- - um DIS NRC 1/81 3rd September, 1981 NATIONAL REPORTING CENTRE 1. *4 This paper is a supplementary report to that prepared by TERRY. C.B.E., Q.P.M., President of the Association of Chief Police Officers, dated May, 1981. Since the preparation of the original report, the National Reporting Centre (NRC) has been activated. This occurred on 6th July, after consultations between the President and Home Office, following outbreaks of public disorder over a wide area. Primarily the task of the NRC was to arrange mutual aid between the Forces. A secondary role was to provide a central collation point for information required by Home Office on behalf of the Home Secretary. In its primary role, the NRC until reverting to a monitoring state on l9th August, arranged aid to eight police forces. This amounted to 908 police support units. In the light of the experience gained, coupled with that obtained during the Prison Officers' Dispute during which the NRC (then the National Information Centre), co?ordinated prisoner allocation, it has been agreed by both ACPO and Home Office that the Centre should be placed on a more permanent footing. In arriving at this decision, it is considered that the NRC will be activated more frequently than has been the case in the past. It is also recognised that by establishing a degree of permanency, greater expertise will be gained by those involved in its operation. To enable this development to take place, it is necessary to establish who will be charged with the overall responsibility for overseeing its work, creating policy and on a more mundane level, authorise and arrange the necessary finances. At present on an adhoc basis, ACPO, the Metropolitan Police, Home Office and HM Inspectorate have been involved. Whilst no formal agreements have been made, in practice no major difficulties have arisen, due no doubt to the temporary nature of the situation. It may therefore be considered advisable that a Steering Committee involving these bodies should be created to oversee the NRC alOng the lines of the committee which is responsible for The suggested composition is; A.C.P.O.: The President The Vice President The immediate past President The Metropolitan Police: The Commissioner, or his nominee H.M. Inspectorate: H.M. Chief Inspector HOme Office: A nominee To formalise its position, the Steering Committee could be linked to the General Committee of the Central Conference of Chief Constables. In practice, the Steering Committee might consider it convenient if the day to day responsibility for the Centre was delegated to the President of ACPO, who in any event has been given the task of consulting with Home Office on the necessity to activate the NRC. Assuming form11.isation of the Steering Committee, the following matters require urgent consideration; Terms of Reference Accommodation .Terms of Reference It is suggested that these should embrace the following, which are the broad basis upon which the NRC has operat- -d recently. Scanned by ??amSCanner .- -v Anya?L 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. (2) Following consultations between the President of ACPO, Chief Officers of affected forces and Home Office, the NRC would undertake:? to arrange mutual aid when:- the national situation demands it, and (ii) local mutual aid arrangements are inadequate or would create difficulties in deploying police resources on a national basis, or the powers vested in the Home Secretary by virtue of Section 14(2) The Police Act 1964 are invoked. To collate and disseminate any intelligence appertaining to the ?situation for which the NRC is activated. To provide the Home Secretary with the information required by virtue of his accountability for such matters. ltations with other Government To provide a central point for consu the NRC is activated. departments involved in the situation for whic Accommodation The NRC is at present located at New Scotland Yard and accommodated in Rooms 1309/1310 with the additional accommodation available in Room 1313. The Commissioner has signified his agreement to the continued usage of these rooms on a priority basis, although when the NRC is not operating they will be available for use by the Metropolitan Police. Communications facilities and other equipment necessary for the running of the NRC proved adequate, although plans are in hand to update the telephone system. In addition a false floor for the purpose of housing cables etc., and the provision of screening for the display boards is also to be undertaken. These alterations will allow the equipment to remain in situe when the NRC is inoperative, obviating the problem of having to dismantle and store the various items. If?in the near-future it is considered necessary to utilise computerised facilities, i.e. PNC and Metropolitan police command and control computer, it is understood there may be some technical difficulties due to the location of the NRC in relation to the Command Control Computer. This apart the present facilities have proved ideal, therefore unless the Steering Committee have any reservations or are desirous of examining computerisation before arriving at a decision, it is suggested that the present understanding with the Commissioner regarding the usage of the rooms be confirmed. 