MOERANE
COMMISSION

INVESTIGATING POLITICAL KILLINGS IN KZN

 

REPORT OF THE
MOERANE COMMISSION
OF ENQUIRY INTO THE

UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE
MURDER OF POLITICIANS
IN KWAZULU-NATAL

 

REPORT OF THE MOERANE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE MURDER OF POLITICIANS IN KWAZULUNATAL

Contents
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 2
ANALYSIS OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE ............................................................................................... 7
WITNESSES ............................................................................................................................................ 10
THE EVIDENCE ....................................................................................................................................... 18
FINDINGS............................................................................................................................................. 412
RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 417
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 424

1 Page

 INTRODUCTION
1.

“Something is rotten in the State of Denmark.”1

2.

Had Shakespeare lived in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) between the
years 2011 and today, he might have had a modern-day
Marcellus utter those words – a theme to which we shall
return. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the
apparently never-ending murder of politicians in KZN is a
symptom of a serious pathology in the Province’s body
politic.

3.

On 28 October 2016 the Premier of the Province of KwaZuluNatal,

the

Honourable

TW

Mchunu,

established

a

Commission of Enquiry into the underlying causes of the
murder and attempted murder of politicians in KwaZuluNatal, (KZN), in terms of section 127(2) of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (“the Constitution”), read
with section 2(1) of the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act, 3
of 1999, (“the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act”).

4.

The establishment of the Commission was made known by
the publication of Proclamation 1 of 2016 in Provincial
Gazette 1748 of 28 October 2016.

1

William Shakespeare: The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark (Act 1. Scene IV).

2 Page

 5.

The Commission was appointed with the terms of reference,
generally, to investigate and report on the underlying
causes of the murder of politicians in KZN with reference
to:

5.1 the number, nature and locality of incidents of
murder and attempted murder involving politicians,
both as victims and suspects, in the Province from
2011;
5.2 indications whether the incidents are related to
political, ethnic, tribal, social or criminal factors or
any other internal or external influences or factors
which may be considered relevant;
5.3 the

outcome

of

any

police

investigation

and

prosecution of the incidents, including the number of
successful prosecutions, trials and convictions of the
perpetrators;
5.4 the perceptions of the public, political parties,
community structures and members of the relevant
communities in respect of the underlying causes of
the incidents of murder and attempted murder
involving politicians, both as victims and suspects,
and the effectiveness of the policing thereof by the
police service in the Province.

3 Page

 6.

The Commission was required to make recommendations:
6.1 to address the underlying causes of the murder and
attempted murder of politicians in KZN;
6.2 in respect of the prevention of future incidents of
murder and attempted murder involving politicians,
both as victims and suspects and ensuring the
successful investigation and prosecution of the
perpetrators;
6.3 on any other matter of whatsoever nature that the
Commission deems necessary or appropriate.

7.

The provisions of the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act No 3 of
1999 were made applicable to the Commission, provided that
the Commission was required to produce and submit its final
report containing a summary of the evidence, its findings and
recommendations no later than 12 months after 28 October
2016.

8.

By reason of the fact that there were unavoidable delays in the
commencement of the functioning of the Commission, its term
was extended by five (5) months to 27 March 2018 by
Proclamation 1 of 2017 published in Provincial Gazette 1891 of
27 October 2017.

4 Page

 9.

The duration of the Commission was further extended by
Proclamations 2 and 3 of 2018 to the end of April and the end
of May, respectively.

10. In terms of section 2(1)(e) of the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions
Act, Advocate MTK Moerane SC was appointed Chairperson of
the Commission, whilst Advocate V Gounden and Prof C
Potgieter were appointed as additional Commissioners. Mr S
Mdledle was appointed Secretary to the Commission in terms
of section 2(1)(d) of the said Act.

11. In terms of the Regulations applicable to the Commission, the
Chairperson designated Advocates B Manyathi and AM
Ngqanda of the Durban Bar as Evidence Leaders and Retired
Brigadier C Marion as Investigator. The said persons were duly
appointed as such.

12. The appointment of the Commission arose out of concern by
the Executive Council of the Province of KZN over politically
related killings which had become prevalent in KZN since 2011
and

had

escalated

rapidly

during

2016

with

adverse

consequences for governance in the Province.

13. The situation was of great concern not only to the Provincial
Government, but also to political parties in the Province of

5 Page

 KwaZulu-Natal, who were of the view that the matter required
urgent intervention.

14. Regrettably, there does not seem to be any reduction in the rate
of the murder of politicians in KZN. There is still something
rotten in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal.

15. Long after the establishment of the Commission, there was
criticism from certain quarters about the necessity of
establishing a Commission of Enquiry into the murder of
politicians as a group or class of persons. It was argued that
politicians were not so special as to warrant the time, energy
and resources devoted to the investigation of only their
murders. It was also contended that the Commission would
amount to nothing more than a mere “story telling” exercise.
However, some of these critics actually came before the
Commission and gave relevant and valuable evidence.

16. It is generally accepted that it is the responsibility of the South
African Police Service (“SAPS”) to prevent, combat and
investigate crime in terms of section 205 of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the Provincial Government is responsible
for research, analysis and the development of safety models in
terms of the Civilian Secretariat of Police Service Act 2 of 2011.
The

6 Page

Province

is

accordingly

mandated

to

analyse

the

 underlying causes of murder, in general, and the murder of
politicians in KZN, in particular, and develop measures to
address such causes.

17. In any event, the Premier is empowered by section 127(2)(e) of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, read
with section 2 of the KwaZulu-Natal Commissions Act, to
appoint

a

Commission

of

Enquiry.

Furthermore,

the

establishment of the Commission of Enquiry has not been the
subject of a legal challenge.

ANALYSIS OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE

18. At the outset it is deemed appropriate to set out our
understanding of the import of the Terms of Reference.

19. As stated above, the Commission is required to investigate and
report on the underlying causes of the murder and attempted
murder of politicians in KwaZulu-Natal ….

20. The question that immediately arises as to who is a “politician”
within the contemplation of the Terms of Reference. The South
Africa Pocket Oxford Dictionary defines “politician” as “a person
who is involved in politics as a job, either as a holder of or a
candidate for an elected office”. Other dictionaries define the
7 Page

 word as “a person who is professionally involved in politics,
especially as a holder of an elected office”, “representative”,
“candidate”, “official”, “legislator”, “office-bearer”, “statesman”,
“stateswoman”, “officer”, “policymaker”, “lawmaker”, “elected
official”.

21. It is clear from the above dictionary definitions that the word
“politician” has a wide connotation encompassing various
persons who are involved in the political process as elected
representatives

or

officials,

candidates,

office

bearers,

lawmakers or legislators, officers or officials etc. This was also
the

connotation

that

the

Evidence Leaders

urged

the

Commission to adopt.

22. We have accordingly adopted this broad definition of “politician”
to include elected councillors, candidates in local government
elections, municipal officials and officers, such as, Municipal
Managers, Mayors and Deputy Mayors, members of the
Executive Committee of municipalities, members and office
bearers of political organisations.

23.

Furthermore, the Terms of Reference are wide enough to
permit the Commission to investigate the murder and
attempted murder of politicians, as defined, “with reference
to indications whether the incidents are related to political,

8 Page

 ethnic, tribal, social or criminal factors or any other internal or
external influences or factors which may be considered
relevant.”

24.

The Commission was acutely aware of the fact that all
murders and attempted murders are, by definition, crimes
or criminal acts. However, we conceived our mandate as that
of identifying those killings or attempted killings that were
perpetrated with a political motive or purpose or were
politically related. The known or reasonably inferred facts
attending such crimes were important in determining
whether or not the killings were committed with a political
motive.

25.

In what follows, we deal with and analyse what we consider
the murder and attempted murder of politicians that fall
within our Terms of Reference.

METHODOLOGY

26.

For obvious reasons, related to time and resources, it was
impossible to investigate the murder or attempted murder of

9 Page

 each and every politician killed in KwaZulu-Natal over the
period 2011 to date. We also deemed it unnecessary to do
so. We believe that the number of persons that were
interviewed by the Investigator and Evidence Leaders and
those

that

were called

to

give

evidence

before

the

Commission provide a sufficient and representative sample
to

enable

us

to

make

credible

findings

and

recommendations.

WITNESSES

27.

The Commission employed the above-mentioned Brigadier
Marion as Investigator and the two above-named advocates
as Evidence Leaders to find and consult with witnesses.

28.

The Evidence Leaders and the Investigator sought and found
witnesses and evidence from:

28.1

the KZN SAPS database, which compiled political
violence cases and which indicated politicians that
were murdered or in respect of which attempts were
made to murder them;

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 28.2

a

data

bank

of political

murders/murders

of

politicians provided by a political violence monitor in
the Province;

28.3

various political parties, professional organisations
and civil society organisations who were invited to
provide testimony on their understanding of the
underlying causes of the killing of politicians in KZN
(see appendix …. for organisations who were invited
to testify and those who testified);

28.4

academics and violence monitors who were invited to
testify based on their scholarly and/or advocacy work
in the area; and

28.5

individuals

who

contacted

the

Commission

Secretariat indicating that they had information and
strong opinions on the underlying causes of the
killing of politicians.

11   P a g e

 29.

Procedure for Final Selection of Witnesses.

29.1

The Investigator and the Evidence Leaders selected
cases using police dockets from the SAPS database,
which represented the various geographical areas
where killings of specific politicians had taken place.
They also ensured that the cases represented the
various political parties that have a presence in KZN.

29.2

The family members of the deceased were contacted
by the Evidence Leaders on the contact numbers that
were provided in the police dockets, and meetings
were scheduled with them.

29.3

In instances where the contact numbers were no
longer in use or had changed, the Evidence Leaders
requested the Investigator to trace the family
members and obtain their current contact numbers.

29.4

In the latter instances, the Investigator had an initial
meeting or contact with the family members.

29.5

The Investigator then provided the Evidence Leaders
with a report based on the interview with the family
members.

12   P a g e

 29.6

The Evidence Leaders then contacted the family
members and scheduled meetings with them.

29.7

In all instances, the Evidence Leaders interviewed
the family members.

29.8

In some instances, the family members referred the
Evidence Leaders to the friends or comrades of the
deceased, who were also interviewed.

29.9

Where the Evidence Leaders were in agreement that
the deceased was a politician in the broad sense and
that the underlying context or motive was political,
they invited the family members, friends or comrades
to testify before the Commission.

29.10 The potential witnesses were briefed on the risks
attendant on testifying and were also informed of the
protection that would be offered to them should they
testify.

29.11 All witnesses were provided with copies of the Terms
of Reference, which were also explained to them in
the consultations.

13   P a g e

 29.12 All witnesses who testified gave oral consent to do so.

29.13 If transportation was requested to the venue where
the

public

hearings

were

taking

place,

the

Investigator transported some of the witnesses to the
venue and back to their residences.

29.14 In other instances, the Secretariat asked the office of
the Premier’s travel agent to make the necessary
travel and accommodation arrangements.

30.

Violence Monitor Database
The data bank which the violence monitor Ms Mary De Haas
had provided as killings of politicians was consulted. The
same procedure was followed as set out in paragraph 29,
above, in the selection from the SAPS database.

31.

Organisations
After the organisation had responded that they were willing
to testify the same process was followed as set out in
paragraph 29, above. Organisations made the decision as to
who would testify and the number of persons in their
delegation. The

Evidence

Leaders consulted with all

members of the delegation prior to them testifying. All

14   P a g e

 organisations were provided with the Terms of Reference of
the Commission.

32.

Academics and Professionals
After they were contacted and they indicated a willingness to
testify the Evidence Leaders met with academics and other
professionals. They were all provided with the Terms of
Reference of the Commission.

33.

Site visit to Glebelands
To

gain

first

hand

evidence

of

the

context,

the

Commissioners and the Evidence Leaders, the Investigator,
the Secretariat and the Commission support staff visited the
Glebelands hostel on 21 July 2017.

34.

Public Hearings
34.1

All witnesses took the oath or made an affirmation.

34.2

The Evidence Leaders led the questioning.

34.3

Questions were informed by the Terms of Reference
of the Commission.

15   P a g e

 34.4

Representatives of the SAPS were present at the
hearings and were given an opportunity to pose
questions to the witnesses.

(5)

The Commissioners also put questions to the
witnesses.

(6)

All public hearings were recorded and transcribed
verbatim.

(7)

The verbatim recordings, the closing arguments of
the

lead

advocates

and

the

notes

of

the

Commissioners were used as primary data for the
making and analysis of the findings.

35.

Final Sample
The final sample of witnesses who testified was therefore
determined using a qualitative methodology which included
a purposive targeted approach to ensure representivity and
was sensitive to the geographical spread of where the killings
took place.

36.

In addition, the purposive targeted approach ensured
representivity of the various political parties.

16   P a g e

 37.

The final number of witnesses who testified was 63.

Limitations of the Methodology

38.

The major limitation to the methodology is that some
witnesses were not willing to testify for a number of reasons,
including fear of repercussions and the fact that some were
still in mourning.

39.

The Institute of Security Studies was invited to give evidence,
but after consideration declined.

40.

Amnesty International offered to make a presentation to the
Commission, but on reflection, decided not to.

41.

Although a representative of the eThekwini Municipality
attended the inspection-in-loco at the Glebelands Hostel on
21 July 2017, and notwithstanding a written invitation, the
said Municipality did not volunteer any witness to testify on
its behalf. In our opinion, as the largest municipality in KZN
that controls a budget of more than 40 Billion Rands, their
testimony would have been material and would have
contributed to the findings in the report.

17   P a g e

 42.

Time and resource constraints were a challenge, but we are
of the opinion that this final Report provides valid and
reliable finding and recommendations that deal adequately
with the matters that had to be investigated according to the
Terms of Reference of the Commission.

THE EVIDENCE

43.

We propose to set out a summary of the evidence presented
to the Commission, both orally and in written form as
witness statements. The purpose of the summary is to
provide an overview of the issues traversed by the respective
witnesses. While it is intended to capture the basis of our
findings and recommendations, we came to our conclusions
based on the evidence as a whole. Thus, the evidence on
which

the

Commission

made

its

findings

and

recommendations comprises the oral testimony of the
witnesses as transcribed and the written submissions and
other documentary evidence presented by the witnesses,
which were admitted as numbered exhibits.

44.

We propose starting with the evidence of the families of the
victims, so as to set out the evidential material in respect of
which other witnesses gave their testimony and expressed
their opinions.

18   P a g e

 SIMPHIWE NTOMBELA

45.

(VOL 8).

He testified on 15 June 2017. He is the brother of the late
Vusumuzi Bonginkosi Ntombela (“Vusumuzi”). He was 46
years, married and had four children when he died. He was
a teacher by profession. In early June 2015 he was shot and
killed in the classroom at Luvisi Primary School, where he
was the Deputy Principal, in front of the learners.

46.

The circumstances of the killing were the following. The
would-be hitman approached the Principal of the school
requesting to speak to the deceased. The deceased
responded that he was still busy teaching. Another learner
was sent to him. The deceased then decided that the visitor
should come to him. The visitor then entered the classroom,
shook the deceased’s hand and spoke to him about work. It
appears that the deceased then gave this person some
numbers to phone. The person pretended to be leaving, at
which point the deceased turned to write on the chalk-board.
That is when the hitman fired 3 or 4 times at the deceased.
The bullets struck the deceased and two learners, Elizabeth
Nhleko and Bongumusa Cele. As a result, the deceased and

19   P a g e

 Ms Nhleko died while Mr Cele suffered gunshot injuries but
survived.

47.

The deceased loved his family because when he attended
political meetings in Durban and they finished late, he would
drive back home at Nquthu irrespective of the time and
would sometimes get home at 2h00.

48.

He was very humble and respectful and the people loved him.
He was a person of principles and would not be swayed if
something was against good principles. He was against
corruption and advocated good governance. He had no
enemies except in political circles. One of the speakers at his
memorial service said to be loved by people is something that
no one could take away from him.

49.

At one stage, Amakhosi did not allow people to come to their
areas and talk about the ANC, but Amakhosi instructed their
Izinduna to allow him to canvass and campaign for the ANC
in their areas.

50.

Mr Mdakane, the hitman, pleaded guilty in the High Court.
He was convicted on 22 June 2015 of two counts of murder,
one of attempted murder, unlawful possession of a firearm

20   P a g e

 and unlawful possession of ammunition. He was sentenced
to life imprisonment.

51.

In his guilty plea statement, Mr Mdakane said he was
approached by one Mr Khambule who asked him to kill the
deceased for a fee. Mr Khambule told Mr Mdakane that the
deceased wanted to kill him (Khambule) and so, Mr
Khambule procured Mr Mdakane to have the deceased killed
first. Mr Ntombela disputed the version that was given to Mr
Mdakane by Mr Khambule as being false. In the statement,
Mr Mdakane stated that he was promised a hit fee of
R15,000 plus a job at Ocean Dawn Company as a security
guard.

52.

Subsequent to Mr Mdakane’s sentencing, a statement was
obtained from him as a witness and Mr Khambule was
prosecuted. There was a trial and he was also sentenced to
life imprisonment on 27 March 2017.

53.

Mr Ntombela indicated that he did not know Mr Mdakane
prior to seeing him in court. He knew Mr Khambule by sight
prior to seeing him in court. From the facts in court, Mr
Mdakane was the hitman and had no motive to kill the
deceased. Mr Ntombela was asked whether Mr Khambule

21   P a g e

 would have had a motive of his own to have the deceased
killed.

54.

In reply, Mr Ntombela first gave the following background.
Mr Khambule was born at Sandlwana and he was a security
guard in Johannesburg. He was also a member of an
organisation called Isikebhe, a community group which
fights stock theft. The ANC approached Isikebhe to work
together so that it would convince its members to become
ANC members.

55.

After Isikebhe was brought closer to the ANC, Mr Khambule
joined the ANC and many members of the ANC were
surprised. He was very close to the ANC Regional
Chairperson prior to December 2014. Before joining the
ANC, Mr Khambule had no permanent job and he was
struggling financially. After joining the ANC, people in the
area were surprised to see him driving a Toyota Fortuner. He
alleged that he was mobilising support for the ANC.

56.

The

Ntombela

family

believes

that

Mr

Khambule’s

partnership with the ANC opened doors for him to drive
expensive cars that he would otherwise not afford. According

22   P a g e

 to Mr Ntombela, it was clear that Mr Khambule was sent by
someone who was behind the scenes to organise the hitman.

57.

There was a time when the deceased told Mr Ntombela that
he was side lined by the ANC. He asked the deceased why he
could not go and be active in other ANC branches like
Isandlwana. He replied that it was no longer easy to get into
Isandlwana because there was a new person called
Khambule who was active there and who was “fighting” with
him (Vusumuzi).

58.

Vusumuzi believed that Khambule had been sent by others
to target him. Vusumuzi said that Mr Khambule was not
even in the sub-region leadership but was seen driving cars
and having all the resources to do the work.

59.

Moreover, when Mr Khambule was asked where he got all
the resources from, he used to say that he was sent by the
ANC regional Chairperson. Even the local PR Councillor said
that he had a problem with “this person”, meaning Mr
Khambule because he was fighting with everyone. He was
always armed and was intimidating them to leave their
positions.

23   P a g e

 60.

Mr Khambule was saying that he was working for the ANC
and he was sent to different branches and wards. Other
members of the ANC in those areas were surprised because
when you work for the ANC, you are not employed, but are
doing party work voluntarily.

61.

Vusumuzi was a member of the ANC, a Councillor and
speaker of the Nquthu Municipality. He was previously a
branch Chairperson and held a leadership position in the
sub-region and was also the Deputy Secretary in the region.
At the time of his passing, the Municipality had a coalition
government between the ANC and the NFP.

62.

Mr Ntombela testified that his brother’s murder was a
political assassination. Shortly after being elected as speaker
in 2011, he phoned Vusumuzi to find out how he was coping
with his new deployment. He complained about his
colleagues, especially the Mayor, that she had pressured
them in approving a certain security company contract
without following proper tendering procedures.

63.

His concern was that such irregularities played into the
hands of the opposition. He also felt that it looked like some
of his colleagues were not really concerned about service

24   P a g e

 delivery, but rather more about self-serving benefits for
pushing through the security company contract without
following proper procedures.

64.

During the national elections of 2014, as a senior member of
the ANC who had even sat in the Bambatha region, he
expected to be deployed to campaign for the ANC as it was
usually done. Surprisingly, he found himself being isolated
from ANC activities by both the Nquthu sub-region and the
Bambatha region.

65.

Around September 2014, Vusumuzi called his brother
reporting that he had been called to the ANC Nquthu subregion meeting. There was only one item on the agenda and
the meeting was chaired by the former ANC Regional
Secretary. The Secretary asked Vusumuzi to write a letter of
resignation from his position as Speaker. The reason given
was that at Umvoti Municipality, there were ANC councillors
who had voted with the IFP on a certain motion.

66.

The Secretary told the meeting that Vusumuzi was also going
to follow the same trend as the Umvoti councillors. The
Secretary told him that if he did not resign, he was going to
shoot him dead. As Mr Ntombela could feel the stress on his

25   P a g e

 brother’s voice, he advised him to report the matter to the
police and obtain bodyguards.

67.

Vusumuzi said he did not think that the police could help
him. With regard to bodyguards, he felt that he could not
afford his own and he did not trust the security company
that was contracted by the Municipality as he felt that it was
a rogue security company owned by a certain ex-convict.

68.

Vusumuzi then decided to phone Mr Sihle Zikalala of the
ANC PEC for advice. Mr Zikalala responded by informing the
IEC that no one had the power to recall ANC councillors
without the approval of the PEC and the NEC. From then on,
the relations between Vusumuzi and certain leaders of the
region and sub-region were so tense such that he decided
not to attend sub-region meetings as they were platforms, in
his words, to insult him and those who were close to him.

69.

When Mr Ntombela asked him why his comrades were
treating him that way, he replied that, as Speaker, he was
supposed to approve certain documents relating to tenders.
At times, he found it difficult to approve them because the
Mayor was not following proper procedures.

26   P a g e

 70.

A week before he was assassinated, Vusumuzi called the
witness telling him that the NFP wanted to work with the IFP
in voting the ANC out of the Executive Committee of the
Municipality. He laid much of the blame on the Mayor and
also mentioned someone else in the ANC who was
determined to get rid of the rule book in the governance of
the Municipality.

71.

He said the real reason why the NFP wanted to end the
marriage between it and the ANC was corruption and the
arrogance of the Mayor and also a few ANC councillors who
were “yes men” of the Mayor.

72.

As the Mayor was closer to the ANC Regional Chairperson
and Secretary, the Mayor was using them to fix him up as
he was a stumbling block to the Mayor’s world of riches.
Vusumuzi hated corruption and entered politics to be a
servant of the people.

73.

As to why he did not mobilise the ANC branches after being
isolated and muzzled by the then ANC leadership, he
indicated that it was so difficult because there was a
Khambule who was driving around in a car, hired by the
Mayor of uMzinyathi District.

27   P a g e

Mr Khambule had all the

 resources given to him by the regional leadership to garner
support for them.

74.

The same Khambule was supposedly the bodyguard of the
Mayor. The Ntombela family received information that he
was working for a security company called Ocean Dawn,
which was hired by the Municipality. It is unknown as to
how he became the bodyguard of the Mayor. He was driving
for the Mayor and the community believed that he was the
Mayor’s bodyguard. Ocean Dawn was the same security
company that was awarded a tender without following
proper procedures.

75.

The Bambatha region was due to have a regional conference
in December 2014. Even though Vusumuzi had confided in
his brother that he had had enough of politics, as there were
two ANC factions that were contending for the regional
election, Vusumuzi was approached by one faction. He
agreed to work with them and worked very hard to win over
branches that were already regarded as supporting the
former Regional Chairperson and Secretary.

76.

As days grew closer to the conference, it became apparent to
the former regional Chairperson and Secretary that defeat

28   P a g e

 was imminent. A certain KZN MP was sent to speak to
Vusumuzi with the purpose of uniting the two slates during
the conference. He took the matter to the relevant faction,
but they replied that it was too late and that they regarded
that attempt as a trick up the sleeve of their opposing
faction.

77.

Vusumuzi’s faction won the regional conference elections.
Relations between him and his nemesis got worse. State
witness, Mr Sithole, in the Khambule murder trial stated
that before the actual assassination, there were two previous
attempts to assassinate Vusumuzi that never materialised.
All this information was shared with Mr Sithole by Mr
Khambule. Mr Sithole also told the court that Mr Khambule
had told him that if he failed to get the hitmen, he
(Khambule) would be in trouble as the Mayor had threatened
to poison him.

78.

Somehow the Mayor was desperate to speed up Vusumuzi’s
murder. The family believes that certain municipal records
could also give a clue as to why the assassination had to be
expedited. The family is also questioning who paid Mr
Khambule’s legal fees as he could not afford them.

29   P a g e

 79.

The reasons that were advanced by the regional leadership
that some of the members of the ANC caucus at Nquthu
Municipality would follow suit to what happened at Umvoti
and vote with the opposition, was just a smokescreen for
wanting to get rid of him. They knew very well that he was a
seasoned member of the ANC and would not betray the
organisation. As a person of principle, he refused to resign
as Speaker because it would have opened the door for them
to do as they pleased and perpetuate corruption.

80.

The family believes that the by-election results at Nquthu
have a bearing on the attitude of the people at Nquthu
regarding Vusumuzi’s murder. The people said that some of
the ANC candidates, especially the mayoral candidate, had
iphunga (stench). People said that they would not vote for
murderers. The IFP ultimately won the Nquthu Municipality
by-election, reducing the ANC membership from about 10 to
3.

81.

The Ntombela family believes that there were people behind
Messrs Khambule and Mdakane who are still free and would
like the investigation to be reopened with regard to these
masterminds.

30   P a g e

 82.

Despite the outcome of the cases against Messrs Mdakane
and Khambule, the family is not happy about the
investigation. The evidence was readily available because the
suspects were caught red-handed and there was nothing
difficult to investigate. At some stage, the investigating officer
told the family that he had a problem in getting hold of the
regional Chairperson for questioning. The family does not
believe that. The family doubts whether the investigating
team ever followed up on the Municipality, the tender, the
Mayor etcetera with the objective of getting to the bottom of
the matter.

83.

According to a report compiled for the Commission by
Brigadier Maqhashalala of SAPS, a possible underlying
cause of the murder was competition for positions which was
characterised by slate politics and factionalism.

KHETHIWE PHAKATHI

84.

(VOL 2).

She testified on 23 May 2017. She is the daughter of the late
Mrs Thokozile Alice Phakathi who was murdered on 10 July
2015. She was 56 years old when she died. The family was
residing at Kwa-Ndengezi at the time and consisted of Mrs
Phakathi, her husband, their three children and a grandchild.

31   P a g e

 85.

Mrs Phakathi was a member of the ANC. She was active in the
ANC at local level, Kwa-Ndengezi and was the Chairperson of
the Women’s League. She was sociable and was a community
health care worker and started a community project. She
helped people by giving them wheelchairs and applying for
grants for them. She also helped orphans to apply for their
grants.

86.

She would assist the people with food parcels whilst they were
waiting for the processing of the grants. She would also
arrange for the elderly to be placed in an old age home. Mrs
Phakathi was approachable, caring and loving. It was easy to
talk to her about anything as a mother and grandmother.

87.

She received a phone call at the beginning of 2015 from
someone at the ANC regional level pertaining to nomination as
Councillor. She explained to her daughter that the caller was
from the Regional level but did not mention the person’s name.

88.

When her daughter asked why she was unhappy because she
was talking to her comrade, Mrs Phakathi asked her to keep
the news to herself and not tell anyone, to which the daughter
agreed. She asked her daughter whether she was aware that
a Councillor had to be elected at Kwa-Ndengezi. She replied

32   P a g e

 affirmatively. She then disclosed that the Regional leader had
called to inform her that they wanted her to be on the list of
nominees. The daughter advised her to accept the nomination.
She said that was exactly what her daughter did not
understand

because

many

people

who

had

accepted

councillor nominations were previously killed and the same
fate could befall her.

89.

In her testimony Miss Phakathi confirmed that councillors
were indeed previously killed at Kwa-Ndengezi. Reverting to
their conversation, Miss Phakathi stated that she immediately
recalled that her mother was stating a fact about councillors
being killed. She however thought that she would not be killed
because she was a woman and that the others were killed
because they were males.

90.

She advised her to take the position possibly for just one year
in order bring change at Kwa-Ndengezi. Mrs Phakathi was still
not persuaded by her daughter. She was very active member
in the ANC and community and was hardly at home. They
would spend a short while with her at home and people would
come and call her to meetings.

33   P a g e

 91.

She was an influential mobiliser. Whenever she called a
meeting,

attendance

would

be

very

good.

These

announcements were made by megaphone while driving
around the community in a vehicle.

92.

A meeting of the Women’s League was held at Kwa-Ndengezi
library. The meeting was held prior to the day of the call from
the regional leader. Mrs Phakathi invited her two daughters to
the meeting to come and observe. At the meeting, delegates
were nominated to attend an ANC conference. She was also
nominated to be part of the delegation.

93.

She advised the nominated members who would be delegates
at the conference about the importance of maintaining
integrity in voting at the conference. She said they would meet
people who would pretend to be ANC members, though they
were not.

94.

She said she had attended conferences on many previous
occasions and they would come across people with briefcases
full of money to bribe the voters. She stressed that they were
not going there to accept bribes, but for the struggle.

34   P a g e

 95.

She then announced that she was stepping down as the
Chairperson of the Women’s League because of her old age.
She then pointed at some of the younger members and urged
them to carry on with the work.

96.

There was a special Women’s League meeting which was
convened at short notice. A few days later, she informed her
family that they were nearly killed at that meeting. She related
that a man came and tried to attack the attendants. She stated
that the police had to be called and they fetched her from the
hall and escorted her home.

97.

She died on 10 July 2015 at about 18h30 at home. There was
a knock on the door and the child who knocked said there was
an elderly woman outside who was asking for Mrs Phakathi.
She indeed went out and when she reached the gate, she was
shot. She was rushed to the local clinic but died on arrival.

98.

A few days prior to that, certain boys came to the homestead
looking for Mrs Phakathi. Her son advised her of the boys who
were outside looking for her. She peeped out of the door and
asked the boys whether they were the ones sent to kill her.
That occurred after the call she had received about her
proposed nomination for councillor.

35   P a g e

 99.

Her daughter believes that she posed that spontaneous
question to those boys out of anxiety caused by the call about
the nomination. Even at the Women’s League meeting, out of
anxiety she spontaneously addressed the attendants and said
“You women know very well that they will come into my house
and shoot me”.

100.

The family ultimately got to know that she was on the
nomination list of candidate councillors, but she had never
told them that she had accepted the nomination. The Women’s
League was very powerful in the area and men had threatened
women with guns at a Women’s League meeting.

101.

Her mother did not have enemies outside politics. Ms Phakathi
believes that her mother was killed for political reasons. There
has been no arrest for her murder and the police are not
keeping the family informed of progress.

102.

There were two camps in the ANC at Kwa-Ndengezi. The one
supported the then Councillor and the other was against him,
based on the manner in which he was doing things. They said
that the Councillor had been in office for a number of years,
but there was no change in the area.

36   P a g e

 JABULILE STELLA MSIYA

103.

(VOL 30).

She testified on 18 October 2017. She is a ward 16
Councillor at uMzimkhulu. The town of uMzimkhulu and
other locations fall in her ward. She serves the uMzimkhulu
Municipality and is a member of the Executive Committee.
The current term is her third as councillor.

104.

She joined the Municipality in 2006 and was once the Chief
Whip and Speaker of the Council. When she joined the
Council in 2006, she was a PR councillor. Prior to 2006, she
was a teacher.

105.

She has been a member of the ANC since 2003. The ANC is
the majority party at uMzimkhulu Municipality. She stated
that after winning the elections, the ANC was supposed to
have

something

called

an

inauguration,

but

the

inauguration cannot be done before the appointment of
people into positions. The Province is responsible for the
inauguration.

106.

As people are appointed to be councillors, members normally
do not get information as to who will occupy which position.

37   P a g e

 However, in her case, someone tipped her off that she was to
going to become the Deputy Mayor. Usually three names are
submitted and hers was supposedly on that list.

107.

Someone informed her that a certain taxi owner had
indicated

kidnap her and no one would know her

whereabouts.

108.

She thought the reason why the taxi owner made the threat
was

because

Municipality,

he
as

used
well

to
as

obtain
the

tenders

Harry

from

Gwala

the

District

Municipality.

109.

Councillor Sindiso Magaqa (“Magaqa”) was also a member
of the Executive Committee at uMzimkhulu Municipality.
Before attending the Executive Committee meeting, they
would first have an ANC caucus meeting where they would
agree on issues and then proceed to the Executive
Committee meeting in one accord.

110.

The ANC was factionalised within the Municipal Council.
She did not expect factionalism in the Council because its
task was service delivery.

38   P a g e

 111.

There was a situation where she, Messrs Magaqa and
Lukakayi enquired about the Memorial Hall which had taken
long to build but was still incomplete. They wanted to know
about

the

progress.

They

proposed

that

a

forensic

investigation or audit should be conducted in that regard
and decided to submit the matter to the Council.

112.

The Council decided that there would be no forensic
investigation because the Council was satisfied with the
responses from the administrative officials and the Executive
Committee. Being loyal to the ANC and seeing that their
proposal was defeated by the majority, they accepted the
position. In other words, as the ANC, they spoke as a
collective.

113.

As the issue of the Hall became public, Cosatu requested a
march about it and requested the office of the MEC Dube to
accept A memorandum. This was in 2017. The march was
held and the memorandum was handed over to the MEC’s
representative.

114.

Even the community was unhappy about the progress of the
Memorial Hall.

39   P a g e

 115.

The issue of the Memorial hall was not the only matter which
they questioned. There was an issue about how council
finances were being banked. It was said that a private
company must be appointed to facilitate the banking. They
then requested the officials to go back and deliberate on the
matter and come back to convince them as the Executive
Committee. The officials came back and they were indeed
convinced.

116.

There was also a perception that a member of the
Municipality’s management approached the Speaker to sign
certain documents regarding the Memorial Hall.

The

Speaker refused to sign because he apparently did not
understand and he would be unable to explain to the public
when questioned. The Speaker was Councillor Khayalethu
Thobela, who was subsequently murdered.

117.

Ms Msiya believes that Mr Thobela was murdered for
political reasons which had a bearing on the issue of the
Memorial Hall and his refusal to sign the documents.

118.

Councillor Tshibase was also a member of the Municipal
Council and he was also murdered. Before his death, he had
concerns about their safety. Mr Tshibase once told the

40   P a g e

 witness and others that they needed to reach their homes
early and lock themselves in.

119.

After the burial of Mr Tshibase, Mr Magaqa approached Ms
Msiya. He advised her that his intelligence had notified him
that since Mr Thobela was number one, Mr Tshibase was
number two, he (Magaqa) would be number three and she
(Msiya) would be number five to be killed.

120.

Mr Magaqa then sought security for himself because the
situation was tense and everyone was afraid. They were
indeed subsequently attacked on 13 July 2017. Ms Msiya,
Mr Magaqa, Councillor Nontsikelelo Mafa (“Mafa”) and
others were coming from a meeting in different cars. At some
point, they parked in order to buy food and Ms Msiya and
Ms Mafa joined Mr Magaqa in his car. Immediately
thereafter, several gunshots were fired at them in the car.

121.

There has been no arrest regarding the shooting. Ms Msiya
heard news in a public media briefing about a suspect who
was allegedly involved in their shooting. She then called the
Hawks and questioned why they were not briefed about
progress. A police officer thereafter came and advised her

41   P a g e

 that one of the suspects in the shooting had been fatally shot
by the police in a robbery incident on the N2 freeway.

122.

After that a National Task Team was sent to assist in the
investigation of the murders and attempted murders. Ms
Msiya is happy about its efficiency. When Ms Msiya testified,
she and Ms Mafa had not been provided bodyguards or
security. She pleaded for urgent attention to their safety and
to be provided with security. Besides their own personal
safety, Ms Msiya testified that her family was also not safe.

123.

Despite the attack, Ms Msiya indicated that she would not
quit being a Councillor. She joined the ANC knowing very
well that she was there for the people and loves serving them.

124.

Despite all the problems in the ANC, she believes it can still
save itself and that the veterans should be utilised in the
process. She recommended that the ANC be united at
national level and do away with factions.

125.

Ms Msiya believes that the underlying causes of the killings
at uMzimkhulu are the determination by some to cling to
power and that there is also a quest to “capture”
uMzimkhulu to control it and the resources.

42   P a g e

 NONTSIKELELO MAFA

126.

(VOL 30).

She testified on 18 October 2017 and confirmed Ms Msiya’s
evidence in a great number of respects.

127.

She is a Ward Councillor at Adelaide Tambo branch in ward
11, uMzimkhulu.

It is her first term as councillor. She

passed matric in 2008 and joined the ANC Youth League
when she was 16 years, as well as the Young Communist
League of the SACP.

128.

She is a member of the ANC and SACP. She got to know the
late Mr Magaqa in 2011. Mr Magaqa was previously the
National Secretary General of the Youth League and was
suspended. He was a branch member of the ANC, but when
he returned from the national level after suspension, some
members of the BEC did not accept him as a member of the
ANC.

129.

Mr Magaqa was a volunteer at branch level, but he was not
allowed into the ANC meetings. Even in 2011, he could not
campaign for the elections at a broader scale, but only
campaigned in ward 16 where he was volunteering.

43   P a g e

 130.

Ms Mafa did not know why Mr Magaqa was marginalised.
They continued working together in 2015 when they were
preparing for the 2016 local government elections. At the
time, her branch was divided into two factions. There was
division regarding the candidates to be nominated as
councillors.

131.

The list that was submitted by the BEC to the Province had
the name of a former councillor who was candidate number
one. The former councillor was the Chairperson of the BEC.
When the list returned from the Province, the former
councillor had been moved to position number two and Ms
Mafa had become number one on the list.

132.

That caused division and resulted in the branch having an
independent candidate who stood for election. They tried to
meet as the BEC even before they became aware that the
order on the list had been changed. The former councillor
then called private meetings where it was discussed that Ms
Mafa could not stand as number one because she was
young.

44   P a g e

 133.

Ms Mafa knew that she was not safe because at one stage
the former councillor convinced her to leave the area and go
to Johannesburg before the elections took place.

134.

The independent candidate was nominated by the branch
members who were against Ms Mafa. The independent
candidate was not the former councillor, but someone else.
The ANC ultimately won the ward election. Although Ms
Mafa became councillor, the branch was however still
divided.

135.

Mr Magaqa was the one who assisted her to win the election.
The Chairperson (former councillor) and other BEC members
started going door to door informing people that there would
be a by-election in respect of her position. She understood
their utterances to mean that they would do something to
her in order to remove her from the position.

136.

Mr Magaqa asked whether it meant that the ward councillor
would die so that there would be a by-election. At the latest
BGM which was held around May 2017, they were supposed
to elect people to be appointed at the regional conference.
There were security guards who were armed with rifles. Mr

45   P a g e

 Meshack Radebe from the Province attended to oversee the
process.

137.

They were surprised to see the armed security guards
because the same security guards are providing security for
the taxi industry. The venue of the BGM was changed at the
eleventh hour to a different location. That is where they
found the former councillor with armed security guards
inside the venue and armed security guards at the gate.

138.

The issue of having armed security guards inside and
outside the BGM was contrary to ANC policy. Ms Mafa, Mr
Magaqa and others were outside the gate and an argument
ensued between Mr Magaqa and the former councillor. Mr
Magaqa was asking why the former councillor was having
security guards and he used the word izinkabi (hitmen),
referring to the security guards.

139.

Mr Magaqa stated that the former councillor cannot be seen
going around with izinkabi, yet they (Magaqa and others) did
not have any security. Mr Radebe intervened and tried to
calm the situation. He even involved the police, saying that
was not a forum for people to point guns at each other.

46   P a g e

 140.

Ms Mafa clarified that the term izinkabi (hitmen) was
commonly used at uMzimkhulu to refer to the security
guards in question.

141.

The BGM did not proceed because some members decided to
go out of the gate and said they would not go back inside
because of the argument. Mr Radebe decided to adjourn the
meeting.

142.

At that time Mr Magaqa was no longer happy about his safety
and he said there were security guards and many cars that
were following him. Mr Magaqa had a personal bodyguard
whom he had arranged privately. In other words, it was not
provided by the Municipality.

143.

Ms Mafa believes that the factions within the Council are the
underlying causes of the killings at uMzimkhulu. She
alluded to the fact that Mr Magaqa was very vocal and
unpopular at the Council’s ANC caucus meetings.

144.

She also alluded to the phenomenon of clinging to power at
all costs, having influence over the award of tenders and
corruption as being underlying causes of the killings at
uMzimkhulu.

47   P a g e

 LULWAZI KNOWLEDGE MAGAQA

145.

He testified on 15 January 2018. He is a cousin of Mr
Sindiso Magaqa, who was shot on 13 July 2017 and died on
4 September 2017 at the Chief Albert Luthuli Hospital.

146.

The deceased was detained in hospital throughout from the
day he was shot until his death. He had he been married for
about a year when he died. He had five children altogether,
but not all with his wife. All five children were under 10 years
of age.

147.

The deceased was a member of the ANC which he had joined
at a young age while still at high school. He continued being
a member until his death. He was 34 years old when he died.
He was the Secretary of the Kokstad region while they we
were still under the Eastern Cape.

148.

He was also the Secretary of the Youth League in the region
and then the Provincial Deputy Secretary. Eventually, he
was elected the national Secretary-General of the Youth
League. Together with Mr Julius Malema he was found guilty

48   P a g e

 of misconduct by the ANC and suspended for one year, but
was still a member of the ANC.

149.

After he had served his sanction, he resumed his political
activity at branch level. He was a good mobiliser, in such a
way that he was able to unite his ward. He was a PR
Councillor at uMzimkhulu Municipality for the ANC when he
died.

150.

The rumours that shortly before Magaqa died he was going
to join the EFF were not true. He was a loyal member of the
ANC. There was speculation that he was going to join the
EFF when it was formed, but he stood firmly in the ANC. If
he had joined the EFF, it is believed that he would have been
among the top five of the EFF.

151.

He was shot on the lower body, more particularly in the legs.
At the time of his death, he was due to start physiotherapy.
It was a shock to the family to hear that he had died of
stomach ache problems because the wounds were on his
legs, not on the upper body. The family does not understand
the link between the stomach ache and the injuries on the
lower limbs.

49   P a g e

 152.

The family believes that he was shot because of corruption
at uMzimkhulu Municipality. He first complained about the
uMzimkhulu Memorial Hall.

That is when the problem

started. He complained that there was no progress on the
Hall, but the money was being spent on it.

153.

After Messrs Thobela and Tshibase were killed, Mr Magaqa
told his family that he was next to be killed. As a result, the
family believes that his reports about a hit list were true. The
family believes that there was nothing other than regional
politics that could have led to his murder.

154.

There has been no arrest regarding his murder. The family
is not satisfied with the manner in which the police are
conducting the investigation. Since he was shot and died,
the

family

has

received

little

information

from

the

investigators about progress.

155.

Regarding the public media statement that was made by the
police that one of the suspects who shot him was shot by the
police during a robbery, the family is confused as to how the
police know that the said person was indeed one of the
suspects in Mr Magaqa’s murder.

50   P a g e

 156.

The family was informed that some tissues were taken to the
Pretoria laboratory for further examination as part of the
post-mortem examination.

NKOSINATHI RICHMOND THOBELA

157.

(VOL 41)

He testified on 24 January 2018. The late Councillor
Khayalethu Thobela (“Khayalethu”) was his brother. At
the time of his passing away, he was the speaker of
uMzimkhulu Municipality. He had joined the ANC when
he was still in the Youth League and also a member of the
SACP. He was 46 years old when he died.

158.

The deceased became a Councillor in 2008, as Ward
Councillor. He then became a PR Councillor and was
designated Chief Whip in that term. He was subsequently
elected to the position of Speaker.

159.

In the ANC, he was the Regional Deputy Secretary of the
Harry Gwala region. He was nominated for the position of
Regional Secretary but was murdered before the Regional
Elective Conference was held. The conference had to be
postponed due to contestation, factionalism and conflict
in the region. There were two slates that were contesting
positions on the REC.

51   P a g e

 160.

The deceased was part of the slate that was led by
Mr Zondi. As stated above, the deceased had been
nominated to become Secretary. The other slate was led
by Mr Nxumalo. The late Councillor Sindiso Magaqa
(“Sindiso”) was part of this slate and had been nominated
to become Deputy Secretary. The witness believes that
Khayalethu and Sindiso did not see eye to eye, given that
they were supporting different slates.

161.

Pictures of the top five of Zondi’s slate were posted on the
social media. Khayalethu’s picture was removed and
initially replaced with a picture of a dog and thereafter a
candle. The family

understood that

to mean that

Khayalethu was going to be killed as a candle symbolises
death. Indeed, he was murdered on 20 April 2017 before
the conference was held. It was not a long period between
the time that his picture was removed and his death.

162.

He returned home in the afternoon and was in the yard
behind his house around 18h00. It appears that the killer
was waiting in the yard of his house to ambush him. The
perpetrator fired five to six shots at him. Spent cartridge

52   P a g e

 cases were found on the scene by the police. He died in
hospital on a later day.

163.

Mr Thobela stated that the family does not believe that
Khayalethu

was

killed

because

of

corruption

at

uMzimkhulu Municipality and also because he allegedly
refused to sign a certain document in his capacity as
Speaker.

164.

The family believes that the underlying cause of his death
related

to

the

internal

contestation

in

the

ANC,

specifically the two slates that were contesting for the
REC.

This

belief is based

on the

substitution of

Khayalethu’s picture on the social media.

165.

Three people were arrested for his murder but the third
one was released before appearing in court. The other two
appeared in court. The first one was allegedly the driver
who transported the hitman to and from the scene. The
second was allegedly the hitman and the third one was
allegedly sent to obtain ammunition that was used in the
murder weapon.

53   P a g e

 166.

It was the alleged hitman and driver who appeared in
court. The alleged hitman was arrested in Ladysmith on
his way to Johannesburg and was found in possession of
a firearm without a licence. The police advised the family
that the spent cartridge cases were going to be compared
with the firearm, but they did not update them on the
results of the comparison.

167.

The family was surprised to hear that the murder charge
was withdrawn

and

the

alleged

hitman was

then

attending the case in relation to the charge of possession
of an unlicensed firearm.

168.

Information was in circulation in the community that two
ANC women councillors were sent to deliver the hit fee to
the hitman. However, that information was not followed
up by the police to the family’s satisfaction.

169.

The alleged driver was only charged in relation to the car
because it was established that the getaway car had been
stolen. The family was not informed by the police whether
he was interrogated about the murder. The family is not
happy

about

the

police

investigation

because

the

masterminds are not being investigated. It could be that

54   P a g e

 there is political interference in the investigation, given
that the murder was political.

170.

Mr Thobela alluded to the fact that regions control the
sub-regions in terms of the deployment of councillors,
speakers

and

mayors

in

municipalities.

Therefore,

regional contestation has a bearing on power, control of
state resources and financial benefit.

NOLUTHANDO PRIMROSE THOBELA

171.

(VOL 41)

She testified on 24 January 2018. She is 31 years old and
the late Khayalethu was her husband. They had been
married for eight years when he died. They have two
children together and he had two other children, four
altogether. They are 22, 17, 8 and 1 year(s) old,
respectively. The last born was five months old when he
was murdered.

172.

Mrs Thobela stated that the deceased arrived home about
6pm, got out of the car after the children had opened the
gate for him. He then went to their bedroom where he
changed his clothing. Thereafter, he went to another
structure in the premises to obtain holy water with which
to perform a certain ritual. That is when he was shot

55   P a g e

 several times by unknown assailants. The witness and
neighbours picked him up and rushed him to Rietvlei
Hospital in a motor vehicle. He was later transferred to
Port Shepstone Hospital, where he succumbed to his
injuries and died.

173.

His death has been very sad and traumatic to the family.
Mrs

Thobela

and

some

of

the

children

received

counselling. He was a very loving and caring husband,
father and family man.

174.

He was a qualified teacher before becoming a councillor.
He left teaching and was a full-time councillor when he
died. If he had left being a councillor, he had teaching to
fall back onto. As a councillor, the community loved him
very much. He served the community very well and he was
a very kind person.

MANDLA CORNELIUS NGCOBO

175.

