Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 1 of 15 UN ITED STATES D ISTRICT CO URT SO UTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CaseNo.l6-8ogso-civ-Rosenbero rannon SHIPPING AND TRAN SIT,LLC, Plaintiff, LENSDISCO UNTERS.CO M ,a division ofLD V ision Group,lnc., Defendant. REPORT & RXCOM M EO ATION THIS CAUSE isbefore the Courton Defendant'sM otion forAttorney'sFees(DE 39), which hasbeen referred forappropriate disposition (DE 49). Forthe reasonsbelow,the Court recom m ends that this case be deem ed exceptionalunder the Patent Actand thatDefendant be awarded $36,317.50 in attorney'sfees. 1. BA CK GR O UND ln this patent infringement case, Plaintiff alleges Defendant infringed four patents generally directed attracking and reporting the location ofa vehicle. On June l3,2016,Plaintiff filed an eight-count Com plaint alleging patent infringem entand seeking undisclosed enhanced financialdamages,including royalties,injunctive relietl attorney's fees,and costs. (DE l). Plaintiffspecificallyrequested afindingthatd'thisisan exceptionalcase.''l (DE 1atl6). Defendant answered by generally denying any violation of patent laws, asserting affirm ative defenses,and raising eightcounterclaim s fourfordeclaratory non-infringem entand lAs itrelatesto the currentattorney'sfee motion,Plaintiffnow argues thatthe case isnotexceptional. The irony ofPlaintiff'sshiû in position isnotmissed by thisCourt. Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 2 of 15 fourfordeclarationsofpatentinvalidity. (DE 9). Defendantalso soughtan iiexceptionalcase'' findingunder35U.S.C.j285. On August22,2016,the Courtheld a scheduling conference (DE 17)and ordered expedited initialdiscovery as follows; Defendant willprovide Plaintiff w ith initialdisclosures,which w illconsistof a list of a1l carriers used by Defendant from June l3, 2010 to the present. . . . Plaintiffw illprovide Defendantw ith a listof allofDefendant's carriersthat are notIicensed oronly partially licensed asto the patentsatissue in this case.Forthe carriers that are partially Iicensed, Plaintiff w ill provide Defendant w ith the licenses. (DE l8!1& 2).Thepartiesexchangedthisinitialdiscoveryasinstructed. M eanwhile,Plaintiffanswered the counterclaimson August29,20l6 (DE 20)followed bythe filing ofaCovenantNotto Sue(d'CNS'')on September 14,2016 (DE 22). Plaintiffthen filed amotiontodismisson Septemberl6,2016 (DE 23)thatsoughtan involuntarydismissal based on the CN S. The Court originally denied Plaintiffs request for dism issal based on Defendant'sobjectionsto each party bearing theirown costsand fees. However,the Court thereaûerdismissedtheclaimsandcounterclaimsupon unopposedmotion. (See DE 28,DE 29, DE 30,DE 31). Priorto the Court'sdism issalofthe claims,Defendantfiled a LocalRule 3.8 notice ofpending or related lawsuits identifying ten active2 and 3153closed patentinfringem ent casesfiled by Plaintiffand itspredecessorArrivalstar,S.A. (DE 27). Defendantnow seeksan award ofattorney'sfeesbased on an exceptionalcase finding pursuantto 35 U.S.C.j285.(DE 39). 2 Al1ten activecasesarenow closed, fourwith stipulated dismissals,five by voluntary dismissalandone bywayofajointmotiontodismiss. Thecourtdidnotreachthemeritsinanyofthetencases. Defendantclaimsthatnoneofthe casesin thisdistricthavereached adecision on the merits.Thispoint isundisputed. Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 3 of 15 II. PAR TY POSITIO NS Defendant'sPosition Defendant claims Plaintiffnever intended to litigate this case. (DE 39). Defendant allegesthatPlaintiffisaiipatenttroll''with Sssubstantively infirm''patentswho broughtthis(and other)dknuisance-litigation''inaiicampaign''fashion forthesolepulposeofextractingaûfquick settlement.''