Rent Matters:
What are the
Impacts of Rent
Stabilization
Measures?
Manuel Pastor, Ph.D
Vanessa Carter, MA
Maya Abood, MA
October 2018

 Rent Matters:
What are the Impacts of Rent Stabilization Measures?

By
Manuel Pastor, Ph.D
Vanessa Carter, MA
Maya Abood, MA

October 2018

1

 Contents
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................................... 3
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 6
History of Rent Regulations .......................................................................................................................... 8
What Are the Economic Impacts of Rent Regulations? ................................................................................ 9
Affordability in Rent-Regulated Units ..................................................................................................... 10
Affordability in Non-Controlled Units ..................................................................................................... 11
The Impact of Rent Regulations on Housing Stock ................................................................................. 13
Impact on Real Estate Values .............................................................................................................. 13
Impact on New Construction .............................................................................................................. 14
Impact on Existing Rental Housing Stock ............................................................................................ 15
What About Mom-and-Pop Landlords? .................................................................................................. 15
Does Rent Regulation Promote Housing Stability? ..................................................................................... 16
Why Does Housing Stability Matter? ...................................................................................................... 17
Does Rent Regulation Result in Greater Societal Well-Being? ................................................................... 19
Is Rent Regulation Benefiting Those Who Need It Most? ...................................................................... 19
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 21
References .................................................................................................................................................. 22
Appendix: Data Profile of Rent Stabilization in Los Angeles and Santa Monica ......................................... 28

2

 Acknowledgements
We thank the California Community Foundation (CCF) for funding this work and Ann Sewill, Chris Goett,
and Francisco Covarrubias of CCF for their guidance in this project. Thanks to Steve Barton (Bay Area
Community Land Trust) and Rashida Crutchfield (CSULB) for their very helpful reviews of early drafts—
and to Amy Schur (ACCE) for connecting us with Steve and providing her own comments. We also thank
Rebecca Diamond (Stanford) for answering our questions about the important recent research by her
and her colleagues. Our gratitude to Nicole White for editing, fact checking, and writing assistance, and
to Dalia Gonzalez (USC PERE project assistant) and Madeline Wander (USC PERE senior data analyst) for
their research assistance along with Gladys Malibiran (senior communications specialist) for contributing
her expertise. Finally our gratitude to the entire staff of USC PERE who provided feedback on our
analysis and many helping hands along the way.

Cover page photo credit: https://flic.kr/p/6uAGWf

3

 Executive Summary
Among the first concepts often taught in traditional economics classes are the notions that the
minimum wage tends to reduce employment and that rent regulation tends to reduce housing
availability. In recent years, the evidence supporting the negative impacts of the minimum wage has
become increasingly weak: economists generally agree that moderate increases in the minimum wage
have almost no discernible impacts on overall employment, partly because higher-paid workers have
more money to spend, tend to be more motivated, and are often better matched with their jobs.
But what about rent regulation? It is important to note that popular demand for restricting rent
increases tend to occur in times of acute housing shortfalls, such as in the U.S. during World War II. Early
rent regulations were often quite severe in their application, but subsequent forms of rent control—
viewed as the second generation of rent stabilization programs—tend to allow rents to rise as long as
they remain below some target, offer decontrol if the property is vacated, and seek to stabilize housing
through other mechanisms such as restrictions on evictions.
As in the minimum wage literature, the evidence on the impacts of these more moderate rent regimes is
more mixed than older economics textbooks might indicate. Evidence suggests there is little negative
impact on new construction, which is logical given that newly produced units have no initial rent targets.
However, there is also research that suggests that rent regulations may lead landlords to reduce
maintenance or take units off the market through conversion into condos or owner move-in evictions.
Some proponents of rent regulations have argued for limiting what they see as loopholes by, for
example, making condo conversion more difficult.
Renters in the controlled or impacted units tend to experience real welfare gains as rent increases lag.
What is interesting is the spillover effects: a key experiment in Cambridge showed that the elimination
of rent regulations led to rent increases in both controlled and non-controlled units. This effect is likely
due to displacement from gentrification: as decontrol forced out lower-income residents,
neighborhoods became more attractive to those better-off potential tenants who wanted to cluster
among those of similar means.
Income clustering effects may also explain why studies of New Jersey—the state with the most
jurisdictions with rent regulations—find little impacts on rent levels and unit availability once
researchers control for income, neighborhood racial composition, and other related factors. Rent
regulations, in short, benefit incumbent renters in controlled and maybe even proximate uncontrolled
units by promoting housing stability. Indeed, the impact of rent regulations on neighborhood stability is
one area where there is broad agreement in the literature.
A recent Stanford study on rent control in San Francisco concurred that there were positive effects of
rent regulations on housing stability, although the study was made famous, in part, due the authors’
statement that rent regulations also “likely fueled the gentrification of San Francisco.” If gentrification is
taken to mean displacement, it is important to realize that the study found that rent regulations
promoted housing stability as beneficiaries of rent stabilization were 10 to 20 percent more likely to stay
in their homes long-term. Rent regulations were found to confer nearly $3 billion in benefits on
incumbent renters in the form of lower rents, but these welfare benefits were offset by decreases in
available units (as landlords utilized loopholes allowing them to remove units that would be stabilized
from the market) and subsequent rent increases in decontrolled units.
While this implies a sort of wash, the researchers note that 42 percent of the offsetting welfare loss was
experienced by future residents—those yet to move to the city who presumably had higher incomes.

4

 Because of this, the net benefit for incumbent residents was positive. Moreover, given the Cambridge
finding about overall rent hikes after decontrol combined with research on vacancy control in California,
one wonders whether the displacement from gentrification would have been even worse had rent
regulations not been in place in the face of the tech boom.
Should we value housing stability? Certainly, this has long been an important public policy priority for
the U.S., although almost all programs to support stability (federal loan guarantees, interest rate
deductibility, and other mechanisms) are aimed at higher-income homeowners rather than lowerincome renters. Housing stability is associated with physical, social, and psychological well-being; higher
educational achievement by the young; and benefits for people of color. These gains are difficult to price
into cost-benefit analyses, but they are real nonetheless and they help to explain why governments are
willing to “distort” the free market to promote home ownership.
One criticism of rent regulations is that they are a blunt tool that can create a misallocation of housing
resources—why exactly should a particular set of incumbent renters gain and is there a more targeted
way to improve the lives of low-income renters? While this is a reasonable concern, a commonly
proposed alternative solution of giving large subsidies to landlords to keep low-income residents in
place seems a politically impractical giveaway. For example, there are currently nearly 190,000 residents
in the city of Los Angeles queued up for 20,000 vouchers to close the rent gap, suggesting that the public
generosity needed for what some see as an “optimal” solution is sorely lacking.
The current evidence cannot answer all the questions swirling about rent regulations. For example,
much more needs to be known about the impacts on mom-and-pop (or small) landlords; one could
imagine they might value the stability of tenants associated with rent regulation but lose from lower
potential profits. In addition, more research is needed on the net impact on business activity; renters
spending less on housing might be more able to spend on other local-serving business, and this potential
spillover effect from rent regulation is one for which research has not generally accounted.
While more research remains to be done, the evidence does suggest that the strident debate about rent
regulations may be driven more by ideology and self-interest—on all sides—and that public policy would
benefit from a more measured discussion. What this review of literature suggests to us is that rent
regulations are one tool to deal with sharp upticks in rent. They have less deleterious effects than is
often imagined—particularly if we are talking about more moderate rent stabilization measures—and
they do seem to promote resident stability and can therefore help to slow the displacement dimension
of gentrification.
At the same time, proponents of rent stabilization must be clear that limiting rent increases cannot fully
solve the housing crisis confronting much of urban California. That will require that rent regulations be
combined with robust efforts to promote housing supply, particularly of affordable units, and job
training and economic development programs that can lift incomes and promote mobility. Such a multipronged approach can help to deal with the housing stresses and strains that are currently worrying
renters, owners, and employers alike.

