A STRATEGIC ECONOMY OF FORCE JULY 2017 Afghanistan  is  an  Expensive  Disaster  for  the  U.S.   •  •  •  •  •  •  As  of  2017,  the  Afghan  War  has  cost  the  USG  15  years,  2,389  U.S.  military  lives,  20,049  U.S.  military   wounded,  and  $826  billion  spent,  not  counMng  1  Trillion  dollars  in  Veteran  Healthcare  costs   –  ReputaMonal  damage  with  both  allies  and  enemies:  America  is  seen  to  be  failing,  and  this   empowers  ALL  enemies   Costs  to  Afghanistan:  173,000  killed,  including  31,000  civilians,  101  insider  aWacks  (in  which  ANDSF   personnel  turned  on  fellow  security  forces),  which  killed  257  Afghans  in  a  20  month  period  in  2015  &   2016   On  average,  2,000  Afghan  soldiers  defect  each  month—in  effect,  the  U.S.  pays  to  build  an  army  for  its   enemy   The  ANA  is  not  yet  capable  of  defending  itself,  and  is  rapidly  losing  territory  to  ISIS,  AQ,  the  Haqqani   Network,  and  the  Taliban—who  are  now  stronger  than  they  were  in  2001   The  U.S.  cannot  afford  a  failed  state—nor  can  it  afford  its  current  expenditure  to  support  a  losing   baWle.  The  USG  presently  spends  more  on  Afghanistan  than  the  enBre  German  Defense  budget  and   next  year  more  than  the  enBre  UK  Defense  Budget.   We  need  a  new  approach  to  salvage  a  horribly  run  effort  of  America’s  longest  war  and  sBll  prevent   terrorism  from  being  exported  to  our  homeland.     July 2017   “The  defini*on  of  insanity  is  to  do  the  same   thing  repeatedly  and  expect  a  different  result”      Albert  Einstein   2 Afghan  Forces  Have  LiWle  to  Show  For  All  Those  Costs   •  The  ANSF  is  corrupt  and  weak:   –  EsMmate  that  40%  of  the  security   forces  reportedly  in  Helmand  do   not  exist   –  The  U.S.  is  paying  for  “ghost   soldiers”   –   U.S.  military  has  lost  visibility  of   ANSF  forces  below  Brigade  level   allowing  corrupMon  and  failed   Afghan  leadership  to  rot  units   wholesale.   •  Afghanistan  is  approaching  an  early   1990’s  implosion  into  Civil  War.   –  This  would  cause  complete  state   meltdown  and  enhance  the   posiMons  of  the  20  odd  terrorist   groups  resident  in  country.   July 2017 Half  of  Afghanistan’s  terrain  is   now  a  possible  terrorist   sanctuary   n   n/ n   n   n   n   Taliban  DesignaBon   Full  Control   Contested   Significant  Presence   Minimal  Presence   No  Presence/Unknown   %  of  Taliban   Control   100%   40-­‐99%   %  of  Districts   10%   48%   10-­‐39%   1-­‐9%   0%/Unknown   15%   2%   26%   3 The  Terrorists  are  no  longer  afraid:  Two  daylight  open  air  Victory   parades  with  captured  US  equipment:  May  and  June  2017   Above:  The  Taliban  parades  in  the  district  center  of   Sangin  in  broad  daylight  UNAFRAID—a  month  a>er   Op.  Resolute  Support  denied  Afghan  forces  had  been   defeated  there    Sangin,  May  2017   60  miles  NW  of  Kandahar  Air  Base   July 2017 Ghazni,  June  2017   75  Miles  South  of  Kabul   4 More  Troops  &  More  Money  Are  Not  The  Answer—That’s   Been  Tried  ExhausMvely   120,000   120   100   80   100,000   80,000   60   60,000   40   40,000   20   U.S.  Troops   Non-­‐U.S.  