long-Term Prescription Drug Addiction Support the Sentence Sought ........................................................................................................... 38 3. Application of the § 3553(a)(2) Factors Also Warrants a Sentence of No More than 48 Months Imprisonment ..................................................................................................... 41 a. Deterrence .................................................................................................................... 42 b. Rehabilitation ............................................................................................................... 44 i TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page c. Just Punishment ............................................................................................................ 45 (1) Ms. Ravelo has already been punished severely for her crimes. .......................... 46 (2) The period during which Ms. Ravelo is incarcerated will also profoundly harm her family, and in particular, her sons................................................................... 49 4. A Sentence of No More than 48 Months’ Imprisonment Is Warranted to Avoid Unwarranted Sentence Disparities In Accordance with § 3553(a)(6) ............................. 50 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 53 ii APPENDIX OF LETTERS ..........................................1 ..........................................2 ..........................................3 ..........................................4 ..........................................5 ..........................................6 ..........................................7 ..........................................8 ..........................................9 ........................................10 ........................................11 ........................................12 ........................................13 ........................................14 ........................................15 ........................................16 ........................................17 ........................................18 ........................................19 ........................................20 iii I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Defendant Keila Ravelo stands before this Court for sentencing following her plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and one count of tax evasion. Pursuant to the written plea agreement entered into by the parties and provisionally accepted by the Court, Ms. Ravelo and the Government have agreed that the appropriate sentence to be imposed in this case is a stipulated term between 48 months and 72 months of incarceration. The Government has advocated for a 72 month term. For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Ravelo respectfully submits that a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment would be the only just outcome. As the Court is well aware, Melvin Feliz, Ms. Ravelo’s co-defendant and estranged husband, figured prominently in this case and, in many ways, his sentence is the starting point for this analysis as well. Indeed, it was Feliz who initiated the fraudulent scheme at issue and opened and operated the two litigation support companies that served as the scheme’s linchpin, for his benefit, from inception. Like Ms. Ravelo, Feliz has also pleaded guilty to his role in connection with this scheme. But in the case of Feliz’s plea agreement, the Government has agreed that the appropriate sentence to be imposed by the Court for this offense is a stipulated term of 48 months’ imprisonment – i.e., precisely the same prison term that Ms. Ravelo requests that the Court impose here. In its Sentencing Memorandum, the Government has taken the position that Ms. Ravelo – who, unlike Feliz, has no criminal history, poses no risk of recidivism, and has demonstrated genuine remorse for her actions – should be sentenced to a prison term of 72 months, two full years longer than Feliz. The Government’s harsh position toward Ms. Ravelo, magnified by the fact that it has already sought, and Ms. Ravelo ultimately agreed to, the forfeiture of all of her assets, is unjustified by either the facts before the Court or the factors that guide this Court’s analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). As detailed below, Feliz is not only more directly culpable 1 than Ms. Ravelo for his role in the underlying offense, but his deceit, manipulation and abuse of Ms. Ravelo throughout their marriage also illuminates her aberrational decision to take the actions that she did. To be clear, Ms. Ravelo requests only that the Court impose a sentence equal in length, not shorter, than that which Feliz and the Government have agreed. Nor, as the Government argues, does Feliz’s ten (10) year sentence for cocaine distribution somehow justify a shorter sentence for him in this matter, or a longer one for Ms. Ravelo, as the Government illogically concludes in its zeal to lock her up. In addition to the unwarranted disparity that a sentence in excess of 48 months would create, such a sentence would also be greater than necessary to accomplish the purposes of sentencing. With respect to deterrence, the punishment that has been imposed upon Ms. Ravelo and the general deterrence that flows therefrom, emphasized by the Government, has been very significant. This case has been the subject of massive publicity, and Ms. Ravelo’s downfall has been extremely well-documented: she has been disbarred and will never practice law again; her reputation has been irreparably destroyed; all of her assets have been forfeited, leaving her virtually penniless; and her psychological and even physical health, already tenuous, have been devastated, so that she is, in every sense, a true shell of her former self. And with respect to specific deterrence, there is no chance that Ms. Ravelo will reoffend: in addition to having demonstrated deep remorse for her misconduct, for which she has taken full responsibility, the fact that Ms. Ravelo will be imprisoned and has been disbarred means she necessarily can never be in position to commit the same offense in the future. Finally, in light of the extensive physical, mental, and emotional conditions from which Ms. Ravelo presently suffers, a sentence in excess of 48 months would, frustrate, not serve, the rehabilitative purpose of providing Ms. Ravelo with the care she needs in the “most effective manner,” as § 3553(a) requires. 2 In sum, given all of the nature and circumstances of the offense, which are discussed in further detail below – but especially Feliz’s sentence – as well as Ms. Ravelo’s history and characteristics, which the Court must consider in imposing sentence along with the purposes of sentencing, it is truly difficult to understand how a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment would not be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to serve the purposes of the sentencing statute under § 3553(a)’s overarching mandate. Section II, infra, sets forth the facts surrounding the offense for which the Court will sentence Ms. Ravelo and the terms of the plea agreement entered into by the parties. Section III, infra, then describes the sentencing process mandated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and, following that process, discusses the legal bases that warrant the requested sentence of 48 months in this case. II. THE OFFENSE CONDUCT, CHARGES AND PLEA On November 5, 2015, a federal grand jury returned a nine-count Indictment charging Ms. Ravelo with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, four counts of wire fraud and four counts of tax evasion. PSR ¶¶ 11-13. The charges stem from allegations that Ms. Ravelo and her now-estranged husband, Melvin Feliz, formed two litigation support companies, eLit Litigation Solutions LLC (“ELit”) and Alternative Litigation Solutions (“ALS”), for the purpose of defrauding two New York law firms where Ms. Ravelo previously worked, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (“Willkie”) and Hunton & Williams, LLP (“H&W”), as well as one client, MasterCard. PSR ¶¶ 25-29. Specifically, the Indictment alleged that Ms. Ravelo and Feliz caused the litigation support companies to submit fraudulent invoices to both law firms for work that was never performed, and that Ms. Ravelo, in her capacity as a partner at the law firms, approved many of the payments from the firms to the companies. PSR ¶¶ 30-65. The Indictment also alleged that Ms. Ravelo and Feliz evaded taxes by failing to report the proceeds 3 of the fraud on their federal income tax returns for tax years 2009 through 2012. PSR ¶¶ 13, 6977. By plea agreement dated October 19, 2017, Ms. Ravelo pleaded guilty to Count One of the Indictment, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and Count Nine of the Indictment, tax evasion. PSR ¶ 110. As Ms. Ravelo stated under oath at the time of her guilty plea on November 20, 2017, she joined Feliz’s conspiracy in the summer of 2012 and wrongfully continued in that conspiracy into November 2014, including by authorizing payments on invoices while knowing that the invoices sought payment for work that had not been performed. PSR ¶ 115. Ms. Ravelo also admitted to the Government and stated under oath at the time of her guilty plea that she knowingly and willfully evaded paying taxes in the amount of $800,000 for tax year 2012 – i.e., the tax due and owing based on the income that she and Feliz obtained that year through the fraudulent scheme. Id. As Mr. Ravelo conveyed to Probation, she has accepted complete responsibility for her actions and makes no excuses for her criminal conduct. Id. Feliz, Ms. Ravelo’s co-defendant, has also pleaded guilty for his role in the scheme. On August 25, 2015, Feliz entered a plea of guilty, like Ms. Ravelo, to two counts: conspiracy to commit wire fraud and tax evasion. PSR ¶¶ 1-3. As reflected in his written plea agreement, Feliz and the Government agreed to a sentence “at the stipulated term of 48 months of incarceration,” which they agreed “is appropriate taking into account all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the advisory Guidelines range determined by the Court.” (Crim. No. 15-421, Dkt. No. 64.) Feliz’s guilty plea on August 25, 2015 followed a separate guilty plea that he entered earlier that year in connection with an unrelated conspiracy; specifically, by plea agreement dated February 3, 2015, Feliz pleaded guilty to his role in a cocaine distribution and money laundering scheme, for which he faces an agreed upon sentence of ten (10) years, though 4 he could, given his criminal history, have been subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty (20) years. (Crim. No. 14-327, Dkt. No. 144.) On November 4, 2016, Feliz’s sentencing was adjourned without date. III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. The Applicable Legal Standard As the Court is well aware, since United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the United States Sentencing Guidelines have been advisory, not mandatory, and district courts must sentence in accordance with the factors set forth in the sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve Congress’s goals for sentencing. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed district courts to apply Booker as follows: (1) Courts must continue to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before Booker. (2) In doing so, they must formally rule on the motions of both parties and state on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and take into account our Circuit’s pre-Booker case law, which continues to have advisory force. (3) Finally, they are to exercise their discretion by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors in setting the sentence they impose regardless of whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines. United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006)); see United States v. Mgbolu, 731 Fed. App’x 76, 79 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Boney, 769 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1003 (2015); United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 529 (2013); United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d 5 Cir. 2009) (en banc); USSG § 1B1.1(a)-(c) (codifying this three-step process and requiring that the steps be performed in this order). Here, the third step in the Court’s evaluation – consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a) – predominates the analysis. As detailed below, a weighing of those factors leads to only one just and appropriate result: Ms. Ravelo should receive a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment. B. Step One The first step requires the Court to calculate the suggested Guidelines range. Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247. The Court’s determination in this regard here requires resolution of just one issue: whether the two-level aggravated role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) is warranted in this case. If the Government’s position is accepted and the adjustment is applied, then Ms. Ravelo’s total offense level is 29 and her Guidelines range is 87-108 months’ imprisonment. If, on the other hand, Ms. Ravelo’s position is accepted and the adjustment is not applied, then Ms. Ravelo’s total offense level is 27, bringing the Guidelines range down to 70-87 months’ imprisonment. For the reasons that follow, the aggravated role adjustment does not here apply as a matter of law and Ms. Ravelo’s suggested Guidelines range, therefore, is 70-87 months. In support of this requested adjustment, the Government points to the conduct of certain alleged “participants” in the offense who, the Government says, were “managed and supervised” by Ms. Ravelo. Gov’t Memo. at 16-19. But as the Third Circuit has made clear, to warrant application of the aggravated role adjustment “the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the [alleged participants] were criminally responsible participants.” United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 318 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). That is, “[t]o be deemed ‘a participant under the Guidelines,’ the ‘individual must be criminally responsible, i.e., s/he must have committed all of the elements of a statutory crime with the 6 requisite mens rea.’” Id. The Government has not made that showing here. Indeed, beyond attaching the “participant” label to various individuals and reciting the ways in which they were deceived, unwittingly, into furthering the wire fraud conspiracy at issue, neither the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum nor the PSR makes any showing at all (nor cites any authority for the proposition) that the unindicted individuals identified were criminally responsible participants, as is required for the aggravated role adjustment to apply. See, e.g., United States v. Olejiya, 754 F.3d 986, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The defendant must manage or supervise one or more other participants in the criminal activity—not simply the property or assets of the conspiracy . . . —in order to warrant an aggravated role enhancement.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d 25, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2016) (aggravated role enhancement did not apply because record neither suggested that defendant “exercised control over any co-conspirator subject to criminal liability” nor that subordinate employees “were anything other than unwitting accomplices.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Ms. Ravelo’s total offense level should be set at 27, not 29, and her suggested Guidelines range is therefore 70-87 months’ imprisonment, overlapping with the sentencing range agreed upon by the parties under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). C. Step Two The second step of the sentencing process requires the Court to address any departure motions. Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247. Here, the parties have entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) to a stipulated term of between 48 months and 72 months of incarceration. As the terms of the plea agreement provide, “[w]hile the Court is not bound by the parties’ stipulations concerning sentencing Guidelines calculations, the Court is bound to sentence Keila Ravelo to a term of incarceration between 48 months and 72 months under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), if the Court accepts the plea.” (Dkt. No. 7 154.) As the Government makes clear, Gov’t Memo. at 20, this step, therefore, does not present any issues for the Court to address, as neither the Government nor Ms. Ravelo need move for a departure. Instead, the question of where within the range upon which the parties have agreed the sentence will lie is a matter that more appropriately falls within Step Three, discussed below. D. Step Three The third and, in this case most critical, step of the sentencing process requires the Court to analyze and apply the factors set forth in the sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7). In deciding the appropriate sentence under § 3553(a), the Court must not presume that a Guidelines sentence is inherently reasonable, as the Supreme Court has made clear. See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (“Our cases do not allow a sentencing court to presume that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is reasonable. . . . The Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed reasonable.” (emphasis in original)); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007) (“[T]he district judge . . . may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.”). Nor, as the Third Circuit has explained, should the Guidelines be given excessive weight in the Step 3 process, for under § 3553(a), the advisory Guidelines range is just one of the several factors that must be considered at sentencing: [T]he recommended Guideline range is only one of several factors that must be considered. We have declined “to adopt a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences.” [United States v.] Cooper, 437 F.3d [324,] 331-32 [(3d Cir. 2006)]. We will therefore not presume that a sentence that is less than the Guideline range is necessarily the minimum sentence that is consistent with the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). Allowing such a presumption to control our assessment of the compliance with the principle of parsimony would elevate the Guidelines above all of the other § 3553(a) factors that must [be] considered at sentencing. United States v. Calderon-Minchola, 351 Fed. App’x. 610, 613 (3d Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Chang Ping Lin, 219 Fed. App’x 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We have rejected 8 formulations that we believe would accord an inappropriate weight to the Guidelines range, such as presuming that a sentencing court considered the factors or that the resulting sentence was reasonable solely because the sentence fell within the Guidelines range.”). Indeed, in stark contrast to the Government’s position throughout its Sentencing Memorandum – which focuses, often myopically, on the advisory Guidelines range, see Gov’t Memo. at 20-24, and ultimately argues, without authority, for a sentence “closest to the Guidelines range, id. at 24 – it is reversible error post-Booker for a sentencing court to place undue weight on the advisory Guidelines range. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 530 F.3d 565, 577–78 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 474 (2008) (remanding for resentencing where the sentencing court appeared to place “too much weight” on the Guidelines); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2491 (2008) (“Nor should the Guidelines factor be given more or less weight than any other.”); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (“A district judge must include the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting consideration. The judge may determine, however, that, in the particular case, a withinGuidelines sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing.”); United States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme Court explained that affording too much weight to the Guidelines range in the substantive review of sentences would create ‘an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range’ and ‘would not be consistent with Booker.’”) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 47). In a similar vein, this Court’s consideration of the full range of sentencing factors must be thorough and genuine. See United States v. Suggs, 298 Fed. App’x 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A sentencing court’s failure to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors or adequately explain its sentence is a procedural error.”) (emphasis added). The Third Circuit mandates that the record 9 “disclose meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of independent judgment, based on a weighing of the relevant factors, in arriving at a final sentence.’” United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 566 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571-72 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 848 (2007)); see United States v. Sotomayor, 563 Fed. App’x. 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (“During the third step, district courts should engage in ‘a true, considered exercise of discretion . . . including a recognition of, and response to, the parties’ non-frivolous arguments.’”) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006)). And, of course, in performing its § 3553(a) assessment, the Court should not lose sight of the Supreme Court’s instruction that it must “‘consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.’” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 487 (2011) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)); see United States v. Salinas-Cortez, 660 F.3d 695, 698 (3d Cir. 2011) (same). Ultimately, after weighing all of the § 3553(a) factors, and as the Government concedes, Gov’t Mem. at 20 and fn. 5, prior to imposing a final sentence, the Court is statutorily required to apply the so-called “principle of parsimony” – Congress’s command in the first sentence of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that “[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes [of sentencing] set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)].” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Those purposes are “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for the offense[,]” “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct[,]” “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant” and “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 10 treatment in the most effective manner[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D); see Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101 (describing the “overarching” instruction of § 3553(a) “to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’ to accomplish the goals of sentencing” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a))); Calderon-Minchola, 351 Fed. App’x. at 612 (same). A sentence violates this overarching statutory command if a lower sentence would just as effectively accomplish the goals of sentencing. Calderon-Minchola, 351 Fed. App’x. at 612-13 (holding that a sentence may not be reasonable where “nothing on th[e] record suggests that a shorter period of incarceration would not have adequately addressed each of the § 3553(a) factors”). As discussed below, a complete consideration of the § 3553 factors and an application of the parsimony principle here demonstrates that a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment would not only be sufficient to satisfy the purposes of sentencing, but that the longer sentence sought by the Government would not in any way further the goals of sentencing any more than would the sentence sought by the defense – the exact same sentence imposed upon Melvin Feliz – a convicted drug dealer, and the instigator and beneficiary of this scheme, who, consistent with his extensive criminal history, abused, deceived and took advantage of Ms. Ravelo. 1. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense The nature of the offense to which Ms. Ravelo pleaded guilty is concededly serious, particularly given Ms. Ravelo’s status as an attorney, and she certainly accepts that she must bear the consequences of her actions. Indeed, Ms. Ravelo has candidly described her actions to the Probation Office, as the PSR describes: After graduating from Columbia Law School in 1991, I worked as an associate at the law firm of Sidley Austin LLP for four years before joining Clifford Chance, where I became a partner in 2000. From 2005 to 2010, I was a partner at the law firm of Hunton & Williams, LLP (“H&W”). In 2010, I joined the law firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (“Willkie”), where I served as a partner until my resignation from Willkie on November 14, 2014. 