5

 Introduction
In California, the debate around the housing crisis is at a fever pitch. After prior inaction, the state
legislature was lauded for passing a package of 15 housing bills in the fall of 2017. The crisis has also led
to social-movement organizing and calls for rent regulation that have been growing in strength and
political power. In 2018 in Southern California, Inglewood, Long Beach, Glendale, and Pasadena all filed
or prepared to file ballot initiatives to allow for rent stabilization (McGahan 2017). Additionally, in
Northern California, Richmond and Mountain View have passed new rent regulations and Santa Cruz
and Sacramento have citizens’ initiatives planned for November 2018 (Smith 2018, York 2018). And on
the November 2018 ballot is a proposition seeking to
Key Terms
eliminate the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, a piece of
legislation that sharply curtails the use of rent regulation
Rent Regulation: General term
ordinances by local jurisdictions.
referring to policies that aim to make
rent affordable.
As a result of this renewed action on rent regulations,
politicians, advocates, organizers, researchers, and
Rent Freeze/Rent Control: Rent
philanthropies are looking to understand the impacts of
regulations that strictly limit
such measures on cities and regions. Most recently, a 2018
increases in rent. In the U.S., such
report by Stanford professors ignited controversy by
first-generation rent regulations were
suggesting that rent regulations “fueled the gentrification of
used around WWI and WWII.
San Francisco” by incentivizing landlords to evict tenants
Moderate Rent Control/Rent
and convert rental units into condominiums (Diamond,
Stabilization: Rent regulations that
McQuade, and Qian 2018:18). The report reinvigorated an
are more flexible (e.g., allow for small
academic and political debate over rent regulations.1 While
annual rent increases, vacancy
rent regulation is only one part of a policy agenda to address
decontrol, etc.). In the U.S., such
our housing crisis and surely must be complemented by a
second-generation rent regulations
vigorous effort to improve housing supply, it has become of
have been the prevailing policy
interest because it has an important niche: it is easy to
design since the 1970s.
implement and it can quickly address the economic pain of
some.
Vacancy Decontrol: A rent regulation
Our literature review examines the existing academic
research on the economic and social impacts of rent
regulations. Rent regulation laws, which are typically passed
on a local level, set maximum rates for annual rent increases
and prohibit landlords from evicting tenants without just
cause. While rent regulations and tenant protections vary
from city to city and ordinance to ordinance, most U.S. rent
ordinances are moderate in that they allow for landlords to
maintain a return on investment, while preventing tenants
from excessive price gouging. We use the term “rent

stipulation that sets units back to
going rate after a tenant leaves.
Forced Mobility: When a tenant
leaves a unit in which they would like
to stay because of increased rent,
decreased habitability, and other
means landlords might use to force a
vacancy.

1

Just one month before the publication of this report, the Haas Institute at UC Berkeley published their own report
on rent stabilization with a focus on the state’s housing crisis, the role of government, and strategies to solve the
housing crisis, including the benefits and limitations of rent control policy (Montojo, Barton, and Moore 2018).
Their findings are similar to ours with more emphasis on the role of government and the importance of rent
stabilization as a solution that can immediately ease rent burden.

6

 regulation” broadly, because “rent control” and “rent stabilization” refer to two specific types of rent
regulation.
To preview our findings from the literature, we note that rent regulations tend to arise in a situation of
imbalance in the rental market in which skyrocketing rents tend to threaten deeply held social priorities
like maintaining neighborhood stability and preventing landlords from profiting excessively from passive
ownership of land. Regulations are not perfect instruments: they may protect incumbent renters who
are not low-income and they must be accompanied by programs to increase supply, particularly of
affordable housing, in the longer-run. In short, housing advocates need to consider multiple tools and
strategies (of which rent regulation is one), including short- and long-term cash transfers to help cover
rent, improvements in workforce standards to increase take-home pay (e.g., instituting wage boards),
and, of course, measures to increase the supply of affordable rental housing.
On the other hand, despite the considerable ink that has been spilled about the Stanford study’s
suggestions that rent control creates gentrification, the study did find that the direct beneficiaries of
rent control experienced more housing stability over time. Moreover, comparable research on a similar
“hot market” in Cambridge, Massachusetts, suggests that the elimination of rent restrictions has
important spillover effects that lead to displacement of low-income people, while another set of
research on vacancy control in California suggests that it might actually curb gentrification pressures.
Meanwhile, studies of more moderate rent regulation schemes do not provide evidence of reductions in
new housing supply. Overall, the research suggests a role for rent regulations in addressing the current
housing crisis plaguing large swaths of urban California. Again, a sole focus on rent regulations will miss
the overall housing crisis mark—but a rejection of this tool will miss what is likely a shared goal of
ensuring all Californians can have shelter that they can afford.
W e begin our review below with a brief history of rent regulations and then turn to the impacts of rent

regulations. We first explore what rent regulations do for housing affordability from several points of
view. We pay some attention along the way to the impact on mom-and-pop landlords, as they are a
group often used to cement opposition to rent regulations; however, we note that the research on this
topic is scant. We then look at the ways that rent regulations promote residential stability and what that
means for the lives of tenants. Finally, we consider the relationship between rent regulations, equity,
and overall societal well-being.
Any review of the empirical effects of rent regulations is limited in three ways. First, there are a limited
number of places that have enforced rent regulations and the ordinances vary by city, as do the
demographics and politics of those places. So, there are a small set of cases to study and they are not
necessarily comparable. Second, the most recent wave of rent regulation occurred in the 1980s and
1990s. Up until a few years ago, no major city enacted or repealed rent regulations. As a result, we
report on some older literature although our general preference in literature reviews is to focus on the
most recent and most up-to-date studies.
Finally, most literature on rent regulations comes from the discipline of economics. While this
perspective is critical, economic literature typically treats housing as an exchangeable commodity and
focuses on the monetary value of homes by comparing rents and home prices. However, the value of
housing in most people’s lives and the importance of housing in society cannot be captured solely
through a market analysis. Housing fulfills important social needs—it provides stability, safety, and
security to individuals and families, outcomes that are valued but not always tagged with a market price.
For that reason, our analysis integrates economic literature with an analysis of housing and tenant
mobility drawn from the fields of public health, education, urban planning, and sociology.

7

 History of Rent Regulations
History shows that rent regulations often emerge when there is population migration chasing economic
growth following a period of low housing production, much like today. Rent caps and rent ceilings
existed in medieval France, Spain, and Italy (Willis 1950). In the United States, rent protections first
started during World War I because of low vacancy rates and massive labor-market restructuring for war
production (Schaub 1920). Eighty-two cities established “Fair Rent” committees comprised of landlords,
tenants, organized labor, and the general public. They lacked the legal power to impose restrictions but
were able to arbitrate tenant-landlord conflicts and threatened profiteering landlords with tax increases,
expulsion from real estate boards, stricter enforcement of health and building laws, and even shutting
off fuel supplies (Willis 1950).
After WWI, New York City faced severe housing shortages, skyrocketing rents, and wholesale eviction of
tenants. In the face of heightened social pressure, the city passed peacetime rent regulations, spanning
from 1920 to 1929. The effort began as a means of stopping what were perceived as unjust evictions but
evolved into regulations to prevent “unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive” increases in rent, or rent
increases of more than 25 percent (Keating, Teitz, and Skaburskis 1998:152). Both the New York Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the peacetime rent regulations on the grounds that they
were necessary for addressing a housing crisis (Keating et al. 1998, Baar and Keating 1975). Generally,
New York City has a strong legacy of rent regulations because so many in the city are tenants.
While there were some rent protections passed during the Great Depression, rent control did not
become a matter of public policy again until World War II (Willis 1950). In the 1940s, military production
and factory work led to massive population growth in urban areas. The federal government feared that
landlords would take advantage of the relocating workforce and that rising rents would stall war
production. As a result, in 1942, the federal government established an independent agency to control
prices and freeze rents (Fetter 2013). The rent freeze covered approximately 80 percent of the nation’s
rental housing stock and lasted through the late 1940s, with some areas continuing rent control well
into the 1950s, over five years after the war ended (Fetter 2013). Fetter found that wartime rent
regulations significantly contributed to an increase in wartime homeownership, even when controlling
for “incomes, savings, tax benefits to homeowners, expectations across cities, or endogenous choice of
base dates” (2013:27).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, with another international conflict came another wave of regulations:
Republican President Richard Nixon instituted a wage and price control program from August of 1971 to
January of 1973 with the intent of easing the rapid inflation accompanying the Vietnam conflict. It
included a rent stabilization element that tenants found appealing, leading to pressures that are said to
explain the widespread continuation of rent stabilization programs in New Jersey (providing a bevy of
cases for the subsequent empirical work reviewed below; see Keating, et al., 1998). In California,
Berkeley tried to continue rent control through a local citizen’s initiative in 1972 but the California
Supreme Court found it unconstitutional.2
During the late 1970s, rent regulation campaigns re-emerged as a result of increased political activism
and ongoing inflation from the oil crisis. Part of the backdrop in California was the 1978 passage of
Proposition 13, a measure that capped real estate taxation and was touted by its supporters as a win for
tenants, who supposedly would benefit from lower rents via the trickle-down benefits of lower property
2

