. ONFIDEN TIA ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS OF ENGLAND, WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND A PAPER TO THE A.C.P.O. COUNCIL ON POLICING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS DISPUTE 1984/85 FINAL REPORT . MARCH, 1986 Hall, Esq.. CBE 0PM Scanned by CamScanner _i ?3 RENIE (F THE FILICDG BEETS 0F NATIONAL UNION OF HENENORKEIE DISPUTE 1984/85 means manna ma 3mm; mm I Hall. CBE 0m Chairman HcLachlan, Esau-(BE om HA LLB President of ACPO Bailey, Esq., CBE QPH Vice President of ACPO Buck, Esq., (BE QPH Birch, Esq., QPM Bunyard, Esq., QPH Imbert, Esq., QPH Kelly, Esq., QPH DL LLB Nobes, Esau LLB Payne, Esq., QPH DL Wright, Esq., (BE A Parkes, Esq., PBE BA Curtis, Esq? BEH Chief Constable Hunberside Police Chief Constable Nottinghamshire Constabulary Chief Constable Northunbria Police Chief Constable Northamptonshire Constabulary Chief Constable Sussex Police Chief Constable Essex Police Deputy Commissioner Metropolitan Police Chief Constable Staffordshire Police Chief Constable North Yorkshire Police Chief Constable Cleveland Constabulary Chief Constable South Yorkshire Police Superintendents Association Police Federation Scanned by CamScanner INTROIIJCT ION The National Union of Mineworkers most bitter disputes of modern tigiiessEUte was one Of the longest and - - The dispute 3 lit the coal mi a: _Spl intered communities who for gjerations have important barometer $333;wa ways" minips has long been an Country and, When dis 8 state of industrial relations in this - - . putes occur for testin th legislation deSigned to reduce the impact of confl fat. effectiveness or For the police service the MUM dis operation in more than 1'50 pute prompted the largest combined . Years of professional policin . It must be said that. often, those taking part in the dispute saw the us: of violence as a tactical weapon, Vile forms of intimidation were common?place. Picketing 3013er went frequently far beyond peaceful persuasion and the actions of some pickets were outrageously criminal. Mass picketing was a frightening strategy more resembling the power of the mob than a means of enlisting MdUStl?lal support. Massive amounts of damage were caused to NCB property often without regard to consequent effects upon safety. Attempts were made to impede whole communities from working, to frustrate industries unconnected with the strike, to hamper the operation of power stations, to stop the movement of coal and other materials. The dispute lasted 51 weeks and throughout the service coped magnificently. Those who had used lawlessness as a strategy were seen to have fail ed. The police service was obliged to respond to a very serious threat to law and order and to the rights of' ordinary people to go about their lawful business, including the right of those on strike to engage in peaceful pioketing. The dispute fell into three main?overlapping phases. First there was the attempt to 'picket out' the working miners, particularly in Nottinghamshire, by mass picketing, demonstration and intimidation. Assemblies of thousands of pickets were not sane ten thousand were at Harworth on 2nd May 1984. For a considerable period something over seven thousand officers were deployed on mutual aid throught England and Wales. A notable feature of the pol ice response was the use of common law powers to stop vehicles carrying pickets into relevant areas. This was done in order to prevent breaches 015' the peace. 'lhe Attorney General said in a statement on 16th March that there was no doubt that a constable had these powers, and the action of the chief constable of Nottingha'nshire in turning back would? be pickets when a breach of the peace was inminent was subsequently upheld by the Divisional Court. The second phase was the attempt to stop supplies reaching steelworks. Convoys of lorries taking coke fran Port Talbot to Llanwern were attacked despite being under heavy pol ice escort. But the most serious disorders were at the Orgreave Coking Plant in South Yorkshire, in May and June 19811. On 18th June, for example, some 10,000 people assembled in order to stop the Scanned by CamScanner British Steel Corporation moving coke from the plant. The disorder lasted for several hours, during which time large nunbers of missiles were'thrown at the pol ice, vehicles and a barricade were set on fire. TO deal "1th We violence it was necessary to use mounted officers and officers equipped With shileds and protective helmets. Ninety three arrests were made at Orgreave that day and 28 police officers were injured. Every lorry load 0f c?ke was enabled to leavg the plant and the convoys reached their destinations safely. The third phase began in Novenber 1981! when some miners returned to work at collieries which had been, until then, strike-bound. The main centres Of Violence were in Yorkshire, Northumberland and Durham. and to a _l esser extent in South Wales. On 30th November, a taxi driver taking a miner to work at Vale Colliery was killed when a piece of concrete was dropped'onto his car from a motorway bridge. Throughout the dispute there were nunerous attacks upon and intimidation against working miners and their families at their homes and elsewhere. There were cases of arson and criminal damage at NCB premises and at the premises of hauliers and coach operators who were carrying supplies or taking miners to work. The nu'nber of pol ice officers in England and Wales injured in this disPute was 1,390. 9,808 people were arrested. mo factors in particular enabled the police to make an effective response to the challenge presented by the dispute. First, the NRC. Second, the tactical planning and training which had taken place following the inner city riots of 1981. The dispute showed that the police were now prepared much better in equipment, in tactics and in the ability to work together. It was notable that despite scenes such as those at Orgreave the police were able to cope without resort to methods such as the use of CS smoke. Defensive equipment such as shields and protective helmets proved of great importancepolice horses. It is unlikely that any other police force in Europe would have been able to cope with such disorders without resort to more aggresive methods, the use of which would undoubtedly have inflamed the situation further. The success of the mutual aid arrangements showed that #3 forces could combine effectively in-any part of the country without need for a third tier force. It also provided a powerful argument against any perceived need for a national police service. Full records, on a day by day basis, have been compiled and are filed with the General Secretary of ACPO. Those files contain the daily disposition of PSU's and a full statistical analysis of all relevant information gathered by the National Reporting Centre. Ordinary policing throughout the country naturally suffered, through it, is not possible to say what effect, if any, the dispute had on national crime figures. The financial consequences were severe, despite the unprecedented scale of central Goverrment assistance. To ensure that the service has identified the lessons of the dispute a Review has been undertaken to re evaltate current national guidance, to see how it fared and to spot whether changes are needed. Spotting short-comings is, of course, always so much more an exact science when one has the benefit and wisdom of hindsight. Scanned by CamScanner Whilst Aulitu. has undertaken a leading role in the Review, both the SuPerintendents' Association and Federation h?Vt! participated. Because Review has focused mainly upon the adequncies of current national guidance, many consequential issues have not received the detailed consideration they demand not least those issues dealing withinelfareenwistress. However, they have not been lost but have been passed to the President of for separate consideration at a later date. It is anticipated that the examination of theselnatters will cover the welfare and stress related Problems of those officers performing both mutual aid duty and general policing. The Steering Cannittee would emphasise the importance and urgency of that review. it behoveslne to say that it is well recognised that such consequential issues must be dealt with both expeditiously and through consultation if we are to give heed to the gratitude we feel to those officers who policed the strike. COMBATING DISORDER Responsibility for the operational effectiveness of the police and the Particular methods to be used to canbat public disorder is shared between the Home Secretary, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Service itselil But the police officer responsible for authorising particular tactics on the day carries on his shoulders the legal implications of his actions Throughout the 1970's many challenges were made upon the service to cope with increasing lawlessness stemming from marches, demonstrations, community tensions and industrial disputes Looking back only a decade or so, one cannot help but be impressed that policing demonstrations, marches and industrial disputes was not usually a matter likely to cause gross public disorder. More often the pattern was that those demonstrating pushed and the police line held; or they sat down and the police removed them; or pickets and policemen got wet and both sought shelter together in the same makeshift hut. Policing tactics were mainly empirical and usually ad hoc. The perception was that the public were satisfied with these policing methods, particularly when they saw on their television screens our European counterparts resorting to tear gas, water cannon and protective equipnent to cope with snailar situations. But if we were snug, the early 1980's quickly awakened us from any complacency because of the disorders at Grunwick, Bristol, Brixton, Toxteth, Warrington and other inner-city areas. New strategies and new tactics had to be devised. Mutual aid had to be given new impetus. Protective equipment was needed and training for our Officers was vital. Although our planning was mainly directed at dealing with street disorders of relatively short duration, the need for flexibility and adaptation was a strong feature of national contingency plans. The street disorders of 1981 were the catalyst for a new approach to policing disorder, not any desire on the part of the police service to change its methods and thereby philosophy. Following our response to the 1981 street disorders the service was tremendously conscious of the steps it was taking and the implications of the new planning measures. The service is always conscious of its critics and, perhaps more importantly, conscious of the need not to erode its ability to police by consent. But policing by consent is a partnership and, at the end of the day, it must be our ability to maintain order on the streets that assunes ascendenoy. Scanned by CamScanner Goverrment, of course, has a large responsibility for preventing disorder through 1tS part in shaping the climate for Society. It must also support those who enforce the law and ensure that appropriate penalties exist for law breakers. Local authorities, through police committees, have 3. 1er function in maintaining public tranquillity through broad social polic1es and by providing an efficient and effective police service. Too often dlfr?lng the NUM dispute some local pol ice authorities were in the vanguard 0f publicised rebuffs of their Chief Constables which could have badly impaired operational effectiveness. The taCtiCS adOpted by the police service throughout the NUM dispute were no more>tharlan extension of the response that had been used during the 1981 street disorders. Chief Constables used many different strategies. The adoption of differing strategies in different force areas reflected the dlfferent situation in each of those areas. But the mutual aid, the 1?3}3t1?5: the tactics (except in relation to motorway interception) and the actlvation of the NRC had all been used before, only the scale was different and it needed to be. However, it was all geared to the same end - the maintenance of law and order. It did not signify an irrevocable Change in the nature 0f the philosophy of policing by consent That our plans, only drawn up in 1982, for dealing with disorder should have been tested so thoroughly and arduously so soon after their introduction is surely a terrible indictment of the times in which we serve. Yet it prov1des powerful proof, if it were necessary, of the tremendous burden of carried by the pol ice service for preserving democratic ree oms. 111E RINJIH This Review has been undertaken by a nunber of Study Groups supervised by 3 Steering Committee. Each Study Group was invited to research a particular topic and prepare appropriate recommendations. This paper is therefore th canposite of findings and recarmendations by those Study Groups. - The topics identified for review were:- The National Reporting Centre Mutual Aid Logistics Tactical Options and Equipment Transport Communications Training Intell igence/Media Relations Financial Implications The Constitutional Position of the Chief Constable THE NRC The NRC was the major influencing factor for providing an effective co? ordination of police resources into those areas where disorder was likely. Every force in the country at some time during the dispute provided officers for mutual aid. At no time did the Centre do more than receive requests for manpower from forces experiencing problems and forward those requests to forces best able to volunteer manpower. Scanned by CamScanner I l? The NRC was not, and could never be, a de facto control centre. It has no capacity to exercise operational control. 