3. I TIA ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS OF ENGLAND, WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND A PAPER TO THE A.C.P.O. COUNCIL ON POLICING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS DISPUTE 1984/85 Scanned by CamScanner REVIEH THE FILICIIG OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF HINEHORKERS DISPUTE 1984/85 MERE. FORMED THE COMMITTEE Hall, Esq.,' (BE QPH Chief Constable Chairman Hunberside Police Helechlan, Esq., (BE QPH MA LLB Chief Constable Pre51dent of ACPO Nottinghamshire Constabulary 3_BaileY:. (BE 0PM Chief Constable Vice President of ACPO Northunbria Police Buck, Esq., (BE QPM Chief Constable Northamptonshire Constabulary Birch, Esq., QPM Chief Constable Sussex Police Bunyard, Esq., QPM - Chief Constable Essex Police Imbert, 0PM Deputy Commissioner Metropolitan Police Kelly, Esq., QPH DL LLB Chief Constable Staffordshire Police Nobes, Esq., Chief Constable North Yorkshire Police Payne, QPH DL Chief Constable Cleveland Constabulary Wright, Esq., (BE Chief Constable South Yorkshire Police A Par-keg, Egg? PBE BA Superintendents Association Curtis, ?811., BEM Police Federation Scanned by CamScanner INTROIIJ The National Union of Mineworkers dispute 19811/85 was one of the longest and most bitter disputes of modern times. - The dispute it the coal mining industry and splintered communities which for generations had been renowned for their unity. In many ways, coal mining has long been an important barometer for gauging the statebf industrial relations in this country and, when disputes 000m": for testing the effectiveness of legislation designed to reduce the impact of conflict. For the police service, the NUM dispute prompted the largest combined operation in more than 150 years of professional pol icing. It must be said that often, those taking part in the dispute saw the use of violence as a tactical weapon. Vile forms of intimidation were common?place. Picketing activity frequently went far beyond peaceful persuasion and the actions of some pickets were outrageously criminal. Mass picketing was a frightening strategy more resembling the power of the mob than a means of enlisting industrial support. Massive amounts of damage were caused to NCB property often without regard to consequent effects upon safety. Attempts were made to impede whole communities from working, to frustrate industries unconnected with the strike, to hamper the operation of power stations, to stop the movement of coal and other materials. The dispute lasted 51 weeks and throughout the service coped magnificently. Those who had used lawlessness as a strategy were seen to have failed. The police service was obliged to respond to a very serious threat to law and order and to the rights of ordinary people to go about their lawful business, including the right of those on strike to engage in peaceful picketing. The dispute fell into three main overlapping phases. First there was the attempt to 'picket out' the working miners, particularly in Nottinghanshire, by mass picketing, demonstration and intimidation. Assemblies of thousands of pickets were not unconmon: sane ten thousand were at Harworth on 2nd May 1984. For a considerable period something over seven thousand officers were deployed on mutual aid throughout England and Wales. A notable feature of the pol ice response was the use of common law powers to stop vehicles carrying pickets into relevant areas. This was done in order to prevent breaches of the peace. The Attourney General said in a statement that there was no doubt that a constable had these powers, and the action of the chief constable of Nottinghamshire in turning back would-be pickets when a breach of the peace was J'mninent was subsequently upheld by theDivisional Court. The second phase was the attempt to stop supplies reaching steelworks. Convoys of lorries taking coke Port Talbot to Llanwern were attacked despite being under heavy police escort. But the most serious disorders were at the Orgreave Coking Plant in South Yorkshire, in May and June 1981!. Scanned by CamScanner On_1$th June, for example, some 10,000 people assembled in order to stoP the British Steel Corporation moving coke fran the plant. The disorder lasted for several hours, during which time large nunbers of missiles were thrown at the police, vehicles and a barricade were set on fire. To deal With the VlPlence 1t was necessary to use mounted officers and officers equipped With 5h1E1d3 and Protective helmets. Ninety three arrests were made at Orgreave that day and 28 POlice officers were injured. Every lorry 103d 0f COke was able to leave the Plant and the convoys reached their destinations safely. The third Phase began in November 1984 when some miners returned to work at collieries which had been, until then, strike-bound. The main centres of violence were in Yorkshire, Northumberland and Durham, and to a lesser extent in South Wales. On 30th November, a taxi driver taking a miner to work at Vale Colliery was killed when a piece of concrete was dropped onto his car fran a motonway bridge. ThFPUBhout the dispute thereivere numerous attacks upon and intimidation against working miners and their families at their homes and elsewhere. There were cases of arson and criminal damage at NCB premises and at the Premises of hauliers and coach Operators who were carrying supplies or taking miners to work. The number of police officers in England and Wales injured in this disPUte was 1,390. 9,808 people were arrested. Two factors in particular enabled the police to make an effective response to the challenge presented by the dispute. First, the NRC. Second, the tactical. planning and training which had taken place following the inner city riots of 1981. The dispute showed that the policewwere now prepared much better in equipment, in tactics and in the ability t0\vork together. It was notable that despite scenes such as those at Orgreave the police were able to cope without resort to methods such as the use of CS smoke. Defensive equipnent such as shields and protective helmets proved of great importancepolice horses. It is unlikely that any other police force in Europe would have been able to cope with such disorders without resort to more aggressive methods, the use of which would undoubtedly have inflamed the situation furthen The success of the mutual aid arrangements showed that 43 forces could conbine effectively in any part of the country without need for a third tier force. It also provided a powerful argunent against any perceived need for a national police service. Full records, on a day by day basis, have been compiled and are filed with the General Secretary of Those files contain the daily disposition of FBU's and a full statistical analysis of all relevant information gathered by the National Reporting Centre. Ordinary policing throughout the country naturally suffered, though it is not possible to say what effect, if any, the dispute had on national crime figures. The financial consequences were severe, despite the unprecedented scale of central Government assistance. The dispute placed many additional demands upon forces because of the requiranent to provide mutual aid over such a pmotracted period. There was increased stress and welfare implications for those officers left in-force due to the additional workload and the necessity to work extended tours of duty. Scanned by CamScanncr .-- 'Illk I'll To ensure that the service has identified the lessons of the dispute, 3 Review has been undertaken to re evaluate current national guidance, t0_se? how it fared and to spot whether changes are needed. Spotting short-comings is, of course, always so much more an exact science when one has the beDEflt and wisdom of hindsight Whilst ACPO has undertaken the leading role in the Review, both the SuPerintendents'Association and Federation have participated. Because this Review has focused mainly upon the adequacy of current national gu1dance, many consequential issues have not received the consideration which they deserve, not least those issues dealing with welfare and stress However, they have not been lost but.have been passed to the President of ACPO for separate consideration at a later date. It is anticipated that his examination of these matters will cover the welfare and stress related problems of those officers performing both mutual aid duty and general policing. It behoves me to say that it is well recognised that such consequential issues must be dealt with both expeditiously and through consultation if we are to give heed to the gratitude we feel to those officers who policed the strike. COHBAIING DISORDER Responsibility for the operational effectiveness of the police and the particular methods to be used to cxmbat public disorder is shared between the Hone Secretary, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Service itself) But the police officer responsible for authorising particular tactics on the day carries on his shoulders the legal implications of his actions Throughout the 1970's many challenges were made upon the service to cope with increasing lawlessness stemming fran marches, demonstrations, community tensions and industrial disputes Looking back only a decade or so, one cannot help but be impressed that policing demonstrations, marches and industrial disputes was not usually a matter likely to cause gross public disorder. More often the pattern was that those denonstrating pushed and the police line held; or they sat down and the police removed them; or pickets and policemen got wet and both sought shelter together in the same makeshift hut. Policing tactics were mainly empirical and usually ad [ms The perception was that the public were satisfied with these policing methods, particularly when they saw on their television screens our European counterparts resorting to tear gas, water cannon and protective equipnent to cope with similar situations. But if we were snug, the early 1980.5 quickly awakened us from any complacency because of the disorders at Grunwick, Bristol, Brixton, Toxteth, Warrington and other inner-city areas. New strategies and new tactics had to be devised. Mutual aid had to be given new impetus. Protective equipnent was needed and training for our officers was vital. Although our planning was mainly directed at dealing with street disorders of relatively short duration, the need for flexibility and adaptation was a strong feature of national contingency plans. The street disorders of 1981 were the catalyst for a new approach to policing disorder, not any desire on the part of the police service to change its methods and its philosophy. Scanned by CamScanner our response to the 1981 street disorders the service 3'83 trwusoouzsiy conscious of the amp; it taking and the implirztiue of the new planning measures. The aervioe is always conscious of 1-53 critics and, perhaps more Important?, conga-1043 of the need not to erode its ability 190 901 o; ?911: gel Loire o] oonx-nt is a partnership and it must be our ability to maintain order on the streets t?nat assumes ascendency. Gwerrment, of course, has a large responsioil ity for yer/entire, its Part in shaping the climate for fboiety. It must also support those who enforce the 1am and ermxe that aypropriam penalties exist for law breakers. Local authorities, tor-oar}. ocmrzitteea, have a zey {motion in neirmainirg poolio trarqaillity wrong. one: social $111183 and 83': efficient and effective pol ice service. Too often during the ill?! displte 31.11% local police autnwitie: were in the verge?? 5f high-J women-e: rebuffs of their Chief unstable: unit-r. "nave ?oaol? impaired operational effectiveness. K. The tactics adopted by the palioe service the SUV. dispute were no more than an extension of the response that had been used Corina the 198? street dimrders. Chief Dansta'oLea Used many different strategies The adoption of oifiering strategies in differen- f? roe area: reiLec-teo the different sitaation in each of those areas. 1' logistics, the tactics {except in relation to :o-or.aay itero-eption, and the activation of the REC had all been wed before, only the scale was different and it needed to be. However, it was all geared to the same end - the maintereme of lau and order. It did not signify an irrevocable change in me nature of tre philosophy of policing by consent. That our pl ans, only drawn up in 1982, for deal irg wits disorder should have been tested so thoroughly and arduously so soon after their introduction is surely a terrible indictment of the times in union we serve. Yet it provides poverfu'l prmf, if it were moessarj, of toe tranendous twden of responsibility carried 57 the police service for preserving democratic freedoms. mama! this Reviaa nae been mdertaken by a umber of Study Groups supervised by 3 Steering Committee. Eacr. Study Group was invited to researon a particular topic and prepare awrowiate reoomexxiations. 1111:: paper is therefore the eanweite of indings and recallendations by those Study Groups. The topics identified for rev iew Here:- Tne Rational Reporting Centre Pix-.21 Logistics Tactical Options and Hammad: Transport Ummioations Training Intelligence/Media Relations Financial Implications The constitutional Position of the Chief Constable Scanned by CamScanner THE NBC The NRC was the major influencing factor for providing an effeCtiVe 00? ordination of police resources into those areas where disorder was likely. Every force in the country at some time during the dispute provided officers for mutual aid. At no time did the Centre do more than receive requests for manpower from forces experiencing problems and forward those requests to forces best able to volunteer manpower. The NRC was not, and could never be, a de facto control centre. It has no capacity to exercise operational control. The Study Group report declares that such a co-ordinating centre is necessary in times of heavy and widespread demand for resources of manpower and equipment. The Centre was able to achieve its objective, despite enormous pressures, but the secrecy which previously shrouded the Centre contributed to a common failure by persons outside the service to comprehend its true role. The Study Group make the following principal recommendations:- - That a co-ordinating centre is vital in times of heavy and widespread demands for police resources - The siting of the centre should remain in the Capital and should be linked to the accommodation provided for the General Secretary of ACPO. Ideally the accommodation should be away from New Scotland Yard albeit the practicalities of such a change are recognised. That the President should retain overall responsibility for the centre but a designated officer of deputy chief constable rank should have day to day charge. The staffing structures and job descriptions for the Centre should be revised - It is not viewed as necessary for the Centre to be heavily canputerised. - That the title of the Centre should henceforth be the Mutual Aid Co? ordination Centre (MACCL MUTUAL AID The abil.ity of forces to aid each other after maximising the use of their own officers was the cornerstone of the police operation in response to the NUM Dispute. However, the resounding success of the mutual aid arrangements should not necessarily be interpreted as implying that the service has sufficient manpower to respond to almost any disorder that may occur in the future. The principal recommendations of the Study Group are:- - That the criterion for mutual aid should remain 1 PSU for every 200 officers of force establishment. Scanned by CamScanner Ihtaaitdthe existing arrangements for the Hetropol itan Pol ice should 5 . That the complenent of a PSU should remain 1 inSpector, 2 sergeants and 20 constables. That forces should comply with present guidelines regarding drivers for PSU's being additional to PSU strength- All PSU's supplied on mutual aid should comprise officers trained to a_ccnmon minimun standard and equipped (where necessary) to a cannon minimun level. That the provision of liaison/wel fare officers should be structured- That administrative and specialist personnel should be treated as a separate mutual aid resource. ARRMBEIENTS The sheer scale of the mutual aid commitment resulted in many forces finding difficulty in dealing with the arrangements to provide accommodation and other logistical factors during the early stages of the dispute- Of particular significance under this heading has been the part played by other pol ice staff associations in the formulation of recommendations to the relevant Study Group. The Study Group make the following principal recoumendations:? Forces should seek to identify premises which could be used to accommodate large numbers of PSU's and regularly review their suitability. That forces? contingency plans should contain detailed planning measures covering a wide range of logistical factors and requirements. - When faced with an incident which requires massive mutual aid forces should seek to establish a dedicated incident/logistic control centre. TALTICAL OPTIONS AND EQUIPFENT The service has, over the past 5 years, developed a range of tactical options which seek to identify appropriate responses to different categories of disorder. The full range of options is considerable but a select few have been promulgated through training packages. Some of those tactics, and developments of them, were used by forces during the MJM Dispute. Concern has been expressed that the Manual setting out the full range of tactical options is restricted to ACPO ranks only. The reasons for this restriction are that when the manual was prepared it was intended as a basis for ccmpiling future training programmes. It was acknowledged that only a Scanned by CamScanner limited nunber of options would be selected albeit a greater range would be researched Wider circulation of the manual was therefore likely to lead to confusion and militate against the goal of achieving common minimum standards. Another reason for restricting the Manual was sensitivity. Clearly the service should have a Manual setting out a full range of tactical options capable of countering all levels of public disorder. However, those options for dealing with the worst possible scenarios should not be freely available within the service lest their promulgation be misunderstood. The production of the mini Manual, which will be more widely distributed, will to a large extent, remove the present anomoly. At the present time the service has two principal publications providing gUidance on public order. These are of course the Tactical Options Manual and the Notes for Guidance for Senior Officers Manual. Perhaps it is time that these two manuals were combined to form one reference document. The mini manual could then contain a much broader range'of information and rancve sane of the confusion. The Principal recommendations of the Study Group reviewing tactics and eQUipment are as follows:? - Minor amendments to certain tactical options on the basis of practical experience. That tactical options be evaluated in relation to bl ockading of motorways and anbushing of vehicles. - That the detailed role of CID officers in public disorder be drawn up. - Improving and standardising protective equipment. TRANSPORT The NUM Dispute highlighted a need for the service to have access to adequate transportation if mutual aid is to achieve its objective. Much work still remains and the Traffic Committee, in conjunction with other committees, will need to give further consideration to drawing up a detailed specification for a standard personnel carrier once the recommendations are agreed. The principal recomendations of the Study Group are:? That a comnon personnel carrier be adopted. - That hired vehicles should not be used in an operational environment. Forces should have sufficient personnel carriers for the whole of their aid conmitment. (DWNICATIONS Generally, force communication systems coped reasonably well with the additional demands of the dispute, bearing in mind the scale of the Scanned by CamScanner incident. Some aspects of providing adequate communication facilities imposed considerable additional pressure upon the Directorate of Telecommunications and communications staff in forces. Predictably, the lack of eqU1pment and compatibility were the chief problems. The principal recomnendations of the Study Group are:- The adoption of a national emergency channel for UHF radio communication. That the 99 channel UHF radio becomes general issue. That,many aSpects of police communications require further examination by the Directorate of Telecommunications and the ACPO Council Conmunications Committee in the light of experiences during the dispute. That a system of mutual aid call signs be established. TRAINIMS Despite the extent of training that has been introduced post 1981 at both force and regional level, it remains apparent that many officers lacked any training in PSU procedures. The main recommendations of the Study Group are:? That all officers receive tactical training to a common minimum standard. That PSU officers receive training every six months. - That regular inter-force training exercises take place. It is implicit in the training programmes which the Association has compiled that forces must not allow middle ranked officers to change nationally agreed policy. In the past, the effect of such changes has been dramatically to lessen the achievement of corrmon standards. Should feedback from forces indicate that changes to training programmes are appropriate, the Training Committee will undertake the necessary evaluative work. RELATIONS The work of this Study Group is continuing and will not be completed for some time. Once the Group has completed its task, any recommendations it makes will be linked to this Review, particularly insofar as they may affect public order issues. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS The ability of the service to respond to disorder must ultimately depend upon adequate financial provision. This may be a statement of the obvious but in the early stages of the NUM Dispute the means by which the service was to obtain the appropriate funding was far from cl ear. Indeed the whole operation could have been compromised Scanned by CamScanner mm it. not been for the Hunt: :wxetarv'r. a1 ear abutment waning 5?prth in Lemma. Ml lowinv, the '11 min/m: mun! minim: ntrau?e 'urcer. n2: Ltd/:5? 55?: rat-r1 3th to tar 1m}: {1'2 1513. 226: officer; 6?4; Amer-t arm: norm/nimntlal mum. 'lhere 1r. arr-2m? ailj?z?i stamam marge f? or tor the um: a! ?Ihhialht and manner); aim-stun drier. gust ?5 rent? led. d? 7W: mimiwl reunmermtirmr. of the mm, Group are;- I - 'Ihat maerument we introduced ?ction 31 of we Emit-e Act Immre mt: avaiiatil ity of lunar; 1r. timer. ct retione'. merge-m1. (3 C3 ?3 'I?nat mum?. in a: 33.44.93; air; be read inec 2-052 toe Line: mm 1 ma.- e, specie; am . era}: me. e. - That there be a mtione. wander!) (marge for a WTM (f THE (1119' mm This a most autpiez topic am in tne peat per-nap: ever, .290 has been rel miarrt to 101?}: itz 718.4 cuzriy on mart] diff'iwit wastitxtiorel issues which could summarize a Chief ?ifficerz' operational Ir! fectivemm. A Star; 6er ha; therefore tackled taiz eztreaeiy vexed subject and their repart hitml izht: the current 411m 1 arr: of km.- '1 1?14 met toe meme of tai: reg/th 3r." mic be considered 01 ie President, (heimer. of (Anzac-ii 'mitbeet; em HMCIC, as a first stage. This rev iew he: been tne third occazion it. tne peat five years tnat I, rmaiman of tne ACES ?Amen ?Jenerai Purposes Camittee, nave beer. asked to near: a review of the zerv ice'n effectivenezz to respond to za?or order issues. All that I have nears and learnt while mdertaking the task: has led me to feel satisfied tnat the polite service can be justifiably proud of its reapome to me um: bizpute. He were required to perform a com-U31 and transient ape-ration with little advance warning and the service coped Where this Review has led to rmtims being made to current retionai adder/x, the] would be seen in the 113m of uprovanents or fire Maire 513196?. Most certainly, it is not the case that who; ezaie reunion i: necessary. Lair?: were use against tale of our officers and against the pol icing [had] adopted in some geographical areas. It has not been the purpose of lea ix; reds-ea: maze explains or to justify any particular police tiers. neither naz it been our purpose to consent upon particular 31mm) ,3 ?some. 27/ mic! unstable; ibuevw, I hope I have given sane ?canned by CamScanner (Show? reasons the service needing to reapond in the way that did and pr dlot that it deserves for the job it perfumed. All Cm?, constables handled a delicate situat . - balance. ion sensitively and professionally, rhtuininp, ?It the use Of' force and those reccmnendations which will require the not! - pUrchase more protective equipment, give more training, etc., 11m" is changed regarding the concept; which has always been at the heart 01 ?.19 Bums? Policing model the concept 01? policing by consent. The to use only the minimun force necessary for maintaining law and or d6]. 