He testified on 13 October 2017. He was born and raised in
Bulwer. He is a qualified teacher and worked as such but
was later elected as a Councillor. When the ANC was
unbanned, he became a member thereof in the Bulwer

56   P a g e

 Branch. He later became a branch leader, REC member of
the Harry Gwala Region.

176.

He was a Councillor for more than 15 years. He has been
exposed to the policies and principles of the ANC and has
attended workshops on governance and social issues. He
was also a member of the SACP but did not renew his
membership.

177.

In the 1990s, there was political violence in and around
Pietermaritzburg, which also spread to Richmond, Impendle
and Bulwer. It was between the ANC and the IFP. Many
people were killed. After the 1994 national elections and the
1996 municipal elections, the violence continued.

178.

The ANC was hoping to win the 1994 provincial elections but
lost. In the 1999 elections, the ANC recruited IFP members
to join it. A special feature in Bulwer was that the members
who were recruited from the IFP always expressed a desire
to be armed. Some of them were trained in the Matigulu
camp as IFP members. When they became joined the ANC,
they still expected to be given weapons.

57   P a g e

 179.

The witness and others used to report them to the police, but
the police did not take any steps. Very few of them ended up
being arrested or having their weapons taken away. It was
said that the weapons that they were carrying were legal
State weapons. After the new government was ushered in in
1994, there was an attempt to collect all those weapons.
Some of them were taken, but no one knows what happened
to them afterwards.

180.

UMzimkhulu has always been an ANC stronghold.

From

2000 to 2006, everything was functioning well. Around
2006, a decision was taken to reintegrate municipalities.
Matatiele would become part of the Eastern Cape and
uMzimkhulu part of KZN. The people of Matatiele felt
aggrieved because they had been well served in KZN. There
was so much activity that during the election of 2006, they
broke away from the ANC and formed a party called the AIC.
The leader of the AIC was previously the Secretary of an ANC
region and the witness was his deputy.

181.

When the demarcation took effect, it caused so much
resentment among the people that they were prepared to
leave the ANC. In 2006, the ANC won the uBuhlebezwe and
Ingwe Municipalities from the IFP. Mr Eric Sikhakhane was
appointed as the Mayor of Ingwe Municipality. Messrs

58   P a g e

 Sikhakhane and Ngcobo were both teachers by profession.
They grew up together and attended the same church.

182.

Before Mr Sikhakhane was appointed Mayor, there were
widespread rumours that people were plotting to kill him. Mr
Ngcobo was named as one of the plotters. The ANC
leadership confirmed the rumours and decided to provide Mr
Sikhakhane with bodyguards. The security company that
was appointed was Globetech in circumstances where
normal procurement procedures were not followed as
everything was done in a hurry.

183.

The owner of Globetech was Mr Romeo Mbambo who was
trained in Caprivi by the apartheid government on behalf of
the IFP government. When Mr Mbambo went to Caprivi, he
was a member of the IFP. The people who were appointed as
Mr Sikhakhane’s bodyguards were ANC members. One of
them was Mr Sihlungu and the other was Mr Bheki Bekwa.
Before that, Mr Bekwa had worked as a member of the KwaZulu Police.

184.

The point that was being made by Mr Ngcobo was that the
rumours about him wanting to kill Mr Sikhakhane were false
and malicious and they caused division among comrades. He

59   P a g e

 was also questioning the appointment of Globetech. He
believes that the ANC created a business environment for a
company owned by a Caprivi trainee, using their names,
thereby making ANC comrades to distrust one another.

185.

ANC members and councillors were complaining about the
irregular appointment of Globetech. When they raised this
with the provincial ANC leadership, they did not want them
to discuss it.

186.

Mr Ngcobo moved on to uMzimkhulu which had been
reintegrated into KZN. KZN created a special budget to cater
for the backlogs in uMzimkhulu. At the time, one of the
policies was that if a person had been employed in
government and his tenure came to an end, there should be
a cooling off period before he was re-employed either as a
consultant or a service provider to the Municipality.

187.

A

special

budget

was

allocated

to

uMzimkhulu

for

development purposes. A programme manager to oversee
that development programme was appointed. The company
that was appointed was Busiya Consulting. Its director was
a head of department in the Sisonke Municipality. During

60   P a g e

 the appointment, the issue of the cooling off period was
ignored. Mr Ngcobo raised it, but he was defeated.

188.

The contract was improper and it provided for payment of
1,5% per annum of the whole budget that was allocated by
the Province to uMzimkhulu. Before the director of Busiya
Consulting left Sisonke Municipality, his term of office
overlapped with the new Council’s term. A great deal of
information was landing on his desk because he was still an
employee of the Municipality.

189.

When he stopped being an employee of the Municipality and
became a consultant, he used that information that was
acquired when he was still an employee to charge the
Municipality. It ultimately turned out that there was an overpayment of about 3 to 4 Million Rand to the consultancy.

190.

Mr Ngcobo also testified about the formation of the Sisonke
Development Agency (SDA) in 2011. SDA was a municipal
entity that could be used as a special agent for the economic
development of the District and its Local Municipalities. The
reports of the Auditor General (AG) reported that the manner
in which the SDA was formed was not in compliance with
the legislation, in that, there was no public participation.

61   P a g e

 191.

SDA had a project to build a Farmers’ Market for which it
received funding from the Provincial Government. At that
time, Mr Ngcobo was the Chairperson of the Infrastructure
Committee. Part of the committee’s oversight was to check
the budgets against the implementation of projects. A
company called Cyclone was appointed to implement the
Farmers’ Market project. The company was paid R2,5 million
in advance. That was done without a Council resolution.
When the relevant officials were asked, they said the
company had issued a guarantee that the Council was going
to get its money back.

192.

However, only R500 000.00 was paid back and R2 million
was lost. The material that was supposed to be used to build
the Farmers’ Market was used to build a private home which
is linked to the company’s director. Nobody pursued the
company to recover those funds. Despite the negative
findings of the AG, there were no consequences to the
wrongdoers. The Council would make undertakings year
after year that it was going to address the matter, but
nothing ever happened.

62   P a g e

 193.

Mr Ngcobo became the Speaker in 2011. He wanted to follow
up on corrupt and irregular practices at the Municipality.
The culture of the ANC is that you do not take people by
surprise. So, he took the caucus into his confidence and
raised the matter with his colleagues, the Chief Whip and the
Mayor. In Mr Ngcobo’s view, justice was not done. It was
merely decided that the matter would be closed because the
company was bankrupt.

194.

When their Council term came to an end in 2011, the terms
of the municipal officials also came to an end. One day when
they were going to discuss whether they were going to
reappoint the CFO or not, he was requested by the CFO,
Mr Mewalall, to meet him. Mr Mewalall asked him to help
him to be reappointed. The policy of the Municipality
prohibited canvassing. The CFO was required to apply for
the post when it was advertised and be subject to due and
proper process.

195.

The

CFO

was

Chairperson

of

the

Bid

Adjudication

Committee. He stated that he had helped the Municipality
and the ANC to appoint its people and to give tenders to its
people, who did not qualify. Mr Ngcobo referred to
documents that were given to him by the said CFO to
illustrate the favours he had done for companies that did not
63   P a g e

 meet the tender requirements but were nevertheless
successful bidders. The tender resolution was taken on 22
July 2011 and it provided “It was resolved to recommend to
the municipal manager that K&M Security be appointed for
provision of security services for Sisonke District area,
namely,

the

main

building

offices,

Umgeni

offices,

uMzimkhulu offices, Underberg offices and Kokstad offices at
the bid price of R8,7 million”.

196.

The tender was supposed to cost R241 000.00 a month.
However, expenditure reports indicated that in November
2011, payment was R476 000.00 and in December 2011,
payment was R497 000.00.

197.

Mr Ngcobo testified that Mr Mewalall subsequently went to
work at the Richmond Municipality. Prior to Mr Mewalall’s
appointment, the previous CFO, Mr Mncwabe, served a very
short period and resigned. Mr Mncwabe indicated that the
irregular practices in the Municipality were so bad that it
would compromise him professionally. He did not want to be
part of the people who would be imprisoned for wrongdoing.

198.

Mr Ngcobo alluded to the possibility of monies in the
municipalities that were being taken out of the public purse

64   P a g e

 to do other things, possibly to pay hitmen. He referred to the
disturbing trend of killings. He raised these issues in the
ANC caucus. However, it caused tension in the Council. He
became a loner and was rebuked.

199.

Mr Ngcobo also referred to other incidents of irregular and
corrupt practices at his Municipality.

200.

He raised the issues in a letter dated 17 October 2012 with
the Provincial Secretary of the ANC, Mr Sihle Zikalala. The
Provincial Secretary then notified the REC of the Harry
Gwala Region. Mr Ngcobo wrote a subsequent letter to the
Provincial Chairperson, Mr Senzo Mchunu, on 15 January
2014 and to the Provincial Secretary, Mr Sihle Zikalala. He
wrote in his capacity as both Speaker and member of the
REC. The subject was “Financial irregularities and conduct of
comrades”.

201.

He indicated that municipal staff were allegedly being
threatened by service providers and alluded to the killings of
Councillors THOBELA, TSHIBASE, MAGAQA and former
Councillor Mncwabe. There were allegations that REC
members of the ANC were allocating tenders.

65   P a g e

 202.

His letter to the PEC was somehow leaked to the newspapers.
The PEC subsequently informed him that there was a letter
written by his Region to the PEC proposing that he should
be charged with misconduct for bringing the ANC into
disrepute. Mr Ngcobo pointed out that his conduct was
purely in accordance with the ANC resolution that comrades
needed to be champions and take tougher action against
corruption. Yet, he was charged by the ANC PEC and
convicted of misconduct.

203.

Mr Ngcobo believes that Councillors Thobela and Magaqa
were killed because they were very vocal about alleged
corruption at uMzimkhulu Municipality. He does not hold
any view and knowledge regarding Councillor Tshibase’s
killing. He believes that kickbacks in tenders are used, inter
alia, to fund the hitmen. The targeting of people who fight
corruption also creates an environment that is conducive to
the looting of more funds in municipalities.

204.

In response to a question whether poverty, unemployment
and inequality played a role in the killings, Mr Ngcobo replied
that what does not belong to you should become yours by
permission.

He

alluded

to

the

fact

that

corruption

perpetuates poverty and that poverty was not the underlying

66   P a g e

 cause of the killings. There is a correlation between the
desire for material things and the defence of ill-gotten gains.

205.

He conceded that he did not have an idea how we should
deal with poverty but added that poverty should never
replace morals. In our social development, people should be
encouraged to make a living and theft cannot be promoted
as an alternative. He referred to Prof Lumumba from Kenya,
who stated that in South Africa, you need to arrest two
Cabinet Ministers and people are going to change. He
believes that some people do wrong because they have seen
others doing wrong with impunity.

Mr Ngcobo’s Recommendations

206.

(a) Every licensed gun must have a sensor that will monitor
its movement and use.
(b) The establishment of a political school to teach political
and moral education for ANC members.
(c) There should be consequence for wrongdoing, irrespective
of the level.

67   P a g e

 PHUMZA PRISCILLA DIKO

207.

(VOL 39).

She testified on 16 January 2018. She was the fiancée of the
late Mr Tshibase of uMzimkhulu. They met in March 2010
and were in a relationship continuously until his death on
23 May 2017.

208.

In January 2013, Mr Tshibase approached her family in
Ntabankulu, Eastern Cape to pay ilobolo. In 2014, he made
a further payment of ilobolo for her and altogether he had
paid eight cows for her. They were in the process of getting
married.

209.

Mr Tshibase had three children altogether. They have one
child together, the youngest, and the other two are not hers.
Their child was 19 months old and was 11 months old when
he was killed. Mr Tshibase was 39 years old when he died.

210.

She testified that she worked at the uMzimkhulu
Municipality for eight years as a personal assistant but
was currently in the administration in a new position to
which she had been recently appointed. She was from
Ntabankulu in the Eastern Cape and had started working
in uMzimkhulu in 2009.

68   P a g e

 211.

She stated that her fiancée was killed on Tuesday 23 May
2017 after Mr Khaya Thobela had been killed in midApril 2017. He was staying at home, because his school
is in the rural area. She was staying in town closer to
work. It is far for her to travel every day to town. So, they
called each other regularly, as couples do. On the day in
question she was not feeling well. At his suggestion she
went to the doctor. In the afternoon she tried to call him
and he did not answer. He then sent a message that he
was in a meeting at Segolo School in Harding. After the
meeting he called her around 6.05pm and said he is out
of the meeting, he is on his way home. That was the last
time she spoke to him. The incident happened around
6.30pm when he was entering his homestead in Gugweni.
He was shot as he was entering his residence.

212.

When she arrived at the scene she realised that he must
have been trying to open the gate because the gate was
already opened and you could see from the way he was
shot, that he was shot whilst he was running back to the
car. From the house inside the yard they said they heard
the sound of the hooter. She assumes that he was hitting
the steering wheel with his head due to the gunshots.
When his father came out the people who shot him were
nowhere to be found.

69   P a g e

 213.

As far as she was concerned, this was a political
assassination.

214.

The deceased was a teacher by profession and a part-time
PR Councillor. He first became a Ward Councillor in 2006 in
ward 14. It was his third term as a councillor when he died
on 23 May 2017. He was a member of the ANC. As a Ward
Councillor for two terms, he was a hard worker. The
community loved him and he also loved and respected them.

215.

Before his death, the deceased told Ms Diko that he had
enemies within political circles, but he did not mention the
names of the people with whom he was not on good terms.
As his spouse, he was not inclined to tell her a lot regarding
his political activities as he said he was trying to protect her.

216.

He would not say much. but would highlight some of the
things and tell her that things were not going well. At some
stage, she asked him why he was not leaving politics and he
would say it would make no difference, so he would
continue.

70   P a g e

 217.

He did not mention any problems during his first term in
2010. It was during his second term as Ward Councillor that
he mentioned that certain people did not want him, but the
community still needed him. So, the community voted for
him for two terms. The people who did not want him were
ANC members. There was an internal conflict in the ANC.

218.

In his third term when he was a PR Councillor, he also
mentioned that there were people who did not want him,
even as PR Councillor. She did not ask him who they were,
but they were within the ANC.

219.

He believed that his phone was bugged and preferred to talk
to her in person. Even when he visited her, he would not stay
until late because he felt unsafe. After the murder of Mr
Thobela, Mr Tshibase was afraid of driving late. He always
highlighted the fact that things were not going well within
the ANC. They knew about the intimidation but did not think
he would be murdered.

220.

Based on the little that he was willing to divulge to her, Ms
Diko believes that the underlying motive for Mr Tshibase’s
murder was political.

71   P a g e

 221.

There has been no arrest for his murder. The investigators,
however, kept her informed on a monthly basis regarding the
progress of investigation. They last updated her in January
2018.

SIPHOZAKHE ZITHULELE ZULU

222.

(VOL 40).

He testified on 23 January 2018. He has been a member of
the ANC for a long time having joined it as a Youth League
member. He resides at Madadeni, Lister Farm, Newcastle. He
is an ANC Ward Councillor at the Newcastle Municipality. He
was elected as a Councillor in a by-election in November
2016.

223.

The late Ms Thembi Mbongo was his fiancée and they were
staying together at Lister Farm, ward 6, Newcastle. She was
murdered on 2 July 2016. They had been residing together
for 16 years when she died.

224.

They have four children together, two boys and two girls.
Their ages are 17, 16, 12 and 7 years, respectively.
Ms Mbongo was also a member of the ANC. She was a
Branch Secretary of the Chief Albert Luthuli Branch, ward
6, in 2014. In 2015, she was nominated as a candidate for

72   P a g e

 ward councillor. She was nominated together with three
male candidates.

225.

Some of the members took kindly to her nomination while
others were not happy. She was a hardworking person and
if the community needed something they would send her for
whatever they needed. She was 35 years of age when she
died.

226.

The small group that was not happy with her nomination
supported one of the other candidates. It is ANC policy for
nominations to be approved by a higher structure. Her name
was second on the list after the nominations at branch level.
When the higher structure had approved, she moved up to
number one on the list.

227.

There were factions within the branch that were linked to the
regional level. After the approval, some people were unhappy
about her being number one. In June 2016, there were about
30 people protestors who were protesting past Mr Zulu’s
residence and they were all female.

73   P a g e

 228.

They had placards and they were making death threats.
Some of the protestors were ANC members and others were
not.

229.

On 2 July 2016, around 19h00 while the Zulu family were
watching the news at home, there was a knock on the door.
One person entered the house and said they were looking for
Thembi and Mr Zulu told him to sit down. A second person
then entered, went past where they were seated and started
shooting towards Thembi. She died on the spot.

230.

Councillor Zulu believes that his fiancé’s murder was related
to the protest and the death threats that were made
regarding her being number one on the list. Other than the
political conflict, he was adamant that there was no other
reason or motive why she would have been killed.

231.

After her murder, the ANC decided that her name would
remain on the list as it was close to election time. The
community also wanted to vote for her posthumously and
she indeed won the ward.

232.

The community and other comrades showed great support
for the Zulu family and insisted on a councillor being elected

74   P a g e

 from the family. That is how the witness Mr Zulu was elected
at the by-election.

233.

There has been no arrest for her murder. The family is not
satisfied with the police investigation. Mr Zulu made a
statement to the police and gave a description of the person
that entered his house first. He had last heard from the
police in April 2017. Although he had lost his mobile phone,
he had done a “sim swop” and retained the same mobile
number.

234.

Prior to becoming a ward councillor, Mr Zulu was selfemployed as a builder, building houses. If he had not been
put forward for councillorship, he would have been able to
continue sustaining himself as a builder.

MUSAWENKOSI PENWELL ZONDI

235.

(VOL 18).

He testified on 21 August 2017. He is the brother of the late
Councillor

Beauty

Nompumelelo

Zondi.

She

was

murdered on 14 March 2016 at Pomeroy, Msinga. She was
45 years old when she died. She was single and had no
children. She had been a member of the NFP for about five
years. Prior to that, she had been a member of the IFP for

75   P a g e

 about five years also. She was a PR councillor of the IFP at
Msinga.

236.

The family established that she shared the same name and
surname with another Ms Nompumelelo Zondi. The other
Nompumelelo Zondi made a call on radio, voicing out her
discontentment about the IFP. The other Nompumelelo was
their relative, but they did not share the same father.

237.

The other Nompumelelo voiced her dissatisfaction with the
IFP. When other IFP members heard it, they concluded that
the person was in fact Councillor Zondi. The call was made
on a radio talk show where people phoned in to voice out
their dissatisfaction. Councillor Zondi tried to deny it, but
other IFP members insisted that she was the one who made
the call. She tried to clarify that it was another Nompumelelo
Zondi, but that was not accepted. She then realised that her
relationship with the party would not be as good as before.

238.

She then decided to leave the IFP and join the NFP and it
was around the time of the NFP’s formation. She also became
a PR Councillor in the NFP. As an NFP member, she started
facing some challenges. It was at the time when the leader of
the NFP, ka Magwaza Msibi, was sick and one of the party

76   P a g e

 members (“Mr X”) asked Councillor Zondi to relinquish her
councillor position.

239.

Mr X wanted to give the position to someone else who was
his lover. She did not agree to step down and she called her
brother about the challenges she was facing in the party.

240.

About a week later, people were sent to kill her. Fortunately,
on their arrival they found that she was not in the house.
She was staying alone in Pomeroy. She saw the people who
were surrounding her house and they could not find her
inside. She was outside the house at the time. Again, she
called her brother and he asked her to come and live at his
house in Paulpietersburg.

241.

She lived with him for three weeks and on the fourth week,
she received a call from the party notifying her that if she did
not return to work, certain measures would be taken against
her. As a result, she returned to Pomeroy, Msinga.

242.

She then requested bodyguards. Ka Magwaza Msibi sent an
investigator to take a statement from her about why she
wanted bodyguards. After that meeting, certain members
organised for the investigator to be killed before handing over

77   P a g e

 the findings of his investigation regarding the request for the
bodyguard. The investigator was indeed killed.

243.

Arrangements were made for another investigator to
continue the process, but he also was killed soon after
meeting Councillor Zondi. The second investigator, however,
did take a statement from her. Both investigators were NFP
members. She again went and lived with her brother in
Paulpietersburg for about five months and subsequently
returned to Pomeroy around November 2015. After that, the
situation seemed quiet, but the family received a message
that she had been fatally shot on 14 March 2016.

244.

After refusing to step down, Mr X apparently stated that he
would not be defeated by a woman. She owned a Toyota
Hilux bakkie and was killed inside her bakkie outside her
residence.

245.

The family believes that the underlying motive for her
murder was political. Before her death, she was about to quit
politics and the family was also encouraging her to do so.

78   P a g e

 246.

NFP and IFP members came to pay their last respects and
also attended the funeral. Various speakers at the funeral
gave clues about the motive for her murder.

247.

There has been no arrest for her murder. The family believes
that the police could have solved the case if they had followed
up on the given clues. The police have also not given the
family any update on the progress of the investigation.

XOLANI DELIGHT NDLOVU (VOL 28).

248.

He testified on 13 October 2017. He is currently not a
member of any political party. He was previously a member
of one political party only, the NFP. He joined it when it was
formed in 2011 and was supposedly expelled in 2016. He
was the NFP’s national Treasurer and Chairperson of the
deployment committee, which was responsible for deploying
councillors to municipalities and he was authorised to have
contact with the IEC.

249.

He testified in his personal capacity on events that
transpired during his tenure as national Treasurer and made
specific

reference

to

the

late

Councillor

Beauty

Nompumelelo Zondi. When Councillor Zondi’s brother
testified before the Commission, Mr Ndlovu felt the need to
79   P a g e

 share some information that might be useful regarding her
death.

250.

He also wanted to answer questions as to why the NFP did
not take part in the Municipal Elections in 2016. According
to him, the death of Councillor Zondi was intimately
connected with the elections. The NFP’s KwaZulu-Natal PEC
was disputing Mr Ndlovu’s appointment as the liaison
between the NFP and the IEC, to the extent that they took
the matter to court.

251.

He did not understand the challenge because, in terms of the
NFP’s constitution, that responsibility lies at national level.
Despite the challenge, his appointment as the official liaison
with the IEC was finalised on 11 March 2016.

252.

Councillor Zondi was a Councillor at both Msinga Local
Municipality and uMzinyathi District Municipality. She was
the

only

NFP

Councillor

that

represented

Msinga

Municipality on the 60% party proportional representation
in the uMzinyathi District Municipality. In the said
Municipality, she was the NFP’s whip and there were three
NFP Councillors altogether.

80   P a g e

 253.

The NFP was in coalition with the ANC. Out of the three NFP
caucus councillors, one was perceived to favour the ANC and
another was perceived to favour the IFP, but their identities
were unknown. One of the biggest challenges that faced the
NFP at the time was that if somebody did not like you, you
would be labelled as having “returned” to the IFP.

254.

Sometime early in 2016, uMzinyathi Municipality did not
have a mayor and Mr Ndlovu was not sure as to how that
came about. Two council meetings were held to elect the
mayor, one was on 29 January 2016 and the next one in
February 2016. Both had to be adjourned due to the inability
of either the ANC or IFP to secure the vote of Councillor
Zondi. Both parties were lobbying and enticing her for her
vote through party members and provincial leaders who were
known to be close to her.

255.

Councillor Zondi had some issues on which she wanted
clarity before attending those council meetings. She needed
advice from the national level and the PEC was not happy
about that, because they felt that she was supposed to seek
advice

from

them. Unfortunately,

that

presented

an

opportunity for shrewd and power-hungry members within
the NFP to exploit for their own gain as she was the king
maker.
81   P a g e

 256.

Councillor Zondi was murdered on 15 March 2016. A week
before her murder, there was evidence that pointed to a
conspiracy to murder her. Certain NFP members accepted
nominations to replace her. There are three grounds on
which a councillor may be replaced, i.e. death, expulsion or
resignation.

257.

Mr Ndlovu showed the Commission forms for acceptance of
nomination which are required to be signed by councillor
candidates in acceptance of a nomination. The forms were
signed by a Mr Ximba and a Ms Dlamini on 3 and 7 March
2016,

respectively,

accepting

nomination

to

replace

Councillor Zondi. At the time, Councillor Zondi was still alive
and had not resigned or been expelled. Ms Dlamini
ultimately replaced Councillor Zondi at Msinga Municipality.

258.

The forms were supposedly sent by Mr Ndlovu to the IEC. He
however pointed out that his purported signatures thereon
were forged. As a result, he opened a case at Westville police
station and the Cas number is 73/05/2016. He is convinced
that Councillor Zondi’s death was engineered internally
within the NFP. He received information that a Mrs Dudu

82   P a g e

 Mhlongo, who had access to his office, is the one who forged
his signature on the forms that were sent to the IEC.

259.

One day while Mr Ndlovu was sitting in his office, a known
person who was a bodyguard of one of the NFP’s mayors,
informed him that he had been approached and promised
R2 million to kill him, as well as Mr Shelembe, Mr Khubisa
and a fourth person whom he could not recall. Mr Shelembe
is the former national Chairperson and Mr Khubisa is the
former Secretary General, of the NFP. Both were still office
bearers when the man approached him.

260.

It was also discovered that certain people were paying money
to some members of the PEC for councillor positions in the
upcoming elections. He was regarded as a stumbling block
because

he

was

responsible

for

signing

nomination

acceptance forms and sending them to the IEC. That was the
reason why the NEC decided that all constituencies must
submit nomination acceptance forms directly to him at head
office. He testified that, in his view, the PEC was defying the
NEC.

261.

Mr Ndlovu alluded to the fact that they were extremely busy
attending to internal problems, misconduct matters and

83   P a g e

 preparations for the upcoming Municipal Elections. In that
midst and confusion, the elections deposit was supposed to
be paid on 2 June 2016. Mr Ndlovu missed that deadline as
Treasurer and he took responsibility for the omission.

262.

A rumour started doing the rounds that he had been bought
by the IFP to sabotage the NFP from standing in the
elections. Because of that rumour, the tension between IFP
and NFP members was at a boiling point, as the IFP was
angry at the false accusation. Fortunately, that tension did
not result in any violence. Mr Ndlovu believes that it was
averted by the public statement he made, refuting the
allegation of being bought by the IFP.

263.

Besides Councillor Zondi, Mr Ndlovu was not aware of any
other NFP councillors who were killed due to the selling of
councillor positions. Mr Ndlovu alluded to violence that
occurred between the IFP and NFP after the NFP was formed
and resulted in killings. He referred to Councillors Shezi and
Shelembe of Kwa-Mashu who were both killed. Both were
NFP members. He indicated that the underlying cause of
their deaths was the conflict between the IFP and NFP.

84   P a g e

 264.

He knew of one case, the death of Mr Nhlebela of
uMzinyathi, that was caused by the internal conflict within
the NFP.

265.

Mr Ndlovu believes that when political leaders make reckless
statements in the media, it has the potential to cause
political violence in general. Mr Ndlovu testified that poverty
has nothing to do with the political killings in the Province.
He based his assertion on the fact that most people grew up
poor and most are still poor but are not killing or stealing.
He indicated that the underlying causes are greed and the
lust for power.

NQABA JACKSON MKHWANAZI

266.

(VOL 22).

He testified on 18 September 2017. He has been a Councillor
at Pongola Municipality since 2011. He has been a member of
the ANC since the early seventies. He is 65 years old and has
been residing at Pongola since he was young.

267.

In the past, the ANC was in the minority at Pongola, but after
the

1994

national

election,

it

started

increasing

its

representation and eventually became the majority party. In
1990, after the unbanning of the ANC and its members

85   P a g e

 returned from exile, he was one of three members who were
active in building the ANC at Pongola.

268.

He

was

Treasurer

of

the

Pongola

Branch

from

its

establishment and then became its Chairperson. He is
currently a member of the Inqaba Branch, which was named
after him because he is its founder.

269.

He knows the late Councillor Mbhekiseni Patrick Khumalo.
Mr Khumalo was murdered on 17 December 2016 at Lubisi in
Pongola. He first knew Mr Khumalo when they were still in
school and thereafter they worked together. The two of them
were friends. He was 58 years old when he died.

270.

Mr Khumalo was due to begin his second term as Councillor
at Pongola Municipality when he died. He was also a member
of the ANC at the Hector Petersen Branch.

271.

The ANC nominates four candidates in the ward for
Councillor. A Regional Committee then screens the candidates
and a regional delegate comes to conduct interviews with the
four candidates and reports to the Region. The Region then
selects two of the four nominees. The delegate then returns

86   P a g e

 and tells the Branch who of the two candidates have been
selected by the Region.

272.

If one person obtained 80% votes at the Branch nomination
and the other received 50%, and the Region decides to select
the one who secured 50%, then conflict starts because the
people would argue that their preferred candidate was the one
with 80% of the vote.

273.

Mr Khumalo was selected by the region even though he did
not gain the highest votes at the Branch nominations. That is
how the conflict started. Some people were supporting Mr
Khumalo and others were not.

274.

At an ANC meeting, some members said there had to be a byelection in Mr Khumalo’s ward. Around September 2016, the
ANC had a roadshow at Lubisi. In that roadshow, there were
people who said they were from an area called Five. They said
Mr Khumalo was not providing them with services. He
responded that those people were not from his ward but from
a different one. Mr Mkhwanazi then requested to speak to
those people aside. He asked them to calm down. They
responded that they would stop complaining only when he was
no longer there, implying, when he was dead.

87   P a g e

 275.

Councillor Mkhwanazi believes that the talk of a by-election
and the assertion that they would only stop complaining when
Mr Khumalo was dead are linked. Mr Khumalo’s death was
aimed at having a by-election.

276.

The ANC is in the majority at Pongola Municipality. There are
29 seats. The ANC has 15, the IFP has 10, the DA has 2, the
EFF has 1 and an independent Councillor occupies 1. The IFP,
DA, EFF and the independent Councillor are in a coalition and
the ratio is therefore 15/14.

277.

Some of the opposition parties took advantage of the
unhappiness of the ANC members. The ANC members who
were unhappy about Mr Khumalo became friendly with the
IFP. After Mr Khumalo’s death, there was an equal ratio of
14/14 and the by-election could have been won by any party
or coalition of parties. The IFP was hoping to win the byelection because there were rumours that the IFP was saying
it was going to take over the Municipality, even before the
results were announced. However, the ANC won and is still
the majority party.

88   P a g e

 278.

Mr Mkhwanazi also expressed his views regarding the
underlying causes of the political killings in the Province.
According to him there are two opposing camps in the ANC in
KZN. The Regional Screening Committee also creates conflict
when they select a candidate who is not the preferred one in
terms of branch votes. The conflict leads to people killing one
another.

279.

Mr Mkhwanazi believes that factions in the party play a role
at Regional and Provincial level on the issue of the selection of
the final candidates for Ward and PR Councillors equally. He
recommends that the ANC must stick to the order of
candidates as per their votes for Ward and PR Councillors
equally.

280.

He is further of the view that the killings are motivated by
corruption in the municipalities. When a person is selected at
Regional or Provincial level to become Mayor or Municipal
Manager, for instance, the Regional or Provincial level will
control him or her remotely by pulling strings.

281.

He recommends that members must be deployed on merit and
qualifications. When the ANC is campaigning for elections, it
utilises volunteers who are generally not well educated. After

89   P a g e

 elections,

they

are

side-lined.

Councillor

Mkhwanazi

recommends the employment of these volunteers on programs
like the EPWP.

282.

He stated that within the ANC in the 1990s in their regional
offices they employed organisers who were employed to
recruit. They are not politically appointed. They are just
employees who are employed for recruitment. Then there
are regional secretaries who are politically voted. Now the
organisers are not being used for their appointments as
recruiters.

It is now the regional secretaries who visit

branches and do the recruitment. Unfortunately, the
regional secretaries are biased and favour their own camps.
Yet the organisers are not biased. They are just employees.
He believed that the ANC leadership must use the
organisers for their duties to recruit, not the regional
secretaries.

283.

Mr Mkhwanazi also expressed the surprising view that if the
ANC loses in KZN and is not in control, maybe that will stop
some of the killings, because there will be nothing to
compete for.

90   P a g e

 284.

Mr Mkhwanazi proposed that while the ANC was having
these

problems

of

leadership

in

KZN

the

national

leadership should call a Provincial Council or should call
an imbizo where people would elect the leadership of KZN,
because if that is not done, come local government elections
in 2021 there will be three factions and more killings will
be experienced. In the run-up to the 2017 ANC elective
conference, he predicted that we will see more killings if
this provincial council is not called.

285.

The witness identified poverty and unemployment as a
cause of the political killings. However, he singled out
corruption as a leading cause, coupled with access to and
competition for tenders. He added factionalism as another
cause.

THANDAZILE KHUMALO

286.

She testified on 18 September 2017. She is the wife of the late
Councillor Khumalo, mentioned above, who was murdered
on 17 December 2016 at their residence at Lubisi, Pongola. He
was inside the house when he was called outside and was then
shot outside the door. She and their two children were inside
the house when the murder took place. The children are 16
and 10 years old. Khumalo had another child who is 20 years

91   P a g e

 old. They are still traumatised and did not receive any
counselling.

287.

As stated above, Mr Khumalo was 58 years old when he died.
They had been married for four years. Besides being a
Councillor, he was self-employed. He loved his family and
children.

288.

Two people were arrested for his murder and the case was due
back in court on 21 September 2017. The family is happy with
the manner that the police have investigated the matter. The
police were also keeping them informed of progress.

289.

Mr Khumalo was loved by the community, even children.
When the by-election was held, the ANC won again because
the community said they would vote in his memory.

THOKOZANI DUBAZANA (VOL 19).

290.

He testified on 22 August 2017. He is a member of the IFP
and a Councillor at Inkosi Langalibalele Municipality in
Estcourt.

92   P a g e

 291.

He knew the late Councillor Mcebisi Patrick Duma. The
two of them were friends for about 10 years. Mr Duma was
married and had five children when he died. He was
murdered on 16 February 2011. He and his wife were
married in December 2010.

292.

Mr Duma was a member of the IFP and a Councillor at
Zwelisha, Estcourt. Mr Duma was initially an IFP member
and Councillor. There was misunderstanding in the party
regarding positions. There were also ideological differences
and views. Then a group called “Friends of VZ” was formed.

293.

“VZ” is Ms ka Magwaza Msibi, the leader of the NFP. At the
time, Friends of VZ were not yet a political party. Friends of
VZ were subsequently expelled from the IFP and they were
welcomed by VZ at Imbabazane, Estcourt. A series of
meetings subsequently took place and discussions were held
regarding the situation.

294.

After that, there were threats that were directed at the people
who were expelled from the IFP by members of the IFP. The
situation was very stressful, but the community offered
support because they knew what was happening. Councillor

93   P a g e

 Dubazana was one of the members who left the IFP and
mobilised for the Friends of VZ.

295.

From 2007 onwards, Councillor Dubazana was a bodyguard
of the Mayor of Thukela District Municipality and he was
also expelled from his job because of his support for the
Friends of VZ.

296.

On the day that Mr Duma was killed, a meeting was held at
Emhubheni. The NFP was going to be launched about a
month thereafter. The community of Emhubheni was
informed about the program of action.

297.

Mr Duma could not attend the meeting because he took his
sick mother to the doctor. When Councillor Dubazana was
on his way home after the meeting, he received a call that Mr
Duma had been killed on the road near Ntabamhlophe. He
proceeded to the scene and found Mr Duma in his white
Honda car and his gun was between his thighs.

298.

There was also a red Toyota Corolla which was suspected to
have been used by the assailants. There were bullet holes in
Mr Duma’s car indicating that he was shot in the car.

94   P a g e

 299.

Mr Duma was loved by the people. In the ward where he was
a Councillor, he was loved by everybody, even children.

300.

There was a hit list of people. Mr Duma was number two on
the hit list and Councillor Dubazana was fifth or the sixth.
The people on the list were targeted because they were loved
by the community and since they were expelled from the IFP,
it was believed that they would form or join another political
party. There were concerns that they would leave with
followers.

301.

The situation in the Municipality was hostile and it was even
hard to live each day. Councillor Dubazana believes that Mr
Duma’s murder was politically motivated and he based that
conclusion on the background he had testified about.

302.

Three people were charged with Mr Duma’s murder and
another murder. One accused was convicted of both
murders and the other two accused were convicted of Mr
Duma’s murder only. The police investigated well and there
were attempts to bribe them so that the matter would not go
to trial, but the police did not succumb to corruption.

95   P a g e

 303.

Someone, who was part of the plan to kill Mr Duma,
informed Crime Intelligence of the police that a vehicle was
already out to go and kill Mr Duma. The police did not
respond to that intelligence that was given to them. The hit
list was released less than a month before Mr Duma’s death.
Councillor Dubazana believes that if the police had done
their job efficiently, Mr Duma’s death might have been
prevented.

304.

He also alluded to the perception that the police are
politically biased and that they sometimes support a political
party. He indicated that they had a recording to confirm that
fact. A station commander from Wembezi SAPS made an
adverse remark in relation to a certain political party at a
police parade.

305.

The NFP was formed after Mr Duma’s death. Councillor
Dubazana believes that Mr Duma would have also joined the
NFP. After some time, there were problems in the NFP too.

306.

Besides ideology, the conflict in the NFP was caused by the
fact that the provincial leadership was imposing its authority
on the branches and not adhering to their wishes.

96   P a g e

 307.

Councillor Dubazana and others went back to the IFP and
the President of the IFP, Inkosi Mangosuthu Buthelezi, came
to Imbabazane at the playground of Umtshezi High School
and they were warmly welcomed back into the IFP.

308.

He also shared his views about the political killings outside
the IFP/NFP, that some people do not want to be led and
they are hard-headed. Hitmen are hired to kill people and it
makes it easy for people to kill each other. Hitmen are hired
to kill people in order to eliminate competition for positions.

309.

In the ANC, many councillors and other people who are
holding higher positions are killed. A lot of these killings are
related to the fight for positions and power amongst
politicians.

310.

Mr Dubazana was not very complimentary about the role of
the police in the murder of the deceased. He insisted that the
police knew an hour before he was killed of his impending
death and did nothing about it, although the police stations
of Ntabamhlophe and Estcourt were three and four
kilometres, respectively from the scene of the murder.

97   P a g e

 311.

He also stated that the hit list, with the deceased’s name
thereon was released less than a month before Mr Duma’s
demise.

312.

He further disclosed that he was an eye witness to the killing
by a policeman of his, (the policeman’s), neighbour, who was
a member of an organisation, which he did not identify, after
a misunderstanding. The policeman was transferred to
Johannesburg and the case “just disappeared”.

313.

Further evidence on the murder of Councillor Duma appears
hereunder in the evidence of Brigadier Maqhashalala.
[Paragraph 421 - 421].

NOKUTHULA MHLONGO (Z)

314.

A direction was made that no person may disclose in any
manner whatsoever her name or address or any information
which was likely to reveal her identity. Any person who
contravened the direction would be guilty of an offence and
liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment not exceeding
12 months.

98   P a g e

 315.

She testified on 26 May 2017 and will be referred to as Z. Z
was residing at Imbali, Pietermaritzburg. PATTY REGINA
NGUBANE, Z’s mother, who shall hereinafter be referred to as
“the deceased” was murdered on 8 June 2016 at Imbali. She
was 59 old when she died.

316.

The deceased was a member of the ANC. She was an additional
member of the BEC and also a member of the Community
Police Forum (CPF). She was also the Treasurer of the
Women’s League at Branch level.

317.

She was a loving mother. She was very helpful to other people
and the community. She is survived by her three children and
other children from her late relatives. Those other children
were also staying with her and were raised by her. The
deceased was not employed. On one occasion, she obtained a
temporary job from a community project of waste removal.

318.

People used to listen to her and they loved her, especially in
Ward 15. She assisted them in obtaining ANC membership.
She was a co-ordinator and used to encourage people to join
the ANC. Problems started when they were busy coordinating
the issue of membership.

99   P a g e

 319.

She gave ANC membership forms and money to a certain man
(“Mr X”) to submit on her behalf. It turned out that the forms
were not submitted. Mr X was also a member of the BEC. At
that time, the term of office of the then Councillor was nearing
the end, but he died before the end of his term.

320.

The BEC had a meeting where it was discussed that the then
BEC Secretary should take over the position of Councillor. Mr
X and other members subsequently dragged their feet in
attending BEC meetings. They did not want to attend because
they wanted the Councillor to come from their area, not the
then Secretary. Mr X was vocal in that regard.

321.

The deceased and Mr X were close, but he suddenly changed
and was not as friendly as before. Mr X was aspiring to become
a councillor. He once asked the deceased and another lady to
assist him to get the position. Mr X asked them to canvass for
him because the two of them were familiar with the people and
were active in the party.

322.

They, however, told him that, as a member of the BEC which
had agreed that the Secretary must become councillor, he
must respect that decision. He did not take kindly to their
advice.

100   P a g e

 323.

Mr X subsequently supported a certain Ntokozo who stood as
an independent candidate for Councillor.

324.

The other lady, mentioned above, was also shot together with
the deceased. They were coming from an ANC meeting. It was
three women and one man was with them at the time. The first
woman entered the yard of her house and the others
continued walking on the road. The lady mentioned above as
‘the other lady” was shot first and she died on the scene. The
deceased was shot immediately thereafter. She was rushed to
hospital, but subsequently died there.

325.

She was able to make a statement to the police in hospital
before she died and mentioned the name of the perpetrator.
Three people were arrested for the murders, but two of them
were released the following day before appearing in court.
Mr X appeared in Court, but the family subsequently heard
that the charges were withdrawn. The police and the
prosecution did not explain why the charges against him had
been withdrawn.

326.

The family believes that the deceased’s murder was related to
politics, based on her daughter’s testimony. There were no

101   P a g e

 other reasons outside politics that could have caused her
murder.

327.

It was not clear whether Mr X and the others who supported
the independent candidate were still members of the ANC. Z
stated that there are factions in the ANC and believes that
members are fighting over councillor positions, which come
with salaries.

MENZI PRAISE NGCOBO (Y)

328.

A direction was made that no person may disclose in any
manner whatsoever his name or address or any information
which was likely to reveal his identity. Any person who
contravened the direction would be guilty of an offence and
liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment not exceeding
12 months.

329.

The witness testified on 12 June 2017 and will be referred
to as Y. Y resides in Mpumalanga, Hammarsdale. Y is a
member of the ANC and the SACP. Y was the Chairperson
of the voting district. There were five voting districts at
Intshanga at the time. Y is married and has one child.

102   P a g e

 330.

On 24 January 2016, a meeting was convened by the SACP
and held at Ndokweni stadium at Intshanga. Y was the
Chairperson of that meeting. The purpose of the meeting
was to explain to the members of the SACP and the
community about the situation because a meeting had been
convened by the ANC on the same day, 24 January 2016.

331.

The purpose of the ANC meeting was to elect members who
were going to be candidates for councillor positions. It was
held at Michael Gwala Hall at Intshanga. It takes about four
minutes to drive from the stadium to the Hall.

332.

The witness and others got to know on Friday, the 22 nd,
that there was going to be a meeting at the Hall on Sunday,
the 24 th. Proper procedure was not followed because one
week’s notice was supposed to have been given. They heard
in the corridors about the meeting that was scheduled.

333.

The voting districts were also not aware of the meeting at
the Hall. The issue was discussed in the caucuses of the
voting districts and it was decided to call the meeting at the
stadium. They believed that they were being excluded from
the ANC meeting because there were different views within
the ANC at the time.

103   P a g e

 334.

Some members wanted some changes in the ward and they
wanted to be part of the members who were going to elect
the Councillor candidate. They also wanted to make clear
the type of people they wanted to stand as councillor
candidates.

335.

Shortly before the meeting started at the stadium, there
was a Mercedes Benz that came and stopped close by. The
windows of the car were then half open, but the occupants
did not alight to attend the meeting.

336.

The attendants were concerned that the Mercedes Benz was
unknown in the area. The then Councillor asked one
Nkosinathi to go and tell the occupants to come out if they
were coming to the meeting. The occupants had firearms in
the car and they indicated that they were instructed to
perform security duties at the Hall.

337.

It was explained to them that the stadium was not the
correct venue to perform their security duties. The SACP
had not arranged any security guards to perform duties at
the stadium. The occupants were then told to leave. The car
was started but it appeared to have a mechanical problem.

104   P a g e

 A local resident who will be referred to as Mr X was inside
the car. At some point, the occupants alighted from the car,
except Mr X.

338.

The Councillor asked Mr X why he was there and he
explained that he was sent to identify certain individuals.
Chaos then ensued and gunshots were fired. The crowd
dispersed and Mr X made a phone call, asking for backup.
In less than five minutes, about six more cars came and
shots were being fired.

339.

Two people died. One was Mr BONGANI HLATSHWAYO, a
member of the SACP who was attending the meeting and
the other was unknown to the witness. He came in the
Mercedes Benz. The witness was shot and injured in the
attack. The attack was witnessed by Ms NONSIKELELO
BLOSE, who herself became a victim of an assassination on
1 August 2016.

340.

The murder of Ms Blose will be dealt with later, when we
consider the evidence of political parties, in particular, the
SACP.

105   P a g e

 341.

Y believes that the attack was planned and politically
motivated. There were factions in the ANC, as well as
tension between the ANC and SACP at Intshanga. The
conflict started when the ANC did not follow correct
procedure and process.

342.

The names of members in good standing did not appear on
the ANC voters’ roll because there were branch leaders who
used to select people who will be part of the voters’ roll and
excluded others. Being excluded from the ANC voters’ roll
has a huge impact because one cannot attend ANC
gatherings if one was not on the roll.

343.

It also has a bearing on being able to have a vote in the
nomination of candidates for Councillor. The correct
procedure would be for the branch to obtain the voters’ roll
from the region. The Secretary and Chairperson are allowed
to attend the meetings and are assigned the duty to visit
the voting districts for a period of one month, during which
members get a chance to check their names on the voters’
roll. If they do not appear, they lodge complaints to have
the issue rectified before voting time.

106   P a g e

 344.

However, some wards failed to adhere to the correct
procedure because they deliberately wanted to ensure that
certain individuals remained in the positions. It was a
deliberate manipulation of processes.

345.

Y recommends that the ANC at all levels should listen to
people when they speak so that issues can be dealt with
timeously before a dispute arises.

346.

Certain people were arrested and charged regarding the
shooting and the criminal case is pending in court.

FANYANA PETROS JELE (VOL 29).

347.

He testified on 17 October 2017. The late Khanyisile
Ngobese-Sibisi was his sister. She was 40 years old when
she died on 18 July 2016. She was a qualified teacher but
was no longer teaching. She was divorced and had five
children aged 21, 18, 17 (twins) and 11 years, respectively.

348.

Khanyisile was a member of the ANC and was born into the
party. She was the Regional Secretary of the Women’s
League in the uKhahlamba region. She loved the community
and also worked for it. She was originally from Madadeni in

107   P a g e

 Newcastle and came to Ladysmith through marriage. She
was called umalumekazi (aunt).

349.

One day, she and Mr Jele went to dump some rubbish at
eSigedleni dump site and they found children eating from
the garbage. She went and bought bread and drinks for
them. She then started a soup kitchen for the children and
funded it from her own money. She continued feeding the
children and their number increased over time.

350.

She fed the children every Saturday and Mr Jele also made
contributions to the scheme. The feeding scheme was
extended to people who were on Anti-Retroviral medication
because some of them were unable to take treatment due to
lack of food. At some stage, she went into business and left
teaching. She became more involved in the ANC and the
community. If someone had died and their family could not
afford

the

funeral,

she

assisted

with

the

funeral

arrangements and expenses.

351.

As a result of her community upliftment, the community
asked her to become a councillor for ward 20 and she
accepted the nomination. Mr Jele was however concerned
about her acceptance of the nomination because councillors

108   P a g e

 were being killed. Even her own sister, who the witness
believed was going to be a councillor had been shot at
Osizweni.

352.

On 15 July 2016, she established what was called
Amayangayanga, which focussed on grooming young girls to
understand the culture and procedures of the ANC. A lot of
people attended the formation of Amayangayanga and many
of them joined the ANC in that event.

353.

There was another ANC meeting which was held on a Friday.
When she returned home, she told her brother, Mr Jele, that
she had stepped on someone’s toes. After accepting the
nomination for councillor, she was tipped for the position of
Deputy Mayor. She was principled, hated corruption and
advocated accountability, clean governance and service
delivery.

354.