5 that such a co?ordinating centre is necessary in times of heavy and widespread danand for resources of manPO?f?er and equipment. The Centre was able to achieve its objective, deSpite enormous pressures, but the secrecy which previously shrouded the Centre contributed to a common failure by persons outside the service to comprehend its true rol e. The Study Group report declare The Study Group make the following principal recommendations:- That a cc-ordinating centre is vital in times of heavy and widespread demands for pol ice resources. - The siting of the centre should remain in the Capital and should be linked to the accommodation provided for the General Secretary of ACPO. Ideally the should be away from New Scotland Yard albeit the practicalities of such a change are recognised. - That the President should retain overall responsibility for the centre but a designated officer of deputy chief constable rank should have day to day charge. The staffing structures and job descriptions for the Centre should be revised. It is not viewed as necessary for the Centre to be heavily canputerised. That the title of the Centre should henceforth be the Mutual Aid Co? ordination Centre (MACC). AID The ability of forces to aid each other after maximising the use of their own officers was the cornerstone of the police operation in response to the NUM Dispute. However, the resounding success of the mutual aid arrangements should not necessarily be interpreted as implying that the service has sufficient manpower to respond to almost any disorder scenario that may occur in the future. The principal recormnendations of the Study Group are:- That the criterion for mutual aid should remain 1 PSU for every 200 officers of force establishment. That the existing arrangements for the Metropolitan Police should stand. That the canplanent of a PSU should remain 1 inspector, 2 sergeants and 20 constables. - That forces should comply with present guidelines regarding drivers for PSU's being additional to PSU strength. 4 Scanned by CamScanner - All PSU's supplied on mutual aid should comPPiSe officers trained to - to a comm?) a cannon minmnun standard and equipped (where necessary) minimun.level. That the provision of liaison/welfare officers should be structured. - That administrative and specialist personnel should be treated as a separate mutual aid resource. LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS The sheer scale of the mutual aid commitment resulted in many forces mugs difficu1ty in providing adequate accommodation It mUSt? accepted that when sudden demand overwhens normal facilities, inevitably suffer. Minimum Standards for tenporary accommodation need to be set down and recompense be available when such standards cannot be met. The three staff associations need to pursue this matter through the PNB to ensure that when emergencies arise our officers do not suffer or are at least conpensated in financial tenns The Federation have set down their proposals for an interpretation of suitable accommodation (Appendix J) and these will be considered by the PAB in due course. The Study Group make the following principal recommendations:- Forces should seek to identify premises which could be used to accommodate large numbers of PSU's and regularly review their suitability. - That minimun standards of accommodation be defined and compensation be available where they cannot be met. That forces contingency plans should contain detailed planning measures covering a wide range of logistical factors and requiranents. - When faced with an incident forces should seek to estab control centre which requires massive mutual aid, lish a dedicated incident/logistic It is also apparent from discussions with other Police Staff Associations that officers in command at the scene of protracted need to give more consideration to the provision of temporary hygiene facilities. TACTICAL OPTIONS AND EQUIPMENT The service has, over the past 5 years, developed a range of tactical options which seek to identify appropriate responses to different categories of disorder. The full range of options is considerable but a select few have been promulgated through training packages Some of those tactics, and developments of then, were used by forces during the NUM Dispute Concern has been expressed that the Manual setting out the full range of Scanned by CamScanner tactical options is restricted to ACPO ranks only. The reasons for this restriction are that when the manual was prepared it was intended as a basis for compiling future training programmes. It was acknowledged that only a limited nunber of options would be selected albeit a greater range would be researched. Hider circulation of the manual was therefore likely to lead to confusion and militate against the goal of achieving common minimum standards. Another reason for restricting the Manual was sensitivity. Clearly the service should have a Manual setting out a full range of tactical options capable of countering all levels of public disorder. However, those options for dealing with the worst possible scenarios should not be freely available within the service lest their promulgation be misunderstood. 'lhe production of the mini Manual, which will be more widely distributed, will to a large extent, remove thepresent ancmoly. At the present time the service has two principal publications providing gUidance on public order. These are of course the Tactical Options Manual and the Notes for Guidance for Senior Officers Manual. Perhaps it is time that these two manuals were combined to form one reference document. The mini manual could then contain a much broader range of information and remove sane of the confusion. The principal recommendations of the Study Group reviewing tactics and equipment are as follows:? - Minor amendments to certain tactical options on the basis of practical experience. That tactical options be evaluated in relation to blockading of motorways and anbushing of vehicles. That the detailed role of CID officers in public disorder be drawn up. Improving and standardising protective equipnent. TRANSPORT The NUM Dispute highlighted a need for the service to have access to adequate transportation if mutual aid is to achieve its objective. Much work still remains and the Traffic Committee, in conjunction with other cannittees, will need to give further consideration to drawing up a detailed specification for a standard personnel carrier once the recommendations are agreed. The principal recommendations of the Study Group are:_ That. a cannon personnel carrier be adopted. That hired vehicles should not be used in an operational envirorment. Forces should have sufficient personnel carriers for the whole of their aid ccmuitznent. Scanned by CamScanner NICATIONS Generally, force communication systems coped reasonably well WIth the additional demands of the dispute, bearing in mind the scale?Of- the vxercise. Some aspects of providing adequate communication faCilities considerable additional pressure upon the Directorate of Tel ecommunications and communications staff in forces. Predictably, the lack of equipment and campatibility were the chief problems. The principal recommendations of the Study Group are:- The adoption of a national emergency channel for UHF radio communication. That the 99 channel UHF radio becomes general issue. - That many aspects of police communications require further examination by the Directorate of Telecommunications and the ACPO Council Communications Committee in the light of experiences during the dispute. - That a system of mutual aid call signs be established. TRAINEE Despite the extent of training that has been introduced post 1981 at both force and regional level, it remains apparent that many officers lacked any training in PSU procedures. The main recommendations of the Study Group are:- That all officers receive tactical training to a common minimum standard. - Tnat PSU officers receive training every six months. - Tnat regular inter-force training exercises take place. It is implicit in the training programmes which the Association has compiled that forces must not allow middle ranked officers to change nationally agreed policy. In the past, the effect of such changes has been to dramatically lessen the achievement of common standards. Should feedback from forces indicate that changes to training programmes are appropriate, the Training Committee will undertake the necessary evaluative work. RELATIONS The work of this Study Group is continuing and will not be completed for some time. Once the Group has completed its task, any recommendations it makes will be linked to this Review, particularly insofar as they may affect public order issues. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS The ability of the service to respond to disorder must ultimately depend upon adequate financial provision. Scanned by CamScanner This may be a statement of the obvious but in the early stages of the MUM Dispute the means by which the service was to obtain the appropriate funding was far from clear. Indeed the whole operation could have been compromised had it not been for the Hone Secretary's clear statement promising support in financial terms. Following the dispute 3 major administrative burden was imposed upon the service to account for individual police officers, loan of equ1pment and consequential costs. There is currently no agreed standard charge for vehicles and equipment: a situation must be rectified. The principal recommendations of the Study Group are:- - That amendment be introduced to section 3] of the Police Act to ensure the availability of funds in times of national emergency. - That the various forms of mutual aid be redefined along the lines of small scale, specialist and large scale. - That there be introduced a notional standard charge for a PSU. CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE CHIEF CONSTABLE This is a most complex topic and in the past perhaps even ACPO has been reluctant to clearly voice its view on many difficult constitutional issues which could conceivably compromise a Chief Officers' operational effectiveness. A Study Group has therefore tackled this extremely vexed subject and their report highlights the current dilemma. - I am of the view that the whole of this report should be considered by the President, Chairmen of Council and HMCIC, as a first stage. (mums CONCLUSION This review has been the third occasion in the past five years that I, as chairman of the ACPO Council General Purposes Committee, have been asked to head a review of the services effectiveness to respond to major public order issues. All that I have heard and learnt while undertaking the task has led me to feel satisfied that the police service can be justifiably proud of its response to the NUM Dispute. We were required to perform a complex and transient operation with little advance warning and the service coped magnificently. Where this Review has led to recommendations being made to current national guidance, they should be seen in the light of improvements or fine tUning to existing systems. Most certainly, it is not the case that wholesale revision is necessaryComplaints were made against some of our officers and against the pol icing policy adopted in some geographical areas. It has not been the purpose of the Review to redress those complaints or to justify any particular police operation. Neither has it been our purpose to comment upon particular strategies adopted by chief constables. However, I hope I have given some Scanned by CamScanner - . 't did and eascns for the service needing to respond in the way babe? clonstables fie Praise th't it deserVes for the 30b it performed- - 11131.10 retaining. the a delicate situation sensitively and professmna y, regards the use of force and those recommendatiogs WhiCh ervice to purchase more protective equipment, glve more trairgithg? heart ding has changed regarding the concept WhiCh has been a nt The the British Policing model - the concept 0f law and rmuireaent to use only the minimun force necessary for maintainingd.t_ i? imposed on the service by the law as well as by its'tra 1 ionls. sary force was the antithesis of what the service W85 1? the coa to achieve. There is no desire on the part Of Chief COHStableS :0 capacity to suppress the freedom to peacefully ganonstr?ate or .ecessarily adopt tactics out of keeping With our traditlons' c; the conclusions of my last review of public order following the ?ier ciscrders of 1981 was to outline a need for a central adVisory body, on behalf of the service, aspects ?ional planning, equipment, guidance etc., and generally act as a 1 scene. That sion was endorsed and the Forward Planning Unit was established. I that this unit should be headed by a provincial officer of rank, possibly an assistant chief constable. That recarmendation has so far, been taken up14~he role of such an officer should be two fold; to co?ordinate all aspects of above force level planning for public disorder in conjunction 2. th ACPO Council Committees, particularly the Public Order Sub-Committee, nd, secondly, to head the Forward Planning Unitessential that the nettle of central co?ordination be grasped forces are to bring consistency to their operational contingency U) 1-4 "h lens. Hard pressed assistant chief constables (ops) should have the enefit of some agency at the Centre to whom they can turn as a point of eference for advice and assistance on all matters affecting public order :ning. Putting aside financial and political factors, I am satisfied improvements to existing operational plans can be introdUced but ansi :ency demands such a co?ordinating officer. '7 (J :{ll'f 3 b) 1 -ly, I would reiterate my comment under the Tactical Options heading the present situation whereby the service has two separate manuals 'ng with public order guidance be remedied by both publications being . iced. Amini manual should then be prepared dealing with all major aspects of ACPO guidance on public order for general issue to inspector rank and aboveclose by taking this opportunity to thank all those who have participated in this Review, particularly those outside the service and the members of other pol ice staff associations. Hall Esq, (BE, QPM Chairman Scanned by CamScanner NATIONAL REPORTING CENTRE Scanned by CamScanner Many, .r . um Tang .f?mgmm?? #5 5552 gig/mama?. 05.2.5? Mn. Eur; raw Om. Ham Mannfill. 1.11flail.) .r/lrfu? rfv?iltAft! 11.1?l'f In! ?1ch I anti/DI I fol/7D11,1. latr?{Pl??io (cultivll flr?o Ii [In fl (at: can?! I I I .l?f Ill ..I 01ml: . 10.infill1.1.. If I a, . It: la: l?.7fl, I 11?1?le Ifbfi a/rr {lug-tiff! Ir?14! I'll): It! I. ll .. 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P1?mnmmuwznm Sam". $5308.02 P: 827..? cm 59;? 2. 2 ?man M: aha. 92d MM :0 3203 .24. 31230: 5&2. mnufmmn?oa AB 345m 72: 3am. max Em gm 9m "Emu on. 130353 35 9.52.0 2.9 Sm 8:33 33 womssoa 3\ 09:68:59 1.2.5 HISTORY 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.3.4 I 1.3.5 LOCATION 1.14.1 1.11.2 (ii) the collation and dissemination of information; the provision of information to the Hana Secretary. The Centre is activated by the President of ACPO, in consultation with colleagues and the Hone Ofiice. At all times, mutual aid officers are under the control. 