The Misuse

Gil
Pell?ce Auiho?iy

Him (Chicago)

A Report and Recommendations based on hearings before the Blue Ribbon Panel
convened by the Honorable Ralph H. Metcalfe, Representative. First Congressional
District of Illinois, on June 26. July 17, July 24. and July 31, 1972.

"Mtg Superintendent, you will be hard pressed to
go into any home in the black ghetto and not find at
least one member of that household who either feels
that they have been abused verbally and physically
by some member ofthe police force, or has first-hand

information of such an incident."

United State Representative,

Ralph Ho Metcalfe to Superintendent
of Chicago Police, James Bo Conlisk,
Jro, at a meeting held on March 20,
1972, attended by community leaders.

TABIE 

The Blue Ribbon Panel
Introductory Statement of the Chairman

Synopsis of Testimony before the Blue
Ribbon Panel

Findings of the Blue Ribbon Panel: The
Problem of Abusive Police Conduct
in Chicago

Recommendations

Appendix: The Events Leading Up to the
Hearings

Exhibits

(1)



60

78

90

THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL

Chairman

Honorable Ralph H. Metcalfe, Representative
First Congressional District of Illinois

General Counsel
Attorney Kermit B. Coleman

Members

Mr. Felipe Ayala, Co-Convenor of the Concerned Citizens for
Police Reform and the Illinois Chapter of the Midwest
Council of LaRaza.

Mr. Andrew Barrett, Executive Director of the Chicago Chapter
of the NAACP.

Mr. Edwin C. Berry, Assistant to the President, Johnson
Products.

Mr. Eriberto Campos, Joint Civic Committee for Nexican Affairs.

Mrs. Lenora Cartwright, Assistant Professor of Urban Studies,
University of Illinois, Circle Campus.

Atty. James Clement, law firm of Dressler, Goldsmith, Clement
and Gordon.

Mr. James Compton, Executive Director of the Chicago Urban
League.

Rev. Clay Evans, Pastor of the Fellowship Baptist Church and
Chairman of the Board of Operation PUSH.

Mrs. Nancy Jefferson, Executive Director of the Midwest
Community Council and Vice-President of the League of

Black WOmen.

Mr. John McDermott, Associate Director, Community Renewal
SOCietyo

Mr. John McKnight, Professor and Assistant Director of the
Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University.

{31}

Atty. E. Duke McNeil, President of The Noodlawn Organization.
Mr. Russell Meeks, President, Search for Truth, Inc.

Rev. Jack Mendelsohn, Pastor of the First Unitarian
Universalist Church.

Father Terry Niebrugger, Pastor of the Corpus Christi
Catholic ChurCh.

Dr. Maceo Pembroke, Pastor of the St. Mark Methodist
Church .

Mrs. Mary Price, President of the Building Council of
Robert Taylor Homes.

Mr. Noah Robinson, Executive Director of Breadbasket
Commercial Association and Consultant to SCLC.

Mr. Jon Waltz, Professor of Evidence from the Northwestern
University Law School.

Mrs. Ozzie Watson, a member of the Tenant's Council of
Robert Taylor Homes.

Staff

Attorney Thomas N. Todd, Director of Legal Services.

Ms. Rochelle Kendrick, Assistant Director of Legal Services.
Mr. Leon Bordelon, Mr. Stephen Br0ussard, Mr. John Burris,

Mr. Gary Cole, Mr. Vernon Ford, Jr., Ms. Ann Fredd, Mr. Milton
Gardner, Mr. Marvin Gary, Ms. Diane Kinnard, Rev. Ed Riddick,
Mr. Carl Smith, Mr. Steven Smith and Ms. Francine Stewart,
members of the legal Research Staff.

Mr. Ralph H. Metcalfe, Jr., Hearing Coordinator.

Mrs. Lenora Cartright, Coordinator of Panel Report.

Mr. Roscoe C. Giles, Jr., Official Court Reporter.

(ii)

INTRODUCTORY STATEN-INT THE CHAIRMAN

This report of the Blue Ribbon Panel is based on testimony
from four days of public hearings held in Chicago in June and
July, 1972,

While abusive police treatment of citizens has been a
major issue for years, the community outcry against abuse of
authority by Chicago policemen increased sharply in 1972.(1)

Numerous complaints of mistreatment by police were received
from citizens across the city, and community groups sought,

tuthout success, to obtain a meaningful response concerning abusive
police conduct from the responsible public officials. Further,
there was a growing concern about the high crime rate in inner
city communities; the community was gravely distressed at the
possibility that some of the policemen responsible for protecting
the rights of citizens appeared to be mistreating them instead.

Accordingly, the Blue Ribbon Panel was convened: a group

of private citizens representing a cross~section of the
professional and ethnic communities of Chicago, to hear

testimony concerning the occurrence of abusive police conduct,

its causes, and its possible remedies.

 

(1) For a detailed description of the events leading up to the
hearings before the Blue Ribbon Panel, see the Appendix.



The purpose of the hearings was to allow private citizens,
concerned organizations, police officials and appropriate ex?
perts the opportunity to make their views known through public
testimony. Included in the testimony, which is synopsized in
Section I of this report, are accounts by private citizens having
firsthand knowledge of abusive police conduct, representatives
of several major police and civic organizations, and recognized
experts from the fields of social and law. Police
officials declined invitations to testify.

In Section II, the findings of the Blue Ribbon Panel are
stated. These are founded upon the testimony from last summer's
hearings, but also draw at apprOpriate points upon other significant
studies and developments that have occurred in the interim.

A primary purpose of the Panel's hearings was to formulate
recommendations for steps that should be taken to eliminate
abusive police conduct and improve police performance in Chicago.
The Panel's recommendations are set forth in Section 

This Report addresses itself to a crisis in police-community
relations in Chicago; the misuse of police authority, at all
levels of the Police Department and related agencies. That
crisis has not diminished in the months since the Blue Ribbon
Panel's hearings, but rather grown, as documentation of police
misconduct and misadministration has grown, and the inaction of

the responsible public officials has continued.

{iv}

The time for action, for police reform, has come. The

Blue Ribbon Panel has served the community well by its careful
Report and Recommendations; now the members of the Panel will
work for the prompt implementation of those Recommendations,

and we trust the community will join us in that effort.

Honorable Ralph Metcalfe
Chairman, Blue Ribbon Panel

Part I

SYNOPSIS OF TESTIMONY

BEFORE THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL

The hearings of the Blue Ribbon Panel into the misuse of
police authority in Chicago were held in the Everett Dirksen
Building on June 26, July 17, July 24 and July 31, 1972. The
first two days were devoted to hearing testimony from persons
who charged that they had been victims of police abuse and
brutality or had been witnesses to such acts. The third day
involved persons knowledgeable about police administration.
And on the fourth day testimony was taken from experts on

and legal aspects of police problems.

THE FIRST TWO DAYS: THE COMPLAINANTS

?ggbegt Odom, Black and a practicing dentist, told of
being stopped by two White policemen on March 13, 1972, for not
having a light over his rear license place, a minor traffic
violation. When Dr. Odom protested being searched in the street,
the officers used excessive force, he said, by throwing him onto
the hood of his car and applying handcuffs. He said that the
handcuffs were secured so that they injured his wrists.
De3pite repeated requests, the policemen refused to loosen the
handcuffs. Dr. Odom was forced to cancel a surgical operation
scheduled for the next morning. Throughout the converstaion,
the policemen addressed Dr. Odom as "Herbert." He characterized
his treatment by the two officers as abusive. He filed a com-
plaint with the Internal Affairs Division (the Dr. Odom
was asked to take a lie detector test. His counsel, knowing that
the Police Department always sends complainants to Reid 
Associates, which has the reputation of supporting the police, sent
him to an independent firm first.

Test results from the independent firm indicated that Dr.

Odom was truthful while the results from Reid Associates indicated
that he was not truthful on some occasions and that a determination
could not be made on other occasions. Dr. Odom was not notified

as to what disciplinary action, if any, was taken against the

policemen.

Mrs, Ardale Calvin, Black, a mother and nurse, was stopped

by two officers on August 2, 1972, who said that she has "bad
fumes" coming from her car. when she offered to accompany the
officers to the station to verify her contention that no improper
fumes were coming from her car, Mrs. Calvin said that they re-
fused to let her drive her car to the police station, telling
her to come to their car. When she asked why she couldn't drive
her own car, the officer grabbed her arm, trying to pull her out
of the car.

Frightened, she jumped out the other side, whereupon the
officer whirled her around by her shoulder and punched her in
her mouth. Mrs. Calvin said that the blow knocked out a tooth,
caused great bleeding and unconsciousness. Her lip required
Six stitches. She complained of tight handcuffs, but the
officers would not loosen them.

Seven charges were lodged against Mrs. Calvin. She said
that she was offered a deal in court wherein if she would "admit"
that she hit the officer, all charges would be drOpped, but she
refused to c00perate. Including charges for police towing of
her car, medical care, and fines levied by the courts, Mrs.
Calvin spent a total of $217 as a result of this encounter. Mrs.
Calvin filed a complaint with IAD with the names of witnesses but
she was never contacted or informed of the results of the

investigation.

Mrs- Roxie Fitzpatrigg, Black, a mother who has held the
same employment for 28 years, told of events surrounding the
killing of her son, Cornell, by an off-duty policemen at Kenwood
High School on February 15, 1971.

A Blue Ribbon Coroner's Jury recommended that the police
officer be charged with involuntary manslaughter. At this hear-
ing, the police officer who killed Cornell, the firemen who was
a partntime security officer at the school and another Chicago
policeman testified that they saw a gun in the hands of Cornell
Fitzpatrick. Several teachers and students testified that they
did not see a gun in his hands. The policeman who shot Cornell
testified that he picked up the gun from the floor and put it
in his pocket. Then he pulled it out of his pocket and put it
back on the floor. He then picked it up again and put it in his
pocket.

The Cook County Grand Jury refused to indict the officer who
shot Cornell.

Mg, Luther Hughes, Black, a father who has worked for Inter-
national Harvester for 25 years, was apprehended on March 2, 1972,
by two White policemen for "weaving" his car in traffic. The
officers confiscated an open bottle of whiskey from the car and
let Mr. Hughes go. He then noticed that his wallet, containing
about $250 (he had just cashed his paycheck) was missing. The
last time he saw it was when he left it on the front seat of his

car when the officers asked him to step outside. He asked them



about it, and they told him to report the incident to the 75th
Street Station. Mr. Hughes was not charged with any law vio-
lations.

Mr. Hughes filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs
Division of the department, and soon thereafter received an
anonymous phone call telling him to meet an unidentified person
atalgas station at three a.m. and he would get his money back.
Afraid, he did not keep the appointment and has not yet recovered
his money. Mr. Hughes was never informed of the results of the
IAD investigation.

Mrs. Mildred Isom, Black, a mother and housewife, alleged
brutal treatment by a Black police officer who had been called
to investigate a burglary at a neighboring convent on May 13,
1972. The officer came to her door and asked if she had called
the police. Mrs. Isom said that she had not. The officer asked
her again if she was sure that she didn't place the call. When
she informed the officer that if she had called him she would
tell him so, he became belligerent, calling her an slut."
When she asked him to identify his superior, the officer pulled
her out into the street, handcuffing her. When the officer tried
to prevent Mrs. Isom from talking to her daughter, who had become
hysterical, she told him that the only way that he could stop her
was by shooting her. She said he replied that shooting her
"would not be hard to do." Mrs. Isom was not allowed to put on
clothes over the nightgown she was wearing and was taken to a
police station, her children left unattended. No charges were

pressed.



 

iMr?kRicherd Leftridge3 Bleek eelfwempiered Chieegeen5
described'ee with-Chieege pelieemen en Februery 259
19?2?'i? ehieh he leet ee involved in en eiter~.-
cation between iedy.friend end her leedledyr during which
eeliee were summonedu When Err Leftridgeie friend eureed ene
of the-effieerie'ie the midet er heeted the officer
etreeh her an the heed with hieehwjeehe When he told the
officer thet the 
wee etteeked by Gee hit him in hie-eye with
hleehmjeeha Thee they heedeeti'ed him eed pushed him mat the
deer with eueh feree thet he fell ever theheeietera
They the_deer ei the en his feet eegthey.put
himiea -Three deye ietergiheftridge'e left remetede-
While'there Bieek ee the he-did.eet tehe
pert in the eitereetieea iMra.Leitridge did not file'e report
with the he felt it to he er. Lettridge
wee eherged with interfering with duties; dieerderly -.

end 

iMre Eieek dehudrieer end tether of eleven5

 

rendered eh ef 222 19?13 when the pelice 
hie heme end hie feet The youngest
eons ege 135_hed hrehee eeighherFefwindee end ehe eelled the
pelieeu They eeme iete Era end epprehended the
yeengeet Ie the they ereehed the house end beet_
the three eldest eeid_thet'hie neighbors

eetimeted thet ?70 or 80? peliee effieere were on the scene?