Mr Jele testified that it was the uMzuvele RDP housing
project that made her unpopular. People from uMzuvele were
complaining about the housing project. During the 2010
storms in Ladysmith, RDP houses were built but were not
completed because the money that was allocated to that
project was used for something else. There were concerns

109   P a g e

 that when she became councillor and Deputy Mayor, she
would start questioning that misuse of public funds.

355.

On 18 July 2016, it was Mandela Day and she wanted to
spend the day with the elderly. She and her son loaded some
blankets in a Nissan bakkie to distribute them to the elderly
in celebration of Mandela Day at the nearby stadium. They
were ambushed on the way to the stadium and shots were
fired at her bakkie with a rifle. She died on the spot and no
one else was injured in the bakkie.

356.

There was information that a certain member of the ANC had
sent her a text message advising her not to go out on that
day, but she went out because she wanted to assist the
community.

357.

On the day of her memorial service, a certain office bearer of
the ANC Women’s League mentioned a discussion that she
had had previously with her bodyguard. She said her
bodyguard had pointed at Khanyisile’s car and said: “The
owner of this car must get bodyguards”. The family was
shocked as to why the bodyguard believed that Khanyisile
should have bodyguards.

110   P a g e

 358.

A suspect was arrested and found in possession of the rifle
that was allegedly used to kill her. The case was due to be
heard on 13 November 2017 at the Madadeni High Court.
The family is grateful to the police for their good work,
especially the investigating officer, Mr Ndlovu.

359.

The family believes Khanyisile’s murder had to do with the
internal politics of the ANC and the misuse of the uMzuvele
RDP housing project funds. The family bases this belief, inter
alia, on the fact that the hitman did not know her.

PHILILE NGCOBO

360.

(VOL 6).

She testified on 13 June 2017. She currently works at
uMgungundlovu District Municipality and was previously
the Deputy Mayor of Richmond from 2011 to 2016. The late
Mr Andrew Mthulisi Ngcobo was her brother. He was
murdered on 16 October 2015 outside his house in
Richmond. He was 41 years old when he died. He was a
senior security officer at Richmond Municipality at the time.

361.

Mthulisi was single and had two children. He was not an
outspoken person and was politically active. He was a
member of the ANC and the local Chairperson of the MKMVA
and also a REC member of the MKMVA. He was also the

111   P a g e

 Chairperson of the Community Police Forum (CPF) at
Richmond.

362.

He loved the ANC and participated in its activities. He was
influential and the people loved him very much. Two
councillors were elected in Wards 2 and 7, respectively. For
Ward 2, it was Mr Kunene and for Ward 7, it was Mr
Shabalala.

363.

The community wanted to remove Mr Shabalala but Mthulisi
was active in defending him. The reason why he was
defending Mr Shabalala was because he was elected under
Ward 7, but after the demarcations ward 7 fell under Ward
2, where Mthulisi and the Ngcobo family were residing.

364.

Subsequently, there was no peace in Ward 2 because people
were saying they had not elected Mr Shabalala. The Ngcobo
family was defending Mr Shabalala because it was not his
own doing that he ended up in Ward 2, but this was as a
result of the demarcation. Some community members did
not take kindly to the fact that Mthulisi was defending him.

365.

The ward ended up being divided and having two slates those who were supporting Mr Shabalala and those who

112   P a g e

 wanted him removed. A meeting was convened by the antiShabalala group in April 2014 at Mlamuli Primary School.
Mthulisi, Ms Ngcobo and other people also attended the
meeting.

366.

The school venue was locked and the anti-Shabalala group
unlocked it without the key and entered. The pro-Shabalala
group stood outside the school premises and did not enter
the venue of the meeting. The meeting continued and the
anti-Shabalala group resolved that Mr Shabalala must go
back to Ward 7, but the pro-Shabalala group disagreed with
that resolution. The hostility between the two factions got
worse.

367.

There was a former councillor (“Mr X”) who had been shot
and injured previously and was in the anti-Shabalala group.
Rumours were circulating that Mr X believed that Mthulisi
was involved in his shooting. Mthulisi tried to clarify to Mr X
that he was not involved in the attack, but Mr X did not
accept the explanation.

368.

Mthulisi was murdered about six months after he had gone
to explain to Mr X. After Mthulisi’s death, the person who
had

113   P a g e

shot

Mr

X

was

convicted

and

sentenced

to

 imprisonment. However, Mr X did not come to apologise to
the Ngcobo family. Mr X was a branch Chairperson of the
ANC and was a general worker at the Municipality.

369.

The relationship between Mthulisi and Mr X was not good. It
was Mthulisi and others who had encouraged Mr X to be a
councillor and mobilised support for him. After he had failed
to perform his duties efficiently as councillor, Mthulisi
lobbied for Mr Shabalala.

370.

The ANC at higher level decided that Mr Shabalala must be
removed from Ward 2. Sadly, they also did not consider the
fact that it was the demarcation that landed him in Ward 2.
When Mr Shabalala was removed, two years of his term were
still left. Another person took over and completed the two
years. After that, the position was taken over by Mr X’s
brother, who became a councillor.

371.

Mthulisi was a discipled member of the ANC, who followed
procedures and the community loved him for that, even nonANC members. He was fearless. There are rules in the MK
that if you were once a member of another organisation, you
are not allowed to be a member of MK. Also, if you had been
guilty of killing other comrades, you are not allowed to be a

114   P a g e

 member of MK. Mthulisi was strict in following procedures
and policies in that regard.

372.

There were certain people who wanted to join the MKMVA at
local level, but he disqualified them on the above grounds.
They accepted his discipline, but after his death all those
who were disqualified were then accepted to join MK.
Therefore, soon after his death, rules were no longer being
adhered to. Mr X also became a member of MK after
Mthulisi’s death.

373.

The family believes that his murder was political for the
reasons alluded to in Ms Ngcobo’s testimony.

374.

Three suspects, including Mr X, were arrested and charged
for his murder, but the charges against them were
withdrawn on 11 March 2016. The police and prosecution
did not explain to the family why the charges were
withdrawn. The family just saw the suspects celebrating on
the road after their release. The family is not satisfied about
the investigation and would like it to be re-opened.

115   P a g e

 COSMOS HLANGANANI NXUMALO

375.

He

testified

on

(VOL 42).

19

February

2018.

He

resides

at

Blaauwbosch, Newcastle. He has been a member of the ANC
for 7/8 years at the Thabo Mbeki Branch. The Branch had
requested a meeting with the Province, but only to find that
the meeting was ultimately conducted by the Region.

376.

The first meeting did not proceed because a quorum was not
attained. A second meeting was subsequently held to elect
the BEC but did not proceed as the REC Secretary who was
present complained about the lateness of time. The meeting
was rescheduled. The third meeting was ultimately held on
2 April 2016.

377.

There were two factions and they supported NDZ and CR17,
respectively, for the position of ANC president. The then
Ward Councillor on 2 April 2016 was Mrs Mentusi, who
belonged to the NDZ faction. Mr Nxumalo was initially in the
NDZ faction and supported Mrs Mentusi.

378.

At some stage, Mr Nxumalo changed allegiance and
supported the CR17 faction. He was visited by some
comrades because he was one of the ward mobilisers. When
he visited the community, he would hear them complaining

116   P a g e

 about the Councillor, Mrs Mentusi, saying they were no
longer supporting her.

379.

Mr Nxumalo tried to explain to Mrs Mentusi what the
community was saying about her, but she did not accept it.
The community was saying she had done nothing in the
period of ten years as a councillor. In other words, her
second term was going to come to an end and she was
heading for a third term.

380.

When Mr Nxumalo changed camps, Mrs Mentusi did not
take kindly to it because she had put her hopes in him as he
was a good mobiliser for councillor candidates and also
recruited people to join the ANC.

381.

The meeting of 2 April 2016 was held at Zamakhanya
Primary School to nominate councillor candidates. The
Chairperson was Mr Ntuthuko Mahlaba and the Secretary
was Ms Ntoko Mhlungu. Mr Gcabashe from the Province was
also present at the meeting.

382.

The Branch did not want the Region to preside over the
nomination meeting because the REC was visiting branches
with ulterior motives. If they had earmarked someone to be

117   P a g e

 a councillor, they would ensure their victory regardless of the
number of votes received. In short, they did not trust the
REC’s integrity. Their region was called Emahlahleni.

383.

The Province did not accede to the Branch’s request to
oversee the meeting. The person who presided over the
meeting was not delegated by the PEC. Mr Nxumalo was
uncertain as to whether the presiding officer was delegated
by the REC.

384.

They tried to tell the presiding officer that they were
expecting the Province to come and oversee the meeting, but
he told them that the meeting was going on whether they
liked it or not. As a result, they were forced to be part of the
meeting. The meeting had to proceed with only a 10%
quorum because it had failed twice previously to secure a
proper quorum.

385.

The presiding officer was accompanied by many armed
bodyguards. The police were also present and it was reported
to them that the bodyguards were armed. The police merely
took a register of those arms and allowed the bodyguards to
continue carrying the arms.

118   P a g e

 386.

Five candidates were nominated and Mrs Mentusi was one
of them. After the nominations, it was reported that there
were some members in good standing who were outside the
gate but wanted to come in. The members who were outside
were eligible to vote.

387.

The presiding officer said the meeting had already started
and he would not allow anyone else to join it. There was a
misunderstanding because some of the members present
wanted those who were outside the gate to take part in the
meeting. The members who were in the meeting did not take
kindly to the exclusion of the others. The presiding officer
took off his hat and gave it to his bodyguard. The hat that
was held by the bodyguard was used to put the nominations
and votes from members.

388.

After Mr Nxumalo had placed his ballot paper in the hat, he
went out with the intention of meeting the members who
were outside the gate. Whilst he was going out, one of
presiding officer’s bodyguards also came out.

389.

It appeared that the bodyguard and a certain Khulekani had
a quarrel about the members who were shut out of the
meeting. When Mr Nxumalo tried to establish what was

119   P a g e

 going on, the bodyguard took out a firearm and shot Mr
Nxumalo in the arm.

390.

Mr Nxumalo believes that he was shot because of the
factions, specifically because he had left the presiding
officer’s faction and joined the CR17 faction and they did not
take kindly to it. Mr Nxumalo was then supporting Mr
Thobani Ndaba for nomination to become a councillor. Mr
Thobani Ndaba eventually won the election with Mr
Nxumalo’s mobilisation for support.

391.

The Mahlahleni region was disbanded before the ANC’s
national elective conference in December. Mr Nxumalo was
of the view that Malahleni was disbanded because it was not
supporting the NDZ campaign but that of CR17 faction and
was not doing things the NDZ way.

392.

Mr Nxumalo indicated that there was still instability and fear
in his area, even after the national elective conference.

SANELISIWE HLONGWA

393.

(VOL 3).

She testified on 24 May 2017. The late Nkosinathi Hlongwa
was her husband. He was murdered on 1 June 2016. They

120   P a g e

 were residing at Imbali, Pietermaritzburg. He was employed
at

uMgungundlovu

District

Municipality

as

a

Local

Economic Development manager.

394.

He was a member of the ANC. They met in 2000 and got
married in November 2013. At the time of his death, they
had no children together, but he had two children. She has
not been involved in politics. He was a branch Chairperson
of the Youth League in Ward 12 and thereafter became the
branch Chairperson of the ANC in ward 12. Edendale also
fell under ward 12.

395.

Mr Hlongwa was a loving person. He loved politics and he
also loved to help the community around Esigodini area. He
was 42 years old when he passed on. Around May 2016, the
deceased told her that he was tipped for a position at regional
level, but she was unsure of the precise position. Some
people, particularly the community of Edendale, did not take
kindly to the position he was tipped for.

396.

There was another issue of conflict. The people of Edendale
were not happy that the councillor for Ward 12 would come
from Esigodini area. The Edendale residents wanted the
councillor to come from their area. Mr Hlongwa attended a
meeting, but it did not materialise and had to be cancelled.

121   P a g e

 It was on a Saturday before his death and the meeting was
supposed to be held at Thuthuka Hall, however certain
people came and burned the hall down.

397.

People from Edendale threw stones and fired shots inside the
hall. The people inside the hall tried to defend themselves
and got out of the hall. They then proceeded to Esigodini and
continued with the meeting there. After the meeting, when
Mr Hlongwa was on his way to Imbali where he was residing,
a car followed him. Mrs Hlongwa heard of the story after Mr
Hlongwa’s death.

398.

Thuthuka Hall was between Edendale and Esigodini. Mr
Hlongwa had acquired a licensed firearm around April 2016.
On the day he was murdered, 1 June 2016, he left the
witness at home and went to an ANC meeting at Esigodini,
but it did not materialise because of some hiccups. The
meeting ended up taking place at Imbali. After the meeting,
Mr Hlongwa accompanied his comrade to his residence at
Esigodini and then returned home.

399.

She then heard gun shots being fired in her sleep. She
thought they were being fired elsewhere, but it was actually
in their yard. She then heard footsteps in their yard and

122   P a g e

 woke up. She looked and saw him lying down. She went to
him and ascertained that he was dead.

400.

There has not been any arrest for Mr Hlongwa’s murder. The
police have not given the family any feedback on the
investigation. She does not believe that the police are doing
their best to solve her husband’s murder.

401.

She does not think that her husband’s death had anything
to do with his employment at the Municipality. She believes
it was related to ANC politics, his position as branch
Chairperson and the regional position he was tipped for. This
is based on her evidence regarding the community of
Edendale,

the

conflict

regarding

the

Councillor,

the

disruption of the meeting at Thuthuka Hall and the car that
followed him after the meeting.

NKOSINGIPHILE SIMON MKHIZE

402.

(VOL 7).

He testified on 14 June 2017. He is the brother of the late
Mr Wandile Mkhize (“Wandile”), who was murdered on 30
June 2012 in Margate. He was shot together with his friend,
Mr Nhlakanipho Shabane (“Nhlakanipho”).

123   P a g e

 403.

Wandile was 34 years old when he died. He was divorced and
had six children. He was a loving person and the family was
proud of him because he was more educated than the other
family members. After the death of their father in 2002, the
family expected more from Wandile.

404.

He had a Bachelor of Administration degree from the
University of Zululand. He was a member of the ANC and
specifically the Youth League. He was also a member of the
SACP, specifically the Young Communist League. When he
died, he was an additional member of the REC of the ANC.
He did not have any position in the SACP. He was working
at the Hibiscus Coast Municipality, currently known as the
Ray Nkonyeni Municipality. He was an executive committee
member and the Chief Whip of the ANC.

405.

Wandile acquired most of his political skills in the North
Coast of Durban. When it was realised that he was originally
from the South Coast, it was decided that he should go back
and work there at his place of birth. At that stage, the ANC
was about to hold the National Elective Conference in
Polokwane.

124   P a g e

 406.

His duty was to unite all the forces in the South Coast. It
was not easy because he was expected to visit all wards and
all branches and there was a lot of resistance from the people
in the area because some did not know him. His main duty
was to ensure that at the Polokwane conference Mr Jacob
Zuma won the position of ANC president.

407.

Because he was young and influential, some people did not
accept him and also did not take kindly to his work in the
ANC. Mr Zuma won at Polokwane and Wandile was
influential in mobilising for him. Prior to the Polokwane
conference, there were the Regional and the Provincial
conferences. He was assigned to mobilise support in all
branches.

408.

One of his friends who was in power wanted big contracts
(tenders) from Ugu Municipality. Wandile was a councillor at
the time and he advised against corruption and breach of
proper procedure. At that time, Wandile was also a director
of a company from which he resigned to concentrate on
politics, because he said business was not his career of
choice.

125   P a g e

 409.

At national level, he was fostering unity in the ANC. That
could be confirmed by the SMSs he exchanged with national
leaders before his death. He was opposed to factionalism in
the ANC.

410.

On 30 June 2012, Wandile was coming from an ANC policy
conference in Midrand. He returned with an REC leader and
was supposed to sleep in Pinetown that day. His residence
was at Manaba, Margate. However, one of his white friends
was waiting for him at Pinetown and he was going to sleep
over there.

411.

It appeared that on their way back from Midrand, they did
not go to Pinetown but Margate. The witness indicated that
he was suspicious about that fact. Wandile had left the key
to his house with his friend, Nhlakanipho. He then contacted
Nhlakanipho so that they could meet in town to get his key.
They met at Margate and the REC member then left.

412.

They eventually proceeded to his house at Manaba. They
parked the car on the road and Wandile then walked into the
premises, leaving Nhlakanipho behind in the car. Wandile
was then shot several times and died on the spot.
Nhlakanipho must have alighted from the car to investigate

126   P a g e

 the shooting. He was also shot on the scene, apparently by
the same hitmen.

413.

It seems that the target was Wandile and Nhlakanipho was
eliminated because he was a witness who possibly saw the
perpetrators.

414.

Mr Mkhize was notified of the shooting by someone who was
supposedly at Harding, some 100 kilometres away from
Margate. To his surprise, there were a lot Wandile’s
comrades at the scene, but none of them had called to notify
him of the incident, despite having his number. That was
suspicious to him.

415.

He believes that Wandile’s murder was politically motivated,
given his calibre. He was influential and eloquent. Whenever
he spoke, even older people would say that he was indeed a
leader. Some people from the area did not take kindly to the
fact that he had returned to the area. Some of them were
much senior to him and had been active in the area much
longer than he. As a newcomer, he was seen as a threat.

416.

He was tipped for the position of Deputy Secretary at regional
level. A lot of people, especially those who were more senior

127   P a g e

 and active, did not take kindly to his political ascendancy.
His brother suspects that Wandile’s death was related to the
factional fights in the ANC. At the time of his death, Wandile
had direct contact with Mr Zuma and his call for unity also
made him very unpopular.

417.

Two accused, Messrs Sikhakhane and Hlongwa, were
prosecuted for the murders. Mr Mkhize did not know them
before his brother’s death. Neither of them was active in the
ANC at local level. So, he believes that neither of them would
have wanted to kill Wandile. Mr Mkhize heard certain things
about his brother’s murder indicating that the masterminds
behind the scenes were political leaders.

418.

The two accused were acquitted of the two charges of murder
and convicted of illegal possession of firearms. The family is
not happy with the investigation and believes that they were
acquitted because of police inefficiency. The first police
officer who arrived on the scene was Mr Nkosi Khoza and he
made sure that no one would find the real evidence.

419.

The family believes that he deliberately interfered with the
crime scene because he was not even on duty that night.
According to the witnesses’ accounts, Mr Khoza was the one

128   P a g e

 who collected the spent cartridges on the scene. Mr Khoza
subsequently died. After his death, a lot of exhibits were
found in his safe. It is uncertain whether the spent cartridges
relating to Wandile’s shooting were also part of those
exhibits.

420.

The family is also unhappy with the manner in which the
trial was conducted. Mr Mkhize complimented police officer
Carstens for his efficiency in his brother’s case. He was
critical of police officer Nyawose who was a bad witness when
he testified at the trial. He could not recall many crucial
details. That had an impact on the negative outcome of trial.

421.

Mr Mkhize believes that the Prosecutor did her best in
preparing the police for trial and in conducting the
prosecution, but the police let her down in Court.

422.

Mr Mkhize had deposed to an affidavit regarding the case on
6 December 2012. Part of the evidence he was going to give
was about what he heard being discussed by the accused,
Mr Sikhakhane, and other people regarding the planning of
the murder. However, he was not called to testify.

129   P a g e

 423.

The family believes that there were masterminds behind the
scene and would like the investigation to be re-opened to
gather evidence against them.

424.

Mr Mkhize also expressed his views on the underlying causes
of political killings. The major factors are greed among
comrades and factionalism. In order to occupy a position,
someone must fall. If you are contesting to be a councillor,
you must die because someone else wants to be a councillor
for five years. Once their term ends, they are nothing again,
if not re-elected.

425.

He believes that the problem may be solved through
academic and political education. He alluded to socioeconomic factors as being contributory factors to the
underlying causes.

BRIAN MFANA SHABANE

426.

He testified on 14 June 2017. He is the brother of the late
Nhlakanipho who was killed together with Wandile. He was
24 years old when he died and was Wandile’s friend. Mr
Shabane confirmed the evidence of Mr Mkhize in so far as he
had mentioned his brother Nhlakanipho. Nhlakanipho was

130   P a g e

 also a member of the ANC and the Secretary of Youth League
at branch level. He was not married. He had one child and a
woman was pregnant with his second child when he died.
Nhlakanipho was very kind and was playing the father figure
to

the

family

because

their

father

was

deceased.

Nhlakanipho had three siblings, including the witness. His
passing has had a negative impact on the family financially
and otherwise.

427.

The family shares the sentiments of the Mkhizes regarding
the manner of investigation and the outcome of trial.

SIZWE CEDRIC GWALA

428.

(VOL 16).

He testified on 17 August 2017. Mr Mthunzi Innocent
Gwala (“Mthunzi”) was his brother. He was killed on 14 July
2012 at Unit 17 Hostel, Umlazi. He was 29 years old when
he died. Mr Gwala and Mthunzi were staying at Unit 17
Hostel. Their home is at Endulinde in Mandeni. He was
single, had two children and was employed.

429.

Mthunzi was a member of the NFP and prior to that had been
a member of the IFP. He joined the NFP in 2012 when it was
introduced at the Hostel where the IFP was more dominant.
When the NFP was formed, IFP members at the Hostel were

131   P a g e

 not welcoming to the idea. Some people ended up being
killed.

430.

On 14 July 2012 around 15h30, Mr Gwala and Mthunzi
went to a tavern at the Hostel to have drinks. Someone, who
was an IFP member, said he does not drink with NFP
members. Mthunzi responded by saying he was indeed an
NFP member and even showed the NFP T-shirt he was
wearing. Mr Gwala then told Mthunzi that they should leave
because of the quarrel, which they did.

431.

They were staying in different rooms at the hostel and they
parted ways for their respective rooms. Mr Gwala decided to
sleep. He was subsequently woken up with news that his
brother was dead. He believes that Mthunzi was killed for
political reasons because of the quarrel regarding his NFP
membership and the T-shirt.

432.

He also cited a previous incident as evidence to reinforce his
belief regarding the political motive for Mthunzi’s murder. A
certain Mr Thabethe was going to be killed and the hitmen
had been seen by Mthunzi, who notified Mr Thabethe. Mr
Thabethe was an NFP member. Mr Thabethe was going to be

132   P a g e

 killed because he was an NFP member. The NFP and IFP
were not seeing eye to eye at the time.

433.

Two suspects were arrested for Mthunzi’s murder. There was
a trial in the Durban High Court and both accused were
found not guilty. The family is satisfied that the police did
their best in terms of investigation, but they are not satisfied
with the prosecution. A material witness not called to testify
at the trial. The prosecution did not explain to the family why
she was not called and also whether there were any
difficulties in proving the case for the State.

434.

The accused who were charged with Mthunzi’s murder are
the same ones that were seen by Mthunzi who notified Mr
Thabethe that they had come to kill Mr Thabethe. The person
who quarrelled with Mthunzi at the tavern was the brother
of one of the murder accused. Mr Gwala believes that the
suspects had planned to kill Mr Thabethe but could not
carry out their plan.

BRIGADIER BONGANI MAQHASHALALA
435.

Brigadier Maqhashalala testified as part of the SAPS
delegation. What we shall deal with here is his evidence
relating to his report on concluded cases of alleged political

133   P a g e

 murders and another document headed Consolidated Report
– Political Cases. The rest of his evidence will be considered
when we analyse the input of SAPS.

436.

With regard to the deceased ANC COUNCILLOR JIMMY
JABULANE LEMBETHE, from Ward 8 Umtshezi Local
Municipality, the evidence is that on 17 August 2012 he was
attacked and shot, together with his wife and children. His
wife sustained a gunshot wound below her left knee and
burn wounds to right leg caused by boiling water. One child,
Nhlanhla Nzuzo aged 11, sustained burn wounds from
boiling water and Nontando Lembethe aged 6 years,
sustained gunshot wound to left leg and burn wounds to her
face caused by boiling water.

437.

The suspects came through the kitchen door and knocked.
Councillor Lembethe opened the door. He then offered them
two chairs to sit whilst they waited for him. They pretended
to sit. One of them drew a pistol and began shooting at the
family who were in the kitchen. Mr Lembethe died on the
scene.

438.

Bad blood existed between the ANC, IFP and NFP over
control of the area. The Municipality was led by the ANC. The
friction was exacerbated by a road construction project

134   P a g e

 which was believed to be dominated by the IFP and NFP as
workers.

439.

The project was allegedly stopped by the ANC as the majority
party. This angered IFP and NFP supporters as that deprived
them of jobs.

440.

Two people were arrested and charged. It was established
that they were members of the NFP and brothers to the NFP
PR Councillor. Both accused were convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment for murder and ten years attempted
murder.

441.

According

to

Brigadier

Maqhashalala,

the

possible

underlying causes were the inter party political conflict and
allocation of jobs to people affiliated to a particular political
party and the use of projects by politicians to lobby for
support.

442.

He further reported on the murder of Mr WISEMAN
MSHIBE, an ANC Ward 80 Councillor at Umlazi. (Montclair
CAS 22/3/2011).

443.

According to the reports, ANC members were not happy with
the manner in which he conducted himself as Councillor. He

135   P a g e

 was perceived to be very strict. He was assassinated on 1
March 2011 outside his residence on his way from a political
meeting. He was about to enter his house at Yellowwood Park
when he was shot. He managed to drive way but later
collapsed and died. One person, who is an ANC member was
arrested, charged, convicted and sentenced to 25 years
imprisonment for murder.

444.

The

possible

underlying

cause

of

the

murder

was

factionalism and competition for positions within the ANC.

445.

Brigadier Maqhashalala further reported on the deceased
ISAAC

THULEBONA

NHLEBELA

(DUNDEE

CAS

51/7/2012). The deceased was an NFP Councillor at the
uMzinyathi Municipality. He had the responsibility of seeing
to it that other NFP councillors accounted to him.

446.

The deceased summoned NFP councillors and warned them
they would be removed as they were allegedly not delivering.

447.

On 6 July 2012, on the road along Hazeldene Farm, the
deceased was fatally shot. A hitman and an NFP Councillor,
who was the Deputy Mayor, were arrested. The hitman
implicated two other Councillors. The Deputy Mayor was

136   P a g e

 part of the councillors that had been warned by the
deceased.

448.

The hitman was convicted and sentenced to 18 years
imprisonment. He then deposed to an affidavit wherein he
implicated the Deputy Mayor, two other councillors and
another hitman. He later refused to testify against the
persons that he had implicated with the result that cases
against them were withdrawn. A triple member case is still
pending in court against the second hitman who was
arrested in September 2017.

449.

Brigadier

Maqhashalala

identifies

the

intra

party

competition relating to competition for positions and the fear
of losing jobs as an underlying cause of the murder of the
deceased.

450.

There had been an earlier attempt to kill Mr Nhlebela on11
April 2011 in Greytown. (Msinga CAS 43/4/2011). The same
Deputy Mayor and another NFP Councillor were arrested for
attempted murder. Key witnesses died from natural causes
resulting in the withdrawal of the charges against the two
accused.

137   P a g e

 451.

On 16 February 2011 at Ntabamhlophe Road near Blue Haze
Mr MCEBISI DUMA, an IFP Councillor in the Mbabazane
Municipality, who had joined the NFP, was travelling along
the Ntabamhlophe road when the occupants of a Toyota
Corolla opened fire on him thereby killing him. The suspects
abandoned the Toyota at the scene and fled.

452.

Four hitmen were arrested and one of them was convicted
and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The second
accused died. The charges were withdrawn against the third
accused. The fourth accused turned state witness and
testified against the first accused. He was later sentenced to
life imprisonment in respect of another unrelated murder.

453.

There was political friction and intolerance between the IFP
and NFP in the area. The underlying cause of the murder
was the political intolerance between the IFP and the NFP
fuelled by competition for power and influence.

454.

Brigadier Maqhashalala also reported about the murder of
ANC eThekwini Regional Secretary Sibusiso Sibiya, who was
assassinated during July 2011. He states that the deceased
was shot at his residence at Inanda. A suspect was arrested.
A key witness was killed in an unrelated taxi incident,
resulting in the withdrawal of the case against the suspect.

138   P a g e

 455.

Notwithstanding the fact that most witnesses before the
Commission and political commentators believe that the
killing of Mr Sibiya was politically motivated or related to
politics, Brigadier Maqhashalala states that the accused that
died “could not be linked to political circles.”

DEAN WILLIAM MACPHERSON (VOL 20).

456.

He testified on 28 August 2017. He is a member of the
Democratic Alliance (“DA”), an MP and constituency head for
Richmond. He is the DA's Shadow Minister for Trade and
Industry. He has been residing in KwaZulu-Natal his whole
life. He made a written presentation to the Commission and
also referred to certain annexures that were not submitted
as evidence.

457.

He has been a member of the DA for about 16 years and a
public representative since 2009. He served in the eThekwini
Municipality Council as a Ward Councillor for Durban North
from 2009 to 2014. In 2014, he was elected to the National
Assembly as a Member of Parliament for KwaZulu-Natal.

139   P a g e

 458.

He was appointed by his party as the constituency head for
Gingindlovu East, which includes Richmond in 2014, shortly
after the elections.

459.

Since he became the constituency head for Richmond, they
have witnessed a climate of fear, intimidation and killings in
the Municipality which has virtually brought service delivery
to a halt. Corruption was rife, the budgets have had to be
slashed and, as a result, service delivery has been severely
compromised.

460.

In November 2015, the then Municipal Manager’s office and
a town hall were set alight by unknown suspects. It was
believed to be a result of factional issues between the SACP
and the ANC in Richmond. On 17 October 2015, Mr
MTHULISI NGCOBO was shot dead outside his home. He
was the brother of the then Deputy Mayor, Thulile Ngcobo.

461.

He was the head of the Municipal Security Services. It was
believed that his murder was politically motivated because
of Mr Ngcobo’s connection to the Municipal Executive and
that it was regarding a scramble for positions within the
executive head of the then 2016 elections.

140   P a g e

 462.

On 6 March 2017, Mr SIBUSISO SITHOLE was gunned
down in Richmond around 9h00 by two unknown gunmen
behind the police station. There have been no arrests and no
further statements from the police have been made, despite
the Police Minister making assurances that a high-powered
task team had been appointed within the Hawks to deal with
the murder.

463.

Mr Sithole was the Municipal Manager for Richmond
Municipality and his term was about to come to an end. He
was about to take up a new position at the Umgeni
Municipality as Municipal Manager.

464.

Mr Macpherson had information that Mr Sithole had
bodyguards from the Municipality, but he had chosen to
leave them at his office or in fact did not inform them of the
reason why he had been called to this particular meeting
point to meet whoever he was supposed to meet when he was
murdered.

465.

It was strange that he had chosen to do so and they were not
sure why he decided to make that choice. In October 2016,
the Department for Cooperative Governance and Traditional
Affairs had gazetted a request that they had received from

141   P a g e

 Richmond Municipality to make two councillors of the
executive designated full time.

466.

At the time of the elections, only the Mayor had been
designated a full time executive committee member. After
the elections, the executive in terms of the ANC component
had been reduced by one because the DA had taken a seat
in the executive because of the election results.

467.

It was brought to the DA’s attention by Mr Sithole that this
request had been made and he requested that they put in an
objection to it because it would be difficult for him to do so
from his position. Mr Macpherson then submitted an appeal
to the MEC Mrs Nomusa Dube-Ncube on 25 October 2016.

468.

He detailed why it was problematic for the Municipality to
designate two more councillors full time. The Municipality
was in a very serious financial situation and was running at
a R9 million deficit and for a Municipality that had an R80
million budget, that posed a very serious problem.

469.

Mr Sithole had also had to slash the capital budget by half,
from R34 million to R17 million, which meant that there
would be less service delivery and less capital projects to be

142   P a g e

 built in the Municipality. Mr Macpherson had calculated
that roughly it would cost the Municipality an extra R20
million over five years to designate the Deputy Mayor and the
Speaker full time. Both were ANC members.

470.

On 8 November 2016, Mr Macpherson received a response
from the MEC’s office that she had considered and declined
the Municipality’s application. That meant that those two
councillors would be considered ordinary councillors and
would receive ordinary salaries.

471.

Mr Sithole was unfortunately killed on 6 March 2017. Mr
Macpherson believes that the issue of designating the two
councillors full time played a part in Mr Sithole’s continued
unpopularity in the Municipality. Mr Sithole had also
recently suspended a Senior Manager for unauthorised
payments to a particular company and for a section 36
contract.

472.

A section 36 contract is basically a contract without tender,
so it is deemed to bypass normal tendering processes. It is
done when it is deemed to be an emergency situation. Mr
Sithole was also investigating the CFO of Richmond
Municipality for maladministration and corruption. Mr

143   P a g e

 Macpherson believes that Mr Sithole had deposed to an
affidavit to that effect.

473.

It was particularly disturbing that the Municipality had
chosen not to retain his services despite the many awards
that he had won as the Municipal Manager and for being the
best Municipal Manager in KwaZulu-Natal. Mr Macpherson
believes that, with his anti-corruption views, it had made
him deeply unpopular in the Municipality and therefore the
political executive of the Municipality had chosen not to
extend his contract.

474.

It was for that reason that he sought employment at Umgeni
Municipality, which was itself entering into a very serious
debt crisis. It would have been to Umgeni’s benefit to have
someone

like

Mr

Sithole.

However,

there

were

also

individuals who were becoming concerned at what he would
bring to that Municipality in cleaning it up and cracking
down on corruption.

475.

On

2

April

2017,

the

Deputy

Mayor

of

Richmond

Municipality, Ms Thandazile Phoswa, was allegedly killed by
her boyfriend in her house. No further statements had been
made by the police if he was actually ever charged for the

144   P a g e

 killing. The boyfriend had claimed that she had killed
herself, but she did not own a gun.

476.

There were claims by the community surrounding her that
it was not possible for her boyfriend to kill her and that there
would seem to have been some ulterior motive, but it is
simply unknown because the police do not give updates.

477.

On 30 June 2017, ward 2 Councillor SIFISO MKHIZE, was
killed in a hail of bullets by a number of gunmen. Again, no
arrests have been made. With regard to Mr Mkhize’s murder,
there is a strong belief that it was politically motivated and
that it was caused by ANC factional violence.

478.

With regard to the Deputy Mayor, it does not make sense
that the police came out very quickly after her killing to say
it was not political. Mr Macpherson was not sure how they
came to that assessment so quickly. The boyfriend was
arrested but is was unknown whether he was ever charged.

479.

The point being made was that in all the killings and the
arson that took place, there has not been a single arrest or
communication, despite a lot of visits to the area from
political high flyers.

145   P a g e

 480.

Mr Macpherson believes that the political violence in general
and specifically in Richmond takes place for two reasons.
Firstly, it happens because those that are stealing want to
eliminate those that are trying to expose them and the fact
of the matter is that the ANC is the governing party in KZN.

481.

Those who want to stop the stealing are people that want to
return the party to what it should be in a larger context on
national level from those that have sought to use political
power to enrich themselves to the detriment of the electorate
and ordinary citizens.

482.

There is a big fight within the ANC in KZN in order to have
access to State resources. If you have a tender worth R1
million, it would be expected that some percentage of that
tender would be fed back into party political coffers. The best
example is the Hitachi deal which was done through
Chancellor House, which is the investment arm of the ANC.

483.

Another best example is the killing of Mr SIBUSISO SIBIYA
of Inanda. He was the ANC’s Regional Secretary at the time.
He was a very warm gentleman and had a reputation of being
a no-nonsense man who despised corruption and wanted

146   P a g e

 transparency. Mr Macpherson believes that the murder of
Mr Sibiya was politically motivated.

484.

The eThekwini Municipality budget is nearly R45 billion and
there is a lot of opportunity for cream to be skimmed off the
top towards political parties.

485.

The Chairperson of the eThekwini Region was Mr John
Mchunu. Mr Mchunu and Mr Sibiya were the polar opposites
of each another. Mr Mchunu was known to use access to
State resources within the Municipality to fight Regional
conferences, Branch AGMs and to leverage access to tenders
as an opportunity to get people elected into ANC structures
and to fund those operations.

486.

If one looks at the then Ngubane report which was tabled in
2009 into the Municipality, that made serious allegations of
corruption, maladministration, not only by politicians but
with the assistance of municipal officials. The Ngubane
report then laid the foundation for the Manase report which
went deeper into these allegations that had been made.

487.

It detailed a web of influence and a toxic relationship
between politicians and civil servants in senior positions to

147   P a g e

 tender awards to friends, families and politicians amounting
to tens of millions of Rands.

488.

However, not a single person has been criminally charged in
the eThekwini Municipality from the Manase report.

489.

Mr Macpherson believes that law enforcement is either
involved in the killings or is protecting very senior politicians
in the ANC who are responsible for the killings.

490.

Mr Macpherson could not comment on why Mr Sithole was
allocated bodyguards but indicated that there would have
been a threat assessment that would have been done. They
would have realised that there was a threat to his life and
they would have allocated him protection.

491.

As recommendations, Mr Macpherson indicated that the
ANC needed to come before the Commission and explain
what they are going to do to stop political killings.

492.

In terms of systems and governance, the bid adjudications
for tenders must be made transparent and open to the public
and members of the public must be invited into bid
adjudication committees.

148   P a g e

 493.

When investigations or forensic audits are commissioned,
the recommendations must be implemented. A good example
is the Manase report recommendations.

494.

We need to start appointing people that are fit for purpose,
not fit for cash flows, not fit for assisting in bank accounts,
not fit for pushing tenders. We need to appoint people that
will do the job in terms of legislation, not try to move the goal
posts. The sad thing is that Mr Sithole was a man who was
fit for purpose, but the political environment let him down.

495.

We need to take put a review into the SAPS’s culpability in
these deaths, in whether they have been a part of the killings
or covered up the killings. That question must be answered.

496.

COGTA needs to have a stronger implementation and a
stronger ability to intervene where clear political factional
fighting is taking place in municipalities. They are not strong
enough in intervening where they need to because KZN and
most municipalities are run by the ANC.

149   P a g e

 497.

The Evidence Leader had indicated to the Commission that
there was a statement in the police docket purporting to be
Mr Sithole’s but decided not to place it before the
Commission because it contained sensitive information and
names. The police representatives at the Commission were
given the docket CAS Number in order to follow up on the
allegations.

498.

Subsequently, Brigadier Maqhashalala, who was part of the
SAPS delegation before the Commission, confirmed that Mr
Sithole had indeed made a statement to the Hawks reporting
alleged corruption at the Municipality.

SLINDILE SITHOLE

499.

(VOL 20).

She testified on 28 August 2017. She is the wife of the late
Mr Sibusiso Edward Sithole who was the Municipal
Manager of Richmond Municipality. He was murdered on 6
March 2017 at Richmond. They had been married for two
and a half years when he died and they did not have any
children together and individually.

500.

There are five children that they are assisting. Three of them
are at University, one is in High School and last one in
Primary School. They are assisting them financially,

150   P a g e

 especially with school fees and other school necessities.
None of them are related to either of them.

501.

Sithole was a family man. He was willing to assist people in
the community as he was working for the Municipality. Some
people even misunderstand the limits of service delivery in
the Municipality in that some of the children they are
assisting came to the Municipality requesting school
registration fees.

502.

When the Municipality said it does not provide such
assistance, Sithole would be touched when looking at their
results. He would come home and make a plea to the witness
to assist them personally.

503.

The deceased’s mother is 72 years of age and he also
supported her and his siblings as their father is late.

504.

He did not talk much about his work at home. He worked
even at home and she used to call him a workaholic because
he even forgot that it was the weekend.

151   P a g e

 505.

He was the best husband ever and used to spoil her. He loved
her and people could attest to that because he expressed his
love for her publicly.

506.

She

confirmed

that

she

heard

the

evidence

of

Mr Macpherson, who testified before her. Mr Sithole was due
to start a new job at Umgeni Municipality as Municipal
Manager. She did not know why he was allocated
bodyguards. He never mentioned anything about his life
being threatened but explained that the bodyguards were
members of Umkhonto we Sizwe who needed employment
and he was told that he must take at least two of them so
that they could be employed.

507.

The police had not given the family an update as to what is
happening with the investigation. She did not know whether
anyone had been questioned or arrested about her
husband’s murder. The family is not happy about the lack of
feedback.

508.

The family believes that Mr Sithole’s murder was politically
motivated. This was based on Mr Macpherson’s evidence and
also the fact that he had no enemies.

152   P a g e

 SIMPHIWE DUMA

509.

A direction was made that no person may disclose in any
manner whatsoever his name or address or any information
which was likely to reveal his identity. Any person who
contravened the direction would be guilty of an offence and
liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment not
exceeding 12 months.

510.

He testified on 24 May 2017. He has been residing at
Glebelands hostel since 1995. He is a member of the ANC
and the SACP. There is an alliance at Glebelands between
the ANC and the SACP. He was the Chairperson of the Young
Communist League and then the Deputy Secretary of the
SACP. He was also elected to the ANC leadership as an
organiser.

511.

A vote of no confidence was passed by the residents in the
Councillor. Firstly, there was an ANC branch general
meeting, but he could not recall the date of the meeting. ANC
members voiced their vote of no confidence in the leadership
of the ANC and also in the Councillor. Secondly, there was a
community meeting and the community expressed their vote
of no confidence in the Councillor.

153   P a g e

 512.

He believes that the resolutions of both meetings were
escalated to the next level of the ANC, but he was not sure.
He confirmed that a memorandum was handed to the
eThekwini Municipality regarding the resolutions of both
meetings. Point 5 of the memorandum read “We are not
satisfied about the type of development that is brought to us
and the manner in which it is managed”. Point 6 read “We are
not happy about the fact that our development is being
managed by people who were stripped of power.”

513.

He confirmed that one of the grievances of the residents and
community was the lack of regular meetings that were
supposed to be convened by the Councillor. Those meetings
would have been the forum for the community to air their
concerns and needs and the Councillor would also give
feedback on the Municipality’s plans to improve their lives
and on the management of the hostel.

514.

Given the fact that there was no official forum to air their
views, the residents were then talking in the corridors and
the Councillor regarded that as plans to overthrow those in
power. That caused division in the hostel. The residents
ended up having three protests. That led to the SACP
convening a meeting which was attended by a provincial
delegate,

154   P a g e

Ms

Judy

McKenzie.

The

meeting

basically

 reminded the members who were going to be elected on that
day of their duties and the need for service delivery to be
prioritised.

515.

He alluded to the existence of a hit list on which there were
a number of people to be killed. The people on the hit list
were vocal about lack of service delivery and lack of
meetings. As a result, they were perceived in a negative light
by the leadership. One of the points on the memorandum
read “We want our residential permits to be changed as per
the hostel indaba resolution”. That related to development.

516.

The leadership and the Councillor did not implement the
recommendations of the hostel indaba. The residents ended
up doing as they pleased because there was no management
of rooms and bed space. The permits were linked to rooms
and bed space. As a result of the non-implementation of the
resolutions of the indaba, conflict arose leading to the start
of violence.

517.

The ANC leadership, including the Councillor, had the power
to decide who would work where and when in terms of
developments,

in

the

sense

of

infrastructure

and

construction. The witness confirmed that when two new

155   P a g e

 blocks were built, the residents were not consulted. Those
buildings were meant to benefit residents in terms of job
opportunities, but the only people who benefited were those
in leadership and the Councillor.

518.

Residents were supposed to get preference in terms of the
allocation of units in those new buildings because they were
family units. 98% of those who were seen to be against the
leadership and the Councillor were side lined in terms of job
opportunities and accommodation. That led to violence.

519.

The requests and grievances in the memorandum were
subsequently escalated to the regional and provincial levels
of the ANC, but nothing was done about them. The residents
see themselves as being neglected. Besides the two
buildings, there were other developments at Glebelands.

520.

There was a development of fencing the hostel which was not
a priority for the residents. The residents’ priorities included
the development of areas like the corridors and storm water
drains that put their lives at risk, especially when it was
raining because there was soil erosion that covered the
buildings. Water would seep into their rooms through the
windows.

156   P a g e

 521.

Even with the erection of the fence, the residents were not
consulted. Had there been proper consultation about the
proposed erection of the fence, the residents would not have
accepted it in terms of their priorities. Opportunities were
not afforded to those who were perceived as being opposed
to the Councillor.

522.

He believes that the only solution for the problems at
Glebelands is to remove the current Councillor. The
community believes that the eThekwini Municipality has
neglected them.

523.

He proposed that the leadership and Councillor must
convene regular meetings to discuss issues of concern. There
have been several peace agreements at the hostel, but they
failed because they were not adhered to.

524.

He also recommends that the ANC should afford every
resident an opportunity to be able to join it. One of the
problems is political power and positions. Those who are
perceived as being vocal against the leadership and the
Councillor are not afforded the opportunity to join the ANC.

157   P a g e

 If you are already a member, you are not allowed to attend
ANC meetings.

525.

The violence is not confined inside and around Glebelands
but spreads far and wide. There are many incidents where
people were killed elsewhere, but their killings were related
to the conflict at Glebelands. In the many killings relating to
Glebelands, there have been no successful prosecutions. The
witness also recommends that the SAPS must ensure that
the information given to them is treated confidentially.

LUCAS NDLOVU

526.

A direction was made that no person may disclose in any
manner whatsoever his name or address or any information
which was likely to reveal his identity. Any person who
contravened the direction would be guilty of an offence and
liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment not
exceeding 12 months.

527.

He testified on 17 July 2017. He is 45 years and was residing
at Glebelands hostel from 1989 until 2016. He left because
it was not safe. He is currently employed.

528.

He concurred with the evidence of the witnesses who testified
before him that the causes of the violence at Glebelands are

158   P a g e

 politics, power, financial enrichment (linked to power),
criminality

(warlords

and

hitmen),

failure

by

the

Municipality to properly manage the hostel and failure by the
SAPS and Metro Police to properly police the hostel. The last
two causes are also based on the findings of the Public
Protector.

529.

He was a member of the Peace Committee which was formed
at the beginning of 2016. It consisted of 20 members plus
the Chairperson. The Chairperson was Mr Sibusiso Donda
and he was appointed by the current Premier, Mr Willies
Mchunu. Mr Donda was usually placed by State organs to
assist in places where there was violence. His understanding
was that Mr Donda was a mediator.

530.

The 20 members of the Peace Committee consisted of what
was termed “10 aside” of the Madala Stezi, which was led by
block 52, and “10 aside” of block R. Blocks 52 and R were
the main blocks but were also representing other blocks in
the hostel.

531.

The Peace Committee was formed after the Municipality and
the police had tried but failed to maintain peace. People
continued to die and it was an alternative to try and make

159   P a g e

 peace. The Peace Committee still exists, but its members are
being killed. Mr Donda’s services were terminated around
February 2017. The residents were informed that Mr
Thabani Nyawose from the Municipal Manager’s office would
take over from Mr Donda. While Mr Donda was the
Chairperson of the Peace Committee, it received a lot of
positive feedback and recognition. The witness indicated that
the Peace Committee is gradually losing power and
influence.

532.

Everything was fine until the issue of the selling of bed space
started and that was the cause of the current conflict and
violence between the two main blocks. Bed space is sold at
R1,000. It is illegal and irregular for residents to sell bed
space, but no action is being taken by the Municipality.

533.

Hitmen came into the equation because of the selling of bed
space. The hitmen were not involved themselves in selling
bed space, but they continued killing people from R block.
Selling bed space means evicting someone from a room
where the bed space is and replace him with a new buyer.

534.

A room accommodates four beds, but because of demand
and

160   P a g e

illegality,

sometimes

there

are

more

than

four

 occupants, and in other rooms, there are less than four
occupants.

535.

After the Peace Committee was formed, it was pledged by the
government authorities that no decisions would be taken
without the Committee. That pledge was signed between the
Councillor, representatives from blocks 52 and R, the
Premier and the Mayor. The Councillor was however opposed
to the powers that were given to the Peace Committee.

536.

The Committee started working and yielded positive results
because the killings declined and the people from block R
were able to come to block 52 and vice versa. Politicians,
including the Councillor, were however not happy with the
positive results. There was also a police officer who was
residing in block 52 who was not happy with the good
relations that had developed between the two blocks.

537.

This police officer did not approve of the peace initiatives.
The police officer was residing at Glebelands but was
subsequently removed. However, he is still involved in what
is happening at Glebelands, otherwise people would not
continue being killed. The witness believes that the police
officer is the mastermind behind the violence and that he

161   P a g e

 brought an R5 or R4 rifle that was used in the shooting in
block R.

538.