15 Imposed on the service by the law as well as by its traditions. unnecessary force was the antithesis of what the service was in the coal- Iiclds to achieve. There is no desire on the part of chief constables to have the qapacity ?00 Suppress the freedom to peacefully demonstrate or to unnecessarily adopt tactics out of keeping with our traditions. One of the conclusions of my last review of public order following the smmer disorders of 1981 was to outline a need for a central advisory b0d3?, comprising. pol ice officers, to evaluate, on behalf of the service, ci operational planning, equipment, guidance etc., and generally 80*: 53 a clearing?house' for provincial forces on the public order scene. That conclus1on was endorsed and the Forward Planning Unit was established. I also recommended that this unit should be headed by a provincial oificer 0f ACPO rank, possibly an assistant chief constable. ?Ihat reconmendation has not, so far, been taken up. The role of such an officer should be two fold; to cc-ordinate all aspects of above force level planning for public disorder in conjunction with ACPO Council Committees, particularly the Public Order Sub-Committee, and, secondly, to head the Forward Planning Unit. i believe it essential that the nettle of central co-ordination be grasped if M3 forces are to bring consistency to their operational contingency plans. Hard pressed assistant chief constables (ops) should have the benefit of some agency at the Centre to whom they can turn as a point of reference for advice and assistance on all matters affecting public order planning. Putting aside financial and political factors, [am satisfied that improvements to existing operational plans can be introduced but consistency demands suchaico?ordinating officer supported by a properly structured and staffed office. Finally, I would reiterate my comment under the Tactical Options heading that the present situation whereby the service has two separate manuals dealing with public order guidance be remedied by both publications being combined. A mini manual should then be prepared dealing with all major aspects of ACPO guidance on public order for general issue to inspector rank and abov e. Mav I close by taking this opportunity to thank all those who have participated in this Review, particularly those outside the service and the members of other pol ice staff associations. 1) Hall Esq, (BE, 0PM thy-Jinnah Scanned by CamScanner BRIE (F 111E KLICDB THE NATIUIAL UNION OF HINEHORKEIB DISPUTE 1984/35 NATIONAL REPORTDB (INTER HEIBERSIIP OF THE STUDY Hall, Esq., A Sloan, Bennion 03E, QPM, Chief Constable, Hunberside Police (Chainnan) Esq., QPM, BA, Chief Constable, Bedfordshire Police Esq? Baputy Chief Constable, Hertfordshire Constabulary Evans, Esq., LLB, Deputy Chief Constable, Surrey Constabulary Forder, Esq., Deputy Chief Constable, Northamptonshire Police Goslin, Esq., Deputy Chief Constable, Cambridgeshire Constabulary (Secretary) Hall, Esq., Deputy Chief Constable, Norfolk Constabulary Kitson, Esq., Deputy Chief Constable, Suffolk Constabulary Smith, Esq., Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police Stone, Esq., QPM, Deputy Chief Constable, Essex Police I Carson, Esq., Commander, Metropolitan Police TERHS OF REFERENCE To review the facilities, staffing, role and function of the NRC. INTROIIJ Cl' ION 1.1.1 The National Reporting Centre is a temporary communications facility at New Scotland Yard. Its essential purpose is, when necessary, to assist in giving practical effect to arrangements authorised by section 111 of the Police Act, 19611. 1.1.2 Subsection (1) of section 111 provides that "the chief officer of police of any police force may, on the application of the chief officer of pol ice of any other pol ice force, provide constables or other assistance for the purpose of enabling the other force to meet any special demand on its resources". 1.1.3 Subsection (2) of section 111 provides a reserve power for the Home Secretary to direct one chief officer to assist another, where satisfactory arrangements under subsection (1) cannot be made, or cannot be made in time. There is no record of any direction under subsection (2) having been made. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE CENTRE 1.2.1 The terms of reference for the Centre are: the arrangement of mutual aid; Scanned by CamScanner the collation and dissemination of information; (111) the provision of information to the Hcme Secretary. 1.2.2 The Centre is activated by the President of ACPO, in consultation with colleagues and the Bone Office. 1.2.3 At all times, mutual aid officers are under the control. of the chief officer of the area being aided, and he remains operationally independent. The Centre has no power to order pol ice of?cer?s '00 move one police area to another. ISTORY 1-3.1 Following the threat of national disruption by tanker drivers and the National Union of Mineworkers in 1972, it was agreed to prepare a National Co?ordinating Centre for police resources. The activities of persons involved in that particular dispute are now mostly remembered by occurrences at the Saltley C081 13813013- 1-32 The first activation of this dormant facility was on 10th February 1974, for the NUM Dispute with the Heath Government. The Centre remained open for almost four weeks, closing on 7th March 19711. The heavy picketing which took place was, on reflection, relatively peaceful and the Centre performed only a monitoring function during this period of activation. 1-3.3 Between 21st October 1980 and 27th February 1981 the Centre acted as a National Information Centre, co?ordinating information to help chief officers of pol ice make the best use of accommodation for prisoners excluded from Prison Department establishments by the industrial action by the Prison Officers' Association. 1.3.11 Between 6th July and 19th August 1981, the Centre co?ordinated the responses to requests from chief officers for assistance from their colleagues in policing the civil disturbances of that summer. It remained open on a monitoring basis until 31st August. 1.3.5 Between 27th May and 2nd June .1982, the Centre helped to co- ordinate mutual aid between forces, for the Pope's visit. LOCATION AND STAFF 1.9.1 The reasons for locating the Centre at New Scotland Yard are that accommodation is available; there is ready access to good communications facilities; suitable staff are available and there is immediate access to the Home Office and vice versa. 1.11.2 The President of ACPO has control of the Centre officio. During the NUM Dispute he has been assisted from time to time by ACPO colleagues and HM Inspectors of Constabulary: the Inspectorate being able to offer advice about regional circumstances. During the daytime, the senior officers had the help at the Centre of eight police officers and mo civilian staff. Overnight, the staffing was at a lower level. Scanned by CamScanner 1.11.3 No annual costing of the Centre is currently available. The physical resources which are provided at New Scotland Yard are used for other purposes when the Centre is not in operation. Staffing the Centre is part of the ordinary duties of those concerned and their salaries are met in the usual way. INFORMATION AND SITUATIW REPORTS 1.5.1 To operate efficiently, the Centre receives information daily from chief officers to establish a broad picture of the operational situation, together with detailed analysis of individual force camnitnents and the availability of mutual aid. 1.5.2 During the recent activation, each chief officer provided a daily report on the general situation in his area and details of the number, capability, availability and commitment of his manpower resources. With this information, the Centre can help chief officers who require mutual aid to define their requests against known national availability, and provide the same picture to supplying forces, liaising between the two. 1.5.3 Information from the daily reports is provided to the Home Secretary, in the same way that he receives reports from individual chief officers to assist him in discharging his responsibilities for law and order, including his responsibility to report, and answer, to Parliament. RCLE OF THE NRC 1.6.1 Responses from Forces and the experiences of the Study Group members, all of whom saw duty in the Centre, indicate that the mutual aid co?ordinating role of the NRC was, and remains, the primary reason for its activation. The arrangements made through the Centre were thought to be adequate, both in terms of obtaining the requisite aid to Forces and for bringing equity to manpower arrangements Service wide. This former objective was sometimes achieved through redeployment of officers already on mutual aid to other forces without, in any way, eroding the operational autonomy of Chief Constables. 1.6.2 The Centre's role and capacity in relation to processing information for the purpose of assisting the police in preventive operations was never more than elementary. The nature of information received at the Centre was seldom capable of interpretation as hard intelligence and in September a specialist intelligence unit at Leicester was established. There was, however, receipt of general information at the NRC, such as the likely day to day targets for mobile pickets. In the main such information had already been transmitted to those forces likely to be affected but the Centre was able to act as a useful back-up. Advance knowledge of the movement of pickets also provided for the staff of the Centre to be prepared for urgent requests for aid through redepl oyment. 1 6 3 In the future the range of intelligence information, if any, to be . - held within the Centre will be dependent upon the result of the Scanned by CamScanner 1.6.5 work of the Intelligence Study Group. The supply Of information to and liaison with Home Office officials was one of the few aspects of the NRC's role which was questioned by scme forces. It should be made perfectly clear that the Study Group considers the supply of factual information to: and liaison with, such officials to be wholly legitimate and a function of the Centre. There is no cause for criticism from this aspect of the NRC's Operations. We consider that such liaison underlines the accountability of the Home Secretary to Parliament and the accountability of the service as identified in section 30 (1) 0f the Police Act 196?. OF THE CENTRE 1.7.1 1.7.3 The role of the NRC was frequently and by a range of commentators described as a National Control Centre giving directions to forces. The true role of the Centre was declared many times and should have been sufficient to dispel any misinterpretation. T?ne Presidents of ACPO, whilst responsible for the Centre, operated an open door DOlicy to political representatives and the media. The representatives of 13.40 major opposition parties availed themselves of the opportunity to visit the Centre and a nunber of visits were made by the media. It is heped that in future activations the President of the day may feel able to adopt a similar policy and thereby increase understanding and appreciation of the Centre's true role. This Study Group considers that the service was to some extent a victim of the unnecessary secrecy which previously shrouded the Centre. Any attempt to have maintained that secrecy, which would have been impossible, could have been damaging to the wider interests of the service. It must be recognised that the NRC needs no special lines of accountability. It is merely the agency through which requests for aid are made and responses co-ordinated. In fulfilling its function it is wholly dependant upon decisions taken by chief constables of requesting and providing forces. In all cases the accountability lies with individual chief constables either making the request or providing the mutual aid response. TITLE FOR CENTRE 1.8.1 The name 'National Reporting Centre' has two main defects: the 'National' aspect, although accurate, is open to an interpretation that it transcends the constitutional status of 143 separate forces. The word 'Reporting' reflects little of the Centres function and is so obscure as to invite misinterpretation. The need for a change of name has been reflected in a number of force responses and the Study Group have examined a variety of suggestions. The function of the Centre, it is considered, is best identified by the title Mutual Aid Co-ordination Centre (MACC). we therefore RECOMMEND that the title for the Centre should be changed Scanned by CamScanner accordingly. FOR THE CDITRE - 1.9.1 The staffing level of the NRC is accepted as being correct but the command and control arrangement, devised on the basis of the former Metropol itan Police Special Operations Room, is no longer seen as appropriate. 1.9.2 A permanent involvement by Home Office officials and the Inspectorate in the staffing of the NRC was found to be unnecessary. They have a proper function in relation to the activities of the Centre but the Study Group feel that we must leave it to than to decide whether their responsibilities are best served by maintaining a permanent presence in the Centre. 1-9.3 The President of ACPO has many and varied commitments. These commitments are considerably increased when the NRC is activated. During the NUM Dispute it was impossible for the President to maintain a day to day command of the Centre by his presence. For this reason a number of deputy chief constables were asked to assume responsibility on a daily basis. Although the frequency of the duties allowed those deputy chief constables to attain some familiarity with the task, the rapid changes in the demands of the dispute made the lack of continuity a problem. While the President of ACPO must retain overall responsibility for the NRC, his permanent presence in the Centre is not seen as necessary. Day to day responsibility for running the Centre should be vested in an officer of lower rank, and that of deputy chief constable appears best to meet this requirement. We see the designation of such a post as that of Co-ordinator. 1.9.5 We therefore RECOMMEND that the President retain overall responsibility for the Centre but the day by day responsibility should be allocated to a designated officer, called the Co- ordinator, who should be of deputy chief constable rank. PROJINCIAL STAFF 1.10.1 Provincial officers performed duties in the NRC throughout the NUM Dispute in the capacities of staff officer to the President and assistant staff officer. They were of superintendent and chief inspector rank. The staff officer and his assistant between them ensured continuity and provincial force experience, not necessarily available to the Metropolitan Police. This coupled with the problems experienced by the Metropolitan Police in filling the controllers position, makes the revision of structure important. A provincial superintendent of suitable experience appears best to fit the role of deputy co?ordinator. The role of staff officer is appropriate to the provincial chief inspector. 1.10.2 We therefore RECOMMEND that a provincial superintendent undertakes the position of Deputy Co?ordinator and a provincial chief inspector the role of Staff Officer. . scanned by CamScanner STAFF 1.11.1 1.11.2 The Study Group would wish to place on record the tremendous assistance given by the Metropolitan Police for the successful operation of the NRC. Throughout the dispute the Metropolitan Police maintained a full commitment to the Centre in the best traditions of the service. The Study Group have considered the duties of all the positions within the NRC and it is apparent that sane changes are approprlate to take account of factors which emerged after this thorough testing. Our RECOMMENDED job descriptions for all 1305135 ?mlAppendix PEDIA RELATIONS 1.12.1 1.12.2 There was no designated post for a press officer within the NRC structure and the role was assuned by the staff officer. The Study Group consider that this should be rectified for the future. An officer, either police or civilian, from Department or from a provincial force, should be allocated the role. The indiv1dual would best work with the information officer as a team responsible to the co-ordinator and his deputy. We therefore RECOMMEND that additional to the staffing structures the post of Press Officer is created for the Centre. LIAISON OFFICER 1.13.1 1.13.2 1.13.3 It was apparent to the Study Group that the provision of designated liaison officers in all forces, and later of information officers in those forces affected by the dispute, was extremely useful in terms of continuity and effective communication The Study Group consider that forces may wish to examine the merits of providing permanent liaison officers when reviewing their in- force arrangements for future mutual aid requirements where the NRC is activated. It is apparent to the Study Group that there can be Occasions were the service would benefit through close liaison with non Home Office Police Forces. We are conscious that such liaison must be undertaken centrally and we are of the view that the National Reporting Centre should be the point of reference for such liaison. We RECOMMEND accordingly. FACILITIES -- 1.14.1 The accommodation provided for the NRC in rooms 1309 and 1310 of New Scotland Yard must be viewed as totally inadequate when one considers the importance and circumstances of the task being undertaken. This should not be taken as a criticism of the Metropolitan Police as full consultations were held before this accommodation was given over to the NRC in 1982 and only the benefit of hindsight now makes this criticism val id. Scanned by CamScanner 1.114.? The provision of room 1311 as an office for the Presidentfn :ztaf'f assisted on those occasions where separation from the Centre 3 main room was necessary. Hmever, other aspects of" the Centre's functioning had to be carried out in a small room amongst stored property. 1-1?4-3 There have been a number of comments regarding the siting of the NRC at New Scotland Yard. Sane forces have suggested that the WC should be away from the capital, whereas others believe that an alternative building in London would remove some of the sensitivity. The Study Group has discussed the possibilities, and on balance, consider that the NRC should continue to be based Within the capital, not least because of staff and accommodation availability. A150, the significance of the Hone Secretary as the Police Authority for the Metropolitan area has obvious advantages. Siting the Centre in any other force area could promote additional problems and political pressures at a time when a situation may already be sensitive. The General Secretary of ACPO already has within the Metropolitan Police building and the Study Group considers that the NRC should be combined with the ACPO suite. The purpose is not to provide a permanent NRC but to emance the availability of office and staff provisions in the event of future activations. If this canbined facility could be housed in a Metropolitan Police building within Central London, but other than New Scotland Yard, then it would seem ideal. 1.1145 We therefore RECOMMEND accordingly and trust that the Cmmissioner can be sympathetic to this request. EQUIPMENT - ISATION 1.15.1 The full spectrun of computerisation of the NRC functions has been considered by the Study Group. We do not see a need for extensive computerisation of the Centre at this time, although we recognise that future changes in technology may make computerisation appropriate. Limited computer input is, hmever, desirable and it is considered that the basic ecmputer equipment introduced during the dispute should be available from the commencement of any future activation of the NRC. The canputer should be utilised for functions, such as storage of statistical information but wall charts should remain the key display mediun. We therefore RECOMMEND accordingly. 1.15.2 The loan of a word processor Cambridgeshire Constabulary was a distinct assistance to the speedy canpletion of often canplex and detailed reports. 1.15.3 The message witch terminal also provided valuable assistance in monitoring aid availability and hard copy cmmunication between the Centre and forces. Scanned by CamScanner 1.15.? We therefore BECOHHEID that in future the 6141.313? the Centre includes the provision of a word processor an: qual ified staff to ope-ram the machine. he also BECDHHEID that we message snitch terminal should retain. (DWNICATIOI 1-16-1 The Wovision of a PRC terminal at the Centre has teen consmerec by the Study Group and is viewed as unnecessar?j- 35-39? certain circunstames the imlusion of a Edi?; terminal in the Centre 2.35:? be counter-proouctive to the wider interests of PM) philosopny' relative to public support for We remark. All verbal contact tetyeen the Centre and forces was 5* Open British Telecom lines. At only are stage did this .1 9561?? Problem - in Kent where it was thought ans 3 conf identiality may have occurred. The simple ex requiring return calls was adopted and no indication of arr} message to or from the 36.5.5 hav ing ?leaked". event of a need to use secure telephone lines, these Her elsewhere in the building. The Terr] Report recommend? secure line scramblers be available Hit?il?. the Centre and: although the need may be limited, the Study Group consider that at least one such line should be available in future. 'u'e RECOHHEND acoordi ngly . 1.16.3 The ?1 isual displays in the Centre were adapted as dictated with maps and deployment boards proving flexible to the prevailing requiranents. More permanent fixtures for these displays would have held some advantages and this prove possible in the event of the combining of the ACPC ano embryo 233C accorrmodation. With the advent of redeployment, some weeks into the dispute, the boards were revised to show availability and deployments. In future activations this capacity to alter the nature of the visual displays may again be an asset and there is no recarmendation for change at this time. 3'?le 1.17.1 The Study Group considers that there should be a manual setting out standing instructions and guidelines for NBC staff. We do not see such guidelines as being bulky or pedantic. They should be seen in the light of a useful aid to all staff working in the Centre and should set out job descriptions and a broad narrative of the Centres functions, role and method of operation. 1.17.2 We therefore BECOHHEID that the Forward Planning Unit of A8 (3) be tasked to prepare such standing instructions in liaison with A2 Branch. Scanned by CamScanner FUTUAL AID ARRANGEWENTS 1.18.1 1.18.2 1.18.3 TRAINING 1.19.1 1.19.2 1.19.3 The co-ordination of arrangements for mutual aid was, during the NUM activation, on an unprecedented scale. Precise details 0f availability with so many forces making requests, was often critical and it is essential that chief constables? estimates of the amount of aid they have available to be realistic. The requirements often to enter into negotiations with forces placed an unnecessary additional pressure upon the NRC staff and was extremely time consuning. In an effort to resolve this problem, and in liaison Mutual Aid Study Group, the format of the "Draftsman Comprise message has been amended. It is hoped that the revised coding Will allow forces to define more accurately the aid which they have available. The revised message format is at Appendix and we that this be taken into use. The considerable accumulation of reports and copy messages during the NUM Dispute activation has generated the question of filing. It is RECOMMENDED that all filing, following an activation, should be lodged with the General Secretary of ACPO. oomnams It is clearly impossible to predict future activations of the NRC as the range of possibilities defies description. It is therefore vital that an on?going programme of regular training exercises for the Centre be carried out. The identification and periodic training of a nucleus of officers to staff the Centre is essential and the recommendations of the Training Study Group should incorporate this feature. The requirement for training and potential attachments is as follows:? Provincial Officers:- 6 Deputy Chief Constables - Co-ordinators 10 Superintendents - Deputy Co?ordinators 10 Chief Inspectors - Staff Officers The Metropolitan Police commitment, with a view to achieving continuity in all positions in the Centre, is a minimun of:? 15 Chief Inspectors to provide (Ccmnunications Officer 15 Inspectors 211 hour (Aid Officer 15 Sergeants cover as: (Loggist 12 Inspectors Information Officers 12 Sergeants/Constables Canputer/ Telex Operators 12 Constables - Plotters 12 Typists (Civilian) - Word Processor Operators 12 Clerks (CO Grade) - Admin/Support During a prolonged activation these nunbers may prove inadequate but the need for continuity and the capacity to commence an scanned by CamScanner activation with personnel faniliar with their role is Vital. . In the event of more officers being required, the nucleus of trained officers and a suitable overlapping of attachments would prov1de the essential continuity. These figures can be related to structure and'duty cover by reference to Appendix "Command Structure" and Appendix "Shift Duty Rota". 1.19.11 Regular exercising of the Centre should be arranged through 118150n bemeen senior staff designated to perform duty ?1mm the Centre and the President. 1.19.5 Such liaison could be facilitated through the ACPO office but the appointment of a Principal Mutual Aid Co?ordinator (designate) may be of advantage. The nomination of a deputy chief constable to this office would provide a focal point to which succeSSNe Presidents could make reference when circunstances dictate that activation of the Centre be considered. The officer would also be able to ensure that the Centre was exercised in a manner relevant to'current public order demands. Without PFeJUdice to the training Study Group, we RECDHHEND accordingly. CONCLUSION 1.20.1 The performance of the NRC during the 19811/85 Dispute has generally received the approval of the service and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. It provided the necessary co?ordination for the movement of many thousands of officers between forces and was for much of the time the key clearing house for information. It achieved its function without encroaching upon the operational autonomy of the 113 separate forces. 