Other jurisdictions in the U.S. also tried to maintain rent regulations. For example, in 1975, Washington D.C. also
instituted a rent control ordinance that has been modified over time but remains in effect (Turner 1998).

8

 taxes. When the promise of lower rents failed to materialize after the proposition was passed—
inflation-adjusted median rents in California rose more than 40 percent in the decade following Prop
13—tenants argued that they too deserved stable housing and price protections and began organizing
for rent reforms.3 In the 1970s and 1980s, Santa Monica, Berkeley, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Jose,
West Hollywood, and East Palo Alto all passed rent stabilization ordinances in response to growing
tenant advocacy. (Keating et al. 1998, Tucker 1997)
The 1970s-era second-generation rent regulations, also called “moderate rent control” or “rent
stabilization,” differed from the war-time rent freezes or rent control (Jenkins 2009; Gilderbloom 1981).
They typically permit an automatic percent rent increase and include vacancy decontrol, which sets
units back to market rate after a tenant leaves (Arnott 1995). Although Santa Monica, Berkeley, and East
Palo Alto, and West Hollywood originally had vacancy controls4 that kept rents in place even after a
tenant moved, a 1995 state law (Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act) required rent ordinances to include
vacancy decontrol measures and limited rent regulations to units built before 1995 or whenever a local
rent regulation was passed (e.g., 1979 in San Francisco) (Murphy 2018, Mallakh 2001).
Another key feature in moderate rent control or second-generation rent stabilization ordinances is that
landlords can petition to pass some of the costs of capital improvements and building remodels onto
tenants (Arnott 1995, Gilderbloom 1981). The ability to raise rents by a capped percent and the option
to petition for additional property maintenance expenses ensures a “fair return on investment,” which
courts have defined as a return commensurate with enterprises of similar risk level (Keating 1998, Baar
1983, Gilderbloom 1981).
As this brief history shows, rent regulations have often been considered a necessity in the context of a
housing emergency to ensure social and economic goals are collectively met. Yet, the purpose, political
forces, and structure of rent regulations have varied over time. In this current moment of labor-market
restructuring, growing global industries, low rental vacancies, and growing inequality—with California
now the fourth most unequal state in the country with the highest percentage of all states of those
considered poor using a housing-adjusted poverty measure—it is not surprising that rent regulations
have regained momentum.5

What Are the Economic Impacts of Rent Regulations?
Understanding the economic impact of rent regulations requires a basic knowledge of the nature of rent
as a return on investment. In general, if a company invests and creates a new or improved product, it is
likely to both make profits and improve overall social productivity. Land, however, is generally a more
passive investment: An increase in rents may arise for reasons having to do nothing with whether a
landlord has improved his or her actual housing product but instead may arise due to external factors
such as the overall set of market conditions, nearby public investments (such as new transit lines), or
3

See www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/grossrents.html. Perhaps the most serious affront to
renters: Increases in median rents had seriously lagged behind increasing in house values during the 1970s but
after Prop 13, the rates of increases were nearly the same, with renters not having any increase in housing wealth
to show for it.
4
West Hollywood allowed for up to a 15 percent increase upon vacancy with some exclusions; a modified version
of vacancy control (Heskin et al. 2000:163).
5
The inequality measure is the Gini coefficient; state-level calculations and comparisons were made using data
from the American Community Survey available at American FactFinder (factfinder.census.gov). The housingadjusted poverty measure is called the supplemental poverty measure; California’s ranking can be calculated using
Table A-5 at www.census.gov/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-261.html.

9

 other sorts of public policies. This is one reason why even free-market economists have favored land
taxes as a way to sop up excess profits (that is, profits arising from conditions external to the quality of
the housing itself) and encourage the more efficient use of land.6
In that context, rent regulations are intended to address this divergence between what might be termed
“building rent” and “land rent” and provide greater rental affordability for tenants in regulated units. As
such, they have the potential to protect tenants from unexpectedly rapid price increases in hot real
estate markets and, by so doing, dampen displacement pressures. The research reviewed below
suggests that moderate regulations do not appear to decrease housing construction but may incentivize
landlords to remove existing units from the rental market through condominium conversion or other
methods. In keeping with the discussion above, multi-city analyses find that the broader economy and
local conditions may have more impact on real estate values than rent regulations.

Affordability in Rent-Regulated Units
Studies have shown that affordability for tenants in rent-regulated units is improved. Long-term tenants
living in rent-regulated units receive considerable benefits by paying substantially less than what would
otherwise be the case (Clark and Heskin 1982; Sims 2007).7 In Boston, MA, and the nearby suburbs
Cambridge and Brookline, rent regulations were implemented in the late 1960s and early 1970s and
then repealed in 1995 through a statewide ballot measure (Autor, Palmer, and Pathak 2012; Sims 2007).
The sudden and immediate repeal of rent stabilization allowed researchers to more accurately study the
price impacts of rent regulation.8
Sims (2007) found that the end of rent stabilization resulted in an average $131 jump in rents (in 2017
dollars) in previously controlled areas.9 Similarly, using Cambridge rent survey data, Autor, Palmer, and
Pathak (2012) estimate that rents in controlled units were 44 percent lower than in non-controlled units
of similar quality, size, and characteristics. In California, a 1982 study of Los Angeles tenants by Clark and
Heskin (1982) found that prior to the introduction of rent regulations, tenants who lived in a unit for
three to five years received a tenure discount of 12.7 percent for a one-bedroom apartment and 21.7
percent for a two-bedroom apartment. The tenure discount is due to the fact that, very often, landlords
chose to either not raise rents or raise rent more slowly than average for existing tenants. In
comparison, tenants who lived in rent-stabilized units for three to five years received a discount of 26.5
percent for a one-bedroom apartment and 30.9 percent for a two-bedroom apartment. In another study
of vacancy controlled cities in California, Heskin, Levine, and Garrett (2000) found that rents were kept
lower, perhaps unsurprisingly.

6

For a recent popular explanation of this point, see www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/04/landvalue-tax.
7
A standard convention is to describe the alternative as “market rent.” But this suggests that there is a fair and
open market which is not the case in the California rental market where land use is regulated, supply does not
meet demand, and production cannot ramp up instantaneously. Simply saying “what would otherwise be the case”
is more precise as it is the rent that would emerge in the absence of rent stabilization, regardless of how
structurally impacted or “free” the housing market might be.
8
The governor of Massachusetts did allow tenants of a certain age or poverty level to remain in their units for one
to two years during the transition period. Thus by 1997, all previously rent-regulated units were decontrolled (Sims
2007).
9
Dollars converted to 2017 dollars from 1998 dollars using BLS CPI for all items in Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MANH, all urban consumers, not seasonally adjusted. The 1998 dollar amount was $84.