Mr. Johnny Dees, 19?year-old son of Willie Dees, said that an
officer pointed a .357 magnum at his head during the above incident
and profanely threatened to "blow his brains out" if he made a
move. About twelve policemen took him into a bedroom and kicked
and beat him. His financee was pushed down and the 13 month old
baby in her arms hit his head on the floor. Mr. Dees was highly
critical of the behavior of the policeman, particularly since the
woman whose window was broken told them that she wanted to droP
all charges. He recounted being shackled with handcuffs on both
wrists and ankles and literally being thrown into a police wagon.

Mrs. Bennye Moon, Black, widow and mother, described an
incident in August of 1968 involving herself and her then pregnant
daughter. When neighbors called police to quell an argument
between Mrs. Moon's son and daughter-in-law, the officers became
abusive of her son. Mrs. Meon said that when she protested, a
policeman pistol whipped her, breaking two ribs and dislocating
her shoulder. ?Mrs. Moon's seventeen?year?old daughter, then with
child, told the policeman not to hit her mother. The officer
then hit the young lady in her stomach. She suffered blackouts
until her baby's premature birth. Her son was born with a
blind, sunken and a dislocated, perforated heart. Mrs. Moon
filed a complaint with IAD and was told that the policeman acted
improperly but was not informed whether the policeman was punished.

Mr. Flemon Pullens, Black, father and postal employee, was
approached in the alley behind his home by two police officers
as he was garaging his car on April 22, 1972. Asked what he was

doing there, Mr. Pullens replied that he was parking his car and

that he lived there. The identification cards which he produced
when asked, were never examined by the officer, who asked Mr.
Pullens to step out of his car. Standing next to the door, Mr.
Pullens offered to take the officers to his home, to prove that
he lived there.

At that time, an officer snatched him away from his car by
the arm. When Mr. Pullens began shouting for help another
officer grabbed his neck and choked him against his car. The
officer covered Mr. Pullens' mouth with his hand, attempting
to muffle his shouts. When another officer hit Mr. Pullens on
his head, he winced in pain, biting off the fingertip of the
officer who held his hand over his mouth. The officer then beat
and kicked him. One white officer said "you dirty Black nigger
of a and repeatedly called him ?nigger.? The witness
displayed scars on his face and head from the beating.

Mr. Michael Perry, White, age 23 and without sight since
birth, told the panel how he was beaten by a police officer for
no apparent reason on April 26, 1971. A man stopped him on his
way to his apartment and asked to talk with him regarding a com-
plaint from a neighbor. When Mr. Perry informed theman that
he did not wish to speak with him, the man asked "You can?t see
I am a police officer?" Mr. Perry told him that he couldn't
because he was blind. The officer then struck him about ten
times in his head with a billy club, handcuffed him, and pushed
him down the stairs. Mr. Perry filed a report with IAD and was
informed that it was not sustained. Later, an officer on the

street said "aren?t you the blind bastard that goes down to the

IAD and reports us?"

Mrs. Laura Gonzalez, Puerto Rican, an import-export traffic
manager, was returning home on February 14, 1969, after taking
some friends to their house, and stepped for a stop sign at an
intersection. As she started into the intersection, a rapidly
approaching police car stopped. An officer asked her for her
driver's license, and Mrs. Gonzalez found that she had left it
at home which was a half block away. The officer agreed to
accompany Mrs. Gonzalez to her house. After she produced her
license, the officer told her to get back in her car. She
refused, and he began to curse her loudly, drawing the attention
of her neighbors.

She got into her car and followed intersection
where he first stopped her. The officer gave a hand signal which
Mrs. Gonzalez interpreted to mean that she was free to go and
she turned right. The office turned left. Within a very few
minutes, about ten police cars surrounded the home of Mrs.
Gonzalez. She was dragged from her car and taken to the station,
where she was called a "dirty Puerto Rican." The officer dumped
the contents of Mrs. Gonzalez's purse on the floor, explaining
that he was looking for weapons. After she picked up her
belongings on hands and knees, she was placed in a paddy wagon
and taken to the police headquarters. Mrs. Gonzalez was not
allowed to park her car. She was locked in a room, crying, for
seven hours. When Mrs. Gonzalez was finally released, she went
to get her car. It had been towed to the car pound, the lights

had been left on, and the battery Was dead. She had to have it

towed from the pound. Mrs. Gonzalez did not file a complaint

with IAD because she was afraid.

Mr. Charles R. Thornhill, Black, husband, father and 
teacher, recounted being stopped on June 29, 1969, by two police-
men who snatched his driver's license out of his hand and would
not tell him why they stopped him The officers" response to
Mr. Thornhill's repeated inquiries as to why he was being detained
was that Black peep?e always try to give the police a hard time.
They asked him, a middle?aged man, if he belonged to the Black-
stone Rangers or the Black Panther Barty. The officers intimated
that they did not belieVe him on this matter. Mr. Thornhill,
angry, snatched his license and returned to his car. An officer
whirled him around by his shoulder, knocked him down, and beat
him. Attacking him with black-jacks, fists and feet in the groin
and elsewhwere, one officer said, "let?s kill this Black 


By this time, from twelve to fifteen White officers had joined
in the beating. He was taken to the police station in a wagon
in which he waited more than half an hour. One officer had sprayed
Mace in the wagon and shut the door, leaving Mr. Thornhill locked
in a wagon full of the irritant. He posted $3,000 bond on charges
of resisting arrest, failure to produce a driver?s license,
assult, aggravated battery, and making an illegal U~Turn. He
says that he was offered a deal by the judge for a two-year
probation in return for a plea of guilty. Mr. Thornhill refused.
He is currently appealing a sentence of two to five yea in the
state penitentiary. Mr. Thornhill filed a complaint with the IAD

and witnesses who saw the incident called the IAD to give infor-

l?

mation. The IAD never informed him of the results of their
investigation.

Mr. John Lewis, medical technologist and father of five, told
of events surrounding a parent-principal conflict at Whistler
Elementary School in February, 1972. He and several other
parents whose children attend whistler were arrested and abused
following a demonstration outside the school, in which they were
demaning the resignation of the principal. One morning some
of the Black parents, mainly women, gathered near the school
while waiting for their fellow demonstrators to arrive. A white
officer "moon-lighting" as a security guard at the school kicked
a door out onto the backs of some of the mothers, knocking one
to the ground. He then began kicking and shoving the mothers.

A young man rushed to aid the women and he was hit and handcuffed.

Mr. Lewis said that when he and other men arrived, the
officer and another policeman who had joined him, hesitated. They
then announced that all the parents were under arrest. The
parents went peacefully to the station where all were charged
with three or four offenses including aggravated battery,
resisting arrest, and mob action. An ex-police officer, whose
wife was arrested, heard her cry out as he entered the station.
When he asked the two arresting officers what they were doing
to his wife, they knocked him down and charged him with aggravated
battery and resisting arrest. Others who were arrested were
present at the hearing and concurred with Mr. Lewis' repre?
sentation of the incident. A complaint was filed with the IAD

but no results of the investigation were given to Mr. Lewis.

11

He said that the group has no faith in the TAD because complaints
from the Black community have traditionally been tossed into a
"dead letter basket."
Mr. Edward Dolberry, was killed by two Chicago policemen on

June 26, 1972, the date of the first Blue Ribbon Panel hearing
into Misuse of Police Authority. At that time, General Counsel
Kermit B. Coleman 'xformed the panel in his closing statement
that there had been a police killing of a Black man, and noted
the irony that such an occurrence would take place on the day

of the first hearing. ML. Coleman read from an eye-witness
account of the murder at the second hearing. The witness stated
that Mr. Dolberry was walking on Madison Avenue, throwing a
butcher knife up in the air and catching it, as a child might.
The witness saw a police car make a U-turn and accost Mr.
Dolberry. Three White policemen approached him with drawn guns.
They surrounded him, and holding their .44 Magnums with both
hands, began to shoot Mr. Dolberry, firing several volleys at
close range even after they had shot the knife from his hands.
The witness stated that Mr. Dolberry's body was fragmented from
the shooting,and that the officers seemed to enjoy killing him.

Mr. David Aguina, Latino, husband and father of four children,

informed the panel of the circumstances surrounding the death of
his brother, Bruce, at the hands of a Chicago policeman, on
February 4, 1972. Nineteen-year-old Bruce met his death in the
men's washroom of a drug store in the heart of Chicago's loop.
Through the police officer who killed Bruce claimed that his gun

went off accidentally when he hit Bruce on the head following

12

an alleged attack, the coroner's inquest failed to show any
bruises or powder burns on Bruce's head. The lone eyewitness
to the killing was in a toiletbooth. He said that he heard

no unusual noises or conversation until he heard what he
thought was a door slamming. Then, hearing someone stumble to
the floor, he got up to investigate and saw Bruce lying on the
floor. The witness, according to Mr. David Aguina, said that
the officer then put his gun to the witness's head. Mr. Aguina
said that when a member of a Mexican-American organization
interviewed the officer, he stated that he through Bruce was
Negro, andthathe feared Negro youths because he had been
jumped once before. The witness was charged with aggravated
battery, but was subsequently acquitted. The IAD investigated
but the results are unknown.

Mr. Lester Jackson, husband, father, contractor, has been
active in the West Side community organization for years. One
April 7, 1968, Mr. Jackson was host to a meeting at his heme
of people who were concerned about the death of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. After the meeting adjourned the wife of one
of the men attending the gathering returned to the house,
informing Mr. Jackson that her husband was being arrested.
Jackson investigated, and was kneed inthe groin and maced by
a White officer. He was charged with resisting arrest and
interfering with a police officerand held incommunicado for
sixteen hours. When his case came up in "Riot Court," he was
sentenced to twenty days and a year's probation. Mr. Jackson,

a leader in the community for years said that he never heard of

13

a complainant receiving a favorable response from the IAD.

Miss Gail Dodd, a seventeen-yenr?old college student,
testified to being brutalized by a Chicago policeman when she
was sixteen. On October 5, 1971, a Black officer drove up
as Miss Dodd was conversing wiLh a lriend in front of a drug-
store in her neighborhhod. Her girlfriend started walking at
a rapid rate, warning her to get away from that officer, who
was notorious in the community for mistreating young Blacks.
Pointing to the two young;ladies, the officer said he wanted
to talk with them. Miss Dodd remained silent and the officer
told her that she must not have known who he was. She replied
that he didn't know her either, and he informed her that she
was under arrest. He told her to get in the car and she com-
plied. He said that he was going to first write down a charge
of resisting arrest, then he was going to slap the out of
her. She told him that he was not going to slap her and a
tussle ensued.

The officer summoned his colleagues over his radio, and
several squads soon appeared. Seven or eight officers knocked
her girlfriend to the ground and beat her. They then handcuffed
Miss Dodd, threw her on the ice cream counter of the drugstore,
lifted up her dress, and beat her about the head until she began
to bleed. At the station, she and her friend were referred to
as "bitches" by the sergeant who had supervised the beatings.
They were detained for six hours before they were taken to the

hospital Miss Dodd spent the night in the Andy Home, a reformatory.

l?

Charged with disorderly conduct, resisting arrest and two
counts of assault and battery, she was released to the custody
of her parents by a judge who commented that if two police
officers were beaten up by two little girls, they deserved it.
Miss Dodd sa that she has been harassed at school since the
incident by the same officers, and testified that they broke
up a surprise birthday party, telling all her friends that they
were under arrest. Miss Dodd said that she did not file a com-
plaint with the IAD "because we were told anything we told them,
they only relay it back to the police officers and they could use
it against us, and they would know what we were planning to do."
Mr Edward Maydon, Latino, a machinist for fourteen years,
alleged that he was brutalized because of his race on March 13,
1971. An Anglo police sergeant whom Mr. Maydon had known for
some time stopped him on his way into a restaurant. The officer
pushed and shoved him across the street in a provocative manner.
Mr. Maydon described the officer as 'wild.? The officer snatched
Mr. Maydon's beret off his head and began to pistol-whip him,
striking the back of his neck five or six times. Referring to
h?n and his companions as "wetbacks." the officer placed them in
apatrol wagon. At the station, a sergeant told him that 10th
Ward Alderman and Committeeman, Edward Vrdolyak had told him to
help keep Blacks and Browns out of the East Side. Mr. Haydon
and his friends were released, never having been charged with a
crime.

Rev. Calvin Turner, president of the National Association

for the Advancement of All People, related a frightening experience

15

on June 2, 1972, in which he was followed by a car with no license
Plates and no city sticker. Rev. Warner is active in the
anti?narcotics movement, and feels that he was being intimidated
in =unection with those activities. He stopped his car, got out,
and went back to the licenseless car asking why he was being
followed. The driver pulled his gun and said: "Nigger, I'll kill
you." Rev. 1. finally got the driver to show his police
badge and identification. Rev. Turner was charged with assault
and battery. He filed a complaint with the TAD but was not in-
formed of the results of their investigation.