11 During my time at H&W and Willkie, I represented MasterCard in a significant multi-district litigation regarding alleged price-fixing by MasterCard and other credit card companies. As I admitted under oath at the time of my guilty plea, I joined a conspiracy in the summer of 2012 with my now estranged husband, Melvin Feliz. Furthermore, I wrongfully continued in this conspiracy into November 2014, including by authorizing payments on invoices while knowing that the invoices sought payment for work that had not yet been performed. By doing so, I knowingly and intentionally conspired and agreed to defraud H&W, Willkie and/or MasterCard by means of materially false representations and promises. As I have also admitted to the Government and stated under oath at the time of my guilty plea, during the tax year 2012 Melvin and I obtained approximately $2,360,000 through the conspiracy to defraud the law firm at which I worked at the time, Willkie. Based on that income, Melvin and I had a tax due and owing of approximately $800,000, which I knowingly and willfully evaded during tax year 2012. I accept complete responsibility for my actions, which I fully acknowledge, deeply regret and do not seek to justify in any way. I have thought long and hard about why I became involved in this crime. Before joining Melvin’s conspiracy in 2012, I represented MasterCard for over a decade. During that time, I gained the trust of MasterCard’s most senior executives and developed a lucrative, and legitimate, legal practice. But my professional success was a point of contention throughout my troubled, abusive marriage to Melvin. For that reason, I worked hard to help Melvin succeed in his business endeavors so that he would no longer feel animosity toward me. I also hoped that any successes Melvin had would improve our dysfunctional, and often abusive, relationship. Unfortunately, those efforts took a devastating turn in 2012. When I learned that Melvin had not, in fact, been providing much of the work product that he had been paid to provide for Willkie (and, in turn, MasterCard), I pleaded with him to make it right by producing the work. He did not. But instead of reporting him, as I should have, I helped to cover up his fraud. To say that this was an extremely poor decision is an understatement, and I make no excuses for it. I was stupid and wrong. I want to convey how deeply shameful this situation has been for me and my family and how much I regret the decisions that I made. This case has had a devastating impact upon my family – in particular my two college-age sons, both of whom have already 12 had to endure seeing their father plead guilty to his role in this fraudulent scheme as well as to unrelated drug crimes. I have worked tirelessly to support my boys throughout this challenging period, but it has been impossible to spare them the extensive negative publicity that this case has generated for over three years. Put simply, what I have done has caused nothing short of a nightmare, and I have, as a result, lost everything – my law license, my home, and all of my money. I cannot adequately express in words how sorry I am to the law firms for which I worked, to my client, MasterCard, which reposed its trust in me, and to my family and friends, whom I have caused incredible pain and embarrassment. The bottom line is this: however aberrational my actions were in my life, I know that my actions, representing exceedingly poor judgment, were criminal ones. Of course, nothing like this could or will ever happen again – I have learned a lot about what is right and important from this horrible episode and experience. It is my sincerest hope that my plea and this statement begin to demonstrate my remorse for my actions and my desire to do everything possible to make amends for them, although I know it will take the rest of my life for me to do so. PSR ¶ 115. This statement is heartfelt and accurate and, although Ms. Ravelo now asks that the Court fully consider certain other circumstances of the offense in order to have a complete picture, none of what she says here, or has ever said, should in any way be viewed as undermining her full and complete acceptance of responsibility for what she has done, which she neither denies nor seeks to minimize in any way. That said, Ms. Ravelo respectfully requests that the Court specifically consider, in addition to the facts described in the Presentence Report, the following “nature and circumstances of the offense” in addition to her “history and characteristics” and the dramatic extent to which she has already been so severely punished, discussed later in this Sentencing Memorandum: (a) Ms. Ravelo’s culpability relative to her co-defendant and estranged husband, Melvin Feliz, and the corresponding disparity that a sentence for Ms. Ravelo in excess of 48-months – 13 the term of imprisonment that the Government and Feliz have agreed is appropriate for his role in orchestrating the fraudulent scheme – would create; (b) Ms. Ravelo’s deep remorse for her misconduct, for which she has taken full responsibility; and (c) Ms. Ravelo’s post-offense conduct, which both reaffirms her sincere remorse and reflects her resolve to live a very different life after serving the prison sentence that the Court imposes. All of these circumstances, although they do not excuse Ms. Ravelo’s conduct and are not and could not be a basis for other than a very long prison sentence of four (4) years, are nonetheless significant factors for the Court’s consideration as it determines where within the agreed upon range to sentence. a. Ms. Ravelo’s Culpability Relative to Melvin Feliz and the Unwarranted Disparity That a Sentence in Excess of 48 Months Would Create The Third Circuit has instructed that the Court “should . . . ensure that its sentences appropriately reflect the relative culpability of individuals” involved in the underlying offense. United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 447 n.12 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Maynard, 596 Fed. App’x 56, 60–61 (3d Cir. 2015) (“the District Court properly weighed [co-conspirator’s] relative culpability and the other § 3553(a) factors”). Similarly, the Court can and should “reasonably consider sentencing disparity of co-defendants in its application of [the § 3553(a)] factors.” United States v. Shimp, 353 Fed. App’x 740, 742–43 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Friedman, 658 F.3d at 363 (remanding for resentencing where district court failed to address whether there was a sentencing disparity between the defendant and another individual convicted of the same offense). As the Government concedes, pursuant to the plea agreement into which it entered with 14 Melvin Feliz “for wire fraud and tax evasion, the parties stipulated to a sentence including a 48month term of imprisonment” – the same term of imprisonment that Ms. Ravelo requests that the Court impose here. Gov’t Memo. at 31. But in the case of Ms. Ravelo, the Government says, a sentence of 72-months’ imprisonment – two full years (and 50%) longer than Feliz – is warranted because Ms. “Ravelo’s conduct was worse than Feliz.” Id. But this truly remarkable position is belied by the facts and the law, and any sentence in excess of the 48 months upon which Feliz and the Government have agreed is appropriate for his conduct would be a grave injustice and in direct contravention of the § 3553(a) factors that guide this Court’s analysis. (1) Feliz Was the Architect and Prime Beneficiary of the Scheme and His Culpability Far Exceeds that of Ms. Ravelo The Court need look no further than the PSR to see that Melvin Feliz – the same man who hid a drug trafficking conspiracy and second family from his wife and two sons for years, see infra at 31-33 – initiated the fraudulent scheme that is at the heart of this case and was the primary beneficiary of its illicit proceeds. In particular, the two litigation support companies that served as the cornerstone of his scheme, ELit and ALS, were opened and operated by Feliz. PSR ¶¶ 38-45. Thus, as the PSR states (and as is undisputed by the Government), it was Feliz, and not Ms. Ravelo, who flew Individual 1, to Las Vegas in 2008, directed her to open a bank account on behalf of ELit, and “[a]t Feliz’s instruction . . . provided signed blank checks associated with the account she had opened for Elit to Feliz.” PSR ¶¶ 38-39. Indeed, the Government concedes that “[i]n or about January 2008, Feliz formed Elit Litigation Solutions, LLC.” Gov’t Memo. at 2. And it was Feliz, not Ms. Ravelo, who directed Individual 3 – – to fabricate email accounts and domain names so that ALS could appear to be the legitimate business that it, like ELit, was not. PSR ¶¶ 43-45. 15 It was not until July 2012 – when Willkie, the law firm at which Ms. Ravelo then served as a partner, raised questions about the legitimacy of the invoices from Feliz’s litigation support companies – that Ms. Ravelo made the horrific decision to join her husband’s conspiracy. PSR ¶ 49. Upon learning that Feliz had not, in fact, been providing much of the work product that he had been paid to provide for Willkie (and, in turn, MasterCard), she pleaded with him to make it right by producing the work. He did not. But instead of reporting him, as she should have, she helped to cover up his fraud. PSR ¶¶ 49-65. As Ms. Ravelo has admitted under oath, this decision and her participation in Feliz’s scheme from 2012 on not only represents exceedingly poor judgment, but criminal conduct for which there must – and already have been – consequences of the most severe sort, ultimately including the loss of Ms. Ravelo’s precious liberty for a very long time. PSR ¶ 115. Those consequences, however, surely should not be greater than those to be appropriately imposed upon Feliz, the instigator and beneficiary of the scheme whose culpability far exceeds that of Ms. Ravelo, particularly given his extensive prior criminal record, and the far greater collateral consequences which have been and will continue to be visited upon her. See, e.g., Maynard, 596 Fed. App’x at 60–61 (“the District Court properly weighed [co-conspirator’s] relative culpability and the other § 3553(a) factors”); United States v. Palazuelos-Mendez, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 597, at *4-5 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2016) (concluding that the sentencing court gave “ample consideration to the facts and circumstances of this case and fashion[ed] an appropriate sentence after considering . . . [the defendant]’s role in arranging key aspects of the exchange, and his admitted prior involvement in other drug transactions” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 802, 810 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming a defendant’s sentence based in part on the sentencing court’s finding that a codefendant was the “the lead instigator”). 16 Although littered with rhetorical questions about how it is “simply impossible that Ravelo” could have been misled by Feliz prior to July 2012, noticeably absent from the Government’s Memorandum is any evidence that Ms. Ravelo actually knew about Feliz’s fraudulent scheme prior to that time. Gov’t Memo. at 24-26. To the contrary, that Feliz was able to devise and carry out a fraudulent scheme before 2012 without Ms. Ravelo’s participation or knowledge is entirely consistent with his ability to deceive, manipulate and abuse Ms. Ravelo throughout their marriage. After all, it was not until 2014, following Feliz’s arrest for distributing cocaine – an unrelated conspiracy that he also hid from his family – that Ms. Ravelo and her sons learned that Feliz had an entirely separate family, including a mistress of several years with whom he had a young daughter. PSR ¶ 149. As described by : A specific period in time really gets to me and that is the time between Melvin’s ( initial arrest in March 2014 and December 22, 2014. During this time, even after all the years of abuse, we all stood by Melvin believing that he was telling us the truth about his innocence. Until it all came down in December and the truth of his actions came to light it was clear that he was a master manipulator, liar and thief. How Melvin is a selfish man who has done nothing in his life that didn’t benefit himself. Ex. 1 ( letter).1 In this regard, Ms. Ravelo was a necessary piece to Feliz’s puzzle – a pawn whom he could manipulate, by burying invoices for the “support services” his companies were purportedly providing among the many others that Ms. Ravelo approved in her capacity as a high-powered partner leading a massive litigation with a ten-figure budget. On April 19, 2015, Feliz wrote to his sons from prison and declared that their mother had “done nothing wrong” – admitting, in effect, that he had deceived Ms. Ravelo in connection with this offense and hidden his actions from her, just as he had hidden so much more about his life and activities. Ex. 15 (4/19/15 Letter from Melvin Feliz). 