0. . . . hi. ramfrymagi-?15) I .3. - 3 ."125' r? 116:. L: ?g Scanned by CamScanner INTRODUCTION Considerable progress has been made in the development of criminal intelligence in the police service, particularly since publication of the 'Baumber' and 'Pearce' reports. Despite this progress. intelligence remains the 'Cinderella' of the service and is undoubtedly under resourced in terms of both manpower and finance . The problems of identifying priorities within no growth police budgets do not require elucidation here. The fact remains, however. that we are in danger of wasting the not inconsiderable resources already devoted to intelligence by failing to give that little extra. The inter-relationship between traditional crime and serious public order problems demands that we deploy our resources on the best possible information. The requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act reinforce that demand; the gathering of intelligence on t0p grade criminals and their associates is now imperative. The report which follows seeks to identify methods by which improvements to the intelligence service can be achieved. The recommendations must obviously be examined as to their viability in technical terms but if they prove acceptable the more critical decision is whether they carry sufficient priority to warrant the necessary devotion of extra resources. It is my belief that they do. 0f critical importance is the recommendation to appoint an officer of ACPO rank as National Intelligence Co-brdinator. Many of the report's recommendations, if accepted. will require considerable further work to implement. Even if such an appointment were made solely for this purpose it would be but there are myriad other duties demanding co-ordination at this level. Scanned by CamScanner improvements . The Working Party believes that the existing system with refinements can . regardless of variations in policing or environmental conditions . succeed to a greater extent than has so far been realised. 1.17 The lack of credibility from which the system has suffered can be remedied by a greater understanding of, and commitment to. its management. In an era of increasing operational constraints the provision of accurate and current information is a high priority. Such a service has cost effective benefits. It assists in highlighting problem areas so that resources can be more effectively deployed. 1.18 Extension of the System - Integrated Intelligence Since the introduction of the system operational problems have emerged which had not been envisaged. Social and industrial unrest have brought a new dimension to the traditional crime and criminality which Baumber and Pearce considered. This has placed an additional requirement on the intelligence system. It has become clear that the whole spectrum of operational activity must be adequately supported by the information/intelligence serv1ces. There are 39_distinctign_s_ between the needs of officers involved in r_out_ine actiyity aid those who form spggialist squads or are faced with public disorder. Separate intelligence systems maintained by individual operational units are frequently incompatible and cannot be jointly accessed. This deprives investigating officers of the maximum information available and is to the I detriment of overall objectives. 1.19 Analysis of this basic flaw and its associated problems has produced the concept of integrated intelligence. The pooling of information regardless of" partisan considerations and the ability to research items of Scanned by CamScanner 15 CHAPTER II 2.1 2.2 2.3 REVIEWS OF THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND DOCUMENTED RESEARCH I Since the publication of the Baumber and Pearce Reports other relevant studies have been undertaken affecting specific areas of the criminal intelligence system. Taken together these studies represent a not insignificant body of research. No single study. has taken a complete overview of the intelligence system to take account of the changes which have occurred since 1975, both in police procedures and in thei enhanced technology which is available to support the intelligence system. Set out below is a summary of the various studies. It is imperative that any group charged with research in the future should read published papers and working party reports and communicate with their authors. so that maximum benefit is derived from their expertise and research for future developments in the intelligence system. Review of Regional Crime Squads Working Group This Working Group was appointed in April 1985 under the Chairmanship of Mr. R. S. Barratt, CBE, QPM, one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary. The Working Group Report of October 1985 has more than forty recommendations, one of which is: Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices. should be [incorporated within- an expanded Regional Crime Squad Organisation . This recommendation has met with some resistance in many forces as far as can be judged from the informal soundings taken by the Working Party. Scanned by CamScanner 2.4 2.5 16 Broome Report on Um; Intelligence A Working Group' established under the Chairmanship of Mr. R. F. Broome. OBE. Chief Constable. than and Somerset Constabulary, recommended:- i. Regional Crime Squads be augmented by or drugs wing under the supervision of a Detective Chief Inspector, responsible to the Regional Co-ordlnator i ii. the existing post of Chief inspector (intelligence) of the Regional Crime Squad be utilised as Supervisor of