Money was collected at Madala Stezi and the police officer
told the residents that the rifle cost R9000. The policeman
called them iminqundu and, when he said so, he was making
a call to the people who were involved in perpetrating the
violence. Those people he was calling were at Westville prison
at the time. He was telling them that iminqundu had
neglected them by allowing peace between the two main
blocks.

539.

The police officer used to write memoranda and give
instructions that they must be read at the community
meetings or marches. The memoranda contained names of
people that he said must be evicted from the hostel. The
police officer would write the memorandum and ask
someone else to read it as if it represented the views of the
residents of Glebelands, when in fact it was his personal
views drafted by him alone.

540.

The residents were afraid of him since he was a police officer,
but they realised that it would be problematic in future if the
problem was not resolved. Several members of the Peace

162   P a g e

 Committee were subsequently attacked. As a result, the
witness left Glebelands because he was a member of the
Peace Committee. There were also subsequent attempts on
his life.

541.

Glebelands is an ANC stronghold. Members of the Peace
Committee are members of the ANC. The hitmen are also
members or supporters of the ANC. So, the violence
perpetrated against the members of the Peace Committee
and others is internal within the ANC.

542.

Throughout the violence, the Councillor acted as though
nothing had happened and he did not even want to be part
of the meeting or march where the memorandum was read.
That painted a negative picture to the residents because he
was supposed to assist them as the person deployed by the
Municipality.

543.

Money was collected at the hostel to buy ammunition,
replenish firearms and to bribe the police to release suspects
who were arrested. Based on the information within the
knowledge of the residents, the witness testified that some of
the hitmen at the hostel are being used for political violence,
not only at Glebelands, but elsewhere in the Province.

163   P a g e

 544.

The witness indicated that there are certain blocks at
Glebelands that are controlled by hitmen. The witness
denied that the violence is influenced by ethnicity and
tribalism.

545.

The witness believes that the solution to the problem would
be to remove the Councillor and to deploy the police officer
in question far away, for example at the border. In addition,
police officers from outside the area must be deployed to
police the area and investigate the cases. The witness
remarked that there had been no conviction despite about
19 people having been killed.

MARY DE HAAS

546.

The first witness was Ms Mary De Haas. She qualified herself
as a registered social worker, holding an Honours and
Masters degree cum laude. She had been a university senior
lecturer in social anthropology and the programme director
before her retirement in 2002. She was a violence monitor in
the Province of KwaZulu Natal since 1985. She had worked
in places like Lamontville at the time when that location was
resisting incorporation into the KwaZulu homeland. She had
worked with leaders such as the late Rev Mcebisi Xundu.

164   P a g e

 She worked closely with Professor Paulus Zulu, (who also
gave evidence before the Commission) in places like
Chesterville, Umlazi and Lamontville. She also worked with
Mr Roy Ainsley, a member of the Progressive Federal Party
in taking affidavits from people who were being tortured,
assaulted and imprisoned by the apartheid police. In about
1987, she started keeping data of the violence. She also
worked closely with the Goldstone Commission. From 1990,
she did more than just collect data, but also tried to get the
police to respond and be proactive in preventing the violence.

547.

She obtained funding for a research project based at UKZN
project called the KZN Monitor. That allowed them to do
some legal work and interventions. It started with the
Shobashobane Inquiry where the funders agreed to fund the
lawyers for the victims. After working closely with the
Goldstone Commission (1990

–

1992), then on the

Shobashobane Christmas Massacre (1995 - 1998), the
violence in Richmond and the intra-ANC fratricide, she
reported on the killings at the Glebelands Hostel. She was
also

networking

with

international

organisations

like

Amnesty International to have some action done. There was
a huge amount of interventionist legal work done. There was
a great deal of political violence after the elections in 1994

165   P a g e

 and she was involved in different areas to monitor the
violence.

548.

Ms De Haas testified that the nature of the killings in
KwaZulu Natal changed from inter-party killings (1980s to
1990s), between United Democratic Front/ANC aligned
groups and IFP supporters, to intra-party killings (2011 to
2017), largely among groupings within the ANC itself and its
tripartite allies. She stated that violence of the 1980s and
1990s was state sponsored and was driven by the desire of
the Apartheid regime to keep the Province of Natal (as it then
was) as a bastion against the ANC and the ANC aligned
members of the UDF. She stated that the people who drove
the IFP were largely White – the Apartheid regime. She
alleges that the people pulling the strings behind the scenes
were, for example, Mr Walter Felgate, Mr Ambrosini and
General Jac Buchner (head of the KwaZulu Police).

549.

In the 90s, the violence was mostly between the IFP and UDF
and later the ANC. In the early 2000s, power in the Province
was fiercely contested between the ANC and IFP and the ANC
won it in 2004. Since then, intra-party violence within the
ANC has been on the increase.

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 550.

In the 90s, the violence was mostly between the IFP and UDF
and later the ANC. In the early 2000s, power in the Province
was fiercely contested between the ANC and IFP and the ANC
won it in 2004. Since then, intra-party violence within the
ANC has been on the increase.

551.

According to Ms De Haas, in order to understand the
violence from 2011 onwards, we need to go back to the
Polokwane ANC elective conference. There were clear
divisions within the ANC in KZN at the time and there was a
lot of unhappiness with alleged doctoring of party lists to
exclude some members. Ms De Haas stated that her
frustration was that no conclusive evidence could be
obtained regarding the political violence in order to have
successful prosecutions. However, some of the allegations
were fairly well-founded.

552.

People

were

excluded

before

Polokwane.

There

was

militancy, and people feared that there would be more
violence. After the said Conference some members of the
ANC residing at Glebelands joined the Congress of the People
(COPE). There were a few strong leaders in COPE and that
came out as being an “Eastern Cape thing”. About 2009 there
was violence, especially in Glebelands against these COPE

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 members. Clermont was another area in which there were
threats and incidents of violence, including murders.

553.

Ms De Haas produced a document which she had compiled
listing what she referred to as political killings. (Exhibit B).
She, however conceded that not all the killings were political.
Some of them related to taxi violence, while others were
simply of criminals fighting among themselves.

554.

Dr Zweli Mkhize was the Premier in KZN and when he was
deployed nationally to the ANC, there was competition over
who was going to succeed him. Two divisions emerged then
between Mr Senzo Mchunu and Mr Willies Mchunu for the
leadership of the ANC.

555.

Ms De Haas indicated that over the past years, it has become
increasingly difficult to work out what’s political and what’s
not. One can say with certainty that a deceased person was
an activist in the ANC, IFP or NFP, or he was a councillor or
party official, but sometimes there was no way of knowing
whether or not the motive was political.

556.

Nevertheless, Ms De Haas has kept data of what she regards
as political killings. She made those statistics available to
the Commission for the period 2011 to 2017 and they added

168   P a g e

 up to a total of 80 incidents. She, however, qualified it by
saying that her figures should not be regarded as being
comprehensive and accurate. She had also excluded the
incidents at Glebelands hostel from the said total of 80.

557.

In 2014, people were unhappy with the Councillor at
Glebelands and they wanted him out because they said there
was no service delivery. There were protests in that regard.
Those people who wanted him out were ANC members, but
some of them had been members of COPE that had returned
to the ANC. A lot of the leaders were block Chairpersons and
they were involved in bringing a vote of no confidence in the
local Councillor at an ANC meeting.

558.

An ethnic/tribal label cropped up repeatedly in Glebelands
because some of the dissenters who joined COPE and
returned to the ANC were from the Eastern Cape, namely,
AmaMpondo. AmaMpondo is used to also include AmaXhosa
because of the historical context.

559.

This resulted in violence at Glebelands. People do not trust
the

police

in

general

and

specifically

regarding

the

confidentiality in treating information. In some of these
political killings, there have been arrests. However, one or

169   P a g e

 two cases are currently in Court. There had not been a single
conviction thus far.

560.

Ms De Haas alluded to the fact that one of the underlying
causes of the killings at Glebelands is politics. There was a
concerted effort in the run-up to the 2016 local government
elections

to

field

the

right

candidates

in

different

constituencies in Durban. Many people within the ANC
complained that they were being side lined because the
candidate selection was a foregone conclusion. You had to
be in the right political camp or faction to be selected.

561.

The people who were dissatisfied with the then councillor,
who was the subject of a vote of no confidence, appealed to
the Provincial ANC structures, but they said they got
absolutely nowhere. They said they exhausted all the
avenues. Ms De Haas believes no action was taken by the
ANC because it was essential to get the right candidate in in
terms of factions and patronage.

562.

Another problem in Glebelands is the unlawful eviction from
bed space in rooms under threat of death. If you pay more
protection money, you are allowed to stay in the room. There
was a whole spate of evictions in 2014. Some of the victims
were women who had children. At least two of the women

170   P a g e

 evicted had protection orders against the man who was
effecting the evictions. They went to the police and the police
advised them to move out.

563.

The underlying motive in some of the evictions was political,
in that, those who were targeted were largely block
committee members who were regarded as a thorn in the
flesh of the Councillor. Some of the women victims were their
partners or girlfriends. The other motive for the evictions is
financial gain. There is suspicion that the police probably
took bribes because corruption at the Umlazi Police Station
is fairly well-known. The police were standing back and not
intervening.

564.

Criminals were taking over blocks from which they would
lodge attacks. People in those blocks were paying protection
fees. A great amount of money was being made from
allocating bed space and rooms. Some of that money was
allegedly used to pay hit men.

565.

In 2014, a meeting was held with the eThekwini Municipality
and the Police. The residents demanded the removal of those
criminal elements and indicated that there was a hit list that
was being disseminated. Some of the people on it were
already killed. Ms De Haas testified that she sent a large

171   P a g e

 amount of email correspondence about the evictions to the
Municipal Head of Housing. He did not seem to know that
there were criminal cases to do with intimidation, threats
and evictions.

566.

According to Ms De Haas, hitmen are a big problem in KZN.
This is aggravated by the paramilitary training that was
carried on until 2008. Political killings have been execution
style. Some of the hitmen who were doing the killings at
Glebelands are involved in some of the political killings
elsewhere in KZN. The hitmen are not only hired in political
killings, but also in taxi killings.

567.

Ms De Haas also testified about the KwaMashu Hostel. The
KwaMashu Hostel has historically been an IFP stronghold
and that dates back to the eighties. In short, her analysis
was that when the NFP broke away from the IFP in 2011.
That caused tension between the two parties, which led to
political violence in 2011/2. The ANC is not dominant at the
KwaMashu Hostel. However, when COPE broke away from
the ANC, there were reported incidents of political violence
between the two parties.

568.

There are financial benefits attached to being a Councillor.
In all political parties, becoming a Councillor is a way of

172   P a g e

 enrichment because you have families and connections who
set up companies to receive tenders. There is evidence of
corruption in municipalities, provincial and national levels
in terms of procurement, tenders and kickbacks.

569.

Ms De Haas was asked whether the political violence was
high or not in KZN, compared to other provinces. She replied
that it was difficult to say. However, she alluded to the fact
that KZN has a well-documented culture of violence
historically. It suited the apartheid regime for black people
to kill each other. Therefore, guns were brought into the
Province. In her analysis in general, KZN leads the pack in
terms of the levels of political violence.

570.

She believes that there has not been transformation in
policing, if one considers that the Kwa-Zulu police were
largely directed by the former apartheid security police. After
1994, the former apartheid police were largely right wing.
What was carrying on was a complete lack of transformation.
Instead of promoting decent, credible black SAPS members,
it was the former Kwa-Zulu police members who were
generally promoted beyond their levels of competence.

571.

After 1994, a number of former white security police officers
were promoted. However, they kept a low profile and were

173   P a g e

 not necessarily implicated in the TRC process, although
some of them were had committed serious crimes. She
alluded to political interference in the police, particularly in
management nationally and provincially. Many national
commissioners without policing experience have been
appointed.

572.

Traditional leaders are also another problem, in that, very
often, the police bow to them in rural areas. Some of the
traditional leaders have been warlords or have involved
themselves in partisan politics. So, politics is everywhere in
policing. However, in some areas, depending on the station
management, policing is better.

573.

In her analysis and experience, police investigations into
political killings are not effective. It has always been
problematic and exceedingly difficult to get known warlords
convicted. Because of the use of hitmen, it has become
worse. She referred to the murder of Mr Sbu Sibiya, the
ANC’s Regional Secretary who was killed in 2011 at his home
in Inanda. Everyone she spoke to in the ANC said it was an
inside job, because he was unravelling too much corruption.
She was informed by someone who knew Mr Sibiya well that
the police were doing things improperly. There were arrests,
but some key people died or disappeared and a crucial

174   P a g e

 witness was killed. So, the case was withdrawn against the
suspects.

574.

Ms De Haas also raised concerns about the allocation of
political cases for investigation. Failure to utilise good and
experienced detectives with proven track records contributes
to police inefficiency in solving cases. Unfortunately, many
good and experienced detectives have either retired or left
the police. Many investigators try to do their work honestly,
but their commanders are corrupt.

575.

There are all sorts of intervening variables. Dockets
sometimes disappear or statements are often badly taken.
Another big problem, including in Glebelands, is that the
police

make

malicious

arrests

or

fabricated

arrests,

sometimes without enough evidence. This is sometimes
aggravated by the collusion of some prosecutors who do not
screen cases properly, leading to the withdrawal of the
charges.

576.

She referred to a policeman who was living in Glebelands
and was allegedly bringing in guns there, including an R4 or
R5 rifle. She notified the cluster commander in writing and
asked him to check their guns registers. She never even
received a response.

175   P a g e

 577.

It appears that she has been vindicated by the recent arrest
of the said policeman.

578.

Ms De Haas indicated that she has been working with the
IPID since the early nineties. In her experience, the IPID has
been very disappointing. She cited the case of Mr Zinakile
Fica, a Glebelands resident who died in police custody while
he was being interrogated. The IPID was very lax about the
investigation, which dragged on.

579.

Ms De Haas also referred to the cases of Messrs Richard
Nzama and Sipho Ndovela, both Glebelands residents. Their
names were allegedly on a hit list. She wrote to the Police
Management who promised to act on it, but nothing much
happened. Mr Ndovela was shot dead at Umlazi Magistrate’s
Court. A couple of months later, Nzama was picked up by
the police and tortured.

580.

When the IPID took over Mr Nzama’s case, the IPID
investigator took a very brief statement from him when Mr
Nzama was in no fit state to make it. He subsequently made
a very detailed statement, giving more detail to the first one,
but the IPID did not act on it. A year passed after the

176   P a g e

 incident, but the identification parade had still not been
held.

581.

Ms De Haas testified about the murder of Mr Joe Dlamini, a
traffic chief who was killed in Pietermaritzburg in 2014. In
her analysis, his murder was linked to politics. There was a
hit list doing the rounds. She was given the names of the
people on that hit list. She was told by inside ANC sources
that all the names on that list were in the Senzo Mchunu
camp.

582.

In response to a question, Ms De Haas alluded to the fact
that there is a correlation between criminal syndicates and
politicians

throughout

the

world,

including

South

Africa. She disputed that poverty has any correlation to the
political killings because there are poorer countries all over
Africa that do not have levels of violence that are equal to
ours.

583.

In her analysis, there are complicating variables. Violence in
any form, including political, is also aggravated by the fact
that criminals get away with it, and when they do, they will
carry on doing it. There is no message of deterrence out
there. It is about the fundamental nature of our society actors that are facilitators, poverty, unemployment, bad

177   P a g e

 policing, the fact that there are so many guns, etcetera are
fuelling it.

584.

Another contributing factor is the private security industry.
It is common knowledge that there are more security officers
than the police. The security industry is very badly
regulated. At the time of the Polokwane Conference, there
were allegations that there were guns being used from the
private security industry. In her analysis, there is a
correlation between the private security industry, the taxi
industry, politics and political killings. Often, the same
security companies guard the taxi industry and politicians.

Ms De Haas’ Recommendations

585.

(a) Politicians must set an example by competing peacefully
and responsibly over positions.
(b) The police must be reconstituted by identifying police
officers who have clean track records and who have done
good work.
(c) Crime intelligence must cease being subverted for political
ends and must be reconstituted and empowered.

178   P a g e

 (d)

Experienced

and

credible

people,

including

retired

policemen, must be brought in to train detectives and IPID
investigators.
(e)

The guns and cache of weapons, still unaccounted for in

this Province, must be found and accounted for.

VANESSA BURGER

586.

She testified on 17 July 2017. She is a graphic designer by
profession. She does community based human rights work
in her spare time and calls herself an independent
community activist for human rights and social justice. She
is a sole practitioner and is not attached to any organisation
or political party. Her testimony focussed on the Glebelands
hostel as from March 2014 up to July 2017.

587.

She was doing community work with other hostels and
started off at Dalton hostel in 2008/2009 during the
xenophobic attacks. She worked with Mthembiseni Thusi,
the Chairman of Dalton hostel who is also the Deputy
Chairperson of Ubunye bama Hostela (Hostel Dwellers
Association). He then got her involved in issues of other
hostels and when a Glebelands man was tortured and killed
in police custody, they invited her to assist the family. That
is how she became involved in Glebelands.

179   P a g e

 588.

She concurred with the other witnesses that the causes of
the violence at Glebelands are politics, power, financial
enrichment (linked to power), criminality (warlords and
hitmen), failure by the Municipality to properly manage the
hostel and failure by the SAPS and Metro Police to properly
police the hostel. The last two causes are based on the
findings of the Public Protector.

589.

She had compiled documents for the Commission entitled
“Glebelands Stats”, “List of Deceased” and a “Chart”, to
which she referred in her testimony. (Exhibit E). There are
71 blocks altogether at the hostel and they are divided into
three, the very old ones, the not so old ones and the new
ones, which are family units. There are approximately
22,000 residents.

590.

Some of the medium aged blocks are overcrowded and the
old ones are grossly overcrowded. People are living in terrible
conditions and the level of unemployment is very high.

591.

There are collections going on in the old blocks and residents
are forced, often at gunpoint, to contribute specified
amounts of money and are threatened with eviction if they

180   P a g e

 do not do so. The amounts may vary but the average is about
R50 per person. There is a group of politically connected
criminals who move from block to block taking collections.
This money is used to purchase firearms, pay for hitmen and
bribe investigating officers, prosecutors and magistrates.
The number of blocks that are controlled by criminals is 14.

592.

Ms Burger stated that the underlying causes alluded to
above are interlinked. From 2014 to date, they had
connected 89 killings throughout the Province to Glebelands
hitmen or their associates. There are also 6 additional deaths
that are unconfirmed but are strongly suspected to be linked
to the same hitmen and their associates. That also includes
people who have died of stress related illnesses brought on
by their violent eviction from Glebelands.

593.

Many of them became unemployed because of the violence.
They were starving, developed health problems and died.
Seven of them reported that they had been tortured by the
police and two of them had since died. Five of them are being
investigated by the IPID. One of the tortured victims was a
woman. Nine people reported that they had malicious or
fabricated charges brought against them and were either
acquitted or had these charges withdrawn.

181   P a g e

 594.

Ms Burger also referred to the findings of the Public Protector
regarding

the

failure

of

the

Department

of

Social

Development to fulfil its responsibility to the victims of the
violence at Glebelands.

595.

Ms Burger further stated that in 2008/9 there was political
conflict involving the ward councillor at the time. He
orchestrated violence against COPE members and members
of the block committees who had been raising concerns
about service delivery and corruption. A lot of questions were
being asked about the allocation of rooms in the new blocks.
The people that were asking questions were members of
COPE and were then targeted with violence.

596.

From that time, there was unhappiness with the Ward
Councillor and the ANC BEC. A vote of no confidence was
passed in the BEC and the Councillor, an ANC member, who
was asked to resign in 2012/3. The unhappiness was not
limited to Glebelands but extended to the informal
settlements

surrounding

Glebelands.

The

community

leaders started mobilising the community, leading to
protests.

182   P a g e

 597.

The issues were escalated through the ANC structures and
the Municipality, but no action was taken. Eventually, as the
protests intensified towards the end of 2013, the Councillor’s
office was burnt down. Immediately, the Municipality
allocated the Councillor 24-hour security and bulletproof
vehicles at a cost of R230 000.00 a month to the ratepayers.

598.

Early in 2014, there was a meeting that was attended by the
community and leaders from the informal settlement. Most
of the top ANC leaders from the Province attended.

599.

Ms Burger further disclosed that a warlord was working with
a police officer from Durban Central SAPS and had brought
in hitmen. He recruited and armed them and housed them
in some of the rooms from which residents had been evicted.
That policeman was also staying in Glebelands and brought
firearms, including a rifle. That policeman was reported in
writing to the police at provincial and national levels, as well
as to the IPID.

600.

The hitmen were used to kill members of the block
committees and many people were killed. The block
committees were instrumental in mobilising the community
in protests relating to service delivery and perceived

183   P a g e

 corruption. They were thus perceived to be mobilising
against the Ward Councillor.

601.

She agreed with the view that the hitmen that are housed at
Glebelands are also used all over the Province not only for
political killings, but also taxi assassinations and other
crimes. If you need a hitman, you go to Glebelands.

602.

Ms Burger made an example of the late Mr John Mchunu,
who was a Regional Chairperson of the ANC. In 2008, he
apparently invited Councillors who had hostels in their
wards to a meeting. He said that the hostel budgets were
going to come out soon and he suggested that they must
start their own businesses for construction, cleaning or
security, and many of them did.

603.

Glebelands has always been an ANC stronghold. Corruption
is very easy to conceal when there is no opposition looking
over your shoulder. There are allegations that contracts are
awarded to politically connected individuals at Glebelands.
In that way, the violence becomes self-sustaining, because
the more violence there is, the more you can justify contracts
for security and the installation of CCTV cameras.

184   P a g e

 604.

According to Ms Burger many of the “developments” that
have been embarked upon at Glebelands are illogical. It was
important that the Councillor be retained in that position so
that the contracts could be pushed through with no
difficulty. A portion of the funds were allegedly channelled to
the ANC provincial coffers.

605.

On the effectiveness of the police, Ms Burger stated that the
police are not “clean” and that they are actively involved in
some cases. The police are not politically independent. The
whole problem is about politics and money. From the
Provincial Commissioner down, there is interference with
good police officers that have been trying to do decent work.

606.

Cases were interfered with and fabricated statements were
found in dockets, including statements from people that did
not even exist. The police at Umlazi SAPS, which is right next
to Glebelands, are discredited in the community’s eyes and
have no credibility. Most of them have proved to be corrupt.
There is evidence of their involvement in many instances of
torture, theft and damage to property. The ones who are
trying to do their work properly are “sort of politically
smacked down”.

185   P a g e

 607.

She made an example of Mr Zinakile Fica, a block committee
Chairperson, who was taken by the police to a satellite police
station near Isipingo and was tortured. He died in police
custody and the matter was reported to the IPID. There was
interference from the police at that time to try to mess up the
case. Despite the IPID’s involvement, there had been no
progress in the investigation. Ms Burger alleged that the IPID
was basically dysfunctional.

608.

She also referred to the example of Mr Sipho Ndovela. He had
been receiving death threats for some time. He was a witness
in a murder case and had witnessed a warlord’s involvement
in Mr Fikile Siyepu’s murder. He made a statement to the
police about what he had seen and was targeted because he
was a witness. So, he was taking a huge risk by trusting the
police and thought they would protect him. He was never
offered witness protection and the police lied that it had been
offered to him.

609.

Ms Burger, Mr Ndovela and the community leaders were
begging for him to be placed in witness protection. He had a
fabricated case of attempted murder brought against him.
There were many people at Glebelands that were targeted,
and malicious charges were fabricated against them. So, Mr
Ndovela appeared in court as an accused and his case was

186   P a g e

 withdrawn at Umlazi Magistrate’s Court. Ms Burger was on
her way to fetch him from court when she was informed
telephonically that he had just been killed at court. The
police had failed to protect Mr Ndovela.

610.

She believes that there is political interference in every
government department in KZN and nationally.

611.

Due to the high level of unemployment in hostels, in 2006,
the residents asked the municipality if they could not start
their own cooperative to service the needs of the hostels by
doing small repairs and maintenance jobs. The municipality
did not like the idea because it was going to take away the
self-enrichment and if the violence stopped, that would also
cut off the money from tenders. A lot of residents have been
saying that they are making money from their blood.

Ms Burger’s Recommendations

612.

(a) The ANC must learn to listen to the community.
(b) Remove the Councillor.
(c) Disband the BEC as it has no legitimacy.

187   P a g e

 (d) All the police that have been implicated must be
investigated, but must be suspended in the meantime and
removed from the area.
(e) The police and the IPID from national level must take over
the

investigation

of

cases

together

with

dedicated

prosecutors.
(f) The cases should be removed from Umlazi Magistrate’s
Court and transferred to Durban Magistrate’s Court.
(g) As per the Public Protector’s recommendations, the
evicted

people

must

be

provided

with

alternative

accommodation.
(h) Visible policing must be deployed on the ground to do
patrols between the blocks.
(i) There must be public engagement and participation in
resolving issues.
(j) The security company, Secureco, that was contracted by
eThekwini municipality must be removed from the hostel as
two of its employees have been involved in murders.
(k) Employees of contracted security companies must be
vetted at both local and provincial levels.

JABULANI MAPHUMULO

613.

A direction was made that no person may disclose in any
manner whatsoever his name or address or any information
which was likely to reveal his identity. Any person who

188   P a g e

 contravened the direction would be guilty of an offence and
liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment not
exceeding 12 months.

614.

He testified on 23 May 2017. He has been residing in
Glebelands hostel for 31 years.

He confirmed that the

residents of Glebelands have been working with Ms Mary De
Haas and Ms Vanessa Burger for many years regarding the
violence at the hostel.

615.

He concurred that the causes of the violence at Glebelands
are politics, power, financial enrichment (linked to power),
criminality

(warlords

and

hitmen),

failure

by

the

municipality to properly manage the hostel and failure by
the SAPS and Metro Police to properly police the hostel. The
last two causes are also based on the findings of the Public
Protector.

616.

He believes that politics is the root cause of the situation in
Glebelands. For purposes of voting, Glebelands falls under
ward 76. The ANC is the biggest and dominant party at the
Hostel. There is also the SACP which is in alliance with the
ANC and SANCO. Years ago, some members left the ANC and
joined COPE. However, COPE is no longer active at
Glebelands.

189   P a g e

 617.

The witness is a member of both the ANC and SACP. He was
once an executive member of the ANC and is currently the
Secretary of the SACP. The current Councillor at Glebelands
is serving his third term of office.

618.

The relationship between the SACP and ANC leadership in
Ward 76 is not good. The witness dealt with the history of
contestation for power between two comrades. One of them
is Mr Vusi Zweni. He and other comrades left the ANC and
joined COPE. After some time, some of them returned to the
ANC. However, Mr Zweni did not return. The persons who
returned were marginalised in the ANC and referred to as
criminals.

619.

That led to the existence of two groups, the so-called
criminals and non-criminals. The two were at loggerheads
giving rise to hostility and division. There was also no unity
and working relationship between the SACP and ANC.

620.

A meeting was held on 7 August 2013 at Megacity, Umlazi.
Mr Willies Mchunu, who was then the MEC for Transport
and Safety, decided to convene that meeting. It was attended
by the ANC and SACP. The witness was the Secretary of the

190   P a g e

 SACP at the time. The leaders who attended included the
current and former Mayors of eThekwini Municipality and
the then Regional Secretary of the ANC.

621.

The causes of the problems in Ward 76, of which Glebelands
is part, were discussed. One issue was the acceptance of the
persons who had returned to the ANC and the resolution of
political disputes and grudges among comrades. The other
issue that was discussed was AGMs, where the leadership is
nominated. It was agreed that all members of the alliance
must be invited to those AGMs to give support to one
another.

622.

The other matter related to meetings of the Alliance. It was
agreed that the Secretaries of the parties must meet and
discuss the agenda for those alliance meetings. One of the
resolutions was that no party should be regarded as being
dominant. There were 11 resolutions that were taken, but
sadly none of them were implemented.

623.

That failure to implement has a bearing on the political
conflict and violence in Glebelands. The then Regional
Secretary of the ANC denied that the resolutions were even

191   P a g e

 taken. Mr Willies Mchunu asked the witness to make copies
of the resolutions so that the ANC would relook at them.

624.

The witness did, but he was disappointed because the ANC
branch Secretary did not show up at the meeting that was
scheduled. He then called him and went to his room to give
him the resolutions. They were supposed to discuss them,
but unfortunately that did not materialise because the ANC
branch Deputy Secretary came and took the Secretary away,
apparently to meet the police. After that, the resolutions
between the parties were never discussed.

625.

The witness alluded to the fact that even they, as the
leadership of the SACP, did not accept the comrades who
had returned from COPE until an SACP AGM that was held.
At that SACP AGM, Ms Judy Metkins pointed out that what
they were doing was wrong and persuaded them to fully
accept the comrades. After that AGM, they sat down with
those comrades and stopped marginalising them.

626.

The Councillor was not enamoured of the fact that the SACP
was henceforth embracing those comrades who had
returned from COPE. There was a dispute between the
Councillor, on the one hand, and Mr Zweni and the members

192   P a g e

 who were regarded as working with Mr Zweni, on the other.
The witness believes that the cause was the political contest
between

the

Councillor

and

Mr

Zweni.

Both

were

Chairpersons and Councillors of the ANC at different times.

627.

A memorandum, dated 13 November 2013, was compiled by
the community and addressed to the eThekwini Municipality
Council. It contained grievances regarding the Councillor
and other issues at Glebelands. Point number 7 stated “The
Councillor that we nominated, we do not need him anymore
because he is disorganising us, but the council is pushing him
down our throats”. However, the eThekwini Council did not
do anything regarding the community’s unhappiness about
the Councillor.

628.

It was further stated in the memorandum that the
community wanted to be part of the development at the
hostel, specifically the building of new blocks. There was
violence, and people were fighting when the rooms in those
new blocks were allocated.

629.

Politics, power, slates and conflict have a bearing on the
violence at Glebelands. He mentioned two of the many
victims of the violence. The ANC branch Chairperson, Mr

193   P a g e

 MBONA was fatally shot. Mr Mbona was not a biased leader
and he consulted all the comrades in his leadership. By so
doing, he was regarded as a hypocrite by some because of
his all-inclusive manner. He believes that Mr Mbona was
killed for political reasons.

630.

The second example was Ms ZODWA SIBIYA who was killed
in April 2016 at Glebelands. She was a principled person
who stood for what she believed. She believed in unity and
was active in uniting people. She was a member of the ANC
and SACP.

631.

The community saw her as an appropriate person to lead
their development and upliftment. She also consulted with
the

comrades

who

returned

from

COPE

and

was

consequently perceived as a hypocrite, just like Mr Zweni.
The witness believes that Ms Sibiya was also killed for
political reasons.

632.

He heard that someone was arrested for Mr Mbona’s murder
but did not know whether anyone had been prosecuted and
what had become of the case. There was no arrest regarding
Ms Sibiya’s murder.

194   P a g e

 633.

He alluded to the fact that the community does not trust the
police and the manner in which they investigate cases of
violence at Glebelands. In substantiation, he referred to the
incident of Mr Fica who died at the hands of the police, as
well as Mr Sipho Ndovela, who was a State witness. Mr
Ndovela was taken by the police to Umlazi Magistrate’s Court
and was fatally shot there. The community also does not
believe that the police treat information confidentially.

634.

The witness stated that the problems at Glebelands can be
resolved if the senior political leadership of the ANC does the
right thing by ensuring that the ANC and SACP work
together within strict structures, lines of authority and
procedures.

THABISO EMMANUEL ZULU

635.

He testified on 11 and 12 October 2017. He was born in 1981
and resided in Pietermaritzburg. Three days after Mr Chris
Hani’s murder, a mass march was organised to Market
Square. He participated in it and that was the start of his
political career. He became involved with the SACP and also
joined the ANC Youth League.

195   P a g e

 636.

In 1996, he was elected to the BEC as the publicist of the
ANC Youth League. Most comrades had dual membership of
the SACP and ANC. At some point, Mr Zulu was residing in
Smero where there were self defence units (SDUs). Firearms
that were meant for the SDUs were then being used for
criminal acts and some of which were organised in his
presence,

hence

the

notion

of

comtsotsis

(criminal

comrades). He, however, did not participate in the execution
of these criminal acts.

637.

Around 2005, he became the first Regional Secretary of the
ANC Youth League at Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma subregion of Harry Gwala Region.

638.

An IFP Councillor had died at Kilmore necessitating a byelection to be held in 2005. Certain comrades of his
approached him requesting “material”, referring to guns. He
replied that he no longer touched those things. These
comrades feared that they might be attacked by their own
ANC comrades.

639.

Kilmore was an IFP stronghold but the witness’ comrades
were fearful of one another. Those comrades then left and
returned with two rifles. The by-election was won by the IFP.

196   P a g e

 Mr Zulu explained why his comrades feared one another.
They believed that those who had lost in the BGM elections
were bitter and angry. They feared that the persons that had
been nominated would attack them.

640.

The negotiations for merging uMzimkhulu into Harry Gwala
started

around

2005.

Night

meetings

were

held

by

ANC/Youth League/SACP members. They wanted to ensure
that the transition was smooth and that uMzimkhulu was
not going to be swallowed into KwaZulu-Natal, but that they
would become equal partners, both in government and in
ANC structures. Those meetings were unofficial as they were
not sanctioned by the ANC leadership.

641.

The regional office bearers of the Youth League were elected
on 20 August 2006 at uMzimkhulu. MR SINDISO MAGAQA
was the Chairperson, Mr Zulu was the Secretary and Mr
Bheki Mtolo was the Deputy Chairperson. The three of them
had a very close working relationship. They built branches
of the Youth League through sweat and sacrifice.

642.

The regional conference of the ANC was approaching, which
created a very unstable climate in the region. This was
because, as the Youth League, they we were expected to

197   P a g e

 pronounce on who they were going to support in the
upcoming conference. The Youth League supported the
views of people who were not in power at that time.

643.

The Youth League was expected to influence the ANC in its
deployment of persons to municipalities because the Youth
League does not deploy. There were two municipalities that
were resisting everything the Youth League was trying to do.
One of those municipalities was Ingwe Local Municipality,
which was led by a Mayor who wanted to attend the
conference in the company of armed bodyguards.

644.

Mr Zulu and Mr Magaqa objected to him bringing in the
bodyguards. They were removed. The Mayor felt humiliated
at the conference. He was the kind of person who wanted to
be worshipped by everyone. Mr Zulu alluded to the fact that
there are currently similar kinds of people in the ANC, who
want to be worshipped.

645.

The way the Mayor secured bodyguards is the same way
things are currently happening in the region. He started the
current trend. He obtained bodyguards because the SAPS
Crime Intelligence members, with whom he worked, lied.

198   P a g e

 They drafted a dubious and shady report to say certain
people wanted to kill him.

646.

According to Mr Zulu, one of the problems in the ANC is that
people who have a direct line to senior leaders think they are
senior leaders themselves. At some point, certain ANC
comrades were spreading false and malicious rumours in the
media that Mr Magaqa was a former UDM member and that
Mr Zulu was an IFP member. When that strategy failed, the
bodyguards and other people close to the Mayor were
involved in an attempt to kill Mr Zulu.

647.

The other challenge was that the Youth League was raising
issues about the security company that was irregularly
contracted to guard the Mayor at the time. The things that
are currently happening in that regard are the same things
that were happening then. The security company in question
was Globetech. It is owned by Mr Romeo Mbambo, a former
IFP assassin.

648.

According to Mr Zulu, that is how the ANC undermines its
own people. People went to exile and have been working for
the ANC, but when they want protection services, they
contract former IFP assassins. Whenever the Youth League

199   P a g e

 was questioning the appointment of the security company,
senior leaders of the ANC at provincial level did not want to
discuss the matter because they were benefiting from it.

649.

Mr Zulu also referred to Mr Dumisani Khuzwayo, a feared
IFP warlord who joined the ANC around 1999. In a meeting,
Mr Khuzwayo informed those present that he had heard that
the IFP was going to have a meeting and he offered the
comrades R4 rifles to use to prevent people from attending
the IFP meeting. Mr Zulu told Mr Khuzwayo that he was not
going to be allowed to import such an IFP culture into the
ANC.

650.

There was going to be the National Elective Conference in
Polokwane in 2007. There were mumblings within the Youth
League that some of its structures were not supporting Mr
Jacob Zuma. There were certain individuals who were
lobbying quietly for a different candidate of their choice. It
was a time of paranoia in the movement. Your name would
just be mentioned with people who supported Mr Thabo
Mbeki, and you would be isolated and marginalised by other
comrades.

200   P a g e

 651.

There is a special relationship between municipal officials
and politicians. Politicians make sure that when the term of
employment of the municipal officials ends, it is renewed. So,
if you “touch’ municipal officials in any way, you are also
‘touching’

politicians

because

politicians

provide

employment and officials provide tenders. So, you cannot
“touch” any of the two.

652.

The Youth League was going to have its next regional elective
conference. Certain people came to disrupt it because it was
highly contested. The police were there but did not do
anything and people were brandishing guns in front of them.
They were blocking the gate of the conference hotel with cars.
The people who were causing chaos were not even delegates.

653.

Delegates were being phoned by the people who were
outside, who included REC members of the ANC. Delegates
had to get under the tables and take instructions on their
phones regarding what to do. Nevertheless, the conference
was successful and the elections were not contested.

654.

When they were preparing for the ANC regional conference,
there were factions in the region. A new culture emerged.
BGMs were held in secret places and you would hear that

201   P a g e

 your own branch had sat. No information would be
disseminated regarding such A meeting. You would only
hear that a certain person was a delegate. Procedures and
processes were not being adhered to and the number of
delegates was being manipulated.

655.

On the day of the regional conference, Messrs Zulu and
Magaqa attended in their official capacities. Both were ANC
REC members by virtue of being office bearers of the
Regional Youth League committee. They wanted to explain to
the delegates that the conference was already stolen through
the inflation of the number of delegates. Both were, however,
shocked because they were stopped at the gate by political
thugs who were brought to the conference and did not allow
them to enter.

656.

Those thugs were feared because some were involved in
cash-in-transit heists and other crimes. They were using
weapons to protect ANC members. The conference was
presided over by the Chairperson of the Province at the time,
Dr Zweli Mkhize.

657.

As the Youth League, they maintained that the outcome of
that elective conference was irregular. They wrote to the

202   P a g e

 Provincial and National leadership. A task team was set up
to investigate. The task team recommended that the
conference must be re-run and the REC must be disbanded.
When the decision was communicated to the REC by the
PEC, the REC was asked to resign on their own, instead of
being disbanded.

658.

Mr Zulu believes that the PEC did not disband the REC
because they had found new loved ones within the elected
leadership. uMzimkhulu was bringing in a sizeable number
in the Province and they did not want to offend them. Mr
Zulu testified that they were then purged one by one as the
Youth League leadership.

659.

There was a certain Municipal Manager who was once
employed at Kwa-Sani and the REC had deployed him. He
was later acting dubiously in terms of his employment. As a
result, Mr Zulu checked his credit record and discovered that
he had three judgments against his name. The point of the
story was that cadres who were deployed were not being
vetted.

660.

Mr Zulu testified that he is an anti-corruption crusader. He
testified about three ANC councillors at Ingwe municipality

203   P a g e

 who were defrauding SASSA. A letter was written to COGTA
at provincial level, but they did not act and these councillors
continued being councillors. Every time he questioned their
retention, he was told that that they were going to pay back
the money.

661.

Their issue was also discussed in the PEC meeting and it
was said they must be removed, but someone very senior
said they cannot be removed because the comrades who
were involved in “Travelgate”2 were retained in Parliament
and not removed.

662.

Mr Zulu testified about a project involving Sisonke
Development Agency and K&M Security where a company
was given a tender worth R8 million, but it ended up being
paid R22 million without variation. They were investigating
this project with a certain policeman who was given the
documentary evidence. The only thing that was outstanding
was to access bank records of a certain account.

663.

Mr Zulu and Mr Mandla Ngcobo met with the said police
officer to discuss obtaining a subpoena for the bank records.

2

This refers to the scandal involving the fraudulent use of Parliamentary Travel Vouchers between 2004 and
2010 in which several Members of Parliament belonging to various political parties were convicted and
sentenced to pay fines.

204   P a g e

 The policeman said they fundraise money which would be
put in the docket so that the Magistrate would authorise the
subpoenas. They were shocked by this conduct of the
policeman.

664.

On 6 April 2016, Mr Zulu sent an email to the police at
national level and the acting Provincial Commissioner. He
was raising issues that he thought were important for the
police to look at as the local government elections were
approaching. He believes that if some of the issues he raised
had been looked at, the killings at uMzimkhulu and Harry
Gwala region would probably have been prevented.

665.

On 4 June 2016, he wrote a document titled “Unmandated
security analysis on election candidates and the ground
picture through the eyes of a civilian”. It was meant for the
Acting Provincial Commissioner and the head of Crime
Intelligence. The document dealt with issues regarding
political killings, the causes and proposals. He set out the
following causes: Intra and inter party political intolerance
within political parties, political feud which is caused by the
scramble for tenders, factions, power that guarantees
proximity to and access to State resources. The infiltration
of political parties by people in the taxi industry who bring
the culture of resolving disagreements through the barrel of

205   P a g e

 a gun. These people are not only bringing in their culture to
politics, but also their guns, hitmen and money to support
their criminal acts.

666.

Mr Zulu believes that if the police were doing their job
properly, we would not be having these political killings.
Acting appointments in the top leadership of the police
aggravates the inefficiency of the police. Those who are
acting do not have serious authority, but always try to please
political

principals

in

order

to

secure

permanent

appointments.

667.

That is why politicians are making everyone to act, so that
they will control them like a “yoyo”. Suspend this one, make
this one act, remove that one and put another one to act.
That results in instability in the whole system. There is a lot
of infighting within the police between career police officers,
political deployments and the old guard.

668.

There is also mistrust between White and Black police
officers. Black officers believe that their White counterparts
leak information to the DA and the media about ANC leaders
when they are being investigated. Their White counterparts
believe that the Black ones are corrupt.

206   P a g e

 669.

The police are not networking and sharing information with
one another because they serve different principals. Each
one wants to get information first so that he will cover up or
give it to his principals first. Principals use that information
to blackmail others or to arrest their opponents.

670.

There has been a pattern. A politician is killed and the police
shoot all except one suspect. They did it with MR SBU
SIBIYA of Inanda. They shot everyone and left only that “Zulu
guy”. When it was close to trial, a witness was exposed and
killed. It begs the question why the witness was not in
witness protection. Even if he was not in protection,
arrangements should have been made to protect him. The
case against Mr Zulu was accordingly withdrawn.

671.

Mr Zulu also referred to the case of MR WANDILE MKHIZE
of Margate. The first police officer who arrived on the scene
took the suspect’s cell phone that would have provided
important clues and evidence in solving the matter. That cell
phone was not placed in the exhibit register at the police
station. They delayed the case and when it was close to trial,
it was alleged that the policeman who had taken the cell
phone had died in a car accident.

207   P a g e

 672.

When Mr Magaqa died, nothing was being said and pressure
mounted from the public. It was then the same story. One of
the alleged suspects was shot by the police and you would
hear funny and conflicting stories about his identity, origin
and residence. Those are their tricks to ensure that the
masters are protected and not revealed.

673.

Mr Zulu alluded to the fact that this was being done
deliberately because political masters are pulling strings of
the puppets, including the police. It cannot be possible that
in Harry Gwala region so many people are murdered at
uMzimkhulu and the police do not get any signal. He was
referring to Messrs THOBELA, TSHIBASE, MAGAQA,
Mncwabe and others.

674.

He then dealt with the true culture of the ANC in that it is
not inherently corrupt but opposed to corruption. Fighting
against corruption is implementing ANC policies. Instead of
being victimised, those who fight it must be hailed as true
cadres. The ANC resolved that those who are facing serious
charges must not hide behind the principle of presumed
innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

208   P a g e

 675.

The good name of the ANC must not continue to be tainted
and brought into disrepute by those who are accused of
serious crimes. They are all expected to step down from their
elected positions until they have cleared their names in
court.

676.

The other

problem is the Private

Security Industry

Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). It is a useless body that is
supposed to regulate private security companies. The
bodyguards of most politicians are known criminals and
izinkabi (hitmen). Mr Zulu referred to a video clip that was
circulated recently in the media showing people carrying an
AK47 rifle.3

677.

Security companies are employing people who are not
properly accredited. Mr Zulu referred to a known robber who
had served 15 years imprisonment. He had become the
bodyguard of a senior ANC official in the Province.

678.

The bodyguards of a controversial and notorious family who
were working at a certain taxi rank approached a certain
councillor. They said they could make a plan if he wanted
them to be his bodyguards. He was a new and young

3

209   P a g e

 councillor who did not have bodyguards. They said they
would just shoot his empty car so that the police would see
that he had been fired at, then the municipality would
provide him with bodyguards.

679.

He alluded to the fact that the security risk of certain
councillors was staged and faked in order for security
companies to obtain tenders to guard them.

680.

Mr Zulu then testified about his discussions with Mr Magaqa
about

suspicion

of

corruption

at

the

uMzimkhulu

Municipality regarding the Memorial Hall. Mr Magaqa
suspected that funds pertaining the hall were being looted.
Mr

Zulu

presented

documents

that

purportedly

substantiated their belief regarding the alleged corruption.
He believes that Mr Magaqa was murdered because he was
questioning and exposing the alleged corruption.

681.

Mr Zulu linked positions and power in the ANC with
positions and power in municipalities. He indicated that the
killings are motivated by that aspect. These days, getting a
position means you are going to have a better life. The
understanding is that being the chairperson of a branch
gives you a chance of becoming a councillor.

210   P a g e

 682.

Being the chairperson of a region gives you a chance of
becoming a District Mayor. Being in the PEC gives you a
chance of becoming a Mayor or an MEC. Being at national
level gives you a chance of becoming a Minister or something
else.

683.

He testified about what he regards as the “gang of three” at
Harry Gwala region, namely Messrs Zamo Nxumalo, Mluleki
Ndobe and Amon Zondi. When the three started having
disagreements, comrades started to be killed and to acquire
bodyguards. He believes that the conflict in the region has a
bearing on their disagreements.

684.

It is a known fact there are many guns in KZN. That fact was
confirmed by people like Messrs Eugene de Kock and Phillip
Powell. Other guns from the mutiny that happened in
Lesotho ended up in South Africa. Those guns have never
been found and it is imperative that they are found.

685.

Mr Zulu alluded to the fact that socio-economic factors and
lack of education and skills have a bearing on the killings. A
councillor who lacks basic education gets elected into the
executive committee. He is expected to understand policy

211   P a g e

 directives of the municipality and to give direction to an
official who has tertiary qualifications, for instance, the
Municipal Manager.

686.

The easiest way of escaping poverty is being a councillor. It
changes your life overnight in terms of lifestyle. Getting a
position in the ANC at various levels also secures you a
higher lifestyle. Mr Zulu doubts if there are any REC
members who are unemployed. Even if there is no post, one
is created for you because “society is not going to respect an
unemployed leader”.

687.

On the question of solutions to the problems, Mr Zulu had
the following to say. Former President Mbeki used to say that
comrades must rise wherever they are and try to correct
things. Comrades in the ANC must not keep quiet but must
raise their voices. Democratic centralism in the ANC does not
mean that an individual must be worshipped. However, he
believed that was exactly what was happening at the time he
testified.

688.

The ANC needed to be cleaned up and cleansed by its
members, who must be prepared to lose everything for its
sake. Mr Zulu believes that the ANC can still be saved and

212   P a g e

 restored. The ANC did not allow its councillor to leave the
community that elected him to live elsewhere in the city. An
ANC that is accountable to its members says the councillor
must remain in the community that elected him.

689.

Mr Zulu made an example of his comrade Mr Mandla
Ngcobo, who sat next to him when he testified. Mr Ngcobo
lost everything, but he remained steadfast, resolute and was
prepared to work and fight. He was once a Deputy Mayor and
also a Speaker. All those perks are gone, but he still stands
for good principle in which he believes.

690.

However, that does not mean that people must wear rags in
poverty. The point of the matter is that freedom for some is
freedom for none. People must be capacitated to survive and
the spirit of ubuntu and sharing must be revived.

691.

Mr Zulu disputed the suggestion that there is a third force.
He maintained that people are being killed by their own
comrades. These are targeted, calculated, cold blooded,
ruthless assassinations of comrades by thugs who are hired
by their own comrades in the ANC. Those who are claiming
that there is a third force must explain what the term means.

213   P a g e

 Comrades are killing each other because they want tenders
and are contesting positions.

MPHUTHUMI BARTHOLOMEW MPABANGA
(UMZIMKHULU MUNICIPALITY)

692.