Fr. Dennis Kendrick, a Roman Catholic Priest, recounted an

 

instance of police brutality and insensitivity at a teenage
dance in the Cabrini?Green housing project on December 26, 1970.
A police officer had been shot some six blocks away, and Fr.
Kendrick heard frantic pleas for help over the radio of a
policeman who was with him. Two police cars and a squadrol with
lights flashing pulled up in front of the school. Fr. Kendrick
turned to see an officer beating two youths who were leaving the
dance. Police officers with drawn guns and patrol sticks began
running at other young adults who were leaving the dance. He
saw a young man pushed to the ground, his head injured. When he
tried to stop the beating of the injured youth?s cousin, who
had asked the officers what his cousin had done, Fr. Kendrick
was threatened with billy clubs and dragged from the scene.

The watch commander pushed him up against the car and held his
arm across his throat. A Black police officer, Robert Irvin,

came to his aid and calmed his fellow officers. Fr. Kendrick

16

filed a complaint with IAD. He took a lie detector test from
John Reid Associates which indicated he was telling the truth
except as to one question which was indefinite. He was not
informed of the results of the IAD investigation. Fr. Kendrick
had told a police captain that he would be satisfied if a
particular officer was transferred from the district.

Officer Robert Irvin, a Chicago policeman, took the stand
and testified that after he intervened in the dispute between
Fr. Kendrick and the police officers, he returned to the district
station, where some of his fellow policemen called him a "Black
Panther militant," a Black and a "prejudiced
He stated that the acting watch commander and the
commander's son engaged in the jeering. He testified that he
has been the victim of constant harassment on his job in the
two years since the incident happened. Officer Irvin did not
know the results of the IAD investigation of the above incident.

Mrs. Catherine Shafford, a wife and mother of five, sent
her 20 year old son to a neighbor's home on June 23, 1972, to
bring back a motorbike that her younger son had been working on
during the day. She went out to the alley as her son approached
their garage and saw two policemen tell her son that they had
been chasing him. The young man explained that he was walking
the bike home and that they must have been chasing someone else.
As he was putting the bike in the garage, his sixteen year old
brother went to pull the door down. One offier grabbed the
younger brother and drew his revolver. When Mrs. Shafford

protested this action, she was knocked down by a blow to her

17

back. She estimates that 15 officers were then on the scene.
Protests from her husband did not stop the policeman from abusing two
of her sons.

These young men and their 17 year old sister were all taken
to the station, where they were refused medical attention for
several hours. When they returned to the station from the
hospital, a sympathetic white officer suggested that Mrs. Shafford
contact Congressman Metcalfe to report her experience. The
younger son and his sister were released without being charged
with any crime. The older son was charged with resisting arrest,
fleeing and eluding the police, no license on the bike, no state
sticker and disorderly conduct. A complaint was filed with the
IAD. Letters were received requesting the younger brother, sister

and father to come down to the IAD office and make a statement.

18

THE THIRD DAY: POLICE PERSONNEL2

Officer Howard Saffold, a policeman for 8 years and President
of the Afro-American Patrolmen's League testified that the
respect and confidence of Black citizens towards the police was
constantly declining. He attributed this condition to the 
numerous complaints of police brutality of which less than 2% are
sustained; (2) the poor police service in Black and other
minority communities; and (3) the open and notorious police
corruption, none of which the police department themselves have
attempted to eradicate.

Officer Saffold also pointed out the serious friction that
exist between white and black officers. He attributed this to the
type of treatment by supervising personnel toward black officers
when they complain about unfair treatment of citizens by some
of their white counterparts. When a black officer registers this
type of complaint he is automatically labeled a trouble maker,
and on many occasions will then become the victim of numerous
disciplinary actions. Officer Saffold further stated that the
percentage of Black policemen was inadequate and should

reflect more closely, the number of blacks in the city 

 

2Several high~ranking public officials were invited by the Blue
Ribbon Pane; to give testimony. All refused. superintendent of
Police James B. Conlisk, Jr., said that he would be out of the city;
former State's Attorney Edward B. Hanrahan flatly refused the
invitation; Mr. Marlin Johnson, chairman of the Chicago Police
Board, informed the panel that any public statement from him at
that time might hinder the progress of a study he was making on
his own. Others who were invited and did not appear were g3.
William E. Cahill, president of the Chicago Civil Service
Commission; and Mr. Peter Fitzpatrick, chairman of the Chicago
Commission on Human Relations.

19

This officer concluded his testimony describing the Chicago
Police Department's and its inability (gave several examples)
to root out corrupt police practices and expressed the need for
an independent, outside agency to receive, investigate and
prosecute cases of police corruption and/or criminal acts
committed by policemen.

Officer Saffold states this type of agency could very well
begin the process of restoring public confidence in an institution
that is sorely needed in our society today.

Chicago's black communities are the most overpatrolled and
underprotected in the city. When a white officer becomes so
intolerant in his community that complaints are coming regularly,
he is sent to the Black community. An armed confrontation between
black and white officers, he thinks, is possible.

Officer Arthur Lindsay, a police sergeant and Vice-President
of the Guardians, a police organization, has been in the depart-
ment for twenty years. He testified that the Guardians came
together to fight polarization within the department, seeing
the possibility of armed confrontation between white and black
officers. Most of the members are black but there are some
white and Spanish-speaking members. He agreed with Mr. Saffold's
description of conditions within the department. Mr. Lindsay
sees community solidarity as thekey to solving the police
brutality problem. He noted a marked decline in the quality of
investigation by the Internal Affairs Division since former

Superintendent Orlando W. Wilson left the department. While

20

having reservations about civilians investigating complaints of
police brutality he feels that since the Police Department has
failed, there is no other alternative. As to policemen, who

are racist or sadistic, they should be screened out by an initial
examination.

Officer Herman Herrick, a sergeant in the police department
and President of the Chicago Police Crimefighters, acknowledged
the presence of several racist and sadistic officers on the
force. He voiced the opinion that most policemen do not fall
into that category. He considers present police channels for
citizens complaints to be efficient in handling the cases with
which they are presented. He opposed civilian review of police
on the grounds that only policemen are sensitive enough to a

policeman's situation to judge them.

21

THE FOURTH DAY: AND EEGAL ASPECTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Dr. Avrum Mendelsohn, a was formerly employed
by the Chicago Police Department from 1965 to 1968 and now works
with the Elmhurst Center. He presently specializes
in selection and promotional testing and evaluation of law enforce-
ment officers for police department. The first step in the
selection procedure of the Chicago Police Department is a civil
service test. It is a "verbal mental ability" test for police
applicants which is "of questionable value" in predicting police
performance on the street and has implications concerning bias
in terms of minority group discrimination.

The second step is physical examinations by both the Civil
Service Commission and the Chicago Police Department. A back-
ground investigation is the third step.

If the above steps are successfully completed, the applicant
is admitted to the Police Academy. After entrance into the
academy, probationary policemen are tested for emotional stability
and other pertinent personality factors.

Dr. Mendelsohn testified that in his experience with the
Chicago Police Department, when emotional and personality defects
are discovered in a probationary policeman, the person is not
removed from duty, but assigned to a "stress area? -- an area
which has a high crime rate and where the policeman gets a lot
of street experience very fast. The purpose, he said, is "to
make them or break them during their probationary period on the
street." Such policemen are classified as "calculated risks,"

Dr. Mendelsohn stated, and although research has produced several

22

factors which could be used in predicting effective performance
of policemen on the street, they have not been adopted? The
Civil Service Commission, according the witness, is the proper
body for administration of testing of police
candidates as part of its initial hiring process. He stated that
there is a definite correlation between the number of complaints
against policeman and the emotional characteristics of the
officers.

Dr. Mendelsohn said his organization.has comp11ed infor-
mation for the City of Chicago which points out what personality
factors are involved in successful police work. This information
includes expertise in examining an individual in terms of his
ability to relate effectively to people, his aggressiveness, his
motivation, his maturity, his alertness and many other specific
job-related areas. He stated that the information has been
published and is available to the Chicago Police Department,
but is not being used.

Dr. Arnold Abrams, a professor of at Chicago City
College and previously a consultant for the Skokie and Chicago
police departments, studied the emotional stability of applicants
to the Chicago Police Force over a three-year period? During
this period, 963 candidates were examined Of
this number, 244 or roughly 20%"were found to have disturbances

that were sufficiently severe as to recommend that they not be

 

Assessment of Police Candidates, "International
Criminal Police Review, August-September 1968,

23

taken into the Police Department." "When sociologists and
go out into the community and sample a community,
they find that roughly 8% of any given community has within

it a population that is suffering from some kind of disturbance
that requires attention." From this it was concluded that

"police work offers a perfect umbrella to legitimatize pathology."

By assigning patrolman candidates with 
problems to stress areas instead of rejecting them as candidates,
you increase problems in those areas: This, I think, goes along
with the philosophy if you want to teach a child how to swim
throw him in the water. He will either swim or drown. I am sure
that some of them come out of it and manage to somehow cope and
do it; but I would imagine that for most it is an extremely
stressful situation and also makes it very difficult on the
neighborhood that they are working in.

He agreed with Mr. Todd's analysis (see below) of the
effect of Mayor Daley's "shoot to kill" order,
adding that an atmOSphere of approval or encouragement of
brutality can lead to the development of the most negative
pathologies within a paramilitary group such as the police.

Mr. Thomas Todd, is Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern

 

University Law School; Assistant Director of the Center for
Urban Affairs at Northwestern, and Executive Vice-President of
Operation PUSH. ?Mr. Todd, who was Assistant United States
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois from 1967 to
1970, stated that at that time he found no activity whatsoever

on the part of the United States Attorney's Office in the

24

prosecution of police officers or other officials for deprivation
of civil rights of citizens.

After a change of the United States Attorney, the death of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and seme other factors, there was a
move to prosecute policemen alleged to have deprived persons of
their civil rights. An old statute,4 passed in 1866, was the
basic authority for federal prosecution of policemen accused of
unlawful acts under color of law. During the disturbances
surrounding the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago,
Mr. Todd took advantage of the national indignation to argue that
if policemen were to be prosecuted for brutality against white
students, they should also be prosecuted for similar acts against
Blacks.

He described the torturous maze of technicalities which
inhibited his attempts to get an indictment against a white
policeman who had slain a Black resident. He succeeded in
getting the indictment after presenting his case to authorities
at high levels in the Department of Justice in Washington, Todd
did not prosecute the case in court, and concurred in the decision

not to do so because of racial implications. The white jury

 

4Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than
are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if
death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years
or for life.

25

delibeiated 45?minutes before acqniLting the policeman, but a

3*n

precedent had been set for the EESL time in Chicago, a white
policeman had been btocght to trial under the 1865 statute for
the sitting of a Black paison.
Attorney Todd also told of finding that one of the policemen
involved in the case had spent three months in a mental hospital

'0

slice ?orce. This



{3
?3

prior to tle ?'ni that he was accepte on

was brought to the attention of the Chicago Police Department, and
it was snbseguently leatned th't the policcman had falsified his
application for appointment to the force by denying that he had ever
had a mental illness or been consulted by a He
testified that the Police Department teaponded by stating that this
was the first case of such a nature to cor. to its attention, and
that to fire the offices would destroy the metals of the police
force.

The'witness cited the need for additional federal legislation
and offered the panel an amendement to existing federal laws
against misuse of police authority, closing some of the loopholes

which allow policemen to escape punishment for their wrongs
against citizens.

Attorney Todd said that a change of attitude is needed at the
highest levels of law enforcement agencies, federal and local,
and cited several cases in which racism was an open factor in the
handling of charges of brutality against white policemen accused

of brutality by a Black citizen; Mr,Todd felt that Mayor Daley?s

order to "shoot to kill and aim to naim"5 created an atmosphere
wherein sadistic, racist officers fool that they will be protected
by the Department and the City administration against justified
charges of brutality. The IAD is totally ineffective because it
seeks "to protect the police officer as opposed to getting at the
truth."

Mr. Marshall Patner, attorney and Chairman of the Chicago
Law Enforcement Study Group, shared with the Panel the findings
of that group on police use of fatal force in Chicago during
1969-70? The findings were:

(1) The Chicago civilian death rate was three times that
of New York, Los Angeles and Detroit and one and one-half times
that of Philadelphia.

(2) Sevent-five percent of the persons killed were Black.

A Black person living in Chicago was over six times as likely to
be killed by the police as was a white person.

(3) 0f the 79 deaths, there is substantial evidence that
the police violated administrative standards of conduct or
criminal statutes in 28 of the cases.

(4) In ten particular cases, there is substantial evidence
that the policemen involved should Have been held criminally liable

in connection with the deaths.

 

5Mayor Richard J. Daley issued this order to his Police Department
in 1968 during riots following the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King, on April 4, 1963.

6The Police and Their Use of Fatal Force in Chicago, Law Enforcement
Study Group, 1972.

27

(5) 0f the ten seriors cases, the State?s Attorney
presented evidence to the Grand Jury in only three. One police-
man was indicteu and brought to trial but was acquitted.

