Case 1:17-cr-00201-ABJ Document 249 Filed 04/04/18 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR.,

Crim. No. 17-201-1 (ABJ)

Defendant

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PAUL J. MANAFORT, JR.’S
MOTION TO DISMISS ONE OF TWO COUNTS AS MULTIPLICITOUS
The United States of America, by and through Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III,
hereby files this response to defendant Paul J. Manafort, Jr.’s motion (Doc. 236) to dismiss either
Count Four or Count Five of the Superseding Indictment (Doc. 202) on the ground that the two
counts are multiplicitous. Manafort’s motion lacks merit. The two counts do not charge the same
offense within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause because proving a violation of the
Foreign Agent Registration Act’s (FARA) false-statements provision, 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2), does
not necessarily establish a violation of 18 U.S.C § 1001(a), and proving a Section 1001(a) violation
does not necessarily establish a false-statements violation under FARA. But even if Manafort’s
argument had merit, pre-trial dismissal would be unwarranted because any multiplicity here
presents only a problem of multiple punishments that can and should be addressed post-trial if the
jury convicts Manafort on both counts. Accordingly, Manafort’s motion should be denied.
BACKGROUND
Counts Four and Five of the Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) are based on
representations that Manafort and co-conspirator Richard Gates caused to be made in letters
submitted to the Department of Justice’s FARA Unit in November 2016 and February 2017. The

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Indictment alleges that, in 2012, Manafort and Gates arranged for two D.C.-based lobbying firms,
Company A and Company B, to lobby in the United States on behalf of the Government of
Ukraine, its President at the time (Yanukovych), and Yanukovych’s political party (the Party of
Regions). Indictment ¶ 21. The Indictment further alleges that, “[t]o minimize public disclosure
of their lobbying campaign and distance their work from the Government of Ukraine,” Manafort
and others arranged for a third party—the European Centre for a Modern Ukraine (Centre)—“to
be the nominal client of Company A and Company B,” id. ¶ 24, and Gates provided false and
misleading documentation to give the lobbying firms a pretext for failing to register with the
Department of Justice as agents of Ukraine, id. ¶ 25.
In 2016, press reports focused on Manafort’s connections with Ukraine. Indictment ¶ 26.
The Indictment alleges that, in response and “[t]o conceal the scheme,” “Manafort and Gates
developed a false and misleading cover story that would distance themselves and the Government
of Ukraine, Yanukovych, and the Party of Regions from the Centre, Company A, and
Company B.” Id. The Indictment further alleges that, when the Department of Justice sought to
determine whether Manafort, Gates, and their firm (DMP International, or DMI) had acted as
unregistered agents of a foreign principal, Manafort and Gates “caused false and misleading letters
to be submitted to the Department of Justice, which mirrored the false cover story” that they had
previously developed and shared with a principal of Company B. Id. ¶ 27. Specifically, the letters
contained representations that:
•

DMI’s “efforts on behalf of the Party of Regions” “did not include meetings or outreach
within the U.S.”;

•

MANAFORT and Gates did not “recall meeting with or conducting outreach to U.S.
government officials or U.S. media outlets on behalf of the [Centre], nor do they recall

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being party to, arranging, or facilitating any such communications. Rather, it is the
recollection and understanding of Messrs. Gates and Manafort that such
communications would have been facilitated and conducted by the [Centre’s] U.S.
consultants, as directed by the [Centre]. . . .”;
•

MANAFORT and Gates had merely served as a means of introduction of Company A
and Company B to the Centre and provided the Centre with a list of “potential U.S.based consultants—including [Company A] and [Company B]—for the [Centre’s]
reference and further consideration.”

•

DMI “does not retain communications beyond thirty days” and as a result of this policy,
a “search has returned no responsive documents.” The November 2016 letter attached
a one-page, undated document that purported to be a DMI “Email Retention Policy.”