(f#.). DefendantsupportsitsGdcampaign''allegationsbypointingoutthatPlaintiff has filed i(over 150 cases in this district alone4''and has avoided any determ ination on patent validity by dism issing the actions before any m eritdeterm inationsare m ade and filing covenants nottosuewhencounterclaimsarefiled.@#.).Defendantseeksanexceptionalcaserulingbased on the kslack of substantive strength of S&T's litigating position'' or for the tsunreasonable mannerin which the case was Iitigatledq.'' (DE 48).Defendantargues an exceptionalcase finding isnecessary to deterPlaintifffrom continuing to filenuisance suits in the future. (DE 39). B. Plaintiffs Position Plaintiff counters the nuisance allegations by citing its right to protect its presum ably valid patents.(DE 44). Plaintiffproffersthatitengaged in sufficientpre-filing investigation by presenting a l6-page dem and Ietterto D efendantwhich included claim schartsdem onstrating the infringement. (1d). Though Defendantresponded asto the generalinvalidity ofthepatents, Plaintiffclaim sthatDefendantdid notprofferany claim schartscom paring the claim to priorart. (f#.).Aûer pre-suit negotiations failed,Plaintiff filed suit and once the Court-ordered initial discovery regarding the carrier/shipping com panies w as com pleted,Plaintiff lsm ade a decision thecasewasnotworth pursuing''andsoughtadism issal.(1d). 4M ore precisely, Defendant'sNoticeofRelatedCases(DE 27)identities325patentinfringementcases tiled inthisdistrictby Plaintiffand Plaintiff'spredecessorsince20l5. 3 Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 4 of 15 111. DISCU SSION LegalStandard The PatentActperm its courtsto aw ard reasonable attorney's fees in çdexceptionalcases.'' The statutt's language is brief:it-l'he courtin exceptionalcases m ay aw ard reasonable attorney feestotheprevailing party.'' 35U.S.C.j 285. Astotherequisiteprevailingpartystatus,the FederalCircuithasconcluded: (Tlhat as a matterofpatentlaw,the dismissalwith prejudice,based on the covenant and granted pursuant to the district court's discretion under Rule 41(a)(2), has the necessary judicial imprimatur to constitute a judicially sanctioned change in the legalrelationship of the parties, such that the district courtproperlycouldentertain()feeclaimsunder35U.S.C.j285. HighwcyEqlf1 / Co.v.FFCO,ff2,469F.3d 1027,1035(Fed.Cir.2006).5 . Turning nextto the Ssexceptional''requirem ent,the term Ssexceptional''is notdefined by statute. Untilrecently,FederalCircuitcase law provided,thatan ûdexceptional''case required a clear and convincing showing of ldm aterial inappropriate conduct''or an action Gtbrought in subjective bad faith''thatwas also Ssobjectively baseless.'' Brooks Furniture Mfg.,Inc.v. DutailierInt' l.Inc.,393 F.3d 1378,128l(Fed.Cir.2005). However,in 20l4,the Supreme Court rejected Brookv finding the ttexceptional'' standards to be Ssunduly rigid'' and im perm issibly encumbering ofthe statutory grantofdiscretion to districtcourts. Octane Fitness, LLC v.ICON Hea1th drFitness,Inc.,134 S.Ct.1749,l755 (2014). The OctaneFitness court announced a new and m ore lenientstandard fordeterm ining when a patent case is exceptional: i$(A)n Sexceptional'caseissimplyonethatstandsoutfrom otherswithrespecttothesubstantive strength ofa party'slitigating position (considering both the governing law and the factsofthe 5FederalCircuitlaw controlsthe issue ofawarding attorney'sfeesin patentinfringementcasespursuant to 9 285. SpecialDevices,Inc.v.OEA,JHc.,269 F.3d 1340,1343 (Fed.Cir.2001)(ççrAlwarding of attorneyfeespursuantto35U.S.C.j285isanissueuniquetopatentlaw andthereforesubjecttoFederal Circuitlaw.''). Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 5 of 15 case)ortheunreasonablemannerinwhichthecasewaslitigated.''Id atl756.OctaneFitness also replaced the ûsclear and convincing'' evidence standard, with a Sspreponderance of the evidence''standard. 1d.at l758. Now,courtsm ay detennine ifa case isexceptionalddin the case-by-case exercise oftheir discretion,considering the totality of the circum stances,'' 1d. at 1756. There is no precise or exactform ula fordeterm ining w hat is or is notexceptional,but instead a districtcourtshould exerciseequitablediscretion.1d.(citingFogerty v.Fantasy,Inc.,5l0U.S.517,534 (1994)). In Fogerty the Suprem e Courtinterpreted a sim ilarly worded attorney'sfee provision in the Copyright A ct and agreed that district courts could consider a tçnonexclusive'' Iist of Eûfactors,''including ûtfrivolousness,motivation,objective unreasonableness''and the need to advance considerationsofcompensation and deterrence. Fogerty,510 U .S.at 535,n.19. On the same day the Octane Fitness decision was released, the Suprem e Court also decided HighmarkInc.v.Allcare Health M gmt.Sys.,Inc., 134 S.Ct.l744 (2014). Highmark, changed the standard of review forj 285 fee determinationsto çkabuse ofdiscretion''from its previousstandard ofde novo. The Suprem e Courtreasoned thatwhile Ssquestionsof law m ay in somecasesberelevanttothej285 inquiry,thatinquiry generallyis,atheart,ddrooted in factual determinations.''Id at1749 (internalcitationsomitted). Im portantly,underSupreme Courtprecedent,a districtcourtm ay award fees even ifthe losing party's positon wasobjectively reasonable if other considerations so warrant. See Kirtsaeng v.John Wiley ttrSons,lnc,l36 S.Ct.1979,1988 (2016). Thebroad range ofddother considerations'' include, but are not Iim ited to, those fadors listed in Fogerty, litigation m isconduct, deterrence of repeated instances of infringem ent or overaggressive assertions of infringement.Id atl989.Thoughitistrueobjectivereasonablenesscarriessignificantweight, Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 6 of 15 thecourtmustview aIlcircumstancesand also considerthe ikobjectivesofthe relevantAct'' when determ ining iffeesarew arranted.1d. B. Defendantis the Prevailing Party Though neither party addressed whether Defendant is a prevailing party,Defendantso qualifies. Plaintifffiled a covenantnotto sue accom panied by a m ove to voluntarily dism iss its claims with prejudice. The Court'sOrderofdismissalwith prejudice created $$ajudiciallysanctioned change''in the parties'legalrelationship qualifying Defendantasthe prevailing party. SeeHighway Equl p.Co.,469 F.3d at1035-36. C. ThisCase isExceptional PlaintW sReasonsWhythisCaseBecameGN//WorthPursuing''AreUnavailing. Atfirstblush,thiscase doesnotappearexceptional. lndeed,a patentholderhasa rightto protectitsvalid patents. In determ ining whetherthe case is exceptional,Octane Fitness instructs the courtto look to the substantive strength ofthe parties'litigating positon and the m anner in which the case was Iitigated. Traditionally, ifa party has a valid claim to protect its patent,the substantive strength ofits position w illw eigh againsttinding the case exceptional. In thiscase, the substantive strength of either parties' Iitigating position w as not fully meted out due to Plaintiff s early filing of a covenant notto sue accom panied by a requestfor dism issal. The Courttherefore focuseson the m annerin which the case was litigated to m ake its determ ination. In this regard,the Court finds unreasonable the m anner of Plaintiffs Iitigation as m easured againstPlaintiffspattern and practice,asdiscussed m ore fully in the nextsection. At the core of Plaintiffs infringem ent allegations is Defendant's alleged patent infringem ent by using dishipm ent Tracking A lerts'' directing its customers to Defendant's shippers(e.g.UPS,FedEx,and USPS)packagingtracking software.SeeCompl.,DE l,! 