01,191?: chief officer of the area being aided, and he remains operational ~y independent. The Centre has no power to order pol ice or icers to move fran one police area to another. Following the threat or national disruption by tanker drivers and the National Union of Mineworkers in 1972, it was agreed to prepare a National Co-ordinating Centre for police resources. The activities of persons involved in that particular dispute are DOW mostly remembered by occurrences at the Sal tley Coal Depot- The first activation of this dormant facility was on 10th February 19714, for. the NUM Dispute with the Heath Government. The Centre remained open for almost four weeks, closing on 7th March .197?- The heavy picketing which took place was, on reflection, relatively peaceful and the Centre performed only a monitoring function during this period of activation. Between 21st Detober 1980 and 27th February 1981 the Centre acted as a National Information Centre, co?ordinating information to help chief officers of pol ice make the best use of accommodation for prisoners excluded from Prison Department establishments by the industrial action by the Prison Officers' Association. Between 6th July and 19th August 1981, the Centre co- ordinated the responses to requests chief officers for assistance their colleagues in policing the civil disturbances of that summer. It remained open on a monitoring basis until 31st August. Between 27th May and 2nd June 1982, the Centre helped to co- ordinate muwai aid between forces, for the Pope?s visit. AND STAFFIIB The reasons for locating the Centre at New Scotland Yard are that accommodation is available; there is ready access to good communications feellities; suitable staff are available and there is immediate access to the Hone Office and vice versa. The President of ACPO has control of the Centre 32; During the NUM Dispute he has been assisted from time to time by ACPO colleagues and HM Inspectors of Constabulary: the Inspectorate being able to offer advice about regional circumstances. During the daytime, the senior Officers had the help at the Centre of eight police officers and two civilian staff. Overnight, the staffing was at a lower level. Scanned by CamScanner 1.4.3 No annual coating of the Centre is currently available. The physical resources which are provided at New Scotland Yard are used for other purposes when the Centre is not in operation. the Centre is part of the ordinary duties of those concerned and their salaries are met in the usual way. INFORMATION AND SITUATIN REPORTS 1.5.1 To operate efficiently, the Centre receives information daily from chief officers to establish a broad picture of the operational situation, together with detailed analysis of individual force commitments and the availability of mutual aid. 1.5.2 During the recent activation, each chief officer provided a daily report on the general situation in his area and details of the number, capability, availability and commitment of his manpower resources. With this information, the Centre can help chief officers who require mutual aid to define their requests against known national availability, and provide the same picture to supplying forces, liaising between the two. 1.5.3 Information from the daily reports is provided to the Home Secretary, in the same way that he receives reports from individual chief officers to assist him in discharging his responsibilities for law and order, including his responsibility to report, and answer, to Parliament. OF NRC 1.6.1 Responses from Forces and the experiences of the Study Group members, all of whom saw duty in the Centre, indicate that the mutual aid co-crdinating role of the NRC was, and remains, the primary reason for its activation. The arrangements made through the Centre were thought to be adequate, both in terms of obtaining the requisite aid to Forces and for bringing equity to manpower arrangements Service wide. This former objective was sometimes achieved through redeployment of officers already on mutual aid to other forces without, in any way, eroding the operational autonomy of Chief Constables. 1.6.2 The Centre's role and capacity in relation to processing information for the purpose of assisting the police in preventive operations was never more than elementary. The nature of information received at the Centre was seldom capable of interpretation as hard intelligence and in September a specialist intelligence unit at Leicester was established. There was, however, receipt of general information at the NRC, such as the likely day to day targets for mobile pickets. In the main such information had already been transmitted to those forces likely to be affected but the Centre was able to act as a useful back-up. Advance knowledge of the movement of pickets also provided for the staff of the Centre to be prepared for urgent requests for aid through redeployment. 1.6.3 In the future the range of intelligence information, if any, to be held within the Centre will be dependent upon the result of the Scanned by CamScanner n. T) 1.6.11 1.6-5 work of the Intelligence Study Group. The supply of information to and liaison with Home Office officials was one of the few aspects of the F019 was questioned by some forces. It should be made perfectly 0197f? that the Study Group considers the supply of factual information 130: and liaison with, such officials to be wholly legitimate and a proper function of the Centre. There is no cause for criticism from this aspect of the NRC's operations. We consider that such liaison underlines the accountability of'the Home Secretary to Parliament and the accountability of the service as identified in section 30 (1) of the Police Act 1964. OF THE CENTRE 1.7.1 1.7.2 1.7-3 The role of the NRC was frequently and by a range of commentators described as a National Control Centre giving directions to forces. The true role of the Centre was declared many times and should have been sufficient to dispel any misinterpretation. The Presidents of ACPO, whilst responsible for the Centre, operated an open door policy to political representatives and the media. The representatives of two major opposition parties availed thensel ves of the opportunity to visit the Centre and a nunber of visits were made by the media. It is-hoped that in future activations the President of the day may feel able to adopt a similar policy and thereby increase understanding and appreciation of the Centre's true role. This Study Group considers that the service was to sane extent a victim of the unnecessary secrecy which previously shrouded the Centre. Any attempt to have maintained that secrecy, which would have been impossible, could have been damaging to the wider interests of the service. It must be recognised that the NRC needs no special lines of accountability. It is merely the agency through which requests for aid are made and responses co-ordinated. In fulfilling its function it is wholly dependant upon decisions taken by chief constables of requesting and providing forces. In all cases the accountability lies with individual chief constables either making the request or providing the mutual aid response. TITLE FOR THE CENTRE 1.8.1 The name 'National Reporting Centre? has two main defects: the 'National' aspect, although accurate, is open to an interpretation that it transcends the constitutional status of 1-13 separate forces. The word 'Reporting' reflects little of the Centres function and is so obscure as to invite misinterpretation. The need for a change of name has been reflected in a number of force responses and the Study Group have examined a variety of suggestions. The function of the Centre, it is considered, is best identified by the title Mutual Aid Co-ordination Centre (MACC). We therefor-e RECOMMEND that the title for the Centre should be changed Scanned by CamScanner acoordi ngly . RESPQBIBJLITY FOR THE CENTRE - STAFFIIG 1.9.1 1.9.2 1-9-3 1.9.11 1.9.5 The staifing level of the NRC is accepted as being correct but the cannand and control arranganent, devised on the basis of the former Metropolitan Pol ice Special Operations Room, is no longer seen as appropriate. A permanent involvement by Home Office officials and the Inspectorate in the staffing of the NRC was found to be unnecessary. They have a proper function in relation to the activities of the Centre but the Study Group feel that we must leave it to than to decide whether their responsibilities are best served by maintaining a permanent presence in the Centre. The President of ACPO has many and varied commitments. These cannitments are considerably increased when the NRC is activated. During the NUM Dispute it was impossmle for the President to maintain a day to day command of the Centre by his presence. For this reason a number of deputy chief constables were asked to assume responsibility on a daily basis. Although the frequency of the duties allowed those deputy chief constables to attain some familiarity with the task, the rapid changes in the demands of the dispute made the lack of continuity a problem. While the President of ACPO must retain overall responsibility for the NRC, his permanent presence in the Centre is not seen as necessary. Day to day responsibility for running the Centre should be vested in an officer of lower rank, and that of deputy chief constable appears best to meet this requirement~ We see the designation of such a post as that of Co-ordinator. We therefore RECOMMEND that the President retain overall responsibility for the Centre but the day by day respon31bility should be allocated to a designated officer, called the Co- ordinator, who should be of deputy chief constable rank. PRWDICIAL STAFF 1.10.1 1.10.2 Provincial officers performed duties in the NRC throughout the NUM Dispute in the capacities of staff officer to the President and assistant staff officer. They were of superintendent and chief inspector rank. The staff officer and his assistant between them ensured continuity and provincial force experience, not necessarily available to the Metropolitan Police. This coupled with the problems experienced by the Metropolitan Police in filling the controllers position, makes the revision of structure important. A prov incial superintendent of suitable experience appears best to fit the role of deputy co-ordinator. The role of staff of: icer is appropriate to the provincial chief inspector. 0 We therefore RECOMMEND that a provincial superintendent . . undertak the position of Deputy Co-ordinator and a provincial ch12: inspector the role of Staff Officer. Scanned by CamScanner ?21110311? All STAFF 1.11.1 1.11.2 The Study would wish to pl ace on record the tremendous assistance given by the Metropolitan Police for the successful operation of the NRC. Throughout the dispute the Metropolitan Felice maintained a full canmitment to the Centre in the nest. traditions of the service. The Study have considered the duties or all the posi L1 one within the NRC and it is apparent that sane changes are appropriate to take account of factors which emerged after this thormmh testing. Our RECOMMENDED Job descriptions for all posts Within the NRC are set out at Appendix MEDIA 1.12.1 1.12.? There was no designated post for a press oificer within the NRC structure and the role was assuned by the staff officer. The Study Group consider that this should be rectified for the future. An officer, either police or civilian, from Department or from a provincial force, should be allocated the role. The individual would best work with the information officer as a team responsible to the co-ordinator and his deputy. We therefore RECOMMEND that additional to the staffing structures the post of Press Officer is created for the Centre. LIAM OFFICER 1.15.1 1.13.2 1.13.3 1.13.? It was apparent to the Study Group that the prov ision of designated liaison officers in all forces, and later of information officers in those forces affected by the dispute, was extremely useful in terms of continuity and effective cmunication. The Study Group consider that forces may wish to examine the merits of providing permanent liaison officers when reviewing their in- force arranganents for future mutual aid requirenents where the NRC is activated. It is also apparent to the Study Group that there can be considerable benefit for the service close liaison with non- Hcme Office Pol ice Forces in major industrial disputes where the NRC is activated. Discussions have been held with the British Transport Police with a view to establishing machinery for liaison and it is considered that reference to such forces should be set out in standing instructions for the NRC staff. We Rm accordingly. FACILITIES - ACMTIOI 1.14.1 The accommodation provided for the NRC in rooms 1309 and 1310 of New Scotland Yard must be viewed as total iy inadequate when one considers the importance and circunstances of the task being Scanned by CamScanner 1 I 1? undertaken. Tm: 3594;:- .. Metropolitan Police 3: - accommooation was given over tr. -.. 25.: benefit of himsignt no: maze: mi: critizim 1.14.3 The prowl ion of mu: a: an nine assmtec on tnose occasion: were 5-22:; 2'2 2.: main rout was necessary; nan-ever, other 2:77:22; L: -2 functioning had to be :errie: mail. :zx 23:17.ng e: property. 1.1?.3 Tnere have been a nutter of 2733-11: regerxng 21% 2.: :5 NBC at lieu Scotland Yarc. Sate 5:1":5 tare sggezzre: 2.2 should be are; from the utteree: :trer: gene-.2 2:2: 2.- alterretive ".222: 31;: 112:5 :5 tie sensitivity. the Stacy ?rm; 5.35 2:52.193: 7.1-2: 12:21:13; as: on balance, consider :nat :re 5:24: 22:29:. :2 2e Lib-32 within the capital, not Least Staff 2.1: 212? availability. ?152, toe inn-e e' 2e Pol mgr-1:7 for tne Metron?tar. a" 32:3; Siting the Centre in err; :mer farce arse 39;: 9:237: prooleue an: politioa; presence: at a ZLZDE ate: 2 33.21;: be sensitive. 1.14.4 me General Secretary of ACE. area-:1 nee :2e Metropolitan Polioe buzzing an: me 5:12; Eros; 39::er NRC should be canine: "aim :55 A3335 L3 2: provide a permeates: out to emanoe 12.6 and staff prmisizre tie ever: of fare 3:2; .2122. 2' combined coal: be - within Central London, czar tine: 5a; 32:2; 3-): far; :31; would seem ideal. f1 1: r: H. ?1 1.14.5 He therefore Imam aocsr'iirgly an: can be to This 1?63251'. WHEY-WIN 31? 