(6) The Uornoner?s Inquest exonerated the police in all but
two eases. the same two cases w?ere the Police Department decided
to press charges but in which ther: was no indictment.

(7) The Internal Af?eirs Division does not reveal what
action, if ray, is eaten in cases it reviews. "The limited
infonnation available from non?police sources indicates that
administrative discipline in cases of police use of fatal force
has been extremely rare."

(8) It is apparent that there is a double standard when a
policemen violates tee law and when another citizen does. This
double standard exists in both the police department and in the
office of the Staters Attorney,

(9) The system for reviewing civilian deaths suffers from
two serious defects. First, the reviewing agencies -- The Chicago
Police Department itself, the State's Attorney, the Coroner and
the IAD have a close working relationship that precludes
independent review within the system. Second, the review pro-
ceedings, with the exception of the Coroners? Inquest, are con-
ducted almost entirely out of View of the public, an arrangement

that precludes review from outside the system.


G:

wilt.

FINDINGS OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL:

THE 0F ABUSIVE POLICE
CONDUCT IN CHICAGO

I said: my God9 1 am his mother,"

He said "Get Out of here, you bitch."

I said, "Do you understand I am his mother?"
Ie (the policeman) took his giscol and he
piS'ol~whipped me, disiocated my shoulder,

asking ribs in two places and messed with
Lj side of which I have two 

She (my daughter) was 17 years old. He hit
her in the stomach and the baby was born
premature-y and deformed,

(Tesfimony of a n.Lness before the
81 '-Jbon Patel hearings.)

Abusive Police Conduct

The testimony in the first two days of hearings before
the Blue Ribbon Panel revealed many instances of grossly
abusive conduct on the part of Chicago policemen. Such
conduct -- particularly the use of excessive force -- violates
the constitutional rights of its victims and the criminal laws
of the State of Illinois, and poisons police?community relations.
There can be no dispute that police mistreatment of
citizens occurs. Even Superintendent James B. Conlisk, Jr.,

(7)

has agreed that the use of excessive force is a reality.



(7)Report 01 the Board of Managers of the Chicago Bar Assoc.
on Police-Community Relations, December 6, 1972, press con-
ference statement. (This Report is hereinafter referred to

as the Report.")

29

How often does it occur? Theuv are only rough
measurea: more than twelve hundred f1200} citizen
complaints of abusive police conduct each year to the
1"a?ice Department: and yet other complaints that
are never compiled and counted.

Comparative information Lg available as to the
frequency of the ultimate form of abusiVe police conduct:
civilian deaths 3L the hands of police officers. According
to a report by the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, the
use of fatal force by oulice is Far more frequent in Chicago
than in other major urban centers. "Chicago's civilian death
rate 1'at the hands of law enforcement officers) was nearly
one and one-half times the Philadelphia rate and more than
three times the rate for New York, Los Angeles and Detroit." (8)
Significantly, 75% of the civilians killed in Chicago were
Black.

But such statistics on the number of deaths or complaints
made reflect only the iceberg tip of the problem of abusive
police conduct. They say nothing of the many instances in
which victims do not complain at all, because they are

convinced it would be futile. Nor do such statistics reflect

 

8)

The Police and Their Use of Fatal Force in Chicago, a
report of the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, Chicago
Illinois, 1972.

30

the false arrests, the illegal seauches or the more common
kind of violence thal occurs daily, esPecially
in exchanges between police and minorities or young peOple. (9)
Very few young Blacks and Browns have been spared the experience
of having to swallow their pride and take a bullying insult
from a police officer.

In serious instances of abusive police conduct, the
police consistantly place criminal charges to justify their
conduct and put the citizen-victim on the defensive. The
use of the same three criminal charges -- disorderly conduct,
resisting arrest and battery against a police officer is
so constant that lawyers and community workers familiar with
such cases refer to this group of criminal charges as the
"holy trinity."

Sometimes these charges are dropped in court. But if
the citizen shows any sign of seeking redress for the treatment
he has received -- such as making a complaint or filing a civil
suit the policemen vigorously prosecute the criminal charges
to secure official ratification of their conduct.

That official ratification is not hard to obtain because
aggressive conduct toward citizens is the approved method of

police behavior in Chicago. This is indicated by the tactics

 

(9) Members of the Brown community, in addition to their
minority status, frequently suffer harassment over their
citizenship or residency status.

31

oi the Special Operations :roup (formerly the Task Force .
rhe duties of the Task Force officer require that he aggres-
sively seek out "suspicious" conduct and engage in stop

and [risk operations and other preventive procedures. These
tactics criticized and cautiously described as "possible

(10)

unconstitutional" by the Report -- reflect the manner in
which aggressive conduct toward citizens is institutionalized

by the Chicagw Police Department.

Police Department ReSponse to Citizen Complaints:
The Police Discipline System

Abusive police conduct could be eliminated, or at
least minimized, if the public officials responsible for
police conduct -- the Superintendent and the Police Board
members -- rigorously enforced among their subordinates proper
standards of conduct toward civilians.

But it is overwhelmingly clear that they do 225 do so.
Instead, complaints from citizens of abusive conduct by police
are almost universally rejected by the Police Department's self-
investigation system.

That police discipline system in which the Superin-
tendent and his Internal Affairs Division have the major

11
reSponsibilities, performed in the following manner in 1971: 

 


10) CBA Report, page 29

11
Five Year Statistical Study prepared by the Internal
Affairs Division of the Chicago Police Department, 1973.

32

Excessive Force and Other Types of
Othen Violations of Complaints
Civil Rights

 

 

Investigations

Completed 1156 3938
Complaints

Sustained 16 1073
Per Cent 1.4% 27.0%

 

These statistics show that complaints of abusive conduct
were refected 98.6% of the time by the Police Department.
The re3ponsibility for these decisions is clear because Police
Department regulations provide that every disPosition of
such a complaint is to be reviewed by the Superintendent. (12)
The statistics also show that the Department is almost
twenty times as likely to sustain a complaint against an
officer if the complaint involves some other type of misconduct.
This demonstrates that the police discipline system is
far more lenient about abusive conduct toward citizens than
it is about transgressions against its internal command
authority.
It has become clear that there are four basic reasons
for the failure of the police discipline system to punish

abusive conduct:

 

(12) Police Department ?eneral Order 67-21 (IV) (L).

33

1. Police attitudes. It is the basic law enforcement

 

policy of the Police Department that aggressive police conduct
toward citizens is desirable and legitimate. Abusive treatment
of a 'Ftizen is viewed as merely over-zealous conduct within
the scope of accepted police behavior.

2. Self-investigation. The entire investigation and
decision 01 civ'lian's complaint of abusive police conduct
is carried out by other policemen. Inevitably this self-inves-
tigation system resolves doubts and conflicts of evidence in the
accused policeman's favor. The Natergate scandal and investiga?
tion in Washington has emphasized on a national scale that self-
investigation results in cover-ups and that only independent
investigation is reliable and credible. (13)

3. Secrecy. The entire handling of citizens' complaints
against policemen is secret. Not only is the public completely
excluded from any access to information, but the complainant
himself receives no information whatsoever about the evidence
obtained in an investigation, the manner in which it is evaluated,
the reasons for a decision, or (in the rare case where a complaint
is sustainedl the penalty imposed. Until very recently, a
complainant was not even informed of whether his complaint had
been sustained or not. This practice of secrecy conceals any
deficiencies in an investigation and precludes criticism or
assistance from the complainant or the public.
(13) The standard police argument is that only a policeman has
the experience and understanding required for investigations of
police misconduct. Is it not equally true that a citizen-victim

of abusive police conduct has a unique and necessary perspective
on abusive police treatment of citizens?

3a

4. Procedural defects. Thole are many severe defi-
ciencies in the procedures by which citizen complaints of
police misconduct are investigated and decided. Following
are some of the defects documented by the Chicago Bar Asso-
ciation in its recent report (after a CBA committee was given
access to the discipline system's operations): (14)

There are no guidelines for the thoroughness of
an investigation, with the result that only cursory investi-
gations are made in many cases. For example, there are usually
no efforts made to interview witnesses at their homes; instead,
registered letters are sent telling them to come to Police
Headquarters, and if they do not appear, there are no further
efforts to contact them. (15)

(bl There are no written guidelines for the evaluation
of evidence, except the general direction to find "the truth."
This standard of proof has no precendent in other fact-finding
processes, such as "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases
or by "preponderance or greater weight of the evidence" in civil
cases. Moreover, there is no attempt to evaluate the credibility

of witnesses along traditional lines. The resolt of these defi-

ciencies is that:

 

(14) CBA Report, pages 12-17. The CBA recommended reforms in
police discipline procedures with respect to these and several
other defects, but there has been no response from the Police
Department.

(15) Fear of the police, arising from the long-standing pattern
of aggressive and abusive police treatment of citizens, obviously
produces a great deal of wariness about responding to such a

letter.

35

"often, conflicting stories are resolved in favor of the
police officer, although in some instances apparently
disinterested and otherwise reliable witnesses supported
the complainant. Fhe investigators support such determination
by saying that it is not possible to determine who is telling
lhe truth and, therefore, the charge is not sustained."

The prior behavior record of the police
officer is not considered during the investigation, while
any prior record of the complainant is considered. A policeman
may accumulate a series of complaints which never affect
him because each one is inadequately investigated, prejudicially
decided, and then filed away and never considered again.

There is no separation of the investigative
and decision-making functions. IAD investigators conduct
the investigation, evaluate the evidence and recommend the
decision and the penalty, if any. "The Committee believes
that this combination of functions conflicts with traditional
and well-recognized fact-finding procedures, and that this
total involvement in a complaint may impair an investigator's

ability to investigate impartially."

Another serious and revealing procedural defect, not

discussed by the CBA, is that the Internal Affairs Division

3h

has a dual function -- to investigate policemen and to defend
them. "The has a two-fold function. One function is to
investigate all complaints of citizens regarding officers 
The second function is to prepare in accordance with arrange-
ments made between the Corporation Counsel and the Superin-
tendent of Police all the necessary investigative work for
the preparation of the defense of a police officer where
there is an alleged violation of an individual's civil
rights." (16)

The Corporation Counsel has a similar conflict of
roles: his office prosecutes disorderly conduct and resisting
arrest charges made by policemen and defends policemen in
civil actions brought by citizens -- but then has the duty
of prosecuting serious disciplinary proceedings against some
of the same policemen before the Police Board.

These conflicting roles of the police discipline system
and the Corporation Counsel inevitably must be accommodated
somehow, and it seems obvious that the accommodation is to
favor policemen accused of abusive conduct and to disfavor

complaining citizens.

 

(16? Brief of the Corporation Counsel in Burke v. Nelligan,
case No. 68 227 in the United States District Court.

37

The police discipline system in its present fonu is

thus seriously inadequate in at least five respects:

-- police attitudes that legitimize abusive conduct:

a self-investigation system that breeds bias:

-- complete secrecy that conceals deficiencies:

-- severe procedural detects in investigation procedures: and
-- serious conflicts of interest on the part of agencies

with major responsibilities in the system.

The immediate result of these inadequacies is that
the police discipline system virtually never sustains
complaints of abusive conduct by policemen -- as shown
in the statistics set forth at the beginning of this section.
The long-term result of structural inadequacies and
ineffective performance is a total lack of public confidence
in the police discipline system as presently constituted.
Thus, a poisonous cycle is set in motion: complaints of abusive
police conduct are ignored, citizens become fearful and dis-
trustful of the police, police-citizen attitudes and cooperation
deteriorate. Ultimately, the greatest loss is in the effec-
tiveness of everyday law enforcement -- in the desire and

ability of the police to "serve and protect" the citizenry.

33

These Iindings of the Blue Ribbon Panel are consistent

with a long history of investigations and studies that

have repeatedly found the police discipline system to be

deficient.

Among them are the following.(17)

"In spite of the elaborate procedures established
for disciplinary and internal investigation,
records of the department indicate there are continuing
breaches of discipline, ethical compromise and
n?scondu?t on the part of Chicago police officers.
We recognize that any large department will always
have disciplinary problems to contend with. However,
we are concerned about the shortcomings of the
disciplinary system at the level of execution."
A Survey of the Chicago Police Department,
International Association of Chiefs of Police,
June 1970, page 340.

"The performance of this branch of the Chicago
Police Department -- the branch dedicated to
impartial and objective investigations of police
conduct was so seriously deficient that it
suggests purposeful malfeasance.:
Report of the Special Federal Grand Jury
investigating the deaths of Fred Hampton
and Mark Clark, May 1970.

"It has also become clearly evident that there
is a lack of confidence in the handling of
complaints concerning Verbal abuse and the use
of excessive force."

CBA Report, page 4.

 

(17) Studies critical of the performance of the police
discipline system date back as far as 1965, when the
American Civil Liberties Union found significant dispari-
ties between the results of IAD investigations and its
own investigations of abusive police conduct.