11. In response to Defendant'sattorney'sfee m otion,Plaintiffarguesthatthe unlicensed shippersused Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 7 of 15 by Defendant utilized tracking technology that infringed upon Plaintiff's patents. However, Plaintiffknew the identity ofDefendant's five shippersbecause they were Iisted on Defendant's website. (DE 44,p.5). Thispointisuncontested. But,Plaintiffstatesitsdecision to suerested on the factthatD efendantiswas underno obligation''to listitsshippers and Defendantm ay have other shippersthatwere notlisted on the website which were not licensed to use the patents. In Plaintiff'sown w ords: ddDuring the parties' cooperation with the Court's assistance (Defendantl identified the five carriers that they used for shipm ent of products,aII five of which are listed on (Defendant'slwebsitenotwithstanding thatitwasunderno obligationtoIistanyorallofthecarriersontheirwebsite.gplaintiffl,recognizing that three ofthe carriers were fully Iicensed and a fourth was partially licensed, and relying on (Defendant'sl representation thatthere were no othercarriers, m ade a buslness decision thatthe case wasnotworth pursuing.'' (1d.). This explanation is flawed. Plaintiff adm its that a1Ifive of Defendant's shippers w ere listed on the website so it was aw are and içrecognized''prior to bringing the action that:three shipperswere licensed (UPS,FedEx,third unnamed);the forth shipper,the United StatesPost Office(:$USPS''),waspartially licensed;and thefifth (unidentified)shipperwasunlicensed. As to the Iicensed shippers,Plaintiffhasno infringem entclaim so that leaves potentialclaim s only as to the partially Iicensed USPS, and the unlicensed shipper. Arm ed with that pre-suit know ledge, Plaintiff decided to file suit. However, aûer the initial Court-ordered discovery where Defendantdisclosed the same five shippers,the case inexplicably becam e no longerworth Pursuing.6 This is so even though Plaintiffwas ataIltim es aw are thatthe U SPS was only a partial Stlicensee'' and did not have a license w ith respect to the $207 patent. Such know ledge by 6 Theexplanation is furtherflawed asevidenced by the factthatPlaintiffsComplaintisdevoid ofany allegationsregarding infringementasitrelatesto Defendant'sshippers. Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 8 of 15 Plaintiff, Ieads this Court to conclude that Plaintiff never intended to litigate to the m erits regarding any shipm entsthatDefendantm ay have sentusing USPS orany shipm entnotifications Defendantm ay have sentto its custom ers. Nothing revealed in the initialdiscovery could bear on the post-discovery decision thatthe case was notw orth pursuing asto the U SPS shipm entsor notifications. It is more likely,that from the inception,Plaintiff never intended to Iitigate its patentinfringem entrightsasthey relate to Defendant'suseofthe U SPS to ship its products. Asto the tifth unlicensed shipper,again,Plaintiffwasfully aw arepre-suitthatDefendant used this unlicensed shipper. Nothing in the initialdiscovery changed this fact. IfPlaintifrs m otivation was to protect is patents,it would have continued its quest. Indeed,itappears that Plaintiff broughtthis case merely to elicita quick setllem ent from Defendant on questionable patents.1 Thisw eighsin