0n the assumption that the preceeding points are resolved, the following subjects will require attention: Staffing Finance Staffing The NRC is divided into two spheres of responsibility; The Command Team ?The Communications Team _Command Team This team consists of the President/Vice President ACPO, H.M. Chief inspector (or his nominee), Home Office representative, and a Staff Officer seconded. from a provincial force. Scanned by CamScanner 15. 16. 17- 18., 19. 20. In practice, on a day to day basis the Staff Officer represents the Command Team in the decision making process. In the eVent of difficulties he in turn refers to the President. It is suggested in order that a degree of expertise and continuity is available-to the Command team, the Staff Officer should be on permanent secondment to the NRC. Whilst the practical advantage of this is obvious, difficulties may arise if a Situation develops whilst the officer is absent, for example on annual leave. In that case an obligation would be placed upon the President/Vice President to supply an officer for staff duties. These officers therefore, must be nominated at an early stage during the President/Vice President?s term of office, in order that they can visit the NRC and familiarise themselves with the procedures. If it is agreed that the Staff Officer's position should be a permanent one, then a job description will need determining. It is suggested that it embraces the following: Whilst NRC activated (Monitoring/live) 1) Receive and action all in?coming messages to the Command team. 2) Liaise with Controller (IC Communications team), and monitor complete NRC operation. 3) Advise Command team on all or any aspects of the NRC and Force operations. 4) Liaise with ACPO ranks in Forces. 5) Act as general factotum to Command team. Whilst NRC is inoperative 6) To maintain the NRC in a manner which will allow quick reactivation. 7) To liaise with Forces and ensure that the role of the NRC is understood. 8) To undertake tasks determined by the Steering Committee/President. 9) To be employed at the discretion of the President of ACPO. Communications Team In the event of the NRC being activated in either a monitoring or live role, the Communications team is supplied en block by department of the Metropolitan Police. The staffing levels are determined by the volume of activity. The full team is:- Controller/Assistant Controller Loggist/Assistant Loggist Teleprinter Operator Collator/Intelligence Officer Traffic Liaison Officer Plotter, and Command Telephonist. The job descriptions have been compiled, and these have proved adequate. They are detailed in the President's report of May, 1981. I cont/d. Scanned by CamScanner - - 21. 22. 24. 25. .u?Jn .u-vc- .. - . sen?lop au-v- - - .- \ua?p?ugh-lu 4-s- A??u-n-Mh? . (4) When the NRC is stood down, these officers return to their normal duties with the Metropolitan Police. However, an Inspector located in A.2. Department has amongst his other duties, the responsibility for maintaining the equipment utilised in the Centre. This arrangement has not been found at fault, although without doubt it places a heavy burden upon the Metropolitan Police. Certainly any extended activation of the NRC would effectively cause the cessation of normal work carried out in the department from which the officers are seconded. The Steering Committee may wish to obtain the agreement of the Commissioner that this present arrangement can continue. Finance Bearing in mind that the NRC is a joint Police/Home Office organisation, the question of financing needs clarification. The areas of concern are; 1) Staff, and 2) Equipment. Staff If the need for a permanent Staff Officer is agreed, the question of payment of salary and expenses will need to be determined along with the conditions of service. Similarly, the degree and source of reimbursement to the Metropolitan Police for the temporary attachment of officers to NRC may require resolving, particularly if the NRC is to become a regular commitment. Equipment Most of the equipment required for the running of the NRC is in situe. Additional expenditure already scheduled will arise from the installation of the false floor, display board screening, and the up-date of the existing telephone equipment by installing AD 9000 units. Unless it is intended to computerise the facilities, no additional heavy expenditure can be foreseen, nevertheless from time to time the question of obtaining equipment will undoubtedly arise. Whilst in the short term this may be borrowed with the permission of the Commissioner from the MetrOpolitan Police, it may become' necessary to purchase equipment for the sole use of the NRC. In view of the present economic climate, the Steering Committee may wish to determine the source of funding and indeed clarify the position with regard to the expenditure which will shortly arise. Scanned by Camgcanner DIS NRC 5/81 28th September, 1981 NATIONAL REPORTING CENTRE Intelligence Function 1. The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent of the intelligence role to be undertaken by the National Reporting Centre when it is activated. 