1.15.1 The fol; spectra: of 719333132213: :f If: I {1.12:2 .15.: :52: oonsiderec my me Stacy Grog. at no: see a nee: for computerisation of the Centre at 2.1: time, 2.153;; we that f?;ture :?nanges in neg man-:? 1 43.53321: appropriate. Limited camber 1.27.1: merger, 25:73:}. an: is considerec that toe basic emote: int?0:14:22 the dispute should be avaiLezle :mennexerz 2 future activation of the [25. ?Zoe amputee 3:13;: '1 functions, such a: storage of Stet: ti.e- zine: charts mould remain me key display 12:11. 1.15.2 He thereto1.15.3 me loan of a Hora processor frn: Sam-imam distinct assistame to the spears om;1e:io: of 357-1.- eagle: 5-1: detailed reports. 1.15.11 'Ihe message stitch temiml also :rowide: I'aliezle warez monitoring aid availability and tart. cog! omen-21"? zen-tee: '2 Scanned by CamScanner Centre and forceS. 1.15.5 We therefore RECOMMEND that in future tgseofqaunidpnsiritabfg the Centre includes the provision of a word that the qualified staff to operate the machine. We also message switch terminal should remain. 1.16.1 The provision of a PNC terminal at the Centre has bee: con31d1egf: by the Study Group and is viewed as unnecessary. Un er cer ld circumstances the inclusion of a PNC terminal in the cent-1r: couh be counter?productive to the wider interests of PNC .0309 relative to public support for the network 1-16.2 All verbal contact between the Centre and forces was conducted Over? Open British Telecom lines. At only one stage did this present any? Problem - in Kent where it was thought some breach oi confidentiality may have occurred. The simple expedient. of requiring return calls was adopted and no indication was received or any message to or from the NRC having "leaked". In the rare event of a need to use secure telephone lines, these were available elsewhere in the building. The Terry Report recommended that secure line scramblers be available within the Centre and, although the need may be limited, the Study Group consider that at least one such line should be available in future. 1.16.3 We therefore am accordingly. 1.16.11 The visual displays in the Centre were adapted as circumstances dictated with maps and deployment boards proving flexible to the prevailing requirements. More permanent fixtures for these displays would have held some advantages and this may prove possible in the event of the combining of the ACPO and embryo NRC accommodation. With the advent of redeployment, some weeks into the dispute, the boards were revised to show availability and deployments. In future activations this capacity to alter the nature of the visual displays may again be an asset and there is no reconmendation for change at this time. DBTIIJCTIONS 1.17.1 The Study Group considers that there should be a manual setting out standing instructions and guidelines for NRC staff. We do not see such guidelines as being bulky or pedantic. They should be seen in the light of a useful aid to all staff working in the Centre and should set out job descriptions and a broad narrative of the Centres functions, role and method of operation. 1.17.2 We therefore RECOMMEND that the Forward Planning Unit of A8 (3) should be tasked to prepare such standing instructions in liaison with A2 (1) Branch. Scanned by CamScanner . i I AID 1.18.1 1.18.2 1.18.3 TRAINEE 1.19.1 1.19.2 The co-ordination of mutual aid arrangements was, during this activation, on an unprecedented scale. The availabllity of that aid, with so many forces making requests, was often critical. The matter of aid cannitment to the national resource is the concern of the Mutual Aid Study Group but this group feels that. it 155 essential for chief constables' estimates of the amount of aid they have available to be accurate. The requirements to enter into negotiations with supplying forces almost every time aid was requested placed an unnecessary additional pressure upon the NRC staff and was extremely time consuning. In an effort to resolve this problem, and in liaison Mutual Aid Study Group, the format of the "Draftsman Comprise" message has been amended. It is hoped that the revised coding will allow forces to define more accurately the aid which they have available. The revised message format is at Appendix and we RECOMMEND that this be taken into use. The considerable accunulation of reports and copy messages during the NUM Dispute activation has generated the question of filing. It is RECDHHENDED that all filing, following an activation, should be lodged with the General Secretary of ACPO. mm It is clearly impossible to predict future activations of the NRC as the range of possibilities defies description. It is therefore vital that an on-going programme of regular training exercises for the Centre be carried out. The identification and periodic training of a nucleus of officers to staff the Centre is essential and the recommendations of the Training Study Group should incorporate this feature. The requirement for training and potential attachments is as follows:- Provincial Officers:- 6 Deputy Chief Constables Co?ordinators 1O Superintendents - Deputy Co-ordinators 10 Chief Inspectors Staff Officers The Metropolitan Police commitment, with a view to achieving continuity in all positions in the Centre, is a minimun of:- 15 Chief Inspectors to provide (Carmunications Officer 15 Inspectors 211 hour (Aid Officer 15 Sergeants cover as: (Loggist Information Officers Canputer/Telex Operators 12 Inspectors 12 Sergeants/Constables 12 Constables Plotters 12 Typists (Civilian) Word Processor Operators 12 Clerks (C0 Grade) - Adnin/Support Scanned by CamScanner 1-19-3 1.19.? 1.19.5 1.19.6 During a prolonged activation these numbers may prove inadequate but the need for continuity and the capacity to commence an activation with personnel familiar with their role is vital. . In the event of more officers being required, the nucleus of trained officers and a suitable overlapping of attachments would prov we the essential continuity. These figures can be related to structure and duty cover by reference to Appendix "Command Structure" and Appendix "Shift Duty Rota". Regular exercising of the Centre should be arranged through liaison between senior staff designated to perform duty within the Centre and the President. Such liaison could be facilitated through the ACPO office but the appointment of a Principal Mutual Aid Co-ordimtor (designate) may be of advantage. The nanination of a deputy chief constable . to this office would provide a focal point to which successwe Presidents could make reference when circunstances dictate that activation of the Centre be considered. The officer would also be able to ensure that the Centre was exercised in a manner relevant to current public order demands. Without prejudice to the training Study Group we RECOMMEND accordingly. CONCLUSION 1.20.1 1.20.2 1.20.3 1.20.14 The performance of the NRC during the 1984/85 Dispute has generally received the approval of the service and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. It provided the necessary co-ordination for the movement of many thousands of officers between forces and was for much of the time the key clearing house for information. It achieved its function without encroaching upon the operational autonomy of the 43 separate forces. The spectre of a national police force, which it appears almost every agency wishes to resist, was exorcised. If resistance to a national force remains in the fixture then the capacity to co? ordinate aid during this massive pol ice operation will support that resistance. It is impossible for the Study Group to predict whether there will be any future activation or what may be its cause. The Group and the service can remain optimistic, however, as to the ability of the Centre to service the needs of Mutual Aid. The principal costs of the NRC have, during all its activations, been borne by the Metropolitan Police. In this latest activation the exceptions in terms of staff were the ACPO rank officers and the provincial superintendent and chief inspector. All equipment and facilities were supplied under the Receivers Budget, other than the word processor. The matter of funding remain unclear for the future and we RECOMMEND that this aspect be examined by the NRC Steering Canmittee. The Study Group members, all of whan had personal involvement in the NRC, make their reccumendations in the context of a successful activation. These recuendations are largely a formalisation of the informal end product of a long but effective period of Scanned by CamScanner activation It is appropriate to reflect in this report our appreciation for the efforts of those officers of all ranks who worked in the Centre and to the Cmissioner of Police of the Hetropolis for his oo-operation. As a footnote to our paper, the Study Group HiSh E0 P0153 out that during our deliberations we have been mindful of the Centre; possible role in a war duties situation. We believe that our recmendations, including staffing ratios, will have the potential to take on those limited fmctions which may be expected of the NRC in such Scanned by CamScanner mammalian-annular. PARA mm Emit: 1.8.1 HI (ii) (ii) (iv) (vi) (vii) that the NRC be reamed the ritual Aid 'JO-orciimtim Centre (HACC) 1.9.5 the Resident of me ACPO retains responsibility fur the Centre Ihat the day to day operations of the 1.9.5 theatre be the responsibility of a Deputy Chief Constable to be imam as the Mutual Aid Co?ordinatcr 1-10-2 that a Superintendent a Provincial Force be in charge the staff at the Centre and be known as the Deputy Co-ordinator That a thief Inspectcr from a Provincial Fcrce he the Staff (l?ficer WW 1.11.2 That a Chief Inspecta' be the Cmunications Officer ?Ihat an Inapector he the Aid Officer That an Inspecta- be the Information Officer That a Sergeant be the Loggist lhat a Constable be the Plotter That a suitably trained Sergeant or Constable be the Cmputer/Telex Operator That a suitably qualified civilian typist he the Hard Processor Operator That a civilian of (I) grade be the Admin/ Support Officer Scanned by CamScanner 10 11 12 13 11-1 15 1b 17 Mammalian: That the posts identified in recmnnendations 6 to 8 above be as described at Appendix to this report Media?elsticnsz?nessmicec That a Press Officer be appointed for the Centre - drawn fran Petropolitan Department staIf or fran a Provincial Force Liaison That the Liaison systen be introduced with non-Hone Office police forces in appropriate circunstances That the Centre remain in London - preferably housed other than at New Scotland Yard and linked with the accalmodation of the General Secretary of ACPO Maximum That a limited capacity table top computer facility be available from the first day of any future activation That a word processor and message switch terminalbe available fran the first day of any future activation Secunefmunicaticns Tnat at least one 'secure' telephone line be made available ?tsndins?otesof?uidams That a brief document be prepared itemising essential information for the setting up and activation of the MACC mm That the standard format for the Draftsman Comprise message be amended in accordance with Appendix to this report App A 1.12.2 1.13.4 1.14.5 1.15.2 1.15.5 1.16.3 1.17.2 1.1802 App Scanned by CamScanner ?015. That all files. talcum In acuvuxon cf the Centre. mould be Mr the control the Sexual Secretary at ICPO. lam max ?that duty-ted staff as hated at paragraph 19.2 cf um noon. be involved 1n cur-clung d? an tantra mm That the NRC Steering Cum? u-me me has? under which an Centre 1: fmded. Scanned by CamScanner Appendix MB DEMPTIGIS - WAL AID CO-ORDIMTIDN MITRE CO-ORDINATOR - Deputy Chief Constable Direct responsibility to the President of ACPO for all functions of the MACC. (ii) Liaison with Chief Officers, Hone Office and Inspectorate. Authorise all reports fromtheMACazo agencies outside theService. DEPUTY - Superintendent Assune Co-ordinator's responsibilities in his absence. (ii) Supervise all functions of the MACC. Liaison with Operations Carmanders in Forces. (iv) Authorise all messages from the HACC to Forces. STAFF OFFICER - Chief Inspector (1) Preparation of reports for the Co-ordinator. (ii) Maintenance of statistical information. Liaison with Metropolitan Police re personnel, facilities and equipment. (iv) Assune the Deputy Co-ordinator's responsibilities in his absence or that of the Co-ordinator. OFFICER - Civilian Adninistrative and support duties as directed by the Staff Officer. Hon!) ma OPERATOR - Civilian Preparation of reports and forms as directed by the Staff Officer. OFFICER - Inspector Collate Information Reports Forces. Scanned by CamScanner (ii) Liaison with Force 3.8.5 and Intelligence Unit(s). Maintain up to date briefing folder for Co-ordinator. (iv) Assist Staff Officer in preparation of reports. PRESS OFFICER Advise Co-ordinator on all matters relating to the media. (11) Liaison with Press Officers in Forces. Liaison with media representatives as directed by the Co?ordinator. (1v) Preparation of draft press releases. Monitor periocicals and newspapers. (vi) Preparation of daily synopsis of press coverage. (v11) Arrange press conferences and media visits to MACC. - Constable (1) Maintain visual displays. (ii) Assist Loggist. - Sergeant/Constable Aclmowledge incaning and despatch outgoing telex messages. (11) Maintain computerised record of all MACC arrangements and Draftsman Canprise message information. Produce programmes and maintain records as directed by Staff Officer. OFFICER - Chief Inspector Responsibility to the Deputy Co-ordinator for all mutual aid arrangements. (11) Monitoring of aid availability/ requests. Supervision of records and visual displays. Additional Night Duty: Determine need for call out - referring to Deputy Co-ordinator. Briefing note for Co-ordinatcr. Scanned by CamScanner .1 I '1 l. . AID (FFIQZB Inspector Liaise with Force Operations Demrtments regardirg 81: requests (ii) Arrange mutual aid deployments. UBGIBT - Sergeant (1) Maintain records of all omnications. (ii) Maintain files of aid deployments. Direct preparation of visual displays. Scanned by CamScanner Appendix AID CBITRE 1mm WISE m5 FORMAT CODE (INTENT 1 Force nunber 2 Force name 3 Force maximum PSU comnit'nent ll PSU's available for mobilisation Total l4(a) Within 2 hours of notice 14(b) Within 14 hours of notice 5 PSU's not available - reason for non-availability 6 PSU's ccmnitted tooun Force 7 PSU's already on mutual aid Force(s) to which