Case Document 40 Filed 10/18/18 Page 1 of 1 Page D# 225 I Reset Form I Print Form IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA APPLICATION TO QUALIFY AS A FOREIGN ATTORNEY UNDER LOCAL CIVIL RULE AND LOCAL CRIMINAL RULE 57.4 In Case Number 1:18?cv?00639 Case Name NRA V- LOthon Party Represented by Applicant: National Ri?e Association of America, Inc. To: The Honorable Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia PERSONAL STATEMENT FULL NAME (no initials, please) Charles Justin Cooper Bar Identi?cation Number 248070 State District of Columbia inn Name Cooper 81 Kirk Firm Phone (202) 220-9600 Direct Dial (202} 220-9600 FAX {202} 2203501 E-Mail Address ccooper@cooperkirk.com Of?ce Mailing Address 1523 New Hampshire Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 Name(s) of federal court(s) in which I have been admitted Please see Attachment A I certify that the rules of the federal court in the district in which I maintain my of?ce extend a similar pro hac vice admission privilege to members of the bar of the Eastern District of Virginia. I have not been repri nded in any an nor has there been any action in any court pertaining to my conduct or ?tness as a member of the bar. mm MN. I hereby certify that, within ninety (90) days before the submission of this application, I have read the Local Rules of this Court and that my knowledge of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence is current. I am am not a full-time employee of the United States of America, and ue 'ex ition frag the admission fee. [ly?piicthil's Sig-nature I, the undersigned, do certify that I am a member of the bar of this Court, not related to the applic that I know the applicant personally, that the said applicant possesses all of the quali?cations required for admission to the bar of this Court; that I have examined the applicant?s personal statement. I af?rm that his/her personal and professional character and standing are good, and petition the court to admit the applicantpm hac vice. [cue a n- -H at I r-rw 1? -. D7 gm ma LIN-.1 f?o Anytime? LI. (Slgnam?oiq (67? (Data; 37/ Typed or Printed Name) (VA Bar Number) Court Use Only: Clerk?s Fee Paid or Exemption Granted The motion for admission is GRANTED or DENIED (Judge?s Signature) (Date) Attachment A Case Document 40-1 Filed 10/18/18 Page 1 of 6 Page D# 226 Jurisdiction Date Admitted U.S. District Court for: District of Columbia 12/02/91 District of Colorado 02/ 17/ 1 5 U.S. Court of Appeals: First Circuit 11/24/04 Second Circuit 04/2 1/ 14 Third Circuit 09/25/92 Fourth Circuit 07/19/95 Fifth Circuit 01/11/83 Sixth Circuit 07/25/91 Seventh Circuit 10/13/00 Eighth Circuit 03/02/93 Ninth Circuit 02/14/96 Tenth Circuit 01/24/92 Eleventh Circuit 09/04/02 District of Columbia Circuit 06/22/83 Federal Circuit 08/ 1 7/92 U.S. Court of Federal Claims 01/12/90 United States Supreme Court 10/ 16/ 82 Case Document 40-1 Filed 10/18/18 Page 2 of 6 Page D# 227 ATTACHMENT In a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, the district court sanctioned our ?rm?s client, the TennCare Bureau of the State of Tennessee, and entered a contempt ?nding for failing to comply with its discovery orders. The district court also entered an order to show cause why our law ?rm should not also be held liable for the sanctions. I was lead counsel in the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered an emergency stay of all proceedings in the case, and subsequently reassigned the case to a different District Court Judge, ?nding that the presiding judge had created a situation that ?combine[d] serious management failures, fundamental misunderstandings that potentially prejudice[d] defendants, and a developing adversarial relationship between the judge and the defendants.? John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2010). In particular, the Court of Appeals found that ?[t]he district court?s skewed view of the actual state of the record with regard to defendants? noncompliance with the consent decree [had] create[d] an appearance that its judgment could be ?awed with respect to defendants? compliance with discovery.? Id. at 364. On remand, the new District Court Judge reviewed the entire record de novo and ?found the sanctions [and contempt] order unjusti?ed, and vacated it.? John B. v. Emkes, No. 12-5414, slip op. at 1 (6th Cir. Mar. 13, 2013) (copy attached). The Plaintiffs appealed, and the Sixth Circuit af?rmed, noting that the new District Court Judge ?vacated the sanctions order because it did not agree that TennCare had violated [the former presiding judge?s] discovery orders.? Id. at 3. The Sixth Circuit also concluded that the new District Court udge?s ?nding that the sanctions order was ?unjust? was ?patently correct.? Id. at 4. A copy of the Sixth Circuit?s unpublished 2013 opinion is attached. Case Document 40-1 Filed 10/18/18 Page 3 of 6 Page D# 228 Case: 12-5414 Document: 69?1 Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 1 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 13a0260n.06 No. 12?5414 LED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Mall: '13 2013 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH s. HUNT, Clerk JOHN B., et a1., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR MARK EMKES, Commissioner, Tennessee THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF Department of Finance and Administration, et a1., TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellee. Before: ROGERS, COOK, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a dispute over Tennessee?s Medicaid program, known as TennCare. During that