2. The general opinion of an intelligence unit is that its value is limited not only by the quality of information submitted to it, but also how well it is subsequently analysed, disseminated, and.subsequently utilised. 3. In most agencies which have an intelligence unit, the majority of information comes from its own field officers who can vouch for the 'dependability or otherwise of the information. It is not envisaged that the N.R.C. will employ field officers, but will rely almost exclusively on information supplied to it. from other organisations, either within the Police or externally. The basic assumption must be that the information is dependable unless the supplier indicates otherwise. 4. The N.R.C. is dependant for intelligence from the following sources. Special Branch/Security Service Information of a political nature, which hopefully will indicate and identify extremist grOups likely or intending to cause trouble at specific events, or in particular locations. Police Forces in General Information relating to hooliganism which may arise at events such as pop concerts, scooter rallies etc. N.R.C. Intelligence Officer Information gleaned:- From the media, particularly those periodicals of an extremist nature, or (ii) Through collating information from all sources and subsequently interpreting it. It must be accepted because of the temporary nature of the N.R.C. only in periods of prolonged activation is this latter source likely to gain credibility. 5. During the recent troubles it was found that very little information was forthcoming from any source, and most of that was obtained by the Intelligence Officer from the media. When this occurred, the N.R.C. was able to inform Forces of events planned several weeks ahead. On occasions it was found that Forces were already aware, but had not deemed it necessary to inform the N.R.C. The Future 6. The experiences of the Summer indicate that realisticaly the N.R.C. cannot delude itself into believing it can undertake a leading role in this field. It can however provide a safety net to ensure Forces are at least aware of what is going on around them, and the Command Team is kept informed. 7. It was noticeable that those items of interest passed to the N.R.C. by the Security Services had previously been notified to the Forces concerned. Similarly, information from Special Branch was within the knowledge Scanned by Camsoanner (2) of the Chief Officers prior to the N.R.C., as was the case with that obtained by the uniformed and Criminal Intelligence sections. It might be argued on this basis that it is pointless informing the N.R.C. However, the opposite situation appertains. 8. Because the bulk of the work is taken up with pre?planning, it is essential that it is fully aware of the sort of events which are scheduled to take place around the country where public disorder may occur. The reason is simple. If a force area is the location for a major demonstration for which it has ESE requested aid, the N.R.C. must still consider the possibility of aid being required at the last minute. In its pre?planning role, the N.R.C. would alert neighbouring Forces, to this possibility. Cases arose during the Summer when Forces were so warned, and then volunteered the fact that they themselVes had a demonstration that day, and would not be in a position to supply urgent aid. This failure to notify the N.R.C. undermines the concept of the pre-planning on a national basis. It is therefore vital all Forces should acquaint the N.R.C. with any information of this nature. With this in mind, the format of Appendix in particular Codes 15-16 relating to Intelligence matters, have been re?defined (DIS NRC 4/81 Conclusion The N.R.C. realisticaly can operate only as a collating and disseminating point for information. Obviously some analysis can be done using what information is available, but it is of insufficient depth upon which to base the main N.R.C. operation. The N.R.C. must inevitably continue to rely to a great extent on the goodwill and commonsense of police forces and other agencies in responding to the requirements set out in the draft 'Notes of Guidance? (DIS NRC 5/81 App. 2, para. 18). It is not considered practical to enlarge the scope of Intelligence work beyond that attained at present (or envisaged in the 'Notes of Guidance'). With this in mind, it is suggested that the Intelligence Officer is replaced by a Collator, and thereby correct any misunderstainding of the extent of his role. Scanned by CamScanner DIS NRC 11/81 17th November, 1981 NATIONAL REPORTING CENTRE Public Order A National Commitment? Following the events of the past 12 months, there has been much discussion within the Police Service and elsewhere on the necessity for the Service to co-ordinate its approach to large scale Outbreaks of public disorder. There has been some criticism that the present approach of the Police Service is disjointed, and that whilst much effort has been expended, much has been duplicated or maybe even overlooked. With these points in mind, there have been suggestions that all aspects of the public order problem should be concentrated under one committee. The present situation is that public order legis- lation, policy, equipment and tactics are dealt with by ACPO General Purposes Committee. Training needs are considered within the province of ACPO Training