On 11 December 2017 the Commission heard the evidence
of the above-mentioned Mayor of uMzimkhulu, who was
accompanied by a delegation of officials of the Municipality,
who comprised Mrs Sindi Nkala, the Deputy Mayor, Mr
Mzweliphansi Sikhosana, the Municipal Manager, Mr Xolani
Tshazi, the Chief Whip, Ms Nokuthula Nduku, director of
corporate services, Ms Thembakazi Ngcemu, Chief Finance
Officer, Ms Khumbuza Dweba, director for structure and
engineering

and

Mr

Thulani

Cele,

Deputy

Manager,

planning, housing and LED.

693.

Mr Mpabanga testified on the basis of a written submission,
which was handed in as Exhibit X.

694.

He told the Commission that in the 2011 Municipal elections
the ANC, of which he is a member, won the elections with a
considerable majority. The seat distribution was as follows:
ANC – 37, NFP – 2, IFP – 1.

214   P a g e

 695.

Upon the resignation of the Speaker, Mr KHAYALETHU
THOBELA was elected as the new Speaker. The Municipality
ran smoothly until the end of its term in 2016. The
Municipality’s financial affairs were properly administered
and they received unqualified audits for the financial years
2012/2013 and 20113/2014. They also received awards
from the Premier’s Office, COGTA and CIGFARO as one of
the best run Municipality.

696.

During the 2016 Municipal elections the ANC won 38 seats,
the AIC one, the DA one, the EFF two, the IFP one. The
Municipality received further awards from the Premier.

697.

Mr Mpabanga then dealt with matters that gave rise to
political conflict. He attributes this to a contest between Mr
Khayalethu Thobela and Mr Zamo Nxumalo for the
Chairmanship of the region, which Mr Nxumalo won. Out of
that arose two factions, one supporting Mr Thobela and the
other supporting Mr Nxumalo.

698.

With regard to the events that preceded the murders of
Messrs Thobela, Tshibase and Magaqa, his version accords
with that of other witnesses and it is not necessary to repeat
it herein. However, he disputes Mr Thabiso Zulu’s evidence
with regard to the alleged corruption related to the Memorial

215   P a g e

 Hall. He produced documents which tend to dispute Mr
Zulu’s evidence.

699.

Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve the dispute
between the two men. It is common cause that there were
factions in the ANC at the Municipality. It thus appears
probable that the death of the three above-mentioned ANC
comrades was connected to the said factionalism.

EDWARD SENZO MCHUNU

700.

He testified on 20 September 2017. He originates from
Hlabisa but is currently residing at Empangeni. He has a
teachers’ diploma and a degree in education from the
University of Zululand.

701.

While he was a student at the University of Zululand in
1983, they were informed that the IFP was going to come
to the university to commemorate King Cetshwayo. As
students,

they

commemoration.

had

a

different

They

rejected

view

the

of

notion

that
of

a

commemoration and saw it as a kind of invasion and as a
kind of an activity that would, inter alia, deal with them
because they were perceived as hotheads.

216   P a g e

 702.

Indeed, that commemoration left five university students
dead. The occurrence confirmed their perception that it
was no ordinary commemoration as it ended in a tragedy.

703.

While at university, the students went on strike against
bad food. The university was closed and the students were
sent home. After a few weeks, the university was reopened and he received a telegram advising him that he
was being denied permission to return to the university.

704.

He subsequently met the current Deputy Chief Justice
Raymond Zondo, who was then serving articles of
clerkship. He advised him that he was one of ten students
who

had

been

expelled.

They

were

subsequently

represented by the Durban Legal Resources Centre to
fight the expulsion. They won the case and were
reinstated.

705.

The following year, the university was closed again. Upon
re-opening, he again received a letter expelling him from
the university. When he asked for a testimonial from the
university, he was informed that his files were “red” and
that he did not qualify to get it. It became apparent that

217   P a g e

 he was one of the students whose names were in the
university’s bad books because of their political activities.

706.

Mr Mchunu has been a member of the ANC since 1990,
but had associated himself with the organisation long
before joining it. He became the first Secretary of the ANC
Ngwelezane branch in 1990. In the same year, he became
the interim Secretary of the region which was then called
Northern Natal.

707.

At the end of 1990, he was elected full Regional Secretary.
He left teaching in March 1992 and became full time
Secretary of the Northern Natal region. He became the
first Secretary of the Province after the amalgamation of
the regions in December 1994 up until 1996.

708.

At the end of 1996 at the conference, he was asked by the
ANC nationally not to avail himself to stand as Secretary.
This had nothing to do with him personally but was a
mechanism to resolve a problem that had arisen. The
provincial Chairperson at the time was Mr Jacob Zuma.
Mr Mchunu accordingly complied with the directive of the
ANC.

218   P a g e

 709.

In

February

1997,

he

was

requested

to

join

the

Legislature, which he did. The following year, he was
elected Deputy Secretary of the North Coast region for a
year. In 1998, he was elected Deputy Secretary of the
Province until 2005. He was then re-elected as Provincial
Secretary.

710.

In 2009, he was appointed MEC for Education and
relinquished the position of Provincial Secretary as a
result of being appointed MEC. He then became a coopted member of the Provincial Executive Committee. In
2013, he was elected as Provincial Chairperson of the
ANC, replacing Dr Zweli Mkhize.

711.

Mr Mchunu later became the acting Premier and was later
appointed Premier in the same year, 2013. In 2015, he
lost the contest for the position of Provincial Chairperson
but remained as Premier. In May 2016, he was “fired” as
Premier.

712.

Mr Mchunu proceeded to express his views of the
underlying causes of political violence in the Province.
The violence in the Province in the form of pre-colonial
wars, colonial wars and apartheid oppression related

219   P a g e

 violence, is part of the overall recorded history of our
country.

713.

The late 1980s stand out as a period of intensified
violence in the Province. Violence in this period took the
form

of

the

murders

of

targeted

politically

active

individuals with both Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge as the
most remarkable of those who were politically active and
were targeted. Griffiths was murdered in 1981 and
Victoria was murdered in 1985.

714.

The killings appeared to be State driven and directed at
anti-apartheid

activists,

trade

unionists,

political

activists, academics and students. People were targeted
in these categories at various periods, but the collective
perception was that the State was behind these targeted
killings.

715.

The State security apparatus, mainly the police, and other
assassins were often in the frontline in the mass attacks
and murders. Towards the close of the eighties and
beyond, and pursuant upon the unbanning of political
organisations including the ANC, the State exacerbated
and fully exploited differences between the UDF affiliates,

220   P a g e

 on the one hand, and the IFP, on the other. They were
fully

conscious

of

the

existence

of

these

political

formations in KZN, in particular.

716.

They knew the sentiments that were shared by all of them
and the feelings they had about each other and they
added fuel to the differences between them and exploited
those differences to consciously fan the fires of violence.
When the ANC and other organisations were unbanned in
1990, the Province was already on fire.

717.

Kwa-Zulu Police were very visible as an extension of the
State security machinery and were highly involved in the
political conflict in the Province. Examples of a few largescale incidents of violence are the seven-day war in
Pietermaritzburg in March 1990, the Shobashobane
Massacre on Christmas day in 1995 and the killing fields
of Mandeni, Macambini area.

718.

In this conflict the ANC always felt justified in defending
itself and its cause. The establishment of self defence
units was justified because there would be individuals,
families, villages and townships that would be targeted for

221   P a g e

 assassinations or mass killings for their known sympathy
with the ANC.

719.

The State and its machinery was the enemy against which
the ANC needed to defend itself. In the ANC’s eyes, the
IFP was never an enemy and the ANC always looked
beyond it. The ANC always looked at itself and the IFP as
victims of a State driven conflict and resultant violence.
The Kwa-Makhutha case involving Mr Magnus Malan, the
then Minister of Defence, are useful pointers as to where
the violence was masterminded. It was masterminded
neither by the ANC nor the IFP.

720.

On the other hand, the IFP felt that it was under attack
from the UDF and later on from the ANC. There was a
proliferation and distribution of firearms and ammunition
in the Province. KZN is the only Province that ever
received seven tons of arms and ammunition at one stage,
as such information was made public.

721.

It was the State and its machinery that was distributing
those arms. It gave them to the Kwa-Zulu Police and
paramilitary formations that had come to the fore. In
hindsight, the ANC and IFP could have averted this heavy

222   P a g e

 conflict if they had not pointed fingers at each other, but
perhaps

had

more

discussion,

understanding,

and

interaction. Perhaps there was not enough time dedicated
to this cause and there was no space to deal with it fully.

722.

The ANC does not accept what is termed “black on black
violence”, which happened in the eighties and nineties,
given that the State machinery and its apparatus was in
the driver’s seat of the conflict.

723.

From the beginning of 1997 though to 2011, political
killings remarkably decreased, surging only around
particular periods, namely, during general and local
government elections.

724.

The peace processes involving political parties, churches,
non-governmental

organisations

and

prominent

individuals played an important role in changing the
situation for the better.

That was from 1994 onwards.

There has, however, never been any organised big
dialogue to intensify and consolidate peace involving the
same people.

223   P a g e

 725.

From 2011, political killings in the Province took a new
turn. The phenomenon is within and around the ANC.
Local politicians are the victims and this is on the
increase. In the main, people who have been targets are
councillors and potential councillors, branch leaders of
the ANC, including those in sub-regions.

726.

There are some levels in the hierarchy of the ANC that are
called sub-regions whereby a number of branches are
clustered together. Being a councillor is something that is
easily accessible, a paying public position for most of the
people at local level.

You do not need any academic

qualification or money to become a councillor.

727.

At election time, you can make yourself available and find
yourself from a position where you are not receiving any
income and you suddenly earn an income. So, it is
gradually

becoming

highly

competitive.

It

is

no

exaggeration that at any given point, you can find up to
10 people competing to be a Ward or PR councillor in the
same area.

728.

The competition is very high and it promises double
growth. Growth is in terms of your social status. You have

224   P a g e

 become somebody, all of a sudden you get respected even
by people in their social functions. You even become
conscious of it in terms of your dress code.

729.

If people campaign for a councillor and they win, others
get in their inner circle. There are layers, and in those
layers, there is a person who would be number one to the
councillor in terms of closeness. There is a benefit for you,
notwithstanding where you are in the circle, because it
puts you next in line. So, you would sooner or later get to
be a member of the BEC or in a sub-region or even in the
REC.

730.

Thirdly, there is proximity to tenders or proximity to
power broking within the political power ladder. This in
turn brings the possibility to offer employment and other
favours. So, when you become a councillor, you are in a
close proximity to awarding tenders, either formally or
informally, directly or indirectly because you know what
is going to come up in your discussions at council
meetings.

731.

You know what tender is going to be out, where, for how
much, and you then informally go to potential interested

225   P a g e

 parties and inform them. Sometimes conversations can go
on to say can you link me up? In all these processes,
tensions

develop

because

of

competition

and

the

syndrome called “my or our turn to eat”. 4

732.

There is manipulation and factionalism within the ANC.
When positions are available through manipulation,
mostly based on factions, it becomes a factor in potential
violence, sometimes which develops into full violence.
The benefits from this practice of factionalism and
manipulation often take the form of guarantees for
continued support.

733.

If you are in a position at regional level or even at
provincial level as a powerful individual or with a
grouping, you benefit when you manipulate and you also
benefit via your faction when you manipulate. You benefit
from

continued

manipulation

support

because

from

you

the

know

beneficiaries

that

things

of

were

manipulated in your favour.

734.

This manipulation takes place at different levels in line
with factional preferences.

4

It includes manipulation of

Based on the book “It’s Our Turn To Eat” by Michela Wrong – Fourth Estate, dealing with endemic corruption
in Kenya.

226   P a g e

 membership. You know long before time that there is
going to be a branch meeting and in order to get to the
meeting, you manipulate membership so that the people
who get in are those on the list. You manipulate such that
those who are in majority are the ones that are going to
ensure a particular pre-determined outcome.

735.

The other one is via deployment. When there is going to
be an elective meeting in a branch, you send somebody
and give them a particular brief in terms of what outcome
is wanted by whomever. You then design tactics, you will
point at a particular person to speak, they will be ready
because they have been briefed.

736.

You brief the deployed person. Regardless of the actual
counting, just be brazen and say it is not correct and then
leave, or say it is correct when everybody can see that it
is not correct. It also happens by pointing nominations in
meetings. You point at nominators, you point at people
with a particular understanding that they are going to
nominate a particular person.

737.

You also do it through counting. You count hands and say
so and so has the majority, when actually they are the

227   P a g e

 minority. You look at people in a brazen way and say this
is the result.

738.

You also do manipulation through placements on a
rationalised list. Once lists have been compiled and they
are submitted somewhere at a committee or wherever, you
start balancing and you change them. Number one
becomes number two or number four and so on. You do
it through quorums at meetings.

Sometimes you do it

via venues. You say in the morning the venue is public
works office and a few hours before the meeting, you
change the venue.

739.

Many people will come to one venue and others will go to
another, via social media. Then you go on with the process
when others are waiting, or you send them to the one
place but you go to a different place. Those who are misled
will depend on which faction they are. Sometimes in one
branch, you receive two submissions, one saying the
meeting never sat and the other saying the meeting sat.
We were in such a place and this person was not there.

740.

You say the meeting is at 10h00 when it is actually at
15h00 or vice versa. You call a meeting of the ANC, but

228   P a g e

 then a bouncer enters. A bouncer is a physically big and
visible male with intimidating eyes and body who is sent
for that purpose. He will take you out of a meeting at the
whim of the person who directs him. Sometimes it is a
person you have never seen in the area or in a meeting of
the ANC.

741.

Sometimes you call the Metro police, SAPS, private
security or bodyguards with whom you are associated as
an individual or faction. You say there are some people
that you would need to remove from a meeting. It is a sort
of physical gate-keeping because sometimes there are
people who qualify to be in the meeting, but because you
did not include them on a list or voters’ roll deliberately,
they are kept outside.

742.

The overall outcome of this practice is that some
communities are in permanent tension. Some enjoy the
result of the manipulation while others decry it and then
want to revenge in one way or another.

743.

There is a need for strong leadership in the ANC at all
levels.

In

these

manipulations,

leaders

often

get

compromised by factions. You shift from principles,

229   P a g e

 traditions,

fairness

and

objectivity

and

you

get

compromised and begin to try and justify these wrongs.
As the leadership, in turn you succumb to these wrongs
and become the underlying cause of the violence yourself.

744.

Mr Mchunu also gave his analysis of the violence at
Glebelands hostel. These killings started in the 1990s.
One

contributing

factor

is

the

administration

of

Glebelands by the eThekwini Municipality. Instead of the
Municipality allocating and controlling rooms, they are
controlled by criminal forces.

745.

They make money by allocating a room and by displacing
another person. You get killed or in some instances, the
person who is willing to pay a higher price gets the room.
So, the main driver of killings there is room allocation.

746.

Some of the solutions are to build a wall around the hostel
and control access at the gate for pedestrians and
vehicles. In addition, you still need to fence off each block
and control access by using an electronic identification
system to enter and exit the gate. Mr Mchunu indicated
that these suggestions were agreed with eThekwini

230   P a g e

 Municipality while he was still in office, but have not been
implemented.

747.

Lights and cameras need to be put in and around the
hostel. That would assist the police in the identification
and arrest of wrong doers. Glebelands has also been
contributing in the proliferation of illegal firearms and
ammunition because of the number of illegal firearms and
ammunition there.

748.

Mr Mchunu used the recent killings at uMzimkhulu to
give his views on the effectiveness of the SAPS. The
murder of Mr SINDISO MAGAQA was not the first murder
in the area. Ideally after the first murder, one would have
expected

the

security

apparatus

to

identify

that

something was developing in that area. If the security
apparatus does not indicate things before they happen, it
means we are all blind.

749.

After an incident has happened, they should have reacted
by analysing what had happened and use the results of
such analysis to see whether another incident was likely
to occur and then take precautionary measures. If one
analyses the Magaqa incident, the perpetrators had to

231   P a g e

 drive the car for quite some time after the shooting.
Everybody would have seen the car and disseminated the
information.

750.

That talks to the ineffectiveness of the police in coordinating a concerted effort to pursue the culprits, given
that UMzimkhulu is a fairly small town.

751.

In general, there is a concern about the level at which the
State security apparatus, in the form of State intelligence,
operates on the preventative side. In other words, on
picking up information before things happen. The concern
is that we might not be at the requisite level as a country.

752.

When you interact with police, very often you get a story
of how police depend on crime intelligence and other
intelligence, including State intelligence generally. When
we look at cash-in-transit heists, very often you get from
the media how police were tipped off before the heist
occurred.

753.

However, on politically motivated killings, the question is
what prevents the police from being equally effective. Mr
Mchunu then referred to an incident that he had

232   P a g e

 experienced personally in 2015. Mr Xolani Nkosi was
murdered at uMhlathuze Township in Empangeni. He was
part of his security team as the Premier.

754.

On that particular day, Mr Nkosi was not at work and Mr
Mchunu was on official business in Ladysmith until late
in the evening. On the following day, he visited Mr Nkosi’s
home where he was killed. After a few days, he received
information that the case was being handled by a police
unit based in Pietermaritzburg.

755.

Mr Mchunu waited and waited and it became apparent
that he was unlikely to receive any briefing. He had
assumed that he would be briefed because Mr Nkosi was
associated with him as the Premier. He then personally
phoned the Minister of Police, Nathi Nhleko, requested to
meet him and he duly briefed him. At the time, Mr
Mchunu was already hearing some “political poison”
around Mr Nkosi’s murder.

756.

Mr Nhleko deployed two senior police officers from the
national level to come and take over the case. Mr Mchunu
had

also

approached

a

private

investigator

from

Johannesburg and he caused them (“the team”) to meet

233   P a g e

 and work together. By the end of their first working day,
they had identified a person who had used the Nkosi’s cell
phone on the first day after his murder.

757.

They went to the vicinity of the one who was operating
Nkosi’s phone and indeed found the phone. They arrested
him together with another person who was with him. The
team also indicated that they were picking up that the
police unit in Pietermaritzburg was of the view that Mr
Mchunu was a suspect in Nkosi’s murder. The following
day, he phoned the Acting Provincial Police Commissioner
enquiring if he was indeed a suspect. He said he did not
know, but he was going to investigate. The following day
or so, the Commissioner emailed a letter to Mr Mchunu
saying he was not a suspect.

758.

The team required the police docket from the unit in
Pietermaritzburg so that the arrested suspects could
appear in Court. They asked the acting Commissioner to
facilitate, but nothing was done. They never received the
docket and the case was withdrawn and the suspects were
released.

234   P a g e

 759.

On the second day of investigation, the team had also
identified a suspect whom they believed had probably
pulled the trigger. The said suspect was in Jozini.

760.

Mr Mchunu established that the docket had finally moved
from the Pietermaritzburg unit to a police officer by the
name

of

Hlongwane.

Mr

Hlongwane

said

he

had

established that the Prosecutors at Empangeni are the
ones who had withdrawn the case against the suspects.
Apparently, the junior Prosecutor who was handling the
case in court was briefed by the senior Prosecutor to
withdraw the case.

761.

There was no clear explanation as to why the case was
withdrawn. The next time, Mr Mchunu heard that the
docket had been removed from Mr Hlongwane and given
to the Hawks. When it was taken over by the Hawks, one
would expect to see sparks as they are an elite crime
fighting unit. Mr Mchunu subsequently heard that a
decision was taken to arrest him within five days because
he was a suspect, despite the Commissioner’s letter.

762.

He pointed out that he was relating the story to illustrate
his personal experience on how the police sometimes

235   P a g e

 “fumble around” in handling serious cases. Overall, when
the State cannot resolve the majority of murder cases, an
element of decay sets in and it is not the expectation of
the people that the State security apparatus should show
signs of decline.

763.

Mr Mchunu indicated that when he met the Magaqa
family they said they were not willing to share information
with the local police and the police from the Province.
They were willing to interact only with the police from
national level.

764.

On a personal level, there was a fabricated suspicion that
he was a suspect and the investigation was derailed and
resources were wasted. Failure to solve crime destroys
public confidence in the police.

765.

Corruption breeds anger. When others see that you are
benefiting from corruption, they become angry because
they feel that they are not benefiting because they are
fools and you are clever. In the process, it also causes
fundamental

divisions

in

the

public

sector

and

community because some defend corruption because they
are also benefitting from it.

236   P a g e

 766.

Mr Mchunu expressed his views on the notion that State
institutions are being used for political ends. He related
to his own personal experience regarding Mr Nkosi. He
questioned how the Hawks, which were established to
carry the hopes of millions in the country to fight and
solve crime, could then become ineffective. It is a painful
experience that is shared by many people.

767.

Mr Mchunu agreed that poverty, unemployment and
inequality would not be resolved in the next few years, but
emphasised that those socio-economic problems and the
internal weaknesses in the ANC do not justify the
perpetuation of wrong doing. Whoever wants to kill and
steal, must not find refuge inside the ANC.

MR MCHUNU’S RECOMMENDATIONS

(1)

(a) The ANC must accept responsibility for the
violence

directly

or

indirectly

and

then

act

accordingly.
(b) A regular and organised dialogue must be held
to intensify and consolidate peace involving

237   P a g e

 political parties, churches, non-governmental
organisations and prominent individuals.
(c) There is a need for strong resolute leadership
that does not depend on factionalism for survival.
(d)

Uncompromised,

consistent

and

coherent

integrity in leaders.
(e) Unity of purpose in leadership.
(f) Communities need to be mobilised on a
continuous basis so that they can assist the police
in fighting and solving crime.

SIYANDA RICHARD MHLONGO

768.

(VOL 34)

He testified on 12 December 2017. He resides in Groutville
Mission, Kwa-Dukuza. He has a Master of Education degree
and studied at the universities of Zululand, KwaZulu-Natal,
Bristol and Wits University. He taught at the Wits and
Zululand Universities.

769.

He was a Councillor and Mayor of Kwa-Dukuza and a
representative of Kwa-Dukuza within the District Council of
Ilembe. He was a member of the ANC and resigned and
joined Cope in 2008. He did not stay long in Cope because
of some problems and contradictions in the party.

238   P a g e

 770.

He regards himself as a free agent and not affiliated to any
political party. He identifies with the ANC ideologically, but
not practically, because it has the best policies. He is a
believer in the Freedom Charter and regards himself as a
social

activist. He

reads

and

writes

extensively

on

governance and policies of different political parties, and on
interpreting issues and commenting on issues in the public
discourse.

771.

He believes the killings impact on good governance and
paralyses the State in the fight against corruption and the
ills of incumbency.

772.

He disagreed with Mr Super Zuma’s assertion that there is a
third force behind the violence in KwaZulu-Natal.

He

believes MR MAGAQA’s killing is part of a broader ANC civil
war and it must take blame for his death as a collective.

773.

To him, the assertion that the killings are an act of
criminality only is not good enough. He saw the death of Mr
Magaqa in the same way as the death of Mr Thami Zulu (real
name

was

Boniface

Muziwakhe

Ngwenya)

who

was

eliminated by some in the ANC. He also saw it in the same
way as the killing of Mr Ben Langa, brother to comrades

239   P a g e

 Messrs Mandla and Pius Langa. Messrs Thami Zulu and Ben
Langa were falsely labelled as spies, the same falsehood that
was levelled against Mr Bulelani Ngcuka.

774.

The ANC and SAPS did not take appropriate action, thus
encouraging people to use violent methods to achieve their
objectives within and outside the ANC. In his view, the
former Secretary-General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe,
made a bizarre statement that “The ANC cannot stop the
abuse of state resources to fight ANC battles”.

775.

In his view, the conditions in which the assassinations occur
are important. In the books on MK and ANC by Messrs
Ronnie Kasrils, Hugh MacMillan, Stanley Manonga and
Thula Simpson, it is revealed that the SAPS used criminals
to infiltrate MK. One of them was Mr Joe Mamasela who was
part of the criminals who killed Mr Griffiths Mlungisi
Mxenge.

776.

He dealt with unbecoming behaviour in Parliament.
Whenever the EFF disrupted former President Zuma, he
demanded

protection.

But,

it

was

he

who

created

misconduct after he was removed by former President Mbeki

240   P a g e

 as Deputy President. According to Mr Mhlongo, “what goes
around, comes around.”

777.

He indicated that they were demonised for coming out openly
against the heckling of Mr Mbeki in Kingsmead and Harry
Gwala stadiums. However, when the EFF uses the same
tactics in Parliament, it is labelled as a “bunch of hooligans”.
He believes that Mr Julius Malema is a product of Mr Zuma.

778.

He mentioned what he terms the “poo brigade” in KwaDukuza, where it was used against Mr Pravin Gordhan. It is
important to note that the misbehaviour of the EFF
emanates from was is happening in the ANC. ANC leaders
attract criminals into its ranks.

779.

When you read about the activities of MK, Mr Oliver Tambo
stopped the using of stolen cars to transport arms. He was
correct and his intervention was decisive in taking
responsibility as the leader, and thus led a morally guided
liberation struggle.

780.

In his book “Armed and Dangerous”, Mr Ronnie Kasrils
mentions a debate in the MK camps between Mr Johnny
Makhathini and Ms Portia Phila Ndwandwe about the use of

241   P a g e

 the “necklace”. Later, the ANC condemned use of the
“necklace”.

781.

Controversial elements like Mr Berning Ntlemeza and Mr
Richard Mdluli have been involved in ANC factional wars. Mr
Mhlongo questioned as to who attracts them into the ANC.
It is not the third force that does, but corrupt leaders who
invite criminals into politics, in general, and, specifically,
into the ANC.

782.

He believes that Mr Zuma and some are above the law. The
reasons why the Scorpions were dissolved was to protect a
“super leader” in the ANC who does everything to avoid his
day in court.

783.

Mr Muziwendoda Kunene was instrumental in the creation
of hoax emails. He is currently serving 20 years in jail for the
murder of a white Ballito property business woman. Mr
Mhlongo believes that Mr Kunene is not different from Mr
Joe Mamasela and questions as to who invited him into the
ANC.

784.

After the rape case of Mr Zuma, Ms Fezeka Khuzwayo was
forced into exile because she feared for her life as the State

242   P a g e

 could not protect her.

It is now known that Mr Richard

Mdluli was involved with Dr Zweli Mkhize to mediate
between Mr Zuma and Ms Fezeka Khuzwayo.

785.

In today’s ANC, leaders who are summoned to court for
corruption create a group of friends and manipulate the
masses. The pioneer of this strategy is Mr Zuma. Mr Zuma
blamed a political conspiracy for his wrongs and weak
morals. Mr John Block also adopted the same strategy.

786.

Mr Zuma lied so many times in Parliament and the ANC
applauded him when he lied and also heckled the opposition.
Criminals

and

thugs

see

MPs

defending

thieves

in

Parliament.

787.

What is worse is that ANC MPs who are loyal to the teachings
of the ANC are being “disciplined” by the party that is
supposed to be the moral and ethical vanguard of our
society.

788.

When

preparations

were

made

for

the

Polokwane

Conference, KwaZulu-Natal campaigned for the removal of
two

papers

from the

discussion

documents,

namely

“Revolutionary Morality and Ethics” and the “RDP of the Soul”.

243   P a g e

 The argument was that these documents were crafted by Mr
Mbeki and Mr Joel Netshitenzhe to discredit Mr Zuma.

789.

Space was opened for “comtsotsis” (criminal comrades) to
steal with impunity because corruption is not punishable.
They see the ANC throwing its moral compass by defending
a leader who is on the run from the court.

790.

Attempts by the Hawks to fight corruption without fear or
favour led to removal of Mr Anwar Dramat, the head of the
Hawks. The selling of posts by some in SADTU demonstrates
that crime is legitimised and unions can blackmail our
leaders.

791.

The ANC must do its soul searching and confront its
weaknesses. It must stop being rhetorical but take gigantic
steps to remove those who are crooked.

792.

Mr Mhlongo alluded to selective and politically driven
prosecutions by the NPA and cited Mr Gordhan as an
example.

793.

SALGA and KWANALOGA argued that attractive salaries
attract people to become councillors, but Mhlongo believes

244   P a g e

 that is not the only factor. He agrees with Professor Zulu and
Mr Senzo Mchunu that a lack of minimum standards for
public representatives attracts everyone to be a public
representative.

794.

He believes that some in the ANC of today dislike “clever
blacks”. They rely on factionalism to intimidate those who
are a threat because they speak “big English”. It is those
without a fall-back position that invite criminals to protect
their political careers and they are ready to kill for these
careers.

795.

ANC members kill one another because of careers and
closeness to the public purse. Mr Mhlongo made an example
of how the Zuma family became instant millionaires and
everyone saying “It’s our time to eat”. Chaos is emulated at
grassroots level.

796.

Security and intelligence structures are weak, factionalised
and professionalism is gone. Good examples are Mr Mdluli
and Mr Ntlemeza. The purging of Messrs Jeff Maqetuka,
Gibson Njenje and Moe Shaik indicated the beginning of the
crisis.

245   P a g e

 797.

After the trio were expelled, the Guptas were free to influence
even the appointment and dismissal of Ministers. This is not
happening in India where the Guptas come from. The
Guptas left India from a civilian airport but landed at a
SANDF airbase in Waterkloof.

798.

The book by Mr Jacques Pauw “The President’s Keepers” and
the one by Mr Du Toit entitled “Enemy of the People” deal in
depth with the problems about appointments and the type
of people that are being appointed. Ms Nomgcobo Jiba
protected Mr Mdluli because he was doing dirty work for Mr
Zuma.

799.

If you have a weak police force, especially the intelligence
part of it, you are not going to be able to solve these
problems. Secondly, if you have a police force that is
factionalised, you are not going to solve these problems.
Thirdly, if you have police force leaders that are friends of
drug dealers, you are not going to solve these problems.

800.

Deputy-President

Cyril

Ramaphosa

supported

the

dissolution of the Scorpions. Mr Mantashe and SACP’s Dr
Blade Nzimande demonised both the Scorpions and former
Public Protector Adv Thuli Madonsela.

246   P a g e

 801.

It is incorrect to place these assassinations only in KwaZuluNatal. The killings started in Mpumalanga and the pattern is
the same. Mr Mhlongo indicated that Mr Mzilikazi Wa
Afrika’s book5 was a must read by the Moerane Commission.

802.

MR MAGAQA was alleged to have had a dossier on
corruption, just like MR WANDILE MKHIZE of Margate.
Messrs Bomber Ntshangase and Jimmy Mohlale were killed
for the same reason like Messrs Magaqa and Mkhize. In
Rustenburg, Mr Moss Phakoe was killed by his comrades for
the same reason.

803.

All this speaks to the moral decay in the ANC. At the
grassroots level masses are misled and manipulated. They
get indoctrinated and blindly follow the leaders. Lies are
hatched. If power is to be lost, leaders hire killers.

804.

Mr Kebby Maphatsoe had to pay Mr Ronnie Kasrils
R500 000 in damages for telling lies about him. Mr Malema
has conceded that he was told lies about Mr Mbeki. It is
natural, lies are not sustainable, but the truth becomes a
victor. Lies were told that Mr Gordhan and others are agents

5

Nothing Left to Steal - 2014 Penguin Books

247   P a g e

 of white monopoly capital without giving concrete evidence.
These lies were driven by Messrs Edward Zuma, Jimmy
Manyi and Sihle Zikalala.

805.

Lies were crafted that Messrs Malema, Joseph Mathunjwa
and Adv Thuli Madonsela are CIA agents. The ANC faction
that

took

the

ANC

to

Court

was

represented

by

Adv Thembeka Ngcukaitobi, a young brilliant lawyer.

Mr

Zikalala called him a “counter revolutionary”.

806.

Mr Mhlongo wrote an article in Isolezwe disputing this lie by
Mr Zikalala. Later, Adv Ngcukaitobi represented the ANC in
North West. Lies, vulgar indoctrination and tribalism,
pseudo left wing radicalism, mistrust and tension end in
thuggery and assassinations.

807.

Corruption and “bling” has become a lifestyle for public
representatives. When you begin to live a lifestyle far above
your income, the next thing is to bring in funders who will
fund your lifestyle. Those people who are protesting that this
person is corrupt are killed because you want to continue
living a lifestyle above your income.

248   P a g e

 808.

That is why there is abundance of cash towards conferences
in the ANC. The funders of factions are rewarded by being
awarded tenders.

MR MHLONGO’S RECOMMENDATIONS

809.

(a)

The ANC must do self introspection.

(b)

Explicitly detail what political parties and the State

must do to inculcate robust, but civil debate.
(c)

Recommend

public

education

on

ethics

and

governance.
(d)

Not to reduce these killings as a KZN problem, but a

national

catastrophe

which

was

left

unattended

in

Mpumalanga Province.
(e)

All political parties must agree that the correct

avenue for any politician who is charged with corruption is
for them to face the charges in court.
(f)

Restoration

of

moral

and

ethical

values

that

underpinned the teachings of great leaders.
(g)

Election and restoration of ethical leaders across all

political parties.
(h)

The SABC must have lessons on moral renewal and

ethics in governance as part of public education.
(i)

Public representatives and candidates must undergo

security clearance by an independent body.
249   P a g e

 (j)

Introduction of minimum educational qualifications

from President to Councillors.
(k)

Public

Representatives

caught

lying

must

be

subjected to discipline by an independent body.
(l)

More powers must be given to the Inspector-General

of Intelligence to probe breach of the code of conduct to avoid
politicians from abusing power.
(m) Insulting and demonisation of judiciary, NPA, SAPS and
Public Protector must be criminalised.
(n)

Glorification of arms through songs and displaying of

arms must be criminalised.
(o)

Depoliticise the State.

(p)

Fight the politicisation of the security cluster and

ensure that it is not used for ANC factions.

KwaZulu-Natal Christian Council (KCC)

810.

The

KwaZulu-Natal

Christian

Council

(“KCC”)

which

operates in all regions of the Province appeared before the
Commission on the 20 July 2017 and provided us with their
analysis on political violence and killings. It was represented
by Mr Mxolisi Nyuswa the director of the Regional Christian
Council that is based in the northern part of KZN called
KRCC. Mr Nyuswa was accompanied by Reverend Sonto

250   P a g e

 Nkosinathi Manuel Thusi a pastor based at the Thukela
Amajuba Mzinyathi Christian Council in Ladysmith.

811.

Amongst the work that the KCC does within the Province, it
monitors electoral violence throughout the Province before
and after elections. With monitors stationed at every corner
of the Province, the KCC was able to dissect the underlying
causes to be as follows:
(a)

that the violence experienced in the Province is not

motivated by elections or rather does not flare due to
elections in isolation but that there are other causes
contributing to the violence. The KCC provided that up
until 2009 the electoral violence experienced was mainly
inter-political between opposition parties. The trend then
changed to intra-political violence within political parties
with members fighting for positions such as councillorship
and mayoral positions.
(b)

that the intraparty conflict observed is mainly based

on the competition over tenders and resources.
(c)

the public’s perception is that financial enrichment

is the main driving factor contributing to the killings.
People fight tooth and nail to secure and remain in
positions.

251   P a g e

 (d)

some of the reports received by the KCC from the

monitors deployed indicate corruption is a common
denominator underlying the causes of violence.

(e)

that political intolerance sometimes contributes to

the impeding problem which also speaks to the erosion of
ubuntu in communities which leads to the taking of a life
being an easy thing to do when solving differences.
(f)

that the language used by politicians is sometimes

toxic and incites violence. That even senior leaders use
provocative language when communicating with members
of the public which conveys a message that violence is
condoned.
(g)

the imposition of leaders on the community leads to

the elimination of the un-preferred candidates.
(h)

Settling old scores and revenge for earlier killings by

persons associated with the intended victim.
(i)

The elimination of persons who have defected from

their political party and joined another.
(j)

The failure or reluctance to accept defeat and the

accompanying loss of status and income, particularly in
respect of people who do not have qualifications or skills.

812.

When pressed to give insight on why KZN was experiencing
this kind of violence, KCC was of the view that when taking

252   P a g e

 into account the political history of the country, the Province
has always been a politically contested Province yielding
much power.

813.

On the political history and violent history of the Province,
KCC attributed the use of intelezi in the past to be
contributing to the brazen killings taking place. On the issue
of intelezi KCC stated “...the point is not necessarily about
whether that is true or not, whether it was successful or not,
but it is still the belief that people have that it is because we
have intelezi with us and therefore intelezi is still with us, then
we have to take it out in a way so that we don’t have violence
that is said to be caused by what you have inside there So
that’s another cause of violence in the Province...”6

814.

The KCC provided the following recommendations to the
Commission to prevent future incidents of political killings:

(a)

that there be ongoing theological reflections about

our democracy;
(b)

permanent violence monitoring throughout the

Province that will go hand in hand with voter education and
democracy deepening;

6

Para 13-19, vol 13 at pg 605 of the record .

253   P a g e

 (c)

that traditional leaders have a pivotal role to play by

being vigilant in their respective communities and holding
political leaders in their communities liable for their actions;

(d)

educating political leaders on what it means to be a

public servant serving community. The majority of
politicians especially at local level serve their pockets
instead of their communities;
(e)

there has to be continuous engagement with political

parties and stakeholders in the form of izimbizo, talks and
dialogue in an endeavour to establish peace and stability
in KZN;
(f)

there has been a major decline in morality in the

Province which is evidenced by the ease in which people
are willing to kill for. A moral revival has to be undertaken.

House of Traditional Leaders KZN – Inkosi Chiliza

815.

Inkosi Chiliza is the Provincial Chairperson of the House of
Traditional Leaders in KwaZulu-Natal. Before he delved into
his evidence of providing the Commission with the
Traditional Leaders perspective of the underlying causes of
political violence in the Province, he acknowledged that
violence started around the 1980’s towards 1990. He

254   P a g e

 attributed the origins for the violence to be that of the
fighting and bloodshed spilt between the IFP and ANC. That
the country moved into democracy without the two parties
involved in the fighting undergoing a cleansing ceremony. He
urged the top leadership to consider having a cleansing
ceremony because if it is not done, the killings would
continue to the next generation as we are currently
witnessing.

816.

He attributed what is currently being witnessed in the
Province as a breakdown of the societal moral fibre in that
violence has now become the norm and even young children
get exposed to violence from a very young age.

817.

He bemoaned the reduced roles of izinduna and amakhosi in
society resulting in communities not having a respected
structure of authority. He made an example that, in the past
political leaders would not dare go into a hostel and cause
chaos

because

izinduna

at

the

hostels

encouraged

togetherness and unity but now chaos ensues because
amakhosi cannot visit and speak anymore without being
accused of being there on behalf a political party.

255   P a g e

 818.

The proposed recommendations by the House of Traditional
Leaders are as follows:

a)

that a meeting should be held between the Traditional
Leaders, Premier with his cabinet, and all politicians in the
cabinet because the Traditional Leaders believe that the
violence and these killings are politically connected and are
as a result of the loss of values and self-respect of people.

b)

that Izinduna and amakhosi should be recognised as having
an integral part to play in their communities and local
government.

c)

that there should be a cleansing ceremony performed and
carried out throughout the Province in consultation with the
King accompanied by prayers asking for forgiveness and
peace. That the King would on consultation provide guidance
on how the cleansing ceremony should be conducted.7

Ubunye bama Hostela

819.

The delegation of Ubunye bama Hostela (“Ubunye”) appeared
before the Commission on the 14 December 2017 and was

7

Para 19-25, vol 11 at pg 536 of the record.

256   P a g e

 led by Mr Mthembiseni Thusi the Deputy Chairperson of
Ubunye and also spokesperson for the organisation in
Durban.

820.

Ubunye is an independent organisation which represents all
hostels around Durban (i.e. Glebelands, Wemmer, Dalton,
Jacobs etc). Mr Thusi is presently the Deputy Chairperson
of the organisation since 2006 when the organisation was
formed. As an establishment, Ubunye has members from
various political parties but retains its independence from
any political influence. Ubunye was established to defend
and to fight for residents of hostels and to negotiate on their
behalf challenges faced with the municipality since hostels
fall under the administration of the municipality.

821.

Prior to presenting its evidence, the Ubunye delegation
requested to pay its respects to the Zulu King by way of
salutation which the Commission granted. It must be
acknowledged that the act of paying respect to the king is
evidence of the influence, reverence and regard people of this
province have for Isilo.

822.

As already stated, Ubunye is an organisation representing
all hostels; therefore, it is no surprise that its evidence was

257   P a g e

 focused mainly on the challenges faced by hostel residents.
They were permitted to testify before the Commission
because of the contributions they would make in making
hostels more governable which would counter the allegations
of hostels being dens for hit-men in the Province. Also due
to the killings experienced in the hostels, with some of them
taking a political form, their input was required.

823.

The failure of the municipality to control the increased
number of people in the hostels came up once again and it
was submitted that the lack of control and oversight by the
municipality led to the phenomenon of selling beds at
Glebelands hostel. However, Ubunye is of the view that the
issue in Glebelands is not limited to the selling of beds but
can be aligned to political and criminal activities. Ubunye
expressed the hope that IPID would have made some
progress regarding Mr Zinakile Fica’s death who was a
resident in Glebelands and killed at the hands of the police.

824.

In 2015, the King was meant to visit Glebelands and
KwaMashu hostels where people had died but unfortunately,
that meeting never transpired. Various meetings were held
with different structures discussing how hostels, the hardest
hit by the killings would be visited but all those meetings

258   P a g e

 yielded no results due to a misunderstanding with the
provincial government because the province did not want the
King to be the only person addressing the hostel residents.
Ubunye is of the opinion that the Province has failed the
people that died in hostels because had the King been
allowed to visit the hostels, he would have heard the
recommendations to be made by Ubunye.

825.

The significance of the role the King can play in the ending
the killings experienced in the Province is vital. This
important role was explained by Ubunye as, had the King
addressed his subjects at the meeting that was scheduled at
the hostels most of the killings that took place at hostels
could have been prevented. The reasoning for the analysis is
that everyone in a hostel comes from a village which has an
Induna who falls under the authority of the King. Thus, had
the King addressed his people, they would have listened.

826.

Ubunye proposes that amakhosi from the south and north
coast be invited to be part of discussions that will look at
solutions for the more than hundred people killed in
Glebelands because approximately four of the people killed
in Glebelands are from the north coast and the majority of
them are from the south coast.

259   P a g e

 827.

Ubunye expressed their dissatisfaction with the current
status of amakhosi, as they have a huge role to play in
restoring the dignity of hostel residents and in the manner
they behave because the people are from the villages where
amakhosi have authority.

828.

When Ubunye was asked as to what it considers to be the
underlying causes of violence in the Province, the delegation
stated that people are fighting over public money and
positions and the people dying are from one political party,
the ANC. Therefore, it is clear they are fighting over power.
On whether tribalism and ethnicity have any influence on
the killings, Ubunye said the majority of people who have
died in Glebelands are from the south (i.e. Eastern Cape) but
ethnicity and tribalism cannot be considered relevant
because most of the people arrested for the killings are from
the south. In short, though the killings in Glebelands are
political, tribalism and ethnicity have no bearing on the
killings but it is all about fighting over power from within.

829.

Ubunye’s hypothesis on the killings being linked to poverty
is that the people voted hoping they would be taken care of

260   P a g e

 but that did not happen. As a consequence, poverty does
have a bearing on the killings.

830.

Ubunye provided the following recommendations to the
Commission:

(a)

permanent violence monitoring throughout the

Province that will go hand in hand with voter education and
democracy deepening;

(b)

the King should be allowed to visit hostels and he

should facilitate a cleansing ceremony at the hostels that
experienced violence. Most importantly, the King or his
delegation should lead the ceremony of cleansing the hostels
of the souls that lost their lives in the hostels.

(c)

that since politicians have failed to intervene in the

situations faced by hostel dwellers, the King should be
permitted and given an opportunity to intervene and solve
the problems plaguing hostels because he is not begging for
any votes but he is a neutral person.

(d)

that the two issues of bed selling and leadership

power struggles should be resolved in Glebelands, as those

261   P a g e

 in power control what happens within the hostel and benefit
financially.

Abahlali baseMjondolo

831.

Mr Sibusiso Zikode testified before the Commission on the
19 July 2017 in his capacity as the President of Abahlali
baseMjondolo (“Abahlali”) which is an organisation not
aligned to any political party formed in 2005 to fight, protect,
promote and advance the interests and dignity of shack
dwellers and the impoverished in South Africa.

832.

Abahlali’s members have been victims of political violence in
the past years and Zikode detailed to the Commission
various incidents in which violence was inflicted on the
members by the police.

833.

On the 26/27 September 2009, Mr Zikode and his family
and other families of the Abahlali leadership were attacked
by a group of people who called themselves ANC members.
The attacks were also advanced at the Abahlali Youth camp
held at Kennedy Road, Clare Estate. During the attacks
guns, knives and stones were used to destroy property and
to assault people. What astounded Mr Zikode and other

262   P a g e

 Abahlali members was that the attacks occurred in the
presence of the members of SAPS, Public Order Police, Crime
Intelligence, Durban Metro Police and other law enforcement
officials in broad daylight.

834.

Twelve (12) people were arrested for the September attacks
and they became known as the “Kennedy 12” but to
Abahlali’s surprise, all the arrested were Xhosa-speaking
from the Eastern Cape. To add to the amazement, the
arrested people were also victims of the attack, who had had
their property (spaza shops and houses) burnt down and
destroyed.

835.

The Kennedy 12 were charged with murder among other
charges but when the matter went to trial they were
acquitted and found not guilty. The Magistrate presiding
over the trial commented that the cases were fabricated
against the Kennedy 12 and the Court could not rely on the
witnesses.

836.

After the incidents of attack against some of its members the
organisation ceased operations for a period of six months
due to the lack of a safe and suitable meeting place. However,
what exacerbated the tensions was that two days after the

263   P a g e

 death of two people, MECs conducted a press briefing at
Kennedy, informing the community and celebrating that
Kennedy had been liberated.8 It was after the press briefing
that Mr Zikode became a target of the MKVA members due
to headlines raising suspicions that he was suspected of
killing people. MKVA members and ANC members were
allegedly instructed to hunt down and kill Mr Zikode.

837.

After the attacks of September 2009, Mr Zikode’s life was in
danger and as consequence of the threat he faced, he then
sought and accepted assistance from Amnesty International
and was also offered some protection by the United States
Government, through being invited to the United States
under the auspices of the International Visitors Leadership
Programme.

Throughout

the

intimidation

perpetrated

against Mr Zikode, the SAPS never offered to protect him. In
any event, he didn’t have much faith in them as he believed
they were somehow involved in the attacks. Mr Zikode also
believes that he was being monitored by the police and had
an incident where his identity was tampered with.

838.

What deepened the rift between Abahlali and the eThekwini
Municipality was the court case instituted by Abahlali

8

Para 23-25, vol 12 at pg 553-554 of the record.

264   P a g e

 against the municipality challenging the constitutionality of
the Slums Act. The matter went all the way to the
Constitutional

Court

where

the

Act

was

declared

unconstitutional. The majority members of the Executive
Council of eThekwini Municipality and other political leaders
around Durban who were not members of the council were
unhappy with the outcome of the court case to the extent
where a video was circulating claiming that Kennedy Road is
the only informal settlement that took the government to
court and went against the President of the country.

839.

Mr Zikode confirmed that the relationship between Abahlali
and

local

government

(especially

with

eThekwini

Municipality) and at provincial level is very bad. The cause
of tensions amongst Abahlali and eThekwini Municipality
was caused by the uncovering of corruption by Abahlali in
the allocation of RDP houses and the outspokenness of the
organisation outside the ANC and government structures.

840.

Abahlali members who experienced violence at the hand
of the police
(1)

On 15 March 2013, Thembinkosi Qumbela: CAS
154/03/2013

was killed. He was the local leader

working with Abahlali in Cato Crest, Mayville.

265   P a g e

 (2)

On 26 June 2013, Nkululeko Gwala, the Chairperson
of Abahlali was shot at Cato Crest. A few hours prior
to Nkululeko’s death Zikode had a conversation with
him and he told Zikode that his life was in danger due
to having uncovered corruption involving high
ranking officials at the eThekwini Municipality.
Nkululeko’s murder was political. Some people were
taken in for questioning but Zikode could not recall if
any arrests were ever made and to that, Abahlali
believe there have been no arrests because of the
involvement of high ranking municipal officials. It is
believed that Nkululeko was killed for exposing
corruption.

(3)

On 30 September 2013, Nqobile Nzuza who was 17
years old at the time was shot and killed by the police
at Cato Crest. Nqobile was part of a service delivery
community protest (about housing corruption) and
was shot on her back whilst fleeing.