committed (by host Force nunber) 8 PSU's received on aid Force(s) fran which on aid (by supplying Force nunber) 9 Information likely to effect PSU availability/demand 9(a) Over next 2? hours 9(b) Over any longer period Codes 10 Onwards Relate to Information Covering the Previous 24 Hour Period 10 Arrests 10(a) Number of arrests 10(b) Cunulative total of arrests 10(c) Nature of offences for which arrested Injuries to police officers 11(a) Slight (requiring no more than initial casualty treatnent) 11(b) Serious (requiring more than initial casualty treatment at a hospital) u} Scanned by CamScanner 11(0) 12 12(a) 12(b) 12(0) 13 14 15 16 17 onwards Fatal Injuries to others Slight Serious) Nature of involvanent to be specified Fatal Damage - brief account of extent and degree of damage Level of denonstrator activity (includes picketing) Total nunber in Force area Nunber of sites receiving attention . Nunber of demonstrators at principal site Location/identification of that site Mood at principal site (Peaceful/Hostile/Violent) Report on significant events since last report, each event commencing date/time/location Information - of movements related to the activation - of events in the near future which may influence public order Available at the discretion of the OIC of MACC ?scanned by CamSganner MUTUAL AID COORDINATING CENTRE COORDINATOR - OFFICER IN CHARGE Deputy Chief Constable DEPU TY JRDINA TOR Superintendent INFORMATION OFFICER COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER STAFF OFFICER Inspector Chief Inspector Chief Inspector . I I . . - PRESS AID OFFICER LOGGIST WORD PROCESSOR Inspector Sergeant Civilian Civilian PLOTTEH Constable Constable ?ight Duty GLrenqth Scanned by CamScanner FOR Cr: YEAH Day-12%: Nonudy Iuesday H?2N?de} FriUd\ Saturoa) ?333 6 am - 5 pm Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 WEEK a pm a an Camp UNE Rest Day Group Normal Duty Normal Duly (Group HEEK 8 ps- - 8 am Group THU Rest Day Group ND) Normal Duty Normal Duty (Group NEEK 8 pm 8 am Group 1 1 . Rest Day Group ND) Normal Duty Normal Duty (3 ND) 8 am .8 pm Group WEEK 8 pm - 8 am Group FOUR Heat Day Group NU) Norma] Duty Nnrmul Duly \2 ND, ND Normal Duty Scanned by CamScanner MUTUAL AID Scanned by CamScanner mm) IHE Hall. East. CBE, 0PM, Chief Constable, Hunberside Police (Chairman) A Young. Esq., Cmmander, Metropolitan Police (Secretary) Phillips, ESL, BA, Assistant Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police Snith, Esq., BA, Assistant Chief Constable, Cleveland Constabulary EVans, Assistant Chief Constable, Heat Midlands Police H0458, Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Norfolk Constabulary Coe, Esq., BA, Assistant Glief Constable, Kent Constabulary Reynolds, Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Gloucestershire Constabulary A Evans, Esq., Assistant (hief Constable, South Hales Constabulary To exanine present criterion upon which forces base their aid cannitment. MOTION 2.1.1 The Study Group took time to give detailed consideration to the responses fran forces on this topic, received as a result of the circular letter sent out by the Steering Omittee. Forces can be asslred that every suggestion has been exanined, including those dealing with legal and constitutioml matters. 2.1.2 It is clear that the success of massive mobilisations of police officers and their equipment over the period of the NUM Dispute is acknowledged by forces. me basis of much of the organisation of Mutual Aid is the ACPO publication of January 1982 entitled "Publ ic Order - General Guidance For Senior Police Officers". This report makes reccnmendations for acne anendnent to that docunent and also for its guidance to be more widely accepted. It was agreed that the ACFO publication had been seen to be generally valid despite the magnitude of the problems encountered during the dispute. The relev?a/ngz Hone Office Circulars dealing with mutual aid are 69/73 and 2 . a DJ The Study Group has been mindful that mutual aid is frequently used by forces in circunstances not linked to public disorder or Police Support Units. In its wider sense mutual aid is a tangible fact of the 143 separate forces combining as a service. We hav been conscious of this factor throughout our deliberations and be ieve that our recaumendations will not compromise the multifarious nature of mutual aid requests. Scanned by CamScanner CIITERIN R18 Hull?. AID comm 2.2.1 The criterion for force commitments to mutual aid was agreed and promulgated through the 1982 Notes of Guidance. That criterion is one Police Support Unit for every two hundred officers of force authorised establishment. In the case of the Metropolitan Police, special agreanent was made that it would provide a minimun of 22 PSU's immediately, at any time and reSardless of other commitments. In practice, and with some advance warning, the Metropolitan Police have the caPaCltY ?30 provide many more than this basic commitment, as they demonstrated many times during the dispute. On occasions and even consistently, some provincial forces found that they too were able to provide more than their comitment. However, it was also the case that other forces found the national criterion a difficult burden. 2.2.2 The initial quest by the Study Group was therefore to re- examine the national criterion. Suggestions from forces varied enormously and various models were put forward of increased, decreased and graded commitments. Our conclusion was that the present criterion of one PSU for every two hundred officers of force establ ishnent holds the merits of familiarity and equality. None of the alternatives either suggested by forces, or created in discussion, held advantages and many produced complications which made then unattractive. The Study Group, therefore, RECOMMENDS that the present criterion diould remain. Similarly, the special provisions for the Metropolitan Police should stand. 2.2.3 Appendix of the January 1982 Notes of Guidance provides comprehensive tables of supplying forces for local aid agreements. Although only applicable in the very early stages of the NUM Dispute this Appendix has been examined. We see no reason for this Appendix to be amended. me arrangements, often utilised when time for planning for mutual aid is available, provide for forces experiencing problems to km; to when they can turn. mural (l7 2.3.1 Follaaing the smer disorders of 1981 the composition of a PSU was agreed as one inspector, two sergeants and twenty constables. 2.3.2 Ihe Group are firmly of the view that the present canposi tion for a PSU has stood the test time and experience in a wide range at mutual aid responses. be present PSU provides for a tactical, self?contained, mobile unit. which has achieved outstanding success. 2.3.3 me Study Group has examined a wide range of variations to the PSU structure. He are cf the via that the {resent canposition should renain maltered. Or ?11)!!me is that the composition of a PSJ dwauld remain 1:2:20. SFECILBT LID 2.4.1 During the HUM Dispute many types of specialist aid, other than PSU's, were requested. In the case of mounted and dog section personnel forces' holdings of such resources are contained in Scanned by CamScanner Appendices to the ACPO Tactical Options Manual. Other aid was requested, such as prison vans and catering facilities, and, the inclusion in the Manual of this type of information would be a useful asset. 2.14.2 'Ihe Study Group accordingly. 2.5.1 A nunber of forces suggested that specific arrangements -be incorporated into rational criteria for in relation to fire fighting and first aid. 'Ihe Study Group has exanined the case for such specialisms to be included in PSU training and the implications. 2.5.2 He have concluded that all members of PSU's should receive a basic form of training to deal with the dangers of fire arising from, say, fire bombs and other incendiary devices likely to be encountered in public disorder situations. We have taken the view, on the balance of evidence available, that to be effective fire fighting techniques must be applied immediately and therefore demand instant knowledge. Re are aware that most forces already incorporate such training in their PSU training programmes. 2.5.3 He that training for all PSU officers should include fire fighting techniques appropriate to public disorder envirorments solely in connection with the safety of officers. We leave it to the Training Study Group to specify the form of such training. 2.5.1! In relation to first aid, the Study Group is of the via: that there are occasions when specialist knowledge of first aid can be essential, indeed life saving. We acknowledge that all pol ice officers receive elementary first aid training and that it is not unusual for qualified medical teams to be in attendance at scenes of large scale public disorder. However, there is reason to justify greater structuring of the arrangements which presently obtain and to suggest that, on occasions, police officers trained to a higher level in first aid should be available in front line situations. 2.5.5 Such specialist personnel should not be part of a PSU response but an additional resource. 2.5.6 Host forces already have first aid teams and where they are established they could be regarded as this additional resource. To provide easy reference to such personnel, their availability should be identified by the Forward Planning Unit on a natiomide basis and included in the Appendices to the Tactical Options Manual. 2.5.7 We therefore that first aid teams should be treated as a separate mutml aid resource and that the capacity of forces to supply such teams as mutual aid be incorporated as an Appendix in the Tactical Options Manual. Scanned by CamScanner FOR PSU OFFICERS 2.6.1 A clear implication of the mobilisation of PSU's for the NUM Dispute was the need for all officers forming part of that response to be trained in the range of duties that may be expected of them. 2.6.2 To call for all such officers to be trained to the highest levels is clearly beyond the means of the service and, possibly, unnecessary. The Study Group accepts that most forces have specialist tactical units such as Special Patrol Groups, Tactical Aid Uniteg Support.Groups and the like and that such groups form the nucleus of police response in particularly violent public disorder. 2.6.3 But this factor should not detract from a requirement for all officers forming part of mutual aid response to be trained to a common minimum level. We are aware that the service has promulgated such a training package based on common minimum standards and we endorse the philosophy and objectives of such training. We see it as essential that mutual aid training should be fully integrated and that there should be common tactics, common words of command and cannon training. 2.6.1.l The Study Group therefore RECDHHENIB that all officers selected to form part of a PSU mutual aid response should have received training to a common minimum standard. PROTECT IV EQUIPMENT 2.7.1 In relation to equipment, it is the view of the Study Group that responding to the NUM Dispute revealed significant in the adequacy of equipment available to some PSU's. 2.7.2 We'have concluded that all forces should hold sufficient protective equipment to enable the whole of their mutual aid response to be regarded as 'equippedh. We accept that this has significant financial implications but consider that the need to protect our officers should assume ascendancy over all other criteria. 2.7.3 Details as to what constitutes protective equipment for PSU's is set out in the Tactical Options Manual. 2.7.4 Dealing with the issue of personal protective clothing, we RECOMMEND that those officers trained to level 1 (dedicated PSU) require such equipment to be personal issue. However, it is hoped that as.more equipment becomes available to forces those items having a direct hygiene implication should be personal issue to all trained officers irrespective of level. DRIVERS 2.8.1 Present guidelines acknowledge the importance of mobility in the operational/tactical deployment of PSU's. To this end all PSU's should have, as additional personnel, suitably trained drivers. 2.8.2 During the NUM Dispute logistical pressures dictated that such drivers were not always provided. Scanned by CamScanner I'll 2-3-3 The Study Group considers that in all future activations c2 smiths aid it is desirable that every PSJ should have dedicated driver: additional to the mit's basic composition We also gas; such drivers should be trained to at least "standard car course level and have received tactical band training in the drivers role to ensure familiarity with those manoeuvres which they may .e expected to undertake in public disorder environzents. 2.8.1; We REOJHHDID adoption in all forces of the present ggdelinest'zat every PSU should have POLICE drivers dedicated to that an. that they should be additional to the PSU's manpower compl Further we RECOHHEID that such drivers should be trainedtc Standard car course level and have received tactical band training aPPY'Opriate to their specialist role. Dowmhm FOR 2-9.1 Most forces have prepared an operational record for use by their PSU commanders when on mutual aid. Appendix of the 1982?xotes of Guidance sets out the general format for Such docucertaticr. '1 A 2-9-2 Where the recommended format for operational record docupentatic was used, it is apparent that PSU commanders found littl difficulty in maintaining adequate records. Hhere th?l docunentation has been complicated by in?force requirements :or additional material, severe difficulties were experienced. U) (b 2-9-3 The Study Group is of the view that an operational record should be prepared on a national basis and mould be taken into use by all forces. The operational record should also embrace aspects relative to finance. We that such an operational record docunent is prepared by the Forward Planning Unit - A8 (3) - using as a general format Appendix of the ACPO Notes for Guidance. SENIOR OFFICES AND LCBISTICAL 2.10.1 Many supplying forces clearly regarded the provision of unrequested senior officers as concomitant with the supply of multiples of PSU's. In some instances the supply of senior officers related to the guidance under part section 1+ of the ACPO Tactical Options Manual. The role of such senior officers was sometimes confused between operational and welfare/liaison functions 2.10.2 The Study Group consider that operational cannand officer-5 should be treated as a separate mutual aid resource. we nacounmm accordingly. 