favorofGnding this case exceptional. ThePre-suitDemandLetter(DE 39-1)isIndicativeof Plaintff'sNuisance Value Settlem entM otivation. The dsmotivation''factorannounced in Octane Fitness also favors a finding thatthis is an exceptionalcase. Plaintiffs pre-suit dem and Ietter to Defendant is devoid of any discussion regarding the identity ofDefendant'sshippers. (DE 39-1). Yet,Plaintiffstates,the identity of Defendant's shippers was the key factor in its reasoning that the case was notworth pursuing. Further,thedemand Ietterseekspaymentofa$45,000discountedçdlicensefee.''(DE 39-1,pg.2, 15) (quotations in original). The $45,000.00 Sslicense fee''is indicative ofa Ssnuisance value settlem ent.'' Costs and fees in patent infringem ent cases routinely run in the six and seven 7 Regarding the questionable nature of Plaintiffs patentss justthi s week,a Califomia DistrictCourt issued an opinion containing an in-depth analysisofPlaintiffsfourpatentsatissue here and concluded thatllallofthe asserted claims ...are drawn to patent-ineligible abstract ideas''and that such claims lacked çtinventive concept sufticient to transfer the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.'' Shipping tjrTransit,LLC v.HallEnter.Inc.,CaseNo.16-06535-AG-AFM (C.D.Cal.Jul.5,2017)(filed as supplementalauthority at DE 51). The California courtfound Plaintiff's position in thatcase Siobjectivelyunreasonable''inlightofapplicableprecedentasasigniticantfactorweighingin favorofan llexceptional''Gnding underthePatentAct.1d. Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 9 of 15 figures.ThefeessoughtbyDefendantinthiscasewhichwasdismissedjustoverthreemonths aheritwasfirstfiled are in excessof$36,000.00. Thatamountrepresentsa mere fraction of what itwould costto defend thiscase to the m erits. See Summ itData Sys.,LLC v.EM C Corp., 2014 W L 4955689,at*4 (D.Del.Sept.25,2014),aft'd sub nom.SummitData Sys.LLC v . NetApp Inc.,620 F.App'x 955 (Fed.Cir.2015)(finding plaintiff's practice ofextracting settlem ents worth a fraction of w hat the case w ould cost to Iitigate supports a finding of exceptionality.) Even when an exceptionalcase finding w as setatthe pçz-octane Fitness high barofbad faith,the FederalCircuitfound thatisnuisance value setllem ents''may be used to determ ine ifa case is exceptional. See Eon-NetLP v. FlagstarBancorp,653 F.2d 13l4, 1327-22 (Ftd.Cir. 20l1). In Eon-Net, plaintiff and its related entities had filed dsover 100 lawsuits''alleging infringem entagainsta diverse group ofdefendants and each com plaintw asfollow ed i'by a quick settlem ent at a price far Iow er than the cost of litigation, a dem and which most defendants apparently had agreed.'' Id.at l328. It is this Court's view that Plaintiff's m otivation was to extracta nuisance settlem enton the theory thatDefendantw ould ratherpay a çtlicense fee''than besubjectedto whatPlaintiffdescribedwouldbean ttaggressivelylitigatedpatentinfringement lawsuit.'' See DE 39-1,pg.12. iii. Plaintlff'sPattern andPracticeSupportsan ExceptionalCase Finding Based on D eterrence. The Ssdeterrence''factor announced in Octane Fitness likewise weighs in favor of an exceptional case finding. Plaintiff has a dem onstrated pattern and practice of filing and then quickly dism issing patent infringem ent cases in this district. Since 2010, Plaintiff and its predecessorA rrivalstar,S.A.have filed over325 cases in this districtalone. This Courtcould notfind one case that where the substantive issue of patent validity was reached. M any cases 9 Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 10 of 15 were voluntarily dism issed w ithin months of tiling. M any