Nqobile was

harmless and unarmed at the time she was shot. The
police officer who shot Nqobile was found guilty of
murder and his sentencing was scheduled to take
place on the 9 October 2017. Abahlali are relieved
that the police officer who shot Nqobile has been
found guilty and that justice had been done.

266   P a g e

 (4)

On the same day of 30 September 2013, another
young girl Bulelwa Makhwenkana was also shot at
the protest, she was also shot from behind while
fleeing from the police. Fortunately, Bulelwa survived
the shooting but no one has been arrested.

(5)

On 8 September 2013, Nkosinathi Mngomezulu was
shot by members of the Anti- Land Invasion Unit, a
Unit

under

the

control

of

the

Municipality.

Nkosinathi was shot eight times in his stomach with
live ammunition. Miraculously, he survived but he is
now permanently disabled. The person who shot
Nkosinathi is known but has not been arrested and
Abahlali believe it is due to him being a municipal
official and was acting under municipal instructions.
(6)

On 29 September 2014, Thuli Ndlovu, leader of
Abahlali, KwaNdengezi was shot and killed in the
presence of her two children and a neighbour’s child
Siphesihle Madlala got caught in the cross fire and
was shot at and was injured. Siphesihle survived but
he is now disabled. Before Thuli got killed, she had
led a community march against the corruption in the
allocation of houses in her area. On the day she was
killed she had just returned from Cape Town when
she received threatening phone calls from the
councillor telling her that her days were numbered

267   P a g e

 and indeed she died on the day. Three people were
arrested and subsequently convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment (the councillor and his gunmen).
The perception of Abahlali is that the arrests were
only effected because the councillor in question and
started killing people within his own organisation
(ANC and SACP).
(7)

On 26 March 2017 at Bhambayi, Inanda the
Chairperson

of

Abahlali

Blessing

Nyuswa

was

threatened by the current local councillor at an
Abahlali community meeting and when shots were
fired

at

Blessing,

Banele

Manyathi

was

unfortunately, struck twice. Banele survived the
shooting incident. Blessing’s life remains under
threat and there have been no arrests made for the
shooting of Banele and attempt on Blessing’s life.
(8)

On 29 May 2017, Jayden Khoza, a two-week old baby
was killed by teargas thrown by members of SAPS at
Foreman Road in Clare Estate. On the day there had
been a protest march by the residents which led to a
road blockade away from the residential area but the
police left the area where the protesters were and
proceeded

to

the

houses

and

threw

teargas.

Unfortunately, the baby was sleeping in one on of the
houses, he suffocated and died. No arrests have been
268   P a g e

 made for the death of Jayden. IPID has conducted the
post mortem but the family has not received any
official report. The family has engaged the services of
an independent pathologist and the report is still
awaited.
(9)

On 13 June 2017, Samuel Hloele of Ekuthuleni in
Dassenhoek was shot dead by the Municipality’s
Anti-Land Invasion Unit. The unit was at Ekuthuleni
in Dassenhoek to demolish shacks without a court
order authorising them to do so and a violent
situation erupted. No arrests have been made for the
murder of Samuel. The Anti-Land Invasion Unit acted
(acts) on the mandate of the Municipality.

841.

Abahlali believe that the police are not independent, that
they are being used by politicians to achieve or further
political agendas. Abahlali are also of the view that the police
act (unlawful conduct) out of the fear of politicians and in
the fear of losing their jobs. Further, Mr Zikode expressed a
real fear within communities on reporting crime as
communities have no trust in the police. He advocated
having police from outside the Province to deal with the ills

269   P a g e

 in the Province as he is convinced that the current provincial
SAPS are pressured politically.9

842.

Interestingly, Zikode is of the view that the training received
by SAPS members if sufficient. However, out of fear of
politicians and at the risk of losing their jobs, they resort to
following instructions contrary to their duty. Political
interference not only affects service delivery but the criminal
justice system as well.

843.

An area of concern that was highlighted by Mr Zikode is that
of the language used by leaders which incites ethnic
discrimination. When asked of the possible causes for Xhosa
speaking people from the Eastern Cape being marginalised
and treated differently in the Province, he was of the opinion
that it was due to the appointment of leaders with no
educational background who have prejudices of believing
that a proper human being is a Zulu speaking person.10

9

There was an incident where Ababhlali’s Cato Crest Leader was called by the local Station

Commander enquiring if he had been shot and how critical his injuries were. The Station
Commander is said to have received instructions from the Provincial Commissioner to check
if Mzimela was still alive. It is clear to Abahlali that the police were well aware that Mzimela
was going to be shot but took no action to protect him. Mzimela was further warned to stop
with the protests. Vol 12 p, 574/575 of the record..
10

Para 1-9, vol 12 at pg 568 of the record.

270   P a g e

 844.

The ethnic discrimination of the aMampondo people is even
carried out by some senior officials and high-profile officials
at meetings where they would address the gathering by
stating that people from the Eastern Cape came here (KZN)
to take houses from the locals therefore, they must go back
to the land of their origin. Mr Zikode at one stage was
accused of siding with Xhosa-speaking people over the Zulu
speakers and he almost died.

845.

11

Mr Zikode cautioned that the rhetoric adopted by politicians
is very dangerous and what is sad is that they don’t
recognise

their

statements

to

be

inflammatory.

He

acknowledged that a lot still needs to be done to educate
authorities as well as communities about the meaning of
ubuntu beyond the phrase and that the problem must be
realised as a societal one.

846.

Recommendations of Abahlali baseMjondolo

(1)

Abahlali as an organisation, support the idea of
having

investigating

officers

from

outside

the

Province thoroughly investigating the causes of these
political killings. Mr Zikode is of the opinion that the

11

Para 12- 20, vol 12 at pg 568 of the record.

271   P a g e

 SAPS members from the Province are compromised
and pressured by the ‘paymasters’.
(2)

That corruption must be reported on and rooted out
especially when it comes to the allocation of RDP
houses to the beneficiaries.

(3)

The language used by politicians must be one that
fosters unity and ubuntu.

(4)

That

SAPS

members,

Metro

Police

and

other

municipal units must be adequately trained on crowd
management and the Municipality should stop
purchasing Casspirs and military vehicles with the
sole intention of abusing the informal settlement
dwellers.
(5)

NB:

It is unfortunate that the SAPS despite having

being given a memorandum that included the list of
Abahlali members that were allegedly brutalised by
the police, they could not respond to the few cases
that led to death of the Abahlali members because
there

were

no

CAS

numbers

provided.

The

representative of the SAPS delegation stated as
follows:

272   P a g e

 “from my side I cannot assist the Chairperson.
We don’t have, due to lack of reference. There is
nothing from my side.”

12

POLITICAL PARTIES

847.

The evidence relating to the Democratic Alliance (“DA”) has
been dealt with above, in connection with the murders of
Messrs MTHULISI NGCOBO, SIBUSISO SITHOLE, SIFISO
MKHIZE and SIBUSISO SIBIYA, at paragraphs 460 to 483,
above.

Vikizitha Mlotshwa (National Freedom Party - NFP)

848.

Mr Mlotshwa, the Provincial Chairperson of the National
Freedom Party (NFP) appeared before the Commission on 15
December 2007 accompanied by the party delegation. The
NFP presented its opinion on the underlying causes for
political violence in the Province.

849.

The NFP divided the potential conflicts between political
parties as between the NFP and the IFP, the IFP and the ANC,
the ANC and the SACP and ANC within the ANC.

12

Para 15-21, vol 49 at pg 2972 of the record.

273   P a g e

 850.

A brief history of the formation of the NFP was given, that
shed light on the conflict between the IFP and NFP. The NFP
was formed in 2011 when it became clear that there were
irreconcilable ideological differences within the IFP. The NFP
then broke away from the IFP and formed its own party.
Since its formation, the NFP has contested two elections, the
first being the 2011 local government elections and the
second being the 2014 general elections. Unfortunately, the
NFP failed to register and participate in the 3 August 2016
local government elections, save for one voting district.

851.

On the violence between the IFP and the ANC, Mr Mlotshwa
noted that the history of the two parties has to be taken into
account and whenever that history is looked at, it cannot be
ignored that the bloodshed and the amount of violence
experienced in the Province was due to the political conflict
of the two prior to 1994. However, he cautioned that the
hatred that existed between the two parties did not magically
disappear but the two need to iron out their old political
differences. The ANC and the IFP need to cultivate a culture
of political acceptance and tolerance that would eradicate
the arrogance and tendency of violence that exists within
their structures.

274   P a g e

 852.

On the conflict between the ANC and the SACP, the political
battle between the two parties is said to be due to the
eThekwini Municipality’s budget of 41.5 Billion Rand. The
multi-billion budget of the eThekwini Municipality gives rise
to the conflict of the two parties. The struggle to control the
city’s budget resulted in poor innocent people of Intshanga
dying for reasons of greed and hunger for power by the
leaders. In order to rectify the conflict between the two
parties, the ANC must engage its members in political
classes where they will learn that being in power is not about
abusing state resources.

853.

On the intra-party conflict within the ANC Mr Mlotshwa
stated that the ANC members have deviated from the
founding principles and values of Ubuntu and the teachings
of former icons of the ANC, such as Mr Oliver Tambo, Inkosi
Albert Luthuli, Dr John Dube, Mr Raymond Mhlaba, Mr
Nelson Mandela, Mr Walter Sisulu and Mr Thabo Mbeki, to
name a few. That it is unfortunate that the ANC has
cultivated a culture of “it is now my time to eat”. The culture
of eliminating whoever stands in your way is rife in the ANC
as they kill one another “left right and centre like nobody’s
business”.13

13

Para20- 21, at volume 37, at page 2378 of the record.

275   P a g e

 854.

Mr Mlotshwa noted that the spirit of comradeship no longer
exists within the ANC as it used to, now that tender
procurement

policies,

corruption,

control

over

state

resources, greed and self-enrichment, looting of state
resources has become the order of the day which has in turn
made the ANC to be its own enemy. The NFP noted that the
ANC’s infighting and power mongering is no longer
influenced by the battle of ideas or principles and values but
now it’s all about the looting of state resources to benefit
one’s self and friends. He attributed the current state to that
of ANC inculcating a spirit of arrogance amongst its
members in that they are entitled to state resources as if they
are the only beneficiaries of the gains of democracy.14 Local
municipalities have become ANC battle fields where
comrades kill each other for councillor positions and cover
up corruption or perpetuate maladministration to pursue
certain agendas. The ANC needs to revisit the issue of cadre
deployment and set clear standards and norms as it has
created an unbearable condition where experienced and
qualified people are compromised in order to accommodate
comrades that are incompetent and ineffective.

14

Para 5-15, vol 37 at pg 2379 of the record.

276   P a g e

 855.

The NFP also commented on possible conflicts between the
SAPS and other state security agencies in that the state
security agencies are compromised and are being controlled
by certain political masterminds.

856.

The NFP identified one of the problems plaguing the ANC,
that of electing izinkabi and incompetent leaders into its
ranks. In its analysis the NFP noted that the ANC’s tendency
of recruiting well known people who are rude or are izinkabi
or

previously

jailed

murderers

to

serve

as

Branch

Chairpersons is compromising the quality of leaders and the
behavioural aspect of the members of the ANC.15

857.

What was of great concern was a report on the release of
some inmates by the Department of Correctional Services
where the National Intelligence Agency revealed that some of
the prisoners to be released had no family structures or
homes to go back to. However, these inmates were released
without the concerns being addressed and most of them
were from the current hotspot areas of Richmond and
UMzimkhulu. Unfortunately, ninety-five per cent of the
released inmates joined the ANC. The question that needs to
be asked is whether the ANC has provided a program of

15

Para 6-20, vol 37 at pg 2383 of the record.

277   P a g e

 integrating

them

into

the

party,

their

families

and

communities.16

858.

The NFP is of the belief that the ANC has compromised its
values, principles and culture by welcoming members who
have not been schooled in the tradition and culture of the
ANC. Those members should be inducted into political
schools and education.

859.

The NFP did have some praise towards the governing party
in that the principles and policies of the ANC are good.
However, the ANC today is only about politics of the stomach
because the newly joined members have not been taught the
policies and principles and the way things are done within
the party, as most of the hit men and former prisoners are
given positions as branch leaders.

860.

The concerns raised by the NFP regarding the ANC
welcoming or accepting former prisoners into their ranks is
a concern that has been expressed by a number of witnesses
that appeared before the Commission. Clearly, the ANC
accepting within itself people who are not properly schooled

16

Para 2-18, vol 37 at pg 2384 of the record.

278   P a g e

 on the policies and values of the ANC is destroying the
organisation.

Recommendations of the NFP

861.

The NFP proffered recommendations and solutions to curb
the violent killings witnessed in the Province as follows:

(1)

The tender procurement policies and processes have
to be revisited and that political heads should be
removed from tendering processes and independent
credible bodies should be appointed to handle tender
procurement and appointments.

(2)

The ANC and all political parties must take their
members to political schools for political education.
There needs to be a clear line between the
government and party politics, so as not to influence
government operations.

(3)

There is an urgent need to revisit the cadre
deployment within the ANC as basic essential
services are being compromised by the quality of
people being deployed within municipalities.

(4)

The IEC and COGTA must play an effective role not
only during elections but also after elections to

279   P a g e

 continue with programs such as voter and political
education so as to enhance political tolerance and
advance the agenda of political stability within the
Province.
(5)

The government must speedily implement security
measures and recommendations that come from
experts on this point of political killings.

(6)

There should be a clean-up and recovery of
unlicensed firearms that are readily available in the
Province. It is believed that there are a number of
unlicensed firearms throughout the Province.

(7)

The police and soldiers should be deployed in all
affected areas in the Province for the recovery and
destruction of all these unlicensed firearms.

(8)

One of the observations made by the NFP is that the
political killings experienced seemed to have the
same

modus

operandi

in

that

a

person

is

assassinated whilst entering or leaving their place of
residence (which reflects precision and coordination).
(9)

On the question of whether or not poverty has a role
to play in these political killings, Mr Mlotshwa
commented that “indeed it is poverty because the
economic gap that is prevailing in South Africa, those

280   P a g e

 who have more and those who have nothing”.17 He
went further to explain that money has an influence
in the procurement of contract killers. However, it
could be argued that greed has a major role to play.
(10)

When asked for comment on the effectiveness of the
police in successfully and effectively investigating the
political killings, the NFP was of the view that the
police are failing to execute their jobs properly and
effectively. The NFP was not the only political party
that held the same view.

(11)

Lastly, on violence between the NFP and the NFP,
Mlotshwa was clear that there have been no killings
within the NFP itself but there are tensions that are
experienced within the party. However, the evidence
set out in paragraphs 436 to 453, above, relating to
the murders of Messrs Jimmy Jabulane Lembethe
and Isaac Thulebona Nhlebela, seems to suggest
otherwise.

17

Para 2-4, volume 37, at page 2392 of the record.

281   P a g e

 Inkatha Freedom Party(“IFP”)

862.

The IFP delegation led by Mr Blessed Gwala, who is the
National Chairperson and leader of the Inkatha Freedom
Party (IFP) in the Province appeared before the Commission
on 19 September 2017.

863.

The IFP provided a historical background of political violence
in the Province. The IFP attributes blame on the ANC for the
killings experienced prior to 2011 against its political
opponents.18 It submitted that the emergence of the NFP did
not present new conflict from that experienced in the past.
Instead, the conflict between the NFP and the IFP is a
continuation of the conflict between the ANC and the IFP.
The IFP believes that the NFP at its commencement was
strategically funded by the ANC.19

864.

The IFP is also affected by the political killings taking place
and has lost a number of its members due to the violence.
There are many incidents that took place prior to 2011. He
further stated that the trends of the political violence prior
to 2011 remain unchanged in that there is a poor rate of
successful investigations of IFP leaders killed resulting in

18
19

Para 3-5, vol 23 at pg 1165 of the record.
Para 21-25, vol 23 at pg 1165-1166 of the record.

282   P a g e

 convictions. In this connection Mr Gwala produced a
document setting out the names of 446 of alleged members
of the IFP that were killed from 1985 to the date on which he
testified, that is, 19 September 2017. Although only two of
the persons on the said list (Messrs Mcebisi Duma and
Themba Xulu) were killed during the period under
investigation according to our Terms of Reference, the
document was admitted as Exhibit L.

865.

The case of Mr Mcebisi Duma is dealt with in paragraphs
452 to 453, above.

866.

The IFP believes that many murders and attempted murders
would never have taken place if not for the belief on the part
of the perpetrators that they were politically protected from
punishment. This perception caused by the ineffectiveness
of the police in solving politically linked violence and
murders has led to the escalation of crime caused by the lack
of notable consequences.20

867.

According to the IFP, there is no doubt that much of the
current violence is intra-party violence within the ANC and
the NFP. Nonetheless, the murder of IFP members and
leaders

20

is

still

Para 1-9, vol 23, at pg 1170 of the record.

283   P a g e

continuing

with

few

consequences

 (convictions of perpetrators) fuelled by the perception that
politically connected hit-men act with impunity.21

868.

On the underlying causes into political killings, the IFP was
of the strong view that some of the killings recorded are a
result of criminality and general lawlessness and that the
general public view this as being attributable to the
incompetence of the police. In the IFP’s opinion, there should
be an investigation into the allegations that the murder
weapons used to commit these crimes are firearms taken or
coming from the police.22

869.

Another underlying cause or factor into political violence
alluded to by the IFP was that of the infighting within the
ANC and that the struggle was mainly for positions and
business opportunities.23 Politicians and aspiring politicians
have become desperate to secure positions within structures
and in all tiers of the government.

870.

The policy of cadre deployment to lucrative positions such as
administrative positions within municipalities and the
legislature has contributed to the incompetence and corrupt
practises witnessed.24

21

Para 3-8, vol 23 at pg 1171 of the record.
Para 18-25, vol 23 at pg 1178 of the record.
23Para 20-25, vol 23 at pg 1179 of the record.
24 Para 3-6, vol 23 at pg 1180 of the record.
22

284   P a g e

 871.

The other underlying cause for the killings and violence
identified by the IFP is that the ANC comrades when seeing
their colleagues accumulating wealth through ill-begotten
means also want a share of the forever dwindling pie which
then causes violence amongst ANC members, who are
constantly jostling for positions.25

872.

Political intolerance was also listed as a factor to the
underlying causes of political violence in the Province.

873.

The ANC‘s selection processes of councillors is also a cause
contributing to the political killings.

874.

On the hypothesis of poverty, unemployment and inequality,
the IFP agrees that the three factors might be driving forces
behind the killings taking place but on a relatively small
scale because the main underlying cause for these killings
are power struggles and people jostling for tenders and
positions.26

875.

Lastly, the IFP contends that the ANC is a common
denominator in the violence witnessed in the Province in that
there is no violence in the Province without the ANC being

25
26

Para 7-11, vol 23 at pg 1180 of the record.
Para 1-5, vol 23 at pg 1230 of the record.

285   P a g e

 involved. The IFP drew a reasonable inference of the ANC
being the main perpetrator of violence currently and over the
past years.27

Recommendations of the IFP

876.

The IFP provided the following recommendations to the
Commission:
(1)

That the Commission should release the outcome of
its investigations to the general public, as it is
common for commissions be established but for the
findings never to be made public.

(2)

That the police should be effective in investigating
politically linked murders and that the notion of an
outside police unit might be more effective is not
necessarily true. The IFP is of the opinion that a unit
comprising of people from outside the Province might
not understand the political climate and situation
faced by the existing police in the Province and that
the police force in the

Province need to be

depoliticised.
(3)

That there should be political tolerance amongst
political parties and that political acceptance should
go beyond political formations.

27

Para 5-10, vol 23 at pg 1210 of the record.

286   P a g e

 (4)

In concluding, the IFP remarked that there are no
clashes between itself and the ANC as the killings are
mainly intra-party and on the contributory factor
leading to killings in Glebelands, the eThekwini
Municipality should be blamed for turning of a blind
eye to the conditions festering in the hostel.

(5)

That the ANC must reveal where the arms caches are
because the conclusion to be drawn is that the
weapons are given to the assassins to kill their own
people.28

South African Communist Party (“SACP”)

877.

The South African Communist Party (“SACP”) appeared
before the Commission on the 21 September 2017. The
delegation

was

led

by

Richard

Themba

Mthembu

(“Mthembu”). The SACP stated that it was the first political
party that called for a Commission of Enquiry into political
killings in KZN back in 2011 to Provincial and Local
government. However, the calls were met with silence.29

878.

On providing a background history into the political killings
witnessed over the years in the Province, the SACP touched

28
29

Para 19-21, vol 23 at pg 1245 of the record.
Para 19-25, vol 25 at pg 1370-1371 of the record.

287   P a g e

 on the types of killings that are indistinguishable to the
killings witnessed presently.30 Political killings experienced
during the days of clashes between the IFP and the UDF in
the 1980’s continued into the 1990’s where the conflict was
between the ANC and the IFP. However, according to the
SACP, the political killings continued in the Province and
now the conflict is mainly within the alliance structures
despite significant traces of political killings between the IFP
and the NFP.

879.

The SACP traced the continuation and the intensity of the
killings within the alliance to the post Polokwane and pre
and post Local Government Elections of 2016. That the
current increase in political killings within the ANC alliance
structures can be attributed to intra-power struggles
generated at leadership level.31

880.

These political killings witnessed presently can be traced to
the killing of local government officials, which are seen as a
consequence of unfair processes in the selection of
councillors, candidates and subsequent deployment in
municipalities.

30

Inter-tribal and inter-clan killings; family killings, witchcraft killings, taxi killings, killings which have
been termed social killings, political killings and State killings. Para 14-20, vol 25 at pg 1340 of the
record.
31 Para 10-15, vol 25 at pg 1345 of the record.

288   P a g e

 881.

The other cause of intensity of these political killings is
linked to tender processes in municipalities and government
departments. Competition for tenders and manipulation of
the tender processes are interlinked with the killings. Power
contestation in the political organisation was also flagged by
the SACP as a cause and link to the political killings.
Unfortunately, political killings are the most problematic
and complex kind of killings and difficult to curb or bring to
a standstill because they are killings where the police are
either by collusion or omission failing to solve.

882.

It is said, in order to understand the present, history needs
to be revisited. Thus, the SACP noted incidents of political
killings prior 2011 that could lead to an appropriate
explanation of the current killings. The killings of Messrs
Sbu Sibiya, Mshibe, John Mchunu and others leaders of
the eThekwini ANC Region were seen as the grand plan in
preparation for a political takeover of the eThekwini Metro.
The political conquest of the Metro was seen to be influenced
by financial interest and national politics. The belief among
many structures on the ground is that any faction that leads
the eThekwini Metro will have influence in national politics
and leadership.32

32

Para 1-10, vol 25 at pg 1347 of the record.

289   P a g e

 883.

The budget of the eThekwini Metro of more than 40 billion is
the main motivation for the conflict as the faction that
emerges victorious is the one that would be in control of the
Metro’s resources.33 The other reason identified as the driver
to control the Metro, is that of the public transport tender
and housing projects.34 The killings of the leaders mentioned
above were the precursor to the real build up towards the
fierce contestation for the eThekwini ANC Region.

884.

An important aspect in understanding the dynamics in the
eThekwini Region is the link between the national power
straggle and the local power struggle within the ANC.
Divorcing the direct link between national politics and local
politics would be a travesty of the political climate as the
problem

starts

with

provincial

leaders

carrying

out

instructions or programmes of national leadership.35

885.

The SACP admitted to having suffered a tremendous loss of
its members due to the political killings but an incident that
stands out is that of Intshanga. The tensions in Intshanga
started over leadership contestation for the ANC eThekwini
Region. The SACP having a strong hold in Intshanga and
supporting James Nxumalo resulted in SACP members who

33

Para 11-14,vol 25 at pg 1347 of the record.
Supra.
35 Para 6-9, vol 25 at pg 1372 of the record.
34

290   P a g e

 are also ANC members being denied their right to renew their
ANC membership leading to the majority of SACP/ANC
members in the area being marginalised by the ANC from
branch activities. The tensions between SACP and ANC
reached boiling point when a meeting at the KwaNdokweni
Stadium, organised by the SACP was invaded by armed men
who fired gun shots at random injuring and killing many
SACP attendants of the meeting. Despite attempts at
reconciliation between the alliance structures, the SACP and
the ANC of Intshanga received a cold reception from the ANC
leadership of eThekwini Region.36

886.

Commenting on the killings plaguing Glebelands, the SACP
was of the strong view that the killings at the hostel are
orchestrated by an organised syndicate operating through or
behind some political leadership. The syndicate’s primary
objective is to capture Glebelands as a monopolised
market.37 However, the SACP is of the opinion that the
situation in Glebelands is not political as the residents there
have no political differences.38

887.

The SACP’s perception of the current political killings is that
State security apparatus are being used in the present-day

36

Para 15-17, vol 25 at pg 1362 of the record.
Para 19-25, vol 25 at pg 1363 of the record.
38 Para 21-22, vol 25 at pg 1398 of the record.
37

291   P a g e

 killings, factional battles in the alliance and within the ANC.
A serious phenomenon noted by the SACP is that of false
arrests and disinformation due to public pressure mounting
on the SAPS.

888.

The SACP remarked on a strange occurrence and practice of
private security personnel controlling political meetings. and
This practice is rife in the eThekwini Region but now has
extended beyond the Region to the entire Province. In
support of this contention, various witnesses have alluded
to

the

increase

of

local

government

officials

being

surrounded by private security. Metro police have also been
said to be used in the political gatherings.

889.

When the hypothesis of poverty, unemployment and
inequality as underlying factors to political killings was
canvassed with the SACP, the delegation held that
committing a crime is a choice which cannot be attributed to
the three factors. That greed and self-centredness are the
driving causes for the killings as opposed to poverty,
unemployment and inequality which are not unique to the
Province but a national problem.39 The killings occurring
now are simply opportunistic factional killings and have
nothing to do with political ideologies.

39

Para 5-23, vol 25 at pg 1407 of the record.

292   P a g e

 Recommendations of the SACP

890.

The

SACP

had

seven

(7)

recommendations

for

the

Commission which can be summarised as follows:40

(1)

That there should be a programme to combat the
culture

of

violence

that

has

overtaken

the

communities in KwaZulu-Natal;
(2)

That the tender procurement process has to be
reviewed

as

the

current

system

is

open

to

manipulation;
(3)

That the criteria and selection method for councillors
to local government should be reviewed to prevent
manipulation of the system;

(4)

That there should be a programme to depoliticise
security structures and mainly the police as the
police are highly politicised;

(5)

That a special unit needs to be established but only
for a limited period in the police force to deal with
political killings (most witnesses have advocated a
special unit comprised of members from outside the
Province);

40

Para 3-25,vol 25 at pg 1366-1367 of the record.

293   P a g e

 (6)

That there should be a Commission of Enquiry into
the abuse of state intelligence in private factional
battles; and

(7)

That the state budget needs to be biased in fighting
poverty, inequality and unemployment.

Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)

891.

The EFF delegation appeared before the Commission on 23
February 2018 led by Mrs Hlengiwe Mkhaliphi. Other
members of the delegation were Dr Mbuyiseni Ndlozi and Mr
Vusi Khoza.

892.

The delegation raised some fundamental points relating to
the establishment of the Commission. They questioned the
need for a Commission of Enquiry whose terms of reference
were to investigate the underlying causes of the murder of
politicians in KZN. They submitted that in terms of the
Constitution of RSA everyone is equal and politicians should
not be accorded a status superior to other victims of crime,
especially murder. They further submitted that that these
killings are not political killings but merely criminal acts that
must be understood as such especially since the majority of
the people being killed belong to one political party, the ANC.
On elaborating on the point, they made an example, if an

294   P a g e

 EFF member is killed by a member of another political party,
then that killing can be characterised as political because of
their differences in ideas but people killing each other for
resources can never be characterised as being political. In
fact, the Commission has heard overwhelming evidence that
of the majority of the killings being among one political party
the ANC and in instances where other political parties have
been involved i.e. (IFP and NFP, it was over ideological
differences and such killings can be correctly termed to be
political killings).

893.

Since its formation five years ago, it has been subjected to
violent political intolerance from the ANC in the Province of
KZN. Detailed accounts of the violence experienced can be
found in their presentation41. Of interest the political
intolerance experienced by the EFF, points to what a number
of witnesses have alluded to, that of political intolerance in
the Province.

894.

In attempting to understand the underlying causes of
political violence in the Province, the EFF, like many other
witnesses emphasised the importance of tracing the history
of political violence of KZN. However, the EFF cautioned
against elevating political killings above other killings when

41

Vol 46 at pg 2765-2772 of the record; Exhibit GG.

295   P a g e

 statistical sources show murder to be a problem plaguing the
entire country. The phenomenon of killings in our country is
demonstrated by the fact that South Africa is in the top 10
countries with the highest murder rate in the world. Hence,
prioritising political killings over killings in general should
be avoided and KZN should not be treated as an exceptional
Province from the rest of the country.

895.

The problem, according to the EFF to be examined is; why
are politicians, councillors and provincial government
officials in KZN guarded by armed men. The practice of being
guarded by men with guns is prevalent in the Province. In
fact, it is not seen anywhere else in the country.

896.

On the third force theory suggested by the ANC, the EFF
strongly denied the existence of such force by saying there is
no third force in South Africa. The EFF went further stating
that the only third force is the ANC as it was implicated in
the ‘fees must fall campaign’.42 On elaborating on the third
force theory, the EFF contended that it is actually the ANC
fighting for resources amongst themselves that is the root
cause and in particular the issue of who must control the
multi- billion budget of the eThekwini Municipality.43
Factions within the ANC fighting over resources are the

42
43

Para 4-14, vol 46 at pg 2791 of the record.
Para 5-11, vol 46 at pg 2792 of the record. See also the submission of the SACP on this issue.

296   P a g e

 cause of the killings and the infighting has nothing to do with
politics. Thus, it must not be termed a political problem.
Simply put, the intra-party conflicts are not due to political
ideologies but a marathon between factions that must eat.44

897.

One of the underlying causes for the killings, according to
the EFF, is that of patronage being at the core of what is
happening because people are pushing for political power by
using the very same resources they get from their proximity
to the State, to be able to issue out patronage by the buying
of support.45 Once wealth is amassed mainly through
corruption, the very same wealth is then used to buy
patronage (i.e. hitmen).46 The EFF submitted that patronage
is the main driver of violence and is not necessarily political
but corruption is at the centre of everything.

Glebelands

898.

The EFF touched on an issue that keeps resurfacing before
the Commission, namely, that of the ANC inviting criminality
within the organisation as an underlying cause. The EFF
made an example of people who were jailed for their
involvement in political violence during the 80’s and 90’s.

44

Para 22-26, vol 46 at pg 2793-2794 of the record.
Para 12-25, vol 46 at pg 2806 of the record.
46 Para 1-4, vol 46 at pg 2807 of the record.
45

297   P a g e

 When they were released from prison with nothing, the ANC
would take them in and house them in Glebelands and that
it is easy for such people with no source of income to be hired
to carry out heinous crimes.47

899.

When asked for comment on the issues surrounding
Glebelands Hostel, the EFF made it clear that the concept of
hostels was an apartheid concept that sought to provide a
kraal of black people for white people to go when in need of
cheap labour. The concept of hostels is inhuman, degrading
and completely dehumanising yet the ANC continued with
the concept and left people in the conditions. The EFF’s
stance on the killings taking place in Glebelands is that they
are simply criminal and about greed.48

900.

“Where there is chaos there is an opportunity for criminals to
make money. I must repeat that. The chaos in Glebelands is
created by the State, by the Municipality, by the ANC, because
where there is chaos they can steal, they can loot, they can
rob poor people blind. That is our take on Glebelands and we
are saying those people are just collateral damage in the
battle of the ANC fighting for resources.”49

47

Para 4-9, vol 46 at pg 2811 and para 1-19 at vol 46, pg 2819 of the record.
Para 24-25, vol 46 at pg 2819 of the record.
49 Para 8-13, vol 46 at pg 2821 of the record.
48

298   P a g e

 UMzimkhulu
901.

The EFF are of the view that the issues of uMzimkhulu are
similar to problems faced elsewhere, that at the core of the
killings is the greed and corruption of the ANC characterised
by fighting over tenders and self-enrichment. The murders
are just criminal committed by criminals trying to protect
their criminal empire at all costs. UMzimkhulu was
unfortunate to be co-opted into this corrupt and unstable
Province of KZN run by the ANC. An interesting observation
made by the EFF is that of comparing the state of the
Province before under the rule of the IFP and presently under
the rule of the ANC. They draw a comparison of the killings
taking place under the watch of the ANC with the majority of
the politicians killed being ANC members.50

Proliferation of arms
902.

The EFF drew from statistics to show that the Province is
experiencing a serious problem of easy access or availability
of arms by showing that 42-43 per cent of murders in the
Province are carried out by using a gun. That the problem is
exacerbated by the fact that there still is a high number of
unaccounted arms in Province. A link was also established

50

Para 1-4, vol 46 at pg 2825 of the record.

299   P a g e

 between the men in the Province, guns and masculinity, in
that the weapon of masculine fascination in KwaZulu-Natal
is a gun.
903.

In conclusion, the EFF appealed that all murders of
politicians be treated as criminal and investigated as such
and the police must do their jobs effectively and without
favour.

904.

At the start of their evidence the delegation expressed the
strong view that the Report of the Commission be published,
unlike some reports to which they mentioned, which are
gathering dust somewhere. Specific mention was made of the
Manase Report into the goings on in the eThekwini Metro.

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC)

905.

The ANC delegation gave evidence before the Commission for
two consecutive days from the 19-20 October 2017. The
delegation was led by the Provincial Chairperson, Mr
Zikalala. As it was customary with all delegations, the ANC
was allowed to make its presentation with the least
interruptions which took the better part of the first day. On
the second day of the hearings, Evidence Leaders were able
to then lead the evidence and probe for clarity in certain
respects. The presentation of the ANC was very detailed and

300   P a g e

 extensive and with a lot expected from the governing party,
the two days were warranted.

906.

The ANC commenced its presentation by acknowledging and
commending the Commission for its work and by owning
that the ANC as the leader of society has an immense
responsibility to play in providing solutions to the political
violence challenge faced by society.

907.

The ANC confirmed that it made a call for the establishment
of the Commission of Enquiry out of grave concerns resulting
from widespread killing of politicians which began to
intensify towards the 2011 Local Government Election and
became extreme pre and post 2016 local government
elections. The killings affected most political parties in the
Province to varying degrees, but of all political parties the
ANC is the hardest hit by the political killings. Despite ANC
members being the most impacted by these killings, the ANC
cautioned against those concluding that the killings of
politicians is a problem emanating from the ANC and thus
an ANC problem.

301   P a g e

 908.

The delegation provided some insight on why the ANC is
most affected party by the killings, two reasons were
provided as follows:51
(1)

The ANC as a governing party has the majority of
politicians in government compared to other political
parties; and

(2)

Due to the magnitude and influence the party has on
society, it will be the most affected.

909.

Consequently, anything that affects or has an impact on the
political climate of the country or the Province is likely to
have a far-reaching effect on the ANC as the governing party
with a majority in the Province.

910.

On attempting to understand why political killings are
prevalent in the Province, the delegation was of the opinion
that the institutionalised culture of violence planted since
the arrival of the colonists is the brunt still borne till this
day. The ANC highlighted various episodes of violence
throughout history dating back to the 19th century, to
demonstrate how the culture of violence was systematically
established and engrained in the life of the nation.52

51
52

Para 7-11, vol 31, at pg 1859 of the record.
Para 4-9, vol 31 of the record at pg 1861 of the record.

302   P a g e

 911.

Of the historical events of violence mentioned, the delegation
held that the culture of violence in the Province cannot be
complete without highlighting the events of the Durban Riots
of 1949. Of importance, the ANC emphasised that in a
number of violent incidents, the apartheid regime was
always at the centre of the violence against so-called black
on black aggression.53 Commissions such as the Goldstone
Commission, proved beyond doubt the role of the apartheid
government in fostering black on black conflict, a culture
well-entrenched and in continuation till this day.54

912.

The ANC has always been concerned about the violence and
as a consequence, has been an active initiator, facilitator and
participant in peace building initiatives in the province. The
ANC’s peace initiatives in the Province since the early 1990’s
are well documented such as the process of putting an end
to the ANC/IFP conflict that affected areas such as
Shobashobane, Hammarsdale and Estcourt to name a few.
It was during that time the ANC contends, that the third
force continued to rear its ugly head, undermining the
democratisation processes through the divide and rule
stratagem that the racist propagandists termed ‘black on
black violence’.55

53

Para 22-25, vol 31 of the record at pg 1868-1869 of the record.
Para 7-10, vol 31 of the record at pg 1871 of the record.
55 Para 16-25, vol 31 at pg 1880 of the record.
54

303   P a g e

 913.

The ANC is of the view that the instigators of violence who
worked for the apartheid state to destabilise South Africa are
not happy twenty- three years down the line of democracy.

914.

The ANC admits that on its own assessment, it has lost
nineteen of its members since January 2016, three members
of the IFP, three members of the NFP, three members of the
SACP and lastly one member of the EFF.56 Areas identified
as experiencing high levels of violence are Intshanga,
Glebelands (which has a majority of killings of a criminal
nature as opposed to political i.e. criminality of bed selling) ,
Madadeni and Ezakheni and have been stabilised through
arrests and rapid deployment of public order police and
visible policing.57 It must be noted that no examples were
given of arrests made in these areas.

915.

The ANC expressed the following hopes regarding the works
of the Commission:58
(1)

that

through

the

Commission’s

findings

and

recommendations, families, friends and comrades
affected by the killings will find closure and healing;

56

Para 11-18, vol 31 at pg 1883 of the record.
Para 23-25, vol 31 at pg 1884-1885 of the record.
58 Para 5-25, vol 31 at pg 1887 of the record.
57

304   P a g e

 (2)

that the Commission will advance innovative means
to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of law
enforcement;

(3)

that the Commission should assist in recommending
a programme to foster the collective participation of
all citizens for nation building and unity against
crime;

(4)

that the killings are clearly taking a shape that
illustrates a complex mix of political decay, social and
moral

degeneration,

criminality

and

deadly

competition for economic or financial resources and
control;

(5)

that the institutionalised and deep ingrained culture
of violence in our society is at the core of the killings;

(6)

the ANC agrees that it is one organisation mostly
affected by killings judging by the number of
incidents affecting its leaders, councillors and
members but does not believe that there is a
patronage network in the province.59 However, the

59

Para 4-5, vol 31 at pg 1950 of the record.

305   P a g e

 ANC cautioned against the narrative that the killings
are an ANC problem alone.

(7)

that the Commission must assist in making citizens
understand the extent to which socio-economic
conditions are playing a role in the killings nationally
and provincially;

916.

The

ANC

requires

the

Commission

to

conduct

a

comprehensive analysis of the role played by the criminal
justice

system

in

fuelling

the

flames

through

the

unsuccessful arrest and prosecution or discouraging the
killings through successful arrest and prosecution.

917.

The ANC identified causal factors for the killings with the
main being the following:

(1)

Contestation for political power backed by the belief
that holding office comes with influence and control
over state resources which can be accessed for
material benefit and self-enrichment.

(2)

Corruption in government which comes in various
forms and the most corrupted being government
officials and public representatives.

306   P a g e

 (3)

Careerism in political office that is manifested by the
belief that becoming a councillor at local government
level is easy and seen as a soft landing towards selfenrichment and power mongering as a means to
sustaining the position of influence. The ANC
admitted that since it is easy to become a councillor,
they are the most vulnerable.

(4)

Inter-political conflict which manifests itself mainly
in hung municipalities where killing of a councillor
creates a possibility of changing power balance and
leadership in a municipality.

(5)

The growth of independent candidates seen in the
last local government is not an exercise of democracy
but an exercise of a sponsored campaign to beat the
ANC at the polls.

(6)

The existence of external forces “third force” that
complicates political tensions but the ANC is of the
opinion that it cannot characterise the external
influences as the notorious third force of the
apartheid era. However, the ANC claims to be ill
equipped to rule out that the third force has taken a
new form as seen from the killings taking place. The
ANC emphasised that even during the apartheid rule,
the third force did not become easily identifiable.
When asked shouldn’t the Intelligence Service have

307   P a g e

 identified the third force by now, the ANC conceded
that indeed, the Intelligence Service should have
identified the hand of the external force.
(7)

Some of the killings characterised as political killings
are as a result of family disputes as seen in various
cases where there have been convictions.

(8)

The role of hit-men “izinkabi” in these killings is a
factor of concern, especially the link of izinkabi and
the taxi industry in the Province. All MEC’s for
Transport, Community Safety and Liaison, who have
been ANC leaders have made all attempts to deal the
lingering issue of taxi violence in KwaZulu-Natal.

918.

On issues plaguing Glebelands, the ANC noted that the
killings in Glebelands started back in late 1990’s and it was
around 1996 that the struggle of bed selling emerged. One of
the interventions made by the ANC in dealing with the
conflict in Glebelands was to call on the eThekwini
Municipality to fence the hostel as an access control
measure. A second call made was for the municipality to
register all residents of the hostel. The Municipality was also
requested to transform the hostel dwellings into humane,
liveable and communal facilities to bring dignity to the
residents.60

60

However,

Para 4-25,vol 31 at pg 1903-1904 of the record.

308   P a g e

as

was

presented

before

the

 Commission, corruption linked to these initiatives saw the
projects being a failure.

919.

A call was also made to the SAPS to establish a mobile police
station at Glebelands as a means of tackling the criminal
elements in the hostel. However, the ANC believes that the
affected people and communities, with the agency of
community-based safety, civic and political structures must
be central to finding lasting solutions for Glebelands.

920.

On the tensions witnessed in uMzimkhulu, the ANC
expressed that in their analysis, there are two issues; firstly,
corruption allegations within the Municipality and secondly,
the power contestation experienced heading towards the
regional conference that has been postponed. The ANC
submitted that problems of uMzimkhulu are being dealt with
by the national leadership.61 The corruption allegations
within the Municipality have been

disputed by the

Municipality. What is not in dispute

is

the power

contestation within the Region.

921.

In an attempt to address the perceptions of state security
apparatus being used by the ANC to fight factional battles (a
perception held by most of the witnesses that testified before

61

Para 20-25, vol 31 at pg 1961-1962 of the record.

309   P a g e

 the Commission), the ANC submitted that the perception is
unfortunate and the ANC believes that it is incorrect. The
delegation maintained that the ANC has always strived to
maintain the independence of state organs including state
security apparatus without influence from politics.

922.

On the selection process of candidates, the ANC explained
that there are guidelines and a Candidate Process Manual
which is used to select candidates for the ANC. The ANC
added that their election processes are transparent and
available for scrutiny by both members and South Africans.

923.

The election process was described as follows:62

(1)

nominations are only made by the Branch General
Members (“BGM”) who nominate candidates.

(2)

every branch forms a screening committee that
screens ward candidates and presents the candidates
to the community.

(3)

screening committees are made up of six members of
the ANC with no direct interest in the outcome of the
candidate selection process plus one representative
from each of the alliance partners.

62

Para 3-25, vol 31 at pg 1907-1909 of the record.

310   P a g e

 (4)

On the issue of the alliance partnership, the ANC
contended that it had a healthy relationship with the
alliance partners and that they are part of resolving
problems arising at branch level. The importance of
the alliance relationship was stressed and the
partnership with the SACP was complimented.

(5)

the

committee

then

screens

and

interviews

candidates and together with the regional list
committee deployee to the branch, select a ward
candidate after the meeting.
(6)

The screening committee then reports back to the
ANC BEC on any negative findings encountered
during the interview process.

(7)

the regional list committee (“RLC”) is set up by the
regional executive committee (“REC”) and convened
by the secretary and six senior members with no
direct interests in the outcome of the candidate
selection process plus one representative from each
of the alliance partners.

(8)

that the RLC has no power other than overseeing the
fair and proper functioning of branch nominations
and ward selection processes and the screening and
drafting of the PR list according to nominations and
representations to present to the municipality and
district or metro PR selection conference.

311   P a g e

 924.

The ANC provided the Commission with short, medium and
long- term solutions in dealing with these political killings as
follows:63

(1)

Short term solutions
(a) state security and crime intelligence should play
a major role in identifying culprits and
perpetrators of crime and violence to ensure that
police work is informed by accurate inside
intelligence to find perpetrators and collect
evidence for successful prosecution.
(b) the government should identify all violent
hotspots in the Province that require special
attention.
(c) operations like operation Fiela should continue
targeting hotspot areas and areas which are
known for violence or harbouring hit-men.
(d) the ANC should hold regular oversight meetings
with the MEC for Transport, Department of
Community, Safety and Liaison to receive
briefing on the progress on cases under
investigation by SAPS and NPA.

63

Pg 1915-1917of vol 31 of the record.

312   P a g e

 (e) the ANC will encourage its members to be active
participants in the community-based crime
prevention structures to deal with threats and
prevent killings as well as other social ills.
(f) the ANC will also call on its members to work
closely with the SAPS to prevent crime and
identify issues and challenges faced in various
communities as well as activating peace and
stability subcommittees across regions to
address the killings in local level.

(2)

Medium term solutions:
(a) it would ensure that its regions and branches are
actively

involved

in

tracking

cases

under

investigation and will mobilise society to take an
interest in the political killing cases within their
communities.

(b) it will work actively to identify formal issues of
discomfort and criminal activities that have a
potential to cause violence or lead to killings.

(c) it would continue to encourage the government to
intensify

313   P a g e

its

social

cohesion

and

social

 development programmes that address social ills,
including substance abuse and crime.

(d) it would intensify the radical socio-economic
transformation

programme

to

unlock

opportunities for jobs and in the long run assist
government in its effort to reduce and ultimately
eliminate poverty and inequality.

(e) it

would

institute

reforms

that

effect

the

transformation of the State into a developmental
responsive State that engages society at local level
through community-based structures and social
enterprises as a strategy for nation building and
peace building. That social cohesion programmes
should include religious formations, academia,
traditional leaders and the business community.

(3)

Long term solutions: the ANC vowed to do as
follows:
(a) continue with political education in all branches
and structures with the aim of promoting
tolerance,

political

consciousness

constructive political engagement.
314   P a g e

and

 (b) as a leader of society, it will embark on an
aggressive societal educational programme to
empower communities to utilise democratic
processes and government channels in resolving
differences.
(c) it will advance the socio-economic transformation
programme in line with the policies of the country
to ensure that training opportunities and skill
building opportunities are created for young
people, women, military veterans and people with
disabilities to enable then to benefit from
employment and business opportunities.
(d) it

will

canvass

academics

across

tertiary

institutions to assist in peace building efforts and
scientific

research

towards

eradicating

the

scourge of violence in the Province, as it is
everyone’s responsibility to ensure that historical
culture of violence in the Province is eliminated.
(e) ultimately, the ANC hopes the work of the
Commission will amplify the importance of socioeconomic transformation programmes to improve
the

lives

development

315   P a g e

of

people
of

the

and

for

country.

sustainable
Of

critical

 importance, the ANC expects the Commission to
contribute to the transformation of the criminal
justice

system

and

improvement

of

local

government systems.
(f)

lastly, it remains committed to working for peace
and stability of the Province.

925.

The ANC made some concessions on the problem faced by
the Province by admitting the following:
(a) by agreeing with the SACP that most of the
problems with these political killings stem from
tenders and corruption and suggested that there
should be an open tender system or a tender
board for transparency.64
(b) it admitted to cadre deployment but explained
that it is normal for political parties to employ
people who resonate with the party in terms of
thinking and policies but it does not mean
incompetent people will be employed. That the
ANC

has

always

employs/appoints

made

people

in

sure
all

that
spheres

it
of

government with qualities and the expertise to do
the job.65

64
65

Para 23-25, vol 32 at pg 1941 of the record.
At pg 1973-1974,vol 32 of the record.

316   P a g e

 (c) that it and the alliance have always been opposed
to materialism and conspicuous consumption
displayed by its members to the extent that the
issues have formed part of the discussion
documents.66
(d) that the King has attempted to attend to the
culture of violence in the Province by conducting
a cleansing ceremony.67 However, as alluded to by
most witnesses, another cleansing ceremony
facilitated by the King has to be conducted as a
solution to the violence experienced in the
Province.
(e) that the external force’s motive is to deepen the
tensions in the Province in order to ultimately
weaken the ANC. The current political killings are
weakening the ANC as an organisation and are
creating a bad image for the party.68

66

Para 10-15, at vol 32 at pg 1978 of the record.
Para 17-20, vol 32 at pg 1993 of the record.
68 Para 10-20, vol 32 at pg 1998 of the record.
67

317   P a g e

 ACADEMICS & POLITICAL ANALYSTS

926.