1 17 To be clear, Ms. Ravelo’s decision to join Feliz’s conspiracy in 2012 and her actions thereafter were inexcusable – even if motivated by a relentless desire to keep her family of four, such as it was, intact – and she knows and accepts that she will be very severely punished for what she has done, and what she did not see and do before that. See Ex. 20 ( ) (“She desperately wanted to keep the family together – for their boys to have a father. This is not uncommon in abusive and highly dysfunctional relationships.”); Ex. 6( letter) (“[H]er choices were poor when the moment came to call him out on his lies that put her own future and career at risk. She instead chose to try to fix it for him and the family.”); Ex. 3 ( letter) (“She stuck it out for the boys and ultimately did them, herself and us more damage.”); Ex. 8 ( letter) (“She suffered in silence, hiding crucial details from her friends and family, so no one was able to put all the pieces together until it was catastrophic for her. For all her academic and professional achievements – this is clearly a very intelligent woman – this was an area that she simply could not conquer. It would ultimately destroy her.”). But in fashioning a just sentence that appropriately reflects Ms. Ravelo’s culpability relative to Feliz, the motivations underlying Ms. Ravelo’s decision – to salvage a failing family situation, and to avoid the further abuse that would have been visited upon her should she not have done so – though no excuse for her misdeeds, bear directly on the “nature and circumstances of the offense.” See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993) (stating that sentencing courts should consider “a wide variety of factors,” including “[t]he defendant’s motive for committing the offense.”); United States v. Garcia-Velazco, 356 Fed. App’x. 571, 574 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The record demonstrates that the District Court appropriately considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors in imposing the sentence,” including “the motivation behind the offense.”); United States v. Solano-Marrero, 228 Fed. App’x. 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting 18 that the sentencing court below “addressed § 3553(a)(1), ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense,’ in describing [the defendant’s] motivation for [committing the offense]”). (2) Sentencing Ms. Ravelo to a Term of Imprisonment In Excess of the 48 Months That Feliz and the Government Have Agreed Upon Would Create an Unwarranted Disparity By plea agreement dated July 13, 2015, the Government and Melvin Feliz agreed to a sentence “at the stipulated term of 48 months of incarceration” for Feliz’s conviction in the fraudulent scheme that he initiated. (Crim. No. 15-421, Dkt. No. 64.) As reflected in that plea agreement, the parties “agreed[d] that a sentence at the stipulated term of 48 months of incarceration is appropriate taking into account all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the advisory Guidelines range determined by the Court.”2 (Crim. No. 15-421, Dkt. No. 64.) Ms. Ravelo seeks precisely the same outcome here – nothing more, and importantly, nothing less. The Government’s brutally harsh position with respect to the greater sentence it seeks for Ms. Ravelo, when put in context, is as follows: the agreed-upon sentence of 48 months for Feliz – the architect and prime beneficiary of the scheme who also pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute approximately 20 kilograms of cocaine, just the most recent felony in his lengthy criminal history – is too little punishment for Ms. Ravelo, notwithstanding the she did not initiate Even under the best of circumstances – i.e., not taking into account, among other things, Feliz’s lengthy criminal history – the minimum suggested Guidelines sentence for Feliz for his role in connection with the fraudulent scheme was 87-108 months. PSR ¶ 95. The Government, however, argues that Feliz’s sentence is in line with the Guidelines and thus does not create a disparity. See Gov’t Mem. at 32. But that conclusion is based upon the notion that somehow Feliz’s sentences “could run concurrently,” a statement that flies in the face of the “operations of the Guidelines” upon which the Government relies. Id. In fact, the PSR’s own calculation, placing Feliz at a level 35, and assuming (though it seems generous given his prior convictions for both drug distribution and perjury, see PSR ¶ 147) that Feliz is in fact in Criminal History Category II, his Guideline range would be 188-235 months, thus demonstrating the tremendous benefit that he is afforded relative to Ms. Ravelo. That benefit would be even greater if, as appears likely, he is in Criminal History Category III, rendering his probable Guidelines range 210-262 months (17.5 to almost 22 years). 2 19 the scheme, has no criminal history and presents no risk of recidivism, particularly given the devastating collateral consequences of her actions, which will forever disenable her from the practice of law. The inconsistency of the Government’s position in this regard, as well as its inhumane severity – and the resultant disparity that it would create – speaks for itself.3 See, e.g., United States v. Keffer, 315 Fed. App’x 433, 435 (3d Cir. 2009) (district court properly “considered [defendant’s] work history, criminal record, role in the offense, and culpability compared with his co-conspirators” in arriving at sentence); Shimp, 353 Fed. App’x at 742–43 (3d Cir. 2009) (district court properly considered disparity between co-defendants, including their respective roles in the offense, in fashioning sentence); Friedman, 658 F.3d at 363 (remanding for resentencing where district court failed to address whether there was a sentencing disparity as between the defendant and an individual who was convicted of the same offense); United States v. Rodriguez-Castro, 641 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011) (district court properly considered lack of criminal record in evaluating whether there would be unwarranted sentence disparities). b. Ms. Ravelo’s Remorse Among the most significant of “the nature and circumstances of the offense” that the Court must consider in applying 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) is the genuine and sincere remorse that Ms. Ravelo feels for her actions, which goes well beyond the “acceptance of responsibility” for The Government’s argument as to how, given Mr. Feliz’s drug conviction, “[t]he operations of the Guidelines” will not create a sentencing disparity with Mr. Feliz is a puzzling one, which seems to reward Mr. Feliz and punish Ms. Ravelo for his extensive criminal record. Gov’t Memo. at 31-32. That Mr. Feliz will also face exposure for his unrelated narcotics offense does not either mitigate Mr. Feliz’s conduct or warrant a higher sentence for Ms. Ravelo in connection with the fraudulent scheme at the center of this case. To the contrary, Mr. Feliz’s conduct in that regard, along with his lengthy criminal history and other facts detailed throughout this Memorandum, prove the point, which is really the critical point to this sentencing: Ms. Ravelo should not and cannot be sentenced to a prison term longer than Mr. Feliz. 3 20 which she has been credited by Probation, see PSR ¶¶ 115-16. United States v. Griggs, 507 Fed. App’x. 196, 199-200 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that, in considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors, the sentencing court had been “persuaded by [the defendant’s] protestations of remorse and assertions of rehabilitation and resolve”); United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2008) (indicating that “a defendant’s degree of remorse at sentencing may be considered” as a sentencing factor under § 3553(a)). Specifically, family and friends reflect in their letters to the Court that Ms. Ravelo has taken full responsibility for her actions, that she is deeply remorseful, and, most importantly, that she will never repeat her misconduct. This sentiment is uniform throughout all of the letters submitted in support of Ms. Ravelo, which also demonstrate how candid Ms. Ravelo has been about her actions. See, e.g., Ex. 2 ( letter) (“ has been upfront about the mistakes she realizes that she has made to break the law that led her to this point, and it absolutely tears at her heart that this is where we are now.”); Ex. 8 ( letter) (“I am a witness that she beats herself up endlessly. She is remorseful, she loved her clients and her career and it all went very wrong.”); Ex. 5 ( letter) (“I have seen how Keila sincerely regrets having committed the offense. She knows in herself that she has done something wrong and must be accountable for the consequences of her actions. Furthermore, I know that Keila will never be involved in any wrongdoing again.”); Ex. 4 ( letter) (“Keila really regrets and accepts responsibility for her role in what brings her before the Court . . . She is embarrassed, ashamed, and remorseful.”); Ex. 3 ( letter) (“Keila is before the Court as remorseful as anyone can be.”); Ex. 17 ( letter) (“She has accepted responsibility in her situation and has come to terms with her offense.”) Ex. 9 ( letter) (“Keila makes NO excuses for her behavior or her 21 actions.”); Ex. 13 ( letter) (“Keila is extremely remorseful and sad for her wrongdoing”); Ex. 14 ( 10 ( letter) (“Keila has accepted responsibility for her part.”); Ex. letter) (“Mrs Keila has cried every day since her arrest. She has apologized to all of us for the pain she caused us all, and to me specifically for the job I lost when she lost her job. She knew I needed to work and tried to keep me employed as long as possible. I appreciated that. But I had to go. That was hard.”). Ms. Ravelo, as reflected in the Presentence Report, has also conveyed her remorse and acceptance of responsibility directly to Probation, and was credited for being “contrite” in doing so. PSR ¶ 115. As the caselaw makes clear, Ms. Ravelo’s remorse is not only an important circumstance of her offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), but also a factor to be considered in assessing “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), discussed further below. That is, it follows from these letters, as well as from the law, that Ms. Ravelo is extremely unlikely ever to commit another offense. See, e.g., United States v. Marsh, 820 F. Supp. 2d 320, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that given the defendant’s “remorse for his offense, it is unlikely that he will reoffend”); United States v. Phillips, No. 5:09 CR 534, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91948, *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2010) (indicating that because the defendant “demonstrated a great deal of shame and remorse for his actions” he was at “a lower risk to reoffend”), aff’d, 455 Fed. App’x. 624 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1112 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (indicating that a defendant “has a low potential for recidivism . . . where the defendant appears genuinely remorseful”); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (D. Neb. 2008) (“In light of his demonstrated remorse, which the court credits as sincere, there is little need to protect the public from any future crimes.”); Russell v. Anderson, No. 1:07 CV 3434, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78195, *10 22 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2008) (indicating that a sentencing judge “must consider factors such as lack of remorse when determining a felon’s likelihood of recidivism”) ; United States v. Morelli, No. 06-CR-17, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85066, *12 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2006) (“I found her remorse to be genuine, which also caused me to believe she was unlikely to re-offend.”); cf., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010) (upholding the “reasonableness of the District Court’s sentence” based in part on the court’s finding that the defendant “expressed no remorse” and was therefore “likely to reoffend in the future”). In sum, as the record shows, Ms. Ravelo is embarrassed, ashamed and deeply remorseful for her criminal conduct. This significant fact – one that must be considered in evaluating the nature and circumstances of the offense, as well as in combination with Ms. Ravelo’s history and characteristics and the need “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant” – counsels powerfully in favor of a sentence of 48 months’ incarceration – which, while very long, is truly sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to fulfill the goals of sentencing. c. Ms. Ravelo’s Post-Offense Conduct Also among the most significant of “the nature and circumstances of the offense” that the Court must consider in applying 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) is a defendant’s response to her apprehension and prosecution and her post-offense conduct. See United States v. McNeal, 175 Fed. App’x. 546, 551 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that the sentencing court properly considered the defendant’s “effort to get himself straightened out” since committing the offense and that “postoffense conduct can shed significant light on the genuineness of claimed remorse”); United States v. Wright, 412 Fed. App’x. 922, 922 (8th Cir. 2011) (considering a defendant’s “favorable post-offense conduct” as a relevant factor under § 3553(a)(1)); United States v. Cowan, 206 Fed. App’x. 955, 959 (11th Cir. 2006) (considering the defendant’s