1.20.2 The Spectre of a national police force, which it appears almost every agency wishes to resist, was exercised. If resistance to a national force remains in the future then the capacity to co- ordinate aid during this massive pol ice operation will support that resistance. It is impossible for the Study Group to predict whether there will be any future activation or what may be its cause. The Group and the service can remain optimistic, however, as to the ability of the Centre to service the needs of mutual aid. 1.20.3 The principal costs of the NRC have, during all its activations, been borne by the Metropolitan Police. In this latest activation the exceptions in terms of staff were the ACPO rank officers and the provincial superintendent and chief inspector. All equipment and facilities were supplied under the Receivers Budget, other than the word processor. The matter of funding remain unclear for the future and we RECOMMEND that this aspect be examined by the NRC Steering Committee. 1.20.11 The Study Group members, all of had personal involvement in the NRC, make their recommendations in the context of a successful activation. These recommendations are largely a formal isation of the informal and product of a long but effective period of activation. It is appropriate to reflect in this report our appreciation for the efforts of those officers of all ranks who worked in the Centre and to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for his co?operation. - Scanned by CamScanner 10 11 12 14 16 17 Job Descriptions That the posts identified in recannendations 6 to 8 above be as described at Appendix to this report Pedia Relations - Press Officer That a Press Officer be appointed for the Centre - drawn fran Metropolitan Department staff or a Provincial Force Liaison App A 1.12.2 1.13.3 That an outline liaison system be prepared with non-Hone Office police forces in appropriate circunstances Accmmodation That the Centre remain in London - preferably housed other than at New Scotland Yard and linked with the accmmodation of the General Secretary of ACPO Canputerisation That a limited capacity table top canputer facility be available from the first day of any future activation Word Processor/ Message Switch That a word processor and message switch terminalbe available from the first day of any future activation Secure Calmunications That at least one 'secure' telephone line be made available Standing Notes of Guidance That a brief docunent be prepared itemising essential information for the setting up and activation of the MACC 'Draftanan Canprise' That the standard format for the Draftsman Comprise message be amended in accordance with Appendix to this report 1.14.5 1.15.1 1.15.1; 1.16.2 1.17.2 1.18.2 App Scanned by CamScanner RENIEH 0F THEIPULICING ARRANGETENHS NATIONAL UNION 01" 11111310110115 DISPUTE 19W85 NRC RECDHIENDATIOB N0. RECO HHENDATION 11 Title for the Centre That the NRC be renamed the Mutual Aid Co?ordination Centre (MACC) 5 Staffing That the President of the ACPO retains responsibility for the Centre 6 That the day to day operations of the Centre be the responsibility of a Deputy Chief Constable to be known as the Mutual Aid Co?ordinator 7 Provincial Officers That a Superintendent a Provincial Force be in charge of the staff at the Centre and be known as the Deputy Co-ordinator (ii) That a Chief Inspector from a Provincial Force be the Staff Officer 8 . Hetropol itan Officers That a Chief Inspector be the Conmunications Officer (ii) That an Inspector be the Aid Officer That an Inspector be the Information Officer (iv) That a Sergeant be the Loggist That a Constable be the Plotter (vi) That a suitably trained Sergeant or Constable be the Computer/Telex Operator (vii) That a suitably qualified civilian typist be the Word Processor Operator That a civilian of C0 grade be the Admin/ Support Officer PARA 1.8.1 1.9.5 1.9.5 1.10.2 1.11.2 Scanncd by CamScanncr 1.20.5 As a footnote to our paper, the Study Group wish to point out that during our deliberations we have been mindful of the Centres possible role in a war duties situation. We believe that our reommendations, including staffing ratios, will have the potential to take on those limited functions which may be expected of the NRC in such circunstances. .-. Scanned by CamScanner 18 19 20 Film 1.18.3 Tnat all files, following an activation of the Centre, should be mder the control of the General Secretary of ACPO whim 1.19.5 'lhat designated staff as listed at paragraph 19.2 of this report be involved in frequent exercising of the Centres functions Fundirg 1.20.3 That the NRC Steering Ccmnittee examine the basis under which the Centre is funded Scanned by CamScanner Appendix JOB DBGIIPTIUIS - All) CENTRE Deputy Chief Constable (1) Direct responsibility to the President of ACPO for all functions of the MACC. (ii) Liaison with Chief Officers, Heme Office and Inspectorate. I Authorise all reports from the MACC to agencies outside the Service. DEPUTY - Superintendent Assune Co?ordinator's responsibilities in his absence. (ii) Supervise all functions of the MACC. Liaison with Operations Carmanders in Forces. (iv) Authorise all messages the MACC to Forces. STAFF OFFICER Chief Inspector Preparation of reports for the Co-ordinator. (ii) Maintenance of statistical information. Liaison with Metropolitan Police re personnel, facilities and equipment. (iv) Assu'ne the Deputy Co-ordinator's responsibilities in his absence or that of the Co?ordinator. OFFICER - Civilian Administrative and support duties as directed by the Staff Officer. wow) PROCESSOR OPERATOR Civilian Preparation of reports and forms as directed by the Staff Officer, INFORMATION OFFICER Inspector Collate Information Reports from Forces. 3.. Scanned by CainScanner (ii) Liaison with Force 3.3.3 and Intelligence Unit(s). Maintain up to date briefing folder for Co?ordinator. (iv) Assist Staff Officer in preparation of reportS. PRES OFFICER Advise Co?ordinator on all matters relating to the media. (ii) Liaison with Press Officers in Forces. Liaison with media representatives as directed by the Co?ordinator. (iv) Preparation of draft press releases. Monitor periodicals and newspapers. (vi) Preparation of daily synopsis of press coverage. (vii) Arrange press conferences and media visits to MACC. Constable (1) Maintain visual displays. (i i) Assi st Loggi st. OPERATOR - Sergeant/Constable Acknowledge incoming and despatch outgoing telex messages. (ii) Maintain 00mputerised record of all. MACC arrangements and Draftsman Canprise message information. Produce programmes and maintain records as directed by Staff Officer. COIMJNICATIONS OFFICER - Chief Inspector Responsibility to the Deputy Co-ordinator for all mutual aid arrangenents. (ii) Monitoring of aid availability/requests. Supervision of records and visual displays. Additional Night Duty: Determine need for call out referring to Deputy Co-ordinator. Briefing note for Co-ordinator. Scanned by CamScanner AID OFFICER - Inspector Liaise with Force Operations Departments regarding aid requests. (ii) Arrange mutual aid deployments. LOGGIST - Sergeant (1) Maintain records of all communications. (ii) Maintain files of aid deployments. Direct preparation of visual displays. Scanned by CamScanner CODE 1 3 5 8 9 9(3) 9(b) Appendix MUTUAL AID CENTRE DRAFTSHAN ODHPRISE MESSAGE FORMAT CONTENT Force nunber chenmm Force maximun PSU commitment available for mobilisation Total Within 2 hours of notice Within A hours of notice PSU's not available reason for non-availability PSU's cannitted to own Force PSU's already on mutual aid Force(s) to which cunnitted (by host Force nunber) PSU's received on aid Force(s) fran?which on aid (by supplying Force nunber) Information likely to effect PSU availability/demand Over next 2? hours Over any longer period Codes 10 Onwards Relate to Infonnation Covering the Previous 24 Hour Period 10 11 10(3) 10(b) 10(0) 11(3) 11(b) Arrests Nunber of arrests Cunulative total of arrests Nature of offences for which arrested Injuries to police officers Slight (requiring no more than initial casualty treatment) Serious (requiringlnore than initial casualty treabnent at a hospital) Scanned by CamScanner 1111-11- 11(0) 12 12(a) 12(b) 12(c) 13 1H 15 16 17 onwards Fatal Injuries to others Slight Serious) Nature of involvenent to be specified Fatal Damage brief account of extent and degree of damage Level of denonstrator activity (includes picketing) Total number in Force area Nunber of sites receiving attention (0) Number of demonstrators at principal site Location/identification of that site Mood at principal site (Peaceful/Hostile/Violent) Report on significant events since last report, each event commencing date/time/location Information - of movanents related to the activation - of events in the near future which may influence public order Available at the discretion of the OIC of MACC Scanned by CamScanner DQERIOFNT MUTUAL AID COORDINATING CENTRE - OFFICER 1N CHARGE Deputy Chu-f Constable DEPU Cl JIJHDINATUH Superintendent . INFORMATIIJN OFFICER OFFICER STAFF OFFICER Inspector Chief kmpector (:hief Inspector I I 1 PRESS OFFICER AID OFFICER LOGGIST WORD PROCESSOR Inspector ?Serqeant Civilian Civilian LIMMPUTERJTELEX Constable Constable \iqht Duty Strength Scanned by CamScanner WLLK FHU uLUx' I vuiy 5 ul quup buy al I (J Hum um! HUIiLiih"itvl'ml Duly d?l 8 pm am Group 5 Group a Group Normal Duty I aim 2 Normal Duty 8 am pm Ix: Group Ii pm Group (Jr-l 35 4-: pm Group Sandi; Uroup a Uruup Hui and Normal Hui); a 3 tEtM? and 11 4 4 Scanned by CamScanner RINIBI OF THE ARRMISEHENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEHORKERS DISPUTE 1984/85 FUTUAL AID MEMBERSHIP OF THE STUDY GRUJP Hall. Esq., cs5, 0PM, Chief Constable, Hunberside Police (Chairman) A Young, ESQ-, Cannander, Metropolitan Police (Secretary) Phillips, Esq., BA, Assistant Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police Smith, Esq., BA, Assistant Chief Constable, Cleveland Constabulary Evans, Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, West Midlands Police P-N Howse, Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Norfolk Constabulary A Coe, Esq., BA, Assistant Chief Constable, Kent Constabulary ReYnolds, Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Gloucestershire Constabulary Evans, Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, South Wales Constabulary TERMS OF REFERENCE To examine present criterion upon which forces base their aid commitment. INTRODUCTION 2.1.1 The Study Group took time to give detailed consideration to the responses from forces on this topic, received as a result of the circular letter sent out by the Steering Committee. Forces can be assured that every suggestion has been examined, including those dealing with legal and constitutional matters. 2.1.2 It is clear that the success oftnassivelnobilisations of police officers and their equipnent over the period of the NUM Dispute is acknowledged by forces. The basis of much of the organisation of Mutual Aid is the ACPO publication of January 1982 entitled "Public Order - General Guidance For Senior Police Officers% This report makes recommendations for some amendment to that docunent and also for its guidance to be more widely accepted. It was agreed that the ACPO publication had been seen to be generally valid despite the magnitude of the problems encountered during the dispute. The relevant Home Office Circulars dealing with mutual aid are 69/73 and 26/82. 2.1.3 The Study Group has been mindful that mutual aid is frequently used by forces in circunstances not linked to public disorder or Police Support Units. In its wider sense mutual aid is a tangible fact of the 43 separate forces combining as a service. we have been conscious of this factor throughout our deliberations and believe that our recommendations will not compromise the multifarious nature of mutual aid requests ?Scanned by CamScanner CRITERION FOR HITUAL AID COW 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 The criterion for force commitments to mutual aid was agr?eeg and promulgated through the 1982 Notes of Gu1dance. ad criterion is one Police Support Unit for every two hun re officers of force authorised establishment. In the case of til: Metropolitan Police, special agreement was made that wou provide a minimum of 22 PSU's immediately. at any we 3? regardless of other commitments. In practice, and some advance warning, the Metropolitan Police have the Capa01ty 3 provide many more than this basic commitment, as they demonstrate many times during the dispute. On occasions and even con51stently, some provincial forces found that they too were able to prov we more than their commitment. However, it was also the case that other forces found the national criterion a difficult burden. The initial quest by the Study- Group was therefore to re? examine the national criterion. Suggestions from forces varied enormously and various models were put forward of increased, decreased and graded commitments. Our conclusion was that the present criterion of one PSU for every two hundred officers. of force establishment holds the merits of familiarity and equality. None of the alternatives either suggested by forces, or created in discussion, held advantages and many produced complications which made them unattractive. The Study Group, therefore, RECOMMENDS that the present criterion should remain. Similarly, the special provisions for the Metropolitan Police should stand. Appendix of the January 1982 Notes of Guidance provides conprehensive tables of supplying forces for local aid agreements. Although only applicable in the very early stages of the NUM Dispute this Appendix has been examined. We see no reason for this Appendix to be amended. The arrangements, often utilised when time for planning for mutual aid is available, provide for forces experiencing problems to know to when they can turn. (DMPOSITION 0F PSU 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.3.4 Following the sunmer disorders of 1981 the composition of a PSU was agreed as one inspector, mo sergeants and twenty constables. The Study Group are firmly of the view that the present composition for a PSU has stood the test of time and experience in a wide range of mutual aid responses. The present PSU provides for a tactical, sel f-contained, mobile unit which has achieved outstanding success. The Study Group has examined a wide range of variations to the PSU structure. We are of the view that the present cqnposition should renain unaltered. Our RECOHHENDATION is that the composition of a PSU should remain 1:2:20. The Study Group is conscious of the growing problems which the implications of the Sex Discrimination Act has brought onto the service. We feel we must therefore comment upon the present dilemma and voice the concern of many chief officers in this regard. . i-Ji-ij 11--.Scanned by CamScanner 9-3.5 Where required to respond to gross public disorder the are capable and competent to form diield Part1c11ut1ng in shield serial duty is highly strenuous and demands physical strength and stamina. For these reasons it is usual for shield serials to conprise male officers. 2.3.6 Additionally there are logistical factors, particularly in mutual aid situations, which contribute to a general requ1renent for to predominantly comprise male constables. 2.3.7 The Study Group must therefore draw attention to the P0551ble hnplications imposed by the Sex Discrimination Act. Also, we would draw attention to the long-term effects upon PSU compositions if the trend in force establishment ratios between male and female officers shuns any significant shift from present figureS. SPECIALIST AID 2.11.1 During the NUM Dispute many types of specialist aid, other than PSU's, were requested. In the case of mounted and dog section personnel forces' holdings of such resources are contained in Appendices to the ACPO Tactical Options Manual. Other aid was requested, such as prison vans and catering facilities, and the inclusion in the Manual of this type of information would be a useful asset. The Study Group REGJHHEHD accordingly. FIRE FIGHTIWFIRST AID 2.5.1 A number of forces suggested that specific arrangements be incorporated into national criteria for PSU's in relation to fire fighting and first aid. The Study Group has examined the case for such specialisms to be included in PSU training and the impl ica ti ons. 2.5.2 We have concluded that all members of PSU's should receive a basic form of training to deal with the dangers of fire arising from, say, fire bombs and other incendiary devices likely to be encountered in public disorder situations. We have taken the view, on the balance of evidence available, that to be effective fire fighting techniques must be applied immediately and therefore demand instant knowledge. We are aware that most forces already incorporate such training in their PSU training programmes 2.5.3 We RECOMMEND that training for all PSU officers should include fire fighting techniques appropriate to public disorder envirorments. We leave it to the Training Study Group to specify the form of such training. 2.5.4 In relation to first aid, the Stucw Group is of the view that there are occasions when specialist knowledge of first aid can be essential, indeed life saving. We acknowledge that all pol ice officers receive elementary firsm. aid training and that it is not unusual for qualified medical teams to be in attendance at scenes of large scale public disorder. However, there is reason to justify greater structuring of the arrangements which presently Scanned by Ca?iScanner 2.5.5 2.5.6 2.5.7 TRAINEE 2.6.1 2.6.2 2.6.3 2.6.4 pol ice officers trained . that on occasions . obtain and to suggest vailable in front line to a higher level in first aid should be a situations. Such specialist personnel should not be part of a PSU response bUt an additional resource. Most forces already have first aid teams and where they are established they could be regarded as this additional reseurceo To provide easy reference to such personnel: their availability be identified by the Forward Planning Unit on a _nat10m1de ba51s and included in the Appendices to the Tactical Optlons Manual. We therefore RECOMMEND that first aid teams should be treated as a separate mutual aid resource and that the caPaCItY 0f forces to supply such teams as mutual aid be incorporated as an Appendix in the Tactical Options Manual. FOR OFFICERS A clear implication of the mobilisation of for the NUM DiSpute was the need for all officers forming part of that response to be trained in the range of duties that may be expected of them. To call for all such officers to be trained to the highest levels is clearly beyond the means of the service and, possibly, unnecessary. The Study Group accepts that most forces have specialist tactical units such as Special Patrol Groups, Tactical Aid Units, Support Groups and the like and that such groups form the nucleus of pol ice response in particularly violent public disorder. But this factor should not detract from a requirement for all officers forming part of mutual aid response to be trained to a common minimum level. We are aware that the service has promulgated such a training package based on common minimum standards and we endorse the philosophy and objectives of such training. We see it as essential that mutual aid training should be fully integrated and that there should be common tactics, common words of command and carmon training. The Study Group therefore that all officers selected to form part of a PSU mutual aid response should have received training to a common minimum standard. PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 2.7.1 2.7.2 In relation to equipment, it is the view of the Study Group that responding to the NUM Dispute revealed significant shortcomings in the adequacy of equipment available to some PSU's. We have concluded that all forces should hold sufficient protective equipment to enable the whole of their mutual aid response to be regarded as 'equipped'. We accept that this has significant financial implications but consider that the need to protect our officers should assune ascendancy over all other criteria. 2.7.3 2.7.4 DRIVERS 2.8.1 2.8.2 2.8.3 2.8.1} Details as to what constitutes protective equipment for PSU's is set out in the Tactical Options Manual. We RECOMMEND that all mutual aid PSU's should be capable of being equipped by the donor force to a ccmmon minimum level in accordance with the Tactical Options Manual. Present guidelines acknowledge the importance of mobility in the operational/tactical deploymentt??PSU?s To this end all should have, as additional personnel, suitably trained drivers. During the NUM Dispute logistical pressures dictated that 5110?! drivers were not always provided. The Study Group considers that in all future activations of mutual aid it is desirable that every PSU should have dedicated drivers additional to the unit's basic composition. We also consider that such drivers should be trained to at least "standard car course" level and have received tactical band training in the drivers role to ensure familiarity with those manoeuvres which they may be expected to undertake in public disorder env irorments. We RECDMHEND adoption in all forces of the present guidelines that every PSU should have drivers dedicated to that task and that they should be additional to the PSU's manpower canplement. Further we RECOMMEND that such drivers should be trained to standard car course level and have received tactical band training appropriate to their specialist role. IDCUHENTATION FOR 2.9.1 2.9.2 2.9.3 2.9.4 Most forces have prepared an operational record for use by their PSU commanders when on mutual aid. Appendix of the 1982 Notes of Guidance sets out the general format for such docunentation. Where the recommended format for operational record documentation was used, it is apparent that PSU commanders found little difficulty in maintaining adequate records. Where this . documentation has been complicated by in?force requirements for additional material, severe difficulties were experienced. The Study Group is of the view that an operational record should be prepared on a national basis and should be taken into use by all forces. The operational record should also embrace aSpects relative to finance. We RECOMMEND that such an operational record docunent is prepared by the Forward Planning Unit - A8 (3) - using as a general format Appendix of the ACPO Notes for, Guidance. -15] 7 Lu! h; I 4.4 C) II.) ?2 5493113 {Ices early regarded the orov isior. of unraquesteo? as its-.2: .ith the ?ppl} of multiples or zeta-tees the supply of senior ?ficers relates to section LL of one CPO Tactical Options I senior officersuas sometimes confused 331955 5.: atic-za. Hazare?liaison functions. The 5" "tr Eran; eccsiiez' that cperatioral campand officers should be tree: as a separate mutual aid resource. We RECOHHEHD acwo?ri: :r . the era; rang-11$ that, where significant nun?oers or are as nurse; aid they she'lci have the Of 3333115831511 sexier officers performing a we; fare/liaison function. its role 1? such sezizr officers should be flexible but include the 531131. Iii-z host ca camand and logistics teams, to ensure :ilitjr of ainiristraticn systems, including operational "isicr c. in relation to mastering and messing, to sper availability; (C. neifare :atters affectit officers in their charge; the 'hcme forcel as appropriate. .2 i:s:a::ces such liaison/welfare officers should be ?23: a police driver who is capable of assisting 'itr. atiristrative inties and a vehicle equipped with a suitable :zu'lti craze; radio. The driver and vehicle should be the applying farce. 'n?e considered the namerioal ratio of liaison officers appropriate to a zit-.2; air: response It is acmledged that future situations call for sane variation to whatever recannendations may be made a: :31: :26. A reasonable structure was, however, agreed and our REMHHEIDATIOI appears bel cu. He believe that our reccnmendations, i: inaselves a achieve a balance between the re, riy ic?e::i:?iec; need for welfare and an over burdenirg of host force facilities. - We Pal's Liaison 2 - 1., unit it the discretion of the host force. U?l - 10 units Superintendent of supply ing force. he than 10 units Superintendent and Chief InSpector of supplying force. Scanned by CamScanner A police driver and suitably equipped vanicle fran the supplying force should always liaison officeds). SUPPORT 2.11.1 With regard to all other forms of non-PSU aid, many forces considered that administrative teans were a useful resource. Unfortunately, during the NUH Dispute, their great drawback was that aided forces sometimes found great difficulty In providing the additional accommodation for such staff. They also presented a financial implication. 2.11.2 To obviate such difficulties in future mobilisations we that administrative support teams should only accompany mutual am by request of the aided force. REIIGIAL BODIES CENTRE 2.12.1 Early in the dispute it was clear that there was a core of mobile pickets amounting to a maximun of scmew'nere in the region of 5,000 men who were causing the major problems in the coal fields. Their movements were unpredictable and the level of violence they were willing to offer led all aided forces to seek to amass the manpower with which they could deal with the worst possible situation. In the event, the fact that their nunbers were limited, except in very few cases, to 5,000 men dictated that the main focus of problems were restricted to one or two main areas each day. Chief constables, having budgeted for the worst possible case, were in danger of being left with large numbers of officers relatively uncannitted. 2.12.2 At various stages during the dispute reference was made to the viability of establishing holding centres for PSU's from which hard pressed chief constables could draw aid. 