2.10.3 The Study Group recognise that, where significant nunbers of PSU's are despatched as mutual aid they should have the support of accompanying senior officers performing a wel fare/liaison function The role of such senior officers should be flexible but include the following:? Scanned by CamScanner 2.10.4 2.10.5 Liaison with host force command and logistics teams: ?30 epsm?e conpatibility of adninistration systems, including operatlonal records; Supervision of PSU's in relation to mustering and messing, to ensure their proper availability; (C) Wei fare matters affecting officers in their charge; Contact with the 'hane force' as appropriate. In all instances such liaison/welfare Officers shou_ld_be accompanied by a police driver who is capable Pf 3553:5t1ng with administrative duties and a vehicle equipPEd "lth a multi channel radio. The driver and vehicle should be fran the supplying force. We considered the nunerical ratio of liaison officers appropriate to a mutual aid response. It is that future Situations may call for some variation to whatever reconmendations may be made at this time. A reasonable structure was, however, agreed and 001' RECOMMENDATION appears below. We believe that our recommendations, whilst in themselves a achieve a balance between the properly identified need for welfare and an over burdening of host force facilities. "tubers of Liaison 1 - 11 unit At the discretion of the host force. 5 - 10 units Superintendent of supplying force. More than 10 units Superintendent and Chief Inspector of supplying force. A police driver and suitably equipped vehicle from the supplying force should always accompany liaison officer(s). ADHINISTRATIV SUPPORT 2.11.1 2.11.2 With regard to all other forms of non-PSU aid, many forces considered that administrative teams were a useful resource. Unfortunately, during the NUM Dispute, their great drawback was that aided forces sometimes found great difficulty in providing the additional accommocation for such staff. They also presented a financial implication. To obviate such difficulties in future mobilisations we RECOMMEND that actninistrative support teams should only accompany mutual aid by request of the aided force. Scanned by CaihScanner WELFARE - ASSOCIATION AND MICE FEMATIOII 2.12.1 201202 2.12.3 2.12.? Where mutual aid requires that large nunbers of police officers be accommodated outside their home Force area, the Study Group 11} conscious of the assistance that can be given by representatives 0? pol ice staff associations in connection with welfare issues and logistical planning. The Study Group advocate that within the structure of personnel requirements to facilitate a large scale mutual aid commitment there should be a recommended structure to deal with wel fare and welfare liaison matters designed as follows:? The following has been put forward for provincial Forces by the Federation and agreed by the General Purposes Ccm'nittee 0f A.C.P.O. notwithstanding 'any local agreement and subject to the constitutional position of Chief Constables:- At Force level (aiding Force). One member of the Joint Branch Board, possibly the Chairman, Vice Chairman or [Deputy Secretary, to undertake responsibility for receiving, collating and dealing with welfare matters in his own Force arising directly fran the attendance of a member of that Force away on mutual aid. This position to be activated when the siding Force sends five or more units to another Force area. It is not anticipated that such officers should leave their hone Force area. At Force level (aided Force). Representatives of the Joint Branch Board to be struck off other duty corrmitments and given the task of receiving and processing welfare complaints from officers visiting and aiding that Force. They would also fulfil the task outlined at above, in addition to contacting their counterpart in the aiding Force to resolve domestic welfare matters. However, these officers should have direct responsiblity to bring welfare problems to the notice of the officer in charge of an aiding contingent. This position to be activated where five or more units are received into the aided area. At National level. 'I?nat representatives of the Joint Central Committee be prescribed within the structure to have responsibilities for liaising/negotiating on welfare matters with senior officers of both aiding and aided Forces through the President of A.C.P.O. The level of National Conmittee involvement would be determined by the territorial size of the dispute but, using the N.U. M. Dispute as an example, it would be appropriate for a member of No 2 Region, a member of No 4 Region and a member of No 7 Region to become involved. The involvenent of the Joint Central Comittee should only be activated if the dispute has required the activation of the N.R.C. (or M.A.C.C.). Scanned by CamScanner {537;?" -9 'iiSE??ute it was clear that there was a core of mobile 335:: arc-mite: t: a maximm: of sanewhere in the region of 5,090 "7'3 33335-78 the major problems in the coal fields. Their nz'u'itetts were ?mpredictable and the level of violence they were ?43-'45 i=3 :ffer Led all aided forces to seek to amass the manPower 3i:- 31135- 11-! could deal with the worst possible situation. In the event, are 52:: that their numbers were limited, except In very 53" 33565, :3 5,333 :en dictated that the main focus of problems were restrizze: to one or two main areas each daY- Chg-f 333333395, having budgeted for the worst possible case: were 1? carer cf :eirg Left with large nunbers of officers relatively 22cm? ricus stages during the dispute reference was made to the of establishing holding centres for PSU's from which hard -: chi constables could oral aid. The concept of centres or :rom which forces could draw PSU's on a day by day, or even by sour, basis appears attractive. if 4 $339: . '5 't?l 'l 0 (I In ii therefore the Study Group have considered the viability 0f 1 55, centres in some depth. There are, discounting the a iristrative and financial problems, many difficulties. Not east is the constitutional dilemma which holding centres would It is arguable whether holding centres in any of the affected areas would have utilised the units on aid more effectively. Cne factor most certainly would have been in danger of erosion that being the constitutional nature of 143 separate police forces and the operational autonany of chief constables. 'lhe redeployment of aid the NRC, referred to below, was always on a request and consent basis, being little different to the original requesting and despatching of aid from parent forces If holding centres are to have any significant advantages over redeployment there would have to be a command structure at such centres to determine who goes where are when. At face value this may appear to be academic but in constitutional terms it is a step which is best avoided. Hav ing considered the concept of regional holding centres this Study Group makes no recannendation to pursue their viability at this time. However, it may be that such constitutional (and associated financial) issues do not apply when the situation has reached the stage where the Hone Secretary avails himself of his authority mder section 14 (2) of the Police Act 1964. Under these circutstames there may be merit in pooling resources at holding centres. mom During the 1984/85 activation the NRC was obliged to arrange the redeployment of aid on an almost daily basis to those geographical areas experiencing the worst of the problems. This was possible because of the excellent relationship which existed between forces As mentioned above, for sound operational reasons, at times chief constables requested sane reserve level of Scanned by CamScanner aid above that actually required for their routine commitment to policing the dispute. As the number of forces obtaining aid increased so too would the surplus manpower have grown. 2.1MJ2 The success of redeployment facilitated by pre?planning of resource availability and close monitoring of developments by the National Reporting Centre, allowed chief constables in the geographically linked problem areas to reduce the reserve factor in their aid requests 2.14.3 In all. future activations the viability of redeploying manpower should be actively considered by all forces experiencing problans and should be co?ordinated through the NRC 2.14.4 Such arrangements should steadfastly maintain the operational independence of chief constables. They must ensure that the Centre only responds to such requests. CONCLUSION 2.15:1 The Study Group consider that many of the existing national agreements on mutual aid remain valid. Where we have made recommendations we are of the view that they will complement present guidelines and enhance the arrangements between forces for mutual assistance in times of need. Scanned by CamScanner PM 25 26 29 KLICIIB unmams Cl" NATIGML UNIGI OF KINUMKEIB DISPUTE WI. AID 310m GWP rm The present criterion for force cannibnent to mutual aid should raein 1 PSU for every 200 officers of force esteblid'ment. That the special arrangements for the Metropolitan Police mould rennin those approved in 1981. 'Ihat the composition of a PSU would rennin 2.3. 1:2:20. That Appendices to the Tactical Options (.14. Manual be drum up specifying specialist aid. I (U ?Ihat training of all PSU officers would include fire fighting techniques appropriate to public disorder environnents solely in connection with the safety of officers. 4 That first aid teans be treated as a 2. separate mutual aid resource and that the Tactical Options Manual mould contain an Appendix specifying forces with such teams. All officers foming PSU's mould receive 2.5.c training to a cmon minim. standard. Forces would hold sdi?icient protective 2.1a equippent to emble the uncle their mutual aid response to be regarded as 'equipped'. He accept that this has significant fimnciel ilplications tut consider that the need to [rotect ou- oi'ficers mould assue ascendancy over all other criteria. ?rst all PSU's would be accompanied by Police drivers additional to the Units Impaler. Scanned by CamScanner C) tn) in In Lu That all sum drivers should be trained to standard car course level and have received tactical band training. Th or cnal 'operaticnal rec That senior officers be treated as a separate mutual aid resource. mat senior officers undertaking a ueli?are/ liaison function should multiples of pol ice support units in accordance with a designated structure. 'Ihat administrative support. teams, special -ist personnel and specialist. equipment be treated as a separate mutual aid resource. Further it is advocated that within the structure of personnel requirements to facilitate a large scale mutual aid eminent there should be a structure to deal with welfare and welfare liaison matters. 2.11.2 Scanned by CamScanner LOGISTICS Scanned by CamScanner [17 0? NATMNAL Ule 0F HINENORKERS DISPUTE Lm ISTICAL OF 111E GRUJP NMc1.achlanEs1., QPM, MA, LLB, Chief Co Neselby Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Nottinghaushire Constabulary Nmaille Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police b? Jackson Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police ibMurd?e Esq? Assistant Qiief Constable, Northunbria Police h'illians Esq? LLB, Assistant Chief Constable, hoothby Esq? Assistant Chief Constable, Hampshire Constabulary A Young, Esq., Commander, Metropolitan Police Inspector Astles, (Federation), Greater Manchester Police OF REFERENCE To examine the National guidance currently available in respect of the support required for extensive mutual aid and determine its sufficiency in light of the National Union of Mineworkers Dispute. Cl? ION 5.1.1 3.1.3 At the initial meeting of the Group it was agreed that each member would research a particular area of the designated topic and present a preliminary paper which would be circulated to the remaining members for consideration and cement. Upon receipt of the preliminary papers individual members took the opportunity to seek the Views of personnel, from their own Force area, with first hand knowledge of the type of Logistical problems encountered during the policing of the dispute. Once such views had been obtained further meetings of the Study Group were arranged at which time the content of such papers were discussed in full and reccmmendations formulated. By adopting this methodology the final docunent represents the collective views of not only members of the Study Group but those Officers/Civil Personnel actively engaged in the field of 'Logistical Arrangements' . During the course of the Review the Study Group gave consideration as to what constituted a model control room. Whilst the Group were mindful that this was possibly outside the original remit it was unanimously agreed that the Control Room was an essential part of the Logistical Support Team and therefore worthy of consideration. In relation to this aspect of Scanned by CamSCahher Nottinghansh i re Constabulary Hertfordshire Constabulary the revial the recumendations of the Study Group appear at Paragraph 3.7.1. 3.1.5 The existing National guidance was generally fomd to beadequate on most issues relating to the type of mar?? extensive mutual aid. 'lhe events of 1984/85 did, mever, 109m?" certain areas where the advisory material could be enhance: light of the experiences gained in policins a prolonged ?5?79? situation. This paper identifies such areas and pron??s recommendations designed to resolve the deficiencies Zoe existing National guidance. 3-1-5 The 313061}! Group have made nunerous recanmendations. Rather than refer to each recommendation in the both Of 01" report '9 nave, 1" sane instances dealt with than by merely cmpiling reccnmendatlons. mesm's mm mun/mm 3.2.1 The need for contingency planning has been emphasised by recent events ttogether with the necessity for operational planning to be supported and complemented by the use of logistics plans and SUpport teams. Early activation of adequately preparec logistics teams would have eliminated many of the problems experienced by some forces who delayed activation of such plans until they were required to accommodate officers in their force area. 3.2.2 The size and nature of a particular incident will, to a large degree, determine the response necessary the police service, and the geographical distribution of 'problem areas' will dictate whether a force is 'supplying' or 'receiving' mutual aid. Sufficient personnel should be identified to provide a logistics support tean for the most extensive form of logistical assistance which may be required. This would, of course, provide the flexibility to allay: fa- me snaller incidents to be dealt with on a smaller scale. 