39

while the major focus of the dlue Ribbon Panel's
hearings were on the problem of abusive police conduct
toward citizens, we also note that investigations by the

deral government have resulted in over 70 indictments of
Chicago police officers in the past year for corruption
.nd other criminal activity. This series of indictments
shows a pattern of police corruption parallel to the pattenm
of abusive - dual -u and the same failure of the police
discipline system to discover and punish improper and unlawful
police conduct.

This pattern of proven ineffectiveness of the police
discipline system has produced virtually no response on the
part of police department executives and other reSponsible
public officials.(18) The police discipline system has been
changed only in the most minor respects, and as often as not
to make discipline of policemen even less likely.

There has been only one significant step taken to reform

police discipline: the assignment of the Chicago Commission

 

(18) A major federal court lawsuit, based on the patterns

of abusive police conduct and non-discipline, has been

brought by community organizations and has been upheld by

the federal court as legally correct. The case is Calvin

v. Conlisk (No. 72 3230 in U.S. District Court); the primary
plaintiffs are Concerned Citizens for Police Reform,the Afro-
American Patrolmen's League and the Chicago Urban League, and
the primary defendants are Superintendent Conlisk, the members
of the Police Board and the City of Chicago. The federal court
has held that those defendants have the constitutional duty to
prevent recurring abusive conduct by policemen. This holding
means that if the plaintiffs prove at trial that the defendants
have failed to act effectively to prevent police misconduct,

the court will grant injunctive relief to force appropriate
reforms.

40

0n Human Relations in June 19:2 to review IAD excessive
force liles. In principle, review function has great
significance because it appears to represent acceptance
by the City and the Police Department of the principle of
independent investigation in a large majority of the cases
it reviews.

But it is clear that the CCHR review function is
circumscribed in so many ways that its impact on the
problems of abusive police conduct and disciplinary

failure is very limited.

1. CCHR merely reviews at one point in the
process, the individual investigation files prepared by
the IAD. CCHR has no part in the basic investigation or
in decision-making, and the system of police self-investigation
continues basically unchanged.

2. CCHR has no role in systematically reviewing
or reforming IAD procedures.

3. CCHR continues the practice of operating in
virtual total secrecy from complainants and the public.

a. CCHR has neither adequate staff nor the
expertise required to deal with the problem of investigation

and evaluation of abusive police conduct.

#1

5. CCHR is regarded by the community as lacking
independence from the City administration and the Police
Department. For example, the Chairman of CCHR, while a
respected attorney, has been specially hired on many occasions
Ly the City to defend major civil cases seeking damages
for police misconduct.

The net result is that the Human Relations Commission
review function, while important as an acceptance of the
principle of civilian investigation, is a wholly inadequate
solution to the problems of abusive police conduct and non-

discipline. (19)

The conclusion of the Blue Ribbon Panel is that an
entirely new independent investigating agency, reporting
its factual findings to the Police Board for imposition of
discipline by them should be created. This preposal is set
forth in detail in our Recommendations. We emphasize here,
however, three important aspects of the proposal.

1. It is based on the two vital principles of

independent investigation and fact-finding, and public

access to the results of investigations.

 

l9)

The Chicago Bar Association Report came to the same
conclusion: "The Commission should not be involved in
police discipline." CBA Report, page 22.

RE

2. The proposal would delegate to the independent
agency the handling of only those types of complaints that
the police discipline system has shown itself incapable of
handling effectively: complaints of excessive force, other
violations of civil rights, and corruption or criminal activity
of any kind by policemen. All other types of police mis?
conduct would continue to be investigated by the present
police discipline system (though we propose several important

reforms in its procedures.)

3. The proposal is Egg a civilian review board.
Civilian review boards historically have had the re3ponsibility
for imposing discipline, but not the authority for conducting
their own investigations. The independent investigating
agency we propose is the Opposite: it has the function of
investigation and fact-finding, but the imposition of
penalties will continue to be the responsibility of the
Police Board and the Superintendent.
Police Personnel Practices: Racial Discrimination
and the Absence of Testing
The Blue Ribbon Panel heard testimony from several
witnesses about major defects in the personnel practices
of the Chicago Police Department. That testimony focused

on two particular aspects of imprOper personnel practices --

43

racial discrimination and the abSane of 
testing.
Obviously both of these matters are intimately related
to the problem of abusive police conduct. Under-representation
of minorities in the police force undermines the effectiveness
of police work in the minority communities. And the absence
of testing means that there is no assurance
that the persons entrusted with badges and guns have the basic
emotional maturity and ability to tolerate stress that will
enable them to deal effectiVely and cooperatively with citizens.
Unfortunately, the record of the Chicago Police Depart-
ment in both of these respects shows not only the long-term
existence of these defects, but a persistent refusal to do
anything about them even in the face of authoritative documen-

tation and requests for change.
A. Racial Discrimination in Employment Practices

As noted above, the Blue Ribbon Panel heard evidence
on this question from several witnesses, particularly
representatives of Black policemen's organizations. Shortly
after the hearings, their descriptions of racial discrimination
in the employment practices of the Chicago Police Department
were authoritatively confirmed by a Justice Department

study.

44

That study, entitled "The Chicago Police Department:
An Evaluation of Personnel Practices", was carried out by
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (an agency
of the U. S. Department of Justice? in response to a complaint
filed by the Afro-American PaLrolmen?s League. It was a
comprehensive examination of the racial impact of all personnel
practices. including recruitment, hiring, promotion and internal
assignments and discipline.
The basic conclusion of the LEAA Study was that:
In key areas, the hard data showed that
Blacks and other minority group members
were being adversely affected by the
present personnel system. Current pro-
cedures and practices do tend to have ad-
verse impact on minority group members,
both as entrg candidates and as departmental
personnel.(2 
This conclusion was based on the following findings as
to racial discrimination in various stages in the personnel
system: (21)
"Baseline Data Blacks represent approximately 33% of
the population of Chicago but only 16% of the sworn officers on
the Police Department. Spanish-Americans?represent about 7%
of the population but only 1? of sworn officers on the Department.
Recruitment and Selection. Blacks and Spanish-Americans

apply for entry onto the Police Department in numbers that

approximate their percentages in Chicago's general population,

 

(2m 1.1m Report, pp. 1.11-1.12.

(21) LEAA Report, pp. 2.1-2.4.

45

but both the written test and the medical examinations given

to police candidates by the Civil Service Commission disqualify
minority group members at about twice the rate that non-minority
group members are disqualified. Since there is, at present,

no adequate evidence that the written test actually measures
what is required for becoming an effective police officer,

the study recommends that the present test be discontinued until
such time as the test (or a newly-developed different type of
test) can be shown to be a valid predictor of job performance
on a basis that is fair to all minority group members. Recom?
mendations are also made for improvements in the medical exami-
nation program.

"Training and Education. A review of the Police Department's
recruit training, in-service training and promotional training
programs showed that the Department has basically good programs
in each of these areas but that adequate attention is not yet
being given to subjects and instructional techniques designed
to improve understanding and working relationships among members
of all racial, ethnic and cultural groups. Recommendations
are made for improving the training.

"Police Department policies and government financial
assistance encourage higher education for personnel of the
Department. Blacks in particular are taking advantage of this
opportunity. There is some evidence, however, that the depart-
mental policy for adjusting shifts and assignments (consistent

with operational requirements) to permit attendance at college

classes is not fully effective. It is recommended that the

46

Department give corrective attention to this matter.

"The instructional staff of the Police Training Academy
does not contain enough minority group officers to demonstrate
to recruits and to in-service officers a positive and construc-
tive policy for accepting and utilizing minority group officers.
It is recommended that more minority group officers be used
in training at all levels.

"Promotion. Black officers are inadequately represented
in the Sergeant, Lieutenant and Captain ranks, in the top level
management and command ranks (positions exempt from civil
service) and, to a lesser extent. in the specialized patrolman
assignments that carry premium pay. The factors causing this
situation are discussed. Recommendations. are made that civil
service promotional procedures be reviewed and validated, that
appointments of Blacks to high level command and policy-making
positions by the Superintendent be increased and that the
procedures for selecting patrolman for specialized assignments
be further improved.

"Assignments. Any review of equity in assignments within
the Police Department is complicated by the relatively low
percentage of Blacks on the Department and by the lack of firm
definition of what constitutes the more desirable or "preferred"
assignments. However, a review of assignments to positions and
units reported during interviews as being the preferred ones

did not reveal any clear pattern of differential treatment

47

except in relation to the Traffic .ivision and the Vice Control
Division. Recommendations are made that the Department exten-
sively review the assignment of Black patrolmen, particularly
in the areas mentioned, and that the assignments of the
reiatively few Black supervisory and command officers be given
careful attention to assure their most effective use. To
establish a better basis for determining the extent to which
minority group and non-minority group members receive assignments
of their preference, a revised system of transfer requests is
recommended.

"Discipline. The study found a higher rate of serious
complaints (Complaint Register cases) against Black officers
than against non-minority group officers in the Department,
and also found that a higher percentage of such charges against
Blacks were found to be Sustained by Departmental investigations.
The study found an even greater disparity in the rate at which
Blacks were given Summary Punishment for infractions of depart-
mental rules. The study did not find any significant differences
in the amount or type of penalties given to Black and non-Blacks
for commission of the same type of offenses in either Complaint
Register cases or Summary Punishment cases. The study recommends
that the Department establish a monitoring system to systemati-
cally detect any racial inbalances in its disciplinary charges
and findings, and to provide for administrative review to
determine the reasons for imbalan and to provide corrective
action where needed. The study also recommends a procedure for

better command officer control over summary punishment cases."

{Illa

These lindings oi the Law Assistance
Administration confirm the racial discrimination in police
employment that community groups and Black police organiza-
tions have long complained of. The findings show that the
major steps in the existing process do not identify those
who are qualified to become Chicago policemen or to be
promoted as well as they serve to screen out minority group
candidates.

However, the complaints and efforts to secure reform
by local organizations have been uaiformly rejected by Police
Department, Civil Service and other public officials. (22)

The public might hope that in response to Specific
documentation and recommendations by the Justice Department,
the public officials reaponsible for police personnel practices
in Chicago would cooPerate in instituting appr0priate reforms.
Indeed, for a period of eight months following the presentation
of its Report, LEAA did attempt to obtain voluntary action

by those officials.

 

(22) A Federal court lawsuit seeking reform of racially
discriminatory police personnel practices has recently
been filed by community organizations and a number of
individuals. (Camacho V. City of Chicago, No. 73 1252
in the U. S. District Court.)

49

But the federal government, like local organizations
before it, has had no success in securing an end to racial
discrimination in police employment in Chicago. On May 22,
1973, the Director of LEAA's Office of Civil Rights Compliance
informed the originalcomplainant, the Afro-American
Patrolmen's League:

"Discussions and correspondence with the officials
.f the City of Chicago have not resulted in a
commitment by these officials to undertake
significant steps to achieve what this agency
believes to be voluntary compliance with the
civil rights laws and regulations affecting the
Chicago Police Department as a recipient of
funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration.

Accordingly, this letter is to advise you that
LEAA has referred this matter to the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice
for such action as it deems appropriate.? 

With respect to the foregoing findings of the Blue
Ribbon Panel, our recommendations are in two areas:

1. For immediate action by the Civil Service
Commision and the Police Department to correct the racially
discriminatory practices in their personnel systems; and

2. In view of the consistent refusal of the
responsible public officials to take such action, for the
adoption of a specific affirmative action program and for the
appointment ofaacommitteeof independent citizens to monitor
implementation of that program.
B. The Absence of Testing

The Blue Ribbon panel heard testimony from two 

formerly affiliated with the Chicago Police Department in connection

 

23. See Exhibit 1 at the end of this Report.
50

Uith testing the emotional qua .1 ns of recruits. lb:
testimony of both witness underscoled the need for 
testing in the section process for police officers in a
large urban environment. Dr. Arnold Abrams headed a panel of
:rists and who screened applicants for
police employment in the early 1960's. He testified that
20% to 30% of these interviewed by the panel were recommended
for rejection ht ause of "grossly incapaci.ating illness."

Both Witnesses indicated that there is at present little
or no testing for .- [ilications of recruits.
finding was confirmed by Report, which noted that
practically all major police departments in the country have
some means of screening out applicants who are emotionally
unsuited for police work," but that "the present patrolman
selection process (in Chicago) includes no method for screening
out persons with serious emotional problems."

Dr. Avrum Mendelsohn, formerly a with the

Personnel Division of the Police Department, indicated that
recruits are not weeded out on the basis of evidence of

deficiencies brought to the attention of the

 

24 Abrams noted that the incidence of problems
was approximately three times as great in the population of
police applicants as in the population at large. He attributed
this to the fact that police work is a "perfect umbrella to
legitimize pathology,"

25 LEAA Report at 3.28. It should be noted that this
criticism is applicable to the Chicago Civil Service Commision
as well as the Chicago Police Department, since the Commission
has primary responsibility for the hiring and selection of
Chicago policemen.