others were dism issed by party stipulation after a defendant challenged the alleged infringem ent by asserting counter-claim s challenging thevalidity ofthe patents. Perhapsm osttelling,w hen the validity ofthe patentsw as challenged,Plaintiffroutinely and promptly filed a covenantnotto sue to end any inquiry. Justso in this case. In thisCourt's view,a plaintiffthatgenuinely seeksto invoke its protection rights under the Patent Actwould eagerly litigate the validity issue,atleastonce,so a decision on the m eritswould em erge. That has not occurred in any of the hundreds of cases that Plaintifffiled. The boilerplate nature of Plaintiff'sCom plaint,the absence ofa requestforthe identity ofDefendant'sshippersin the presuitdem and Ietter,the unconvincing argum entthatthe case becam e ddnotw orth pursuing''aûer initialdiscovery,and the hundreds ofsubstantially sim ilar ifnotidentical lawsuits filed in this district,suggests thatPlaintiff's strategy is predatory and aim ed atreaping financialadvantage from defendants who are unw illing or unable to engage in the expense ofpatentlitigation. The need ivto advance considerations of...deterrence''ofthis type of litigation behavior isevident and weighs in favorofan exceptionalcase finding. See Octane Fitness,l34 S.Ct.at l756 n.6 (quoting Fogert y 510 U.S.at534 n.19)). ,Jeealso Shipping & Transit,LLC v.HallEnter.Inc., CaseNo.16-06535-AG-AFM (C.D.Cal.Jul.5,2017)(filed assupplementalauthorityatDE 51) (finding iiacompelling need fordeterrenceandtodiscourageexploitative litigation''bythissame Plaintiffaûerfinding a dsclearpattern ofserialfilingsw ith the goalofobtaining quick setllements ata price Iower than the cost of litigation and the intent to Iitigate even when Plaintiff should haverealized ithadaweak Iitigation position').ThetotalityofthecircumstancesIead theCourt to concludethatthis isan ddexceptionalcase''underthe PatentAct. 10 Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 11 of 15 D. A ttorney,sFees8 The Courtturns nextto the am ountoffeesto award. To m ake thisdeterm ination,courts calculatetheSslodestar''bymultiplyingthenumberofhours(temperedbybillingjudgment)spent in the Iegalwork on the case by the reasonable m arket rate in the localarea. Ddlard v.Cit yof Greensboro,l13F.3d 1347(11thCir.2000).Thecourtmaythenadjustthelodestarfstoaccount for other considerations thathave not yetfigured in the com putation, the m ostim portantbeing the relation oftheresultsobtained to the work done.'' Id Here, based on its review of D efendant's attorney's fee request, the Court finds the requestrtasonable. As to the firstddlodestar''factor,a çsreasonable hourly rate is the prevailing m arket rate in the relevant legal com m unity for sim ilar services by Iawyers of reasonable com parable skills,experience and reputation.'' Duckworth v Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1396 . (1lthCir.l996)(quotingNorman v.Hous.Auth.ofC// .pofMontgomery,836 F.2d 1292,l299 (l1thCir.l988)).Thedsrelevantmarket''isddtheplacewherethecaseisfiled.''ACLU v.Ga.of Barnes,l68F.3d423,437(11thCir.1999). Thefeeapplicantisbearstheburden ofproducing satisfactory evidence thatthe requested rate is in linew ith prevailing m arketrates.'' foranger v. Stierheim,10F.3d 776,781(11thCir.l994).Satisfactoryevidenceddataminimum ismorethan the affidavitofthe attorney perform ing the work . . . (and)mustspeak to ratesactuallybilledand paid in sim ilarlawsuits.'' Norman,836 F.2d at 1299. A courtmay tirely on its ow n expertise''in 8 TheCourtnotesDefendant'sargumentthatPlaintiffwaiveditsrighttoobjecttoanawardoffeesbynot complying with LocalRule 7.3(b)'s conferralobligations