3.2.3 The correct selection of personnel is regarded as a matter of the utmost importance and will ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of contingency plans. Riel-ever possible, the team which commences the activation of the plans, should renain unchanged. This should obviate the need for briefirg and familiarisation of 'fresh' personnel, and provide maximum continuity. 3.2.11 All personnel identified to perform functions as part of a logistics support tea: should receive suitable training to enable them to perform their specific roles and they should wherever possible have the Opportunity to participate in exercises. 3.2.5 Logistical planning in sale forces at the centre of activity in the recent dispute, fell into two distinct areas; the logistics cannand team and the logistics swport tea. The cmposiuon of such teans in one of the forces actively involved in the run dispute consisted of:- Scanned by CamScanner $2.6 Logistics Comnand Tenn Adninistrative Officer Chief Superintendent Deputy Force Adninistrative Officer Superintendent (1-D Personnel) The support team working under the direction of the command tear: were responsible for the follwing functions:- 3-2.7 Support Team Site/Acconmodation Acquisition Superintendent Site/Accumodation Panagement Superintendent: Canmunications Superintendent Transport Superintendent Force HQ Security Inspector Catering Force catering Officer Supplies Administrative Staff Danestic Services Danestic Services Hanager 3-2-8 Each member of the support team was assisted by a deputy and an additional tean of supporting personnel. 'me support tean met at least once a week or more frequently if the situation demanded. 3-2-9 In addition to the functions performed by the support team it is suggested one officer in the rank of Superintendent should be made responsible for all liaison with military personnel. 5.2.10 An area of particular relevance to the cannand team is information regarding Operational planning. A manber of the logistics command team should be afforded the opportunity to attend all planning meetings and Operational briefings in order to assess and comment where necessary on the effects on logistical arrargements. 3.2.11 See recommendations 35 to 1r? . AMTIDV mum EDS 3.3.1 Accommodation of large numbers of police officers presented a nunber of receiving forces with problems which had not previously been encountered. Identification and acquisition of suitable premises was a major area of concern, with sane forces experiencing considerable political interference at local goverment level which substantial 1y reduced the scope for potential accomodation 4,3,2 Much use was made of military establishments both in use and disused but substantially more accommodation could have been available if some of the disused camps had been maintained in a reasonable state of repair. One example of this was the disused RAF Syerston which alone could have accommodated all of Nottinghanshire's mutual aid requirements. The Goverrment may, in the light of the most recent experiences, wish to consider the possibility of retaining sane of the more suitably located military sites scheduled for disposal, on a care and maintenance basis as part of the overall contingency pl an for dealing with a Scanned by CamScanner 3.3.3 3.3.4 CATERIIG 3.4.2 3.14.3 3.14.5 tion for large numbers national crisis. Without suitable at difficul ty in of officers, the police service would have gre mounting a similar exercise if required to do 50- The Study Group has considered the case for legislation be available to requisition accamnodaticn in kin national At this time we have refrained from mamen? such a recommendation as we consider the voluntary proved Bde?luate. However, do not discount such a recarmen ther in future if adequate ac but-.1011 cannot be found through 0 means. See recommendations 148 to 78. Existing Enidelines identify the need for logistics support teams ?0 or'Etahise catering arrangements and, where necessary, to nominate local catering contractors for this task. Private caterers were able to provide satisfactory service but there are inherrent disadvantages of being totally reliant on a service which is outside of total control. Flexibility, quality and reliability are areas where force catering provided a far better service and the dedication and loyal of police employed civilian staff is certainly worthy of acetic am. If the police service becomes fully ccmm1tted to private catering, difficulties can be foreseen in the event of disruptive action being taken by the trade unions resulting in the withdrawal of labour from the catering service. This of course is possible with all civilian staff and it has been suggested that such staff should have a clause included in their contract of employment. A further advantage of utilising force caterers emerged from a suggestion that mutual aid could be extended to the provision of catering staff which would allcw such forces as the Metropolitan Police to augment the catering facilities of- smaller forces. It is however felt that no,hard and fast rules can be laid down, but rather that Forces have catering officers employed at Executive level who have the ability and imagination to meet any given crisis. See recommendations 79 to 92. ADDITIGML EDUI MT 3.5.1 The Public Order Equipment Manhal as issued by the Public Order Forward Planning Unit in July 198? ,deals mainly with personal portable and vehicle protection ecuipment with a section 0:1 munitions, but there 'is a fifth section which deals with miscellaneous equipnent. It is within this section that detailed information relating to itlns of' Quinnent now identified as being 1- Scanned by CamScanner essential requirements could be included. 3-5-2 Many forces displayed much enterprise in supplying items of equipment for the general comfort and convenience of their men. This ranged fran tea urns to televisions and much of the equ1pment was obviously felt to be useful at the time, but it fal ls mainly into the category of welfare equipment. The experience of one force actively engaged in the dispute suggests that the?prov ision and control of all such equipment should be the respon51b111ty of the host force. 3-5-3 Part of the equipment manual could be usefully extended to cover additional items, such as display boards, tea urns,? cold drink dispensers and a wider range of high power lighting equipment all of which were in considerable demand during the NUM dispute. Again, these items should be the responsibility of the host force unless hire or loan arrangements can be negotiated between forces but it is essential that issue of equipnent is closely monitored. 3 .5 See recommendation 93. AMHISTRATION 3.6.1 The main administrative functions, within the logistical arrangements, centre around the need to co?ordinate the response to the internal and external policing requirement together with the maintenance of adequate records for permanent storage and auditing purposes. OF A (INTRO. ROOM 3.7.1 ?In response to a suggestion that there may be merit in the - production of a 'blueprint' for a model control room, the Study Group has endeavoured to provide a list of features and systems which were successfully utilised by various forces during the NUM dispute. 3.7.2 See recommendations 91% to 116 and Appendix . Scanned by CamScanner N0REVIEH OF THE PDLICING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEHORKERS DISPUTE 1984/35 STUDY GROUP - LOGISTICS RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS All forces should have a dedicated logistics support team. Emphasis is placed on the need for a logistics plan in addition to the general contingency plan. Activation of logistics support teams by forces both 'receiving' and 'supplying' officers on mutual aid should be achieved as early as practicable once a potential requirement for extensive mutual aid has been identified. This should minimise difficulties in co-ordinating necessary arrangements. Forces should assess what personnel may be required to establish a logiStics support team. The personnel which may form part of such a team should be identified, together with the functions they would be expected to perform. Such personnel should receive suitable training to equip than to discharge their responsibilities and they should participate in exercises to ensure maximun readiness and efficiency. Logistics support teams should be carefully selected to ensure the snooth running of police activities. Forces should adopt a Command/Support structure similar to the ones detailed at para 3.2.6. Consideration should also be given to representations from the staff associations. A member of. the logistics command team should attend all operational briefings/debriefings/ meetings to assess the effects of any proposed operational strategy on the provision of logistical support. PARA 3.2.1 et seq 33201 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 302-1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq 3.2.1 et seq Scanned by CamScanner UN 185 H6 ?47 148 '49 Contingency plans should include matters which may not have previously been Le.- (3) Existing catering arrangements and their ability to cope with a large influx of officers on mutual aid Arrangements for obtaining and stock? piling food Contingency plans for hiring vehicles to supplanent existing fleets Plans for dealing with outbreaks of food poisoning and infectious/contagious diseases Procedures for obtaining additional ccnmunications equipment and the avail- ability of such equipnent Fuel arrangements for police vehicles The provision of ports-loos and other tenporary hygiene facilities The above list is in no way meant to be exhaustive but serves merely to illustrate the diversity of matters to be considered in the preparation of contingency plans. Contingency plans should be constantly reviewed at least once per year. Each force should maintain a definitive and accurate list of all facilities/equipment available. Logistics officers should be identified and withdrawn their respective deparunents. It is suggested Training departments may be able to provide a considerable manpower input for this purpose. Forces should identify suitable accomodation of the appropriate standard available from the following sources:- PCLICE UNIVERSITIES MINISTRY OF DEFENCE LOCAL AUTHORITIES HOPE DEFENCE PRIVATE CDMPANIES Negotiations for the use of military accannodation should be made in accordance with current advice on Military Aid to the Civil 3.2.1 et:A? 30301 3?0 seq Scanned by CamScanner IU l'unn'l . 'llzc lune into and me Hi shy -J ?Hum was"'11th property before on-ei te negotiations beam? practicable. Whilst Local Authority. University and private premises may be able to assist, co-operation could be affected by trade mions, student unions or political presstres at a local level. mese matters must be taken into consideration in the preparation of plans. Experience has mom that wherever possible, any wanises acquired diould be able to accarmodate not less than 10 PSU's. A large nunber of smaller loations would not be feasible in terms of both the nunbers of adninistrative staff required and the cost of maintainire sud: a service. Having identified suitable accumulation, it is necessary to ensure all ancillary requirenents are satisfactory Location proximity to sensitive areas. (in) Transport - secire parking. to) Caterim - edeqmcy of facilities. Tailet and naming facilities. All Forces mould record and upchte at six intervals all potential accounodation within their Force area. Contingency plans would be prepared to deal with the rquiruents for furnittre and bedding to equip both firnimed and unfu-nimed accaunodaticn. A specimen index card for recording information abOut potential accauodation is attached at Wadi: were there is a possibility that it may be necessary to "call out" officers at mart notice. liaison staff oust be aware of the location of such officers and would ensire pmper planning of sleeping acct-cation to minimise disruption to officers not affected. Beds. nodding and limo can be obtained at no charge fra the [1183. Details of hall to apply for these itas are Mn at Appendix Sheets and pillow cases etc? mould be lamdered once a week therefa-e lamdriaa willing and able to deal with the qmntity neceaary Md be identified. Scanned by CamScanner 5.3-l et seq ct seq 3.3.1 et. seq . 58 Where more than one shift pattern is worked by 3.3.1 officers one location, officers working et seq . different shifts wherever possible should be different parts of the premises. I Sleeping accaunodation would be kept away from 3-3-1 recreation facilities. SEQ 50 Accannodation centres must have adequate 3.3-1 I provision for the necessary nunber of vehicles, et seq and suitable fuelling facilities close at hand. I 61 Security arrangements are required to prevent 3.3.1 sabotage and intrusion the mediadate list of suppliers of all essential 3.3.1 equipment should be maintained. et seq 63 Forces should respond positively to requests for 3.3.1 I outdoor sports facilities. et seq 61% should contain facilities for 3.3.1 I indoor sports and recreation table tennis, et seq darts, daninoes, cards. Provision should also - be made for a 'lounge' area if possible. I 65 Forces should consider the installation of a bar. 3.3.1 This can be achieved either by approaching the et seq NAAFI organisation or using in?force stock and - equipment and applying for it to be licensed as a Home Office canteen. 66 Television and video hire are essential and 3.3.1 . contingency plans should include details of et seq canpanies prepared to undertake this ocmmitment. Video hire should be strictly controlled by camp I liaison staff. 67 Sufficient pay-phones should be provided to 3.3.1 enable officers to maintain contact with their et seq families. 68 The Logistics Officer responsible for liaison 3.3.1 I with donating forces must stipulate the et seq rendezvous point and time of arrival and this information should be confinned by telex. - (Unless the Supplying Force has become familiar with local geography). 