51

Police Department. Rather, I :ruits are labeled

"calculated risks" by the Department and are assigned to
26

high-crime areas. Thus, many who are not 
qualified to serve as Chicago Police officers not only
become members of the force, but are assigned to areas where

no demands on them are greatest and the consequences of their
mistakes are likely to be most serious.

This testimony indicates two major failings in the policies
for hiritg ra' Iploying Chicago Police officers. The absence
of testing results in the hiring of police
officers who are likely to abuse their authority. In addition,
even when a recruit or officer manifests diffi-
culties, no intelligent attempt is made the individual
in question in an environment in which his performance can be
carefully monitored until it is determined wheather the
difficulties warrant a discharge.

It is the recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Panel that
testing take place as part of the initial
selection process at the Civil Service Commission, and that
emotional or problems should result in exclusion

from police employment, rather than merely some form of non-

sensitive assignment.

 

26

Dr. Mendelsohn described the purpose of this policy as
follows: "The basis theoretical orientation has been to make
them or break them during their probationary period on the
street."

52

Secrecy in Police Administration and Operations

It is clear that in the long run the ability of
community groups and of public generally to analyze
and affect the performance of their police department depends
on the availability of information concerning police
administration and Operations.

It is equally clear that the history of police-
community relations in Chicago is marked by a long-
standing pattern of police secrecy. We have noted above
our findings concerning the virtually total secrecy in which
the police discipline function has been carried on, and this
is an excellent example of the relationship of official
secrecy to official malfeasance. If police discipline
statistics and procedures had been public information over
the year, would the police discipline system have been able
to maintain an operation marked by severe procedural defects
and an infinitesimal percentage of sustained complaints?
When a system that performs so baHly shrouds itself in such
secrecy, it seems obvious that the secrecy has the purpose
of precluding public scrutiny and reform.

There are many other examples of the secrecy that

surrounds police operations in Chicago.

53

--Thc LEAA Report notes that she Civil Service
Commission refused to grant access to records on a recently
completed promotional exam, for purposes of checking actual
scores against rankings on the promotion list. Although
assurances were given by LEAA that no candidates' names would
be divulged, the Commission still insisted that "confiden-
tiality" requirements precluded federal government analysis
of the information requested. (27\

--The Law Enforcement Study Group, in the preparation
of its report on the use of fatal force and on many other
occasions in the course of its resvarch, has requested infor-
mation from the Police Department. These requests have been
ignored or refused, and on the most recent occasion, the
Superintendent's Office made clear that the main reason for
the refusal was that the Study Group was not regarded as having a
sufficiently favorable perspective toward the Department

--In its function of preparing the annual budget of
the Police Department, the Police Hoard refused to hold public
hearings although it is apparently required to do so under

the Illinois open meetings law.

 

{27? LEAA Report, page 1.0 -1.11.

5d

--Thc Police Department and Vivil Service

Commission have consistenly refusvd to provide any specific
information to community groups Concerning those agencies'
actions in response to the LEAA Report on police personnel
practices. (Here again we see clearly the relationship
between secrecy and malfeasance --the LEAA letter concerning
those agencies' non-compliance with civil rights laws shows
that the purpose of the secrecy was to conceal inaction.)

--After the Police Department spent hundreds of
th0usands of dollars in 1969-70 for a comprehensive survey
of police administration by the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, the reSulting four-volume study was withheld
from the public.

In sharp contrast to the long pattern of police

secrecy in Chicago is the program adopted by the New York
City Police Department in September 1971. At that time,
the files, records and men" of the New York Police on
"the whole range of police activities" were opened to academic
research and student field work and internship programs.
Commissioner Patrick Murphy acknowledged that there would
have to be some confidentiality limitations but that"we want

the least possible restrictions." {29)

 

(28)
See footnote (23), supra.
(29)
New York Times, September 17, 1971 (see Exhibit 2).

35

In establishing the program ol public access to
information, Murphy appointed eighl top-level college and
university officials as an advisory group to oversee the
program.

We believe, and recommend in the following section,
that a similar program of public access to information
concerning Chicago police operations is essential. It should
be carried through a general duty on the part of the Police
Board to make comprehensive data available to the public and
through a specific program of access to information for
researches, an advisory committee of academic leaders
should be appointed to formulate details of the program and
oversee its administration.

Only through a new posture of openness on the part of
the Police Department can public awareness of police
operations be achieved and public confidence in the police
rebuilt. In those areas of police performance that need
reform, public assess to information will enable the public
to participate intelligently in the reform process. In those
areas where police performance is adequate, public access to
information will help to dispel the public's lack of
confidence.

In summary, police openness would give rise to a
constructive dialogue between citizens and their police

department and lay the groundwork for improved police-community

relations.

56

Governance of the Chicago Police Department

In the preceding sections of these findings, the
Blue Ribbon Panel has discussed the particular problems
of abusive police conduct, discriminationy and inadequate
personnel pratices, and police secrecy. We strongly
believe that these serious problems reflect a general
isolation of the Chicago Police Department from the citizenry
it is supposed to serve and protect.

We hardly need say again that public confidence in
the police is essential to the proper performance of all
aspects of the police function --the fight against crime
as well as disciplinary and personnel administration. But
public confidence can only be generated through public
participation; it cannot be obtain in a police-public
relationship based on the premise that Police Department
executives know what is right and what should be done.

In Chicago, the agency that constitutes the ultimate
link between the public and their police department is the
Chicago Police Board. The Board was created in 1960 with
apparently broad powers to nominate candidates for the
position of Superintendent, set Police Department policy,
prepare the Department budget and decide serious disciplinary

cases .

Yet, for a period of 13 years since its creation, the

Police Board has functioned as nothing more than a rubber

stamp for the decisions of the Police Department Administrators.
The members of the Board have largely been business and labor
executives, closely associated wilh the City administration;
some of the members are not even residents of the City of
Chicago.

The passive nature of the Police Board is best demonstrated
by the manner in which it has exercised its power to establish
Police Department policy. All general orders and other
Department directives are submitted to the Board for its vote
of approval -- but only they have already been put into effect
by the Superintendent. Not once in 13 years has the Board ever
failed to give its after-the-fact approval to an action taken by
the Superintendent; in fact, it appears from Police Board minutes
that there has never been any debate nor a single dissenting vote.

we believe that if there were genuine, representative public
participation on the Police Board, the isolation of the Police
Department from the public would he ended. A dialogue of reality
between Police Department administrators and credible representatives
of the public would be created. It would not be routine; there
would be disagreement and dissenting votes; Police Department
administrators might have to justify their policies and might not

always get exactly what they wanted.

58

But in the long run, such a dialogue would lead to a
far healthier relationship between the public and the police,
a relationship in which public participation and knowledge
would make possible genuine public confidence in the police
and the support and cooperation of all citizens of Chicago
in the law enforcement function.

To achieve a genuine representative character in the
composition of the Police Board, it is the first recommendation
of the Blue Ribbon Panel that the size of the Police Board be
increased and the method of selection of its members modified.
The implememtation of that first recommendation will make
positive police-community relationships and necessary police

reforms a continuous, self-generating and self-enforcing

process.

59

Part 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL

Based upon the foregoing findings, the Recommen-

dations of the Blue Ribbon Panel for essential reforms

in the operation of the Chicago Police Department are

presented below.

basic categos?es;

These Recommendations fall into five

Modification of the membership and
duties of the Chicago Police Board,

to insure greater accountability of

the Police Department to the public;
Creation of an independent investigating
agency to handle the most serious
allegations of misconduct by police
toward the public those involving
excessive force, violations of civil
rights and criminal activity of any
kind. The proposed investigating agency
would be a fact-finding body; the
imposition of penalties would continue

to rest with the Police Board and the Super-
All other allegations of police

intendent.

misconduct would continue to be handled

ED

4.

5.

by the present police discipline system;
Thorough reform of the criteria for
selection and promotion of policemen,

to insure an end to racial discrimination
and to insure the selection of highly
qualified policemen;

Modification of certain operating policies
detrimental to the minority communities;
Establishment of a policy of full public
access to information concerning all police

department operations.

(31

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. The Chicago Police Board

A.

Selection of Police Board Members.

1.

The membership of the Chicago Police Board
should be increased from the present five

to fifteen members;

Six members of the Police Board should be
appointed from a list of names submitted

by organizations that have been active on
behalf of the Black and Brown communities

of Chicago in seeking police reform, including
but not limited to Concerned Citizens for Police
Reform, the Chicago Urban League, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the Afro-American Patrolmen's League,

and the Guardians.

Powers and Duties of the Police Board.

Since the Police Board should be accountable to

the public for all operations of the Department,

the Board should have broad authority to initiate,

62

amend or terminate policies and procedures in

all areas of the 

Its management

and control responsibilities should include

the following:

1.

Appointment and dismissal of the
Superintendent;

Initiation, or review and approval before
implementation, of policies and procedures
in all aspects of Department operation;
Imposition of disciplinary penalties,

upon the findings of the proposed
independent investigating agency
(Recommendation 11 (A) in disciplinary
cases involving allegations of excessive
force, other violations of civil rights
and criminal activity of any kind.

(This responsibility is in addition to
the Board's present duties of hearing

and deciding major disciplinary cases
upon the filing of charges by the

Superintendent.)

63

Preparation of, public hearings on and

submission to the City of the annual budget

of the Department;

Establishment of a system through which

comprehensive data on Department operations
is made available to the public and to

researchers;

Maintenance of a staff sufficient to provide

the Board with independent analysis of

questions coming before it.

64

II. The Police Discipline System

A. An Independent Investigating Agency.

19

An independent investigating agency should

be established to carry out the functions

of receipt, investigation and factual deter-
mination on all complaints of excessive force,
other violations of civil rights and criminal
activity of any kind by policemen;

No staff membertJIthe independent investigating
agency shall be a present or former member

of the Chicago Police Department;

The agency should have the subpoena power

in carrying out investigations and hearings;
After completing its investigation of an
allegation, the agency should have the option
of forwarding the case to an impartial
hearing examiner for a public fact-finding
hearing, or forwarding the case to the
Superintendent for disciplinary action by

him up to thirty days suSpension. (The action

of the Superintendent on such cases should

be made public.

55

5. Hearing examiners should be attorneys selected

from among names recommended by bar associations;

6. When a hearing examiner sustains an allegation
of police misconduct, the case should be
forwarded to the Police Board for imposition
of penalty, in accordance with Recommendation
I (B) (3). At the same time, the factual
findings and reasons for decision should be
made public;

7. The independent investigating agency should
also have the authority to refer cases at any
time to appropriate authorities for consideration
of possible criminal prosecution;

8. This independent investigating agency is not
a civilian review board. Civilian review
boards have historically had the authority
to impose discipline, but not to investigate.
This proposed agency is the opposite: it has
the function of investigation and fact-finding,
but the imposition of penalties will continue
to be the responsibility of the Police Board

and the Superintendent.

66

B.

Internal Reform of the Police Discipline System.

10

The present police discipline system should

retain responsbility for investigation and

impositionof penalties on all disciplinary

matters other than the Specific categories

delegated to the independent investigating

agency;

Deficiencies in the procedures of the present

police discipline system should be corrected,

including:





The standard of proof in police
discipline cases should be the same
as in civil lawsuits: Proof of the
misconduct by "a preponderance or
greater weight of the evidence;"
Written criteria governing the
thoroughness of investigations
should be established to insure that
all possible evidence is obtained.
Coordination of the disciplinary

proceeding with related criminal or

civil proceedings should be maintained.

b?











Equitable procedures for polygraph tests
in police discipline investigations should
be established. Citizens and policemen
who are to take polygraph tests should
be given a list of several polygraph
companies to choose from. Submission to
polygraph tests should be entirely optional
in disciplinary cases;

The e'tire prior record of complaints
against an officer should be considered

in disciplinary investigations to enable
identification of officers who engage

in a pattern of misconduct;

The investigation and fact-finding functions
should be performed by different persons;

A record of all disciplinary penalties
should be maintained to insure similar
penalties for similar acts of misconduct;
The composition of the Department's
Complaint Review Panel, which has recently
been changed to include a policeman of

the same rank as the accused, should also

include an independent civilian. The

complainant should have the same opportunity

63



as the accused policeman to appear before
the Panel;

All of the other procedural deficiencies

in the police discipline system, identified
in the Chicago Bar Association Report and

in other studies, should be corrected.

69



Selection and Promotion of Policemen

A. Steps to be Taken by the Civil Service Commission.

1.

All of the steps in the selection and promotion
procedure for which the Civil Service Commission
is reaponsible should be rigorously validated

as being related to job performance and not
Special attention

racially discriminatory.

should be given to:

Written examinations;

Physical examination standards and
procedures;

Background investigations;

The height standard should be reduced to
5'6" to minimize discrimination against
Brown and Oriental candidates for police
employment;

A comprehensive program should be instituted
to screen out undesirable police candidates
on the basis of and emotional

evaluations;

a"
.