the Regional Drugs Unit within England and Wales the structure of Drugs intelligence be approached on three levels, l.e. Divisional, Force and Regional/National iv. existing Coilator/Locai intelligence Offices and Force intelligence Systems are appropriate for evaluating and disseminating Local and Force Drugs intelligence v. that Regional Criminal intelligence Offices assume a responsibility: for evaluating and disseminating regional drugs intelligence and for liaising with the National Drugs intelligence Unit. ACPO Crime Working Party on Extortion and Product I Contamination in the Food Industry and Criminal Activities of Animal Rights Groups Following cases of iextortion and product contamination in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, the ACPO Crime Committee set till}? a working party under the Chairmanship of G. W. Jones, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, to enquire into these offences and a repert with recommendations was prepared Scanned by CamScanner 2.6 17 in June 1985. The recommendations re?ect not just action on extortion and product contamination but also the response of the Police Service to the growing threat posed by Animal Rights Groups. The WorkingParty recommended, inter alia, that One National Unit, equipped with additional Crime Pattern Analysis terminals, located at New Scotland Yard, should have the responsibility for evaluation, analysis and input of information and for dissemination of developed intelligence on such activities. The National Unit has been operational at New Scotland Yard since 6th January 1986. Working Party on Criminal Information Systems - Review of the Computerised Crime Pattern Analysis System The revised Working Party on Criminal Information Systems was established under the Chairmanship of Mr. J. . Burrow, LL. . Deputy Chief Constable, Merseyside Police. The following terms of reference were agreed i. to examine the present operation of the Crime Pattern Analysis application, with a view to assessing and, if I possible, quantifying the impact on the investigation of crime ii. to consider how CPA relates to the National Identification Bureau Methods Index to make casted recommendations for the more efficient and effective use in the short?term of the application; together with any other item referred by the parent body to the Working Party for examination . Scanned by CamScanner 60 CHAPTER VI 6.1 6.2 6.3 THE CONCEPT OF A NATIONAL IHTELLIGZNCE OFFICE (N10) The notion of a National Intelligence Office (2.10) was postulated in the Baumber Report. In 1935 Heads of Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices identified the need for a greater degree of compatibility within their organisation. They saw this compatibility being achieved by the appointment of a National Intelligence Co-ordinator. This Working Party, in the light of its research, supports the concept of a 510. A recommendation in respect of this was made to Mr. C. Sampson, Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police, in his liaison role between RCIOs and ACPO Crime Committee. Deliberation of the recommendation has been delayed pending the recommendations of this Working Party. The introduction of a NIO would provide the level of management which could more effectively control and direct resources devoted to the intelligence system, particularly within the regional structure. In completing the tiered intelligence system it would provide a greater degree of cohesion and an overview of matters of national significance. This would effectively eliminate the parochial attitudes which are at times apparent in the present system . In recent years (several national units have been established-to deal with specific crime problems as they have become prominent. Examples are the NDIU and the Animal Rights National Index. Such units have been created outside the intelligence system and have been designed as stand alone systems lacking compatibility and co-ordination. To obtain the maximum effect from the total information available all national functions should be integrated into a national intelligence organisation. Scanned by CamScanner 62 6 . 6 Rank of Co-ordinator To ensure that a NIO has the authority and credibility necessary to carry out its national functions, the Working Party recommends that the position of National Intelligence Co-ordinator should be .of the rank of Assistant Chief Constable, if appointed from a provincial police force, or Commander, if appointed from the Metropolitan Police. This would allow the National Intelligence Co-ordinator access to ACPO both at national and regional levels . 6.7 If the post of National Drugs Intelligence Co-ordinator remains at Assistant Commissioner level, there is an obvious anomaly in appointing a National Intelligence Co-ordinator at a lesser rank. This is unavoidable given the impetus which has been put into the drugs problem. The fact remains that there is a need for the extra post. Long term consideration must involve the integration of the NDIU into the N10. 6.8 It is recommended that the period in post be a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 5 years. 6.9 It is recommended that the Standing Committee of Chief Officers currently responsible for the overview of Regional Crime Squads assume a similar role in respect of. the National Intelligence Office._ The National Intelligence Co?ordinator could then report to this committee. This is dealt with further?in paragraphs 6.19 and 6.20. 