Id. (emphasis omitted).
These and other representations in the letters are alleged to be “false and misleading,” and
Manafort knew them to be so. See Indictment ¶ 4 (“[W]hen the Department of Justice sent
inquiries to MANAFORT and Gates in 2016 about their activities, MANAFORT and Gates
responded with a series of false and misleading statements.”). In particular, the Indictment alleges
that, contrary to the representations in the letters, Manafort and Gates had:
selected Company A and Company B; engaged in weekly scheduled calls and frequent emails with Company A and Company B to provide them directions as to specific lobbying
steps that should be taken; sought and received detailed oral and written reports from these
firms on the lobbying work they had performed; communicated with Yanukovych to brief
him on their lobbying efforts; both congratulated and reprimanded Company A and
Company B on their lobbying work; communicated directly with United States officials in
connection with this work; and paid the lobbying firms over $2 million from offshore
accounts they controlled, among other things.
Indictment ¶ 28. In addition, court-authorized searches of Manafort’s e-mail accounts and a search
of Manafort’s Virginia residence had “revealed numerous documents, including documents related
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to lobbying, which were more than thirty-days old at the time of the November 2016 letter to the
Department of Justice,” id., thus suggesting that the letter’s representations about e-mail retention
were likewise false and misleading.
Count Four charges that Manafort “knowingly and willfully caused to be made a false
statement of a material fact, and omitted a material fact necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading, in a document filed with and furnished to the Attorney General under the
provisions of FARA,” in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 1 Indictment ¶ 45.
The charge identifies six excerpts from the letters, including the representations quoted above, as
the basis for violation. Indictment ¶ 45.
Count Five, in turn, charges that Manafort violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a) and 2 based on
the same representations in the two letters. 2 Indictment ¶ 47. Tracking the statutory language,
Count Five alleges that Manafort “knowingly and willfully did cause another: to falsify, conceal,

1

Section 618(a)(2) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who . . . in any registration
statement or supplement thereto or in any other document filed with or furnished to the Attorney
General under the provisions of this subchapter willfully makes a false statement of a material fact
or willfully omits any material fact required to be stated therein or willfully omits a material fact
or a copy of a material document necessary to make the statements therein and the copies of
documents furnished therewith not misleading, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a
fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.”
Section 2 of Title 18, which is referenced in Count Four, punishes as a principal whoever
aids and abets the commission of an offense or “willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States.”
2

Section 1001(a) provides in relevant part that “whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States,
knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, . . . both.”
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and cover up by a scheme and device a material fact; to make a materially false, fictitious, and
fraudulent statement and representation; and to make and use a false writing and document
knowing the same to contain a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement.” Id.
ARGUMENT
Manafort argues (Doc. 236 at 4–9) that Counts Four and Five are multiplicitous and moves
the Court to require that the government choose to try him on one of the counts while dismissing
the other. As explained below, the Court should reject those requests: Counts Four and Five
permissibly charge separate statutory violations, and even if a multiplicity defect existed,
dismissing one of the counts at sentencing would sufficiently remedy it.
A. Counts Four and Five Charge Separate Offenses Under The Blockburger Test
1. “It is well settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinct offenses under separate
statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause” of the Fifth Amendment. Albernaz v.
United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 n.3 (1980). Convictions for separate statutory charges based on
the same conduct violate that Clause’s protection “against multiple punishments,” and qualify as
multiplicitous, only when those convictions are “for the same offense.” United States v. Mahdi,
598 F.3d 883, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 971
(2010); see United States v. Cooper, No. 17-3015, 2018 WL 1542496, at *5 (D.C. Cir. March 30,
2018). To determine whether two crimes under separate statutory provisions qualify as “the same
offense” for double jeopardy purposes, courts have long applied the test set forth in Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), which asks “whether each provision requires proof of a fact

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which the other does not, i.e., whether either is a lesser included offense of the other.” Mahdi, 598
F.3d at 888 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3
The Blockburger test “calls for comparison of the statutorily-prescribed elements of the
offenses, not the constituent facts either as alleged or proven.” United States v. Coachman, 727
F.2d 1293, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see, e.g., Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980) (“[T]he
Blockburger test focuses on the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each offense,
rather than on the actual evidence to be presented at trial.”); United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d
948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (inquiry “focuses exclusively on the statutory elements of the offenses”),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005 (2000). The inquiry, at bottom, is whether proof of one of the two
offenses “necessarily includes proof of” the other. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985);
accord United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108 (1985) (per curiam) (summarily reversing
lower court’s multiplicity determination because “proof of a currency reporting violation does not
necessarily include proof of a false statement offense” under 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
2. Under these principles, Counts Four and Five charge separate “offenses” within the
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. As an initial matter, and contrary to Manafort’s principal
contention (Doc. 236 at 6), proof of a violation of FARA’s false-statements provision will not
“necessarily” prove a Section 1001(a) violation as well. While FARA covers statements rendered