Committee whilst mutual aid on a national basis is arranged under the auspices of the newly formed Steering Committee for the National Reporting Centre. This latter body is to be linked to the General Committee of the Central Conference of Chief Constables. Whilst there is some agreement that it may be advisable to concentrate all aspects of public order under one committee, there is a division of thought as to whether this should be under the auspices of ACPO or the Central Conference of Chief Constables. ACPO Control The Advantages. If it is decided to create a Committee reporting direct to ACPO Council on public order matters, its membership would comprise in the main of Chief Officers involved in the General Purposes and Training Committees, together with the President, who would represent the interests of the National Reporting Centre. Under such a structure, it would be possible to have sub committees or Working Parties with term of reference covering training, personal equipment, transportation, legislation and mutual aid programmes. Any decisions reached by this Committee will be recommended to Council, and if accepted, will in due course be recommended to Chief Officers. Such a Committee would not infringe upon the autonomy of Chief Officers, who could decide upon the degree of co-0peration they wished to offer. The Disadvantages. The overall objective of such a Committee is to achieve a high degree of standardisation and thus enable efficient and effective co?operation between Forces. Any failure to accept and act upon recommendations of this Committee could jeopardise the prospect of inter?force efficiency. Scanned by CamScanner The financial aspects which loom large could not be satisfactorily dealt with in the Committee, and where it is considered that the burdens be spread nationally it would require further discussions with the Central Government, effectively causing further delay. Central Conference of Chief Constables The Advantages. If it was considered forming a Committee along the lines of the Steering Committee of the National Reporting Centre, or indeed simply enhancing the remit of that body, it could undertake responsibility for public order related matters. Its composition could be as that of the suggested ACPO Committee, together with Home Office and Inspectorate representatives. The recommendations emanating from this Committee would in many cases result in Home Office circulars which in themselves might be considered more persuasive than ACPO recommendations. Financial Constraints would be discussed at the time subjects are considered, along with political implications. It should shorten discussion periods and allow for speedier implementation of recommendations. It could, as in the case of the suggested ACPO Committee have a sub Committee or Working Party sub structure to doihe research. In view of the political implications inherent in the national public disorder scene, the involvement of Home Office would be apparent and the political view more readily available. The Disadvantages. Because such a Committee would have representation from both Home Office and the Inspectorate, it may be seen to be a vehicle for Central Government infringement of the operational independence and autonomy of Chief Officers. This consideration aside the possibility of involving Central Government on the financial and political aspects at an early stage may outweigh this disadvantage. Scanned by CamScanner PUBLIC ORDER TRAINING PROGRAMME - OBJECTIVES The past year has highlighted the need for Police Forces to harmonise their efforts in order that they can react effectively and efficiently to large scale outbreaks of public disorder. It must be considered in future more occasions will arise when Units from various Police Forces will be required to work together, therefore it is essential that a high degree of standardisation is achieved in various aspects of police operations not the least of these being training. An effective training package cannot be designed to promote a national response without consideration of the following:: a) Unit Structurea It has been recommended by ACPO Council that Police Forces should adjust the composition of Police Support Units to one Inspector, two Sergeants and 20 men. Inherent in the recommendation is that each section of a support unit will consist of one Sergeant and lo Constables. This section may be further sub? divided into two shield units, or a number of snatch (arrest) squads. b) Personal Equipment Equipment utilised throughout England and Wales should be to all intents and purposes standardised in order that Incident Commanders would be aware of the capabilities of Units, from whichever Force they originated, and not cemmit them to situations inadvertently for which they are not trained or equipped to deal. c) Transportation The question of transportation is important in deciding tactics.. A standard coach, whilst adequate for transporting Units over long distances is totally inadequate for deployment in a public disorder situation. It is recognised that small personnel carriers designed to carry a section and its equipment, are most useful but if they are to be used tactically it is essential that their design is similar, so that