'lhe concept of centres or pools from which forces could draw PSU's on a day by day, or even hour by hour, basis appears attractive. 2.12.3 Therefore the Study Group have considered the viability of holding centres in some depth. There are, discounting the administrative and financial problems, many difficulties. Not least is the constitutional dilemma which holding centres would create. 2.12.14 It is arguable whether holding centres in any of the affected areas would have utilised the units on aid more effectively. One factor most certainly would have been in danger of erosion that being the constitutional nature of '43 separate police forces and the operational autonomy of chief constables. 'Ihe redeployment of aid by the NRC, referred to below, was always on a request and consent basis, being little different to the original requesting and despatching of aid fran parent forces. If holding centres are to have any significant advantages over redeployment there would have to be a command structure at such centres to determine who goes where and when. At face value this may appear to be academic but in constitutional terms it is a step which is best avoided. Scanned by CamScanner 2.12.5 Having considered the concept of regional holding centres this Study Group makes no recmmendation to pursue their Viability a this time. However. it may be that sum - - do not a 1 when 51 ua . assocmted finanC1al) issues PP 15 himself of his reached the stage where the Home Secretary av ai authority under section 114 (2) of the Police Act 1961!. Under these circunstances there may be merit in pooling resources at holding centres. REDEPLDYENT 2.13.1 During the 198u/85 activation the NRC wa5_0bl igeq stotgrg?gg: the redeployment of aid on an almost daily atshle roblems geographical areas experiencing the worst of t' nsEi which This was possible because of the excellent rela 10 existed between forces As mentioned above, for sound operational one reserve level of reasons, at times chief constables requested . aid above that actually required for their routine ggnmitmnentatg Policing the dispute. As the number of forces 0 a1n1 8 increased so too would the surplus manpower have grown- 2.13.2 The success of redeployment facilitated by pre?planning 0f resource availability and close monitoring of developments by the National Reporting Centre, allowed chief constables 1n the geographically linked problan areas to reduce the reserve factor in their aid requests. - 2.13.3 In all future activations the viability of redeploying manpower should be actively considered by all forces experiencmg problems and should be co-ordinated through the NRC. 2.13.11 Such arrangements should steadfastly maintain the operational independence of chief constables. They must ensure that the Centre only responds to such requests. CONCLUSION 2.1Ll.1 The Study Group consider that many of the existing national agreements on mutual aid remain valid. Where we have made recommendations we are of the view that they will complement present guidelines and enhance the arrangements between forces for mutual assistance in times of need. Scanned by CamScanner? mucus mammals THE "1111an WIN OF NEW DISPUTE HJWIL AID STUDY GRCIJP REGJHENDATIGE RECDHENDATIOH The present criterion for force ccnmitment to mutual aid should renain 1 PSU for every 200 officers of force establishnent. That the special arrangements for the Metropolitan Police should remain those approved in 1981. That the composition of a PSU should remain 1:2:20. 'Ihat Appendices to the Tactical Options Manual be drawn up Specifying Specialist aid. 'lhat all officers forming PSU's should receive training in fire fighting techniques appropriate to public disorder. 'Ihat first aid teans be treated as a separate mutual aid resource and that the Tactical Options Manual should contain an Appendix specifying forces with such teams. All officers forming PSU's should receive training to a cannon minimun standard. All mutual aid PSU's should be capable of being equipped to a canmon minimun level. That all PSU's should be accompanied by drivers additional to the Units manpower. PARA 2.3.3 2.5.3 2.5.7 2.6.1.l 2.7.1} .M- .. . Scanned by ?CamScanncr 30 31 32 33 34 That all such drivers should be trained to standard car course level and have received tactical band training. That a standard fonmat be agreed for a national ?cperational reocrd'. That senior officers be treated as a separate mutual aid resource. That senior officers undertaking a welfare/ liaison function should accanpany multiples of police support units in accordance W1U1 a designated structure. That adninistrative support teams, speCial -ist personnel and specialist equipnent be treated as a separate mutual aid resource. 3.10.8 2.10.5 9.11.2 Scanned by CamScanner REVIEH 0F POLICING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF HINEHORKERS DISPUTE 1984/85 LOGISTICAL ARRANGETENTS HEIHBERSHIP 0F STUDY McLachlan Esq., CBE, MA, LLB, Chief Constable, Nottinghamshire Constabulary A Meselby Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Nottinghamshire Constabulary Domaille Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police Jackson Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police McMurchie Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Northunbria Police Williams Esq., LLB, Assistant Chief Constable, Hertfordshire Constabulary Boothby Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Hampshire Constabulary A Young, Esq., Commander, Metropolitan Police InSpector Astles, (Federation), Greater Manchester Police TERMS OF REFERENCE To examine the National guidance currently available in respect of the support required for extensive mutual aid and detennine its sufficiency in light of the National Union of Mineworkers Dispute. INTRODUCTION 3.1J At the initial meeting of the Group it was agreed that each manber would research a particular area of the designated topic and present a preliminary paper which would be circulated to the renaining manbers for consideration and comment. 3.1.2, Upon receipt of the preliminary papers individual manbers took the opportunity to seek the views of personnel, from their own Force area, with first hand knowledge of the type of Logistical problems encountered during the policing of the dispute 3.1.3 Once such views had been obtained further meetings of the Study Group were arranged at which time the content of such papers were discussed in full and recommendations fonnulated. By adopting this methodology the final docunent represents the collective views of not only members of the Study Group but those Officers/Civil Personnel actively engaged in the field of 'Logistical Arrangements'. During the course of the Review the Study Group gave consideration as to what constituted a model control room Whilst the Group were mindful that this was possibly outside the original remit it was unanimously agreed that the Control Room was an essential part of the Logistical Support Team and therefore worthy of consideration. In relation to this aspect of I Scanned by CamScanner 311nm 3.1.5 3.1.6 the review the recommendations of the Study Group appear at Paragraph 3.7.1. The existing National guidance was generally found to be adequate on most issues relating to the type of support reqU1?9d for extensive mutual aid. The events of 198?/85 did. however, certain areas where the advisory material could be enhanced 1n light of the experiences gained in policing a disorder situation This paper identifies such areas andPY?QV-?Ldes recommendations designed to resolve the deficienCles 1? the existing National guidance The Study Grouplnavernade numerous recommendations. Rather than refer to each recannendation in the body of our report?we have, in some instances dealt with than by merely compiling recommendations. LOGISTICS PLANNING PLANNING 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4 3.2.5 The need for contingency planning has been emphasised by recent events together with the necessity for operational planning to be supported and complemented by the use of logistics plans and loSistics support teams. Early activation of adequately prepared logistics teams would have eliminated many of the problems experienced by some forcesvwm)delayed activation of such plans until they were requiredtuiaccommodate officers in their force area. The size and nature of a particular incident will, to a large degree, detennine the response necessary from the police serVice, and the geographical distribution of 'problen areas' will. d1ctate whether a force is'supplying? or'receiving' mutual aid. Sufficient personnel should be identified to provide a logistics support team for the most extensive fonn of logistical assistance which may be required. This would, of course, provide the flexibility to allow for the smaller incidents to be dealt with on a smaller scale. The correct selection of personnel is regarded as a matter of the utmost importance and will ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of contingency plans. Wherever possible, the team which commences the activation of the plans, should remain unchanged. This should obviate the need for briefing and familiarisation of 'fresh' personnel, and provide maximum continuity. All personnel identified to perform functions as part of a logistics support team should receive suitable training to enable them to perform their specific roles and they should wherever possible have the opportunity to participate in exercises. Logistical planning in some forces at the centre of activity in the recent dispute, fell into two distinct areas; the logistics cannand team and the logistics support team The composition of such teens in one of the forces actively involved in the NUM diSpute consisted of:- Scanned by CamScanner 3.2.6 Logistics Command Team Administrative Officer Chief Superintendent Deputy Force Administrative Officer Superintendent Personnel) The support team working under the direction of the command team were responsible for the follcwing functions:- 3-9-7 Support Team Site/Accommodation Acquisition Superintendent Site/Accamodation Management Superintendent Communications Superintendent Transport Superintendent Force HQ Security Inspector Catering Force Catering Officer Supplies Administrative Staff Danestic Services Danestic Services Manager 3-2-8 Each member of the support team was assisted by a deputy and an additional tean of supporting personnel. The support team met at least once a week or more frequently if the situation demanded. 3-2-9 In addition to the functions performed by the support team it is suggested one officer in the rank of Superintendent should be made responsible for all liaison with military personnel. 3.2.10 An area of particular relevance to the command team is infonnation regarding operational planning. A member of the logistics cannand team should be afforded the opportunity to attend all planning meetings and operational briefings in order to assess and ccmment where necessary on the effects on logistical arrangements 3.2.11 See recannendations 35 to 47. TEAMS 3.3.1 Accommodation of large numbers of police officers presented a nunber of receiving forces with problems which had not previously been encountered. Identification and acquisition of suitable pranises was a major area of concern, with some forces experiencing considerable political interference at local government level which substantially reduced the scope for potential accommodation. 3,3,2 Much use was made of military establishments both in use and disused but substantially more accommodation could have been available if some of the disused camps had been maintained in a reasonable state of repair; One example of thiSINaS the disused RAF Syerston which alone could have all of Nottinghanshire's mutual aid requirenents. The Goverrment may, in the light of the most recent experiences, wish to consider the possibility of retaining some of the more suitably located military sites scheduled for disposal, on a care and maintenance basis as part.of the overall contingency plan for dealingiuith a Scanned by CamScanner 3.3.3 national crisis. Without suitable accommodation for large numbers of officers, the police service would have great difficulty in mounting a similar exercise if required to do so. The Study Group has considered the case for legislation be available to requisition accommodation in times of national emergency. At this time we have refrained from making such a recommendation as we consider the voluntary arrangement proved adequate; However, we do not discount such a recomnendation in future if adequate accommodation cannot be found through other means. See recommendations 48 to 78. WELFARE ASSOCIATION AND POLICE FEDERATION 3.4.1 CATERING 3.5.1 Where mutual aid requires that large nunbers of police officers be accommodated outside their home force area the Study Group is conscious of the assistance which can be given by representatives of Police Staff Associations in connection with welfare issues and logistical planning. In major public disorder operations, where the NRC is activated, we are of the view that there is need for a two?tier infonnal liaison structure to be put into effect to provide the necessary consultative machinery. At first-tier level we consider that senior representatives from the Staff Associations have access centrally to the President of ACPO or, in appropriate circumstances the NRC Co?ordinator, to discuss general issues affecting welfare. At second-tier level we consider that representatives of the Superintendentls Association and the Federation from the host force are either attached to, or have access to, the logistical tean to advise the officer in charge on matters affecting welfare. If these arrangements are implemented the Study Group takes the view that.there should be little need for staff representatives from aiding forces becoming deeply involved in welfare matters in another force area Existing guidelines identify the need for logistics support teams to organise catering arrangements and, where necessary, to nominate local catering contractors for this task. Private caterers were able to provide satisfactory service but there are inherrent disadvantages of being totally reliant on a service which is outside of total control. Flexibility, quality and reliability are areas where force catering provided a far better service and the dedication and loyalty of police employed civilian staff is certainly worthy of commendation. Scanned by CamScanner 3.5.2 3.5.5 If the police service becomes fully committed to private catering, difficulties can be foreseen in the event of disruptive action being taken by the trade unions resulting in the withdrawal of labour from the catering service. 'This of course is p0551ble with all civilian staff and it has been suggested that such staff should have STRIKE'clause included in their contract of employment. A further advantage of utilising force caterers emerge? from a suggestion thatlnutual aid could be extendedtx3the PFOV151OP Of catering staff which would allow such forces as the Metropolitan Police to augment the catering facilities of smaller forces. It is however felt that no hard and fast rules can be laid down, but rather that Forces have catering officers anployed at Executive level who have the ability and imagination to meet any given crisis See recommendations 79 to 92. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT 3.6.1 3.6.2 3.6.3 The Public Order Equipment Manual as issued by the Public Order Forward Planning Unit in July 1984 deals mainly with personal, portable and vehicle protection equipment with a section on munitions, but there is a fifth section which deals with miscellaneous equipnent. It is within this section that detailed information relating to items of equipment now identified as being essential requirenents could be included. Many forces displayed much enterprise in supplying items of equipment for the general comfort and convenience of their men. This ranged from tea urns to televisions and much of the equipnent was obviously felt to be useful at the time, but it falls mainly into the category of welfare equipment. The experience of one force actively engaged in the dispute suggests that the provision and control of all such equipnent should be the responsibility of the host force. Part of the equipment manual could be usefully extended to cover additional items, such as display boards, tea urns, cold drink diSpensers and a wider range of high power lighting equipment all ofvn?x?iwereixlconsiderable demand during the NUM dispute. Again, these itans should be the responsibility of the host force unless hire or loan arrangements can be negotiated between forces but it is essential that issue of equipnent is closely monitored. See recannendation 93. Scanned by CamScanner Egg 4 1-4 ?1.111-111 06111.4?.- I1U1 11 . II l.412..l.l J. wk; Hum Emu-n mna1u1mcu1m11.1 1111-.1111Dm in 1 mad-mama -. 11na1-nwm Hm 1 1H .n.H.1l1-1-l. 11 111-11 111:1 IE. mun ?dawn-Hum $1.an .WW1HWW amHunmEdnm 1n mn?cmum an 1U1 1% ?(111.1wa wilt-.111 Eapgga w.mL Hn 1mmnosmm an H. 1qmmdu nu Ham? Hum-1m 11.1%. mm urn-1n- 1H1.1--.1..n .u.11m..1 11.3. wu1 unnumw 1.1.1111. in .umm 12.91 . 1-H w?guum w-vmn ?1-1 Nu.? spun amxm nmm-mm I11. Huh-111d.? um 1 1H1m wu111mm Hm an m. .IP wmnBEmuamuHusm m; m- man 11%. ~11. L1 I Of] 0 momssoa 3N OmBmomssoH N0REVIEH OF THE POLICIM: OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF HINENORKERS DISPUTE 198"/85 STUDY GROUP LOGISTICS RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS All forces should have a dedicated logistics support team. Bnphasis is placed on the need for a logistics plan in addition to the general contingency plan. Activation of logistics support teams by forces both 'receiving' and 'supplying' officers on mutual aid should be achieved as early as practicable once a potential requirenent for extensive mutual aid has been identified. This should minimise difficulties in co?ordinating necessary arrangenents. Forces should assess what personnel may be required to establish a logistics support team. The personnel which may form part of such a team should be identified, together with the functions they would be expected to perform. Such personnel should receive suitable training to equip than to discharge their responsibilities and they should participate in exercises to ensure maximum readiness and efficiency. Logistics support teams should be carefully selected to ensure the snooth running of police activities. Forces should adopt a Command/Support structure similar to the ones detailed at para 3.2.6. Consideration should also be given to representations from the staff associations. Axnenber of the logistics command team should attend all operational briefings/debriefings/ meetings to assess the effects of any proposed operational strategy on the provision of logistical support. PARA 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3'201 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 30201 et seq 3.2.1 et seq Scanned by CamScanner hm". l- an ?5 ms 147 H8 49 Contingency plans should include matters which may not have previously been examined, Existing catering arrangements and their ability to cope with a large influx of officers on mutual aid Arrangements for obtaining and stock? piling food (C) Contingency plans for hiring vdiicles to supplement existing fleets Plans for dealing with outbreaks of food poisoning and infectious/contagious diseases Procedures for obtaining additional cmmunications equiment and the avail? ability of such equipnent Fuel arrangements for police vehicles The above list is in no way meant to be exhaustive but serves merely to illustrate the diversity of matters to be considered in the preparation of contingency plans. Contingency plans should be constantly reviewed at least once per year. Each force should maintain a definitive and accurate list of all facilities/equipment available. Logistics officers should be identified and withdrawn from their respective departments. It is suggested Training departments may be able to provide a considerable manpower input for this purpose. Forces should identify suitable acconmodation of the appropriate standard available fran the following sources:? MICE UNIVERSITIES MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LOCAL AUTHORITIES HOME DEFENCE PRIVATE CDMPANIES Negotiations for the use of military should be made in accordance with current advice on Military Aid to the Civil 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq I 3.3.. a et seq 7 Scanned by CamScanner .. Power. The Hone Office and the Ministry of Defence must agree to the use of military Property before on-site negotiations become practicable. 50 Whilst Local Authority, University and Private 3.3.1 Premises may be able to assist, co?operation et seq could be affected by trade unions, student unions or political pressures at a local level. These matters must be taken into consideration in the preparation of plans. 51 Experience has shown that wherever possible, 3-3.1 any premises acquired should be able to et seq accommodate not less than 10 PSU's. A large nunber of smaller locations would not be feasible in terms of both the nunbers of administrative support staff required and the cost of maintaining such a service. 52 Having identified suitable it is 3.3.1 necessary to ensure all ancillary requirenents et seq are satisfactory Le:? Location - proximity to sensitive areas. Transport - secure parking. Catering - adequacy of facilities. Toilet and washing facilities. 53 All Forces should record and update at six 3.3.1 intervals all potential accommodation et seq within their Force area. 51! Contingency plans should be prepared to deal 3.3.1 with the requirenents for furniture and bedding et seq to equip both furnished and unfurnished accommodation. A specimen index card for recording information about potential accommodation is attached at Appendix . 55 Where there is a possibility that it may be 3.3.1 necessary to "call out" officers at short et seq notice, liaison staff must be aware of the location of such officers and should ensure proper planning of sleeping accannodation to minimise disruption to officers not affected. 55 Beds, bedding and linen can be obtained at no 3.3.1 charge from the DHSS. Details of how to apply et seq for these items are shown at Appendix 57 Sheets and pillow cases etc., should be laundered 3.3.1 once a week therefore laundries willing and able et seq to deal with the quantity necessary should be identified. Scanned by CamScanner Where more than one shift pattern is worked by officers frun one location, officers working different shifts wherever possible should be accommodatedin different parts of the pranises. Sleeping accommodation should be kept away fran recreation facilities. Accommodation centres must have adequate provision for the necessary nunber of vehicles, and suitable fuelling facilities close at hand. Security arrangenents are required to prevent sabotage and intrusion fran the media. An up to date list of suppliers of all essential equipnent should be maintained. Forces should respond positively to requests for outdoor sports facilities. Accannodation should contain facilities for indoor sports and recreation table tennis, darts, daninoes, cards. Provision should also be made for a 'lounge' area if possible. Forces should consider the installation of a bar. This can be achieved either by approaching the NAAFI organisation or using in-force stock and equipnent and applying for it to be licensed as a Hone Office canteen. Television and video hire are essential and contingency plans should include details of companies prepared to undertake this commitment. Video hire should be strictly controlled by camp liaison staff. Sufficient pay?phones should be provided to enable officers to maintain contact with their families. The Logistics Officer responsible for liaison with donating forces must stipulate the rendezvous point and time of arrival and this information should be confirmed by telex. (Unless the Supplying Force has become familiar with local geography). The Officer in Charge of the accommodation_should personally receive the Mutual Aid. He must have sufficient staff to direct and control vehicles, personnel and equipment on arrival. He should be of a sufficient rank to enable him to control discipline of officers on mutual aid. 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 30301 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 30301 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 30301 et seq Scanned by CamScanner I I I I I 5 3-5?Reception teams must record and index all officers, vehicles and equipment received on mutual aid. Receiving Forces should supply bed cards and nominal rolls (Appendix for completion by all officers with the minimum of delay. Completed cards should be returned to the reception team. All infonmation regarding accommodation and responsibilities should be supplied to Commanders on Mutual Aid at the earliest opportunity. This includes briefing arrangements. Clear and accurate signs at accommodation sites reduce unnecessary enquiries and confusion. The officer in charge of accommodation and his staff must have access to inspect kitchen facilities of Force, private and service caterers but where military premises are involved there must be careful liaison with military personnel. In the event of suspected outbreaks of food poisoning if the premises are military accommodation, the military health officer should be consulted. Problems arising at other premises should be communicated to the Area Environmental Health Officer. Contingency plans should include measures to deal with outbreaks of food poisoning and contagious/ infectious diseases (Appendix Catering is important and the responsibility for this should rest with properly qualified and trained personnel with experience and management of large scale catering establishments or operations. He/she should be employed on a management/executive basis and be responsible to the Senior Force Administrative Officer. Catering Officers should be managers and not 'Chefs', they should tour catering sites and feeding statiOns to maintain standards. Deputy Catering Officers should be deployed on the day to day supervision of canteens. Catering Officers should be given the executive power to obtain supplies from sources without political interference and without using Central purchase facilities if the need arises. Catering Officers should identify supply sources and be able to augment existing supplies forth- with. 