rehabilitative efforts in the context of assessing the nature and circumstances of the offense); United States v. Vandurmen, 2015 U.S. 23 Dist. LEXIS 118, at **6-8 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2015) (considering defendant’s response to her arrest and release on pretrial supervision); United States v. Halaska, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33979 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2009) (considering a defendant’s “exemplary post offense conduct and apparent rehabilitation”); cf. United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that “post-offense rehabilitation efforts, including those which occur post-conviction, may constitute a sufficient factor warranting a downward departure”). Ms. Ravelo, with her family and friends by her side, has proven that she is prepared to get her life back on track as a contributing member of society after serving the prison sentence that she knows this Court will impose. Ms. Ravelo has asked those whom she loves and who love her for forgiveness and has expressed her commitment to making amends for the pain that her conduct has caused: It is clear to me throughout our many conversations that Keila’s priorities have shifted, and after serving her sentence she is committed to using her talents and intellect in service of others. Keila has asked me to forgive her and the shame that she believes she has brought to those closest to her. I forgive my friend. Ex. 14 ( letter); see also Ex. 2 ( letter) (“She is so overly poised to come out on the other end of this situation a stronger and better human, and it will show when she starts her life over and proves once again to the world why she is one of the truly rare angels that God has put on this earth.”). Keila has renewed her faith and continues to repent for the damage and suffering she inflicted on others. Ex. 11 ( ) (“With a sincere heart, she has repented of all the harm and pain she caused to others . . . I believe in her commitment to following her spiritual path.”); Ex. 17 ( letter) (“She has grown tremendously in leaps and bounds spiritually. She has given God her life and her situation is ready to embark on her life with God by her side.”); Ex. 14 ( 24 letter) (“Her faith in God has been renewed and has sustained her through this ordeal.”); PSR ¶ 161 (“In 2016, in the context of increasing psychological stressors, Ravelo began to participate in small group supportive therapy and prayer groups at her church.”). And she has made clear that she plans to make an example of herself and help others avoid the tragic mistakes that she made: She is not a threat to society but rather intends to put this tragic experience to good use by teaching and warning the next generation of lawyers, business people and anyone who will benefit from her story – including women in dire situations of bullying, manipulation and verbal and emotional abuse . . . She will be a stellar member of society like she once was and her prospects of ever falling into crime again are zero to none in my view. Ex. 8 ( letter); see also Ex. 6 ( letter) (“She has a lot to contribute still to society and she will share this with others so they don’t make the same mistakes. I know she has spoken to the next generation in the family about her mistakes and will continue to influence the next generation of young lawyers and professionals by speaking out about how easy it is to fall. She wants to talk to women about emotional manipulation and abuse. She wants to use this to help people.”); Ex. 3 ( letter) (“She wants to be a role model again to immigrant woman who want to get an education; and she wants to speak publically about the underlying issues that played a huge role in her horrible choices in this case, especially staying far too long with an abusive, narcissistic and criminal man.”); Ex. 12 ( letter) (“If justice is served, I feel we can save this wonderful woman who can still come back and do something productive for many people in society. She wants to teach others from her rise and fall.”). In sum, Ms. Ravelo’s post-offense conduct and commitment to serving others upon her reentry into society, along with her sincere remorse for her actions, are among the “nature and circumstances” of the offense that militate in favor of Ms. Ravelo’s requested sentence of 48 months. 25 2. The History and Characteristics of the Defendant In fashioning Ms. Ravelo’s sentence, the Court must consider, in addition to the nature and circumstances of the offense, Ms. Ravelo’s “history and characteristics.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Those facts, as evidenced by the PSR and the numerous letters written on Ms. Ravelo’s behalf, portray a self-made woman who ascended, against all odds, from a difficult and challenging upbringing in the Dominican Republic to the pinnacle of the legal profession in New York City. Along the way, however, Ms. Ravelo encountered significant, often heartbreaking obstacles, which perhaps inform both how she became involved with and remained with Melvin Feliz, and why an otherwise law-abiding woman committed the offense that she did. a. Personal Background (1) Born to a Working-Class Family in the Dominican Republic With Dreams of an Education in the United States Keila Doris Ravelo was born on in Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic. PSR ¶ 143. She is the second of six children born to Alfredo and Marianela Ravelo. PSR ¶ 144. Keila was raised in working-class conditions on the island. PSR ¶ 145. Although her family’s basic needs were met, Keila’s parents struggled to provide for their six children. PSR ¶ 145. Her father pursued various business ventures throughout Keila’s childhood, but most of those ventures ultimately failed. PSR ¶ 145. In 1973, when Keila was eight years old, her family moved to the United States, where they lived for three years in a small one-bedroom apartment in Connecticut before returning to the Dominican Republic in 1976. PSR ¶145. Although Keila did not speak English at the time, her first experience in the United States fueled her dream to return and pursue an education. In 1983, she followed through on that dream, moved in with her aunt in New York, and ultimately earned a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Upsala College in East Orange, New Jersey – 26 paying for her own education along the way and becoming the first in her family to obtain a college degree. PSR ¶¶ 146, 171. But Keila’s educational achievements did not stop there: in 1988, she was accepted to Columbia Law School, where she graduated with a J.D. in 1991. PSR ¶ 172. (2) History of Sexual Abuse and Low Self-Esteem Notwithstanding her resilience and educational achievements, Keila’s childhood was far from perfect. From a young age, Keila nevertheless established herself as the rock of her family – an attribute that has continued into her adult years, as her mother and siblings have repeatedly turned to her for money, advice, and emotional support. As 27 put it, Keila “was the glue to our family . . . She was always about family.” Ex. 5 ( letter). concur. Ex. 6 ( letter) (“She always took leadership in our family problems with our parents, and all the siblings. When anyone was in trouble she came to our aid.”); Ex. 4 ( letter) (“Keila was always ready to lend her hand and advice in any family problem or need since the age of 16. She cares passionately about our family, especially now for our aging parents.”). confirms Keila’s unceasing devotion to her family: “[e]very family problem with her siblings along the way of our family life, she took the lead on her shoulders . . . but Keila was the one who primarily always cared about taking care of me.” Ex. 3 ( letter). There are many defendants whose family relationships warrant consideration as a mitigating factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). See infra at 35 (citing cases). But there are few whose family relationships have survived the kind of challenges that Keila’s have. Those relationships warrant this Court’s consideration as well, in ultimately imposing sentence. Id. That is especially so since both her commitment to family and her history of abuse help to explain how and why she became involved with and remained with Melvin Feliz, a relationship that is critically important to understanding the offense at issue here. b. A Dysfunctional, and Often Abusive, Relationship to CoDefendant Melvin Feliz (1) A Relationship Wrought with Problems from the Start After graduating from Columbia Law School in 1991, Keila passed the New York bar exam and joined a private law firm in New York City. PSR ¶ 147. Among the first assignments of her young legal career was a pro bono civil case, alleging police brutality, on behalf of her future husband, Melvin Feliz, who was in custody at the time serving a seven-year sentence 28 following a drug conviction – a sign of things to come. PSR ¶ 147. Feliz’s police brutality case was ultimately unsuccessful, and, Feliz was later convicted of perjury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for representations he had made during that civil case, resulting in another prison sentence – this time for eight months. PSR ¶ 147. This was not to be his last lie. Meanwhile, Keila kept in touch with Feliz and, in 1995, approximately one and a half years after he was released from prison, the two were married. PSR ¶ 147. According to Keila, she believed in Feliz and thought he could be reformed. Feliz, like Keila, had emigrated from the Dominican Republic, and Keila viewed him as “a lot like [her] father,” as he was often “bouncing business ideas around.” PSR ¶ 150. And given that she was already of the belief that she was unattractive and only getting older, Feliz – an attractive, charming man whom her parents would, she thought, approve of because of his Dominican roots – was, she believed, as good as she could get. Ex. 20 ( ). But, tellingly, “[a]t Feliz’s insistence, [Keila] never informed her family of the truth of how they met.” PSR ¶ 150; see also Ex. 4 ( letter) (“She believed in him and hid from the family many details of him and the marriage.”); Ex. 13 ( letter) (“I had my reservations with him, but Keila really believed in him and his capacity to change and be a good man.”). (2) Physical and Emotional Abuse 29 To be clear though, Feliz was not around much for his family. As reflected in the letters submitted to the Court, Keila was effectively a single mother for years, a constant presence for her sons who received no support from their father but had a mother who devoted her attention to her children around the clock despite her demanding legal career. Ex. 8 ( letter) (Feliz “was barely in the picture, disengaged, aloof and even absent.”); Ex. 17 ( letter) (“I knew he was a father, but I rarely saw him around.”); Ex. 9 ( letter) (describing how she long “assumed [Keila] was a single mother”); Ex. 10 ( letter) (“Mr Melvin barely showed up . . . He would not show up for weeks and weeks.”); Ex. 8 ( letter) (Feliz “was barely in the picture, disengaged, aloof and even absent.”). Unsurprisingly, Feliz’s mistreatment of Keila behind closed doors was even more appalling. 