before a motion forattorney's fees isfiled. I zmm 376rtantly,these obligationsare mandatory. See Club M adonna, Inc.v.CitvofM iamiBeach,No.13z-civ-lwenard/fioodman,2015 WL 5559894,at*9(S.D.Fla.Sept.22,2015)(thetffailuretocomply with LocalRule7.3 isgroundsforgranting the (moving parties)fees,ifotherwise remsonable''),appeal dismissed,2016 W L 723881 (1lth Cir.Feb.23,2016). Here,itisuncontested thatPlaintiffdid not . complywithLocalRule7.3(b).AndwhilethereisnoindicationthatPlaintiffwastlippantinitsfailureto com ply,the Courttakes the opportunity to remind the parties of the rule's purpose in conserving resourcesforalIconcerned. Because the Courtisobligated to adjudgethe reasonablenessofthe fee request,itw illdoso. Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 12 of 15 determ ining a reasonable hourly rate. 1d.at 1304. To recover non-localrates for an out-ofm arket attorney requires the fee applicantto show 6da lack of attorneys practicing in that place who arewilling and abletohandle''theclaims.ACLV l68F.3dat437. Defendantseeksthe follow ing hourly rates: *1* $350.00 perhourforattorney Geoffrey M .Cahcn ofthe W estPalm Beach law tirm ofCahen Law who haspracticed Iaw forover10 years(33.75 hours) 4* $350.00 per hour for attorney Jarod Bona,a California-based attorney who has practiced law forover15years(19.8 hours- discountedfrom regularrateof$575.00) *:* $l70.00 per hour for attorney Aaron Gott, a California-based attorney who has practiced law for3years(59.4 hours-discounted from regularrateof$270.00) 4* $170.00 perhourforattorney M atthew Riley,an attorney who haspracticed Iaw for over3years(31.9hours) 4. $170.00perhourforattorney LuisBlanquezan attorneywith 10yearsofexjerience in European Law and whost admission to the California barremains pendlng (2.5 hours) %* $135.00/$90.00 perhourforlegalassistantGabrielaHamilton,who hasover16 years ofexperience(4.9hoursat$135.00/11.05 at$90.00) To discern ifa fee isreasonable ornot,the Courtûsis itselfan experton the question and m ay consider itsown knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and properfees and m ay form an independentjudgmenteitherwithorwithouttheaidofwitnessesastovalue.''Norman v.Hous.Auth.of C//y ofMontgomerlh 836F.2d 1292,1303(11thCir.1988). Drawingon its own expertise,the Court finds the above requested hourly rates reasonable com pared to the billing rates routinely charged in the Southern District ofFlorida. The rates for the California firm,Bona Law Firm ,PC,are sim ilarorbelow the ratesoflocalattorneys. M oreover,the Court notes thatthe 19.8 hours billed by M r.Bona,is significantly Iowerthan those of his associate attorneyswho performed the bulk ofthework. The associateattorney rateof$170.00 isin line w ith whatthis Courthaspreviously aw arded forassociatesw ith three yearsofexperience. n e 12 Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 13 of 15 $135 rate for 4.7 hours of legalassistant Gabriela Ham ilton is a bit high for this district, however,the reduced rate of $90.00 for 11.05 hours is below the $125 thisCourthas found reasonable for Iegal assistants w ith sim ilar experience. On balance, the rates for Gabriela Ham ilton are reasonable. The second tûlodestar''factorconsidered is the reasonable hours expended. The court exercises its discretion in determ ining what constitutes reasonablt hours. Gray v.Lockheed AeronauticalSys.Co.,125 F.3d 1387 (11th Cir.1997). ltisappropriate to exclude excessive, redundant,and unnecessary hours;hours w hich are inadequately docum ented;and hours which would be unreasonable foran attorney to billthe client or opposing counselin the exercise