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1' et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 3.5.1 et seq Scanned by CamScanner 1 Sufficient basic supplies should be available in stock or be otherwise readily available to feed men in the first few days of an incident. Facilities should be identified for the storage of extra provisions and plans for the possible use of mobile refrigeration units should also be considered. Catering Officers should control through HQ Catering the purchase and supply of all produce and supplies. This will ensure standardisation and be econanically viable. A 'substantial meal' should be equal to the prevailing level of refreshment allowance (inclusive of preparation costs). Officers should be fed every four hourS, but where this is not possible a packed meal should be provided as 'emergency rations'. Such rations should not however be regarded as a main meal. Officers travelling long distances to an aided Force should be provided with a meal prior to taking up operational duties. Consideration should also be given to the provision of a meal before the return Journey or, at least, the availability of a packed meal if officers have not been provided with a meal immediately prior to their release fran the aided force. - Meals should be provided by the dictates of the body clock rather than GMT. That is to say if an officer has been on duty since Ham then his ?breakfast' should be a substantial meal. Facilities should be made to supply beverages and refreshments in the field, dependent on the dictates of the weather and time. Catering Officers should maintain a list of part time experienced staff who could be called upon to augment existing staff. Catering Officers in company with the appropriate civilian or military health officer should check prenises prior to and during their use as feeding stations, to ensure suitability and to avoid health hazards. Contingency plans should be regularly reviewed and updated to provide accurate information on all available facilities. Scanned by CamScanner 3.501 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 3.5-1 et seq 3.5-1 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 33501 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 30501 et seq 3.5.1 et seq 1?1 in n? \0 1C3 1018 alluding list of equipment required at ppm: base 3:45.: be included under Part .r.e P?llc Crier aquipnent ?nal:- cold Erin: Dispensers Hider range of higw power lighting Reflective Tabards Portable traffic signs (5) Blue flashirg signs 1r.) Reflective cones Facilities should be made available for a dedicated Force Incident Control Roan of sufficient capacity to be able to cope with any incident requiring extensive mutual aid. Extensive use should be made of canputer facilities, cannand and control systats and major Crime systems. These should be canplmented by the use of 'uhite' boards and other manual and hard copy facilities. Force canputer interface with FNC S1ould provide the necessary PNC facilities. Telemone lines routed through a group hunting systan should be utilised. Direct telemone links with other forces should be established. Private lines including a dedicated line for informants should be available. Teleprinter or other message transfer systems are essential. Adeqmte screening and soundproo?ng for equip- ment and operators should be provided. A separate conference roan with VDU, radio and television facilities should be provided for use of cannand staff and incident roan staff. Dedicated teams of personnel to provide maximm continuity should be aimed for. Sufficient personnel of the appropriate rank to deal with:? Scanned by CamScanner 3.8.1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq 105 106 _Deployment and assessnent of requiranents; Liaison with NRC, other forces, logistics teams and Catering liaison and arrangements; Message handling; Welfare/Discipline matters; Control of intercept points; Equipment requirements; Transport; (1) Intelligence; (3) Escorts; Arrangements for demonstrations/marches; (1) Identification of trends and assistance with operational planning; Press liaison with Liaison with Divisional Commanders; (0) Monitoring of policy application and advisory function; In addition there should be adequate facilities to display all necessary management information; Maps/charts of all relevant locations should be displayed in praninent positions; Photographs/hard copy of resource deployment at set intervals for future analysis; Too many 'information' files tend to become unnanageable and may lead to information becoming misplaced. On?going information should be kept in a handover file which should be used as a component of the briefing at shift changes. Attached at Appendix is an example of an - Incident Control Room Command and Control Structure together with a specimen Incident Room Structure. Scanned by CamScanner 3-8-1 et seq 3.8.1 et seq Appendix INCIDENT mm AID STRUCTURE I (24 HOJR 7 DAY HEEK STAFFDB) ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE (OPERATIONS) CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT (OPERATIONS) (12 hour tour of duty) (12 hour tour of duty) SU PERINTENDENT SU PER INTENDENT INSPECTOR CHIEF INSPECTOR INSPECTOR INSPECTOR SERGEANT SERGEANT OPERATIVES OPERATIVES (N) TELEPHONISTS (ll) TELEPHONISTS (ll) LIAISO QEFICERS (14AM - 2PM PDN - FRI) INSPECTOR (NATIONAL REPORTING CENTRE) INSPECTOR NEIGHBCU RING FORCE) RING FORCE) PERSONNEL OPERATORS 2 - CIVIL STAFF 2 STAFF 2 - POLICE OFFICERS 2 POLICE OFFICERS . Scanned by CamScanner INCIDENT LLIN 1. RADIO COMMUNIOEYIONS MONITOR 2. OISPLAY (coupurza LOG) INFORNANTS YELEPHOHE LIarsou OFFICERS (Fonsxsu FORCE) (supsazufsuosut) TACTICAL OFFICER DEPLOYMENT (CHIEF INSPECTOR) (INSPECYOR) OPERATIVES DEPLOYMENT BOARD CONTROLLER PERSONNEL - LOGISTICS (SEFGEANT) MEALS LIAISON a . . Scanned by CamScanner Appendix INIEX CARD - AOCOHDDATIOH Address: Owner: 'lype: Single Roms/Dormitory Capacity: Equipped: Canplete/Partial/ None muirment Required: Availability: Mediate/Length of Notice Updated On: The reverse of the card may be used for any other continents pertinent to the subject. Scanned by CamScanher Appendix BEDS IND BEDDING England and Wales is divided into a Northern and Southern Zone. The boundary line is drawn roughly the Wash, North of Birmingham to Powys 1n waes The Northern Zone store is at RAF Burtonwood, Near Liverpool. The Southern Zone stores are at Hilton KeyneS, Royston in Herts and Bristol. Each Zone has at this time approximately ?0,000 beds and a quarter of a million blankets, aieets and pillow cases. All the equipment is controlled by the Department of Health and Social Security, but the administrators are the Crown Suppliers. Action to be Taken:- Telephone: 01-922?2000 Crown Suppliers Third Floor Wellington House 133-135 Waterloor Road London SE1 Ask for the Chief Purchasing Officer. Inform him of your requirements. He will clear with DHSS and direct you to the appropriate store. The responsibility for collection is yours. Example of Transport Needs:- Articulated Container Trailer - Cubic capacity of ZMOO cu ft will carry 175 beds and bedding to minimun standard. (Appendix) Scanned by CamScanner Appundll SUGGEETED OF Nm?e' N0&l?ank H0110 [lane address: Home Telephone NlmberScanned by CamScanner ACTION TO BE TAKEN HHEN SUSPECTING FOOD POISONING Appendix 0R CDNTAGIOUS DISEASE Contact Local GP. Infonn Environnental Health Authority or Military Health Officer in all circunstances Where military premises are used. Isolate Patients. If Food Poisoning - Identify Product Keep Sanple if Possible. Scabies and other Infectious/Contagious Diseases - follow advice of Medical Officer. A Scanned by CamScanner REVIEH OF THE POLICING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF HINEIIORKEPB DISPUTE TRANSPORT STUDY GROUP IEPBERSHIP OF THE STUDY A Leonard Esq., Deputy Chief Constable, Sussex Police Sharples Esq., Deputy Chief Constable, Avon and Somerset Constabulary Leeds Esq. Acting Commander, Metropolitan Police Holford Esq., Chief Superintendent, Nottinghamshire Constabulary Terry Esq., Fleet Manager, Sussex Police OF REFERENCE The Steering Committee did not draw?up terms of reference for this Study Group. The Group?s general terms of reference were devolved from the Logistics Study Group. INTRODUCTION Analysis of Force Reports H.1.1 There was a degree of congruence in the observations made by both aiding and aided Forces which fell almost naturally into two categories:? Those concerning the adequacy of vehicles, protection, Ilevel of support, etc., and; Those problems arising fran the sheer scale and duration of the particular dispute THE OF THE STUDY 4.2.1 The Group felt that the review should provide positive guidance for the future based on the lessons of the dispute but that it was not competent to specify detailed operational requirements for vehicles. ZU3was also recognised that.many of the Study Groups would overlap in their comments and/or recommendations but that should not inhibit discussion. LEGAL ASPECTS u,3,1 Various aspects of road traffic law and public order law were investigated. No changes are reconnended as there was no shortage of powers for the pol ice to exercise in the regulation of movements - . Scanned by iCamScanner of pickets/demonstrators, although strategy and f" - handling disruption on motorways or high speed due- requires careful consideration. This particular 5:92-- nu- referred to the Tactical Options Study Group. IIJIBER 1mm The composition of a PSU is vital ir. decidir: required per unit. There is need for 22:5 :e nationally. The standard was considered to :e correct implications arise from the different az-scg about staff sent to support the l: is izpcr?r.: to establish levels of additional personnel and atexer me," 322*: travel with the unit. (3) Drivers Drivers should be additional to and no: par: :5 the PSI. is an advantage for that to be trainee a rig: starsar: driving. Hours of duty car. '5 long an: tier-fore, from a safety point of view, it is essential toe: the :river should not have been involved it the put; it :rz?er as;ec: of the 5 work. There is also need for specialist driver training it. pub; ic order duties particularly their. so: of the relate to the use of vehicles tsetselaes. I: is ur. inefficient to place un?trair. :i dri"ers ir. suc'r. situations. The Metropolitan course for support drivers is worthy of further examination on a rational basis. See recommendations of the Aid Study Group. First-aiders/fire fighters Before the autcmatic inclusion of such extras both aiding, and aided Forces should consider the reason for :utual aid an whether or not in the circunstances such person: 2. should accompany Public disorder is not the only reason for the supplying of mutual aid. 0. See recommendations of the Mutual Aid Study Group. (C) Equip-eat Sane forces found that the ctrrent level of 1:30 transit type vehicles per PSU does not necessarily allow for such units to be sel f-contained in terms of equipment. Those forces using the "four wheel" transit rather than the recanended ?six wheel transit found particular difficulty in carrying the stocks of equipment and manpower. Sane forces therefcre fomd it necessary to use three vehicles per PSU in order for their mutual aid cannihnent to be self-contained. Scanned by CamScanner Pool of vehicles The question of regional pools of vehicles was discussed, but the constitutional position concerning ownership, finance and priority use led the Group to discount this suggestion as a viable option. PROTECTION OF VEHICLE 4.5.1 Great diversities in the level and style of protecting vehicles were apparent during the NUM dispute. Sane Forces had pemianently fixed protective grills; others had de?mountable protection not always capable of being carried in the vehicle; others used combinations of bandit glass and Makrolon and some vehicles had no Protection whatsoever. Again, it is considered that an operational requirement be drawn up covering minimum and optimum levels of protection taking into consideration size and type of vehicle and the use to which it would be potentially put. HIRED 15.6.1 A feature of the dispute was the inordinate number of hired vehicles used to transport PSU's. This was partially a function of certain Forces not having equipped to meet their national commitment, or, where they were so equipped, an unwillingness to despatch those vehicles to another Force area in case they should be needed at home. A further problem was the sheer duration of the dispute and the havoc this played with maintenance, servicing and replacement schedules. The image of the Police Service was certainly not enhanced by pol ice officers arriving at scenes of considerable public disorder and de?mounting from Co?op van hire transits. On more than one occasion confusion arose because both the police and the NUM were hiring vehicles from the same canpany. Hired vehicles were, of course, unprotected and therefore placed severe restrictions on the ability of operational Commanders to deploy them in riot, or near riot, situations. MICE CONVOYS AND ESCORTS Convoys 14.7.1 Considerable public comment was passed and there was much criticisn of the manner in which mutual aid convoys travelled from the aiding to the aided Forces, particularly in respect of motorways. Whilst security is important, the deliberate blocking of the overtaking lane, thereby restricting general traffic flows to the speed of the convoy, is unacceptable. Training in this respect should be examined. Escorts 4.7.2 The draining of aided Forces, both in manpower and vehicle terms, was quite considerable when escorts/guides had to be provided for use by mutual aid. Previous comments on the size of a PSU vehicle are relevant if the solution is to attach a member of the host Scanned by Ca?scanner Force guide to strange locations. Difficulties and variations of what could and had been-re-charged were encountered by a nunber of the Forces. 11e- fuelling arrangements, at least in the early stagesof' the dispu e, were unclear. Sane aiding Forces had made no prov131on for their vehicles to re-fuel en route. The aspect of for damaged vehicles was also raised and it was felt that a standard re?charge formula covering all classes of vehicles should be drawn UP and agreed. See Finance Study Group report. 'w Iv ?l Scanned by CamScanner H0. 107 108 109 110 01-? ms KLICDB mums 0? ms NATIONAL UNION OF DISPUTE 19W85 GRCUP - TRAISPORT RECDHEHDATIONS Type of Vehicle A comnon policy should be established on the type of vehicle required for PSU duties. It is recommended a fifteen seat personnel carrier is the most practical type. A detailed operational requirement should be drawn up including levels of protection to be afforded and taking into account the equipment needed to be carried to enable a unit to be completely self-contained. All Chief Officers should be urged to meet their national commitment in respect of vehicles for PSU's. The use of hired vehicles for operational work is not reccmmended. Hired vehicles should be restricted to coaches for the transporting of officers to and their hone Forces. lbtonlay activity (1) Tactical plans should be drawn up for dealing with incidents on motorways connected with public order disputes; (ii) All such activities on motorways should be supervised by trained motorway officers to minimise danger to the general public. Convoys and escorts Coaches travelling to and aided Forces do not generally require to be in convoy; (ii) Empty personnel carriers travelling to and fran aided Forces should travel in convoy so that they arrive together and are ready for deployment; Operational deployment of units may be required to travel in convoy but dependant upon circunstances should not impede the normal free flu? of traffic particularly on motorways. et seq 14.4.1 et seq 4.3.1 et seq ?.701 et seq 4-701 et seq ?07-1 et seq Scanned by ?CamScanner 111 11." no-nnll 1m "ram-ants 1 Alded Forces should assune ta lent res for arranging suffic p0 it: played fuelling points or them; bility of the anganents for aided it would be the reaponsl aiding Forces to make arr fuel on Journey: to and {ran Forces. (11) Ply-em. of mnapa't costs fomula covering all classes A standard re?charge eed between of vehicles :hould be drum up and as!" Forces. 14.8.1 et, seq et. seq ?08.1 et. seq 4 Scanned by CamScanner REVIEH OF THE POLICING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF HENEHORKERS DISPUTE COMPUNICATIONS PEFBERSHIP OF THE STUDY '1 Kelly ESQ., QPM, DL, LLB, Chief Constable, Staffordshire Police (Chairman) Johnson Esq., 0PM, Chief Constable, Lancashire Constabulary Nobes Esq., LIB, Chief Constable, North Yorkshire Police A Soper Esq., QPM, Chief Constable, Gloucestershire Constabulary Whiteley Esq., CBE, QPM, Chief Constable, Suffolk Constabulary Wilmot Esq., Deputy Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police A A Vickers Esq., QPM, LLB, Deputy Chief Constable, South Wales Constabulary ?lie? 3801-. IBA, FBIM, Assistant Chief Constable, West Mercia Constabulary Mitchell Esq., Commander, Metropolitan Police .--.J TEBPSIOF REFERENCE Tc assess the adequacy of current equipment available to Forces responding to widespread disorder and the conpatibility of such equipnent when used on mutual aid. INTRODUCTION 5.1.1 This report deals with communications for situations involving actual or potential serious public disorder or for major incidents. 5.1.2 Generally, despite their limitations, Police communication systems coped reasonably well during the NUM dispute, with appropriate modifications being made where necessary. 5,1,3 In addition, the communications section of the ACPO Public Order "General Guidance for Senior Police Officers" booklet gave adequate guidance to Forces During the diapute, the Directorate of Telecommunications provided on tenporary loan to Forces, in excess of 1000 personal radios, 50 base stations, 80 mobile radios and a full range of ancillary equipment, as well as installing a number of temporary control systems. 5,1,5 This equipment was made available in a variety of ways, est, diverting; stocks due to be issued, refurbishing old equipment and taking into use spare hOldingS. The diversion of stocks meant that some Forces had to retain older equipment longer than originally intended. Scanned by CamScanner 5.1.6 I . a. I a Additionally, a large quantity of eiuigment w?as Forces' own holdings of rented equips-ant inyoiving e: and retaining of racioo for :12, required a significant maintenance effort an: we ?reno?j/i Tel are to be congratulates for?tne 331' "3 c0ped with the additional demands placed upon Nevertheless, certain problems were 5159:?. ign?oec 2-, and they fall under the following general neacir?'i- Problems experienced try the Diratorate of Tammany-25275- VHF Radio - adequacy of channels etc. UHF Radio - adequacy of channels etc. Difficulties of reception plus the need for 'Jru?ic $1933 equipment. . PSU and other Convoys - intermmicatior. racio con?ict Incident @ntrol. Security of Radio Transmissions. Equipment - Loss/Danage/lnjury. Details of the various proclezts are set on recannendations. PMBLEIB WHERE BY DIBHJORATE (F 5.2.1 5, (5.2 The Directorate has brought to notice certain pros- encountered during the dispute. there was the lack of early of Po?zce requirements and a lack. of cue?ordination ir. 34:443.; it answer; the needs of Forces were met. Info emu: tr; . . reacned the Directorate in a number of ways. Inca-r93; . and aoout the correct avenue of app?oecr. Lee to roguests wing sen- either to local depots, direct to Directorate E-leaoqsarters, o. through tne Police Liaison Office, and it would nave beer, zoo-r. :cre efficient if early aoviw of a general mmicaticns reggraest could have been provided to the Directorate fro: one central point. Indeed, we consider that this is essential for effective alarming to support a potential major operationthe beginning of the dispute, senior management at tr. Directorate made contact with staff of the Piational Reporting Centre who were unable to provide any indication of the cmmications facilities required but were able to give helpful guidance on now situations might develop and give rise to the need for adoitionai cmunications. There can be little jostt that it wool: have teen more efficient had there been one central organisati charged with responsibility for the co-ordination of demancs radio equipment. He for consideration, that tone 5 should undertaee this task in the sac way as they co?ordiraoe demands for manpower. f. A '1 5 - The second problem arose over the planning of energency communications. whilst in sale areas this was quite adeqmte there was a feeling that some Forces did not fully appreciate that the expertise of the Directorate was available to then and accordingly mistakes were made bemuse of lack of consultation Scanned by CamScanner at an early stage. A3 5: result of this, :u-mur Inamltammt. inutructml depot. mnrumm'n Lo Hu' Imtml by visiting; Forced prov idinp, on?ol te guidance! where We RECOMMEND that whenever Forum. are planning ('mm'tgvm'y uommummticmn the Directorate should bu naked for .nul from the outset. VHF RADIO Inocupatibility of VHF Radios ?0?91 (on One of the most common problems during Hu- Hm. H..- Inumuotltullty oi VHF radio lwtm-cm Um uldlm?, I'Ul't?l' .md howl i?orco brought, about by insullh'lr-nl. channel on Lln- radio equipment, the widespread nature,- at and insufficient time to arrange for the ?Loryntal 1 (lam: connidr?rod that a VHF (humlf'l, nationally vunmtilnln. Mum, be oi in the deployment of ltdor-I?orm' mutual nid Thl.'. (wold vauso problem; ul? interl?vrc-m-e-, for ommplo when: persons were vmmuniootinp, at. tho limo in clone .11 he?, in mi fort-m. I-?orce areas. Mort-ovvr, cam-h I-?orm- nmuld Imw? Un- mtloml lr?ullk'nt'y hull: 1? 11h (antral Houu and on its hill-top sites, whivh would rnim- problmm oi' rrxpemse and oi orcommodntlon to install .1 radio vhunnvl who}: might. be [mt-d only infrequently. on not. lm-l that a national VHF channel would lu- Jun-Allied or that 1L would fully :solve the problems that huv: enrlmen. U59 0! the Ah'l?l'l'l set. would provide an interim but problum will only be fully resolved when the HMHI Iul Jy impl treatise the- pont Wlh'x' mull: vinmnel out will have channel capacity and wil be unpaid 0 use .mywlu-RECOMMEND that the problem of iIICompatibility ot? VHF radios be looked at by the Ull?cCLuroLc 01' Telecommunications an a matter 01 urgency to ascertain unemer sane other interim solution 13 poamblu. Insufficient. VHF mantel: ?,?ouu1 lt Dec-me clear during the dispute that most Forces had insufficient VHF channel: to meet their Operational requirement: adequately. This led to severe congestion of radio systems whenever all 'danesut' were transferred to the limited nunbcr or r?dh?allehg channels so that one or more Channel 5 could be son-[y dedicated to the control the NEH diapute operations? more an be no doubt that there is a need for more VHF channels to be madc- available to Force; It mans essential that, At?? A each would new one VHF .:hannel, which can be dedicated 101.41.?, 16. at. aura-ZEN! 01? Incident ultnout :H'ectins the L?I?l?iClenC) [[1089 channels 1L4 mm.) 