30 a firsthand “witness to the constant tension, pressure and emotionally abusive behavior [Keila] endured at home.” Ex. 10 ( letter). As described by Keila “cried a lot at home because [Melvin] would yell, get drunk, often start drinking early, then leave the house all night, act like a bully, belligerent, use her like a punching bag for his jokes and call her names, act aggressive and loud to intimidate everyone.” Id. He would mock her – and drink heavily when he was in the house with the family, often throwing parties “during the week when Mrs. Keila was working and the kids were doing their homework. Id.; PSR ¶ 167; Ex. 1 ( letter) ( ). This “pattern continued until the end. Big big arguments, tears, slamming doors, chaos between them. But [Keila] always wanted to make it work.” Ex. 9 ( letter). Indeed, she tried desperately “to keep up the appearance of a solid marriage and refused to admit her home was broken. It would be such a failure.” Id.; Ex. 6 ( letter) (“She wanted to believe he was a good man underneath. She wanted to believe he would better himself for the family. And she wanted to help him become a successful person because he was jealous of her success.”). As always, Keila’s sons were her focus: “ ” Ex. 1 ( letter). In 2014, nearly twenty years after marrying Feliz, Keila finally built up the courage to say that enough had become enough. Given what unfolded that year, however, Feliz had already made that choice for her. 31 (3) Feliz’s Pattern of Deception, Culminating In the Revelation That He Had a Second Family Unbeknownst to Keila and Her Sons The circumstances under which Keila first met Feliz – while he was in prison serving a seven-year sentence for drug crimes – and the perjury conviction that soon followed, were (as noted) a preview of things to come. PSR ¶ 147; see also Ex. 20 ( ) (“She met Mel while he was in jail for cocaine possession and she was working as a paralegal and yet she still never felt good enough for him – this is very symbolic of Keila’s low self-worth and the imbalance in this relationship. She actually felt that Mel was a ‘catch.’”). As observed, Keila was “deceived and manipulated by her husband” for years, as he constantly led Keila to “believ[e] things that were not true.” Ex. 5 ( letter) (Keila’s “marriage took a turn for the worse as she was deceived and manipulated by her husband, Melvin . . . I know that Melvin was a manipulator and that possibly had Keila believing things that were not true.”). had a similar impression of Feliz: Over the years there were many things about him that did not add up. He would tell me so many stories – that he was a lawyer with a degree from the Dominican Republic, when he was a paralegal. He told me he was in real estate investments, litigation support work, and radiology. Things did not add up to me but for the sake of the family, I did not dig deeper into his affairs. I saw a poor work ethic and a man who was erratic and prone to lies and exaggeration. Ex. 4 ( letter). The most tragic example of Feliz’s deception came to light after he was arrested in March 2014 for distributing cocaine – a charge that came as a shock to Keila, as Feliz had promised Keila and their sons that his involvement in drug trafficking was a thing of the past. PSR ¶ 149. Even then, after all of the abuse and betrayal she had endured from Feliz over the years, Keila strived to fix Feliz’s problems. While reviewing discovery documents related to Feliz’s drug 32 arrest in an effort to aid in his defense, Keila came upon a phone number in Feliz’s call logs that she did not recognize, but that recurred frequently. PSR ¶ 149. Keila dialed that number, and the woman who picked up identified herself as Feliz’s wife. PSR ¶ 149. During that call Keila learned that Feliz had been living a double life for years, and this woman, Feliz’s mistress, had given birth to a young daughter – Feliz was the father. PSR ¶ 149. To make matters worse, Feliz and his mistress named their daughter Melanie, the name that Keila had made clear to Feliz she would choose if they had been able to conceive a girl, something she always wanted. Naturally, this revelation was devastating to Keila. Indeed, “Keila was emotionally beaten to her lowest of lows.” Ex. 9 ( letter); see also Ex. 14 ( letter) (“Keila shared intimate details of her broken marriage, emotional abuse, and the betrayal of the sacred promise Mel (Melvin Feliz) made on their wedding day.”) But, as noted above, the manner by which Feliz was able to manipulate and deceive Keila is also significant for another reason: that Feliz was able to hide from Keila his mistress and their young daughter for years is consistent with his ability to hide from Keila prior to 2012 that the litigation support companies he operated were not, in fact, performing the services for which they were paid. c. Ms. Ravelo’s Impressive Legal Career Before she joined Feliz’s conspiracy in 2012, Ms. Ravelo built – through years of hard work – a lucrative, and legitimate, legal practice. The Government has summarized Ms. Ravelo’s path to legal stardom well: “Ravelo raised herself from a challenging background, conquered law school, and became a prominent and successful New York antitrust lawyer. She was richly rewarded for her achievement in this competitive field.” Gov’t Memo. at 27. After working for ten years at the international law firm of Clifford Chance – first as an associate, and then as a partner – Ms. Ravelo joined Hunton & Williams in 2005, where she remained for five years – . 33 PSR ¶¶ 177-78. From 2010 through November 14, 2014, Ms. Ravelo served as a partner at Willkie Farr and Gallagher, another prestigious New York firm, where she focused her practice on high-stakes antitrust litigation. PSR ¶ 176. During the course of her legal career, Ms. Ravelo earned many accolades for her professional success, including, among others, routine selection to Super Lawyers and recognition as a “Rainmaker” by Minority Corporate Counsel Association and a “Woman Worth Watching” by the Diversity Journal. Ms. Ravelo’s employment history, impressive by any measure, is a factor appropriately considered by the Court in assessing Ms. Ravelo’s history and characteristics and determining a just sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See, e.g., Tomko, 562 F.3d at 570-71 (affirming sentence of probation because of the defendant’s “negligible criminal history, his employment record, his community ties, and his extensive charitable works” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 581 Fed. App’x. 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2014) (sentencing court properly considered defendant’s employment history); United States v. Allen, 551 Fed. App’x. 491, 494 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that a defendant’s “employment record is part of his history and characteristics” under § 3553(a)); United States v. Taylor, 280 Fed. App’x. 397, 399 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering the defendant’s “impressive employment history”). Here, it is relevant to understanding who the defendant is and why she took the actions at issue here – both so that the Court can fulfill its responsibility to “‘consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.’” Pepper, 562 U.S. at 487 (citation omitted); SalinasCortez, 660 F.3d at 698. d. A Loving and Supportive Mother Who Has Made It Her Life’s Work to Support Her Sons Although Ms. Ravelo was a very hardworking and successful attorney, fully dedicated to 34 her legal career, as discussed above, she has always had an even stronger devotion to her family – and in particular, to her sons, . Indeed, her life is and always has been consumed by her family and their well-being, leaving little time for her own pursuits or interests. Ms. Ravelo’s devotion to her family, as illustrated through their letters and the letters of those who observed them together, is precisely the type of information that the Court must consider in determining Ms. Ravelo’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a)(1). See United States v. Castanon, 476 Fed. App’x. 503, 507 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing the adequacy of a sentencing court’s consideration of a defendant’s “family obligations”); United States v. Roberts, 332 Fed. App’x. 809, 810 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he District Court adequately considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Appellant’s criminal and employment history and family ties, and concluded that a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range was proper.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Thomas, 181 Fed. App’x. 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder Section 3553, the history and characteristics of the defendant, including her family ties, are pertinent to crafting an appropriate sentence.”); United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming sentence based in part upon sentencing court’s consideration of defendant’s “close family ties and support”); United States v. Baker, 502 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s lenient sentence, which was based solely on defendant’s family responsibilities). As described by : The three of them of have [a] very loving and close relationship. Keila is ‘the baseball mom’, the mom that is there when they hurt, or when they celebrate. The mom that sits down and does homework, or talks about relationships. I know these two boys are and will be excellent human beings, mainly because of their mother. Ex. 13 ( letter). that same intimate connection on a daily basis: Keila “is a dedicated mother, completely 35 consumed by those boys’ needs. She spent time with homework, projects, tutors, and coaches. She was personally involved in anything that had to do with them.” Ex. 10 ( letter); see also Ex. 13 ( letter) (“Keila is a devoted mother, she has given these boys, love, attention, her presence.”); Ex. 8 ( letter) (“Keila is a fantastic mother, completely devoted to her boys, never missing a beat to help them grow.”); Ex. 9 ( letter) (“Knowing how respectful and well-mannered her boys were, I figured that Keila’s really LIKE a single parent, as they were learning all of their life qualities from her and it was evident they were adored by their mother and they, in turn, loved their mother.”). Regardless of the demands she faced at work, Ms. Ravelo never let her job get in the way of being there for her sons: “I don’t know how she did it. She was always working at the office or home. But also she was always on top of her kids’ needs.” Ex. 10 ( letter); see also Ex. 12 ( letter) (“She is a super mom ( . She is mother and father.”); Ex. 17 letter) (“As a mother, Keila was always persevering and dedicated to the welfare, upbringing and education of her two sons.”); Ex. 2 ( letter) (“She would come home around 8 or 10pm most nights, and in spite of being so exhausted from commuting and working, always made the time afterwards ”). 36 In this regard, the Court must also consider the effect that incarceration will have on Ms. Ravelo’s sons as one of the “characteristics” that are pertinent to her sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 70; Perez-Ramos, 525 Fed. App’x. at 870; Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d at 1148; Martin, 520 F.3d at 90; Baker, 502 F.3d at 468. Put simply, Keila’s sons “NEED her. They went through many years of abusive hell at the hands of the other parent. They need time to heal with their mother, to start their lives over, in as healthy of an environment as is now possible for them.” Ex. 9 ( letter); Ex. 2 ( ). A sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment, though very substantial, is the best way that the Court has available to it to consider that factor and limit the deleterious effects of Ms. Ravelo’s sentence. See, e.g., Castanon, 476 Fed. App’x. at 507 (discussing the adequacy of a sentencing court’s consideration of the defendant’s “family obligations”); United States v. Baez-Arrogo, 553 Fed. App’x. 922, 37 923 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that the sentencing court properly considered the defendant’s “family circumstances”). To be clear, Ms. Ravelo will already be incarcerated for among the e. Ms. Ravelo’s Poor Health and Long-Term Prescription Drug Addiction Support the Sentence Sought Finally, Ms. Ravelo respectfully requests that the Court consider the significant adverse consequences, beyond the loss of her freedom, that will result when Ms. Ravelo is imprisoned. In particular, she would point the Court to her physical, mental and emotional health among the “characteristics” relevant to determining her sentence. See United States v. Tucker, 444 Fed. App’x. 538, 541 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding the sentencing court gave “meaningful consideration” to defendant’s health issues); United States v. Brown, 357 Fed. App’x. 483, 487 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding sentence to be procedurally reasonable and noting that the district court “explicitly addressed [defendant]’s health issues”); Sweet, 376 Fed. App’x. at 280 (noting that “[t]he District Court began by considering Sweet’s personal history and characteristics,” including his “medical problems,” which it found “supported a lenient sentence”); United States v. Baynor, 335 Fed. App’x. 163, 167-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the sentencing court properly weighed the 38 defendant’s medical condition); United States v. Fetterhoff, 328 Fed. App’x. 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding sentence was substantively reasonable because “[t]he District Court clearly considered [defendant]’s health in crafting its sentence”); United States v. Aguayo, 563 Fed. App’x. 727, 728-29 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that district court’s decision to impose a lenient sentence was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including defendant’s health problems); United States v. White, 506 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that the district court properly considered “factors that were not recognizable as matters for departure under the guidelines [but] can and should be evaluated in reaching a fair and equitable sentence . . . things like the Defendant’s age, his minimal criminal record, [and] his medical condition”). 