of goodbillingjudgment.SeeDuckworth,97F.3d at1397;Norman,836F.2dat1301.Here,the reasonableness ofthe hourly ratesand the num berofhours expended is supported by the expert affidavit of C.Corey M auro,Esq. (DE 39-2). The Court agrees with this reasonableness assessmentand computesthelodestarforatotalofawardof$36,317.50 asfollows: A ttornevs/staff H ourlv Rate H ours Total Geoffre M .Cahen,Es . $350.00 33,75 $1l,812.50 Jarod Bona,Es . $350.00 19.8 $6,930.00 AaronGot't,Es . $170.00 59.4 $10,098.00 M atthew Rile ,Es . $170.00 31.9 $5,423.00 LuisBlan uez,Es . $170.00 2.5 $425.00 Gabriela Ham ilton $90.00 l1.05 $994.50 GabrielaHam ilton $135.00 4.7 $634.50 163.1 $36,317.50 TotalFees Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 14 of 15 Aw ard of ReasonableFee TheCourthascarefully reviewed the attorney invoicessubmitted by Defendant(see DE 39-3 andDE 39-4),theDeclaration ofC.Cory M auraastoAttorneys'FeesandCosts(DE 39-2) and finds that they retlect reasonable billing rates and hours reasonably expended on the litigation. There is a isstrong presum ption thatthe lodestar is the reasonable sum the attorneys deserve.''Bivinsv.Wrap ItUp,Inc,548F.3d l348,1350(11thCir.2008);seealsoNorman,36 F.2d at l302. Under the totality of the circum stances, the Court finds this exceptionalcase warrants an award ofattorney'sfeesto Defendantunder35 U.S.C.j 285. The Courtthus recommendsthatPlaintiffbeorderedtopay $36,317.50. F. A ttorney'sFeesExpert Defendantalso seeksto recover$1,000 infeesforitsattorney'sfeesexpert,Cory M aura, Esq. kisection 35 U.S.C.j 285 only authorizesa courtto award reasonable attorney feesnot expertwitnessfees.''SeeAdvanced GroundInfo.Sys.,Inc.v.L# 360,Inc.,No.14-C1v-80651M iddlebrooks,2015W L 11401854,at*2(S.D.Fla.Dec.1,2015),af d,No.2016-1332,2017 W L 1046223 (Fed.Cir.M ar.20,20l7). Though the award ofexpenses is properly within the scope ofj 285,fees forexperts are considered a form ofa sanction only allowable ifthere is fraudonthecourtorabuseofthejudicialprocess.SeeCent.SoyaCo.,lnc.v.Geo.-d.Hormel&. Co.,723 F.2d l573,1578(Fed.Cir.1983);accord Ftz#e#J Chem.Indus.,L/tf v.MylanLabs., Inc.,549F.3d 1381,l391(Fed.Cir.2008);Amstedlndus.v.BuckeyeSteelCastingsCo.,23F.3d 374, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Under the circumstances present here, the Court declines to recomm end thatDefendantbe awarded itsrequested expertw itness fees. Case 9:16-cv-80980-RLR Document 52 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2017 Page 15 of 15 CONCLUSION AND RECOM M ENDATION The Courtfinds thatDefendant.as the prevailing party,is entitled to recover its attorney's fees forthe Iegalwork perform ed in defense ofthis patent infringem ent law suit. The Courtis obligated and has ensured thatsuch compensation isanchored in reasonableness. G uided by the applicable legalstandards,the CourtR ECOM M EN DS that: Defendant'sM otion forAttorney'sFees(DE 39)beGRANTED IN PART Ae DENIED IN PA RT; Defendantbeawarded$36,317.50inattorney'sfeeswithpost-judgmentstatutory interesttoaccrueinaccordancewith28U.S.C.j1961. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT A partyshallserveandfilewrittenobjections,ifany,tothisReportandRecommendation with U.S.DistrictJudge Robin L.Rosenberg,w ithin 14 daysafterbeing served w ith a copy. See 28 U.S.C.j636(b)(l)(C). Failureto file timely objectionsmay limitthe scope ofappellate review of factual findings contained herein. See U S.v. Warren,687 F.2d 347,348 (1lth Cir.l982),cerf.denied,460U.S.1087(1983). DO NE AND R EC OM M END ED in Cham btrs at W tstPalm Beach,Florida,this 10th day ofJuly,20l7. Vv u J- DAVE LEE BM N NON U .S.M AGISTRATE JUDG E