'daneatit' use and LA Scanned by CamScanner Lack of 5.5.1 5-502 5.5.3 we REUJMMEHD accordingly. Cannunications to Hire Vehicles Many Forces were able to meet their commitment to mutual aid only by hiring vehicles from commercial sources.. Quite clearly vehicles were not equipped with Police radio and whilst some effort was made to utilise hand-held VHF or board-mounted equ1pment, supplies of such equipnent were limited. It seems improbable that Forces will, in the foreseeable future, possess sufficient transport of their own to fully "19-913 mutual 31d cormnitments on the scale seen during the NUM disPUte' It: ?0110?! therefore, that temporary radio arrangements will continue to be necessary. The Directorate of Telecommunications has emphasised that the dispute highlighted the need for a centralised Of radio equipment for emergency use. Although most of the requests for equipnent were met, this was at the expense of diverting other needs or by providing refurbished equipment which could not be expected to work to the same efficiency as current issue. In addition, the Directorate also had to provide assistance for other emergencies during the period of the Miners' dispute the docks strike, in addition to the normal routine servicing of Force equipment and systems planning. We that the Directorate of Tel ecommunications should give consideration to the provision of emergency holdings of VHF radio equipment to be held either centrally or on a regional basis, and should also consider the funding of such emergency holdings. We also RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Telecommunications should pursue the concept of the post?NARC multi channel portable VHF set, if this has not already been done. Insufficient Cry stals 5.6.1 5.6.2 One factor which exacerbated the position regarding incompatibility of VHF radio during the dispute was the apparent shortage of at local or regional level to sets at short notice. As indicated earlier, the post-NARC VHF radios will resolve this problem. The Directorate of Telecommunications has stated that specific difficulties arose in obtaining sufficient plus the large amount of effort expended in actually sets. However, we RECOMMEND that, as an interim solution, the Directorate makes available adequate supplies of covering all frequencies, at regional or local depot level. UHF RADIO Insufficient UHF Emergency Channels 5.7.1 During the dispute, it became manifestly clear that, overall, there were 1nsuff1c1ent UHF channels for Police use and, in particular, Scanned by CamScanner 5-7-3 5.7.14 that the national provision of four emergency frequencies was totally inadequate. The close proximity of a number of radio schemes operating on the four emergency UHF frequencies led to unacceptable cross talk and interference. Additionally, many convoys utilised the emergency channels for inter?vehicle communications and added to the proolem by interfering with local emergency schemes The requirement for additional UHF frequencies had already been identified by the ACPO Communications Committee in February, 198?, before the NUM strike began, and had been communicated to the Directorate of Telecommunications so that action could be taken whenever additional UHF spectrum became available. Experience of Forces during the dispute has served to emphasise the urgency of this requirement. We consider that more UHF frequencies should be made available, both for normal and emergency use, and that one of these extra channels should be dedicated solely for use by PSU convoys. We RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Telecommunications should pursue this issue as a matter ofpriority. Impatib?ity of UHF Channels and Limited Capacity on UHF Radio Sets 5.8.1 5.8The limited channel capacity of the UHF sets available for Police use proved inadequate for operational purposes during the dispute. The majority of Forces utilise UHF radio sets which are limited to 5 channel settings and are, therefore, unable to accommodate all four available emergency UHF frequencies. Many logistical problems were experienced throughout the dispute in attempting to equip aiding detachments with compatible communications and this, in turn, imposed severe restrictions on operational flexibility. Virtually all Forces have identified a need for the multi?channel sets, of the types currently being manufactured and distributed, to overcome the problems indicated above. We RECOMMEND the general introduction, as soon as possible, of a multi-channel UHF radio (capable of up to 99 channels). The need for a tnul ti-channel set is recognised by the Directorate. Provision of UHF Equipment to Aiding Detachment '3 . 9.1 9-2 Throughout the dispute problems arose because of demands at short notice for the provision of additional UHF equipment. Through the good offices of the Directorate of Telecommunications these demands were met but it is felt that clear guidance should be given as to whether the responsibility for the provision of compatible UHF equipment should rest with:- The aiding Force, or (ii) The host Force. Adoption of a mul ti-channel UHF set, as indicated above, will solve this problem: but we RECOMMEND that, in the interim period, the host Force should, in c0nsul tation with the Directorate of Scanned by CamScanncr Telecommunications, be responsible for the supply of compatible UHF radios. ISSUE OF RADIOS '10 SUPERVISORY OFFICERS 5.10.1 5.10.2 a1 Guidance for Senior Police the Communications Section, ld ordinarily be issued only to ecognised that this may vary The ACPO manual "Public Order Gener Officers", at paragraph 18.12 of reccmmends that personal radios shou InSpectors and above, although it is according to operational necessity. During the NUM dispute, it became common practice to issue personal radios to the Inspector and to each of the Sergeants in a PSU because it was frequently necessary to sub?divide the PSU into independent sections during the course of operations. This has also proved to be- the case in other public order operations and we RECOMMEND that the General Guidance should be amended to provide for the issue of personal radios to PSU Sergeants and above subject to operational necessi ty. 0F RECEPTION PLUS THE NEED FOR PUBLIC ADDRESS EQUIPMENT Difficulties of Reception During Disorder 5.11.1 5.11.2 The tremendous noise generated in disorderly situations during the dispute made reception of radio transmissions extremely difficult. This problem had already been recognised and a Working Party has been set up by ACPO Communications Committee in conjunction with the General Purposes Committee. Experiments were carried out during the. dispute to provide "hands off" communication facilities for the NATO helmet. This research has now been broadened to provide similar facilities for the standard Police helmet. The report of the Working Party is awaited. Public Address Systems '5.12.1 5.12.2 The problem of noise levels during disorderly situations also showed a requirement for mobile public address systems, (both hand held and vehicle mounted) with a very high decibel output. This would aid communication both with the crowd and, in some cases, with front 1 inc Pol ice Officers. We RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Telecommunications undertake research to meet this need. PSU AND OTHER (DNVOYS RADIO EQUIPMENT Requirement for Suitable Roof Aerial for Convoy Communications or 311311 Radio Schemes 5.13.1 Problems of intercommunications en?route between . vehicl PSU and other convoys arose from:? es form1ng Interference other local schemes encountered during the Scanned by CamScanner journey; (ii) The length of the convoy, which in some cases coke lorry convoys, was considerable; Large convoy vehicles, such as coaches, screening transmission. In addition, some difficulty was experienced in operating portable UHF base stations in vehicles because of the inadequate height (and consequently in some cases positioning) of aerials on command vehicles which gave insufficient range of transmission. 5.13.3 As indicated earlier, more emergency UHF frequencies allev1ate the problem of interference and would allow a national UHF channel (which because of its limited range would not give rise to the same problems as a national VHF channel) to be dedicated for PSU convoy use. We further RECOMMEND that the Directorate of TelecomrnUl?liCE-i1210nS should carry out research into the adequacy and pOSitiONing 0f aerials for UHF mobile base stations with a view to extending the range of transmissions. 5.13.11 A radio telephone (referred to in Paragraphs 5.20.1 and 5.20.2) would provide an alternative means of communication between the convoy and relevant Forces. EMU IREHENTS 5.1Q.1 In order to provide a communications link with convoys, host Force motor?cyclists were often employed as escorts but problems arose when motor-cyclists found difficulty in operating standard UHF radio sets while steering their vehicles. 5.14.2 It is clearly desirable that there should be a communications facility between the escort and the convoy. We RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Telecommunications should investigate the possibility of providing a "hands free" method of operating UHF personal radios suitable for use by Police motor?cycl ists. INCIDENT (DNTROL Dediwted Incident Control Centre 5.15.1 We have already dealt with the need for a minimun of one VHF channel to be available for dedication to incident control at 5.1-1.3. 5.15.2 Experience during the dispute clearly indicated the need for a dedicated incident control room, which was usually located at Force Headquarters. It was also found that greater effectiveness was achieved where a unit at each of the scenes of operations was dedicated solely to the task of reporting the current situation to central control by VHF radio. This accords with the scheme of communications set out in the chart, "Incident Radio Communications Network" contained in the cannunications section of the ACFO "Public Order General Guidance for Senior Police Officers" booklet and is RECDHHENIED. Scanned by CamScanner 5.15.3 Those Forces with "Command and those having a major incident 108 faCillty? foun ntrol of the efficient to dedicate one or more VDU's to the 02nd could keep incident. By this means, the officer in overall Gang] take informed himself completely in touch with developments an de loyment of decisions as to the supply, and rfef-eagve where it personnel and equipment. This was partlcularly e_ ed monitor. We was possible to transfer VDU entries onto a Group commend this practice and understand that - of the concerned with "logistics" are looking into the 0011130511310? "ideal" control room. STANDARD CALL SEN ispute had as many as three 5.16.1 Some operating during the de of the day. Such situations different call signs during the cours . . caused confusion and there is a cl ear need for an efflCIGrlt national mutual aid call sign structure which recognises that there may be separate deployments of individual sections of PSU 5. 5.16.2 We RECOMMEND that there should be a national mutual aid ca?hl Kicgg structure and we understand this aspect is being pursued by General Purposes Committee, Public Order Sub Comrnittee. TEN CODE 5.17.1 Experience has shown that the "Ten Code" meant different things to different Forces and this gave rise to confusion. 5.17.2 This problem was recognised by ACPO Communications Committee and a Working Party on the subject will shortly present their report for consideration. 0F RADIO Security of Radio Sites 5.18.1 The Directorate of Telecommunications has pointed out the fact that attacks were made on sane radio installations, during the period of the dispute. We RECOMMEND, therefore, that the Directorate should approach Forces with a view to taking such steps as may be necessary to ensure maximun security of hill-top radio sites and Directorate property. Transnission Security 5.19.1 It was apparent throughout the dispute that pol ice radio broadcasts were monitored by outside agencies, including the NUM, and this gave rise to occasional problems of security and operational efficiency. 5.19.2 Whilst it would be desirable to have total security of radio communications we are aware of the problems involved, not least those of cost and effectiveness. We RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Telecommunications should look again at this problem and issue Scanned by CamScanner I I I I I'm guidance to Forces KBILE RADIO 5.20.1 Sane Forces equipped their PSU's with mobile radio telephones as a means of communication and were generally well pleased with the facility. The radio telephone provided a more 'secure' means of communication and could be utilised when VHF radio was not compatible with local schemes or when radio communications were faulty. Whil at some congestion of the radio telephone schemewas occasionally experienced, developments in the cellular radio Iieic may offer even more attractive options for the future. 5.20.2 We RECOMMEND that each Force should possess portable radio telephones sufficient for issue to:? The officer in command at each location of operations; (ii) Any convoy sent from the Force. USE OF (B RADIO 5.21.1 The Directorate of Telecommications advises that as radios should not be used as a substitute for a telephone, due to CB radio being a very insecure mode of communication. We agree and RECOMMEND accordingly. Enumurr 5.22.1 During situations of disorder there were instances of loss and damage to radio equipment and, in some cases, of injury to Police Officers wearing 11:. 5.22.2 It is felt that methods of wear and of use of radio equipment should be investigated by a Working Party of ACFO Connunications Canaittee. We accordingly and feel that the Staff Associations should be represented on the Working Party. Scanned by CamScanner N0. 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 THE POLICING ARRANGEMENTS OF NATIGIAL UNIGI 0F MINDIORKEIB DISPUTE 198W 85 SEUDN GROUP - COMMUNICATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS tre should undertake Can The National Reporting demands for radio the task of co-ordinating equipment. In similar situations, whenever Forces are planning emergency communications. the Directorate should be asked for advice an guidance from the outset. The problem of incompatibility of VHF radios should be looked at by the Directorate as matter of urgency to ascertain whether an interim solution is possible during the NARC programme. Each Force should have AS A MINIMJM one VHF channel which can be dedicated totally to an - emergency or major incident without affecting the domestic use. The Directorate of Telecommunications should give consideration to the provision of emergency holdings of VHF radio equipment to be held aidier centrally or on a regional basis, and also consider the funding of such emergency holdings. The Directorate of Telecommunications should pursue the concept of the post WARC multi channel portable VHF set if this has not already been done. During the WARC change-over period the Directorate of Telecommunications should make available at regional or local depot level adequate supplies of covering all frequencies. More UHF frequencies should be made available both for nonmal and emergency use. One of these extra channels should be dedicated solely for use by PSU convoys. The Directorate of Telecommunications should pursue this issue as a matter of priority. PARA {3.010% 5.5.5 5.0.2 Scanned by CamScanner 121 123 125 126 127 128 A multi channel UHF radio (capable of up to 99 channels) should be introduced generally as soon as possible. When mutual aid is provided and until a multi- channel UHF set is adopted, the host Force should be responsible for the supply of compatible UHF radios. manual "Public Order General Guidance for Senior Police Officers" at paragraph 18.12 of the Communications section should be anended to provide for the issue of personal radios to PSU Sergeants and above, subject to operational necessity. The Directorate of Telecommunications should undertake research into public address systens (both hand-held and vehicle mounted) with a very high decibel output. The Directorate of Telecommunications should carry out research into the adequacy and positioning of aerials for UHF mobile base stations with a view to extending the range of transmission. The Directorate of Telecommunications should investigate the possibility of providing a "hands free" method of operating UHF personal radios suitable for use by Police motor- cyclists. We commend the practice of dedicating a unit at each scene of operations solely to the task of reporting the current situation to central control by VHF radio. This accords with the scheme of communications set out in the chart, "Incident Radio Camnunications Network". We commend the practice of dedicating one or more VDU's of camnand and control canputers to the control of incidents. We also commend the practice of transferring VDU entries on to a centralised monitor so that the officer in overall command may keep himself in touch with developnents and take informed decisions as to the supply, deployment and re?deployment of personnel and equipnent. There should be a national mutual aid call sign structure and we understand this aSpect is being pursued by the ACPO General Purposes Committee, Public Order Sub Committee. 5.10.2 5.12.2 5.13.3 5.1H.2 5.15.2 5015-3 5.16.2 Scanned by CamScanner 130 131 132 133 1314 The Directorate of Teleconmunications should approach Forces with a View to taking such as may be necessary to ensure max1mun security of hill?top sites and Directorate Property. ications should. radio transm1551on to Forces. io telephones The Directorate of Telecommun look again at the problen of security and issue guidance Forces should possess portable rad sufficient for issue to: (1) ?me officer in ccmmand at each location of operations; (ii) Any convoys sent away from the Force. Citizens Band Radio should not be used as a substitute for a telephone due to it being a very insecure mode of communication. ACPO Cmmunications Canmittee should set up a Working Party to investigate methods of wear and of use of radio equipment. Tne Staff Associations should be represented on the Working Party. 5.18.1 5.21.1 5.22.2 f?ii Scanned by CamScanner THE POLICIES ARRANGETENTS or THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEHORKERS DISPUTE 1984/85 TACTICAL OPTIONS IEPBERSTIP OF THE STUDY Payne QPM, DL, Chief Constable, Cleveland Constabulary (Chairman) Rostron Esq., QPM, Deputy Chief Constable, Gwent Constabulary Domaille Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police Dovaston Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Constabulary Morritt Esq., FBIM, Assistant Chief Constable, North Yorkshire Police A Weselby Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Nottinghamshir?e Police Jackson Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police Evans Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, West Midlands Police TERMS OF REFERENCE To examine the current guidance available to the service and its application to industrial disputes, including the dissemination of the Tactical Options Manual. 6.1.1 Our Group was tasked with the following:- (3) Assessing the principal tactical and equipment problems arising the pol icing of the NUM dispute; Making recommendations to improve the Tactical Options Manual. 6.1.2 The Group, which comprised one chief constable, one deputy and six assistant chief constables, all from forces who had experience of pol icing the NUM dispute selected the following topics for detailed examination:- (1) Tactical Options; (ii) Briefing and Debriefing; Command, Control and Cormnunications; (iv) Protective Equipment including the Identification of Intimidation and the role of CID in public disorder. 6.1.3 A canprehensive report detailing our findings has been compiled to assist in the preparation of amendments to the Tactical Options Manual. Because that report is largely of a technical nature it would not be pertinent to incorporate it into this rev iew. It will however, be passed to the Public Order Sub-Carmittee when the question of implementation is considered. Scanned by CamScanner BROAD STRATEY of the View that the 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 . . 1; this Group is . It is important to stress ?imal industrial disputes 15 not strategy for policing . required to res which on occasmns, was . Pond mirtafig?i? triaanty inci'dents which occurred dflent? :hef NUM dispute. The potential for disorder, which watsha :her aossphe NUM dispute, required, on occasions, morde ?is t: ens?e presence of police, traditionally clothed an e31 ppin,tr01 that disorder was either prevented or brought un er 0 erved that force strategy - ou obs . Amongst other things, the Study Gr ions of the NUM dispute for responding to some of the implicat needed to take account of measures for:? The defusing of potentially violent situations and a return to peaceful picketing; The control and dispersal of mass demonstrations; (C) The protection of non?striking miners travelling to and work; The protection of property, including that of the National Coal Board; and The preservation of the peace and the protection of life and property in the mining villages and towns. In referring to these issues, the Group bore in mind that there were often marked differences in the attitude, temper and behaviour of those taking part in the dispute in one area compared with another and, indeed, at different times in the dispute. Not surprisingly therefore, pol icing strategies varied from one pol ice area to another in order to reflect local circumstances and disorder potential. We have made no attempt to compare such different strategies. Not only would it require canparisons to be . drawn, which is quite outside the scope of this Review, but it would be misleading. . we would, however, comment that it was the clearly expressed desire of the service to maintain so far as possible, a traditional pol ice image, to depart it only when absolutely necessary, and to exercise the concept of the minimun use of force to achieve objectives. The Study Group concluded that strategy is a matter for individual chief constables to assess in the light of prevailing circumstances. In so doing thought must be given to the wider effects of strategy, particularly insofar as it may effect neighbouring forces and, to, what may be termed, service or global thinking on strategy. TACTICAL OPTIONS 6.3.1 The Study Group looked at two aspects:- Scanned by CamScanner How did the options contained in the Tactics; work. out in practice? What situations arose for which guidance was "3 6.3.2 The disorder experienced in the dispute differe: .1 street disorders in that it usually occurrecat places, at reasonably predictable times: @5333? I: degree of pre-planning albeit perhaps after. -., when serious disorder occurred, the patter 5 Of 9:55 ?fax?: 2: often similar to that of the 1981 street 5-19-35; 4; envirorment was often relatively open space rather 7-35 -3: streets. 6-3-3 With few exceptions the Tactical Options Karma; was Excerpt: a: have provided well founded tactics which were successzu. majority of occasions. Sane lessons were learnt, 633:?- use of verbal warning messages identifying inmvicua- makers and, that officers with long shields should not nor-La- deployed without accompanying short shieLd Such matters have been considered by our Group In has been prepared. It is RECOMMENDED that the g?danoe anal-"2 by the Group, which is of a detailed nature, tactical options, warning messages, the use of coatings officers equipped with long and short shields be ev ACPO Public Order Sub-Cannittee and, if accepted, put fon-?arc' :or inclusion into the Tactical Options Manual. 6.3.5 In making this recommendation the Study Group is co much of the detail for tactical options planning must be fluid take account of new lessons as they emerge. "n'e therefore take V164 that reviewing tactical options must be an ongoing task: for the Public Order Sub-Committee and the Forward Planning .it based on the lessons of experience and best practice. SPECIAL 6.4.1 Tho tactics which emerged during the HUM di5ptte are not precisely covered in the Tactical Options Hanual. The first of these related to the blockading of roads and motorways. The second concerned the anbushing of vehicles driven by persons intending to lawfully enter industrial premises. Both tactics revealed a need for a positive police response embracing the following:- Regular reconnaissance by police along the routes concerned; Effective preventive measures, including control of strategic points, for example, access roads and key junctions; Adequate protection for escorts; and Equipped PSU's in a position to respond quickly. The Study Group has prepared guidance to deal with the blockadirg of roads and motorways, the assoc1ated tactic of using 510: moving Scanned by CamScanner thereb other road?users an draw inconvergiegfsg of vehicles- It is RECOMMENDED that, the am US the ACPO Public Order Sub?Committee considered bl, Options Manual. convoys to attention, an this guidance be for inclusion in the Tactics TACTICS arious forces during the course rable public Garment. Although 6.5.1 The use of intercept tactics by ce was not new, its legality of the NUM dispute produced conside tactic by the poll 22:31:12 tbkyizhe courts, both civil and criminal. The courts held that it was perfectly legitimate f3: wgepol ice to use such tactics in the interests of preventing sor . 6.5.2 There is no doubt that intercept tactics preventing excessive numbers of hpiolfc?qij/Lglemgrilzorder was avoided designated locations. Thus, muc pong to take stronger measures without recourse to the police havi to deal with actual disorder. To be effective the Group concluded that intercept tactics require the following:? Good intelligence and a high degree of liaison between forces; Flexible planning and the ability to redeploy police resources rapidly. 6.5.3 The Tactical Options Manual gives some guidance under the_heading 'Checkpoints? but this requires enlarging in the of experience during the NUM dispute. The Group has prepared specific guidance on intercept and turn- back tactics and we RECOMMEND that such guidance be considered by the Public Order Sub-Committee for inclusion in the Tactical Options Manual. 6.5.5 Our Group has also considered the implications of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1981!, in relation to intercept tactics. The power to turn-back vehicles is at common law and reflects the duty on the police to preserve the peace. Nothing in the Act alters this common law duty and accordingly it does not modify the power and responsibilities of the police in this regard. Where, in order to prevent a breach of the peace, road checks are set up to stop and turn?back persons intending to go to a specific site, the authority under the Act is not required. DISPUTES 6.6.1 As previously stated, whilst the tactical guidance contained in the Tactical Options Manual was found to be suitable for responding to a great many of the incidents which occurred during the NUM dispute, it is the Groups view that further specific guidance in relation to industrial and trades disputes could usefully be contained in the Manual. Our Group has gathered a wide-range of potential guidance for the service relating to industrial and trades disputes and we RECOMMEND that the Public Scanned by CamScanner at ?$1111 ?$311110? our 111131111113 1?1? n12?- 11~? \sz?mt. autumn: 1? ~15 1?11. 1w 1m: \w?mm uw 111?.? uh?? \vaas alt?! 11:1?1?19111?11?1 1111 1? ?1 ?11 1931 111:31?1?1?2wt?1x? qwuncml pm?nw-n 2.x x?nwdx 31:11:19.9 11? 