6.10 Current Situation in Relation to Intelligence of National Significance The need to 'collate centrally information/intelligence which is of national significance has been recognised by the' Police Service for a number of years. Several such Scanned by CamScanner 63 repositories have, therefore, emerged throughout the country. A number of police forces have taken the initiative in accepting responsibility for collating information on certain subjects, these include i. West Yorkshire Police - bogus officials ii. Sussex Police - antique dealers EssexlCambridgeshire/Devon and Cornwall Police - indices iv. Thames Valley Police - peace convoys. Additionally, national indices are maintained at New Scotland Yard by i. The National Office for the suppression of Counterfeit Currency ii. The National Drugs Intelligence Unit' Metropolitan Police (SB) - Animal Liberation Front and associated activities. 6.11 If these indices continue unchecked, without proper co-ordinated management, direction and control, it is difficult to understand how the best use can be made of the available information. This can only be achieved by integration.? of all such existing indices within a National Intelligence Office. I 6.12 Functions of a NIO Detailed research would be required to identify all of the functions which should be carried out by a NIO. However this Working Party recommends that consideration be given to the inclusion. of the following: Scanned by CamScanner 64 i. criminals of national significance ii. national crime problems where serious offences link a number of regions, 'The.Fox' enquiry. distinctive crime patterns, such as bogus officials. organised syndicated crime iv. animal rights activities. product contamination and food extortion v. counterfeit currency - the functions currently carried out by the National Office for the Suppression of Counterfeit Currency vi. drugs activity of the type currently registered by the National Drugs IntelligenceUnit (a long term consideration) vii. state security information, the activities of anarchist groups which may influence operational policing. It is accepted that Special Branch will remain privy to detailed and sensitive information football hooliganism - the monitoring of trends on a national basis ix. 'Peace Convoy' and other similar group activity publication of national intelligence circulations xi. monitoring of information on matters concerning public disorder, racial tension .and 'industrial unrest Scanned by CamScanner :v 7? 6.13 6.14 V. r: r" - .-- 1rd: ?1 65 xii. itinerants' index responsibility for special facilities xiv. providing liaison with the Prison Advisers Office xv. establishment of a national reference section in respect of large scale operational matters, such as party political conferences, pop concerts, etc. The detailed planning for such events requires a very sound understanding of the techniques involved and the agencies capable of providing specialist assistance. Currently forces involved are required to research that which is, to some extent, known and available in various forces around the country. Without a formal central repository of such information, those responsible for :organising events are required to visit other forces which have undergone a similar experience and duplicate much of the painstaking research which has previously been done. A central repository, which would include copies of operational orders and debriefing notes, would significantly reduce the initial problems which have to be resolved during the planning phase. In addition,' a NIO would be expected to identify crime and operational matters in general which could have potential to develop and become nationally significant. This function, coupled with the ability to in?uence the creation of ad hoc indices on a nationwide basis would be a very positive step forward in the better management of information fintelligence . The role of a NIO at times of major outbreaks of public disorder or disruptive industrial. action would be a natural extension of its functions which should encompass :a permanent facility for monitoring such Scanned by CamScanner 66 matters. A NIO would become the intelligence wing of the Mutual Aid Co-ordinating Centre (MACC) at such times. This arrangement would obviate the need to set up a central intelligence unit similar to that established in Leicestershire for the dispute of 1984/85. This was examined in detail in the Part I report. 6.15 Use of NIO - Inputting and Accessing Information Information is directed throughout the national intelligence system according to accepted criteria and the operational requirement. With the introduction of a NIO this requirement would be extended. Information which is input must involve all appropriate levels of the system to enable each level to properly discriminate and exercise an analytical function. Where it is sought to establish that which is recorded within the system, there should be nothing to prevent an operative, at any level, instigating searches at any or all levels of the system. However, when subsequent new information is available it must be passed through the tiered system until it reaches its appropriate level. 6.16 Staffing of NIO The Working Party has not attempted to research the staffing requirements of a NIO other than to state the obvious requirement for the Co-ordinator. to have clerical and staff officer support. If the principle is accepted detailed research will be necessary to determine the establishment of a NIO. 6.17 Funding of the NIO The means of funding a NIO is a crucial and delicate issue. Exact costings cannot be estimated until staffing Scanned by CamScanner 67 levels have been agreed and it is reasonable to suppose that those levels would grow progressively as the office became operational . 