Troops   2017   2016   2015   2014   2013   2012   2011   2010   2009   2008   2007   2006   2005   2004   0   2003   20,000   2002   Troops  in  Afghanistan   140,000   Current  DoD  spend  in   Afghanistan  is  as  high   as  it  was  in  2008,  when   there  were  5X  as  many   troops   DoD  Enacted  Budget   Though  troops  were  drawn   down  from  2010  to  2014,   DoD  spend  stayed  high   160,000   0   U.S.  DoD  Spend   It  is  not  a  maWer  of  10,  25  or  100,000  troops—  the  paradigm  of   their  approach  is  clearly  incorrect   5 Sources: Brookings Institution, DoD July 2017 5 The  Way  Forward   Desired  End  State   •  • Deny  terrorist  sanctuary  in  AFG     • Bolster  the  legiMmate  Kabul   Government  that  can  be  held   accountable  for  Afghan  terrain   • Constant  pressure  on  Taliban,  Al  Qaeda   and  ISIS  &  terrorist  groups  resident  in   •  Afghanistan   • Government  CorrupMon  is  reduced    and   moving  toward  self  sustainment   July 2017 Afghanistan  is  effecMvely  in  bankruptcy   –  60%  of  its  total  public  expenditures  are  sMll   funded  by  donors  (mainly  the  U.S.)   –  The  U.S.  alone  covered  90%  of  its  total  security   expenditures  in  the  same  period   The  best  way  forward  is  analogous  to  a  Chapter  11   reorganizaBon   –  A  designated  trustee  to  preside  over  all  U.S.   policy  in  Afghanistan  (&  Pakistan)   –  Allow  for  Afghan  poliBcal  de-­‐centralizaBon  the   way  it  worked  for  Centuries   –  Bolster  the  Afghan  security  forces  in  a  proven   way   –  Focus  on  Afghanistan’s  economic  arteries,  rather   than  its  populaBon  centers   –  Deny  the  Taliban  its  sources  of  income   –  Develop  a  private  sector  to  wean  the   government  from  dependence  on  donors   6 Key  Support  needed  for  ANSF   1.  Long  Term  Ba`alion  and  below  Mentors:  They  would  live,  train  and   patrol  alongside  their  Afghan  Counterparts.  Unlike  the  DOD  model   where  troops  rotate  every  6-­‐9  months,  these  mentors  would  stay   with  the  same  unit  and  region  for  years.   2.  AviaBon  Support:    Contractor  provided  Day/Night  ISR/CAS/   Medevac/Lip  and  resupply  needed  by  Air.  Fixed  wing  and  Helo.   These  aircrap  would  be  considered  Afghan  Air  Force  with  Afghans   making  any  weapons  decisions.  Western  pro  pilots  and  mechanics   ensure  safety  and  reliability     3.  ANSF  Governance  Support:    Combat  LogisMcs  and  Base  life  support,   Payroll  and  HR  all  need  professionalizaMon  to  ensure  Units  are   supported  in  a  Mmely  and  reliable  manner.  Must  eliminate  Ghost   soldiers  and  rampant  corrupMon  destroying  the  ANSF  from  the   inside.       July 2017 8 ANA  GENERAL  STAFF   (KABUL) LT.  GENERAL  Mohammad  Sharif  Yaftali 201  CORPS (KABUL) LTG  Mohammad  W aziri HQ   BATTALION KABUL 1ST  BRIGADE PRESIDENTIAL  PALACE 2nd    BRIGADE POL-­‐E-­‐CHARKHI 3rd    BRIGADE JALALABAD ANAAC  SUPPORT   SQUADRON KABUL KABUL   REGIONAL   LOGISTICS  DEPOT KABUL   CORP  LEVEL   BUSINESS   SUPPORT  OFFICE KABUL 203  CORPS (GARDEZ) General  Abdul  Wasi HQ   BATTALION GARDEZ 1ST  BRIGADE KHOST 2ND    BRIGADE SHARANA 3RD  BRIGADE GHAZNI ANAAC  SUPPORT   SQUADRON GARDEZ GARDEZ   REGIONAL   LOGISTICS  DEPOT GARDEZ CORP  LEVEL   BUSINESS   SUPPORT  OFFICE GARDEZ 205TH  CORPS (KANDAHAR) General  Imam  Nazar HQ   BATTALION KANDAHAR HQ   BATTALION HERAT 1ST  BRIGADE 1ST  BRIGADE KANDAHAR HERAT 209TH  CORPS (MAZAR-­‐I-­‐SHARIF) B.G.  