Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 1 of 12 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA THE PROTECT DEMOCRACY PROJECT, INC. Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 17-CV-1000-CKK U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, Defendant. COMBINED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO NSA’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Michael P. Abate (DDC Bar No. MD28077) (DC Bar No. 1023343) Kaplan Johnson Abate & Bird LLP 710 W. Main St., 4th Floor Louisville, KY 40202 Phone: (502) 540-8280 Fax: (502) 540-8282 Benjamin L. Berwick (MA Bar No. 679207) The Protect Democracy Project, Inc. 2020 Pennsylvania Ave., NW #163 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 202-599-0466 Fax: 929-777-8428 Counsel for the Protect Democracy Project, Inc. Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 2 of 12 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................... ii INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1 RESPONSE TO NSA’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ......................................................... 2 ARGUMENT..................................................................................................................................................... 2 I. Congress Did Not Exempt the NSA from FOIA. ......................................................................... 2 II. The NSA’s Declaration Does Not Plausibly or Logically Explain How Evidence of an Unsolicited Request from the President to Publicly Undermine the FBI’s Ongoing Investigation Constitutes a “Function” or “Activity” of the NSA. .............................................. 4 III. Any Legitimate Interest in Nondisclosure Can Be Satisfied by Allowing the NSA to Invoke Exemptions Over Specific Portions of the Documents. .................................................. 7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................. 8 ii Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 3 of 12 INTRODUCTION This case concerns serious and troubling accusations against the President of the United States: that he attempted to use the National Security Agency (“NSA”) for his own personal benefit to publicly undermine the ongoing investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) into alleged collusion between Russia and the Trump campaign. The President’s improper request of the NSA is consistent with other known activities of the President during the same period, including his multiple requests to then-FBI Director Comey for his personal loyalty and to drop any investigation into the President’s former National Security Adviser, Michael Flynn. According to multiple news reports by major media outlets, NSA officials rebuffed the request and documented the President’s unusual and inappropriate contact. The NSA attempts to recast this remarkable series of events as if it were nothing more than a routine intelligence briefing of administration officials. That is simply not true. Indeed, the only reason that the requested records would exist (as there is every reason to believe they do) is that the President was asking the NSA to do something so outside its normal functions that the NSA Director rebuffed the President of the United States and senior NSA officials felt compelled to document this staggering breach of protocol. That cannot be described in any logical or plausible sense as an “activity” or “function” of the NSA. Therefore, Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act is simply irrelevant. On these incredibly unique and troubling facts, the public has a right to know whether senior government officials are engaged in misconduct. Indeed, that right is one of the very reasons FOIA exists. See, e.g., Bartko v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-5333, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 3673936, at *10 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2018) (“FOIA, at its core, operates on the assumption that ‘it is for the public to know and then to judge.’ . . . That is how FOIA helps ‘to hold the governors accountable to the governed.’” (citations omitted) (rejecting Glomar assertion)); see also, e.g., SAI v. Transportation Sec. Admin., 315 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D.D.C. 2018) (deliberative process privilege “disappears altogether when 1 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 4 of 12 there is any reason to believe government misconduct occurred” (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); cf. also Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1234 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The public interest in learning of a government employee’s misconduct increases as one moves up an agency’s hierarchical ladder.”). This Court should not permit the NSA to hide the very existence of such documents behind a declaration that is so boilerplate and vague as to be meaningless in its application to this case. RESPONSE TO NSA’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS Protect Democracy’s Motion for Summary Judgment contained a statement