Physicist. and involved in the
selection process should be independent
professionals recommended by academic insti-
tutions or professional associations;

Such professionals, and other selection~system
personnel, such as background investigators,
should be representative in composition of

the Black and Brown populations of the city;
DiSQualification on the physical examination
should be COnfirmcd by all appropriate medical

procedures and reviewed by other members of

the group of examining physicians.

B. Steps to be Taken by the Police Department.

1.

The Department should use the probationary

period as an additional phase in the selection
process, discharging any probationary patrolman
whose performance on intelligence and 
tests, classroom curriculum or field training
indicates he is not highly qualified to become

a policeman;

?1

2. All steps in the selection and promotion
process for which the Department is responsible
should be rigorously validated as being related
to job performance and not racially discriminatory;
3. All procedures involved in duty assignments,
performance ratings and discipline should be
rigorously evaluated, and modified as necessary,

to insure that they are not racially discriminatory.

Public Accountability for Police Personnel Practices.
Despise recommendations by numerous consultants

and government agencies, the foregoing essential
reforms in police personnel practices have been
rejected by the Civil Service Commission and the
Police Department. To insure that the necessary
changes are implemented and that the
demonstrated racially discriminatory effects of
past and current practices are remedied, two steps

should be taken jointly by the Civil Service

Cbmmission and the Police Department:

1. Both agencies sould publicly adopt the
goal of representation of the Black and

Brown communities at all levels of the

Department in proportion to their numbers
in the population. A detailed affirmative
action program, covering all steps from
recruitment to exempt appointments and
including timetables for achieving the
above goal, should be formulated and made
public;

To insure prompt action and to render the
Commission and the Department accountable to
the public with respect to selection and
promotion practices, a Special citizen's
committee should be established to monitor
and make recommendations concerning those
practices. The composition of the committee
should include persons with apprOpriate
expertise and representatives of organizations
that have been active on behalf of the community
in seeking police reform. The committee should

report to the Commission, the Department and

the public.

Y3

TU. Operating Policies Detrimcntal to Minority Communities.

A. Aggre331ve Patrol Tactics.

The agressive patrol tactics of the Special

Operations Group

(formerly the Task Force),

which result in many unconstitutional searches

and arrests,

should be terminated immediately.

B. jglicies Affecting the Brown Community.

1.

There should be immediate cessation of
harassment of Brown persons who are stopped
on the streets by policemen for the sole
purpose of investigating residency status.
This is the function of federal agencies,
not the Chicago Police Department.
Bi-lingual translators should be present

at all hours at Police Headquarters in
district stations in Spanish-speaking
communities.

In cooperation with organizations in the
Brown community, the Department should

implement appropriate orders and in-service

training programs to improve the policeman?s



understanding of Lhe bi-culturality of the

Brown communityo

?5

Public Access to

Information Concerning Police

Department Operations.

A.

Range of Police Activitiis to Public Inquiry
and Research.

1.

The basic policy of the Department with respect
to public access to information should be that
all aspects of the Department's files, records

and personnel should be available to qualified

researchers;

Exceptions to this policy, specified in advance,
should be created only where necessary to protect
the confidentiality of pending criminal

investigations and the names of informants;

No person should be denied access to information
because the Department disagrees with his
research purpose or perspective or because of
lack of academic credentials or affiliation.

The sole criterion for responding to research
proposals should be whether the proposal is

orderly and coherent;

Sufficient Department personnel should be

assigned to comply with all requests for

research data;

5. The policy of permitting qualified researchers
full access to information should be supplemented
by a comprehensive Department program of
reporting to the public on Department policies

and operations and their results.

Advisory Committee on Public Access to Information.

The Police Board and the Superintendent should

appoint an advisory committee to oversee the

foregoing program of public access to information.

The committee should be composed of the deans of

all law schools located in Chicago and the chairmen

of the social science departments of major universities
located in the city. The members of the advisory

committee should select a chairman from among

themselves.



 

APPENDIX

THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE

BLUE RIBBON PANEL HEARINGS

HS

Abusive police conduct toward citizens is obviously
a problem as old as the police institution itself. Even
in terms of the current era of police history in Chicago,
which began in 1960 with the appointment of Orlando W.
wilson as Superintendent and his commencement of a reform
program which yielded impressive short-term results,
community protest against abusive police conduct arose
in the early 1960?s.

It is not the purpose of this Appendix to recount
the community's experience in the past ten years in
seeking police reform, but rather to trace the events
that occurred in one community in the months before the
Blue Ribbon Panel hearings and contributed to the convening

of those hearings.

Third Ward Committee on Crime Prevention

During the latter part of 1971, residents of the
Third Ward, located within the Second Police District,
decided they must act against the two problems of
escalating crime and repeated incidents of police

abuse.

39

in accordance with his responsibilities as an
elected representative of thetpeople, U. 5. Representative
Ralph H. Metcalfe convened a group designated as the Third
Ward Committee on Crime Prevention, composed of clergymen,
representatives of civil rights organizations, community
businessmen, and citizens of all ages.

initial efforts included a plea to all
community residents to report any crime of which they were
aware, provide information to investigators and testify if
called upon. The organization held public meetings to
discuss the dual menace and to devise methods of ridding
the community of crime and abusive police conduct.

Realizing that reform could not work without the
complete and willing cooperation of the police, Congressman
Metcalfe and Third Ward Alderman Tyrone T. Kenner, with
delegations from conferred with top personnel of the
Second Police District and invited them to meetings of 
to hear complaints and offer suggestions and full support to
the effort.

In cooperation with the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Urban Progress Center, a system was devised to recruit men
from the community and tutor them for the examinations leading
to an appointment to the city police force. It was hoped that

some of the successful candidates would be assigned to the

ED

community where their knowledge of the area would be used to
help reduce the crime experience.

On Sunday, October 3, 1971, Representative Metcalfe,
Illinois State Representative Harold washington, and Alderman
Kenner visited some 40 churches in the community, appeared
at local meetings and on radio programs, explaining the need
for an organization like and urging citizens support.
Ministers associated with the crime prevention committee
appealed to their congregations, many of whose members had,
in one way or another, been directly involved in cases of
criminal actions or police abuse.

Each church in the Third Ward was sent information
packets consisting of placards listing telephone numbers
through which crimes could be reported, a directory of
governmental services, and application forms for membership
in On that day, more than 3,200 persons applied for
membership. Additional applications by mail and from forms
left at churches raised the total membership to 6,190 residents.

Another stirring manifestation of community support
occurred on Sunday, March 5, when some 3,000 persons joined
together in prayer "against crime and fear." The massive
prayer meeting was held at Bethel AME Church (Exhibit 3) and
involved ministers and choirs from churches throughout the

area.

H1

It was a twist of irony that during this period of
recruitment the crime rate in the Second Police District
rose from second to first place among all police districts
in the city, according to police statistics.

The Case of Dr. Odom

On March 13, 1972, Dr. Herbert Odom, a prominent Black
dentist and chairman of the First Congressional District
Citizens Committee, had an encounter with two police officers
for a minor traffic violation (light out over license plate},
during which, he alleged, he was physically abused. The
affair received intensive coverage in the Chicago Daily
Defender and created a public outcry against abusive police
conduct.

The following week, on March 20, Police Superintendent
James B. Conlisk, Jr., met with Congressman Metcalfe, community
leaders of and Dr. Odom to discuss the incident and
other concerns of the community in regard to police protection.

The representatives cited numerous cases of police
abuse of which they had documented knowledge, and explained
to the city's top police official the conditions which existed
in the Third ward and other communities with a large con-
centration of Black residents.

They made several requests of Superintendent Conlisk,
including 1) that he direct his staff to apprise him of all
instances of alleged police brutality against Black people,
and 2) that he give serious at'ention to eliminating the

Special Operations Group, formerly known as the Task Force,

32

declaring that members of this group were intimidating citizens
and failing to reduce crime?

Representative Metcalfe personally recommended that Supt.
Conlisk issue a general order to all police personnel that his
office intended to put an end to police brutality. He also
urged that the officers in the Odom case not be given the
customary punishment of two or three days deducted from
accumulated vacation time.

Instead, he urged that the offenders be suspended without
pay for 29 days or that charges be preferred against them with
the Police Board, recommending dismissal from the force. It
was felt that this would lend convincing support to the
Superintendent's written order that new policies and procedures
would be instituted to eliminate police brutality.

Two days later, on March 22, Supt. Conlisk issued General
Order 72-6 (See Exhibit 4) which informed all personnel of
the Police Department of constitutional, state, and city pro-
visions and laws guaranteeing the rights of all citizens to
equal protection of the law. There was no criticism of the
order from any source. Only one problem arose -- the order
was not implemented.

The Claiborne Tragedy

Another meeting was scheduled with the police superintendent
for a few weeks later, but in the interim a shocking case of
police neglect took place on the Scuth Side.

The victim was another dentist, Dr. Daniel Claiborne,

who suffered a stroke on April 15, while driving his automobile.

83

The stricken driver lost control 0! the vehicle, which crashed
into a parked car. The investigating officer dragged Dr.
Claiborne from his car, reporting later that the dentist seems
"incapable of being examined for drunkeness.?

The officer arbitrarily diagnosed that the gravely ill
dentist was drunk. At 7:20 the victim was arrested,
charged with drunkeness and placed in a cell without test or
examination. Nearly six hours elapsed before police informed
Mrs. Claiborne of her husband's condition. The call was made
at 1:05 after the dentist had been in a cell in a coma
throughout that length of time.

Dr. Claiborne subsequently died as a result of the delay
in receiving medical attention. The action of the arresting
officer and other officers who had contact with the victim
constituted a violation of a departmental regulation (General
Order 67-9) which specified that "under no circumstances will
an incoherent or unconscious prisoner be placed or allowed to

remain, in a cell without medical treatment."30

 

30Consequent tothis needless tragedy, Supt. Conlisk, on
April 26, 1972, reacted to public indignation by issuing
General Order 72-11 to replace General Order 67-9. The new
order, "lockup Keepers," simply adds to the duties of the
lockup keepers the responsibility of reporting "any extra-
ordinary or unusual occurrences in regard to his prisioners
to his commanding officer immediately," and to "familiarize
himself with all aspects of the lockup 'Emergency Plan.'"
All instructions regarding procedures to be followed when a
prisoner is sick or injured were contained in the previous
general order. (See Exhibit 5).

HQ

 Six-Point Request

A second meeting was held between Supt. Conlisk and the
delegation on Monday, April The police official
was informed that his general order against brutality was not
beitg complied with or enforced, and was presented with four
unsolicited cases of abuse of police authority reported to
since the first meeting. Included was the Claiborne
matter. also presented to the superintendent a list of
six recommendations:

1. Termination of all activities of the Special
Operations Group (Task Force) and an immediate
end to all tactics and procedures employed by
the special force.

2. Establishment of a Citizens Board in each police
district in order to insure the protection of
citizens and restore public confidence in the
Police Department. Members of the Board should
be acceptable to the community.

3. Immediate steps should be Laken to rectify the
situation within the organizational structure
of the Police Department which left it without
a single Black in a policy-making position.

4. The immediate recruitment of Black personnel
so that the ethnic composition of the Police
Department would reflect the proportionate

ratio of Black residents of the city.

85

 The obvious failure to uppunde ?lacks in every
category of the Police Department should be
corrected.

6. (be above requests and reCUmmendations should be

inaugurated and functioning by May 31, 1972.

At that meeting, the police superintendent stated that he
could not respond to the requests at that time, and agreed to
meet with the grozp for a third time on April 21.

However, on April 18, Supt. Conlisk advised that
he wOuld be unable to keep the appointment, and it was re-
scheduled for Monday, April 24. Then, on Saturday, April 22,
Representative Metcalfe received a telegram from the superinten-
dent informing him that he could not honor his agreement for
the April 24 meeting, and expressing no desire for a future
meeting with the group.

Meanwhile, Supt. Conlisk had referred the four cases of
abuse of police authority to the department's Internal Affairs
Division. The resulting actions and reports were considered
inadequate investigations of the incidents.

The Impact of 

The Third ward Committee for Crime Prevention had put
forth a strenuous effort in the interest of law, order, and
justice. It had listened to the people and heard their com-
plaints; it had taken its evidence to the proper authorities;
it had offered community cooperation in the task of reform;
and it had organized the community so that the citizens were

capable of performing what might be zsked of them.

36

Although the olficial reaction was cool, community
responSe was enthusiastic. Citizens were aware that they had
the support of elected leaders, businessmen, community
organizations, and ministers. They came forth to volunteer
their so?; tea and their testimony.

Gathering of Forces

Indeed, the actions of had resounded throughout
he city, and produced a response of astounding and gratifying
proportions.

Officials of organizatiors such as the League of Black
Women, Urban League, SCLC, NAACP, RUSH, Search for Truth, Inc.,
The Afro-American Patrolmen's League, The Guardians, The
woodlawn Organization, Black Panther Party, various churches
and community organizations, elected officials and Latin
American community leaders came forth voluntarily and voiced
their support, noting that the conditions that existed in the
Third Ward also existed in their communities.