dispute, the district court sanctioned TennCare under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 for failing to comply with its discovery orders. We later reassigned the case to a new district-court judge. On remand, the district court found the sanctions order unjusti?ed, and vacated it. The plaintiffs? appeal that decision. We af?rm. In 1998, the plaintiffs ?led a class-action suit alleging that TennCare had violated the Medicaid Act. The parties entered into a consent decree. Eight years later, District Court Judge William J. Haynes, Jr. ordered discovery to determine whether TennCare was in compliance with the decree. During that process, the plaintiffs ?led two motions to compel, which the district Case Document 40-1 Filed 10/18/18 Page 4 of 6 Page D# 229 Case: 12-5414 Document: 69?1 Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 2 No. 12-5414 John B, et al.. v. Emkes court granted. The plaintiffs then ?led two motions for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, which the court granted as well. Finally, the plaintiffs applied for attorney?s fees that resulted from the motion to compel, and TennCare ?led a response in opposition. The court did not rule on the plaintiffs? application. Around the same time, TennCare ?led a motion to vacate the consent decree. The district court denied that motion. On appeal, TennCare asked this court to reassign the case to a new district-court judge. We granted that request, ?nding that the court had created a situation that ?combine[d] serious management failures, fundamental misunderstandings that potentially prejudice[d] defendants, and a developing adversarial relationship between the judge and the defendants.? John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2010). The case was then reassigned to Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr. On remand, the district court addressed the plaintiffs? unresolved application for attomey?s fees. The court ?rst construed TennCare?s response in opposition to that application as a motion to reconsider the sanctions order. The court then said that it had reviewed the record and decided that the sanctions order was unjusti?ed. See Mem. and Order at 4. Thus, the court vacated the order. We review this decision for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355, 376?77 (6th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs make three arguments on appeal. First, the plaintiffs argue that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it vacated the sanctions order without identifying an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence . . . or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent injustice.? But we have repeatedly refused to put these kinds of limitations on the -2- Case Document 40-1 Filed 10/18/18 Page 5 of 6 Page D# 230 Case: 12-5414 Document: 69-1 Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 3 No. 12-5414 John B, et al.. v. Emkes district court?s discretion. See, United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1990). To the contrary, we have said that is within the sole discretion of a court to determine if a prior ruling should be reconsidered.? Id. Here, the court did not apply the wrong legal standard. Second, the plaintiffs argue that the district court?s order was too conclusory to allow for meaningful appellate review. A court?s order is too conclusory only if it does not ?give us a clear understanding of the analytical process by which ultimate findings were reached and to assure us that the trial court took care in ascertaining the facts.? Gonzales v. Galvin, 151 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 1998) We understand perfectly well the analytical process by which the court reached its decision here. In its order, the court found that the sanctions order was based on Judge Haynes?s belief that TennCare had not cooperated with his discovery orders. Mem. and Order at 3. But the court recognized that ?the record lack[ed] evidence that defendants [had] intentionally destroyed relevant [information] in the past, and nothing in the record indicate[d] that defendants [were] unwilling, or [would] refuse, to preserve and produce all relevant [information] in the future.? Id. (quoting John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 460 (6th Cir. 2008)). Moreover, the court recognized that the very reason we ordered the case reassigned was that ?[t]he district court?s skewed view of the actual state of the record with regard to defendants? noncompliance with the consent decree [had] create[d] an appearance that its judgment could be ?awed with respect to defendants? compliance with discovery.? Id. at 1?2 (quoting John 3., 626 F.3d at 364). Thus the court made its reasoning clear: the court vacated the sanctions order because it did not agree that TennCare had violated Judge Haynes?s discovery orders. The plaintiffs? second argument is meritless. -3- Case Document 40-1 Filed 10/18/18 Page 6 of 6 Page D# 231 Case: 12-5414 Document: 69-1 Filed: 03/13/2013 Page: 4 No. 12-5414 John B, et al.. v. Emkes Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred when it denied their application for attorney?s fees because both Rule and Rule make the award of those fees mandatory. Both rules provide, however, that the court should not order the payment of attorney?s fees if doing so would be ?unjust.? See Fed. R. Civ. P. Here, the district court vacated the sanctions order precisely because that order was ?unjustified?; and that ?nding was patently correct. So this argument too is meritless. The district court?s judgment is af?rmed.