of material facts as to which there is no dispute, which is hereby incorporated by reference in opposition to the NSA’s motion. NSA’s opposition does not contest any of those factual assertions or assert that there are any disputes that would prohibit this Court from entering summary judgment. See LCvR 7(h)(1). With regard to NSA’s Statement of Material Facts, Protect Democracy does not dispute any of the factual assertions contained in Paragraphs 1-11 or 13 of that Statement. And while Protect Democracy does contest the accuracy of the assertions in Paragraphs 12 and 14-26, it does not contend that these disagreements are material factual disputes that render summary judgment on the Glomar issue premature. Rather, those paragraphs contain the NSA’s legal contentions about the validity of its Glomar assertion, which can and should be rejected at the summary judgment stage for the reasons explained below. ARGUMENT I. Congress Did Not Exempt the NSA from FOIA. The NSA’s brief implies that Congress enacted Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3605, in order to place all of the Agency’s documents off limits from FOIA requesters. But it did not. Rather, Section 6 has both logical and legal limits and must be “construed with sensitivity to the ‘hazard(s) that Congress foresaw.’” Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., 2 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 5 of 12 Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Am. Jewish Cong. v. Kreps, 574 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Acknowledging some logical limit to Section 6 is essential. As one district court presciently observed, if “section 6 is taken to its logical conclusion, it would allow the federal government to conceal information regarding blatantly illegal or unconstitutional activities simply by . . . claiming they implicated information about the NSA’s functions.” Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F.Supp.2d 899, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2006). That is precisely what the NSA is attempting to do here. In order to give meaning to the limits that Congress intended for Section 6, courts must be vigilant in resisting overbroad definitions of the “activities” and “functions” of the NSA. If the agency is permitted to stretch that term to its theoretical limits—as the NSA attempts to do in this case— Section 6 would completely swallow FOIA’s rule of disclosure. That is not what Congress intended, and this Court should make clear that even a broad withholding statute does not apply in every case. The most appropriate interpretation of Section 6’s scope is actually found in the declaration of Steven Thompson, the NSA’s Chief of Policy, Information, Performance, and Exports. As the Agency explained there, the purpose of Section 6 of the NSA Act was to protect the Agency’s sources and methods of intelligence gathering. See Thompson Declaration ¶ 11; see also Founding Church of Scientology, 610 F.2d at 829 n.46 (declining to decide whether the term “activities” of NSA includes anything more than sources and methods). There are times, of course, when revealing the mere fact of a communication between the NSA and another person or entity might well reveal those sources, methods, or targets. But this case presents no such risk. The White House and the NSA have repeatedly and publicly disclosed their interest in the Russia investigation. Indeed, the President seems obsessed with it. See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, 14 tweets that show Donald Trump’s Russia obsession is only growing worse, CNN.com (May 29, 2018). The only thing that would be revealed from requiring the Agency to confirm or deny the mere existence of the records at 3 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 6 of 12 issue in this case is whether the President attempted to lean on the NSA to undermine the investigation. That additional fact cannot reveal anything about the NSA’s sources or methods of intelligence gathering, rendering Section 6 irrelevant to this particular dispute. For these very same reasons, the NSA is wrong to suggest that this case is controlled by Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. National Security Agency, 678 F.3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (hereinafter, “EPIC”) or People for the Amer. Way Found. v. NSA/Cent. Sec. Serv., 462 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2006). Each of those cases concerned specific intelligence programs run by the NSA—in EPIC, the NSA’s “Information Assurance” program, and in People for the American Way, the NSA’s “Terrorist Surveillance Program.” Here, by contrast, there is no specific NSA program or activity at issue; simply a question of whether the President was trying to use the agency’s imprimatur for his own improper purposes. Indeed, even People for the American Way recognizes that “Section 6 is not without limits.” 