10

 Product quality is also important in considering the impact of rent regulations: Some research shows
that tenant affordability comes at the cost of better maintenance (Kutty 1996; Sims 2007). For example,
Sims (2007) found that chronic maintenance problems (such as holes in walls or floors, chipped or
peeling paint, loose railings, etc.) were more prevalent in controlled than non-controlled units during
the rent-control era and that this differential fell substantially with rent stabilization’s elimination. To
avoid these issues, jurisdictions with rent regulations typically increase code enforcement and have
specific programs for landlords to request rent increases to pay for capital improvements (Gilderbloom
1981). Specific provisions in rent stabilization ordinances, like allowances for rent increases contingent
on quality improvements, conditional annual rent increases, and stringent enforcement of quality codes,
may address concerns about deteriorating maintenance (Gilderbloom 1981; Kutty 1996).

Affordability in Non-Controlled Units
Q: Do rent regulations increase the cost of renting non-regulated units?
A: On balance, no—and where they do, closing policy loopholes can help. In fact, some research
shows that rent regulations could help keep rent more affordable for all renters.
Studies based on empirical data have found that rent regulations either slightly increase rental
affordability in non-controlled units or have a modest effect on rents when controlling for other factors.
For example, Glaeser’s (2003) study of New Jersey and California found that cities with rent regulations
had 10 percent lower growth in median rents than cities without rent regulations, even when controlling
for other factors. (However, Glaeser raises issues of housing misallocation, a topic we come back to
below.) This finding is based on citywide 1970 Census data (before rent stabilization) and 1990 Census
data (after rent stabilization) but did not distinguish between controlled and uncontrolled units.
Sims’ (2007) study of rents in Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline, Massachusetts, distinguished between
controlled and uncontrolled units. His results indicate that having 10 to 12 percent of rent-stabilized
units in an area decreases the rents of non-controlled units by $23 to $28, which would be $36 to $44 in
2017 dollars.10 Ambrosius and colleagues (2015) sharpen up the analysis further by comparing housing
trends for New Jersey cities with and without rent stabilization using 2010 Census data. New Jersey
makes a prime case study since, as noted earlier, it has a large number (over 100) of municipal
governments that have adopted rent regulations. While rent stabilization jurisdictions did show smaller
increases in rents than jurisdictions without such regulation, the difference disappeared in a regression
analysis that controlled for population, income, and housing characteristics.11
So, why do rents in uncontrolled units seem to go down? Traditional economic theory would suggest
that although rent regulations may improve affordability for long-term tenants, it should come at the
cost of broader affordability for all renters. According to traditional theory, a price cap on rents should
restrict the supply of housing, lead to a shortage of units, and ultimately drive up rents in uncontrolled
units (Block and Olsen 1981; Epstein 1988; Friedman and Stigler 1946). This line of thinking typically
proclaims that rent restrictions limit the supply of housing because landlords and developers have less

10

Dollars converted from 1998 dollars to 2017 dollars using BLS CPI for all items in Boston-Cambridge-Newton,
MA-NH, all urban consumers, not seasonally adjusted.
11
Rent per room was actually higher in rent-controlled units. This is because such units have fewer rooms, on
average (Ambrosius et al. 2015:128–29).

11

 incentive to invest in new development (Block and Olsen 1981). So why are many studies showing the
contrary?
Sims (2007) suggests that rent-stabilized buildings have more maintenance and habitability concerns
and thus drive down surrounding rents and property values. Ambrosius and colleagues (2015) find that
rent-regulated areas tend to be lower income, have low homeownership, and more people of color; this
neighborhood composition may be less appealing to higher-income renters (and so actually work against
gentrification in the sense of demographic change and displacement). Finally, prospective renters might
be unwilling to pay significantly higher rents in uncontrolled units, since they might try to wait for a rentregulated unit to come on the market. This could pressure landlords to offer lower prices than they
normally would.
In contrast with the range of earlier findings, Diamond and colleagues (2018) found that San Francisco’s
rent regulation induced a decrease in housing supply that led to a city-wide rent increase of 5 percent.
They suggest that this is largely due to landlords removing rental units from the market and converting
them to condos, tenants in common (TICs), or by other redevelopment to exempt units from regulation.
While Diamond et al. (2018) recommend offering subsidies to tenants as a way to avoid these landlord
backlash effects, closing the loopholes around conversion could also help ameliorate these impacts.
There have been so many pressures driving up rents in San Francisco in recent years that one concern is
whether the increase in rent costs the authors found due to rent stabilization would have actually been
outpaced by what might have emerged had rent hikes been completely unrestricted.
Indeed, research on the removal of rent stabilization in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the 1990s
suggests that rents went up on both controlled and non-controlled units when rent regulation was
removed, with tenants of previously stabilized units seeing a 40 percent increase in rent (Autor, Palmer,
and Pathak 2012). One is left to wonder about the potential impact of decontrol in San Francisco, given
the feeding frenzy the local real estate market has become. On the other hand, research from Heskin,
Levine, and Garrett (2000) found that in California cities with vacancy control (in which there are limits
on rent increases as tenants change), there was no evidence of gentrification. Their study looked at
Berkeley, Santa Monica, West Hollywood, and East Palo Alto from 1980 to 1990—at the beginning of the
tech boom, so gentrification pressures were weaker—and found that tenants had lower rents and
longer tenure. This suggests that tighter, not looser, rent regulations might slow gentrification.
What are we to make of these results? With the exception of the Stanford study, researchers found that
rents stayed the same or were lowered in units without rent stabilization but in proximity to stabilized
units. In a supercharged market like San Francisco, rents did increase, but it is unclear—even in a welldone effort that seeks to control for as many other factors as possible—if that impact is from rent
stabilization or from the escalating and highly unusual demand pressures that have made the city
uncommonly unaffordable. In any case, the bulk of the research suggests that rent regulations can not
only make controlled units more affordable but it may also make non-controlled units more
affordable—albeit due to maintenance issues and some degree of residential sorting—suggesting a role
for rent regulation as a tool in response to skyrocketing housing costs.

12

 The Impact of Rent Regulations on Housing Stock
Impact on Real Estate Values
Q: Do rent regulations decrease the property values of apartment buildings for owners?
A: While it is reasonable to assume that property values are diminished by rent regulations,
research on this issue is mixed.
Autor, Palmer, and Pathak’s (2012) analysis of residential buildings in Cambridge, MA, reveals that rentstabilized properties were valued at a discounted rate when compared with non-rent-stabilized
properties and that the elimination of rent regulation helped make up part of the gap, increasing the
value of formerly stabilized properties by 18 to 25 percent. The study used two years of assessment
data—1994 (during rent stabilization) and 2004 (after rent stabilization)—and a commercial database
covering changes in ownership of residential properties from 1988 to 2005 to conduct the comparison.
Some degree of undervaluation is to be expected: as noted earlier, one of the underlying principles
behind rent stabilization (or a land tax) is the idea that part
of the value of a property has to do with forces outside the
“As many professional landlords will
control of the landlord and so represent excess profits that
readily admit, higher rents may help
may be socially undesirable from the point of view of
them meet their monthly obligations but
efficient allocation of overall resources.
true profits come not through cash flow,
but through property appreciation.”

Perhaps most significantly, Autor and colleagues (2012) also
examined whether or not the repeal of rent regulation in
- Ambrosius and colleagues (2015:131)
Cambridge, MA, resulted in a spill-over increase in property
values for previously uncontrolled buildings. They found that repeal of rent stabilization resulted in a 12
percent increase in market valuations of never controlled houses between 1994 and 2004.
Why the spillover effect? The increases in property values were due in part to increased rental revenue
and additional maintenance and improvements. Although their data sets did not allow a complete
analysis of micro-level resident attributes, the authors suggest that part of the spillover effects on
property values were due to changing attributes of residents and “the production of other localized
amenities that made Cambridge a more desirable place to live” (Autor, Palmer, and Pathak 2012:31). In
other words, after decontrol led to the 40 percent rent increases noted by Autor and colleagues (2012),
lower-income residents were likely forced out of Cambridge and replaced by wealthier residents. This
could suggest that rent stabilization is an important strategy to slow gentrification.
Cambridge is, however, a small city where university students give the housing market a particular
dynamic that is not replicable in most other cities. In contrast, Ambrosius and colleagues (2015) had a
sample of 74 rent-stabilized cities and 87 non-rent-stabilized cities in New Jersey. These authors found
that neither the presence nor the strength of rent stabilization had a significant impact on appreciation
or foreclosure rates. Although they initially identified slightly higher changes in property values in rentstabilized cities (112.8 percent as compared to 109.5 percent in non-rent-stabilized cities) and a slightly
higher rate of foreclosure in rent-stabilized cities (4.8 percent as compared to 3.5 percent in non-rentstabilized cities), these differences can be explained by other factors, the most significant of which were
median income, the share of rental housing, and local demographic composition. While the study is
specific to the New Jersey case, it is a more robust analysis as it takes into account population change,
the share of the population that is African-American, median household income, vacancy rates, and

13

 more; in contrast, Autor and colleagues’ (2012) data set is focused solely on real estate and their
method does not control for the socioeconomic characteristics of tenants. More work needs to be done
in this area of investigation.