Amanullah  Mubin HQ   BATTALION MAZAR-­‐I-­‐SHARIF 1ST  BRIGADE MAZAR-­‐I-­‐SHARIF 2ND  BRIGADE 2ND  BRIGADE 2ND  BRIGADE QALAT FARAH 3RD  BRIGADE COMMANDO   BATTALION HERAT COMMANDO   BATTALION MAZAR-­‐I-­‐SHARIF ANAAC  SUPPORT   SQUADRON ANAAC  SUPPORT   SQUADRON KANDAHAR 4TH  BRIGADE HERAT TARIN  KOWT HERAT  R EGIONAL   LOGISTICS  DEPOT COMMANDO   BATTALION KANDAHAR HERAT CORP  LEVEL   BUSINESS   SUPPORT  OFFICE ANAAC  SUPPORT   SQUADRON HERAT KUNDUZ MAZAR-­‐I-­‐SHARIF MAZAR-­‐I-­‐SHARIF   REGIONAL  L OGS   DEPOT MAZAR-­‐I-­‐SHARIF CORP  LEVEL   BUSINESS   SUPPORT  OFFICE MAZAR-­‐I-­‐SHARIF 215th  CORPS (LASHKAR  GAH) B.G.  Mohammed  Ahmadzai HQ   BATTALION LASHKAR  G AH 1ST  BRIGADE GARMSIR 2ND  BRIGADE DELARAM 3RD  BRIGADE CAMP  SHORABAK COMMANDO   BATTALION LASHKAR  G AH ANAAC  SUPPORT   SQUADRON LASHKAR  G AH LASHKAR  GAH   REGIONAL   LOGISTICS  DEPOT LASHKAR  G AH KANDAHAR KANDAHAR   REGIONAL   LOGISTICS  DEPOT KANDAHAR July 2017 207TH  CORPS (HERAT) Gen.  Abdul  Nasir  Hedayat CORPS-­‐LEVEL  EMBEDDED   BUSINESS  TEAMS CORP  LEVEL   BUSINESS   SUPPORT  OFFICE KANDAHAR CORP  LEVEL   BUSINESS   SUPPORT  OFFICE LASKKAR  G AH 111th  Capital   Division Maj.  G.  Nasir  Ziaye  Com HQ   BATTALION KABUL 1ST  BRIGADE KABUL 2ND  BRIGADE LASHKAR  G AH HQ  Special   Security  Brigade KABUL   CORP  LEVEL   BUSINESS   SUPPORT  OFFICE KABUL Seamless  Drawdown  for  U.S./NATO  Forces   •  Mentor  and  Air  Projects  start  immediately  and  build   capacity  in  parallel  to  US/NATO  efforts.   –  Air  OperaMons  focus  on  supporMng  ANSF  units  in   need  of  support  and  not  conflicMng  with  USAF/CT   missions.   –  As  ANSF  Brigades  demonstrate  proven  capability   for  independent  operaMons,  the  assigned  US/ NATO  units  are  cleared  for  reprioriMzed  missions.   •  This  is  the  no  risk  method  for  transiMoning  home  the   US  ConvenMonal  forces  in  Afghanistan   July 2017 10 The  Wollman  Ice  Rink  Moment  of  the  Trump  AdministraBon   •  Afghanistan  is  effecMvely  a  failed  state,  despite  a  trillion  dollars  in  spending  -­‐  and  another   trillion  in  veterans’  health  care  costs  yet  to  be  paid   •  America  cannot  afford  infinite  spending,  while  American  defeat  emboldens  every  enemy,   and  makes  America  less  safe,  while  Afghanistan  remains  a  nucleus  for  terrorist   organizaMons     •  This  new  approach—a  “Strategic  Economy  of  Force”—accomplishes  the  following:   –  Applies  crushing  pressure  on  all  of  the  20  terrorist  organizaBons  resident  in   Afghanistan  &  Pakistan—from  ISIS  and  Al  Qaeda  to  the  Taliban  &  others:  zero   sanctuary  for  terrorists   –  Prevents  the  collapse  of  the  Kabul  Government   –  Minimizes  U.S.  casualty  risks   –  MiBgates  poliBcal  risk:  the  Afghan  government  is  stabilized,  terrain  is  recaptured,  and   corrupMon  is  reduced   –  Costs  are  reduced  significantly  for  a  sustainable  effort  against  terrorism.  This  costs   less  than  8%  of  what  USG  spends  now.   –  Provides  an  off-­‐ramp  to  the  longest  war  in  America’s  history  and  a  sustainable   victory  for  America       July 2017 11