11% serum ?what? ?0?qu ?11 ?13 Nt? \mt 1?11?11?11? szvoii?ix? 11? ?1.2m 111$ 1?m?131?1?1. .11 1111 14111123] Aid 1 1.1 113? a \Yl? 0? 10"] the "?1111 sew-1?11: 1v 1111111191: 51:1?1?. ?1101? 11?1? 3? 1?0: 1 1: s: 13? Favor ?1r? 11? 3?11 35110613 131? 11? 1:1?1?113?1 :1?11??a1?h 11? be a111?1?1e11 11? relation to :w?1.?11?1.1.v 133?? 1?1! Own?: ?11::?1Wr31101? ?ax-1:110 or piokvts, 1a-y1$ s?v. 113011 1?3? 1\1? informanon 3121011111 1w snmw?WJ by a 1?3?161?1?15 mckasa 1?1?1??11151 11113 mlwriei?ing 310?? 1:5 3115:7211 113:". of 1111?1wa1i1xnmamgmont. 1?1?11? :3 3:31?1?1?1?1?131? 1:11;. Tcams :11 an early stage of ?Ms imludc? training 111?1??a\? nw?r?. 1111.110 um 1?1 ?1131 aids and other 16mi?1zw. ma 1?21" 1631? 31:01:11? also 1111111116 Jewiet?ing. 1? ($513; 1?33 11:19:: 1 11 1111? present guidance ?1.112.132 11? 11w 391111? 11?1c1?11?q?13n11 doi? ici?iug and are of the 111-1 ?11 3?1?1?1?11?. he 1:2?1 her and more detailed 51.1.1.1 1? 1112.1? 11? 11w Ta1?1i1a?1 Options Manual. Our 1 1. are 11? 31.1: 1111-11 1111-3 should be gussn?. 11? we 1 1 ?1?1101? Sub-1?1w11100 11? be considered for ?12? 1?1?11111115 Mama}. am no MI Cu 111?? 15 man? 1M1 11911111911 to incident omnand cert: :?as New given bi the Group reviewing Logistics who haw 11-11111: .1 :xr?oer 111? Nonetheless, we are of the 111?s: 1 ?11 does \M?t?ant some 21131111111111: by our Group as 1w ?wand and control is a prerequisite for tactical success. .15 was :?emxzmapd 1x1 the 1111131113 Stun Gmup, we have concluded 1N11?11te11 llk?h?kt?t Nutrol and Mardimtion were Vital at fave 191 el and um the task could not be handled in the normal mu tawny: ran-1?1- optimum: roam Scanned by CamScanner up has per detailtgigcour Sci-1x11125385? The Study ro see - 1 n: 6.83 dent that our should be inc1 operational structures, CO command. We . . contleiiltimthpesgublic Order Sub?commutes to be consicere fer pass the Tactical Options Manual. inclusion in concern the use by forces of 6.8.1! We have also noted Pugh (figufirent nanenclature. ?mesa facmrs ntrol problans 1: nt terminology an . operations "1115:1331 31 nd designations and that the termino ogy - - Ma 1 communications codes, contained in the 2231322515310; should be followed by forces to ensure carmona 1 throughout the service. hieve alread been done by forces to ac yt. An implication of the MM 5! 6-9.1 work has relation to equipment for standardisation of equipnen was to emphasise this need in particularly protective equipment. 6.9.2 In view of the very large nunbers of officers deployed through mutual aid, it is not surprising that sane were not capable a result such PSU's were, on of bein fully equipped. As occasiogs, at some risk when in front line operations where violence was at its worst. anders need to know that equipnent is available 5-9.3 Operational comn dering deployment and the for all trained officers when consi range of duties to be undertaken. erever PSU's form mutual This Study Group is of the view that wh aid, such units should be self contained and the personnel capable of being fully equipped. We are aware of the recommendations of the Study Groups examining mutual aid and training and agree their respective findings, which we see as complementary, in regard to both protective equipment and training, for all mutual aid PSU officers. 6.9.5 We RECOMMEND that the Public Order Forward Flaming Unit be tasked with establishing cannon minimum levels of personal protective equipnent for all PSU's when on mutual aid. PROTECTED PCLICE The report of the Public Order Forward Pl annin 19814 commented that there was much vehicles used to transport PSU's during the NUH dispute Furthermore, there were variations in the amount of protection afforded to pol ice owned PSU vehicles. 6.10.1 6.10.2 It is considered that such diversit arises from a factors, none of which can be resolved by the service ralallmober 05 reflects the following:- ne an Scanned by CamScanner . i I ?a ?We: az?rzoers? grits tc toe dtspute. - A . x? "saw Nice .mc. NM et? \du? mi pron? :cr. \q . u: tn? trarsrert durzru tee ereseu?ces. resuittrs we ms :rsr-s; . It . . \e 3?36 tact tl?st (her is currert tees! \el?tcm ?rst or mun the \u 15'110 1?8. zcz?. er!) tour thee. m. :1 ans. 1. in! titre threes the My ire: minutes d?nw?l?h?d,? sti?e tr-?Zers to esrr} muttuwnt. and others used ?1 A sent-ire: eitzc?. es (Nih? .. is ereu; 2s snare ?rst we Stuit drcur er has made :?ecnrr?emistiers Erich lend to the adoption 01? specit?h? \?elziclets? for use ?ey Cur Grcur that those :eec .eu??uicm uczgd, make the {Ask til? detail ins S?retectii :?er 3?31? vehicles were xeasible. IMIFICATIGI (T FCLICE SIIPRRT nth! Respite the exist nee dt? guidel ines on the identification of both PS2: relic). es and their persmnel. mun-01 ?es care to light during tl'e Nth". dis; :te. Fer exszt?ple. sure forces sent i?SU's without. the i?eree :izu?eer being displ sired or. either the Vehicle or police perse 'neL. As 3 result supervisory ei?t?ieers lest contact. with their men and men lost contact with their vehicles JR: problems were experienced in respect of the use of mu esl l-signs. An early report. shcwed that. every force receiving mutual aid operated a different. system or cemmnmi. control and suns ??is resulted in sane PSU's being allocated several a-U ?3 l? 331.5 me tire-up were umnimeus that. a combined identification and enl 1- 315:: system should be introduced for use by mutual aid l?s?u's. ?og-ever, the call-signs should be of an al pha-nuneric type and designed to give 3 cl ear identification of the donor Force, as gel; as the mr icular unit. The Group seeordingly RECOMMEND that the Forward Planning Unit be tasked to produce. such a cal l?sign struetzre :?dr evaluation by the Public Order Sub-Committees ?me mining. dispute of 198W85 produced many forms of intimidation i ?ludins mass picketing, assaults, criminal damage and threats. ?mese may be smarised as follows:- Scanned by CamScanner MASS VPICKETIK: 6.13.1 ASSAULTS 6.14.1 DAHKEE 6.15.1 THREATS 6.16.1 (DEBATIV 6.17.1 of pickets were . - nunbers and moo . Sions the weight 0 'ate p01 Whites, intimidstorx- 3013,1933?: recommended to deal with intimida Bf lar concern were the been prepared by our Group- . '1e demonstrators. Where 23:11.; gatherings of femal: worth noting that they were 1 a 16 co eag reassurance of ample support from "1.8 . attempt to defuse - ce in a . campaigns were introduced by the p011 . informatlgn on the such situations. eaders 0 ensure relevant law and were distri ket 1 ctionS. This was their awareness to the consequences found to be an effective tactical option. route to and from work,? it throughout the cannunities, ims were sometimes found reprisal. In addition to attacks on workers en was noted that assaults were prevalent and often of an opportunist nature. hot to be reluctant to canplain for fear of cars and even the domestic pets of legitimate targets for attack, Equally sinister were the In some communities the homes, working miners were considered especially during the night hours. . attacks on the property belonging to those dispensmg JUSthe. Many instances of damage occurred to property owned by the National Coal Board and ccmpanies servicing the coal industry or consuners of its product. A particularly insidious form of intimidation was that taking the form of threats of physical violence to the wives and children of working miners. It was often extremely difficult to prevent or detect offenders as they usually preserved their anonymity by use of telephones. Links with colliery management were found effective to voice police concern at such activities, to provide greed-black ogiofftenceds where the victim was reluctant to contact po ice rec an to rovide worst affected. f80111tles for rehousmg those PEASURES Intensified Patrols Despite the often intensive pol ice 0 . . . perations nec miiung communities, local police officers were 1121?:th po we normally. Such officers were able to'identify community . agdistiioonlzland lrecommend appropriate responses. Where necessary p0 1ce presence was also anF?haSised by intensified use Scanned by CamScanner 6.17.2 6.17.3 6.17.4 6.17.5 6.17.6 6.17.7 of liveried pol ice vehicles. Vulnerable property similarly received additional police attention ran uniformed personnel. Cc-mity Interveners There is ample advice available in the Tactical options Manual detailing carmunity interveners. Where the principal 1ndustr?y of a community was coal mining it was found that useful contact could be made by the police with NCB officials who could often act as effective community interveners. The importance 0f haying contacts well established and know to local P01ice officers was emphasised. The Courts Scme areas experienced difficulty convening adequate numbers Of courts to deal with the many offenders arrested. In scme areas, Justices disqualified themsel ves, declaring an interest in the coal industry. A considerable backlog of cases built up. Consequently the Lord Chancellor appointed a nunber of Stipendiar'y Magistrates on a temporary basis, which successfully resolved the problem. Besetting Where appropriate, the offence of besetting was charged. Although the use of this offence was, until the dispute, relatively rare, it was found to meet particular incidents. This fact has been identified to the Group examining legislation in relation to the Public Order Act on behalf of ACPO. Dedicated Telemones A confidential telephone line for the use of victims of intimidation was installed in one force area. Abusive and hoax calls were received but they did not detract from the overall value of such a telephone system. Auto Index In certain areas an auto index was maintained which assisted in the identification of vehicles owned by those strikers bail ed by the courts with conditions, curfews, to keep away from NCB property, etc. Such an index should be computerised as immediate retrieval is frequently an operational necessity. The role of the CID in Public Disorder Surveillance and intelligence gathering are, in the main a proper CID function in public disorder situations. Although our has considered the range of guidance that should be available to the service, it is considered that any input on these matters should await the findings and recommendations of the Group examining intelligence. However, the NUM dispute drew attention to the value of having CID officers used in a supporting role in public disorder, particularly where major crime enquiries are required, follow-up enquiries are needed, or preparation of complicated file papers is necessary. Many of the options Scanned by CamScanner tions Manual are actually of the Tactical 0p are to other fonns of available in Section 3 they applicable to trade disputes as criminal disorder. 6.17.8 Anti?intimidation Sal-d! Where employed, these squads were effective particularly in relation to serious crime. Though, conversely, many or their investigations were into an offence of a rel ativelb? minor nature, the intimidation factor elevated their status. It was the uads that they experience of those forces shed such sq can have severe man a protracted dispute power implications, and i COnSideration may need to be given to detective officers being supplied through mutual aid. i Scanned by CamScanner? 135 11110 1141 142 RBIIEWEERICIEMMWIBE NATIQIAL 0F HINWORKEIB DISPUTE 1984/95 TACTICAL OPTIONS The preparation of tactic? guidance must be ongoing but that the guidance prepared the Group in relation to warning messages, the use of combinations of long and short shields be evaluated by the Public Order Sub-Camittee. Tactical options in relation to blOCkading of motorways and anbushing of vehicles prepared by the Study Group be evaluated for inclusion in the Tactical Options Manual. That the tactics relating to intercept points be evaluated for inclusion in the Tactical Options Manual. That the guidance gathered by the Study Group examining tactics dealing with industrial and trades disputes be evaluated for inclusion in the Tactical Options Panual. That further and more detailed guidance be prepared in relation to briefing and debriefing and be included in the Tactical Options Manual. That the Study Group's findings in relation to operational structures, incident oonmand, sector cannand, incident control and PSU earmand be incorporated into the Tactical Options Manual. That the Public Order Forward Planning Unit be tasked with establishing cannon minimun levels of personal protective equipnent for all mutual aid PSU's. That the Forward Planning Unit be tasked to prepare a national standard call-sign structure linked with personnel and vehicle identification. PARA 6.3.14 6.11.2 6.5.4 6.6.1 6.7.5 6.8.3 6.9.5 6.11.3 #1 Scanned by CamScanner mm: 01-? ms mucxm OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF Hmmomcsas DISPUTE 19811/85 FINANCE PEBERS-IIP 0F STUDY Mr A Goodson OBE, QPM, LLB, Chief Constable of Leicestershire was Chairman of the Group for its first two meetings but due to other commitments was replaced by Mr Nobes LLB, Chief Constable of North Yorkshire. The other members of the Group were:- Burke ESL, BA, Deputy Chief Constable, Warwickshire Constabulary (Secretary) A YOUNG Esq., Ccmnander, A.8 Branch, Metropolitan Police Watson Esq., BA, Assistant Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police Plackett Esq., DNA, FCIM, Administrative Officer, Nottinghanshire Constabulary Supt. Caple, BA, Leicestershire Constabulary TERPB OF REFERENCE The initial terms of reference for the Study Group were to develop a Service View as to the content of any future circular advice dealing with major/ large scale aid. Also, to formulate a common pol icy for the payment of hours of duty performed, expenses and other borrowed services arising through mutual aid. At the first meeting of the group when the fact that the Home Office were also in the process of producing a new draft circular became known, the working group's terms of reference were amended as follows:- Tc review the financial aspects of existing Hone Office Circulars, or any proposed changes in these circulars, dealing with mutual aid; to identify such financial problems as emerged from the recent industrial dispute in the mining industry and to make recommendations about the principles to be embodied in any future circular; and to identity the problems that may arise in forming common pol icy for the payment of hours of duty performed, expenses and other operating services arising through mutual aid. 'Ihese amended terms of reference were agreed by the President of ACPO. Scanned by CamScanner nrmowCI'ION at the Home 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3 nded a meeting The Chairman or the working group paper was examined. The Office on 10th May 1985 when a new taken by ACPO on this Chairman pointed out the eing underould be Very relevant subject and sugge of the Am to the contents of a new Circular. to consult their and ACC who were present also ind members before agreeing such a paper. issues further at a later date. It was accepted by the group that with the time 5":ihewhat are very them it would be impossible to deal in detail wtl) 'dentifying the controversial issues and they would essestial iv 1 problems and bringing them to the no ice 0 to appropriate, recommendations which were considered suitable resolve these problems heir three occasmns and wish to express Mr Chatrath of the Audit information and help from the The members sat on appreciation to Mr I PicWell an Commission and all Forces for the detailed . supplied to them on the financial implications arising large scale deployment of mutual aid. ACWNTABJLITY 7.2.1 7.2.2 It was identified that finance played a considerable part in the question of the accountability of Chief Constables and has significant implications so far as his operational independence was concerned. The group were conscious of the fact that the question of the Chief Constable?s accountability was being examined by another group but felt the ?we were inextricable. It was felt the present position imposed an unreasonable constraint upon a Chief Constable's operational decisions at a time when his thoughts should be wholly directed towards operational problems. A new circular needs to identify in unequivocal terms the principles for funding incidents of such major proportions as to take them outside normal policing activity. The circular needs to encompass both payment for mutual aid and escalating costs within the force. A model for achieving this might be definin regulation under the general provisions yof Sectiong 3: 31120331113122 Act ?19614. When a_policing operation of major proportions and out51de normal pol icing activity occurs where expenditure in excess of an'agreed percentage of the appropriate authority's rates has been incurred the Pol ice Authority or the Chief Constable (if they are in dispute) can a roach of central funding. pp he Hone Secretary for a declaration Ideally there is a further need . in the event. of th in Circumstances where the Shiiggecsoicrtetgiy at there existed a considerable threat :oathe maintenance of law and 0rd . er Courts to resolve the impasse: or for recourse to the It is RECOMMENDED that Pol ice A prousion be made unde 196? that ?he? 3 P0110318 099ration ro?e?ut?i?grito?i$? Scanned by CamScanner occurs, and expenditure on that operation amounts to an agreed percentage of the appropriate authority's rates, for the Police Authority or the Chief Constable to approach the Home Secretary for a declaration that further costs be met from central funding. DEFINITION OF THE VARIGJS FORDB (I: AID 7-3-1 7.3.2 Home Office Circular 1314/73 identifies three categories of aid small scale aid, large scale aid and major aid, indicating the financial implications of each. It had been considered that these three categories were mutually exclusive and one or other was intended to cover every eventuality. However recent events and decisions by the Home Secretary as promulgated in Parliamentary answers and Home Office Circular 5/85 indicate a considerable blurring between the forms of aid until then clearly defined. In the light of this recent experience it is RECOMMENDED that mutual aid be categorised as fol lows:? Snall Scale Aid For which no charge is generally levied and rel ating to casual assistance from relatively small mmbers of officers on a quid pro quo basis. Specialist Aid Where officers are provided by one Force to another normally to undertake a specialist task in circumstances where, because of the particular skills, the recurring basis of the provision of aid, or because of the duration of the period of aid, no reciprocity is possible. In such circumstances the full economic cost of the aid should be met by the aided force. Large Scale Aid Where mutual aid is provided otherwise than as defined in small scale or specialist aid then that aid will be recompensed by payment on the scale of a standard charge for a Police Support Unit devised from a mathematical model which comprises the notional cost of an average PSU together with an element for consequential costs. STANDARD CHARGES FOR RITUAL AID POLICE SUPPORT UNITS 7.4.1, 7.14.2 It is accepted that due to a nunber of variables Such as length of service, rest day, etc., the actual costs can vary between one PSU and another. However, the administrative tasks necessary to identify and collate the particular costs of each PSU is very great and raises the question of identifying a standard charge for a PSU. This approach could obviously create anomolies of over and underpayment in relation to the actual costs incurred by the aiding authority. These are, however, likely to balance out over time. A mathematical model identifying the average service, the proportion on average on rest day, etc., of the notional PSU is Scanned by CamScanner reducing the massive and realistic This model, which additional costs falling ential upon the aiding force and inc . lanetnatkgogcgg?ietquof the costs, would need two scales in order to 't and Provincial differing rates of pay between Metropoli an officers. ges both in anta rable a iding an earl seen to have oonside administrativ assessment of it is considered inciple support fact that it is essentially a Authorities. There is need notional model and it or CIPFA with ertise. 7.11.3 The Audit Commission have been consulted and in pr the concept whilst identifying the matter for the Home Office and Loca . for some expert advice as to formulating the may well be that the Society of County Treasurer sane input from the Receiver's Office could prov1de tha exp The cost of vehicles used for transporting PSD's also needs examining as a wide variety of costs per mile for Similar vehicles is evident. Standard charges, based upon vehicle type and engine size, for police owned vehicles is seen as deSirable. It 15 accepted that the actual costs for hired vehicles will have to be met by the aided Forces. model be devised to Support Unit based th an element for 7.4.5 It is RECOMMENDED therefore that a mathematical identify a notional standard charge for a Police upon the additional costs incurred together wi consequential costs. It is further RECOMMENDED that standard mileage charges be devised 7.4.6 for police vehicles used by PSU's based upon vehicle type and engine size. 7.5.1 The recent dispute has highlighted significant administration problems for both aiding and aided Forces in the accurate recording and checking of the very detailed records which were considered necessary by some Treasurers and Auditors in order to provide adequate information upon which a proper level of scrutiny could be undertaken An agreed standard charge for a PSU will obvioiusly obv1a'te some of this work but there is still a need for standard forms which record sufficient information to support a claim for payment without imposing unreasonable demands upon either authority in the preparation or checking of the documents It is worth mentioning that recent experience has shown it is virtuall 3:23:11: fin; adn atirded Force to check properly the accuracy of ml 0 er than where obvious errors themselves occur. Standa on the forms do mum to alleviate thisrirglbiragn?s and standard documentation will 7.5.2 It is RECOMMENDED that stand . . ard docunentation a the Audit Comnussmn be used when cl aims for mu?fda?i sauralet-"ambaldee by Scanned by CamScanner SIJFERMJPERARY OFFICERS 7.6.1 When PSU's are deployed on mutual aid, it has become the practice with some Forces to deploy additional supporting officers and civilian staff to service the mutual aid being provided. This support ranges from one senior officer responsible for welfare, liaison etc., to large administrative units, mechanics, drivers etc. The presence of a large number of additional personnel imposes considerable logistic burdens on the aided Force, specially where overnight accommodation is being provided and in most instances they merely duplicate the aided Force's logistics and welfare provisions. 7.6.3 It is That no additional officers or civilian personnel accompany mutual aid other than in accordance with an agreed scale, and; That where additional supporting staff is required that it be requested by the aided Force. '11! WORKED DAY 7.7.1 The great disparity between definitions of the working day adopted by different Forces causes confusion and inequity when officers from different Forces are working together. In many Forces the working day conmences at midnight, in others 6am and yet other 7am Again, when providing mutual aid, some Forces identify their working day as starting at the time the officers leave their hone Force with all subsequent days commencing on the daily anniversary of that time. Instances occur of disparity in payment being made to officers working identical periods of duty due to the different starting and finishing times of their particular day. In addition, such variations add considerably to the administrative load. 7.7.2 The recent experience does indicate a need for a cannon definition of the working day but it is accepted that any definition could raise problems depending upon the particular shift system worked so far as the interpretation and Regulation is concerned. Should a common working day be agreed, the opportunity to provide standard interpretations of Police Regulations so far as the tours of duty which continue beyond the completion of the standard working day, overtime, the start time of a rest day, etc., become possible. 7.7.3 The inadequacy of existing regulations and circulars to deal with long term and major operations outside the compass of normal policing operations is self evident. Therefore these cannents and recommendations are suitable only for the routine use of mutual aid. In section ten we comment upon the desirability of having special regulations to deal with wholly exceptional circunstances. Scanned by CamScanner It is RECO 1 a standard working That the Police Negotiating Board def day, and; terpretations of Board agree in That the Police Negoiil?gi 1:80 the working day. the Regulations apperta THE NEED FOR SPECIAL REGULATIONS ispute identified the ations, Home Office Circulars and Police 0 deal with Negotiating Board Circulars were totally i?deaqnuftihfeat to the the situations which arise when a signi 0 ion as a scale and durat maintenance of law and order occurs 0 unbers of police officers lo ment of very large 2: $323.23 $31 (fig lbong periods of time. In particulagi Tull: 3:221; authoritative interpretation of Home Office and PNB i created the fact that they are not supported by legisl at on, difficulties which have not yet been resolved. 