3

Manafort quotes (Doc. 236 at 5, 6) from the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Dixon, 509 U.S 688, 696 (1993), which summarized the Blockburger test as “inquir[ing] whether
each offense contains an element not contained in the other.” But the Blockburger opinion, (see
284 U.S. at 304), Supreme Court decisions post-dating Dixon (see Rutledge v. United States, 517
U.S. 292, 297 (1996)), and Manafort’s cited D.C. Circuit precedent all state the governing test as
being “whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not,” Mahdi, 598 F.3d
at 888 (quoting United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529
U.S. 1005 (2000)); see also Cooper, 2018 WL 1542496, at *5. Those formulations are used
interchangeably because they are functionally equivalent: each looks to what proof satisfies the
statutory definitions, rather than looking to the facts alleged to establish the violation in a particular
case. The proper analysis therefore does not change under either linguistic formulation.
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“misleading” by omissions of material facts, 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2), the D.C. Circuit has held that
Section 1001(a) does not reach statements that are misleading but “literally true.” See United
States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 919 (1994); United States
v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 832–833 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (1993). Similarly, FARA
covers willful omissions of material fact no matter how they are accomplished, see 22 U.S.C.
§ 618(a)(2) (“willfully omits any material fact required to be stated”), while Section 1001(a)
applies to “nondisclosure of material facts” only when the conduct amounts to concealment and is
“accomplished in a particular way: by a ‘trick, scheme, or device.’” United States v. Safavian,
528 F.3d 957, 965 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) and citing Woodward, 469
U.S. at 108). Accordingly, proof of a FARA false-statements violation will “not necessarily
include proof of a false statement offense” under Section 1001(a). Woodward, 469 U.S. at 108.
Similarly, proving a violation of Section 1001(a) will not necessarily establish a FARA
false-statements violation. That is because Section 1001(a) reaches not just false statements in
materials furnished to the Attorney General under FARA, see 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2), but such
statements made in any matter within the executive branch’s jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
Section 1001(a) would therefore cover false statements about an individual’s lobbying work
whether made to the State Department or the FBI, see United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475
(1984); indeed, it reaches statements made to entities that are outside of the federal government
when the executive branch “ha[s] the power to exercise authority” over the relevant matter. See
United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 208 (3d Cir. 2009) (reports submitted to local housing
authority); see also, e.g., United States v. Hooper, 596 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 1979) (stipend
reports made to university subject to federal audit).

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In sum, each of the false-statements statutes at issue can be satisfied with proof of facts
that would not suffice under the other: Section 1001(a) requires proof of actual falsity or
concealment through a trick, scheme, or device, whereas FARA sweeps more broadly by reaching
literally true yet misleading statements and willful omissions even absent affirmative acts of
concealment; and while FARA requires proof that the false or misleading statements were made
in submissions to the Attorney General, Section 1001(a) reaches more broadly to cover false
statements to other executive branch agencies (or non-federal agencies subject to federal
oversight). Those differences demonstrate that proving one offense does not necessarily prove the
other. Accordingly, the two crimes do not amount to “the same offense” under the Blockburger
test, see Mahdi, 598 F.3d at 888, and neither Count Four nor Count Five should be dismissed
as multiplicitous.4
3. Manafort’s remaining contentions lack merit. Focusing on the offenses “[a]s alleged in
the Superseding Indictment,” Doc. 236 at 6, he offers a comparative chart that implies that the
charges against him rest solely on the ground that he affirmatively “made a false statement.” See
id. But Manafort’s focus on the specifics of the Indictment is, as a legal matter, misplaced. As
explained above, p. 6, supra, the Blockburger test compares the statutes on their face, not the
allegations in the particular charging instrument. See Coachman, 727 F.2d at 1301.