Impact on New Construction
Q: Do rent regulations decrease housing production and supply?
A: On balance, rent regulations do not impact new housing construction. When such regulations
allow for condo conversions and redevelopment that exempts the property from rent regulations,
units are taken off the market.
On balance, new housing supply is more influenced by cyclicality in the local economy and other local
conditions than rent restrictions (Arnott 1995; Gilderbloom 1981). This is particularly true of moderate
rent control, which exempts new construction and includes vacancy decontrol (Gilderbloom 1981). One
study suggested a stifling impact on construction, but it relied on surveys of banks with regards to how
rent regulations affect lending rates for landlords. Seventy-four percent of Boston bankers and 68
percent of Fort Lee bankers reported that rent regulations “influence” loan activity and contribute to
mortgage risk. However, the analyses rely on a small sample size (37 lending institutions in total), a
qualitative assessment by bankers who may be ideologically predisposed to dislike rent regulation, and a
nebulous definition of “influence” (Gilderbloom 1981 reporting on Sternlieb 1974, 1975).
A 1976 report by the Urban Land Institute (ULI) analyzed building permits and found that multifamily
housing construction in rent-regulated areas dropped in Washington, D.C., from 1970 to 1974 (Black
1976 as reported by Gilderbloom 1981). But Gilderbloom (1981) notes that the analysis did not control
for other variables such as availability of land and changes to the economy. He points out construction
dropped in many cities from 1970 to 1974 without rent regulations and increased in many cities with
rent regulations during the same period of the ULI study.
Alternatively, Gilderbloom and Ye (2007) used regression analysis of 76 New Jersey cities with rent
stabilization and found that there was little to no statistically significant effect of moderate rent control
on new construction after controlling for population, racial demographics, population change, income,
the percentage of units that were renter occupied, vacancy rates, and unit age. Similarly, Sims (2007), in
an analysis of Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline, MA, found that while building construction permits did
rise after the repeal of rent stabilization in 1995, multifamily building permits actually reached their
height in the mid to late 1980s—during rent stabilization. In short, there is not much evidence to
support the notion that moderate rent stabilization impacts new construction, a pattern that makes
sense given the ways in which moderate regimes tend to exclude new units from coverage.12

12

Indeed, former Berkeley Housing Director Dr. Stephen Barton has suggested that rent control could actually
boost the construction market noting that in a hot real estate market, without rent stabilization or tenant
protection, wealthy incoming tenants will crowd out lower-income renters—as has happened in places like San
Francisco. In his view, if tenant protections allow current tenants to stay in their homes then the newer, wealthier
tenants would both drive demand for new housing and be able to afford the rents required to make new
developments pencil out. Excluding new construction from rent regulations is key in this scenario and is the
standard way regulations have been written in California.

14

 Impact on Existing Rental Housing Stock
Rent stabilization, however, can affect existing stock by inducing landlords to remove controlled units
from the market. This can happen in two main ways. First, owners can move into their units, as some
rent regulations exempt apartment buildings if the owner lives in one of the units. Most ordinances still
allow a landlord to evict a tenant if the unit will be used as the owner’s primary residence. Second, a
unit can be taken off the market by converting the unit from a rental unit to a condominium. Several
studies find that rent stabilization may encourage owners to take their units off the market in these two
ways (Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018; Fetter 2013; Heskin, Levine, and Garrett 2000; Sims 2007).
For example, Sims’ (2007) study of Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline, Massachusetts, compared rental
and ownership patterns during and after rent stabilization. His study found that housing units in
decontrolled areas were 7 percent more likely to become rentals after the end of rent stabilization than
those units located in areas that were never controlled.
The structure of rent regulations influences how units are taken off the market. Heskin, Levine, and
Garrett’s (2000) study of Los Angeles found that the incentive to convert rental properties to ownership
units was even more evident in places with vacancy control, where the unit remains at a price lower
than would otherwise be the case after a tenant moved out. They estimate that vacancy control resulted
in a 7 percent decline in rental units.13 More recently, a Stanford study by Diamond, McQuade, and Qian
(2018) found that rent stabilization incentivized landlords to convert rental units into condos, tenants in
common (TICs), or owner occupied units; or redevelop the buildings to become exempt from rent
stabilization. According to their estimates, this led to a 15 percent decrease of the rental stock and an
even larger reduction in the number of tenants living in protected buildings.
In response to the Stanford study, some community groups have suggested that authorities could
prevent the downside of unit reduction by closing loopholes that allow for rental to condominium
conversions (Tenants Together 2018). At a local level, most jurisdictions that have rent stabilization
ordinances already have some regulations limiting condominium conversions, including prohibiting
condo conversions for buildings of a certain size, capping the percentage of rental units that can be
converted, requiring that tenants have the opportunity to purchase the building before it goes to
market, or by requiring landlords to pay tenants significant relocation costs (Bakker 2005; Gorska and
Crispell 2016).14 However, in California, under state law, the Ellis Act allows landlords to evict all of the
tenants in a building, after which the landlord might convert the units into condominiums or demolish
the building and put up a new apartment building if the local government allows it. Tenants Together
and other advocacy organizations have been advocating to repeal the Ellis Act in order to preserve
rental housing while maintaining the benefits of rent stabilization (Dreier 2017).

What About Mom-and-Pop Landlords?
Q: Do rent regulations disproportionately impact mom-and-pop landlords, as compared to corporate
landlords?
A: The literature does not clearly address this question.

13

They also found that vacancy control corresponded with lower rents, longer tenant tenure, and more kids—as
well as shift from tenancy to ownership.
14
For an interactive map of condominium conversion ordinances, see Matthew Miller’s Condominium Passage
Over Time map public.tableau.com/profile/matthew.miller2971#!/vizhome/Ordinances/Dashboard1

15

 Unfortunately, existing academic research on rent regulations does not generally attempt to distinguish
between mom-and-pop landlords and larger scale investors; indeed, very few studies have attempted to
define “small-scale,” “mom-and-pop,” or “amateur” landlords. Some suggest that mom-and-pop owners
are more likely to charge lower rents and negotiate with tenants, which may mean that, as a group, they
are likely less impacted by moderate rent regulations (Gilderbloom et al. 2009; The Furman Center for
Real Estate and Urban Policy and Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies 2013).
Still, further research needs to be done to better understand how rent regulations impact the real estate
value of units owned by mom-and-pop landlords. If rent-stabilized properties are, in fact, offered at a
discounted price (as per some of the research reviewed above), it may be more feasible for mom-andpop landlords to enter the market, thus encouraging entrepreneurship and asset-building. However,
given the likely impact of rent regulation on reducing returns, mom-and-pop landlords with fewer
capital resources may also be more likely to abandon properties or allow their units to fall into disrepair
than larger landlords who could marshal funds for improvements. Further research is required to
explore these speculations and determine the balance of effects.