debussing or ?mbussing procedures, particularly at the scene of major disorder are - . It is appreciated that the main problem is one of finance,however steps can be taken to achieve these objectives. The greater the degree of standardisation, the more feasible it becomes to devise a training package suitable for use nationally, a training package designed to achieve the following:- d) Crowd and Demonstration Control The policing method used in controlling crowds and demonstrations, largely pre~planned and relatively peaceful, has now been proven, indeed a high degree of standardisation has been achieved throughout the country. However training personnel to deal with large scale outbreaks of public disorder requires-Further thought if the police service is to be seen to be efficient in reasserting the rule of law in the minimum of time with the minimum of injuries to both officers and members of the public. e) Shield Training Most, if not all Forces, now have an element of manpower trained in the use of long shields, and it is to be hoped that the training methods have been standardised, but in all probability there are some variances. When Units are deployed locally, this causes no problem, however when manpower is deplOYed from a number of Forces lack of standardisation can result in the h' Scanned by CamScanner (2) 1055 of efficiency and indeed danger to those participating. f) Snatch (Arrest) Squad 'Experiences in the past summer have indicated the desirability of developing the use of snatch squads utilising a short shield.? A number of shields are at present undergoing evaluation but more importantly: the tactics in their use need to be developed. As in the case of long- shields, tactics and the basic words of command require standardisati??i g) Basic Commands To avoid any confusion in Forces when mixed Force Units are operating. it is commonsense that all basic commands given should be in standard form. and agreed standard commands must therefore be devised and adqpt??- h) Communications Whilst it may be considered to be a technical problem, the difficulties encountered intomnunha?m,simple orders to Units deployed in the field cannot be overlooked. Sound tactical appreciation and subsequent orders to . bring it about can be totally frustrated if the orders cannot be communicated. Research in this area is urgently required. i) Supervisors The training of Sergeants and Inspectors who are in immediate control of Units must similarly be standardised. They must above all begfamiliar with the limitations placed on their Unit by its degree of training in tactics and personal equipment. j) Incident Commanders It is perhaps in this area of training that the most thought will need to be given. It is desirable to restrict the number of senior officers at the scene of any major disturbance to ensure that tacEIEs and orders_emanate from a restricted source (and thus avoid confusing and conflicting instructions). The role of an Incident Commander demands a high degree of initiative, flexibility and tactical appreciation. It is to be recognised that many . senior officers have to all intents and purposes become administrators, and it is unfair to expect any officer without previous training in this particular field, to suddenly take charge. For that reason, it may be better to design a package and restrict the training to a selected number of officers who will form a pool to be called ;upon in the event of large scale outbreaks of public disorder. 3 In any event any training packages should encompass an understanding of ?tactics, and above all, an appreciation of the capabilities of both manpower ?and equipment available to them. k) Rigidity . . In formulating any training package, one danger mustybe avoided - that of rigidity. If too many rules and too many procedures hi??iaia agar, there is a danger that initiative will be?stifled. Whilst it is right that the basic roles of commanders should be strictly laid down, the tactical asPect requires both initiative and flexibility. It must be recognised that some officers are better equipped to undertake these roles than others, apd if feasible. the training package should attempt to identify such officers in Sfa?r'E?EE'E?ay may be ear?marked for the future. Scanned by CamScanner 1. STEERING COMMITTEE NATIONAL REPORTING CENTRE Minutes of a Meeting held in Rooms 1309/10, New Scotland Yard, at 10.45 hours, on Friday, 20th November, 1981. Present: B.N. PAIN, C.B.E., Q.P.M. G.W.R. TERRY, C.B.E., Q.P.M. K.G. OXFORD, C.B.E., Q.P.M. Sir Peter MATTHEWS, O.B.E., Q.P.M. D. HALL, Q.P.M. Cdr. R. RADFORD B. MORRISSEY, O.B.E., Q.P.M. L. BYFORD, Q.P.M., LL.B P. HONOUR In Attendance: Supt. R.R. NEVILLE, Q.G.M. Staff Officer, National Reporting Centre. Ch. Inspector D. SURRIDGE - Staff Officer to Chief Constable, Kent. Ch. Inspector J. SIMON - Staff Officer to Chief Constable, Merseyside. Apologies Apologies were received from Mr. G.H. PHILLIPS, Home Office. Matters Arising Steering Committee Composition It was agreed that a Steering Committee consisting of persons holding the appointments listed below should be created to oversee the running of the National Reporting Centre, and that the Committee should be linked to the General Committee of Central Conference of Chief