7.8.2 After examination of many alternatives the group have come to the conclusion that circulars, whilst valuable in normal Circumstances, are unsuitable for dealing with energencies on the scale recently experienced. The police service is the principal emergency service and thus it is arguable that the Regulations governing its conditions of service and administration must take account of all the situations they may face. It follows, therefore, that special regulations should be drafted to deal with the most serious of circumstances. The effect of these special regulations would of necessity have to replace normal existing regulations when invoked. 7.8.1 The unforeseen circunstances of the recent fact that Police Regul 7.8.3 A possible procedure for invoking such regulations is for the Chief Constable(s) who are requesting mutual aid, to decide after consultation with those Chief Constables providing the aid to bring special regulations formally into effect. Special regulations would need to define simply and clearly the conditiions of service of officers deployed on mutual aid, in particular in respect of payment and living conditions. The group are aware of representations being made to the PNB in respect of special allowances for officers living away from bone on mutual aid but it is felt that a simpler approach is desirable. Experience has shown that even in the most serious of incidents officers rarely worked for 16 hours and when on duty spend a significant part of their time on stand-by where it is posible to rest and relax. Therefore it does seem equitable for some degree of give- and-take to prevail. In the light of this the following considerations should be examin . regulations:- ed when drafting 5990131 Officers sh ul of 24 hours? normally have 8 hours rest during each period They should be awarded 16 hou duty not greater than that occas1ons when duty periods rs pay for periods of actual unber of hours. On the very rare exceed 16 hours, an additional 4 Scanned by CamScanner hours payment be made but where duty exceeds 20 hours, payment for 2H hours be met; (C) These regulations, when invoked, should apply whether officers travel daily or are billetted; In such exceptional circumstances it must be accepted that sleeping accommodation may not be of normal standards but the reasonably generous rate of pay does take account of this; In view of the generous rate of pay for officers below the rank of Superintendent no additional allowances are considered necessary; Officers above the rank of Chief Inspector living away from home who do not receive any additional salary should be provided with an allowance to cover incidental expenses; (8) That these costs be included in the mathematical model for the notional cost of a PSU. 7 .8.5 It is RECOMMENDED that where a threat to the maintenance of law and order is of such scale or likely duration that existing regulations, HO Circulars and PNB Circulars are inadequate to govern conditions of service and administration, that Special Regulations are invoked superceding normal regulations and making such special provisions for pay, allowances and conditions of service as are necessary to police the situation. SIBSISTEIIQ CLAIIB AND ENTERTAINPENT ALLGIANCES 7.9.1 Where the aided Force makes full provision to provide all meals for mutual aid, then subsistence allowances cannot be justified. There may be a need, however, to pay subsistence to cover the period of travel to and from the aided Force if meals are not provided and where police regulations apply. 7.9.2 It is recognised that officers living away from home do incur some additional expenditure but the overall level of payment being recommended, we believe, compensates for this. 1 7.9.3 No evidence has been elicited to substantiate the need for entertainment allowances to be paid to liaison officers attached to mutual aid units. Therefore, the group consider no provision need be made for such allowances. 7.9.4 It is That where all meals are provided, no subsistence claims be met, and; When meals are not available, subsistence/refreshment allowance be paid in accordance with regulations. Milk. Scanned by CamScanner MID-BY . ST vision for mutual aid and uested to make PTO 7.10.1 in the home Force but 15 wholly be operationally er Force and therefore, canno comInitteg ?ftgg?uilts home Forde, then it does seem reasonable to mm: the aided Force to meet the costs incurred in accordance with the standard PSU charges envisaged. icers are wholly committed to where off . It 15 RECOMMENDED a at Force be respon31ble for the stand-by duty for another Force, th costs incurred. 7.10.2 COIBEDUENTIAL AND DIRECT (DSTS com ensin costs incurred by the home Force as a 7.11.1 The concept of re which is not consequence of providing mutual aid is a new concep particularly clearly defined. Hane Office Circular 5/85 relates only to the miners dispute and the principles of consequential costs need to be identified in any future circular or regulations and those indicated in H0 Circular 5/85 expanded to take account Of all costs properly incurred by any Forces as a result of the abnormal activities. For example, non-police personnel, such as traffic wardens and control roan staff, may be required to perform duties on overtime which would otherwise have been undertaken by regular officers. Not only personnel but equipment, clothing and vehicles are also subject to additional use, increasing the rate of wear and tear and depreciation, thus shortening the normal replacement time. These consequential costs should form part of the mathematical model to be added to the cost of the PSU for the aiding Force. In the case of the aided Force similar considerations need to be examined when central funding is invoked and the actual cost of extra wear and tear identified and reimbursed. 7.11.2 It is That any new Home Office Circular or regulations on mutual aid includes an elenent for consequential costs as a part of mathematical model of notional costs of a That consequential costs take account of all those itens for :h?tch cl aims can properly be made against the aided force, 3 That when central funding is invoked th actual cost of wear and tear, etc., on the host force's resources be reimbursed. ERRED AID 7'12-1 32:26}: tskiixgioush breakdown 'of law and order is threatened there aided Forcenet: on occa31ons._ to transfer mutual aid fran one costs. When ce inoiher, Greatlng difficulties in apportioning occurs these funding on the scale of the miners dispute authorit? 1 ?Flues are ameliorated but when police me are respon31b1e for funding there is a need to identify Scanned by CamScanner . 7.12.2 7.12.3 an equitable method for apportioning those costs. A_possible solution is for the initial host Force retuinirw, the liability for accommodation and thereafter the costs be apportioned pro rate between the various Forces benefiting from that aid. It is RECOMMENDED that there is need for an eq ui table method of." apportioning the costs of mutual aid transferred from one receiving Force to another. Scanned by CamScanner 1?43 11m 145 'Ihat rovision be made under Se Polio: Act 1961!, that when a 110mg 0f such proportions occurs and ex cen Operation amounts to an agreed per the Police authority's rates, ?03; a proa Authority or the Chief Constable tpfurther Hone Secretary for a declaration the costs be met central funding. Ihat mutual aid be categorised as follows:? 7.3.2 (3) Snell Sale Aid For which no charge is generally levied and relating to casual assistance fran relatively anall nunbers of officers on a quid pro quo basis. SpeCialist Aid Where officers are provided by one Force to another normally to undertake a specialist task in circumstances where, because of the particular skills, or the recurring basis of the provision of aid, or because of the duration of the period of aid, no reciprocity is possible. In such circun? stances the full economic cost of the aid should be met by the aided Force. (0) Large Scale Aid Where mutual aid is provided otherwise than as defined in small scale or specialist aid then that aid will be recompensed by payment on the scale of a standard charge for a Police Support Unit devised from a mathe- matical model which canprises the notional cost. of an average PSU together with an elenent for consequential costs. That a mathematical model be . ev lead to i standard charge for a Police 33:32:? 5 to eth se upon the additional costs incurred er with an element for consequential costs 1 Scanned by CamScanner 1146 147 1?31 152 155 156 158 Ihat standard mileage charges be devised for police vehicles used by Police Support Units based upon vehicle type and engine size. That standard dccmentation agreed as suitable by the Audit Cannission be used when claims tor mutual aid are made. That no additional officers or civilian persomel accompany mutual aid PSU's other than in accord- ance with an agreed scale. That where additional supporting staff is required that it be requested by the aided Force. That the Police Negotiating Board define a standard working day. lhat the Police Negotiating Board agree inter- pretations of the Regulations appertaining to the working day. 'lhat where a threat to the maintenance of law and order is of such scale or likely duration that .11 7.0.5 7.7.11 7.8.5 existing Regulations, HO Circular and PNB Circulars are imdeqmte to govern conditions of service and administration, that Special Regulations are invoked superceding normal Regulations and making such special provisions for pay, allowances and conditions of service as are necessary to police the situation. 'Ihat where all meals are provided, no subsistence claims be met. Ihat when meals are not available, subsistence/ refreshment allowance be paid in accordance with Regulations. That where officers are wholly comnitted to stand- by duty for another Force, that Force be responsible for the costs incurred. mat any new Hone Office Circular or Regulations on mutual aid include an element for consequential costs as part of the mathematical model of notioml costs of a PSU. 'Ihat consequential costs take account of all those itans for which claims can properly be made against the aided Force. That when central ?nding is invoked, the actual cost of wear and tear, etc., on the host Force's resources be reimbursed. 7.9.11 7.9.11 7.10.2 7.11.2 7.11.2. 7.11.2 Scanned by CamScanner - thod of - an eqmtahl? me 7.12. 159 That then? :Smngegogg of transferred 3 tiomn no . receiving Force to a Scanned by CamScanner REVIEH (F PILICDB FOR NAIICIIAL OF DISPUTE 1984/85 PAPER PREPARED BY Bunyard Esq., 0PM, Chief Constable, Essex Police TERPB OF REFERENCE Tc: assess whether the Dispute has revealed significant gaps in the current eXtent and quality of training at all levels within the Serv1ce._ To identify if the Service requires minimun specified standards for Tactical Band public order training. 8.1.1 The NUM Dispute tested Public Order Training and Mutual Aid organisation to the full. It gave a tremendous opportunity for an exchange of ideas and it lasted long enough to allow a good deal of 'on the job' training for all ranks. There were failings and those failings highlighted problems in relation to the training of all ranks in Public Order techniques. Following the riots of 1981 great efforts were made to ensure that the pol ice were better equipped and trained to handle such situations in the future, and this resulted generally in an over-emphasis on riot?type disorder. Having concentrated public order training predcminantly on the control of serious and violent disorder for two or three years the problems of Greenham Common, the NUM Dispute and latterly Molesworth have highlighted the need for a tremendous range of- skills and flexibility of approach from those in command on the ground when deciding upon police action. From the extremely interesting cannents and reccmnendations received from various forces there is clearly a need to look closely at the likely role of each rank in a public disorder situation, examine the problems they are likely to face and then design a training package which covers the full spectrun of their training needs. (DHSTABLEB AND 8.2.1 It is apparent that all constables and sergeants may be called upon to deal with Public Order problems. It is equally apparent that these problems range fran the minor incident which can be dealt with in a very low key fashion up to and including a full?scale riot. Given this diversity it is apparent that all officers must receive familiarisation training to a common national standard. This training will be mainly to ensure that each and every constable and Scanned by CamScanner .J 8.2.3 8.2.1! 8.2.5 8.2.6 sergeant knows the basics of our response to Public Order problems. There should be no exceptions to this principle an 1?3 therefoge follows that CID officers and women pol ice_off1cers ShOUl-ih-e included in the programs irrespective of their ?11,1? forces. Despite our earlier comments on the role of women P0 lee officers in relation to (see Mutual Aid? we nanhF??less consider that such officers should receive first-tier training We take this view in order that the service can be sure that Sigch officers have received training appropriate for those occaSlons en they may be required to undertake public order duties. This first level of training can be given once and then repeated every other year. Initially the main effort will have to be made by individual forces but then it should also be included in the programme for recruits which will ensure a steady lessening 0f force input. The programme presently being constructed by the Central Planning Unit and the Fomard Planning Unit 3) should prOVIde 01? this most basic level of training and should be instituted without any amendation. It is only when this situation has been achieved that we can genuinely talk of the Police Service being trained to a cannon minimun standard. We RECOMMEND accordingly. Such training will need to provide an element of theory as well as practice. It is essential that officers understand the law in relation to Public Order and have some awareness of crowd and the role of the media at Public Order incidents. Equally 13 important that policing methods in relation to particular events such as Royal visits, football matches, marches and demonstrations are explained and discussed so that a flexible response becomes part of the mental armoury of the Service as well as part of its capacity. Although the common minimum standard will ensure a level of awareness throughout the Service it will not be sufficient for uniformed constables deployed on normal pol ice duty who will necessarily form the major proportion of our response to wide-scale public disorder. These officers will need to be trained to a higher level and more often than those receiving basic training. Again the programme should be devised in the same fashion and communicated to forces by the Central Planning Unit. It is envisaged that this type of training should be given every six months. Officers to receive it must be selected with due regard to their physical fitness and an age-cell ing of no seems the most suitable general cut?off point. We REGJHHEND accordingly. Second tier training will be the responsibility of individual forces although, in addition to local input, regional training involving the collection and deployment of resources should occur on an annual basis. However, the scale of these exercises does not have to be especially large and can be effective if only two or three forces are involved at any one time. We RECDHHEND accordingly. The third and final tier of trainin should "no which provide an initial emergency reesponse. centrally based reinforcement units retained on a permanent basil: and they require the highest level of training. The personnel so employed should be trained every three months and should partici te in regional exercises as frequently as opportunities allow. paWe Scanned by CamScanner 1 . .. RECOHHEND accordingly. 8.2.7 Although the problem of Public Order is predominantly met by uniformed officers there is also a role for the more specialist dapartments of the Service. It is essential that C1D officers are preperly trained in evidence gathering techniques and that horse and dog units receive training designed nationally and adhered to within forces and regions. It is equally important that the deployment and use of baton rounds and CS agent receives the same type of consideration. We RECOMMEND accordingly. INSPECTORS 8-3-1 . This rank attracts Special consideration since the recent experience of the Service points to the fact that inspectors face both tactical and command problems and training needs to be geared to cater for those needs In so far as tactical training is concerned they must be trained as an integral part of the tactical training given for constablesznuisergeants and should receive training at the same intervals dependent upon their individual deployment within force& We RECOMMEND accordingly. 8-3.2 In so far as command training is concerned it is apparent that this needs to be given immediately before every session of tactical training. Command training has clearly been lacking for inspectors in the past and therefore calls for early theoretical and practical input. Theoretical training should be classroom based, covering such subjects as briefing, legislation and contingency planning. This training will need to becnia nationally agreed and produced PBOkage in the same way as the practical training must be agreed and produced nationally. Ideally, the inspectors should pass fron the theoretical training administered in the classroom to practical based training with sergeants and constables where they can begin to utilise their command skill:i Practical training can be catered for at force level by exercises and scenarios during the tactical training of all uniformed ranks AND ABOVE - COMHAND.BAND Very few officers required to fulfil a command role in the NUM Dispute felt fully prepared to undertake the task. Again the identified areas of training broke down into strategic, cxnmand and tactical needs. Officers of these ranks should receive training at a regional level based on a nationally produced syllabus covering a wide range of topics related to public.disorder. The regional training presently given is subject to review by the Central Planning Unit and it is likely that the revised course will shortly be available. In addition those selected officers who attend the Police Col lege should have their regional training reinforced by further practical and theoretical inputs. Officers should attend a regional training course every other year and shoulciattend tactical trainingtdithin their own forces on an annual basis We RECOMMEND accordingly. Scanned by CamScanner . n1 '7 8.14.3 It is essential that they know the capabilities of their :f'iizeu ""26 and equipnent and this can only be achieved if they pa we- the training received at constable and sergeant lev elthe present time little or no practical ccmnanc A remedy for this is seen in the in-force and regime.--) .53; tactical exercises already referred to. These exer--se.. - - dESiSned to test many aspects of cannand in "real" sitaatimf. ACPO BANKS 8.5.1 The present training for Assistant and Chief 5335?? f5 3 the Police Staff College should continue: ?it? ofzzcer attending a course every other year. 'Ihis should enszre that officers retain a level of knowledge cmensurate responsibilities. We RECORDED accordinle- ACPO HBLIC ORDER 0F TACTICAL OPTIGB AND RELATED METERS 8.6.1 The Manual is considered to be an excellent reference book and there is no doubt that practical training in most forces is based on its contents. 'Ihere is a problem in relation to its sheer size and the fact that the contents of the Manual have not been dissezinated to those likely to perform a ccmnand role. This is not an acceptable situation and there is a real need for the mini-Manual presently bemg produced. This should be circulated to those officers likely to perform a command role and provide them with a more viable and ea31ly absorbed work of best practice. He BECOMI- accordingly. A Scanned by CamScanner 160 161 162 163 1613 166 167 168 169 170 All police constables and sergeants should be given biennial faniliarisation training; locally but to an agreed rational standard. Such trainirg should be incorporated into the Initial Training Cause for Probationary Constables. periods of second-tier training should be given to those uniform constables who are PhYSically fit to mdertake duty at wide-scale public disorder. Second and third tier training should be carried out locally according to a rationally agreed syllabus. Regular multi-force exercises should be held. periods of third-tier training should be given to those units which provide an initial emergency response as a regular part of their duties. Specialist training should be given to CID officers, dog and horse units to agreed national InSpectors should receive cannand and tactical training alongside sergeants and constables. Chief Inspectors and above mould receive biennial strategic, cannand and tactical training on a regional basis. They should participate in practical training sessions for inspectors, sergeants and constables. Every force should ensu-e that it has an appropriate nunber of ACPO ranks who attend biennial training at the Police Staff College. A practical manual of guidance swuld be made available to all inspectors and above who are likely to be tasked with public order duties. PARA 8.2.2 8.2.2 8.2.11 8.2.4 8.2.5 8.2.6 8.2.7 80301 8.11.2 8.5.1 8.6.1 Scanned by CamScanner (F 11192 ?swarms THE NATIQMI. UNION OF DISPUTE ?811/35 [0311? THE 011? (DISTIBLE OF THE STUDY 1' Wri?h? (1515. Chinf Countable, South Yorkshire Police A 0 ?nith?hw- 1? Acting Chief Constable, Constabulary l} 1? Esq? Deputy Chief Constable, Leicestershire Constabulary I) Crunpton Assistant. Chief Constable, Greater ranchester Police .1 A Crawford qu., Assistant Chief Constable, Merseyside Police THUG OF REFERENCE To consider the constitutional position of the Chief Constable in the light of the mining dispute, and the problems which have been faced by some of our members. CT ION 9.1.1 The Study Group's approach to this issue has been based on a nunber of questions. For instance, had the differences of opinion between chief constables and their police authorities on how, or even if, the picket lines should be policed revealed any ancmalies in the respective responsibilities of the Home Secretary, Police Authority, and Chief Constable, as they were understood by the police? Was a Chief Constable's understanding of his operational autononw as unequivocal after the dispute as it was before? What would be the effect on police authority/chief constable relationships following recognition of the police authority's apparent inability to control a chief constable's spending on operational actions with which it disagreed. 9.1.2 In pursuing these questions we acknowledged that we were not the first to review the constitutional position and operational autonomy of chief constables as a result of pol icing the dispute. At the ACPO Council meeting on 5 July 198?, A Goodson Esq., was asked to examine the legal position of chief constables when exercising operational autonomy against the wishes of their police authority. 9.1.3 His subsequent paper concluded that a Chief Constable could not be curtailed in his operational decisions by his Police Authority, or indeed by Central Gov ernment. The paper contended that it was clear from case 13d and the Police Act, 19611 that the operational decisions of a Chief Constable was unfettered, and that the Pol ice Authority's responsibility was confined to the maintenance of an adequate and efficient Force. The paper maintained that Central Scanned by CamScanner 9.1 .11 9.1.5 9.1.6 9.1.7 9.1.8 9.1.9 ontrol the Chief Constable la in 134 toocnal decisions and that to era 2d 31?3ng 1 egi sl ation. Goverrment was unab other constable 1hr such position 1'6qu uestioninE Hr' Goodson-s concliusiions and 1 Our GFOUD startedtyof?.? a nunber of publ icationls :fr Slnig out of the those which were "mica po Ge actions ispu e, those Writ. . . the Miners' Strike era In the Constable'ds opetrastuional aUtonZw 2:31:59, ctd?grn that it should be so but 0 no ggest that it does not exist. . Cobden Trust, and now Secretar Sarah Spencer, Director of the nEcl 1pse of the Police Authof?i?t? 'cle entitled :Eggesnilnlt: :rltila, "This dispute has exposegithe weaTkhness of the authorities in the tripartite relations Pm ey (Chief Constables) have made operational decisioins :ith extensme financial implications ovei'lwlhich ?Ehgintg?l a the Eggoumizgiltiotypoiy the police to local police authorities ?131:5 more in theory than in reality and undermine the faint Optimism that authorities could exert sane influence over the operational methods of their force through their control of the budget". Other ccmnentators, albeit reluctantly, cane to the sane general conclusion, and press the case for the necessary legal reform to enable police authorities to exercise local democratic control over operational policing. To sunmarise our findings, we confirmed Mr Goodson's conclusion that a Chief Constable's autonomy in deploying his existing resources is unfettered. But he can be called to account for his actions in the courts and our Group was extremely concerned at the lack of support and adv ice available to a chief constable if he was called upon to justify and explain his operational decision to a court. We consider ?that some of the implications of our review warrant further consmeration by the Association of Chief Police Officers. We therefore that the findings of the Group be considered by the President, Chairman of ACPO Council Committe and Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary. Scanned by CamScanner mm: a? ma mam mama-ms or Human. UNION or DISHJTE 198355 mammal. (F 111E CHIEF cons'f N0. RECOHEIDEIHII PARA 17] That the report of the Study Gro be considered by the Pr'esident, malijprman Whole report of ACPO Council Cannittees and HHCIC. Scanned by CamScanner