A number of academics and social and political analysts and
commentators gave evidence before the Commission. We
shall consider their evidence in no particular order.

LUKHONA MNGUNI

927.

Mr Mnguni was the second witness to testify before the
Commission, having done so on 30 March 2017.

928.

Mr Mnguni stated that he had done a comparative analysis
of political violence of KZN and other Provinces and is of the
view that comparatively, the killings are more prevalent in
this Province. He backed his analysis by quoting from a
paper written by Mr David Bruce of the Institute for Security
Studies (“ISS”), in which political violence was researched
and found that 90 per cent of the political killings postapartheid South Africa have taken place in KZN.69

929.

In order to understand the present climate of the Province
Mr Mnguni took the Commission through a brief background
history of the Province by acknowledging the deadly wave of

69

Para 9-18, vol 1 at pg 102 of the record.

318   P a g e

 violence that hit the Province during the apartheid era. The
violence experienced in the 1990’s was inter-party. Even
though other Provinces like the Eastern Cape and Gauteng
experienced violence it was not as widespread as in KZN,
which was a political hotspot for violence. The violence of the
1990’s was between the IFP and the ANC. The Province
experienced widespread violence compared to certain areas
of country. If the Province was to be considered in its present
form, one would realise that KZN has not experienced a clean
break from the past violent history. The fact is violence
diminishes for a while only to resurface again and the reason
for the escalations in violence could be due to no post conflict
recovery process carried out that would have ensured the
nurturing of a different mindset amongst political players
and citizens and discourage violence as a mechanism to sort
out political differences.70

930.

Mr Mnguni argued for two things to be implemented in order
to facilitate the “post conflict recovery process” namely; that
violence not be a de facto remedy to solve political differences
and secondly, violence not to be used as a tool to control
others. That the fostering of a different political climate is
required. The “process” he argued would have to be overseen
by national, provincial and local government as cooperation

70

Para 15-25, vol 1 at pg 103-104 of the record.

319   P a g e

 from all spheres of government is required in addressing the
problem of post conflict.

931.

In his analysis of what the underlying causes of political
violence in the Province he stated the following:

(a) The scramble for political power is now understood to
mean an opportunity to access state power which is
applicable to all levels of government. However, high
contestations are rife at the local level. Political power is
seen to be a vehicle to amass wealth. For example, a
councillor is in a position to influence who gets a RDP
house and at what price. In a way, those in power see
themselves as gatekeepers that can manipulate processes
and elicit bribes to their benefit.
(b) Being in politics is seen as being better off. Politics of
virtue is now politics of the day. Politics of today has
changed from the traditional centring of society and the
pursuit of justice to being “crass-materialism and selfwealth accumulation”.
(c) Patronage - the chain of patronage starts from the top
down from those in power ensuring that they distribute
resources to stay in power by dispensing patronage to
their supporters. The chain of patronage creates two
types of people; those that are part of the network and
320   P a g e

 those

that

oppose

and

expose

corruption

termed

‘whistleblowers’.
(d) Criminality - there are criminal elements (but also
political) in all the killings taking place and from the
execution of the killings it can be said that they are
premeditated and deliberate.

932.

On perceptions of the political climate of the Province, Mr
Mnguni stated that the Province is highly intolerant
politically with a potential of politics of fear, politics of
inducement, politics of censoring, politics of coercion and
politics that seeks to control independent minds.71

933.

When it came to the effectiveness of the police regarding
investigating political murders, Mr Mnguni shared the
sentiments expressed by most witnesses that the police are
ineffective when it comes to dealing with political murders
due to the roles being muddled and influenced by politics.
The public holds the view that most of the ineffectiveness of
the police investigations is due to political agendas being
deliberately executed and designed not to lead to any
convictions. That it is rather unfortunate that police are also

71

Para 3-12, vol 1 at pg 116.

321   P a g e

 viewed as being corrupt and some members of the police
having sympathies with certain political parties.

934.

On the successful prosecution rate for the killings, Mr
Mnguni’s perception was that, conviction rates are generally
low in the country. So, it should not come as a surprise that
the prosecution rate for political killings would also be low.
He further pointed out that there are a number of factors
that determine a successful prosecution and unfortunately
when it comes to political killings people are reluctant to
testify for a fear of being killed. The fear is also exacerbated
by the lack of confidentiality of information shared with the
police, thus making it difficult for the National Prosecuting
Authority to execute its mandate. The general perception
held by ordinary members of the public is that one must not
involve oneself in political killings.

935.

Mr Mnguni, concluded by recommending solutions to the
Commission that might assist in reducing or curbing future
incidents as follows:72

(a)

creation of mechanisms that would deal with

political intolerance. Political tolerance can be made part of
the KZN school curriculum to educate and foster political

72Vol

1 at pg 123-127 of the record

322   P a g e

 tolerance whilst children are still young so that they grow up
being aware and able to deal with political differences.
(b)

urgent demilitarisation of the Province is required

through initiatives spearheaded by the government to
recover the caches of arms. There has to be a plan to recover
and to destroy the arms once recovered.
(c)

the commitment of political education by various

political parties of their members. A culture of practising
politics of virtue needs to be embedded in political education.
Each party must demonstrate as part of their political
induction,

political

education

and

political

tolerance

education.
(d)

there needs to be a dedicated police unit that will

deal with the political killings coordinated at provincial level.
(e)

Lastly, the government must make a concerted effort

to root out corruption within its ranks as currently the
manipulation of state resources has no consequences.

PROTAS MADLALA

936.

He testified on 12 June 2017. He is currently the CEO of
the Small Enterprise Development Agency (SEDA). Mr
Madlala started as a journalist and was employed by the
then Natal Mercury. He then did a BA and BA honours in
Political Science and Philosophy at the University of

323   P a g e

 Zululand. Thereafter, he moved to Pretoria as a journalist.
He was a press officer of the Catholic Bishops of Southern
Africa, under the late Archbishop Dennis Hurley, where he
was serving Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana and South
Africa.

937.

He then obtained a scholarship through the late Professor
Sibusiso

Bhengu

and

did

an

MA

in

International

Communications in Washington DC. He returned to South
Africa in the late eighties, when there were massive forced
removals by the apartheid government. He successfully and
peacefully headed the struggle against forced removals of the
people of Mariannhill.

938.

He then went to the then Natal University where he taught
Community Development. Some of his former students are
currently Cabinet Ministers in government. From 1994 to
date, he has been an independent political analyst.

939.

He

has

travelled

extensively

internationally

on

a

professional level. Mr Madlala gave a historical background
of violence in the Province. When he grew up as a young boy,
what was typical of killings in KwaZulu-Natal arose from
faction fights, mainly in Msinga. In the late eighties,

324   P a g e

 particularly at the time of the death of Mrs Victoria Mxenge
in 1985, the violence escalated to a higher level.

940.

After the death of Mrs Mxenge and her husband, Mr Griffiths
Mxenge, political violence escalated. Amabutho (warriors)
were IFP aligned and Amaqabane (comrades) were UDF
aligned and thereafter ANC aligned. It was mass killings that
were directed at masses like in Shobashobane and
Mpumalanga, Hammarsdale. According to him, those mass
killings were State sponsored and targeted particular areas
which were viewed as belonging to a particular enemy
political party.

941.

In the last four years or so, the kind of killings have become
different from the eighties and nineties. The killings appear
to be targeted and well calculated with military precision. It
is an intra-party kind of violence and it is comrade against
comrade, specifically within the ANC, NFP and IFP remarkably, not within the DA.

942.

The victims of the violence have been largely the ANC, IFP
and NFP, the latter two parties to a lesser extent. The ANC
made a mistake, especially with the first local government
elections in 1996. They imposed Councillors in communities.
In the last municipal elections in August 2016, KZN had the

325   P a g e

 highest number of independent candidates who had defected
from the ANC.

943.

Another dimension is the killings between the ANC and
SACP, especially at Intshanga. The violence is predominantly
within the ANC largely because it is the governing party and
controls State resources. Mr Madlala believes that the
violence within the ANC is a curse that was witnessed after
the ANC Polokwane National Elective Conference. What is
happening nationally, provincially, regionally and locally is
all interlinked, but the violence happens mainly at local level.

944.

Since Polokwane, there have been different slates and the
ANC has been in disarray. The killing of people is a business
and the killers are available and well trained. It seems that
people are killed as they arrive home after a political meeting.
There are very few arrests and a very low conviction rate of
the culprits.

945.

The new government came up with things like outsourcing
State work in the form of tenders. It makes sense that the
killings are largely within the ANC because it controls many
municipalities and State resources.

326   P a g e

 946.

Mr Madlala suggested that the government should utilise
some of the strategies of the apartheid government. He
illustrated this by saying that the army must be utilised to
raid Glebelands hostel for arms and ammunition. He alluded
to the fact that in Mpumalanga, Hammarsdale, the army was
brought in and the strategy was effective in solving the
violence there.

947.

He indicated that perhaps the current violence is linked to
the past violence through cultural beliefs, in the sense that
the past deceased are “still fighting and not finally rested”.
Iqunga (propensity to kill) means that when people are at
war, traditionally they use umuthi to strengthen themselves.
After the war, they need to be cleansed of iqunga, otherwise
they will have the urge to kill again.73

948.

He also suggested that the issue of tenders and access to
State

resources

should

be

reviewed.

People

become

millionaires overnight through tenders.

949.

He alluded to the fact that the DA has been in government
in the Western Cape for quite a long time, but there are no
political killings there. His analysis of that aspect is that

73

See the discussion at Vol 5 pg 268 of the record.

327   P a g e

 there is perhaps less patronage, jobs for pals, and everything
is done above board and transparently there.

950.

He testified that he had read that the Youth League wanted
R1 billion from eThekwini Municipality’s budget, plus 40%
employment for the youth and that no qualifications must
be asked for.

951.

He made a comparison between the ANC and IFP. The IFP is
a traditional party and they respect their leader like a father
figure. It is sort of autocratic and he said he meant that in a
good spirit. On the other hand, the ANC is in disarray and
the centre does not hold. It is no longer the ANC that was
once respected and where the centre held everything
together. It needs very strong leadership to pull the various
factions together.

952.

That aspect also extends to the arms of the State. There is a
lack of commitment and a lot that has gone wrong in our
country. The ANC must do a self-introspection74 at all levels
and the veterans must play a leading role in the process. The
councillor candidates must be those who are elected by the
communities, instead of being imposed by the ANC.

74

He used a Zulu expression – iANC ‘kufanele izinuke amakhwapha”. Literally. The ANC should smell its
armpits”.

328   P a g e

 953.

On the view that the police are not efficient in the
investigation of political killings, Mr Madlala indicated that
much has to do with patronage and the fact that most people
in the public service are not careerists. In the old times, most
teachers were teachers because it was their chosen vocation.
Currently, there is a lot of mismatch, not only in the police
force. There are many good people who are in wrong jobs for
a variety of reasons.

954.

It is a pity that in the past six years non-police candidates
have been appointed as National Police Commissioners.
General Phiyega was a social worker and Mr Bheki Cele was
a political activist. They have never worked even in a charge
office.

955.

Mr Madlala alluded to the high unemployment rate as having
a bearing on the killings. Most people are unemployable
because they lack skills. Once they have tasted a higher
lifestyle of being a councillor and the elections suddenly
throw them out into the wilderness, they could resort to
whatever means to remain in position, even if it means
killing.

329   P a g e

 956.

What concerns Mr Madlala is that, in a typical black
community, formal education does not matter. Someone who
has hardly sat in a classroom becomes a millionaire quickly.
That kind of message is worrying because it drives people
into materialism at whatever cost, even if it means killing.

PAULUS MZOMUHLE ZULU.

957.

He testified on 18 July 2017. He is a Professor and a Social
Scientist. He has a PhD in Social Sciences. He is the Director
of a research unit located in the School of Social Sciences at
the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He was previously the Vice
Chancellor at the then University of Natal and a Senior
Research Fellow in the Centre for Social and Development
Studies in the University of Natal.

958.

He has written extensively and has many publications. His
first interest was on elections and then on migrant labour
and his experiences and perceptions took him to the hostels
for one and a half years in 1976 to 1977.

959.

He next went into marketing research with Unilever and his
main focus was on black advancement when multinational
companies were interested in recruiting black people into

330   P a g e

 senior positions. At that time, the concept of Ubuntu gained
prominence in the South African lexicon.

960.

He proceeded to the University of Zululand where he studied
and wrote about political authorities, Amakhosi and
Izinduna.

961.

In 1985 he witnessed the first serious wave of political
violence in KwaZulu-Natal following the murder of Attorney
Victoria Mxenge. When violence became endemic, it was then
that he began collecting data. In a book entitled South Africa
Beyond Apartheid, where he wrote a chapter that chronicled
the views and activities of the United Democratic Front and
other organisations that had mushroomed at the time.

962.

He has authored a number of articles, including Political
Violence in the Hostels, The Third Force in a Hidden Hand. He
has also written a book entitled A Nation in Crisis, which
deals, inter alia, with what he calls public morality in the
modern day South Africa. He maintains that there must be
an alternative morality from that which governs the way
people behave. He decries the type of conduct and morality
that culminates in what we now call State Capture.

331   P a g e

 963.

He believes that morality and the violence are interlinked in
the sense that the alternative morality is the main cause of
the current violence.

964.

He compared the violence of the eighties with the current
violence. He stated that the two are different in terms of
magnitude. You had a battlefield in the 1980s through to the
early 1990s. Causally or in terms of participants, it was also
different.

965.

In the eighties, it was much more complex in terms of
participation. A number of people were involved in violence
either in retaliation or as instigators who were recruited into
it as foot soldiers.

966.

The violence today is very different, in that, it is very selective
and does not target ordinary people unless they are hit by
stray bullets. It is targeted at the leadership in the political
drama. One has to have a certain status to be involved in
that violence. The actual perpetrators are hired assassins.
You would not know who actually pulled the trigger.

967.

The people that are targeted are people who occupy specific
positions in society. In comparison between then and now,
the violence is predominantly intra-political party.

332   P a g e

 968.

Furthermore, between the eighties and the nineties although
there was an ideological dimension, that was not the driving
force.

969.

It was the South African government and those aligned to
the government system versus others that were opposed to
that system.

970.

He alluded to what he terms a competition culture. His
contention was that there seems to be a culture of
eliminating the competitor. It is not only in political violence,
but also in taxi violence. It is also the same in other
competitive engagements.

971.

If you chat with soccer players, they would tell you that for
their games they consult some medicine man. In general, he
gives them umuthi that would hamper their opposition from
performing effectively.

972.

Professor Zulu stated that he had never come across a team
that said they went to an inyanga who gave them umuthi on
how to place their goals accurately. He regards that as
negative competition.

333   P a g e

 973.

Having worked for five years at Unilever, he understood it
quite well. If you wanted your Lux soap to sell better, you
would advertise it through a beautiful young model to make
people believe that it would make them beautiful too. You
would not advertise negatively against your competitor’s
similar product.

974.

But in the case of our people and it happens even with the
so-called xenophobia, foreign nationals are accused by locals
of taking their businesses. What they should be doing is to
sell their goods at reduced prices or give them another
marketing gimmick that would enhance their products’ sale.

975.

Elimination culture does not go down well. Prof Zulu
indicated that South Africa is a nation that does not want to
be criticised. We do not look inwards when things happen,
but we are always the victims of something or we have been
duped into something or victims of white monopoly capital.

976.

That probably explains why political violence manifests in
the elimination of the opposition.

977.

He was talking about culture as a human response to
environmental conditions.

For an unknown reason there

seems to be a culture of blood in KZN. He could not say

334   P a g e

 where it emanated from and indicated that serious studies
needed to be undertaken to understand the underlying root.

978.

His understanding was that the competition went very high
up in the social and political structures. That is the
syndrome that we have, particularly in the ANC. That is
aggravated by a culture of complacency in the criminal
justice system, particularly the police.

979.

The same that happens with political violence also happens
in taxi violence. It is very rare that the perpetrators are
caught immediately and, given the extensive resources that
we have in this country, one wonders why this is the case.

980.

The violence occurs between people on the ground, that is
your councillors, because that is where it is happening
mostly. It seldom happens at the level of MPLs and MPs. He
traced the links from councillor right up to find out where
they were linked to.

981.

He maintains that the orders must be coming from higher
up, either directly or indirectly through the connections,
connectivity and linkages. He shared the view that state
organs are being used for political ends. He alluded to the

335   P a g e

 existence of political factions at Branch, Regional, Provincial
and National levels.

982.

On why the violence is predominantly at low level,
specifically councillors, he was of the view that numbers
played a major role. That was his first empirical response.
There are only 400 MPs in the whole country from different
provinces. There are about 80 MPLs in the Province and
more than 400 councillors just in Durban alone. So, there
are much more competitive positions for councillors than
there are for MPLs and MPs.

983.

In the political arena, one needs to be connected to the
political elite. There are no qualifications. So, the stakes are
much higher. A number of councillors would probably not be
qualified to do anything other than as labourers or as
ordinary factory workers. The salary of the councillor is
relatively high, well over R15 000.00 per month.

984.

It is a question of all or nothing that really operates. One
either has the job or nothing at all. Given this competition,
in the absence of qualifications, negative competition in the
form of violence is the perfect recipe.

336   P a g e

 985.

Although there are councillors in all provinces, the trend of
violence in terms of the culture of violence and negative
competition about councillorship is concentrated in KZN. In
his analysis, the first reason is that KZN is considered the
biggest Province that contributes to and shapes national
politics.

986.

Empirically, there are more votes in the national positions
coming from KZN than from anywhere else. Secondly, the
history and culture of violence in the Province seems to be
much more than elsewhere. That is a very serious
contributing factor.

987.

In his book,

A Nation in Crisis,

he compares the

remuneration packages of politicians, particularly members
of parliament in Australia, India, United Kingdom, Canada
and South Africa. He found that South African politicians
are inordinately highly paid. Another form of remuneration
derives from the tender system, corruption and kickbacks.

988.

All these are interlinked as being the underlying causes of
the political violence. The stakes are extremely high. You
either are in or out and even having adapted your lifestyle
that you would never have had. He indicated that some of

337   P a g e

 the loan sharks were saying that their clientele were MPs,
MPLs and councillors because of their high lifestyles.

989.

His recommendations are to make the criminal justice
system effective, but it could probably be serving the interest
of some high-ranking politicians that the criminal justice
system is not effective. Secondly, some qualifications for
political positions. He explained that he was not necessarily
referring to academic qualifications, but moral qualifications
and appropriate minimum skills for the job.

990.

Beyond that, if the relevant candidates had minimum
qualifications and skills and did not make it as a councillor,
there would be an alternative to fall back on. It therefore
reduces the incentive to kill but does not eliminate it.

991.

His contention was that the current state of poverty,
unemployment and inequality in the country had no bearing
on the culture of violence and negative competition where
there is the sharp struggle over scarce resources that drive
poverty, unemployment and inequality.

338   P a g e

 Professor Sihawu Ngubane

992.

On 18 August 2017, Professor Sihawu Ngubane (“Ngubane”),
the Head of African Languages at the University of KwaZuluNatal testified before the Commission in his personal
capacity and as a member of the public as permitted by the
Terms of Reference.

993.

He is also the Chairperson of the African Renaissance in the
Province of KwaZulu-Natal.

994.

Ngubane made submissions to the Commission from an
African and cultural philosophy viewpoint. Throughout his
presentation, he stressed the spirit of ubuntu, which,
according to him, stands for unity of humanity through the
principles of empathy, that could endeavour to resolve the
issues of instability in the Province.

995.

In providing a background to the history of the Province, he
held that in the 1960’s KwaZulu-Natal was the most stable
Province in South Africa (with parents from all over the
country sending their children to prominent schools like
Ohlange High School, Inanda Seminary etc). Unfortunately,
the conflict witnessed between the UDF and the IFP in the
‘80s saw the Province plunging into a dark period of violence.

339   P a g e

 996.

That there were initiatives undertaken by politicians,
religious and traditional leaders from the 1990 to 2004 to
bring stability to the Province. The African Renaissance
Conference held in 1990 was the first conference held in the
Province with the theme “Beyond the Conflict”. Peace was
successfully negotiated at the Conference and following that
there was a Seminar called Unity of Faith where religious
leaders prayed and discussed peace. Thus, the return of the
violence witnessed today is shocking to many as the root of
the violence is deeply political as the politics of today is
viewed as a meal ticket and source of wealth by many.

997.

The Terms of Reference require an investigation to be made
into whether the killings have anything to do with ethnicity
amongst other underlying causes and interestingly Ngubane
had the following to say:
“...the most unfortunate element of this instability is that it
affects a single ethnic group. It is amongst the Nguni people
themselves, as we are aware that Nguni is constituted by
amaZulu, amaXhosa, amaSwati and amaNdebele so it is not
cross ethnical. It is a single ethnic that is fighting or that is
in war.”75

75

Para 1-5, vol 17 at p 849 of the record.

340   P a g e

 “It is unfortunate that it is amongst people of the same ethnic
group. It would have taken a different view if there were
ethnic conflict, but here we are all Nguni, so we can work
together as the Nguni people to solve these problems.”76

998.

As a social scientist, Ngubane advocates ubuntu as a
concept to be used in the restoration of peace. He maintains
that cultural resources may be important to construct a solid
and sustainable peace initiative in the Province by revisiting
indigenous roots.

999.

On giving insight into the underlying causes of violence in
the Province, Ngubane held that the culture of violence is
escalating

due

to

self-interest

fuelled

by

wealth

accumulation and egocentrism amongst people.

1000.

The second underlying cause he listed is the lack of identity
amongst people. People who kill others have simply lost
ubuntu.

76

Para 6-9, vol 17 at pg 869 of the record.

341   P a g e

 1001.

Ngubane concluded by opining that the lack of equal
distribution of resources, greed, political intolerance and
competition amongst Africans is the cause of killings.77

1002. On recommendations, he proffered that traditional leaders
need to be included in political administration as people are
more loyal and accountable to their izinduna and people are
unlikely to behave in a manner contradicting the values of
their local induna. Thus, traditional leaders have an
important role to play in resolving the current problem.78

1003.

He further proposed that the King of amaZulu and
traditional leaders should be engaged for the ritual of
ukuvala umkhokha to be performed in the Province.

Professor Richard Pithouse

1004. Professor Richard Pithouse (“Pithouse”) is a Professor of
Political Studies with the Rhodes University but was born
and raised in the Province of KZN. With a journalistic
background he has written extensively on political violence
since 2001. He has worked with various organisations and

77
78

Para 18-22, vol 17 at p 868 of the record.
Para 4-10, vol 17 at p 863 of the record.

342   P a g e

 community groups and currently he is working with Abahlali
baseMjondolo.

1005. Pithouse acknowledged the serious problem facing the
Province and that whilst the political violence is heavily
concentrated here in KwaZulu-Natal, it is slowly manifesting
elsewhere. The reason for the concentration in the Province
can be traced to civil war that took place in the 1980’s
through to the 1990’s. Pithouse is of the opinion that
political violence has not been thoroughly addressed hence
it keeps rearing its ugly head. In trying to understand the
reason for violence peaking at various instances, he
explained that people are socialised in different ways and
that at times violence becomes normalised and people with
a capacity for violence or even a taste for violence become
valuable assets and moved to the forefront.79

1006. He expanded that there is a clear social crises in the country
and the crisis is not necessary limited to political violence
(i.e. xenophobic violence, attacks on gay people and on
women) point to a serious crisis of the country. The violence
perpetrated against women is often ritualised here in South
Africa.

79

Para 15-25, vol 16 at pg 795 of the record.

343   P a g e

 1007. Tracing the history of violence, Pithouse touched on conflict
between the IFP and the ANC and that Richmond was the
epicentre of the conflict. Later the NFP emerged resulting
into conflict between the IFP and the NFP. However, the
decisive turning point he observed was the support for the
former President Zuma during his rape trial. That a military
approach was adopted and even the theme song of awulethe
umshini wam at the time were clear symptoms of an obvious
military posture taken up by all kinds of actors.80 As a
consequence, there was a sudden much more militarised
discourse by certain people that took on an ethnic and racial
form.81

1008. On the underlying causes for political violence, Pithouse
gave political intolerance as one of them.82 As he has studied
political theory, he stated that the intolerance amongst
people is not due to political ideologies but simply a
contestation for resources. That in most cases it is clear that
factions are not about ideology but about power and
resources resulting in a language used to legitimise
themselves in what they are doing.83

80

Para 21-25, vol 16 at pg 797 of the record.
Para 7-9, vol 16 at pg 798 of the record.
82 Almost all of the witnesses that have testified before the Commission alluded to political
intolerance being an underlying cause for the violence.
83 Para 17-24, vol 16, at pg 806 of the record.
81

344   P a g e

 1009. Another underlying cause as listed by Pithouse is that of
ethnicity. He gave an account of how witnessed in Cato Crest
a mobilisation of ethnic claims to distinguish between who
counts as a friend and who count as an enemy. The people
of the Eastern Cape were presented as illegitimate, having
no right to be present in certain spaces, to live in spaces and
to be present politically and those who relate to the people
from the Eastern Cape as equals were presented as
traitors.84

1010. On socio-economic conditions playing an underlying role in
these political killings, Pithouse had the following to say:
“...We have to be careful here because when people
argue that social and economic conditions lead to certain
pathologies, it is often a way of thinking and speaking
that quickly collapses into saying the impoverished
people are pathological. So we need to be careful about
that. There are many people who have no money, live
incredibly hard lives and conduct themselves in a
dignified manner and do no harm to anyone else.”

1011. He stressed the importance of not pushing a narrative
that leads to saying socio-economic conditions lead

84

Para 15-25, vol 16 at pg 807 of the record.

345   P a g e

 people to killing. Instead, he urged that it be realised
that when there is a serious economic crisis it can often
result in real pathological political outcomes. That
despite having an economy that doesn’t meet the most
urgent and basic needs of millions of people, this does
allow certain things to become possible to fester but
there are cases where you have qualities that don’t
result in the kinds of violence we are experiencing
here.85

1012. Pithouse

also

identified

political

power

as

an

underlying cause into the political violence. He
explained that it is human nature to do despicable
things where money and power is concerned but
qualified the statement by adding that not everyone is
susceptible to the trappings of power.86 He observed
that there is something seriously wrong with society in
that people involved in a political culture of violence or
a culture of

legitimising violence remain credible

actors within society yet under normal circumstances
such violence would not be tolerated.87 He cautioned
on attributing the conduct displayed by those with
power and money to be due to a decline in human

85

Para 12-25, vol 16 at pg 810 of the record.
Para 8-11, vol 16 at pg 811 of the record.
87 Supra.
86

346   P a g e

 values because the majority of the population still
adhere to the human values as known to society.

1013. Pithouse made the following recommendations:
(a)

That political violence cases should be investigated

by an outside police unit as local units are likely to be
manipulated by the local influential power brokers who
control political spaces in their communities, business
people and opportunistic criminals.
(b)

That the battle is not necessarily about being a

councillor but about access to resources which then creates
an unhealthy competition (i.e. RDP houses are often sold by
councillors). Therefore, councillors and government officials
in the municipality colluding together to loot resources
meant for the communities should be held accountable.
(c)

That

Commission

despite

various

advocating

witnesses

minimum

before

the

requirements

for

councillors, Pithouse, unfortunately is of a different view in
that the introduction of minimum requirements as an entry
to local government would mean a reduction of democracy.
He cautioned against responding to this crisis by reducing
democracy for the ordinary South African and opening it to
the elites. Instead a solution is for democracy to be taken
seriously by all actors in the political sphere and in the

347   P a g e

 communities (i.e. all political parties, law enforcement
agencies etc).

1014. He indicated that he always finds it very difficult to explain
bad practices using poverty as the causal factor. A number
of poor people are morally upright. With regard to inequality,
the chances of leapfrogging your position would probably
feature. One would have to be well connected to have that
opportunity.

1015. Poverty per se does not necessarily make people murderers
or want to compete for better positions by eliminating others.

1016. We need to put the right people in the right positions to make
governance and the country to work. You get a good principal
and a very bad school and all of a sudden it functions
efficiently.

AMAR MAHARAJ
1017. He testified on 16 August 2017. He is the Ethics Manager of
the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) and is
based at the national office in Pretoria. Mr Maharaj testified
in his official capacity. His current position serves as the
official reporting line for whistle blowers to report unlawful
348   P a g e

 and irregular conduct. Ethics and integrity is important at
IPID, considering the work that they do.

1018. IPID has provincial offices in all the major provinces and the
KZN office is headed by the provincial head, Mrs P Maharaj.
The IPID’s national head (Executive Director) is Mr Robert
McBride and the national Head of Investigations is
Mr Matthews Sesoko.

1019. Mr Maharaj made a presentation to the Commission in the
context of the following allegations that were made by
witnesses before the Commission.

1020. A large majority of the family members of the deceased are
dissatisfied regarding the manner that the police are
investigating their cases. They have made the following
complaints:

(a)

Dereliction of duty on the part of the police in

investigating the matters.

(b)

Alleged corruption on the part of the police in terms

of conducting investigations.

349   P a g e

 (c)

General dissatisfaction with IPID in terms of their

investigation of the police with regard to wrongdoing.

(d)

The assertion by Ms Vanessa Burger that the IPID in

KZN is dysfunctional.

1021. Mr Maharaj started off by saying that Ms Burger testified
that the IPID in KZN is dysfunctional and has failed to hold
police officers to account. In a media response, the IPID
dismissed

her

claims

as

being

spurious

and

unsubstantiated. His office had received numerous reports
from within the IPID relating to Ms Burger’s testimony.

1022. The data that was received by his office was vast regarding
cases that were closed as unsubstantiated, cases that were
completed without proper investigation, especially in KZN.
Mr Maharaj furnished the Commission with data in that
regard about cases of torture, assault, rape, death as a result
of police action, deaths in police custody and discharge of
official firearms. He then conducted an investigation and
evaluated the data and concluded that the IPID in KZN is
indeed dysfunctional, based on the data in question.

1023. In essence, Mr Maharaj testified that the relevant data
indicates cases relating to various offences were completed
350   P a g e

 and closed in KZN without proper investigation. Such
closure and completion are contrary to the IPID Act and
standards.

1024. He also referred to the Public Protector’s report 7/2017
relating to the Glebelands Hostel, specifically regarding three
cases, as follows:

(a)

In Isipingo CAS 129/03/2014 (Zinakile Fica), the

IPID reported to the Public Protector that the docket was sent
to the DPP on 28 January 2016 and a decision was awaited.
According to his investigation, there was no such record on
the IPID master recommendations register.

(b)

The SAPS case management system reflects the date

of the incident as being 14/03/2014. Mr Maharaj was made
aware that the docket was only picked up by the IPID on
5/08/2015, almost 17 months later, to commence their
investigation.

(c)

In Umlazi CAS 389/03/2014 (Xolisa Yena), the IPID

reported

to the Public Protector that the docket was sent

to the SPP on the19 November 2015 and a decision was
awaited. However, he established that the CAS number 389
was incorrect, and the correct one is 398. According to the

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 IPID records, that case was completed and closed on 29
October 2014 and no recommendations were recorded on the
IPID master recommendations register.

(d)

There was no indication on the register that the

docket was sent to the SPP on 19 November 2015 for
decision, as alleged. This case was a classic example of cases
that were completed, closed and archived without proper
investigation.

(e)

In Umlazi CAS 565/07/2015 (Richard Nzama), the

IPID reported to the Public Protector that the case was under
investigation. Mr Maharaj stated that he was unable to find
that case in the IPID’s records and therefore could not
substantiate the IPID’s report to the Public Protector.

1025. Mr Maharaj referred to data to illustrate hundreds of cases
that were closed without proper investigation at the IPID in
KZN. He testified that an IPID investigator from KZN had
blown the whistle to him regarding cases that were being
closed without proper investigation. Mr Maharaj alleged that
the cases were being closed to chase statistics to create the
false impression that the KZN office was performing well.

IPID DELEGATION
352   P a g e

 1026. They testified on 13 December 2017. Their presentation to
the Commission was made by Mr Matthews Sesoko, the
national head of investigations, who was accompanied by the
head of the IPID, Mr Robert McBride.

1027. The summary of their evidence focusses only on aspects that
are

relevant

to

the

mandate

of

the

Commission’s

investigation, as follows:

(a)

Their legislative mandate.

(b)

Their role in the Commission.

(c)

Feedback on identified cases that were mentioned by

other witnesses.
(d)

The IPID’s alleged dysfunctionality in KwaZulu-

Natal.
(e)

Allegations made by Ms De Haas and Ms Burger

relating to the police supplying firearms at Glebelands.

1028. The IPID is a statutory body that was established in 2012. It
emanates from section 206 of the Constitution and its
enabling Act is the IPID Act. Mr Sesoko testified that the IPID
was not sufficiently resourced in terms of human and
financial resources to be able to execute its mandate. This

353   P a g e

 fact was mentioned as it was important for the Commission
to understand the context within which it operates.

1029. He stated that the allegations that the KZN office was
dysfunctional cannot be substantiated. His view was based
on the assertion that the KZN office is investigating
hundreds of cases and the witnesses who alleged its
dysfunctionality based that view on only four cases that were
being investigated by the KZN office.

1030. He conceded that there are issues and challenges in KZN
relating to workload, lack of capacity etcetera that needed to
be addressed, but that could not characterise the office as
being dysfunctional.

1031. He dealt with the matter of Mr Zinakile Fica who was
allegedly tortured and died in police custody. The delay in
finalising the investigation was beyond the IPID’s control,
who were required to obtain toxicology and histology reports.
Those

examinations

are

conducted

by

the

National

Department of Health.

1032. They were informed that it takes between three to five years
to obtain those reports because of the backlog. The NPA even

354   P a g e

 got involved in trying to assist them to get the reports as
quickly as possible, but it was difficult.

1033. The post mortem examination on Mr Fica was conducted by
two doctors, a private pathologist and a State pathologist.
There had to be interaction between the two of them in terms
of analysing the toxicology and histology reports. Their
conclusions were that the deceased had a history of a heart
condition which could have led to his death but could not
exclude death occasioned by torture. If the deceased was
suffocated, it could also have resulted in his death. The
docket had been referred to the NPA and a decision was still
awaited.

1034. They dealt with the matter of Mr Jiyane, who was allegedly
tortured by suffocation. The victim visited the district
surgeon 14 days after the alleged assault. The IPID was
informed by Ms De Haas and Ms Burger that they would
facilitate all meetings between the victim and IPID, as the
victim feared for his life.

1035. The victim had moved to Gauteng and that was part of the
challenges in concluding the investigation. Numerous
attempts were made to engage with the victim, without

355   P a g e

 success. The docket was referred to the NPA for a decision.
The latter declined to prosecute.

1036. The other matter related to Mr Richard Nzama who was
allegedly arrested by the police on a charge of attempted
murder. Mr Nzama alleged that he was assaulted by the
police. Statements were obtained from witnesses. After the
warning statement of the police officer who arrested the
complainant was obtained, the docket was referred to the
NPA for a decision.

1037. The NPA asked that the other suspects must be identified
and warning statements be obtained from them. Numerous
attempts were made to engage with the complainant and
witnesses without success over a period of time. Ms De Haas
was engaged to render assistance as she was aware of the
whereabouts of Mr Nzama.

1038. Mr Nzama had moved to a farm in Tongaat where there were
no proper street addresses, thus making it difficult to locate
him. On 11 January 2017, Mr Nzama arrived late for an
appointment to point out the scene of the crime and the
pointing out could not be done as he was rushing to work.

356   P a g e

 1039. Mr Nzama subsequently contacted Ms De Haas and
informed her that he was available and that the investigating
officer must contact him. On 17 August 2017, Mr Nzama
pointed out four crime scenes. The investigation was
finalised and the docket was submitted to the NPA and a
decision was still awaited.

1040. The IPID refuted the evidence of Mr Amar Maharaj regarding
the alleged closure of cases. Mr Sesoko stated that Mr
Maharaj had no authority to testify before the Commission.
He averred that Mr Maharaj’s evidence was incorrect and
that

it

was

informed

by

his

misunderstanding

of

investigation procedures, given that he was not an
investigator. If he had taken time to clarify issues with them
as investigators, they would have explained the case
management system to him.

1041. He confirmed that Mr Maharaj had written to the Public
Protector requesting an investigation regarding issues of
case management and he indicated that the Public Protector
had advised that the matter must be dealt with internally.

1042. He also dealt with the allegations made by Ms De Haas and
Ms Burger relating to the supply of firearms at Glebelands.
He confirmed that allegations were made to their office in

357   P a g e

 that regard. He requested Ms De Haas and Ms Burger to
assist them with information and evidence so that they
would approach potential witnesses, but nothing tangible
came forth. The IPID also engaged the police to get
information,

but

they

did

not

obtain

any

tangible

information or evidence.

1043. Mr Sesoko testified that from 2011 to date, they had not
received any information or complaints that the police were
colluding or instrumental or involved in cases of political
violence in the Province.

1044. He conceded that the IPID has a standard procedure that
requires

investigators

to

give

feedback

regularly

to

complainants every 30 days, however, they were struggling
with adhering to that procedure because of their workload
and capacity constraints.

1045. It was put to the IPID that the Commission had heard
evidence that the police investigation of political cases was
being interfered with by political masters who are allegedly
handling them. They were asked whether there was any such
political interference with the IPID in its capacity as the
watchdog of the police.

358   P a g e

 1046. Mr Sesoko assured the Commission that they would resist
any political interference in their investigations, if it
occurred. He made an example of the fact that they even
went to the Constitutional Court to fight against political
interference. He cited the fact that Mr McBride, a colleague
and he were charged criminally by the police on fabricated
charges because their decisions did not accord with a certain
political agenda. They were, however, vindicated in the end.

1047. On the question of the success or otherwise of the arrest,
prosecution and conviction of those involved in the
murder of politicians, Mr Sesoko stated that generally
there are good policemen and women who are in the
service to make sure that they protect life and property
and in terms of the Constitution, but when you have a
situation where the police at the highest level get
themselves involved in corrupt activities, it does affect
how policing happens at lower level. That is a matter that
needs to be urgently addressed. He was hopeful that with
the appointment of the new National Commissioner most
of these issues will be addressed.

1048. As to their effectiveness in KZN, they had investigations
even

at

the

highest

level

involving

a

Provincial

Commissioner. It is important that the criminal justice

359   P a g e

 system takes all these matters very seriously so that in all
their respective spheres they make sure that they
prosecute those people at the highest level to send out a
message that corruption cannot be acceptable, and when
they do that, then they will be able to make an impact.
He added that as a department, with due regard to
capacity constraints, they took a strategic decision that
they are going to prioritise high impact cases, especially
where senior officers are involved so that they try and
make an impact in the police by removing those at the
highest level that are involved in criminality and assisting
the police.

In that way, once they do that, then the

message that goes down is that criminality in the police
at whatever level is not acceptable. When you have a
situation when junior members see crime and corruption
happening at the highest level and they complain to
management and management does nothing about it,
and, in fact, when they complain they are disciplined,
suspended, even dismissed, It sends the message that
when you see crime happening here, don’t say anything.
So, part of these investigations that they are doing came
as a result of honest police officers saying corruption is
happening at the highest level, and they have been
complaining and nothing is happening. That is how they
got involved.

360   P a g e

 1049.

He further stated that they realised how serious the
situation was when they themselves were receiving death
threats from those that they were investigating. So, it is
important that they all target those at the highest level
that are involved in these crimes. So that when the
message goes out everyone is clear, that whoever you are,
you will still be prosecuted for committing these crimes.
In that way, he believes, it will also change the perception
of the public in terms of policing, in general, and the
effectiveness thereof.

South African Local Government Association (“SALGA”)

1050. The South African Local Government Association (“SALGA”)
appeared before the Commission on the 29 August 2017
with a delegation of five members. SALGA represents the
interests of councillors and its mandate is to organise and
represent the interests of local government in different
structures. SALGA is an organisation that operates in all
nine provinces with national executive committees and
provincial executive committees and is established in terms
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

361   P a g e

 1051. SALGA represents over nine thousand (9 000) councillors
country wide and are thus best to speak on issues affecting
councillors in the province. Of the nine thousand councillors
SALGA represents, it was noted that 70 per cent of those
councillors are new, having entered into local government
after the 2016 local government elections, meaning out of
every ten councillors, seven are new having never been in the
local government sphere consequently having limited
understanding of local government. It was submitted that
the high turnover of councillors often has an impact on
service delivery as a person with the five-year cycle of
councillorship often spends two years learning local
government workings and when finally gets to grips with
their office, their term is over.

1052.

SALGA

provided

a

breakdown

in

numbers

of

municipalities and councillors as: 257 municipal councils
with 9 306 councillors across the length and breadth of the
country and an excess of 250 000 municipal employees
within the local government sphere throughout the country.

1053. SALGA distinguished councillors as not being employees of
a municipality but defined as office bearers in terms of the
Public Office Bearer’s Act adhering to a code of conduct for

362   P a g e

 councillors. Councillors have a clear set of rules that they
need to observe (however, roles are often blurred).

1054. Further, SALGA submitted that there are two kinds of
councillors in theory, full-time and part-time councillors.
The significance of the two types of councillors will become
clear herein below when the correlation between poverty and
unemployment is made in relation to the number of parttime councillors as against full- time councillors. There are
also councillors elected and voted for by the community and
PR Councillors.

1055.

Full-time councillors were described as those that are given
full time responsibilities, for example, the mayor, speaker
and, in certain municipalities, the chief whip or member of
the executive committee or mayoral committee. They would
be referred to as full –time councillors because of their day
to day responsibilities which make them appear as if they
are employees of the municipality but as already mentioned
they are not employees in the true sense.

1056. Part-time councillors are those with full time employment
elsewhere for example, teachers, policemen, doctors etc.
Part-time

363   P a g e

councillors,

though

elected

and

given

 responsibilities within the municipality, discharge their
duties on a part-time basis.

1057.

When it comes to remuneration of these two types of
councillors, SALGA stated that the remuneration scales
differ according to roles played i.e. full-time or part-time and
that salary scales are also determined by the grade of the
municipality. Municipalities are graded between 1-6. Grade
1 is the entry level and is usually a very small municipality
with little income and a small population number. The
highest grade is grade 6 municipality like metropolitans with
high population and high income with an entry level salary
scale of R 215 000 per annum. The highest salary scale of a
grade 6 municipality for an executive mayor is R 1.2 million
per annum.

1058.

Looking at the structuring of municipalities in KwaZuluNatal, they all are members of SALGA and there are 54
municipalities in the Province.

1059.

SALGA highlighted an increase in by-elections since the
year 2000 countrywide and that the by-elections are mainly
due to councillors dying either through natural causes,
motor-vehicle

364   P a g e

accidents

or

political

killings.

Studies

 conducted by the Association also revealed that there are an
increasingly high number of threats directed against females
within local government (councillors and administrators in
the municipality) who are more vulnerable. This factor can
be confirmed by the Commission by looking at the number
of female councillors who have been brutally killed during
the period under investigation. Worryingly, the study showed
that the threats come from community members and
political parties of which the threatened person is a member
causing the threats to be intra-party.

1060. The effect of threats made to councillors as well as the
culture of intimidation against councillors which is now
prevalent, has a major impact on municipal system
processes and directly impacts on service delivery.

1061.

On the question of socio-economic factors playing a role in
the killings witnessed in the province, specifically that being
a councillor is seen as a means of employment because of
the salary and perks that come with councillorship, SALGA
dispelled the myth in that:

365   P a g e

 a) There are councillors that were employed elsewhere but
requested

by

their

political

parties

to

serve

their

communities;

b) There are councillors that are business people but
requested by their political parties to serve in local
government;

c) The

majority

of

councillors

are

employed

full-time

elsewhere and are councillors on a part-time basis. There
are 9 300 councillors and 10 per cent of them are full-time.
Therefore, a large proportion of the councillors are parttime.88

1062. SALGA rejected the argument that killings are informed by
unemployment. The notion that people are killing each other
because being a councillor comes with a better pay and
perks was said to be inaccurate and incorrect. “People are
killing each other for power”.89

1063. Gwala, one of the delegates who gave his personal views,
rejected the argument that poor, uneducated people are
easily manipulated and used to commit crimes of eliminating

88
89

Para 8-11, vol 21 at p 1065 of the record.
Para 15-16, vol 21 at p 1077 of the record.

366   P a g e

 each other for resources. He posed a question: “there are
poor municipalities elsewhere, why are the people there not
killing each other?”90

1064.

Lastly, on answering the question related to poverty and
unemployment Gwala stated as follows:
“I, however, differ with the dilution of power in the sense
that people would kill each other for food and this being
relevant in the work of the Commission, because if that was
to be the case one would see largely hungry people killing, or
people who are without food at a very much material level. If
one looks at the way the poverty index in South Africa is, one
sees poverty prevailing in specific parts of South Africa, such
as in the Eastern Cape and some parts of KZN and in the
north and Limpopo and so forth, and yet one doesn’t see the
kind of violence happening and so the broader issues around
access to guns also are quite important”.91

1065. Gwala further argued that people are not killing each other
so that they can have something to eat, but that people have
moved beyond having an RDP house and meagre income.
That state power is not being used to feed people (per notion

90
91

Para 8-11, vol 21 at pg 1080 of the record.
Para 16-25, vol 21 at p 1091 of the record.

367   P a g e

 of poverty) it is used in the pursuance of power for oneself
and power to pursue resources.

1066.

SALGA raised an important factor, that in municipalities
where there are well established systems in place it is
unlikely for councillors to be killed. However, in a
municipality that has broken down systems, it is likely for a
councillor to be killed. The killings can be attributed to the
need for state power.

1067.

A study was conducted by SALGA into the effectiveness of
strong Human Resources Policies (“HR”) in place within
municipalities and found that lack of policy leads to
opportunists taking advantage of the system. Municipalities
were ranked between 1-5, 5 being the existence of strong HR
policies and none of the municipalities in the province scored
between 5 or 4. Three municipalities scored 3 and the
majority scored 1 attesting to a lack of HR processes and that
decisions are made ad hoc.92 The problem simply is a lack
of systems in place but municipalities are instead given the
task to manage substantial amounts of money and when
there is a lack of policy, the will of man prevails.

92

Para 10-21, vol 21 at p 1078 of the record.

368   P a g e

 1068. The underlying causes of political killings in the personal
views of one of the delegates of SALGA are:

a) Weak

systems

in

place

to

curb

corruption

and

manipulation of the system;

b) The extraordinarily high number of weapons in the
Province;

c) The rhetoric of politicians and political actors that
encourages violence.

Recommendations

1069. SALGA acknowledged that a safety and security manual for
councillors will have to be developed because currently there
is no prescribed document when it comes to safety and
security issues of councillors. SALGA conceded that there
are numerous instances where deaths could have been
prevented by providing security timeously. SALGA also made
the following recommendations:

369   P a g e

 (a) That KwaZulu-Natal have a collective executive system
and that the system of not having executive mayors
should be reviewed.

(b) That a system should be devised to attract appropriately
qualified candidates in the local government sphere,
despite the challenges that would arise.

(c) That there should be proper document management in
local government to curb corruption and manipulation of
tender processes.

(d) That councillors be trained and equipped with basic
skills.

Electoral Commission (IEC)

1070. The IEC was represented before the Commission by Mr
Mawethu Mosery who is the head of the Electoral
Commission in KwaZulu-Natal (Provincial Electoral Officer)
who gave the IEC’s perspective of the killings taking place in
the Province.

370   P a g e

 1071. The IEC assisted the Commission in understanding the
circumstances in which it gets to be involved in filling a
vacant seat in a municipal council and how they are charged
with managing and promoting an environment that is
conducive for free and fair by-elections to take place in
circumstances where an elected representative being a ward
councillor has died.

1072.

The IEC provided some statistics on the number of
councillors that have been replaced during the period falling
under investigation by the Commission. The IEC submitted
that during the period of 20011 to December 2017, a total of
502 sitting councillors were replaced in the Province
resulting in vacancies that had to be managed by the IEC.
Unfortunately, the IEC does not maintain records of causes
of death resulting in the vacancies having to be filled.

1073.