Does Rent Regulation Promote Housing Stability?
Nearly every academic study finds that rent stabilization decreases tenant mobility and increases
housing stability for rent-stabilized residents (Ault, Jackson, and Richard Saba 1994; Clark and Heskin
1982; Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018; Gyourko and Linneman 1989; Munch and Svarer 2002). A
study of San Francisco tenants living in buildings with two to four units found that medium- and longterm beneficiaries of rent stabilization are 10 to 20 percent more likely to remain in their units and
roughly 4 percent more likely to remain in San Francisco. Based on the results, older tenants and longterm residents appeared to benefit most from rent stabilization and have the longest sustained tenure
(Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018). In short, rent regulations help to ensure community continuity,
aging in place, and retention of a workforce in high-cost cities, although this can lead to problems for
the entry of newcomers.
Indeed, given the mixed evidence on the effects of rent stabilization on housing supply, most
economists who are critical of rent regulations focus on how restricted tenant mobility leads to housing
misallocation (Ault, Jackson, and Richard Saba 1994; Glaeser and Luttmer 2003; Hardman and Ioannides
1999). They argue that rent stabilization can keep people from moving into units that better meet their
shifting tastes and preferences; basically, renters may decide to stay in their current rent-stabilized units
even if their family size has changed or their income has grown, and so the “fit” is imperfect. On the
other hand, rent stabilization helps to counter mobility that is driven by force (e.g., suddenly escalating
rents due to external market conditions) rather than by choice—something that those campaigning for
moderate rent control highlight as a primary concern (Dreier 2017). In any case, for market-oriented
economists, the rental market is an “optimization problem” and restricting people who could and want
to pay more for a unit means that the wrong person is in that home and overall social welfare is
reduced.
How one considers the balance of these tendencies is a key policy question. In the oft-mentioned
Stanford study, the authors note that tenants benefiting from rent stabilization gained nearly $3 billion
in welfare (in present-discounted value, a process that tries to account for what a benefit in the past

16

 may be worth today).15 They suggest that there was an equivalent loss in welfare for those who saw
their rents rise as this red-hot market was wracked by induced condo conversions that reduced available
rental stock. They note that 42 percent of those costs were borne by future renters—that is, those who
were not in the city at the beginning of the period and who found it more expensive to move in later.
The authors do recognize that “incumbent residents benefit on net” (Diamond, McQuade, and Qian
2018:31).
Thus, part of the debate boils down to the value we place on housing stability, a factor which is hard to
quantify in purely monetary terms. Indeed, while rent regulation ordinances provide an economic
incentive for people to stay in place, they also provide protection against de facto evictions. All
moderate rent stabilization ordinances in the United States prohibit landlords from evicting tenants
except if the tenant has breached the contract. While other legal strategies like “just cause eviction”
ordinances similarly protect tenants from eviction, in the absence of rent regulation, landlords raise
rents as a way to force tenants out. As Matthew Desmond and other academics have concluded,
evictions are becoming epidemic and can be devastating for families and communities, not only in the
short-term but for generations (Desmond 2012; Desmond and Gershenson 2016; Desmond and Kimbro
2015).

Why Does Housing Stability Matter?
Is housing stability important for society to consider, even if newcomers to a market may be
disadvantaged? The U.S. has certainly tended to make housing stability a public policy goal. After the
Great Depression in the 1930s, in response to the flood of foreclosures and homelessness, the federal
government deemed housing stability too important to leave to the privatized mortgage market and
created incentives and regulations to encourage more stable consumer lending products. Prior to the
Great Depression, home loans were primarily short in duration and often with variable interest rates.
The 30-year fixed-rate mortgage exists because of extensive government guarantees and incentives
provided to banks like the creation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the invention of mortgage
securitization (Min 2013). Additionally, the messaging around Proposition 13 in the 1970s focused on
the benefits of housing stability for homeowners—particularly for older residents (Cannon 2009).
However, U.S. tax and fiscal policy has generally prioritized the economic stability of homeowners over
renters. Christopher Howard (1999) refers to the tax expenditures and social policies that benefit those
with wealth as the “hidden welfare state.” These include tax deductions on retirement accounts, home
mortgage interest, children’s saving funds, and more, in effect making housing and finances more stable
for those with more wealth—middle- and upper-income residents. This leaves renters missing these
economic benefits and struggling with forced mobility.

15

Because of data limitations, the Diamond, McQuade, and Qian (2018) study was limited to 1994 to
2012, and thus missed the most recent rapid rent increases and the subsequent extra benefits that may
have accrued to rent-stabilized tenants; for that run-up in rent, see
www.bayareamarketreports.com/trend/second-wind-may-2017. The study also does not seem to
capture what might be termed “partial benefits” to those who moved in the middle of the period
studied and may have entered with a higher initial rent but then benefited from limited increases over a
shorter sub-period; this latter point was discussed in email correspondence with the authors.

17

 The benefits of residential stability include:


Physical, social, and psychological wellness
Research has shown a correlation between forced moves and stress (e.g., anxiety, depression,
etc.) and well-being (e.g., substance abuse, premature mortality, etc.) (Bures 2003; Desmond
and Kimbro 2015; DeWit 1998; Exeter et al. 2015; Fowler, Simpson, and Schoendorf 1993; Liu et
al. 2014; Morris, Manley, and Sabel 2018; Oishi and Schimmack 2010; Stokols and Shumaker
1982). However, researchers argue that assessing the impact of mobility alone without
considering the reason for mobility (such as eviction, foreclosure, divorce, etc.) leaves out
important issues like poverty, joblessness, and family conflict (Anderson et al. 2014; Flouri,
Mavroveli, and Midouhas 2013; Morris, Manley, and Sabel 2018). In response, Burgard,
Seefeldt, and Zelner (2012) examined how different causes of housing insecurity affected health
and well-being. They found that people who moved in the past three years for any reason were
slightly more likely to be in poor or fair health, report anxiety attacks, and have depression than
those with no instability. People who moved for financial reasons were 2.6 times more likely to
report fair or poor health, 2.5 times more likely to experience an anxiety attack, and nearly
twice as likely to experience depression than those with no instability. In one study, researchers
found that introverts struggled to build strong social ties when there were frequent moves in
childhood. As adults, these introverts (when compared to extroverts) had higher rates of
mortality (Oishi and Schimmack 2010).
Studies in both the U.S. and abroad have found that evictions and foreclosures have stronger
effects on the mental and physical effects of women than men (Bolívar Muñoz et al. 2016;
Nettleton and Burrows 1998; Vásquez-Vera et al. 2017). Given this gendered pattern, it is
significant that Rosenfield and Ziff (2018) report on research showing that stress during
pregnancy can have long-term negative effects on the child. There is also a racial dynamics; for
example, Black women are more likely to face eviction than Latino or white men or women in
Milwaukee County (Desmond 2012). In Evicted, Matthew Desmond (2016) suggests that eviction
is to Black women what incarceration is to Black men. Desmond describes how “poor black men
may be locked up, but poor black women are locked out,” which only further propagates
economic disadvantage (2016:98). Desmond documents that one of the reasons for evictions is
the inability to pay rent—which requires at least a two-pronged response of keeping housing
costs low as well as boosting take-home pay.



Educational attainment
Frequent moving can disrupt children’s learning and social support systems, which can dampen
learning and exacerbate behavioral problems. Students who repeatedly change schools are
more likely to lag behind their peers in reading and math and more likely to repeat a grade, even
when controlling for demographic characteristics (Garriss-Hardy and Vrooman 2005; Simpson
and Fowler 1994). Children from low-income families are particularly at risk since low-income
households have the highest mobility rates (Coulton, Theodus, and Turner 2009). One study
shows the connection between income and the achievement gap, finding that chronic stress in
childhood results in impaired working memory later in life (Evans and Schamberg 2009). Several
studies also show that moving frequently results in lower high-school graduation rates (e.g.,
Gasper, DeLuca, and Estacion 2012).