462 F. Supp. 2d at 31. The NSA conveniently ignores that aspect of the case when it repeatedly makes its boilerplate assertions that any discussions with other government officials about any issue whatsoever are “activities” of the NSA. See, e.g., Thompson Declaration, ¶¶ 25, 28, 30. That kind of limitless view of Section 6’s scope would render FOIA virtually irrelevant to the NSA—something Congress could have done but chose not to do. II. The NSA’s Declaration Does Not Plausibly or Logically Explain How Evidence of an Unsolicited Request from the President to Publicly Undermine the FBI’s Ongoing Investigation Constitutes a “Function” or “Activity” of the NSA. The Agency’s declaration offers this Court little more than boilerplate slippery slope arguments that have little, if anything, to do with the facts of this case. It should be rejected as an illogical and implausible explanation for the Agency’s attempt to sustain its Glomar response. Most of the Declaration’s contents are simply irrelevant to this case. Mr. Thompson goes on for many pages about the NSA’s mission of deriving and analyzing signals intelligence (“SIGINT”) and communications intelligence (“COMINT”). See, e.g., Thompson Declaration ¶¶ 5-11, 30-31, 33. 4 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 7 of 12 His Declaration speaks in ominous terms about the need to protect those sources of intelligence from unwarranted intrusion, and the harms to national security that might result from requiring the Agency, in this case, to simply confirm the existence of the requested documents. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 25, 31-33. The fundamental problem for the NSA is that its Glomar assertion has nothing to do with protecting these kinds of intelligence sources and methods. The FOIA request at issue here seeks only a very narrow set of documents: internal NSA memo(s) written to memorialize an inappropriate phone call from the President of the United States, who attempted to use the NSA for his personal benefit to undermine any suggestion of improper collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. The mere fact of communication between the White House and the NSA cannot reveal anything about the Agency’s SIGINT and COMINT capabilities. Thus, all references to SIGINT and COMINT intelligence channels are just noise, meant to distract the public and this Court from the core issues in this case and make the consequences of ruling for Protect Democracy look severe. Similarly, the NSA errs in alleging that disclosing even the existence of the memo would reveal “that NSA possessed intelligence concerning a specific topic,” and/or “expose particulars concerning NSA’s activities and/or capabilities, the identity of those who may or not be potential (or actual) surveillance targets, and/or whether or not the Agency possesses foreign intelligence on a particular topic.” Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11 (quoting Thompson Decl. ¶¶ 31-32). Protect Democracy’s request for documents showing that the President improperly asked the NSA to undermine an FBI investigation does not seek any such information from the Agency. And, of course, if any responsive records happen to contain such details, the NSA can attempt to assert substantive claims of exemption over that specific information and make appropriate redactions (which Protect Democracy may or may not choose to challenge, depending on the credibility and plausibility of the Agency’s response). 5 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 8 of 12 In reality, what this case boils down to the NSA’s generalized concern that an adverse ruling on these particular facts will require the Agency, in all future cases, to disclose “whether or not it advised or spoke to a specific governmental principal on a stated day, concerning a particular topic.” Thompson Decl. ¶ 25. But that kind of boilerplate response “is not even in the ballpark” of what is required to sustain a valid Glomar assertion. Bartko, ___ F.3d ___, 2018 WL 3673936, at *6; cf. also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (“The Government’s argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”). Moreover, that abstract question is not presented by this case. Protect Democracy does not argue that anyone can FOIA the NSA to determine if it communicated with the “Secretary of State in the days leading up to a treaty signing with a particular country or to the Secretary of Defense in advance of a specific military operation.” Id. ¶ 31. In such a case the NSA could of course argue that confirmation of the existence of such undisclosed intelligence interests might credibly reveal something not known about the Agency’s functions or activities. But that concern is not present here. The NSA itself has already disclosed that it first discovered Russian attempts to influence the election and passed that information along to their “FBI teammates.” PDP’s SUMF (ECF No. 23-2) ¶ 7 & Exh. 2, p. 114. Moreover, as noted, the President has broadcast to the world his keen interest in the Russia investigation, which he has taken to calling a “Rigged Witch Hunt” of late. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Tells Sessions to ‘Stop This Rigged Witch Hunt Right Now,’ NY Times (Aug. 1, 2018). And the NSA “freely acknowledge[s]” that it regularly speaks to the President about intelligence issues. Thompson Decl. ¶ 31. Moreover, even during this litigation, NSA Director Rogers continued to testify publicly about the NSA’s involvement in the preparation of the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment declaring that Russia interfered with the 2016 Presidential Election. See, e.g., Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before U.S. Senate Select 6 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 9 of 12 Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 13, 2018) (“Admiral Rogers: I participated in that 2017 work. I stood by it then and I stand by it now, and I agree with Director Pompeo: This is not going to change or stop.”).1 Admiral Rogers also testified publicly that he raised concerns to the Director of National Intelligence about politicization of the selective declassification of the Nunes Memo and portions of a Congressional report about Russian oligarchs. Id. Given these numerous public statements by both the NSA and the President about the Russia investigation, it would reveal nothing that is not already obvious about the NSA’ intelligence interests even if the Agency confirmed the President placed a call to the NSA about the Russia investigation. Generalized fears about disclosing intelligence interests in other, hypothetical circumstances do not transform this into a case that threatens to reveal anything about the NSA’s own activities or functions. After all, if the requested documents exist, it is only because the NSA leaders viewed the President’s request as so inappropriate and outside the Agency’s mission that they felt compelled to document it (as former FBI Director Comey did of similarly inappropriate requests during that same time period, see PDP SUMF ¶¶ 13-26). Indeed, these facts are so egregious and unusual that if the Court rules Glomar is not applicable, the Government surely will argue in the next hypothetical case seeking access to records of a previously undisclosed intelligence interest that any adverse ruling here is easily distinguishable and does not control that alternative fact pattern. Simply put, there is no need to give Section 6 an implausibly broad reading in this case in order to protect the Agency’s ability to give it a reasonable reading in another, hypothetical future case. III. Any Legitimate Interest in Nondisclosure Can Be Satisfied by Allowing the NSA to Invoke Exemptions Over Specific Portions of the Documents. The NSA did not face a binary choice: assert Glomar or release the records in full. Instead of hiding behind an inappropriate invocation of the Glomar doctrine, the Agency could—and should—  Available at https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threatshearing-1# (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).  1 7 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 10 of 12 have confirmed or denied the existence of responsive records and, assuming they do exist, asserted any exemptions that would justify withholding the documents in whole or part. If any of the actual contents of the documents contain SIGINT or COMINT intelligence, or pertain to undisclosed intelligence interests, the Agency could of course redact those portions in reliance on Section 6 of the NSA Act and Exemption 3 of FOIA (and any other applicable FOIA exemptions). If it does so, FOIA also would compel the Agency to release any reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of the records to Protect Democracy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.”). (And, of course, Protect Democracy could choose to challenge those withholdings if the NSA’s claimed exemptions appear inappropriate). In arguing for this approach, Protect Democracy is not contending that an agency must redact records actually subject to a valid Glomar assertion, as NSA misleadingly contends. See NSA Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 24-25. Rather, Protect Democracy simply contends that the normal procedures that apply in a FOIA case provide more than adequate protection to any legitimate intelligence interest the Agency may have in these documents. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject the NSA’s reliance on the Glomar doctrine and should grant Protect Democracy’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dated: August 30, 2018 8 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 11 of 12 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Michael P. Abate Michael P. Abate (DDC Bar No. MD28077) (DC Bar No. 1023343) Kaplan Johnson Abate & Bird LLP 710 W. Main St., 4th Floor Louisville, KY 40202 Phone: (502) 540-8280 Fax: (502) 540-8282 Benjamin L. Berwick (MA Bar No. 679207) Counsel The Protect Democracy Project, Inc. 2020 Pennsylvania Ave., NW #163 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 202-599-0466 Fax: 929-777-8428 Counsel for Plaintiff 9 Case 1:17-cv-01000-CKK Document 26 Filed 08/30/18 Page 12 of 12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on August 30, 2018, I filed the foregoing through the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will serve all counsel of record. s/Michael P. Abate Counsel for Plaintiff