39 3. Application of the § 3553(a)(2) Factors Also Warrants a Sentence of No More than 48 Months Imprisonment Ms. Ravelo recognizes that she must, and will, be punished for her offense, the seriousness of which she does not dispute. She respectfully submits, however, that a prison sentence beyond 48 months would be greater than necessary to accomplish the purposes of sentencing. Indeed, leaving aside the horror of even one day of imprisonment, any member of the public who has observed the extent to which Ms. Ravelo has already suffered emotionally, professionally and financially, as well as the very public scrutiny that this case has received, would understand that actions like Ms. Ravelo’s will be severely punished. In this sense, a sentence of 48 months would most certainly “reflect the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote respect for the law and . . . provide just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (providing that, at sentencing, the Court shall consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to provide just punishment for the offense; . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the 41 defendant; . . . and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”). a. Deterrence As a matter of specific deterrence and in the interests of protecting the public, there is, quite simply, no chance that Ms. Ravelo will reoffend. Indeed, future criminality is inconceivable in Ms. Ravelo’s case. As the letters provided show, and as her genuine remorse, see supra at 20-23, and post-offense efforts, see supra at 23-25, confirm, to say that Ms. Ravelo has learned her lesson is a profound understatement. The Court can be certain that she will never again expose herself or her family to the negative consequences of criminal conduct: Her desire to keep her family intact may have led her to make some less than perfect decisions, but I know she is a good person, a loving and compassionate human being, and an incredibly devoted mother. I truly believe she deserves an opportunity to be a productive member of society again. There is no doubt in my mind that she has learned much from this painful experience and would never do anything to put her boys or herself at risk again. Ex. 9 ( letter); Ex. 8 ( letter) (“[H]er prospects of ever falling into crime again are zero.”). The Government, even as it concedes that “[b]ased on her funds and the forfeiture in this case, Ravelo will not be able to live the lifestyle she loves upon release,” Gov’t Memo. at 29, claims that “a sentence at the top end of the agreed-upon range will serve to assure that Ravelo, if tempted, does not resort to crime.” Id. at 29-30. But even leaving aside that this takes no account of Ms. Ravelo’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility, the Government’s claim ignores that Keila will never again be in the position to be “tempted,” for she has been disbarred, will never practice law again, and thus could never be in a position to commit the same offense in the future. See United States v. Vigil, 998 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1157–58 (D.N.M. 2014) (addressing deterrence objectives of § 3553(a) and finding that defendant’s loss of 42 professional license rendered her “unlikely to reoffend” and that sentence imposed was “still long enough to deter most people—particularly professionals—who might be tempted to engage in similar crime.”). Nor is a sentence beyond 48 months necessary to advance § 3553(a)(2)’s general deterrence objective. As some courts have observed, a criminal prosecution itself serves as significant deterrence. United States v. Stern, 590 F. Supp. 2d 945, 958 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“‘The mere fact of [the defendant’s] prosecution deters others from engaging in this sort of conduct, and a sentence of incarceration will act as a further deterrent to others contemplating such activity. The value of any longer sentence as a deterrent, over and above these other factors, would be marginal.’” (quoting United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (D. Neb. 2008))). But beyond the mere fact of prosecution, and of course, the lengthy prison sentence that will be imposed here, there is so much more about this case that will undoubtedly deter others from engaging in the conduct to which Ms. Ravelo has pleaded guilty. Indeed, anyone looking at this case would understand not only that they risk losing their freedom for years, but also that they would, as Keila has, lose their license to practice law and a career that, in her case, took decades to build; they would, given the relentless publicity that has attended this matter, suffer the complete and truly irreversible destruction of their reputations;4 they would understand that, See, e.g., Ex-Willkie Farr and Hunton & Williams Lawyer Disbarred After Admitting to $7.8M Fraud (July 6, 2018), available at https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/07/06/ex-willkiefarr-and-hunton-williams-lawyer-disbarred-after-admitting-to-7-8m-fraud/?slreturn=20180817 112051; Ex-Willkie, Hunton Partner Disbarred Over $7.8M Fraud (June 28, 2018), available at https://www.law360.com/articles/1058569/ex-willkie-hunton-partner-disbarred-over-7-8m-fraud; Lawyer admits bilking 2 law firms out of millions (Nov. 21, 2017), available at https://www.nj.com/bergen/index.ssf/2017/11/lawyer_admits_bilking_2_law_firms_out_of_ millions.html; Ex-Big Law Partner Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud Conspiracy, Tax Evasion Charges (Nov. 20, 2017), available at https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/ newyorklawjournal/2017/11/20/ ex-big-law-partner-pleads-guilty-to-wire-fraud-evasioncharges/; Atty Fights Subpoena For Tell-All Book On Ex-Willkie Partner (Sept. 7, 2017), 4 43 like Keila, that could lose all of their assets and personal property to forfeiture, leaving them in financial ruin that will likely be a lifelong consequence of their actions; and they would see the devastating effects on their physical, mental, and emotional health that result from their conduct. The notion that somehow the deterrent effect resulting from all of this would be greater because a six-year, as opposed to a four-year sentence, is imposed is unsupportable, and not in the least articulated by the Government in its heartless submission. In sum, a sentence in excess of 48 months would be excessive in this case, and the additional two years’ imprisonment that the Government asks the Court to impose on Ms. Ravelo would serve no deterrent purpose at all, let alone one that the Government has articulated.5 b. Rehabilitation Nor would a sentence beyond 48 months’ imprisonment serve to provide Ms. Ravelo “with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). In fact, given the extensive and debilitating physical, mental, and emotional conditions from which Ms. Ravelo presently suffers, available at https://www.law360.com/articles/961529/atty-fights-subpoena-for-tell-all-book-onex-willkie-partner; Lawyer Tied to Ex-Willkie Partner's Fraud Case Speaks Out (Nov. 30, 2016), available at https://www.law.com//newyork lawjournal/almID/1202773532335/Lawyer-Tied-toExWillkie-Partners-Fraud-Case-Speaks-Out/; Ex-partner accused of bilking her law firms acted as her husband 'coercively demanded,' lawyer says (Aug. 27, 2015), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ex_ partner_accused_of_bilking_her_law_firms_acted_ as_her_husband_coercively; A Bentley, Secret Emails and a Credit-Card Antitrust Case. The Strange Life of Lawyer Keila Ravelo (Aug. 30, 2015), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/ lawyers-offstage-actions-threaten-antitrust-pact-1440970174; Former BigLaw Partner Charged in NJ with Bilking NY Firms (Dec. 22, 2014), available at https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/ almID/1202713188764/former-biglaw-partner-charged-in-nj-with-bilking-ny-firms/. As the basis for its general deterrence argument, the Government simply asserts, without explanation, that “72 months’ imprisonment is the best way to send a message to others who may be tempted to engage in similar conduct” and that “a sentence of 48 months . . . will not sufficiently deter others . . . .” Gov’t Memo. at 30. It cannot and does not explain why this is so, with studies, evidence or other basis to overcome the parsimony principle. 5 44 detailed above, the time that Ms. Ravelo spends in prison will serve only to interrupt the current care that she receives and so desperately needs. See United States v. Kravetz, 948 F. Supp. 2d 89, 116 (D. Mass. 2013) (“[T]hat jail will interrupt [defendant’s] continuity of care and exacerbate his compromised health - are validated by courts and commentators alike. Indeed, the increased risk of stress and infection in the unsterile prison setting is so well documented, as to be a truism.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Pineyro, 372 F. Supp. 2d 133, 139-40 (D. Mass. 2005) (imposing a sentencing below the Guidelines range finding that “[a] sentence within the Guidelines range . . . would substantially disrupt an existing, elaborate and required medical treatment plan for [defendant], wholly without justification”). Of course, Ms. Ravelo’s care will be disrupted – the only question is whether this sentencing factor, which Congress requires this Court to consider (though the Government completely ignores it) will be served better by a sentence of six rather than four years. It will not. Indeed, because the treatment that Ms. Ravelo will require in prison will be significant, a sentence of six rather than four years will increase the costs to be borne by taxpayers, an aspect of this factor as courts have considered it. See United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010) (“imprisoning [defendant] would simply pass the cost of medical care on to taxpayers”); United States v. LaraCastillo, 310 Fed. App’x 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming sentence and finding district court considered all § 3553(a) factors, including “the cost to taxpayers associated with housing [defendant]” with health problems). Put simply, a sentence in excess of 48 months would frustrate, not serve, the rehabilitative purpose of providing Ms. Ravelo with the care she needs in the “most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). c. Just Punishment Ms. Ravelo recognizes that she will be punished for her criminal conduct, and as the discussion above makes clear, she does not dispute “the seriousness of the offense” within the 45 meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). She respectfully submits, however, that a sentence of no more than four years’ imprisonment would be serious punishment indeed. In assessing whether this is so, the Court must keep in mind that the punishment it imposes must, given all of the circumstances, be “just,” and that “a sentence of imprisonment may work to promote not respect, but derision, of the law if the law is viewed as merely a means to dispense harsh punishment without taking into account the real conduct and circumstances involved in sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 54 (citation omitted). As discussed herein, “taking into account the real conduct and circumstances” of this case and this defendant, including the devastating ways by which Ms. Ravelo has already suffered, discussed in detail above, a sentence greater than 48 months would not only be unfair and inconsistent with the law and the sentence that Feliz and the Government have agreed is appropriate for his role in the offense, but would do a real disservice to our system of justice by promoting not respect, but disrespect for the law. (1) Ms. Ravelo has already been punished severely for her crimes. In that regard, in fashioning a just punishment for Ms. Ravelo, the Court must consider the ways in which she has already been punished by virtue of her arrest and criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. D.M., 942 F. Supp. 2d 327, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that “a lifetime of collateral consequences” attach to a criminal defendant after being convicted, which may be considered to determine whether the sentence imposed “reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law and provides just punishment”). The concrete and permanent ways by which Ms. Ravelo has already paid for her crimes are set forth at length above. See, e.g., supra 43. That punishment is also documented in the letters here provided to the Court. Thus, as aptly described by 46 Keila has accepted responsibility for her part. She has lost her reputation (labeled a criminal), her career (disbarred), and lost all of her assets (went from the 1% to poverty). Former colleagues and even friends have walked away, isolating her. Her punishment began the day she was arrested almost 3 years ago. Ex. 14 ( letter). That same sentiment echoes throughout the many other letters submitted by friends and family, which detail the utter devastation that Ms. Ravelo has already endured. See Ex. 1 ( letter) (“She was disbarred, cannot ever get a good job commensurate with her intelligence and education, she is bankrupt, her name and reputation are mud and people she loved and thought were true friends have abandoned her. Her supposed friend of over 25 years is writing a book to exploit ”); Ex. 2 letter) (“She has lost everything to this situation: her reputation, her career, the countless people who we thought were friends, the money she made is gone or forfeited.”); Ex. 3 ( ) (“She built something from nothing and lost it all.”); Ex. 5 ( letter) (“The charges have ruined Keila’s reputation with her career, colleagues and many friends which she has so carefully built over the last 30 years.”); Ex. 13 ( letter) (“Everything she has worked hard for is gone, her career, her reputation but most important her boys suffering is . . . incredibly painful for her.”); Ex. 17 ( letter) (“In 2014, Keila Ravelo, as I had known her died . . . I have seen the profound effects that Keila’s arrest and criminal prosecution have had on Keila and her sons. Keila has suffered many health breakdowns.”); Ex. 9 ( letter) (Keila has “lost EVERY home, car, and material thing she owned, as a result of this. Most penetrating to me is her career. Being an Attorney at the highest level, as she was, being a woman of color, was NO easy task and dare I say that it was harder for her than any other. The one thing she spent years and years to acquire, is gone forever. That, along with the public humiliation, in itself, is horrific punishment.”); Ex. 8 ( 47 letter) (“She has lost all material things, reputation, was disbarred. Melvin Feliz betrayed her during the marriage unbeknownst to her in multiple ways. After the marriage he has continued to betray and defame her.”); Ex. 18 ( letter) (“She has been at home pretty much full time in a self- imposed prison the last years.”). These consequences can be and must be considered in assessing whether the penalty imposed is in fact just. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 141 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding district court appropriately concluded, pursuant to § 3553(a), that the defendant’s “conviction made it doubtful that the defendant could pursue his career as an academic or translator, and therefore that the need for further deterrence and protection of the public is lessened because the conviction itself already visits substantial punishment on the defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Panyard, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34978, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. April 23, 2009) (noting district court may weigh factors such as career loss, reduction of family finances, and loss of community standing pursuant to § 3553(a)); United States v. Scott, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (“Although defendant committed a serious crime, the mitigating factors were such that confinement in prison was not needed to provide just punishment. . . . Defendant also suffered significant collateral consequences in the probable loss of her job, which added to the punitiveness of her conviction.”); United States v. Mateo, 299 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[B]eyond the offender’s actual deprivation of liberty when incarcerated, a host of other penalties and burdens always attend criminal conviction, to name a few: losses of family life, of socioeconomic status, of employment and career opportunities; diminution of certain civil rights and entitlements; and countless humiliations and indignities commonly associated with living in confinement.”). Here, the only just sentence when taking into account the myriad and very profound ways in which 48 Ms. Ravelo has already been punished, considered through the prism of § 3553(a)’s command that a sentence be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” is a term of incarceration of 48 months. (2) The period during which Ms. Ravelo is incarcerated will also profoundly harm her family, and in particular, her sons. In imposing a sentence, the Court should also be aware that any term of imprisonment will not only punish Ms. Ravelo, but also those around her. In this regard, “[i]t is appropriate – indeed, essential – that the District Court consider the impact of a defendant’s family circumstances on the purposes underlying sentencing.” United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2002). As described above, Ms. Ravelo’s sons have already suffered tremendously as a result of Ms. Ravelo’s criminal conduct and that of their father, who betrayed his wife and two sons in extraordinary ways. Of course, the impact of having a parent imprisoned is devastating for any child. But having both parents incarcerated at the same time is unthinkable. The rest of Ms. Ravelo’s family has also suffered deeply and will continue to suffer during any period of incarceration. explains: Keila “has asked our family for forgiveness for all that she has put us through, as we are also victims of her mistakes. Our mom is 80, our dad is 90, and they are suffering. We are all suffering.” Ex. 4 ( letter). To reduce the collateral damage to and the rest of Ms. Ravelo’s family, who should not have to endure anymore pain, and thereby to achieve a just punishment as the courts have interpreted this goal, this Court should accordingly impose a sentence of no more than 48 months. Indeed, sentencing Ms. Ravelo to a term longer than that agreed upon by the Government and Mr. Feliz would serve only to exacerbate the pain of the innocent family members who do not deserve to suffer any further. See Castanon, 476 Fed. App’x. at 507 49 (discussing the adequacy of a sentencing court’s consideration of the defendant’s “family obligations”); Baker, 502 F.3d at 467-68 (affirming district court’s sentence of probation, which was based on “the effect incarceration would have on defendant’s older son”);United States v. Baez-Arrogo, 553 Fed. App’x 922, 923 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming a sentence in which the district court granted a defendant “a nine-month downward variance because of his family circumstances”); United States v. Trapero-Cortez, 501 Fed. App’x 800, 801 (10th Cir. 2012) (district court granted defendant’s request for a downward variance, citing his “commitment to his family”); United States v. E.L., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66063, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2016) (imposing below-Guidelines sentence upon finding “[a]n incarceratory Guidelines sentence . . . [would] deprive [the defendant’s] family of vital financial and emotional support while doing little to further protect the public”); United States v. Bortnick, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11744, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2006) (“In the instant matter, this Court does not believe that taking defendant out of his family environment for a protracted period of time will serve a useful social or penal purpose. Defendant’s contribution to the care of [his son] and to his family’s financial circumstances is crucial.”). 4. A Sentence of No More than 48 Months’ Imprisonment Is Warranted to Avoid Unwarranted Sentence Disparities In Accordance with § 3553(a)(6) Finally, Section 3553(a)(6) directs sentencing courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Thus, “the disparities that matter are those between ‘similarly situated’ individuals.” United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 446 n.11 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “[T]he purpose of § 3553(a)(6) is to promote national uniformity in the sentences imposed by federal courts.” United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 2012). 50 The most recent sentencing statistics released by the United States Sentencing Commission are instructive in this regard. See United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 261 (3d Cir. 2007) (considering Sentencing Commission report and statistics in evaluating potential sentencing disparities). Between October 1, 2017 and March 31, 2018, federal judges nationwide have imposed sentences within the advisory Guidelines range only 42.1% of the time in cases where fraud is the primary offense. United States Sentencing Commission Quarterly Data Report, Preliminary Fiscal Year 2018 Data, Table 10A, available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencingstatistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_Quarter_Report_2nd_18_Final.pdf/. During that same period, the average sentence imposed in a fraud case was 49.9% below the Guideline minimum. Id. at Table 16A. Thus, even if the Government’s position regarding the suggested Guidelines range for Ms. Ravelo were accepted, Ms. Ravelo’s sentence, to be aligned with the national average (and putting aside the agreement she has reached with the Government), would be approximately 43.5 months. And if Ms. Ravelo’s position regarding the suggested Guidelines range were accepted, Ms. Ravelo’s sentence would be 35 months. Either way, recent sentencing statistics in federal courts across the country align much more closely (and indeed are less severe than) the sentence here sought by Ms. Ravelo. Perhaps even more to the point, recent cases within this District involving similar crimes and similarly-situated defendants (i.e., attorneys, as the Government repeatedly emphasizes in its sentencing submission) also counsel in favor of a sentence of no more than 48 months’ imprisonment for Ms. Ravelo. See United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2007) (district court erred by failing to address argument “that two cases recently decided in the same district—both of which concerned [the same offense]—provided bench marks for determining a 51 proper sentence, and that the court should hew close to the sentences in those cases (thirty months and forty-six months) in order to ‘avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among [similarly-situated] defendants’”). For example, just last year the Government touted the sentence imposed against Joseph W. Witkowski, a former attorney, who pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with one count each of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. See https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/former-nj-lawyer- sentenced-four-years-prison-408-million-mortgage-fraud-scheme. On March 8, 2017, the Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez sentenced Witkowski to 48 months in prison for his role in that conspiracy, which caused lenders to release $40.8 million based on fraudulent mortgage loan applications and then laundered the proceeds of the fraud. Id. Witkowski’s sentence was also consistent with – if not more severe – than sentences imposed in the District of New Jersey in recent years in cases involving defendants with similar records who engaged in conduct, like Ms. Ravelo, representing a breach of trust. By way of illustration: • On May 26, 2015, Adam Gottbetter, a New York corporate and securities lawyer, was sentenced by the Honorable Jose L. Linares to 18 months in prison “for orchestrating a stock market manipulation scheme designed to artificially inflate the stock price of two publicly traded companies through manipulative trading and other fraudulent means.” See https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/new-york-securities-lawyer-and-owner-registered -broker-dealer-sentenced-18-months-prison. • On April 27, 2015, Thomas Frey, a Middlesex County, New Jersey lawyer and certified public accountant, was sentenced by the Honorable Anne E. Thompson to 27 months in prison for conspiring with a New Jersey mortgage broker to extort and defraud victims by falsely representing to them that they were the subjects of criminal investigations. See https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/middlesex-county-new-jersey-lawyer-sentenced-27months-prison-extorting-and-defrauding. • On June 27, 2013, Timothy Provost, a former partner of a law firm in Freehold, New Jersey, was sentenced by the Honorable Michael A. Shipp to 33 months in prison “for defrauding the firm and its clients by improperly diverting more than $885,000 from the law firm.” See https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/former-new-jersey-lawyer-sentenced52 33-months-prison-embezzling-more-885000-law-firm-funds. In sum, any sentence beyond 48 months’ imprisonment for Ms. Ravelo – much less the 72 month sentence the Government seeks – would create an unwarranted disparity not only with Ms. Ravelo’s co-defendant, Melvin Feliz – an unprincipled and unjust result, particularly in view of Feliz’s increased culpability and lengthy criminal history, among other things – but also “defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). CONCLUSION For all of the reasons set forth above, and those to be further elucidated at the sentencing proceeding before the Court, Ms. Ravelo respectfully requests that the Court impose a sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment. Respectfully submitted, GIBBONS P.C. Attorneys for Defendant Keila Ravelo Dated: September 19, 2018 By: s/ Lawrence S. Lustberg Lawrence S. Lustberg, Esq. John D. Haggerty, Esq. 53