6.18 The Common Police Services Fund appears to be the only viable option but at this stage the Home Office has not ?been approached pending ACPO consideration of this Report. ,Discussions are in progress with the Home Office on funding aspects of the Part I Report recommendations which could have some bearing on this issue. 6.19 The sensitivity of creating a N10 is clear and there may well be local authority resistance to the idea. If it can be clearly demonstrated that the objective is to' enable police to more effectively combat major crime there must be a realistic opportunity of convincing those authority members who harbour doubts. 6.20 Beyond these general considerations it is not thought that more detailed recommendations on funding can be proposed until a decision on whether to create a NIO is made. If this decision is affirmative the costings will be greatly affected by the choice of where the office and the co-ordinator are located. 6.21 Management Committee of N10 There is a clear guide as to the appropriate level of management in the existing arrangements appertaining to the ROS National Co-ordinator. The Committee charged with this duty comprises Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Chairmen of Regional RCS Management Committees, Assistant Commissioner (S.O.) Metropolitan Police, the RC5 Executive Co-ordinator and a Home Office representative . Scanned by CamScanner 68 6, 22 It is recommended that this committee would be the ideal structure to manage the affairs of a N10 'and agenda items could be considered at the same twice-yearly meetings which consider RCS matters. This proposed arrangement would follow the regional system where each management committee considers RCS, R010 and TSU items. 6.23 Location of NIO The Part I report addressed this subject in detail. The important role a NIO would fulfil during a sustained period of widespread public disorder should be borne in mind. The close co-operation that would be required under such circumstances with the MACC, Home Office Departments and Security Services suggests London as an appropriate site for the N10. Equally, many of the day to day operations would involve liaison with services that are based in London. 6.24 A specialist function currently carried out by C.ll which is fundamental to proactive intelligence gathering would be greatly impeded if a NIO sited in the provinces was given this responsibility. 6.25 The major obstacle to a London based location is the cost of office space. It would be unwise to consider using New Scotland Yard, assuming there was sufficient space, as there is a strongly perceived need to demonstrate the independence of a NIO from the Metropolitan Police. There is a widely held view, not because of antipathy towards the Metropolitan Police, that a NIO incorporating existing national intelligence services would have a greater degree of universal credibility if separated from the existing structure within the Metropolitan Police. The Working Party recognises this View and recommends that due notice be taken of it. Scanned by CamScanner 69 6.26 The Working Party have not attempted to identify suitable London office space and recommend that this be pursued if the recommendation on creation of a N10 is accepted. Home Office and Property Services Agency would be required to assist in locating suitable premises. 5 6.27 The Part I Report recommended No.4 Region RCIO at Birmingham as the best possible short term solution to the location of a NIO dealing with public disorder. At the time of preparing this report discussions are taking place between ACPO and Home Office on the feasibility of this, and other recommendations contained in the Part I Report. 6.28 Birmingham is a viable option for a permanent NIO performing all the tasks recommended in this report. Whilst not.having the advantages already outlined in the London option, there are good communications to and from the City. Further research would be necessary to identify suitable office accommodation. 6.29 It is advocated that London and Birmingham are certainly viable options. Full consideration must be given to the recommendations contained in both this and the Part I Report. Scanned by CamScanner Scanned by CamScanner SOURCE 1. When there is no doubt of the authenticity, trustworthiness competence of the source. 0R 2. If information is supplied by an individual who, in the past, has proved to be r_eli_able in all instances. Scanned by CamScanner ANOTHER ONE BEEN SPOT 0N ABOUT HIM ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, BUT THAT WAREHOUSE JOB NEVER CAME OFF WEEK. HERE euv! HARRY BLACK IS PUTTING ANOTHER BLAG SOURCE A source from whom information in the past has, in lye. Tuning". 91 Meg-noes l?gram-?d to be ",elir??e; Scanned by CamScanner SOURCE 0 LISTEN BABE A WORD TO 7745 SYD NOTT IS PUSHING HE 0m T0 LOCAL SCHOOLKIDS. HOW AM SUPPOSED TO BELIEVE THAT WHEN EVERYTHING ELSE YOU HAVE TOLD ME HAS BEEN WRONG. THOUGH 70 BE FAIR YOU WERE RIGHT ABOUT VIC VOMIT STEALING LEAD OFF THE Source from whom in the past has in the majority of instances proved unreliable. Scanned by CamScanner IT IS MY DUTY AS A CITIZEN TO INFORM KJU THAT ET TS PLANNING A FACTORY BREAK IN AT MARS. 7 In the case of a previously untried source where there is some doubt about the authenticity, trustworthiness or competency. lL.i