When Police Supt. Conlisk cancelled the April 24 meeting
with the group assembled at the appointed time to
develop alternative strategies for attaining its goal. Con-
siderable feeling still surrounded the death of Dr. Claiborne,
and as a result of this and other factors, a groundswell of
support for and its program evidenced itself at this
meeting.

The interest of other communities, especially the Latin
American groups, make it apparent that the problem existed

in city-wide proportions and that a larger organizational base

87

was necessary. For that purpose the "Concerned Citizens for
Police Reform" was created. Representative Metcalfe accepted
a unanimous request to serve as convener and spokesman.

The stated purpose of CCPR is "to seek reforms in the
administration and conduct of the Chicago Police Department
and its employees." Such refonns include an end to police
misconduct toward civilians and the improvement of police
service to the community.

Although the new organization maintained an awareness
of other forms of police misconduct, it stressed the fact that
its main focus and principal activities would be directed
toward abusive police conduct against citizens, discrimination
against Black and Brown members of the police force, and
all~out war against crime in the community.

The stage had been set for action in a different direction.
Mayor Richard J. Daley was invited to attend a meeting of CCPR
on May 2, to discuss the police problem in the community where
it existed. Apparently finding the issue of insufficient
importance to merit his response or attendance, the Mayor
instead scheduled a meeting at City Hall for May 3, to
"examine" police practices.

Members of the Concerned Citizens for Police Reform and
other invited Blacks (except those who were employed by the
city government) decided to boycott the City Hall meeting,

which was seen as another attgupt to avoid the problem.

HS

A New Course

When Superintendent Conlisk failed to schedule another
meeting with when Mayor Daley refused to come to the
Black community to discus police problems; when the original
sin recommendations of were not met, a new course of
action was pursued.

In an effort to strike harder and deeper at the problem
of the misLse v' police authority, the community and its leaders
appealed to U. 8. Representative Ralph H. Metcalfe, urging him
to use his stature as an ere;ted representative of the people
for the purpose of convening hearings into the matter of
abusive police conduct and deficienL administrative practices.

In response to that appeal, Congressman Metcalfe convened
the Blue Ribbon Panel Hearings.

It is appropriate to comment here on the continuing role
of Concerned Citizens for Police Reform. In response to the
wide recognition that the essential task of police reform
in Chicago will be and time-consuming, CCPR was brought
together as a special interest organization whose sole program
is reform of the Chicago Police Department. In pursuit of that
program, CCPR helped organize the hearings of the Blue Ribbon
Panel and aided in the preparation of this Report of the Panel.

CCPR will now devote its energies to aiding in the effort
of implementing the Panel's Recommendations. It is the intention
of CCPR to support, assist and work in concert with all organi-
zations interested in police reform. CCPR has no wish to replace

any existing organization working in this area but rather to

strengthen the overall effort.

89

Part 

EXHIBITS

90

EJXW ASSISTANCE 
WASHINGTON. DC 208.10

 

May 22, 1973

Mr. Renault A. Robinson

Executive Director

Afro?Aucrican Patrolmen?s League

7126 South Jeffery

Chicago,-IL 60649

Kc: Complaint of Distrimination

Dear Mr. Robinson: of the Afro-American Patrol-
men's League against the
Chicago Police Department

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter to me dated
May ll, 1973, and copies of that same letter to the
Attorney General-designate, and Donald E. Santarelli,
Administrator of LEAA.

Discussions and correspondence with the officials of the
City of Chicago have not resulted in a commitment by these
officials to undertake significant steps to achieve what
this agency belibves to be voluntary compliance with the
civil rights laws and regulations affecting the Chicago
Police Department as a recipient of funds from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Accordingly, this letter is to advise you that LEAA has
referred this matter to the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice for such action as it deems approPriate.

Sincerely:

fhn'bert (1. Ricig 
Office of Civil Rip.th Compliance

EXHIBIT 1

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See other side for text.

91 A

POLICE HERE TO OPEN AND TO ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS
The New York Times, Friday, September 17, 1971
By Lacey Fosburgh

Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy told a group of eight leading local
educators yesterday that for the first time in its history the department was
ready to open its "files, records and men? to academic investigations.

The Commissioner urged the group??comprising eight top?level college and
university officials??to"spread the word" among their faculty members and
students quickly, saying he envisaged making the department available not only
for research projects, but also for all kinds of field work and internship
programs??for law students and young social workers, for example.

want these scholars to investigate us as far as they can," he said.

Mr. Murphy acknowledged that his mpve was highly unusual in police circles.

Questioned by the educators, he agreed that the program's ultimate success
would depend on how those involved both police and the scholars, got around the
mutually suspicious relationship that sometimes exists between the police and
the public.

MUCH TO GAIN

"Traditionally, the police, both here and throughout the country, have been
quite closed and secretive," Mr. Murphy said, "but I want to get away from this.
I want your help. There?s no question we have much to gain by opening our doers
and getting your insights on many of our problems."

"Do you mean on the whole range of police activities?" Dr. Robert McKay, dean
of the New York University Law School, asked.

"Yes," the Commissioner answered.

"Good," said Dr. McKay.

Earlier, in an interview, Mr. Murphy said:

"We are going to have to overcome their reservation about how far we mean to
go in letting them investigate us. But I can think of no area where they would
not be allowed to go, except for certain practical limitations involving confi?
dential information and investigations."

The eight educators here agreed to serVe as the Commissioner's new academic
advisory cabinet and, meeting once a month, to OVersee the program.

Noting that as recently as last year the New York City Rand Institute received
"vigorous opposition from the highest levels of the department" while it was
working on two police studies, he said: "But I've changed these highest commands
and now I expect a new attitude.?

The meeting yesterday, which followed almost eight months of discussion and
planning, was also attended by the following:

Dr. Timothy Healy, vice?chancellor of the City University: Prof. Arnold Goren,
assistant chancellor of New York University; Dr. Ruth Neintraub, dean of social
sciences at Hunter College; Dr. Donald Riddle and Dr. Claude Hawley, president
and vice president of the City University's John Jay College of Criminal Justice:
Dr. Joseph McLaughlin, dean of the Fordham Law School, and Prof. Michael Sovern,
dean of the Columbia Law School.

Yesterday, over coffee and?cinnamon buns, the educators expressed enthusiasm
for Mr. Murphy's broad invitation.

Dr. Healy said: "This is quite extraordinary. Most scholars feel the Police
Department is a closed world, but if you, Commissioner, really are Opening it
up, there are going to be serious scholars who will be Very interested."

Professor Goren noted, as did others, that the younger generation today was
generally so "turned off" the police, and ?see them only as hitting heads,?
that such a new channel for contact between the two groups could have ramifica-
tions far beyond the success of a single project.

He cautioned, however, as did the others, that any restriction about the use of
police materials??whether individuals' names or intelligence files-?would have to
be set up in advance. No scholar, he said, would ever accept censorship.

know,? Mr. Murphy said. "And we want the least possible restrictions.?

As to possible projects, the ideas included using law internes to study police
performance in the courts and the placing of social?work students in the precincts
to work with patrolmen and community groups.

Dean McKay, noting that two-thirds of all third-year law students at N.Y.U.
had some kind of field training, said: "FiVe of my professors already have a long
list of ideas and my only question is, when can we being? Tomorrow?"

"Yes," the Commissioner answered.

913

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"h w? . mat-m. magnum
when
0 
a 
)3 
m?rr -- "memo;
 to. LImI-a?nuuon, An'mnc?anmt 13 038,-! 
- 31-52; Illinois {Ion'tlitrniom Article 
F-mh Its-rm:ch ?imuico, Am. 13, anti 10133 .
um ?1.33! {m 3h. 3.992% General Order 65-9
.
orehtr: 

A. .hr. policy of the 130 'o?uicc no civil rights.

{Timur tlu: ninntion to obscer uphold, and enforce all lam: pertaining to individual r3133)?: without

r't-w'nl to race. religion, 1.01013 mti .nal anemia-y. or economic atatus. .
i- If EDI RIGHTS AND THE Law
.1. Ali Enlmhifzmta of this country are guaranteed protection 1:3; the Constitution of the United States from un?mvl'ui vat

mul unronstmahlc march and seizure.

Tint of the Un?ctl States: hm: math: it a crime to privqa persong? hi3: civil rightm. "Whoever umicr -:n'rw 1'
any law. 3w.th Ordinance. )?tfruialjon, or sutom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State. i?i- iv:
50 he: of any rights, privileges or immunities secure-:1 or protected by the Cmmitutiou or law of Lin: 3'nimci
or to different pains, or penaltica, on :v count of such inhabitant being an align, or by I'crr'vr :15
hi3 Cari-yr or race, than are preacribcd for the. of citizens, 93ml! be fined not more than 51.000 or :rm "15
not. more than om: your, or both; and if death rcsultn shall in: nuithth to for any term of years or for  

- 'i'hc St:th of Illinois has enacted civil rights laws. law makes it :1 mandatory duty of officers to protect ?ght:
of :m (Emu-12d person.

Elm}: city and state laws make it an offense to deny anothc? the use and Benefit of any public place of amwcn?a?uz 
-1r.gtmn-.nhuinu. .
 In .v-cm?-moo with state law. when making a lawful arrest: or authorize?! search and seizure, 
w: force only when the of pt moving: to iound to be imui?l?ici-m: to c?rttsi'z 
and um: only minimum (lower: of such physiml force necessary on any occasion.
I 7 '1 (IO Uli?l'l'i?lfil?} AND POMGY 
A. ?n addition to real-wot l? or 11mm: :ivil rightn imposed by law. aim Department as a matter of pnliry (ammo-rig; it? 
mm public at. all times with courtesy and civility.
person-me! will: .
.1. never show on}! him; or prejudice: against any individual or group became of race, rciigion, color. zw Cami 
or economic status.
on! and conduct moms:ch as gentleman. Twat all persons with complete courth and with Il?v 
due 10 every as a human being. 
waver take :1 condomsmiing attitude towards members of the public or employ the use of derogatory rr'rmn.
ti. recognize that it is their duty to provide: service to {l-v public and therefore will always courteow'y arr-u 3' 
pct-mu or vohicic and will not: require a. person to come to them.
A?rl 
r1; nffittcr willprotch cat. 1 pawn cm an
i 19:21:11}! with ail lawn and Department policy relating to aim I rights.

  

r? 9" 
g" 
. of .lh?iatre
I
EXHIBIT 4 a

1.33; JET.

I '36 April ism! I it? April 19?: i 

?In-naaqno-o?n?nu-vn-uq?mm .o .4 

 



 

 

 

.I 
oumm I
. i
General Order 70-19
fli'rccial Order ill-?33v i General Order (37-9 
11'0le .

'lilis m'ir. .

r: incs ccrtuiyl functions and clulics of a Ion'mp itcr per.
-l .i ms. the responsibilities of :1 't-clzup iqccpi in iln- event of a prisoner's illness.

Milli. I?JU'i'll'iS
iocaup liCt'I?It?l' will no charge of all. prisoners delivered into his custody. lie will:
i poi-1? a?  {sum erln?f'} - unusual occurs-mucus in regard to prisoners to his commanding; ol'l'ict-i' 
. . familiarim? with 11.: ?upsets of the lockup "tinny-gene}; Plan."

ll. maintain; an accurate record of all prisoners on the. Prisoner Roster sheet 

maintain an nectar-sic: rccoul of prisoners l?rr}. on Ilu- Loclzup Food Record (Cl?ilfi'l?il?l.

 Nicol: nil prisoners regularly during his touc oi. :5 ill: will turn all prisoners and records over to lot-"Hp
sci per who relieves him.

search frat-Ch prisoncr caa'cfuily in his lockup and confiscate anything which could be used in cfl'wxiwr NI 
hr it'il'lictjruj; sclf~injury to others.

.i .ml carry any weapon on his person. not keep any weapon within the loclzup. and not permit may 
of weapons into tint: lockulu by others. .

Ii. min: all monies. valuables. and smoking materials (including matches) for safe-keeping and ins-1"" mt
itemized rccvinl: rim prisoner.

. E. gun: that all cells are clean and in :1 sanitary Condition.

J. not allow any person, including; any member of not on necessary police dutivs. t"?ll  
lockup without tiic written authorization of the :tcln commander. Under no circumstances shall any :ni micr
be questioned, or interviewed in his call.

in swan. l?ullfii?i?fliih 

zl- li?iwn a primuer is muml to be sick or 'rijurcd. a 1 chip keeps will notify the sergeant on Cli'hl?. ul'm' or i
officer even if condition appears to have been caused 'w in? 

ii. if a prismlt" is taken out of the lockup for medic 3 treatment. this Will he noted on the Arms! Ml "p 
it will also he moor-tied on the buck ol? til-s Court Record Copy, and tin: if! Est 1? 

of rcpor s.

. p.
u? H: I

Under no circumstances will an incoherent or unconscious prisoner be placed. or he allowed to . 1' in.

without ointmentSuperintendent of k?olivr:

In

. 'i  from previous order.



- EXH 5 -

91:.