4

The result would be the same under Manafort’s preferred terminology of “necessarily
included” offenses, which he draws from precedent interpreting not the Double Jeopardy Clause,
but Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c). See Doc. 236 at 4 & n.1. Under that precedent,
one offense is “necessarily included in the other” if “it is impossible to commit the” first offense
“without . . . having committed the” second. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 719 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As explained above, pp. 6-7, supra, it is possible to violate
Section 618(a)(2) without violating Section 1001(a) and vice versa; accordingly, neither is a
“necessarily included” offense of the other.
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In any event, Manafort misreads the Indictment. Count Four alleges in plain terms that
Manafort both caused “a false statement of material fact” to be made, “and omitted a material fact
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, in a document filed with and furnished
to the Attorney General under the provisions of FARA.” Indictment ¶ 45 (emphasis added); see
22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2) (covering false statements and omissions of material fact). Count Five, in
turn, alleges that Manafort committed each of “[t]he several different types of fraudulent conduct
proscribed by” Section 1001(a), United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 319 (2d Cir. 2006) (cited
at Doc. 236 at 7 n.3). In particular, and contrary to Manafort’s assertion (Doc. 236 at 3), the
Indictment alleges that he “knowingly and willfully cause[d] another . . . to make and use a false
writing and document knowing the same to contain a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent
statement.” Indictment ¶ 47; see id. (also alleging that Manafort caused another “to falsify,
conceal, and cover up by a scheme and device a material fact[ and] to make a materially false,
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation”). The Indictment, in short, alleges not only
that Manafort made false statements but also that he committed the several other types of conduct
that he acknowledges Sections 618(a)(2) and 1001(a) to reach.
Manafort asserts (Doc. 236 at 7) that these differences in the types of conduct covered by
the two provisions do not prevent Counts Four and Five from qualifying as “the same offense”
under Supreme Court precedent. But his cited decisions do not support that conclusion. To the
contrary, the Court’s decision in Illinois v. Vitale, supra, makes clear that a court determining
whether one offense “necessarily involve[s] proof” sufficient to establish another must account for
the full range of conduct that satisfies the two statutes. 447 U.S. at 417. In that case, the Court
held that manslaughter by automobile would not qualify as the greater offense of “failure to reduce
speed” if manslaughter could be committed through factual means other than “a failure to slow.”

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Id. at 419 (“[I]f manslaughter by automobile does not always entail proof of a failure to slow, then
the two offenses are not the ‘same’ under the Blockburger test.”). By the same logic, if a FARA
false-statements violation can be proved through facts that would “not always entail proof” of a
Section 1001(a) violation, and vice versa, then the two offenses are not “the ‘same.’” See id.
Manafort’s other cited cases are inapposite. Both involve application of the Blockburger
test to offenses—such as felony murder and criminal contempt—that necessarily incorporate all
elements of a subsidiary crime. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S 688, 698 (1993) (contempt
based on violation of a “court order [that] incorporated the entire governing criminal code”);
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682, 682–683 (1977) (per curiam) (felony murder). In that setting,
courts have based their Blockburger analysis on the particular version of the incorporated offense
at issue in the case, i.e., “the drug offense” that formed the basis for the contempt charge in Dixon,
509 U.S. at 698, and the robbery offense underlying the felony-murder charge in Harris, 433 U.S.
at 682–683 & n.*. See also United States v. McLaughlin, 164 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(explaining Blockburger’s application to “compound offenses” such as felony murder), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1079 (1999). Manafort does not claim that either of the two statutes here
incorporates another crime’s elements in similar fashion.
Finally, although Manafort notes (Doc. 236 at 5 n.2) that the Blockburger test is not
dispositive where contrary congressional intent is evident, he does not argue that Congress
intended to preclude multiple convictions in the specific circumstances of this case. That is with
good reason. Courts have regularly upheld “convictions and sentences under both § 1001 and a
more specific” false-statements provision. See United States v. Ramos, 725 F.2d 1322, 1324 (11th
Cir. 1984) (Section 1001 and 18 U.S.C. § 1542, which covers false statements in passport

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applications). 5 And when, as is true of FARA, 6 the more specific statute postdates Section
1001(a)’s enactment, courts have likewise rejected any suggestion that Congress meant to displace
Section 1001(a) and require prosecution exclusively under the other statute. See United States v.
Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 945–946 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045
(1986). This case, in short, does not present the “clear indication of contrary legislative intent,”
Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, that would be necessary to counter the presence of separate offenses
under Blockburger.
B.

Pre-Trial Dismissal Would Be Unwarranted Even If The Counts Were
Multiplicitous

Even if Counts Four and Five were multiplicitous, Manafort’s requested remedy of pretrial dismissal would be unwarranted. That remedy is not, as Manafort implies (Doc. 236 at 8–9),
standard practice in this District or elsewhere. See United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir.
2011) (“There is no inflexible rule that the exclusive remedy for multiplicitous counts is election
between them.”); United States v. Phillips, 962 F. Supp. 200, 201 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that “the
decision whether to compel the prosecution to elect among multiplicitous counts before trial is
within the discretion of the trial court”) (cited at Doc. 236 at 8–9). To the contrary, Manafort’s
own cited cases recognize that “[t]he principal danger in a multiplicitous indictment is . . . that the
defendant may receive multiple sentences for a single offense.” United States v. Langford, 946