Constables to whom it would report; A.C.P.O.: The President Vice President Immediate past President A.C.P.O. General Purposes Committee: The Chairman Honorary Secretary Metropolitan Police: The Commissioner, or his nominee H.M. Inspectorate: H.M. Chief Inspector or his nominee Home Office: A senior official There was some discussion on the advisability of requesting representatives of A.C.P.O. Training Committee to participate as members of the Steering Committee but it was decided, following a discussiOn, that any advice on training matters could be sought as and when required. Terms of Reference It was agreed that the terms of reference for the National Reporting Centre would be as follows:? "Following consultations between the President of A.C.P.O., Chief Officers of affected Forces and Home Office, the National Reporting Centre would undertake; a) to arrange mutual aid when; i) The national situation demands it, and ii) Local mutual aid arrangements are inadequate or would create difficulties in deploying police resources on a national basis, or cont/d.. Scanned by CamScanner .. . (2) The powers vested in the Home Secretary by virtue of Section 142(2) of the Police Act 1964 are invoked. b) To collate and disseminate any information appertaining to the situation for which the N.R.C. is activated. c) To provide the Home Secretary with the information required by virtue of his accountabilityfor such matters". Accommodation for the National Reporting Centre The Commissioner, through Commander RADFORD, signified his agreement to the continued usage by the National Reporting Centre of Rooms 1309/10 and 1313. Room 1313 will be used solely by the National Reporting Centre whilst Rooms 1309 and 1310 will revert to use by the Metropolitan Police when not required by the National Reporting Centre. It was decided that this agreement entitled the N.R.C. to priority use of these rooms and Commander RADFORD indicated that this was also his understanding. The Position of Staff Officer to Command Team The position of the Staff Officer appointed to the National Reporting Centre was reviewed. It was agreed that it was essential for continuity in this post, but it was also accepted at the present moment whilst the National Reporting Centre is inOperative, there is insufficient work load to occupy a Staff Officer full time. It was agreed that the current President should nominate an Officer whose main responsibility would be the day to day running of the N.R.C. when activated and also to ensure that the N.R.C. when de?activated was maintained and exercised periodically. It was also accepted that the Vice President would, during his term of office, nominate an Officer who would take responsibility for running the Centre at the commencement of the new President's term of office. It was agreed that the effect of the Staff Officer being a Presidential nominee would allow for a three year period of continuity, as he would also be available during his Chief Officer's period as 'Immediate Past President'. This would enable an experienced Staff Officer to be present, drawn from a pool of three whilst the Centre was operative. Mr. HONOUR on behalf of the Home Office, undertook to consider the financial implications of such a post. It was determined that the following should be the job description for the post of Staff Officer; Whilst NRC activated (Monitoring/live) 1) Receive and action all in?coming messages to the Command Team. 2) Liaise with Controller (IC Communications Team), and monitor complete NRC operation. 3) Advise Command Team on all or any aspects of the NRC and Force operations. 4) Liaise with ACPO ranks in Forces. 5) Act as general factotum to Command Team. Whilst NRC is inoperative 6) To maintain the NRC in a manner which will allow quick reactivation. 7) To liaise with Forces and ensure that the role of the NRC is understood. cont/d. i -m narrow.?- Scanned by CamScanner lO. (3) 8) To undertake tasks determined by the Steering Committee/President. 9) To be employed at the discretion of the President of ACPO. Communications and Support Team Commander RADFORD on behalf of the Metropolitan Police agreed that the Communications and Support Team would continue to be supplied by the Metropolitan Police. It was also agreed that the manning levels of this team would be left flexible, subject to adjustment determined by the situation at the time. It was accepted that ideally the following posts should be filled; Controller/Assistant Controller Loggist/Assistant Loggist Teleprinter Operator Information Officer (ex Collator/Intelligence Officer) Traffic Liaison Officer Plotter, and Command Telephonist It was agreed that the basic job descriptions for these positions would be as contained in the President's Report of May, 1981. Financing of the National Reporting Centre There was considerable discussion among members on the financial implications in running the National Reporting Centre. This included both staff and equipment costs. Mr. HONOUR, on behalf of the Home Office, stated that the Home Office was unable to assist at this stage, as it was not in possession of written estimates. The Committee was informed that difficulties had arisen with British Telecom through its reluctance to provide anything other