Out of the 502 seats that had to be filled, 391 were of Public
Representatives (“PR”) derived from proportional represented
seats. About 111 were seats of ward councillors that had
become vacant, 31 of them were as a result of death of a
sitting elected representative. Out of the 391 vacant seats of
PRs that became vacant, 93 of the vacancies were due to the
death of the councillors and 19 of the deaths were confirmed

371   P a g e

 being due to unnatural causes (murder and culpable
homicide). The remaining 316 seats were vacant due to
resignation or termination of party membership and other
reasons not related to death.93

1074.

The causes of vacancies in municipalities are outlined in
section 27 of the Municipal Structures Act of 2009 and could
be due to the following:
(a) Resignation of a sitting councillor;

(b) A councillor no longer being qualified to continue as a
councillor;

(c) When a councillor contravenes the code of conduct for
councillors and thus removed from office for being in
breach of the code of conduct;
(d) When a councillor ceases to be a member of the political
party that elected him to office;
(e) When a councillor ceases to be a member of the local
council which elected him to the district council;
(f) When an independent ward councillor becomes a member
of a political party or when an elected ward councillor

93

Para 1-14, vol 47 at pg 2879 of the record.

372   P a g e

 ceases to be a member of a political party that elected
him.

1075. The process of by-elections was explained by the IEC, in that,
the Municipal Manager would publish a notice setting out a
date for the by-elections but due to arrangement and
practise adopted, the IEC has asked Municipal Managers not
to publish a notice calling for the by-elections but rather the
MEC for COGTA to publish the notice in terms of the
Municipal Structures Act. By-elections are then conducted
in terms of the provisions of the Act and the results finalised
and released within seven days.

1076. The IEC does get involved or rather intervenes when there
are political tensions and conflicts arising in communities
during political campaigns. The IEC ensures that political
parties and those contesting an election publicly commit to
and sign the code of conduct. The code encourages free
political activity and promotes political tolerance amongst
the competing political parties. The IEC ensures compliance
and enforcement of the code through the electoral court.
However, the question is, is it enough that the IEC enforces
the

code

only

during

political

campaigns.

Perhaps,

enforcement of the code to maintain tolerance should be
373   P a g e

 ensured throughout not only leading to elections. On the
positive

side,

government

the

of

IEC

together

KwaZulu-Natal

with
have

the

provincial

sought

further

interventions to promote political tolerance through a
committee that was established in 2011 in preparation for
local government general elections. Clearly, the provincial
government acknowledges that it has a problem when it
comes to political education in the Province and various
witnesses have testified on the political intolerance. When
probed on how the Province compares to other Provinces
when it comes to political tolerance, unfortunately, it was
submitted that KwaZulu-Natal has more cases of political
intolerance than other Provinces.94

1077. The IEC conceded that where conflicts are intra-party, their
success rate is very low and almost non-existent when trying
to mediate.95 The failure is due to a number of issues such
as:96

a) it is difficult to identify who are the differing parties to the
tension or conflict within a political party;

94

Para 9-10, vol 47 at pg 2894 of the record.
Ibid.
96 Para 17-24, vol 47 at pg 2891 of the record.
95

374   P a g e

 b) political parties tend to rely on their own internal
mechanisms when it comes resolving their differences
and they tend not to welcome external interventions;

c) there is also a resistance or reluctance to share details on
the tension or conflict (factionalism being a major cause)
with an external body or institution like the IEC.

d) That it is impractical for the committee to intervene and
build tolerance in the above listed circumstances.

1078. The IEC further submitted that political killings especially in
the Province have been a concern for the IEC as they have
an impact on the voting public and that the killings impair
on the voting enthusiasm of the public being from being
active participants in the broad constitutional democracy.

1079. The IEC noted a high number of by-elections compared to
other Provinces but could not produce any empirical reasons
except for noting that there is a high number of councillors
who resigned in August 2016 and as already mentioned 19
councillors died resulting to 19 ward seats having to be filled.

1080. The existence of the Multi-Party Political Intervention
Committee (“Committee”) formed in 2011 only in KwaZulu-

375   P a g e

 Natal is indicative of the persistent problems experienced in
the Province when it comes to political developments and
intolerance.97 The IEC confirmed the Committee only exits in
the Province due to the high level of political intolerance here
in KwaZulu-Natal compared to other Provinces.98

1081.

Mr Mosery, in his personal capacity gave his analysis of
what are the underlying causes for the killing of politicians
in the Province as follows:

a) competition within a political party for the occupation of
a political office;

b) the level of desperation to hold a position of to be in a
political office fuels the killings to the extent that taking
another life is a consequence of the ambition;

c) a lack of understanding of the role a public representative
elected to serve the community entails. People see being
a public representative as a way to self-enrichment which
flames them being in public office by all costs;

97
98

Para 12-21, vol 47 at pg 2901 of the record.
Para 24-25, vol 47 at pg 2901 of the record.

376   P a g e

 d) a lack of suitable, mature, responsible people of integrity
as public representatives. Even though qualifications
would play a role, a measure of moral character and
integrity is strongly needed to hold public office;

e) the general perception that being a councillor confers
upon a person access to resources points to a misguided
understanding of a role of being a councillor or public
representative.

1082. The IEC was clear in its presentation that political
intolerance is still a major problem faced by the Province.

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA)

1083. Stats SA was invited to the Commission to provide the
Commission with insight on the possible underlying cause
of poverty, unemployment and inequality being factors for
the killings of politicians and whether or not a correlation
can be drawn.

1084. Stats SA was represented by Ellen North and Mrs Anneline
Creighton,
respectively.
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the

chief

director

and

chief

statistician,

 1085. Stats SA defined poverty as a deprivation of basic needs.
That poverty is determined in two ways:

a)

A money metric poverty- where you determine a monthly
earning to be above poverty line.

b)

A poverty measuring index - where deprivations are
determined such as unemployment, health, whether you
have assets or not and whether you have basic services.

1086. KwaZulu-Natal is the second largest Province with a
population of 11.6 million people and has the lowest life
expectancy rate in the country of 60.7 per cent. A third of
the Province population is the youth between the ages of 15
and 34 and a higher unemployment rate of 24 per cent.

1087. The causes of violent crimes which include murder,
attempted murder and robbery are commonly cited as
follows:99
a) Poverty and inequality in terms of worsened social
conditions

and

vulnerability,

exclusion and marginalisation;

99

Para 16-25, vol 48 at pg 2929 of the record.

378   P a g e

specifically

social

 b) Early childhood development, in that how children are
normalised to violence in terms of family circumstances
and how they learn to reason has an impact, so as a
lack of coherent family structures and a failure to have
caring and engaging adults;

c) Abuse of alcohol, drugs, abuse and trauma has an
impact on a person’s propensity towards violence; and

d) Failure of the criminal justice system to secure the rule
of law effectively and to address injustices as there is an
absence of deep value-based commitment to law in
society.

1088. Stats SA submitted that in comparison to other Provinces,
KwaZulu-Natal has the third highest murder rate with 36.6
per cent whilst the Western Cape has the highest percentage
of 55 per cent followed by the Eastern Cape with 51 per cent
with Limpopo having the lowest murder rate. However,
interestingly, when it comes to poverty as a driving factor for
violent crimes, Limpopo, the poorest Province has the lowest
murder rate.100 Therefore, the logical correlation to be made

100

Para 14-17, vol 48 at pg 2930 of the record.

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 is that poverty in KwaZulu-Natal cannot be said to be a
driver. For one to argue poverty as an underlying cause for
the political killings, an explanation will have to be proffered
in relation to the statistics of the murder rate in the poorest
Province.

1089.

A reverse correlation was drawn by Stats SA in that,
Limpopo having the lowest murder rate has the highest
incident of food poverty and is the worst affected Province in
the country, followed by the Eastern Cape and thirdly,
KwaZulu-Natal.101 So if a hypothesis could be made on the
analogy that the political killings are due to socio-economic
circumstances, Limpopo should be having the highest
murder rate and we should be witnessing a high level of
political killings as everyone would be scrambling to ‘serve
politics of the stomach’. The reasonable conclusion that can
be drawn when one considers the statistical diagnosis of the
Province, the underlying cause being poverty can safely be
excluded in this instance and perhaps an underlying cause
of greed could be examined more broadly.

1090.

It was also pointed out that there is no correlation between
the poorest parts of the Province and murder rates. A
connection between deprivation and higher murder rates

101

Supra.

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 was drawn for eThekwini (Umlazi, Glebelands) as well as
Newcastle, Alfred Duma, uMhlathuze, KwaDukuza, Mduduzi
and Ugu. These were noted as areas with the highest murder
rates.102

1091. In a nut-shell, poverty, inequality and unemployment cannot
be given dominance over the other underlying factors as
alluded to by various witnesses that of greed, factionalism,
patronage and a breakdown of the moral fibre of society.

1092. The witnesses conceded that there was a correlation between
murders, poverty and inequality and marginalisation.

South African Police Service (SAPS)

1093. The SAPS delegation appeared before the Commission on the
20 February 2018 led by the Acting Provincial Commissioner
Major General Langa, Major General Chiliza who was the
Cluster Commander for eThekwini from 2009 to 2015 and
well versed with the Glebelands situation, two Major
Generals from National Office, Generals Chauke and
Ramatsoele, who spoke on the issues of training of the police

102

Para 10-18, vol 48 at pg 2931 of the record.

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 and

two

other

Provincial

Brigadiers,

Brigadiers

Maqhashalala and Mbhele.

1094.

The Terms of Reference are clear about what information
the SAPS is required to provide to the Commission. In
particular, paragraph 1 (c) of the terms require the following
from SAPS:

“the outcome of

any police

investigation

and

prosecution of the incidents, including the number of
successful prosecutions, trials and convictions of the
perpetrators; and...”

1095. Paragraph 2 of the Terms of Reference requires the
Commission to then make recommendations on the
underlying causes giving rise to murder of politicians in
KwaZulu-Natal and most importantly, recommendations in
respect of the prevention of future incidents of murder and
attempted murder involving politicians, both as victims and
suspects and ensuring the successful investigation and
prosecution of the perpetrators.

1096. It is against this backdrop that much was expected of and
required from SAPS. The Commission had hoped that since
the SAPS was represented throughout the proceedings,
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 proper account would be given on all the individual cases
presented before the Commission. For the period which
SAPS was not presented before the Commission, the SAPS
legal representatives were handed a memorandum in which
the evidence of the few witnesses that had appeared before
the Commission was summarised. That memorandum was
marked exhibit “DD” dated the 28 January 2018.

1097.

Concern has to be registered about the manner in which
SAPS gave its evidence and most importantly how the Acting
Provincial Commissioner, without prior warning, was not
available for the entire third day of the SAPS’ testimony.
However, the Commission managed to receive important
evidence from the SAPS presentation.

1098.

The evidence by SAPS is at most fragmented but we have
divided it into three segments, namely:

a) Glebelands Hostel;

b) Police training; and

c) Responses to complaints on individual cases.

SAPS response on Glebelands Hostel

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 1099. During the period of 2009 to 2015, General Chiliza was the
Cluster Commander for eThekwini outer cluster, previously
known as Umlazi Cluster under which Glebelands Hostel
fell. General Chiliza is currently the Deputy Provincial
Commissioner for crime detection in KwaZulu-Natal. Since
he was the Cluster Commander from 2009-2015, he was
best placed to assist the Commission to understand the
complexities of Glebelands.

1100. General Chiliza provided the background to the attempts
and interventions made to resolve the issues of Glebelands
in that, in 2009 a task team was established under the
command of Captain Kane to take over investigating murder
cases and attempted murder cases arising from the hostel.
The indicators of violence at the formation of the task team
were that there was in-fighting between the ANC and COPE
supporters within the hostel. It was alleged that the
residents of Glebelands were unhappy with the Montclair
Police Station, alleging that the members from Montclair
Police Station were biased when dealing with cases from the
hostel.

1101. When the task team commenced its investigations, it
established that the hostel dwellers had a system of Block
Chairmen in place with each block having its own Chairman,

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 a secretary and the chairperson of the block chairperson’s
committee being Mr Mthembu who was residing at block R.
As a consequence of the various block chairpersons, two
groups emerged, namely, the R block supporters and the
supporters

of

the

Ubunye

bamaHostela’s

(“Ubunye”)

President who was a former Ward 76 ANC Branch Executive
Chairperson and a former ward 76 Ward Councillor.
Glebelands Hostel falls under ward 76 in which the Ubunye’s
President was a previous ANC ward councillor.

1102.

After the 2007 local government elections, the Ubunye
president lost his councillorship position to a Mr Mzobe who
remains a councillor to date. Prior to the 2009 national and
provincial government elections Mr Mthembu’s group
defected from the ANC to COPE, which led to a conflict
between COPE and ANC supporters and the president of
Ubunye, mentioned above, also defected with other members
of the branch to COPE. This was the set-off of the conflict at
the hostel, so it would appear.

1103.

The Mthembu group that had defected from the ANC to
COPE returned to the ANC after the 2009 government
elections. When the group returned to the ANC problems
started to emerge with the group having differences with
Councillor Mzobe by not recognising the Councillor as well

385   P a g e

 as the BEC and as a result aligned themselves with the SACP
and SANCO. The battle between the two groups was for the
control of the Ward and the Hostel.

1104. Glebelands is dominated by one political party, which is the
ANC, with members of the ANC Branch Executive Committee
also being members of the Ward Committee. On examining
the trends of violence within the hostel, it is clear that before
the emergence of another group known as the “Hlophe
group” in May 2014 which was in opposition to the Mthembu
group, murders and attempted murders were subsiding
within the hostel, despite the prevalence of in-fighting and
grumblings regarding councillorship and constitution of the
Ward Committee.

1105. Drastic change in the not so peaceful climate of the hostel
occurred at the emergence of the Hlophe group that
controlled what is known as the Madala Stezi (meaning the
old block in the northern part of the hostel). The Hlophe
group and the Mthembu group were flinging accusations
against each other, which often led to someone being killed.

1106. A break-down of the number of people killed in Glebelands
for the period of 2010-2017 was provided by General Chiliza.
Unfortunately, it was only numbers with no additional

386   P a g e

 information to assist in determining the identity of the
victims. There were 24 murders committed within the hostel
and the pattern that emerges is that the majority of murders
were committed through stabbings that occurred mainly at
night and they are as follows:

a) 1 April 2010- 31 March 2011: five (5) murders were
committed. Out of the five, two were victims of shootings
and three (3) were victims of stabbing.103

b) 1 April 2011- 31 March 2012: eleven (11) murders were
committed. Out of the eleven, (7) seven were victims of
stabbing. Two (2) of them were shot and the last two (2)
were victims of assault. Five arrests were made for the
(11) murders and ended up in Court but two (2) cases
were withdrawn and the accused was acquitted in one. In
one an accused was sentenced to four years and in
another the accused was sentenced to ten (10) years.

104

c) 1 April 2012- 31March 2013: five (5) murders were
committed. Four (4) out of the five (5) were victims of
stabbing. One (1) was a victim of assault. Three cases

103
104

Para 19-25,vol 43 at pg 2544 of the record.
Para 1-10,vol 43 at pg 2545 of the record.

387   P a g e

 went to Court, one was withdrawn and the remaining two
the accused were found not guilty and acquitted.105

d) 1 April 2013- 31 March 2014: three (3) murders were
committed. One of the three made it to Court and the
accused was sentenced to five years.106

e) 1 April 2014- 31 March 2015: there were eighteen (18)
murders that were committed. Four of the eighteen
murders went to Court. Nine of the cases of murder could
not be linked to what was happening in Glebelands.107
However, even the remaining eight could not be linked to
politics as the motives differed from room-mates fighting
over switching off of a light and various other criminal
activities.108

f) 1 April 2015- 31 March 2016: there were seventeen (17)
murders that were committed. Fifteen of the victims were
shot and one victim was stabbed and one victim died as
a result of their house being petrol bombed. Out of the
seventeen cases, five could not be linked to a political
motive.109

105

Para 19-25, vol 43 at pg 2545-2546 of the record.
Para 6-9, vol 43 at pg 2546 of the record.
107 Para 20-25, vol 43 at pg 2554 of the record.
108 Para 1-25, vol 43 at pg 2555 of the record.
109 Para 1-25, vol 43 at pg 2556-2557 of the record.
106

388   P a g e

 g) 1 April 2016 – 31 March 2017: there were eleven (11)
murders committed. Nine of the victims were shot and
one was stabbed. The eleventh victim was pushed from a
window from the third floor and died on impact.110

1107. Statistics provided on attempted murders that occurred in
Glebelands were as follows:

a) 1 April 2010- 31 March 2011: there were three (3)
attempted murder cases that were committed. Two out of
the three cases, the victims were shot and one was
assaulted with a hammer. Two cases went to Court and
one case was withdrawn and in the other the accused was
acquitted.111

b) 1 April 2011- 31 March 2012: there were six (6)
attempted murders that were committed. Out of the six,
four were victims of stabbing, one was a victim of a
shooting and one was a victim of assault. Out of the six
cases, four ended up in Court and three of the cases
resulted in withdrawals and one the accused was
sentenced to three years imprisonment.112

110

Para 22-25, vol 43 at pg 2560-2561 of the record.
Para 5-12, vol 43 at pg 2547 of the record.
112 Para 14-24, vol 43 at pg 2547 of the record.
111

389   P a g e

 c) 1 April 2012- 31 March 2013: there were nine (9)
attempted murders that were committed. Out of the nine,
four were victims of stabbing and three were victims of
shootings. In one case boiling water was poured on the
victim and the one victim was otherwise assaulted. Six
cases made it to Court, four were withdrawn at Court and
in the one case, the accused was fined Five Thousand
Rand.113

d) 1 April 2013-31 March 2014: there were six (6)
attempted murders that were committed. Out of the six,
three were victims of a shooting. Two of the victims were
stabbed and boiling water was poured on one victim. Four
of the six cases went to Court; two were withdrawn in
Court; and in one, the accused was sentenced to 15 years
imprisonment. In the other, the accused was fined Two
Thousand Rand.114

When General Chiliza was asked on whether he could
confirm that all the cases of murder and attempted murder
in Glebelands were politically connected, he was unable to
validate that the killings were politically connected. What

113
114

Para 1-5, vol 43 at pg 2548 of the record.
Para 15-18, vol 43 at pg 254 and para 20-25 at pg 2551-2552 of the record

390   P a g e

 emerged from his evidence was that in most instances the
causes of murder or attempted murder are not political in
Glebelands.115 General Chiliza emphasised that there are
many dynamics to be considered when attempting to
understand the issues of Glebelands, but general criminality
features prominently. In General Chiliza’s analysis, the
criminal elements plaguing Glebelands are exacerbated by
the conflict caused by the selling of bed spaces, illegal
evictions, power to control the blocks and accessing the
collection fees that are demanded from the residents.116

1108. On the challenges faced by the SAPS in investigating the
murders and attempted murders in Glebelands, General
Chiliza held that the SAPS would encounter reluctance from
residents to come forward as witnesses despite having
knowledge of the criminal activities in the hostel. Another
obstacle was that potential witnesses were dissuaded by
some people from going into the witness protection
programme.117 General Chiliza commended the work done
by Ms Vanessa Burger which assisted in breakthroughs in
certain cases despite mostly working for the Mthembu group
that was in opposition to Councillor Mr Mzobe.118

115

Various causes of death in the hostel, para 1-17, vol 43 at pg 2557 of the record.
Para 5-18, vol 43 at pg 2560 of the record.
117 Para 15-22, vol 43 at pg 2561 of the record.
118 Para 4-13, vol 43 at pg 2562 of the record.
116

391   P a g e

 1109.

General Chiliza was of the view that even if a thousand
police members were to be deployed to Glebelands, the
killings would still continue at the hostel.119 However,
despite the problems that exist within the hostel, a dedicated
task team is still in place and the police have improved their
efforts and there is even a Satellite Station in the hostel to
make the services accessible to residents.

1110. The existence of the two rival groups in Glebelands adds to
the challenges prevailing in the hostel which amongst them
is the high number of firearms recovered at the hostel. 120
General Chiliza disputed the allegations that there are high
calibre firearms in the hostel but admitted to an AK 47 being
recovered.121 He did later on admit that during his tenure as
cluster commander there was an incident where an R5 or R4
rifle was used during an attack but disputed R4’s and R5’s
being recovered at the hostel during his time as commander.
When probed to conceding that these rifles should not be
readily accessible to the general public, Chiliza stated that
R4s and R5s are similar to LM4s and use the same
ammunition. The SANDF and security companies also use
the same (LM4s) cartridges and ammunition. When probed
further on the possibility of an ordinary citizen owning a high

119

Para 13-14, vol 43 at pg 2564 of the record.
Para 17-20, vol 43 at pg 2579 of the record.
121 Para 13-15, vol 43 at pg 2567 of the record.
120

392   P a g e

 calibre weapon his response was he wasn’t aware of any
person owning such a weapon however, he did not verify with
the firearm registry.122

1111.

It must be noted that the responses provided by SAPS on
the high calibre weapons being easily accessible or used in
some of the killings in the hostel is disturbing. What is the
most distressing is the fact that these R4s and R5s/LM4s
are issued to security companies and there have been
allegations that security companies have employees who
sometimes double up as izinkabi and the fact that the SAPS
has no knowledge and control of the issuing of these
dangerous

weapons

in

the

Province

despite

having

confirmation of these weapons being used in some murders
is unacceptable.123

1112. Lastly, on Glebelands General Chiliza stated that SAPS are
apolitical and do not account to any political body and most
importantly the killings taking place in Glebelands are
criminally linked and not political.

122
123

Pg 2580, vol 43 of the record.
Para 7-11, vol 43 at pg 2581 of the record.

393   P a g e

 SAPS response on adequacy of police training

1113.

General Chauke and General Ramatsoele from Pretoria gave
evidence before the Commission on 21 February 2018,
dealing specifically with the adequacy of training SAPS
members undergo. The two Generals’ evidence sought to deal
with the allegations of the police not being competent to
sufficiently investigate and resolve the political killings in the
Province.

1114.

It was unfortunate that on this second day of SAPS giving
their evidence that the Acting Provincial Commissioner,
General Langa had to be excused at 12h00 due to some
commitment in Pretoria.

The Chairperson expressed his

displeasure at the senior officer in the Province leaving
without

imparting

valuable

information

and

recommendations to assist the Commission.124 General
Langa was excused to return on 12 March 2018 with the
SAPS delegation for a third day of evidence hearings from the
police.

Unfortunately, on 12 March 2018 General Langa

could not attend the proceedings as he was reported to be
out of the country on official business.

124

Para 1-15, vol 44 at pg 2642 of the record.

394   P a g e

 1115. General Chauke is the person responsible for training all
permanently appointed members of SAPS countrywide and
with twenty-six years in the service, twenty-four of those
years spent training members of SAPS.125

1116.

General Chauke’s responsibility in the division of Human
Resource Development component is to train all members of
the police but the training of each member is informed by a
competency profile which assists in determining the type of
training required by a member based on the competency
profile. A process of conducting a skills audit for each
member is undertaken when training permanent members
of SAPS.

1117.

New SAPS members go through a basic training programme
which is an entry level programme. On completion of the
basic training programme, members are then deployed to
various units (i.e. crime prevention, public order policing
etc). Once members are in their respective categories, a skills
audit is conducted to determine what type of training each
member requires and which category profile they fall into. It
is after the audit that the extraction training needs is done
to consolidate all the needs of the members of SAPS.

125

Para 12-23, vol 44 at pg 2608 of the record.

395   P a g e

 1118.

Skills development facilitators from each province at every
station have skills development facilitators who assist in the
conducting of needs extractions and skills audits which are
then forwarded to the provincial head for verification. The
provincial

training

committee

which

consists

of

the

provincial commissioner, labour, human resources and
provincial human resources department, receive the needs
of each province. The committee then prioritises in terms of
the strategic priorities of the organisation. Every five years
the organisation (SAPS) compiles strategic planning which
the strategic priorities guide the areas of focus and look at
the priorities of each province (i.e. priority crimes differ from
province to province.

For example, in the Eastern Cape

stock theft might be dominant and in KZN sexual offences
might be dominant).126

1119. The training provisional plan for members is informed by two
parts, the national plan and the provincial plan. The national
plan consists of courses that are presented by the national
training institutions and the provincial plans are those
courses presented at each and every province where the
provincial human resource departments are tasked with the
job.127

126
127

Para 1-16, vol 44 at pg 2610 of the record
Para 1-9 vol 44 at pg 2612 of the record.

396   P a g e

 1120.

Members of SAPS are exposed not only to internal courses
but

also

international

courses.

SAPS

have

bilateral

agreements and sponsorships with various countries such
as France, China and the USA. Detectives, operational
members within the TRT and POP members receive training
that focuses on forensics.128

1121.

SAPS has partnered with tertiary institutions as well as
private institutions in the country to provide training to
members. Detectives undergo a fifteen week course on
general detective environment which includes general
principles of criminal law, functioning in a team, provisions
of the Criminal Procedure Act, management of exhibits,
investigative

interviewing,

statement

taking,

victim

empowerment, witness protection procedures, crime scene
management, stress management, investigation of specific
crimes, inquest investigations, missing persons, docket
administration, principles of evidence in the investigation of
a crime, giving of evidence, the role of crime intelligence in
the investigation of a crime, informers, tracing techniques
and utilisation of information systems.129

1122.

The allegations that SAPS members lack adequate training
and the necessary expertise to solve the political murders

128
129

Para 10-14, vol 44 at pg 2612 of the record.
Para 1-25, vol 44 at pg 2613 of the record.

397   P a g e

 was disputed by the two Generals and the above attests to
the extensive training that detectives countrywide receive
before being tasked with solving crimes.

1123.

The allegations of the Umlazi Police failing to deal with the
Glebelands situation was touched on by the Generals in that
out of the seventy (70) members falling under Umlazi SAPS,
forty-seven (47) of the members have undergone the crime
solving training courses and twenty-three (23) of the
members have been trained with the basic investigation
course. Training is ongoing. Therefore, the majority of the
detectives falling within Umlazi are sufficiently trained in
crime investigation and the perception held by many is
incorrect.

1124. Major General Ramatsoele (“Ramatsoele”) is with the
National Head Office at the Detective Service and is the
National Head for Specific Crime Investigations with thirtyseven years of being in the SAPS and with thirty-two (32)
years in the detective service. His evidence focused mainly
on the criteria followed when selecting a police official to
function within the detective service.

1125.

As already touched on by Chauke, all SAPS members
receive basic training and on completion of that basic

398   P a g e

 training, they identify their interests and potentials within
the service and those that fit the profile of being a detective
are identified through their work ethic in docket handling,
registering of cases, visible policing, statement taking, state
of the investigating diary etc. The best candidates are then
recruited to the detective service on authorisation of the
station commander and then are placed on probation. The
probation period is twelve months with the potential
candidate working with an experienced investigator.

1126.

The detective services at all stations is divided into three
main groups of investigation:

a) Violent crimes-murders, armed robberies, hijackings
etc;

b) Economic crimes- fraud, forgery etc ; and

c) A group investigating general crimes.

1127. The two Generals emphasised that the SAPS do their best to
ensure that all the members receive the theoretical
knowledge of the field they have chosen as well at the
practical skills to execute their functions. The SAPS believe

399   P a g e

 that they have sufficient systems in place to provide their
members with the required knowledge.
1128. On addressing the public’s perception that junior officers are
given the task of investigating these political murders which
leads to no arrests in the majority of cases, SAPS responded
that their investigating priorities are not based on rank level
although sensitivity is borne in mind when it comes to cases
which would require an experienced investigator. In
allocating a case to a detective, skills are examined and you
might find that a Warrant Officer of fifteen years has the
skills and expertise to investigate a high-profile case wherein
one would be of the opinion that such case should be
investigated by a General or Brigadier. Therefore, rank level
is not a criterion for investigating crimes, the criterion is the
capability of the officer to execute her/his duties.

1129.

The SAPS conceded that the successful combating of crime
is the role played by Crime Intelligence to a great extent.
Crime Intelligence is part of the value chain in investigation
and is a critical link in crime detection. Unfortunately,
despite widely being acknowledged that Crime Intelligence is
failing when it comes to political killings, SAPS could not
comment on who is responsible for crime intelligence and the
workings of that section of SAPS.

400   P a g e

 1130.

The SAPS further admitted that it plays an integral part in
leading a case to successful prosecution and that prosecutor
guided methods of investigations are promoted because they
lead to successful convictions. However, the evidence
tendered before the Commission dealt largely with the
difficulties faced by the prosecution in obtaining successful
outcomes.

1131. It was also regrettable that there was no one in the SAPS
delegation that could speak authoritatively about crime
intelligence and its role in gathering intelligence concerning
the murder of politicians in KZN. To the Commission’s
amazement, none of the police officers seemed to know about
the scandal involving the sacked former head of the Rapid
Deployment Head, Captain Morris “KGB” Tshabalala.130

1132. The SAPS even recommended a team of integrated detectives
and prosecutors to gather all (dockets under investigation
and dockets pending in court) dockets in the Province
associated with political violence to be dealt with by the
integrated task team.131

130
131

Vol 44 pg 2676 – 2679 of the record.
Para 3-9,vol 44 at pg 2637 of the record.

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 NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY
(CYRIL THULANI SELEPE)

1133. He testified on 22 February 2018. He is an advocate and a
Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions at the office of the
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in Pietermaritzburg. He
has been a prosecutor for 17 years and a deputy director for
8 years. He prosecuted the case of the so-called KZN26.

1134. The office of the DPP is in charge of all prosecutors in the
entire province, i.e. in the lower and high courts. Adv Selepe
confirmed that the NPA had received a memorandum from
the Evidence Leaders containing specific cases that required
feedback.

1135. The evidence leader alluded to the fact that the Commission
was aware that the DPP’s office deals with sensitive matters
in terms of the stage of the investigation, etcetera and he was
given the liberty to withhold any information at his
discretion. Adv Selepe then proceeded to give feedback on
the cases, as follows.

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 Nqutu CAS 2/6/2015
Deceased: Vusumuzi Bonginkosi Ntombela

1136. He complimented the SAPS for good investigation, the
members of the public who assisted in the apprehension of
the perpetrator who pleaded guilty and the second accused
who was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment in the High Court. He confirmed the fact of the
case as testified to before the Commission by the brother of
the deceased.

1137. With regard to the family’s concerns that there were
masterminds behind the scene, he indicated that there was
no evidence in the docket pointing to anyone else besides the
two accused who were convicted. He conceded that he was
not excluding the possibility of masterminds, but there was
no evidence to suggest it.

1138.

He confirmed that, in general, the hitmen are usually not
given much information by the middlemen who procure
them. As a result, they reveal very little to the SAPS and NPA
when they are caught and some even deny that they were
involved. That makes it very difficult and not feasible to
detect the masterminds behind the scene. The NPA would

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 welcome any further information and would guide the SAPS
to investigate it further.

Richmond CAS 92/10/2015 and CAS 114/10/2015
Deceased: Mthulisi Ngcobo

1139. Adv Selepe had perused the docket and confirmed that the
charge was withdrawn on 11 March 2016 in the lower court.
He stated that the charge was withdrawn due to insufficient
evidence. He was not willing to comment about the evidence
as the investigation was still on going, suffice that when
there is sufficient evidence and prospects of a successful
prosecution, the matter will be re-enrolled.

1140. Adv Selepe alluded to the need to educate the public. If the
NPA persists with a prosecution where there is no evidence,
it constitutes a civil wrong for which it may be sued civilly.
Besides the civil aspect, it is morally wrong to prosecute an
innocent person, in the sense of without evidence.

1141. In terms of informing the complainants, victims and
interested parties, he indicated that the investigating officers
are the NPA’s voice to the community and they rely on them
in that regard. The NPA’s decisions are communicated to the
investigating officers properly. Nevertheless, the NPA has an
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 open-door policy in dealing with complaints, queries and
representations and they do respond to them.

Umlazi CAS 478/7/2012
Deceased: Mthunzi Innocent Gwala

1142. Regarding the family’s concern that a material witness was
not called to testify, he explained the gist of her evidence.
She said on a certain day, she was in Durban when she saw
two African males having a conversation. She overhead them
saying they had killed the deceased. Her evidence was very
vague in that she did not identify those people. She did not
say whether they said they had killed the deceased
themselves or they were talking about what other people had
done.

1143. So, her evidence would not have added any value to the case.
The issue was complicated by the fact that the witness
refused to testify. There is an entry in the docket by the
investigating officer to that effect.

1144. Adv Selepe then moved from that specific case to what
occurs in general. Witnesses do frequently refuse to testify
at trial for a variety of reasons, including fear of being killed.
The NPA tries their best to refer them to witness protection
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 programme, but some refuse it. When you compel such a
witness to testify, they become hostile in court and that
aggravates the case.

Ibisi CAS 91/4/2017
Deceased: Khayalethu Edgar Thobela

1145. Adv Selepe had dealt with this case himself and declined to
prosecute in respect of the murder charge as there was no
evidence linking them to the murder. Brigadier Mbhele met
with Adv Selepe and informed him about a person who has
been arrested in possession of a firearm in a roadblock near
Ladysmith. His informer had told him that he was the
hitman in Thobela’s murder.

1146. They fast tracked the ballistic analysis. Within two or three
days, the ballistic report was obtained and it excluded the
said firearm as being the murder weapon. They had no other
option, but to prosecute the accused for possession of the
firearm, not murder. In respect of theft of motor vehicle,
there was no evidence in the docket giving a full description
of what vehicle was used in the Commission of the murder.

1147.

Regarding the murder charge, the investigation was still ongoing to gather further evidence. Adv Selepe urged the

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 community to assist the SAPS and the NPA in obtaining
evidence, not only in the Thobela case, but all cases.

Plessislaer CAS 169/6/2016
Deceased: Petina Regina Ngubane

1148. Adv Selepe stated that the DPP’s office declined to prosecute
in the matter because there was no evidence warranting a
prosecution. The only evidence was the deceased’s statement
that was made in hospital to the police before she died. She
mentioned the perpetrators’ names in that statement. That
would have constituted hearsay evidence in court.

1149. The NPA’s decision was informed by case law which provides
that, in as much as hearsay evidence may be admissible
statutorily, it should not play a decisive role towards the
conviction of the accused. It needs to be accompanied by
other evidence to enhance the prospects of a successful
prosecution. Adv Selepe referred to a similar reported case
where the Supreme Court of Appeal set the conviction aside
based on the precedent alluded to above.

1150. He indicated that in most cases, the NPA is required to make
a judgment call on whether to hastily prosecute a weak case
because of public sentiments or to wait a bit longer to
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 acquire more evidence. He conceded that the best option is
to wait because it gets worse if the accused gets acquitted
due to weak evidence. He confirmed that the investigation
was still on going.

Margate CAS 1/7/2012
Deceased: Wandile Mkhize and Nhlakanipho Shabane

1151. Adv Selepe confirmed that the matter was dealt with in the
DPP’s office. The two accused were prosecuted on the basis
of a confession and a pointing out respectively. The court
ruled both to be inadmissible and the NPA was left in a
difficult position as there was no other material evidence.

1152. Regarding the family’s allegation that a potential witness was
not called to testify, Adv Selepe indicated that he could not
find that witness’ statement in the docket. If the statement
never existed, the prosecutor who dealt with the trial in the
High Court would not have known about such witness.

1153.

There are instances where a witness has not made a
statement and it is brought to the attention of the prosecutor
that they have material information. The first thing is that
the NPA must be fair to the accused and disclose that fact to
the defence because one cannot ambush the accused as they

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 are entitled to receive the State’s evidence because to prepare
adequately for trial. Once those constitutional hurdles are
crossed, such witness may be called to testify.

1154. He indicated that the request to have the prosecution reopened was welcome by the NPA, provided that further
evidence would be obtained to prove that there were other
people who were involved.

1155.

He conceded that Glebelands had been troubling everyone
for years. He was tasked by the DPP to look into all dockets
relating to Glebelands matters and the co-operation and
dedication of the SAPS was impressive. It had been a joint
project for many years and the difficulty had always been
lack of evidence. However, at some point there were
breakthroughs in obtaining the evidence as people were then
willing to come forward.

1156. Mr Sipho Ndovela was a witness and he was killed at Umlazi
Court. A person was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced
recently to life imprisonment. Also, recently certain people,
including a policeman, had been arrested in connection with
offences at Glebelands.

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 1157. Adv Selepe was not willing to divulge any more information
regarding those arrests due to the sensitivity and stage of the
matter. He stated that, in an environment like Glebelands,
only the brave ones would come forward and give statements
to the SAPS because of the risks involved.

1158.

He also referred to a letter dated 18 August 2017 from his
colleague, Mr S Prithipal, indicating that they had received a
total of 49 cases involving members of political parties for
the period 2011 to date. As the NPA, they are informed by
the evidence and information in the whether a case is a
political killing or not. He also confirmed that political
killings and other high-profile cases fall under his portfolio
in the DPP’s office. He conceded that the statistics may not
be absolutely accurate, as sometimes a case is perceived as
being political in the public domain when in fact there is no
factual evidence in the docket to confirm it.

1159.

Regarding the recommendation that a task team of
experienced prosecutors and detectives must collect all of
the relevant dockets of political killings and work on them,
he indicated that that has been happening for a long time.

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 1160. In response to a question by a Commissioner whether
experienced investigators and prosecutors would know how
to collapse a case, Adv Selepe replied that he did not want to
speculate as the public required answers. He however stated
that he had never encountered such a situation in his career.
Similarly, he had never heard of any prosecutor who was
influenced by any politician to ensure that a case was not
successfully prosecuted or that it was withdrawn.

1161. In response to a question by a Commissioner, Adv Selepe
conceded that there is a provision in our law to subpoena
people who have information relating to crimes to compel
them to give information. He added that such procedure
never been utilised in political offences simply because the
NPA has never received any information to the effect that a
particular person has information but does not want to make
a statement or to testify. If the police had brought it to the
NPA’s attention, they would indeed deal with it accordingly.

1162. In response to a question by a Commissioner, Adv Selepe
indicated that they have had instances of hostile witnesses
in political cases. Generally, such witnesses are accomplice
witnesses and they let the prosecution down in their
testimony in court by changing their versions or denying
their
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statements.

Ultimately,

it

becomes

difficult

to

 prosecute such witnesses thereafter because there is no
other evidence to prosecute them and, by law, you cannot
subsequently utilise their own accomplice statements
against them.

1163.

He also confirmed that, in terms of recent jurisprudence, a
decision to prosecute and a decision not to prosecute are
both justiciable in that they can be challenged in court and
set aside.

FINDINGS

1164. We have carefully considered the evidence set out above. We
have read the transcribed evidence and studied the written
submissions that accompanied some of the oral testimony of
the witnesses that testified before us.

1165. As these proceedings are inquisitorial and not adversarial,
we have not attempted to resolve the few disputes of fact. We
did not find it necessary to do so, as the bulk of the evidence
was common cause or otherwise not disputed.

1166. What follows are the essential findings.

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 1167. The murder of politicians were at a local level, involving
mainly Councillors, potential Councillors, and branch
leaders of political organisations.

1168. The barriers of entry to becoming a Councillor are extremely
low. Essentially if one is a popular person without any
academic or vocational qualifications one is able to become
a Councillor.

1169. The election into a political position of Councillor gives one
political power which creates the opportunity for access to
resources through tenders and other financial avenues,
leading to corruption, crass materialism, and conspicuous
consumption.

1170. Election as a councillor allows for upward mobility in
financial and social status. Consequently, the loss of the
Councillor position leads to a corresponding loss of the
financial and social status.

1171. Accession to the position of Councillor puts one in close
proximity to the awarding of tenders and creates the
opportunity for the manipulation of the tender process for
personal benefit.

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 1172.

Election as a Councillor also lends itself to the creation of a
patronage network. However, should the Councillor lose
his/her position, not only does the Councillor lose their
income and social status, but the entire patronage network
may suffer a similar loss.

1173. The advantages that come with election as a Councillor
therefore results in fierce competition for those positions and
consequently manipulation of voting for those positions are
common especially at branch, regional, and national levels
within political parties.

1174. The evidence of a number of witnesses confirm that branch,
regional, and provincial meetings of political parties are
manipulated using a number of underhand tactics which
seek to marginalise some in the battle between different
factions. This often results in violent attacks and retaliatory
attacks, which have been at the core of a number of murders
of politicians.

1175. The evidence also suggests that a lack of political leadership
or manipulation by leaders is also a contributory factor to
the disruption of branch, regional, and provincial meetings
often resulting in the murder of politicians.

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 1176.

The evidence suggests serious weaknesses in the entire
criminal justice system, especially the security apparatus,
including national intelligence, crime intelligence, and other
general and specialised investigation units, in terms of
effectiveness of personnel, and coordination, and coherence
among security entities.

1177.

The evidence also indicates that there were weaknesses in
crime intelligence in the gathering, processing and deploying
of evidence to prevent or resolve the murder of politicians.

1178.

There was evidence to the fact that state institutions,
particularly security institutions, are being manipulated by
politicians for political ends.

1179. There was evidence that criminal elements are recruited by
politicians to achieve political ends, resulting in a complex
matrix of criminal and political associations that also lead to
the murder of politicians.

1180. Evidence that senior political functionaries in the province
employed private and out of province police to resolve
criminal incidents, involving them personally, in the
province does not give much confidence in the ability of the
local security establishment.

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 1181.

The murder of politicians and other killings relating to
Glebelands Hostel received a lot of attention in the local
media. As a consequence the Commission made an in loco
inspection of Glebelands Hostel. The conditions witnessed by
the Commission in the Hostel corroborated the evidence of
those who alleged neglect of the Hostel by the responsible
authority, the eThekwini Municipality.

1182.

The abdication of this responsibility was both in terms of
the lack of maintenance of the physical property, as well as
in the administration of the property, including the
allocation of beds, which was left to criminal elements,
resulting in violent competition for control of the lucrative
business of controlling the renting of the beds.

1183. The correlation between electoral and political competition
and its attendant violence was highlighted by the IEC. The
result is the impairing of the voting public’s willingness to
engage with democracy and it increases voter apathy.

1184. There was evidence that language used by politicians is
sometimes provocative and incites violence, contributing to
the murder of politicians.

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 1185. There was also evidence that suggested that a culture of
violence had taken root in the Province and that this culture
had its roots in the colonial and apartheid eras. The murder
of politicians is not a new phenomenon in KZN. The killing
of Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge is one of the most highprofile cases of the murder of politicians. They were
assassinated in 1981 and 1985.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1186. The

Commission

deliberated

and

decided

on

the

recommendations that follow hereunder.

1187. Political parties must take responsibility for the violent
competition between their members for political positions
and power. The Commission recommends that political
parties urgently educate their members about democratic
practices, especially the universal practice of peaceful
political competition as opposed to political intolerance and
violent political competition. Political parties must discipline
their members whose conduct encourages or results in
political intolerance and violence and where their members
are involved in or are accomplices to killings they must
report these members to the relevant law enforcement
authorities.
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 1188.

In the current context of an extremely volatile political
environment and an upcoming election, it is recommended
that political parties immediately settle differences within
and between themselves through peaceful means using
negotiation,

mediation

and

other

consensus

building

techniques to avoid the continuing murder of politicians and
public officials.

1189. There was overwhelming evidence from the majority of
witnesses that access to resources through the tender
system is the main root cause of the murder of politicians.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (s217(1))
states that, when an organ of State in the national,
provincial, or local sphere of government, or any other
institution identified in national legislation, contracts for
goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system
that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost
effective. There was ample evidence before this Commission
that the above constitutional provisions were violated in all
respects by manipulation and exploitation by politicians and
public officials in collusion with business people. It is
therefore strongly recommended that the State must
urgently investigate this matter and where necessary revise
its procedures to ensure that it complies with the

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 constitutional provisions of fairness, equity, transparency,
competitiveness, and cost effectiveness.

1190.

The Commission recommends that the State immediately
take measures to depoliticise and professionalise the public
service. The State must rebuild a public service that is driven
by the politics of delivery and public service and not the
politics of patronage and personal accumulation. The State
must also take measures to immediately enforce the
separation of powers, duties, and functions between public
representatives

and

public

officials

and

hold

each

accountable professionally and criminally for their respective
conduct.

1191. Government functionaries must, without exception, have the
appropriate qualifications for the jobs that they are expected
to perform in. Political deployment of persons as government
functionaries

into

positions

without

the

appropriate

qualifications must be discouraged and eliminated as a
practice.

1192. The investigation of corrupt activities and the attendant
criminal acts by politicians, public officials and business
people must be vigorously investigated and those against
whom there is evidence of corruption must be expeditiously

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 prosecuted and if found guilty must be appropriately
sentenced to rebuild the confidence of the public in the
public service and to avoid building a culture of impunity
and a culture where perpetrators believe that they are
politically protected from prosecution and punishment.

1193.

There was ample evidence before the Commission that acts
of omission and commission by the police, through
incompetence or political manipulation, has led to a loss of
public confidence in the criminal justice system but
especially the police services and security agencies in
general, including crime intelligence, national intelligence,
and the specialised policing and prosecution agencies. It is
recommended that the State take immediate measures to
ensure that institutions of the entire criminal justice system
are immediately depoliticised and the political manipulation
of these agencies to meet political ends is immediately
brought to an end and public measures be taken to instil
confidence in the public that the State is acting vigorously,
expeditiously, and without fear or favour.

1194. It is recommended that an inter-ministerial task force of
national Ministers of the security cluster, working with their
provincial and municipal counterparts, immediately review
the workings of the security agencies to ensure that effective

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 coordination and coherence among and between these
agencies is reinforced in practice. Competition and noncooperation among these agencies is a major contributory
factor

to

the

unresolved

murder

of

politicians

and

consequently contributes to the perceptions and actual
culture of impunity.

1195. It is recommended that the recruiting, training, and
deployment of police be improved through ensuring that
properly qualified people are recruited, adequate and
specialised training is given, and appropriate police be
deployed to appropriate situations.

1196. The evidence indicates that weak political parties and
leadership is what leads to factionalism and intolerance
within and between parties which in turn results in violent
conflict,

often

resulting

in

the

murder

of

political

functionaries. It is therefore recommended that political
parties build a strong membership base that is rooted in
democratic values, political competition, tolerance, sound
moral values and service to the public.

1197. It is also recommended that political parties re-enforce a
culture of adherence to and mobilisation along the lines of
democratic principles and political programmes and not

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 narrow identity or along the lines of political positions and
power.

1198.

Whilst educational qualifications should never be made a
requirement to hold public office as such a requirement will
violate the democratic right of any citizen to hold public
office, it is recommended that political parties and state
institutions should provide effective and appropriate training
as well as reassess any current training so as to ensure that
elected public officials are well prepared for the tasks that
they are expected to carry out.

1199. In the medium to long term, it is recommended that political
parties must work with religious organisations, civil society
organisations,

the

media,

academics

and

any

other

appropriate institution to reverse the current culture of
intolerance, violence, and killings and political parties,
together with the State and organs of civil society, must
enforce a strict code of conduct which prevents politicians,
state officials and citizens from using language which incites
hatred, prejudice, and violence.

1200. The evidence presented before this Commission is not
confined just to the Province of Kwazulu-Natal but has
similarities with incidents of the murder of politicians in

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 other Provinces, and the underlying causes of the murder of
politicians are potentially present in all Provinces. The
Commission therefore recommends that this report be
referred to the National Cabinet so that the evidence and
findings can be studied and the recommendations can be
implemented nationally. The culture and network of
patronage and impunity does not stop provincially but
stretches nationally and the problem must therefore be
prioritised provincially but eventually addressed nationally!

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1201. We wish to acknowledge all the individuals and companies
listed

hereunder.

Without

their

hard

work

and

professionalism, we would have struggled to accomplish this
mammoth task. We express our gratitude to them for their
tireless efforts.
Acknowledgements:
1. Evidence leaders: Advocates Bheki Manyathi and Michelle Andile
Ngqanda
2. Investigator: Brigadier Clifford Marion
3. Secretariat: Mr Solo Mdledle, Mr Frans Muller, Ms Zola Moima, Ms
Busisiwe Dube
4. Researcher: Mr Matthew Kimble
5. Staff of the Premiers Office including Premier’s Advisor Ms Linda
Zama
6. Staff of the Department of Public Works
7. Staff of ACCORD
8. Members of the South African Police Services
9. Staff of Sneller Recordings
10. Eagle Stationers

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 THUS SIGNED AT DURBAN THIS 12TH DAY OF JUNE 2018.

_______________________________________
ADVOCATE MARUMO TK MOERANE SC
CHAIRPERSON

________________________________
ADVOCATE VASU GOUNDEN
COMMISSIONER

__________________________________
PROFESSOR CHERYL POTGIETER
COMMISSIONER

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