5

See also, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 117 F.3d 1464, 1468–1469 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Section 1001 and impersonation of a federal official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 912), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1071 (1998); United States v. Laimeche, 56 F. App’x 835, 836 (9th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished) (Section 1001 and Medicare-specific statute); United States v. York, 888 F.2d 1050,
1058–1059 (5th Cir. 1989) (Section 1001 and false statement in a loan application under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014).
6

Compare Act of June 8, 1938, ch. 327, § 5, 56 Stat. 633 (version of FARA’s falsestatements provision in the original 1938 statute), with United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 92–
93 (1941) (explaining that the relevant language in current Section 1001(a) was added in 1934).
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F.2d 798, 804 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960 (1992). And because “the primary evil
of multiplicity is double punishment for the same offense,” “[m]ultiplicitous counts may be” (and
often are) remedied at the sentencing phase. United States v. Sanford, Ltd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 102,
121 (D.D.C. 2012); see Ball, 470 U.S. at 865.
The D.C. Circuit has approved of remedying multiplicity claims at the post-trial stage in
several settings. In United States v. Hubbell, 177 F.3d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1999), a false-statements
prosecution, the court observed generally “that multiplicity claims are better sorted out post-trial.”
The court in United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1999), “detect[ed] no prejudice” from
the submission of multiplicitous counts based on the same evidence, holding that the only
necessary remedy was to vacate one of the two resulting convictions. Id. at 872. And in United
States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the court held that the trial judge had “correctly
submitted” charges under two tax statutes to the jury “[g]iven the absence of controlling D.C.
Circuit precedent” deeming such charges multiplicitous and that the appropriate remedy was
simply “to vacate the sentences” for one set of the charges. Id. at 859; see United States v. Wheeler,
No. 11-cr-151 (ESH), 2012 WL 1865506, at *1–*2 (D.D.C. 2012) (where multiplicity question
was “of first impression in this jurisdiction,” finding it “appropriate to allow all of the counts to
go to the jury” so that the court of appeals would have a chance to address the question).
Analogous considerations show that Manafort’s multiplicity claim here is also “better
sorted out post-trial.” Hubbell, 177 F.3d at 14. First, Manafort faces little risk of prejudice from
being tried on Counts Four and Five where, by his own account (Doc. 236 at 3, 8), “the charges
encompass the same underlying facts and conduct,” Sanford, Ltd., 859 F. Supp. 2d at 124, and the
jury will have to weigh the same evidence in evaluating Manafort’s guilt on the Count One
conspiracy charge in any event. See Indictment ¶ 38 (alleging that Manafort conspired to commit

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the false-statements offenses charged in Counts Four and Five and “to defraud the United States
by impeding, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of” the Department of Justice.
Moreover, as Judge Huvelle concluded in Wheeler, 2012 WL 1865506, at *2, any “potential
prejudice”—such as Manafort’s suggestion that jurors will be tempted to reach a compromise
verdict (Doc. 236 at 8–9)—“can be addressed through” instructions emphasizing the need for the
jury to consider each charge separately. See, e.g., 1A Kevin F. O’Malley, et al., Fed. Jury Prac.
& Instr. § 12:12 (6th ed.). Jurors, of course, are presumed to follow such instructions. See Zafiro
v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540–541 (1993).
Finally, if there were a serious question of multiplicity (here, the government submits there
is not), post-trial consideration would promote judicial efficiency. It would avoid premature
resolution of a question of first impression that may disappear if the jury acquits on one or both of
the charges, see Pires, 642 F.3d at 16; Sanford, Ltd., 859 F. Supp. 2d at 121, 124, and would
preserve the possibility that the court of appeals will be able to resolve the legal question on appeal
from a final judgment (or an appealable post-trial order), see Dale, 991 F.2d at 859; Wheeler, 2012
WL 1865506, at *1.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Manafort’s motion to dismiss one of two counts as
multiplicitous (Doc. 236) should be denied. 7
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
Special Counsel
Dated: April 4, 2018

/s/ Andrew Weissmann
Andrew Weissmann
Greg D. Andres (D.D.C. Bar No. 459221)
Scott A.C. Meisler
U.S. Department of Justice
Special Counsel’s Office
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 616-0800
Attorneys for the United States of America

7

If the Court defers consideration of the multiplicity question to the post-trial stage, it may
wish to deny Manafort’s motion “without prejudice to being renewed after trial.” Wheeler, 2012
WL 1865506, at *2.
14