than verbal estimation of costs. The Metropolitan Police are continuing to pursue this matter. Commander RADFORD undertook to provide the Committee and Home Office with a full break-down of the financial implications of both staffing and equipment. It was agreed that Mr. HONOUR would arrange as soon as possible, a meeting involving the President, immediate past and Vice Presidents, the Metropolitan Police and Home Office, to discuss financing of the Centre, possibly through Common Police Service funds. As far as the Staff Officer was concerned, ways would be explored to see if it was possible for a Force to carry the Staff Officer supernumerary during the Presidential year. Standardisation of Police Support Units The Committee heard from Mr. HALL on ACPO Council's agreement to the standardisation of Police Support Units, based on one Inspector, two Sergeants and 20 Constables. It was agreed that all requests for Units to or emanating from the National Reporting Centre will be considered as requests for Units comprising of one Inspector, two Sergeants and 20 men. Calculation of Force Commitment Police Support Units On behalf of ACPO General Purposes Committee Mr. HALL outlined the formula which that Committee was proposing as a basis for calculating a Force's commitment. The formula is based on the actual Force establishment figure. For every 200 officers irrespective of rank, current appointment or sex, a Force should raise one Police Support Unit of one Inspector, two Sergeants and 20 Constables. It is proposed that Forces will be notified of the extent of their commitment through an appendix in the "Notes of Guidance on Public Order for Senior Police Officers" which is in the process of being revised. Scanned by CamScanner ll. l2. l3. l4. (4) Following discussion on the suitability of the formula it was agreed that the National Reporting Centre would accept the resultant figures as a mathematical base for their resource calculations. Communications Facilities Telephones The Committee was informed of the progress regarding the installation of the AD 9000 telephone equipment, work having commenced and which it is anticipated will be completed by mid December. In the meantime the Centre can function utilising the existing telephone system. Communications Facilities Computerisation The Committee considered a paper regarding the usage of computerised facilities. It was noted that the message switching system would be computerised in due course, and it was believed that this broadcast facility would add to the efficiency of the Unit. Discussion took place on the merits of a computerised logging system. It was accepted that on the one hand the costanuithe role of the NRC as a "request and supply unit" rather than a "command and control unit", did not warrant the installation of such equipment at present. However, it was also accepted that times could change and that the use of such equipment should not be totally dismissed. In the circumstances Commander RADFORD agreed to seek technical advice on the feasability and cost of such equipment in order that the Committee could further consider the matter in due course. Intelligence Role of the National Reporting Centre Following discussion on a prepared paper, it was agreed that the National Reporting Centre could not undertake an intelligence role, but that it should confine itself to being an information centre. Its main task being to ensure the Command Team was acquainted with any information to hand on a given situation and that Forces themselves and their immediate neighbours were aware of the information. The NRC's accepted role being that of a safety net. The importance of Forces passing information to the Centre was stressed. This was vital in order to avoid problems of a request being made to Forces which had themselves a prior commitment that had inadvertently not been made known to the N.R.C. It was agreed that in future, the Intelligence Officer of the Centre would be re-designated Information Officer to avoid any confusion. Training Exercises The question of training and exercising the National Reporting Centre was discussed at length and it was agreed that future training exercises should take the form of communications exercises during which the Centre would be activated and Forces alerted. Following the alert, Forces would be requested to supply a situation report and if at that time it was practical to do so, a number of Forces would be requested to form Police Support Units. In this way, the ability of the Police Service to respond to outbreaks of public disorder should be properly guaged and tested. It was considered that the Staff Officer be given the role of visiting Forces under test to ascertain their efficiency and readiness, but after further discussion the concensus of opinion was that this might be best undertaken by Her Majesty's Inspectorate. The Staff Officer would be best utilised visiting Forces who had found difficulty in interpreting and compiling the information needed on situation reports. It was accepted that there was little point in planning an exercise prior to the re?issuing of the amended Notes of Guidance, which will take place shortly. Scanned by CamScanner 15. l6. l7. (5) Commander RADFORD stated