18

 Does Rent Regulation Result in Greater Societal Well-Being?
Economists have long tried to quantify the distributional impacts of rent regulations, typically through
cost-benefit analyses that compare the dollar benefit received by tenants relative to the dollars lost in
revenue by landlords (Lyytikäinen 2006; Micheli and Schmidt 2015).16 Reasonably enough, one expects
that renters will gain while landlords will lose—but there is also the potential that gains for renters could
help fuel demand in other parts of the local economy.
For example, in a recent report looking at housing in the Bay Area—a supercharged housing market that
according to Zillow Research’s August 2018 rent index is the only place with metro areas more expensive
for renters than Los Angeles17—the authors found that if “economically insecure Bay Area renters paid
only what they could afford for housing, their [collective] spending power could grow by $4.4 billion”
(Treuhaft, Pizarek, Ross, and Scoggins 2018:19). The authors report that excess spending on housing
(that is, paying more than 30 percent of income for rent and utilities, a standard considered “housingburdened”) not only takes away from discretionary spending but also from everyday expenses, like food
and childcare.
Businesses have clearly seen the need to address the housing crisis. Even tech companies report being
refused by potential workers and everyday businesses struggle to find employees who can afford to live
nearby. A recent study by Beacon Economics conducted for Next 10, a non-profit based in the Silicon
Valley, has found that California is seeing low-income households leave the state even as high-income
households move in, a pattern suggesting that the state’s high taxes are not scaring people away while
the state’s high rents are pushing people away (Khouri 2018). As we have noted, tackling the state’s
housing dilemmas will require more than one approach but rent regulations can play a role in
ameliorating pressures, at least in the short- to medium-term.
While the distribution of benefits between renters and landlords—and between landlords and other
business activities—is of interest, there is also the question of the allocation of benefits between
renters. Are the renters that do benefit from rent regulations those who are the most in need?

Is Rent Regulation Benefiting Those Who Need It Most?

Q: To what extent do rent regulations benefit low-income residents? Does rent regulation
create incentives for moderate- and higher-income renters to stay in their units?
A: Research shows that renters under regulations and cities with rent stabilization tend to be
older, lower-income, more headed by single-mothers, and more commonly people of color.
However, this is not at the exclusion of younger, wealthier, whiter renters. For example, just
as researchers have found that lower-income tenants benefit from rent regulations, so do
middle- and higher-income tenants. Rent regulations are not efficient at targeting those who
need them most.

16

For example, Sims (2007) found that rent stabilization resulted in a $17 million per month transfer from
landlords to tenants in Boston, Brookline, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, combined.
17
See “United States and 50 Largest Metro Areas: August 2018,” Real Estate and Rental Overviews by Metro Area,
Local Market Overviews, Zillow Research, available at www.zillow.com/research/local-market-reports/.

19

 Several studies have found older households tend to be the primary beneficiaries of rent regulations
(Clark and Heskin 1982 in Los Angeles; Glaeser 2003 in Manhattan; Gyourko and Linneman 1989 in New
York City). Many researchers have found that tenants in rent-stabilized units or jurisdictions have lower
incomes (Ambrosius et al. 2015; Gilderbloom and Ye 2007; Glaeser 2003; Gyourko and Linneman 1989).
Similarly, Ambrosius and colleagues’ (2015) study found that New Jersey cities with moderate rent
control had nearly 25 percent lower median incomes and 70 percent more Black residents than cities
without.
Moderate rent control appears to benefit people of color. In a few studies, rent-regulated units have
been shown to be comprised of disproportionately more people of color than their non-regulated
counterparts, including New Jersey (Ambrosius et al. 2015; Gilderbloom and Ye 2007), California (Heskin,
Levine, and Garrett 2000), Cambridge, MA (Sims 2011), and some parts of New York City (Gyourko and
Linneman 1989).18 Gyourko and Linneman (1989) found that in uncontrolled units, 12 percent of
households were headed by a Black person, 3 percent headed by a Puerto Rican, and 22 percent by a
single woman. In controlled units, in comparison, 19 percent of household heads were AfricanAmerican, 14 percent Puerto Rican, and 32 percent single women.
While people of color and low-income people may be disproportionately represented in rent-stabilized
units, they may not benefit proportionately from price reductions. Gyourko and Linneman (1989) found
that the benefit-to-income ratio, or the percent of the rent savings from rent regulation relative to
annual income, was higher for white families than for either Black or Puerto Rican families. Furthermore,
the study found that rent stabilization provided moderate progressive benefits for lower-income
families, but that income was not highly correlated with benefit. Thus, they conclude that “while many
poor families received benefits, so too did many higher income families. In a similar vein, while many
low-income families benefitted from rent regulations, many other equally poor families received no
benefits,” (Gyourko and Linneman 1989:66). Glaeser (2003) similarly argues that while rent stabilization
provides low-rent places to live in costly cities that would otherwise be unaffordable, older people and
people without children primarily benefit from economic integration. Thus, he concludes, “rent control
is not targeting the people who are likely to gain the most from integration” (Glaeser 2003:199).
One valid argument against moderate rent control is that it does not specifically target low-income
residents and, as such, middle- and higher-income tenants will exploit the benefits (Davidson 2013). This
is one reason that those who are against rent regulations because of the potential for misallocation
argue that a better approach would be to directly subsidize renters with a dramatic expansion of Section
8 vouchers (which allow for renters to pay less than they normally would with the government making
up the difference), other forms of housing vouchers (Glaeser 2003), government subsidies, or tax credits
for renters (Diamond, McQuade, and Qian 2018).
While a sensible view in theory—who could argue against more efficient targeting of subsidies and
interventions?—it is important to take into account the public’s willingness to support such measures.
For example, the City of Los Angeles had not opened up Section 8 to new applicants for 13 years before
finally creating a new lottery program to get on the waiting list for Section 8 in 2017. Nearly 190,000
people applied for 20,000 spots, suggesting that demand is exceeding the generosity of taxpayers and
housing authorities that is needed to achieve the holy grail of allocative efficiency (Schrank 2018).

18

Gyourko and Linneman’s (1989) analysis comprised almost 15,000 renters throughout New York City. In contrast,
Glaeser’s (2003) restricted sample of around 2,600 renters in Manhattan found that rent-stabilized units had more
white renters than non-rent-stabilized units.

20

 In short, there is often a gap between theory and policy realities. Social Security and Medicare are
available to everyone in part because if the government means-tested and limited senior aid to those
truly in need—which is what economists would prefer—political support would collapse. Similarly, we
could let the market set wages and then make up for any difference in what it takes to survive with
direct income payments. However, that is not popular, partly because it is seen as a subsidy to
corporations who pay low wages, and so Americans tend to support minimum wage laws instead.
Americans would probably take the same view if we eschewed rent regulations in San Francisco and
instead gave incumbent residents payments that would promptly head into the swelling coffers of
apartment owners. Rent regulations may represent a second-best but politically feasible solution to
housing instability.

Conclusion
This report has sought to examine the empirical evidence on rent stabilization. While there are some
divergences in views in the literature, there is a general consensus that tenants in rent-regulated
apartments stay in their apartments longer and typically benefit from rent discounts. Despite being
viewed by some as a market distortion, such housing stability reduces evictions (forced mobility) and
can provide important societal benefits. These benefits are often not quantified but they can be
particularly important for lower-income people and people of color who are disproportionately
impacted by housing instability, evictions, and forced relocation.
While some research suggests that rent regulations lead to higher rents in unregulated units, other
research points to lower rents overall. While moderate rent control does not seem to impact new
construction—logical since part of the moderation is not applying rent controls to the initial price of new
units—research shows that stricter rent regulation spurs the conversion of rental units into owneroccupied properties (e.g., condo conversions). Based on this finding, rent regulations should be carefully
crafted to take into account this phenomenon. Other policy design consideration might include the
inclusion of single-family dwellings and policies about building maintenance as well as other ways
landlords may indirectly push out tenants.
Rent regulation is not a silver bullet and is a somewhat blunt policy tool that generally favors less
advantaged populations but does not always target those who need it most. Gilderbloom and Ye go so
far as to argue that moderate rent control that includes vacancy decontrol and exempts new
construction is “toothless” and more of a “symbolic” than “distributional” housing reform (2007:216).
However, it is relatively simple to administrate, does not require tax expenditures, and protects some
tenants from price gouging. Moreover, it is an anti-displacement tool: when Cambridge, MA, lifted its
rent ordinance, there was an influx of wealthier residents. And in San Francisco, rent stabilization has
allowed long-term, lower-income residents to stay in their homes rather than being pushed out to farflung suburbs.
The debate about rent regulations can sometimes be at a fever-pitch, but the research suggests that a
more even tone might be appropriate. Pressures for rent regulations arise when markets are hot and
seem to have benefits, particularly for housing stability, that go unrecognized by fervent opponents. At
the same time, proponents of tenant rights need to recognize that while rent regulations can prevent
both sudden sharp upticks in rent and unjust evictions, California also needs broader policies to increase
affordable housing production targeted to those most in need (including families) and labor market
interventions to ensure that wages keep up with the cost of living.