that after the initial exercise there was little point in further exercises if the Centre had already been activated during the previous 12 months. After a short discussion it was agreed that any exercise would be held in the last quarter of a year, during which the Centre had remained dormant. In addition it was determined that a scenario did nothing to exercise the members of the Command Team, and should be discontinued. Any training in this connection could, if required, be undertaken by utilising the Police Staff College carousel course on public order. Notes of Guidance The Committee examined the drafts for inclusion in the Notes of Guidance, and a number of amendments were made. It was agreed that changes should be limited to avoid any confusion but that Forces must not be overburdened with requests for non essential information. The interpretation appendix on the information required under the various codes was accepted. A further draft is appended at and this has been included in the draft Notes of Guidance to be issued by the General Purposes Committee. Mr. TERRY reminded the Committee that Home Office had indicated that they wished to issue a circular dealing specifically with mutual aid and it was thought that paragraphs 1-4 of the draft may form the basis of that paper. Mr. HONOUR said that the question was still under active consideration and that Home Office were of a mind to issue a circular covering not only the National Reporting Centre but other matters which need to be considered on a national basis. He asked if the Committee would have any objection to the inclusion of the rest of the paper dealing with the National Reporting Centre being issued as an appendix to a Home Office circular. There was no objection raised by the Committee. Time, Date and Venue of next Meeting To be arranged at the Presidents discretion. There being no further business, the meeting was concluded at 1315 hours. Scanned by CamScanner NATIONAL REPORTING CENTRE History Following the threat of national disruption by tanker drivers and the National Union of Mineworkers in 1972, it was agreed to set up a National Co-ordinating Centre for police resources. On Tuesday, April 1972, a meeting was held at the Home Office where this Force was represented by Sir Robert MARK (Deputy Commissioner). It was felt that the centre should be in Iondon so that it had immediate access to Central Government in the event of a total communication breakdown. It was accordingly agreed that the centre would be at N.S.Y. and would be staffed by Metropolitan officers. This Force also stated that as the situation in Iondon, at a time of National unrest, would be very severe, aid would never be given, but would also not be sought. Home Office Circular 69/1973 was issued on 16th April 1973, and contained standing instructions on the question of mutual aid and the N.R.C. At 6 am on 10th February 1974 the centre was activated to deal with industrial action in the mining industry and remained upon until 7th March 1974. Nothingthappened with the centre until alst October 1980 when it was opened to co?ordinate the movement of prisoners, following the period of industrial action in the Prison Service. The centre remained open until 28th February 1981 and arranged the movement of 1,068 prisoners. Whilst undoubtedly successful, the operation did highlight some deficiencies, not least of all with regard to the facilities and equipment. These deficiencies were further illustrated during the course of a one day exercise held on 9th March 1981. Scanned by CamScanner 1? Sir George TERRY, President of A.C.P.O. (1980-81) was tasked with making recommendations for the future of the centre and to that end Chief Superintendent PERRETT, A.2, Inspector ANNIS, A.2, and Chief Inspector FLENELY, Staff Officer to Sir George TERRY, prepared a report published in May 1981. This report was to be debated by the A.C.P.O. General Purposes Committee, but before that could be done the summer disturbances in Brixton, Toxteth and Moss Side occurred and it was decided to open the centre. It was accordingly decided to implement the recommendations in full. Scanned by CamScanner I Functions of the N.R.C. The N.R.C. has three main functions:- (1) to arrange mutual aid; (ii) to collate and disseminate information relevant to the particular situation; to provide the Home Secretary with information required by virtue of his accountability. With regard to which is obviously the prime function, the whole question of mutual aid is governed by Section 1h, Police Act l96h. Sub-section of that section enables a Chief Officer to provide manpower aid to another Chief Officer upon request. This supply of aid, however, is totally dependent upon the good will of the donor Fbrce. If that Fbrce is reluctant to provide aid the N.R.C. cannot direct it. Therefore, the smooth operation of the centre is dependent upon the degree of co-operation that can be develoPed which, in turn, is dependent upon the attitude and approach of the N.R.C. staff. Sub-section (2), however, empowers the Hbme Secretary to take control of all 43 Fbrces, at which point the President of A.C.P.O. would be able to direct Chief Officers to provide aid. These powers have never been invoked. Scanned by CamScanner