21

 At the end of the day, a multi-pronged approach is required to address the state’s housing crisis and
create a more stable path for mobility in today’s economy. With increasing evidence that racial and
income inequalities are a drag on sustained growth (Benner and Pastor 2015) and with housing costs
limiting consumer spending on other items and creating problems for working retention and attraction,
it is critical to go beyond past arguments and experiment with a variety of methods to create a California
economy and housing market that work better for all the state’s residents.

References
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2015. “Forty Years of Rent Control: Reexamining New Jersey’s Moderate Local Policies after the
Great Recession.” Cities 49(December):121–33.
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27

 Appendix: Data Profile of Rent Stabilization in Los Angeles and Santa Monica
The literature suggests that rent stabilization can lead to longer-term residential stability and is likely to
assist less advantaged households; at the same time, there may be problems of allocation in terms of
effectively delivering benefits to those who face the most barriers to affordable rent. While we did not
conduct an extensive empirical analysis, we looked at the characteristics of those living in units
governed by a rent stabilization ordinance (RSO) compared to those in other units. We did this for two
jurisdictions, Los Angeles and Santa Monica, for which we could approximate the geography and use
some designations to draw the micro-data necessary to draw a picture of the two populations. The data
and methods used are discussed at the end of this appendix.
According to the data profile depicted on the next page, in Los Angeles, a slight majority of renters live
in rent stabilized units (56 percent). They are distributed across the age spectrum and have a similar age
profile to non-RSO renters. However, there are higher rates of poverty among RSO renters than non-RSO
renters. Latinos disproportionately benefit from RSO as do, to a lesser degree, undocumented
immigrants. This correlation may simply be due to these communities living in older housing stock, as
LA’s RSO does not include mechanisms to precisely benefit any particular group of people. However, this
is consistent with the previous literature on less advantaged communities benefiting. On average, LA’s
RSO units have fewer rooms and bedrooms than non-RSO units, and lower rent—both in aggregate and
when split apart by unit size and so affordability is enhanced. For the RSO units, 44 percent have been in
the hands of the same tenant for 5 years or more; the figure for the non-ROS units is 38 percent,
suggesting that rent stabilization does indeed encourage residential stability—but also that there
remains a significant degree of turnover in RSO units.
In Santa Monica, the share of tenants in RSO units is greater than that in Los Angeles: 76 percent. The
age profile is a bit older in RSO units and it is somewhat whiter and higher income; this pattern on
income and race is consistent with the age finding but the fact that RSO residents have higher income is
consistent with the housing allocation issues raised in the literature. As for RSO units compared to nonRSO units, they have about the same number of rooms and bedrooms. On average, RSO units cost about
$206 less than non-RSO units which is a smaller discount than in LA where that difference is $270. And
as in LA, the majority of units turn over in under 5 years but the turn-over is even more rapid in the nonRSO units.
One important caveat: the Santa Monica data is based on a smaller raw sample and so the trends there
may be less reliable than what are seen for Los Angeles. What the larger Los Angeles data profile shows
is congruent with the literature: those in rent-stabilized units are less advantaged. And both profiles are
also consistent with the literature: those in rent-stabilized units generally pay lower rents, and tend to
be able to stay in those units for a longer period of time.

28

 RSO UNITS AND TENANTS

2012-2016
Los Angeles

Santa Monica

RSO

non-RSO

RSO

non-RSO

56%

1,025,290 44%

52,799 76%

16,246 24%

<18

23%

25%

11%

17%

18-24

11%

12%

9%

7%

25-35

23%

23%

29%

36%

36-64

35%

33%

40%

30%

8%

7%

11%

10%

48%

44%

23%

26%

Non-Hispanic white

20%

23%

64%

55%

African-American or Black

10%

9%

4%

-

Latino

57%

53%

19%

23%

Asian-American/Pacific Islander

10%

12%

8%

10%

2%

2%

5%

-

US-born

56%

59%

75%

72%

Foreign-born, naturalized citizen

13%

14%

13%

12%

Legal permanent resident (LPR)

13%

12%

9%

9%

Undocumented immigrant

18%

15%

4%

59%

346,175 41%

Tenants
Age of Tenants

1,289,294

65+
Tenants Living Below 150% of Poverty
Race/Ethnicity of Tenants

Other
Immigration Status of Tenants

Rental Units

507,821

29,760

79%

8,150

21%

Units by # of bedrooms
Studio

88,025

32,032

3,309

-

1 bedroom

214,787

97,877

13,064

3,063

2 bedrooms

169,343

128,541

10,787

2,956

29,436

64,685

2,600

-

4 bedrooms

4,563

18,716

5+ bedrooms

1,667

4,324

3 bedrooms (3+ in Santa Monica)

Rooms (average)

3.2

3.9

3.5

Bedrooms (average)

2.3

2.9

2.4

Median Rent

$1,030

$1,300

$1,546

3.5
2.6
$1,752

Median Rent by Bedrooms
Studio

$805

$927

$1,133

1 bedroom

$993

$1,014

$1,464

$1,649

2 bedrooms

$1,254

$1,359

$1,900

$2,164

3 bedrooms (3+ in Santa Monica)

$1,519

$1,568

$2,061

4 bedrooms

$1,418

$1,752

$889

$2,061

5+ bedrooms

-

-

Average Tenure in Unit
12 months or less

20%

23%

21%

28%

13 to 23 months ago

9%

10%

10%

2 to 4 years ago

27%

29%

23%

32%

5 to 9 years ago

17%

17%

12%

-

10 to 19 years ago

19%

14%

18%

-

20 to 29 years ago

6%

4%

9%

-

30+ years ago

3%

2%

8%

-

Source: USC PERE (Program for Environmental and Regional Equity) analysis of 2012- 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) microdata accessed from
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Ruggles, Steven J., Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek, 2017, Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series: Version 7.0 [Dataset], Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.
Note: Missing data due small sample size (50 cases or less).

29

 Brief Methodology
Profile data is based on author analysis of 2012-2016 American Community Survey (ACS) microdata
accessed from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2017). We used Public Use
Microdata Areas (PUMAs) to approximate the geographies, but neither city are perfectly fits with its
corresponding PUMAs. The PUMA used for Santa Monica misses a bit of the southern portion of the city
and, for example, the PUMAs used to approximate the City of Los Angeles includes Veterans Park, Culver
City, the City of San Fernando, etc. while parts of other neighborhoods (e.g., Hollywood) are missing.
Nonetheless, the ACS remains the most rich and accessible data source for exploring the demographics
of rent-stabilized jurisdictions.
In order to estimate which units and people are under rent stabilization, we had to make some decisions
in order to identify them in the dataset. Los Angeles’ RSO includes units built on October 1, 1978 or
earlier and Santa Monica, April 10, 1979 or earlier (with some exceptions for units built later). Based on
how the ACS data is structured, we had to choose units built in 1979 or earlier, instead of being able to
isolate more exact dates. In LA, RSO units are also restricted to those with two or more units or one-unit
structures with adjoining walls (e.g., town homes). We compared the number of units we found in the
micro-data to those published by each city and we had a reasonably close approximation, so have
confidence that our estimation procedure identified the correct units.
For more on Los Angeles’ RSP, see: https://hcidla.lacity.org/RSO-Overview
For more on Santa Monica’s RSO, see: https://www.smgov.net/Overview.aspx

30