09 The Officer in Charge of the accommodation should 3.3.1 personally receive the Mutual Aid. He must have et seq sufficient staff to direct and control vehicles, personnel and equipment on arrival. He should be I of a sufficient rank to enable him to control discipline of officers on mutual aid. Scanned by CamScanner Reception teans must record and index all officers, vehicles and equipment received on mutual aid. Receiving Forces should supply bed cards and naninal rolls (Appendix for canpletion by all officers with the minimun of delay. Completed cards should be returned to the reception team. All information regarding accaimodation and responsibilities should be supplied to Ccnmanders on Mutual Aid at the earliest opportunity. 11115 includes briefing arrangements. Clear and accurate signs at accanmodation sites reduce unnecessary enquiries and confusion. The officer in charge of accounodation and his staff must have access to inspect kitchen facilities of Force, private and service caterers but where military [remises are involved there must be careful liaison with military personnel- In the event of suspected outbreaks of food poisoning if the pranises are military accounodation, the military health officer should be consulted. Problens arising at other premises should be cannuniceted to the Area Envirormental Health Officer. Contingency plans should include measures to deal with outbreaks of food poisoning and contagious/ infectious diseases (Appendix Catering is important and the responsibility for this should rest with properly qualified and trained personnel with experience and management of large scale catering establisrments or operations. He/d'le should be employed on a managanent/executive basis and be responsible to the Senior Force Adninistrative Officer. Catering Officers should be managers and not 'Chefs', they should tour catering sites and feeding stations to maintain standards. Deputy Catering Officers should be deployed on the day to day supervision of canteens. Catering Officers should be given the executive power to obtain supplies fran sources without political interference and without using Central purchase facilities if the need arises. Catering Officers would identify supply sources and be able to augnent existing supplies forth? with. Scanned by CamScanner 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.3.1 et seq 3.18.1 et seq 3.11.1 et seq 3.1m et seq Sufficient basic supplies should be available in stock or be otherwise readily available to feed men in the first few days of an incident. Facilities should be identified for the storage of extra provisions and plans for the possible use of mobile refrigeration units should also be considered. Catering Officers should control through HQ Catering the purchase and supply of all produce and supplies. This will ensure standardisation and be econcmically viable. A 'substantial meal' should be eqml to the prevailing level of refreskment allmance (inclusive of preparation costs). Officers should be fed every four hours, but where this is not possible a packed meal should be provided as 'emergency rations'. Such rations should not however be regarded as a main meal. Officers travelling long distances to an aided Force should be provided with a meal prior to taking up operational duties. Consideration should also be given to the provision of a meal before the return journey or, at least, the availability?of a packed meal if officers have not been provided with a meal inmediately prior to their release fran the aided force. Peels should be provided by the dictates of the body clock rather than GMT. That is to say if an officer has been on duty since ?anthem his 'brealcfast' should be a substantial meal. Facilities should be made to supply beverages and refreshments in the field, dependent on the dictates of the weather and time. Catering Officers should maintain a list of part time experienced staff who could be mlled upon to augment existing staff. Catering Officers in oanpam with the appropriate civilian or military health officer should check premises prior to and during their use as feeding stations, to ensure suitability and to avoid health hazards. Contingency plans should be regularly reviaaed and updated to provide acctrate information on all available facilities. 3Iue1 et seq 3.4.1 et seq 3.4.1 et seq 3.14.1 et seq et seq et seq 3.14.1 et seq 3.1m et seq et seq 3.11.1 et seq 3.4.1 et seq Scanned by CamScanner 93 95 99 100 101 102 103 1014 The following list of equipment required at the support base should be included under Part of the Public Order Equipnent Manual:? Display Boards Tea Urns Cold Drink Dispensers Wider range of high power lighting Reflective Tabards Portable traffic signs Blue flashing signs Reflective cones Facilities should be made available for a dedicated Force Incident Control Roan of sufficient capacity to be able to cope with any incident requiring extensive mutual aid. Extensive use should be made of canputer facilities, command and control systems and major crime systans. These should be complemented by the use of 'white? boards and other manual and hard copy facilities. Force computer interface with PNC should provide the necessary PNC facilities. Telephone lines routed through a group hunting system should be utilised. Direct telephone links with other forces should be established. Private lines including a dedicated line for informants should be available. Teleprinter or other message transfer systans are essential. Adequate screening and soundproofing for equip? ment and operators should be provided. A separate conference room with VDU, radio and television facilities should be provided for use of ccnmand staff and incident roan staff. Dedicated teams of personnel to provide maximun continuity should be aimed for. Sufficient personnel of the appropriate rank to deal with:- 3.5.1 et seq 3.7.1 et seq 30701 et seq 3.7.1 et seq 3-7-1 et seq 30701 et seq 30701 et seq 3.7.1 et seq 3.7.1 et seq 30701 et seq 3.7.1 et seq 3.701 et seq 44 Scanned by CamScanner 105 106 (1) Deployment and assessment of requirements; Liaison with NRC, other forces, logistics teams and Catering liaison and arrangements; Message handling; Welfare/Discipline matters; Control of intercept points; Equipnent requirements; Transport; Intelligence; Escorts; Arrangements for demonstrations/marches; Identification of trends and assistance with operational planning; Press liaison with Liaison with Divisional Commanders; Monitoring of policy application and advisory function; In addition there should be adequate facilities to display all necessary management information; Maps/charts of all relevant locations should be displayed in pruninent positions; Photographs/hard copy of resource deployment at set intervals for future analysis; Too many 'information' files tend to become unnanageable and may lead to information becoming misplaced. On-going information should be kept in a handover file which should be used as a component of the briefing at shift changes. Attached at Appendix is an exanple of an Incident Control Roan Command and Control Structure together with a speciment Incident Roan Structure. 30701 et seq Scanned by CamScanner Appendix mu INCIDENT ROOM com um coma. STRUCTURE (24 Ram - 7 REEK Sim) ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE (OPERATIONS) CHIEF (12 hour tour of duty) (OPERATIONS) (12 hour tour of duty) SUPERINTENDENT SUPERINTENDENT CHIEF INSPECTOR CHIEF INSPECTOR INSPECTOR INSPECTOR SERGEANT SERGEANT OPERATIVES OPERATIVES TELEPHONISTS TELEH-IONISTS LIAISQNDEEIQEBS (14AM - 2PM mN - FRI) INSPECTOR (NATIONAL REPORTING CENTRE) INSPECTOR FORCE) SERCEANT (NEIGHBOURING FORCE) PERSONNEL OPERAJDRS 2 - CIVIL STAFF 2 - CIVIL STAFF 2 - POLICE OFFICERS 2 - POLICE OFFICERS 3 I 9 I'll .0 Scanned by CamScanner I #:13qu 2. :5 Inc10?nt cosaAIota 3. ruaercr i ?1'5?v s. cnvz?xnz . e. cesnAsczas i mncu orncu mnovnn 1. Innxu IOIITDE z. VISUAL uxs:1av Les) unto?canons: OPERAIIVES 22Lianox? Known-t um ctr-noun PEISOIIEL - LOGISTICS Liaison or::c:as (row :cact) IEILS LIAISOI OFFICER IICIOEVT has! - CHIEF 215356'33 - - rcatr:x :cxsv;sxz - - Cllfai?? BUPEEU Scanned by CamScanner Address: Type: Capacity: Equipped: Equipnent Required: Availability: Updated On: Single Roms/Dormitory Mediate/Length of Notice The reverse of the card may be used for any other cannents pertinent to the subject. Scanned by CamScanner Appendix BEIB AND BEDDIIE England and Wales is divided into a Northern and Southern Zone. 'Ihe boundary line is dram roughly the Wash, North of Birmingham to Powys in ?was The Northern Zone store is at RAF Bm-torwood, Near Liverpool. The Southern Zone stores are at Milton Keynes, Royston in Herts and Bristol. Each Zone has at this time approximately ?40,000 beds and a quarter of a million blankets, sheets and pillow cases. All the equipnent is controlled by the Department of Health and Social Security, but the adninistrators are the Crown Suppliers. Action to be Taken:- Tel ephone 01-922-2000 Crown Suppliers Third Floor Wellington House 133-135 Waterloor Road London SE1 Ask for the Chief Purchasing Officer. Inform him of your requirements. He will clear with 11-138 and direct you to the appropriate store. The responsibility for collection is yours. Example of Transport Needs:- Articulated Container Trailer - Cubic capacity of 21100 cu ft will carry 175 beds and bedding to minimun standard. (Appendix) Scanned by CamScanner Appendix SIBGETED DBIBN OF Name, No 5: Rank Hcme Force/ Div Hane address: Home Telephone Nunber: PSU No: Bed No: Block: Scanned by CamScanner 7. can?: i. lucr- intro-mat. mu. wa er ?Hun rum Instr 1: aw: nun-n p.13: and. S. as?. hut-u. :(Fman-mnm-W and. :1 E. Socio- an Dal-m - (0:.an 0.10- Mod Mica. Scanned by CamScanner . TRANSPORT Scanned by CamScanner . I m1 STUDY i OF THE STUDY GROJP shard 33;? Deth' Chief Constable, 315561! Police "pies 331., Deputy thief Constable, Avon and Sonarsat Constabulary eer?s Esq? Acting Cnanc?er, Hetromlitan Police- :crd Esq? Chief Suxrin?xndent, Sontinghazs'iire Constabulary Il?u use: %rager, Sussex rolioe '?131") Steering Caz-zittee did not draw-up terms of reference for this Study cope The Group's general tarts of reference were devolved from the negatics Study Grout). mama halysis of Force Reports 3.1.1 There was a degree of congruence in the observations made by both aiding and aided Forces which fell almost naturally into two categories-- nose concerning the adequacy of vehicles, protection, level a. c: support, etc., and; (In) These problas arising from the sheer scale and duration of the particular dispute. EE ROLE (I: STUDY 54.2.1 Tne Group felt that the review should prov1de positive -. .- gmdance for me iuth-e based on the lessons of the dispute but that it was not competent tf?. speu?r detailed operational requirements for vehicles. it was also recognised that many of the Study Groups would overlap in their comments and/or recommendatio should not imibit discussion ?5 that LBSAL ASPECTS 2.3.1 Various aspects of road traffic law and . . publ 1c order law were investigated. ho changes are reccmended as there was no shortage of powers for the police to exercise in the regulation of movements Scanned by CamScanner of pickets/demonstrators, although strategy and tactics for handling disruption on motorways or high' speed dual carriageways requires careful consideration. This particular asp??ct was referred to the Tactical Options Study Group. IIHBER AND TYPE or VEHICLE BE USED 14.4.1 The composition of a PSU is vital in deciding how many vehicl 63 are required per unit. There is need for this to be accePted nationally. 'Ihe standard 1:2:20 was considered to be correct but implications arise from the different interpretations among Forces about staff sent to support the PSU's. It is important to establish levels of additional personnel and whether they should travel with the unit. Drivers Drivers should be additional to and not part of the PSU. It is an advantage for than to be trained to a high standard 0f driving. Hours of duty can be long and arduous; therefore, from a safety point of View, it is essential that the driver should not have been involved in the public order aspect of the PSU's work. There is also need for specialist driver training in public order duties particularly when sane of the tactical options relate to the use of vehicles themselves. It is unfair and inefficient to place un-trained drivers in such situations. The Metropolitan course for support unit drivers is worthy of further examination on a national basis. See recommendations of the Mutual Aid Study Group. (D) First-aiders/fire fighters Before the autcmatic inclusion of such extras both aiding and aided Forces should consider the reason for mutual aid and whether or not in the cirounstances such personnel should accompany PSU's. Public disorder is not the only reason for the supplying of mutual aid. See reccmnendations of the Mutual Aid Study Group. (C) Equipment Sane forces found that the current level of two transit type vehicles per PSU does not necessarily allow for such units to be sel r-contained in terms of equipment. Those forces using the "four wheel" transit rather than the recommended "six wheel" transit found particular difficulty in carrying the stocks of equipment and manpower. Sane forces therefore found it necessary to use three vehicles per PSU in order for their mutual aid commitment to be self-contained. 'l 'l ?l ?l Scanned by CamScanner Pool of vehicles The question of regional pools of vehicles was discussed, but the constitutional position concerning ownership, finance and priority use led the Group to discount this suggestion as a viable option. OF VEHICLE lt.?5.1 Great diversities in the level and style of protecting vehicles were apparent during the NJM dispute. Sane Forces had permanently fixed protective grills; others had de-mountable protection not always capable of being carried in the vehicle; others used combinations of bandit glass and Makrolon and some vehicles had no protection whatsoever. Again, it is considered that an operational requirement be drawn up covering minimun and optimum levels of protection taking into consideration size and type of vehicle and the use to which it would be potentially put. HIRED VEHICLES 14.6.1 A feature of the dispute was the inordinate number of hired vehicles used to transport PSU. This was partially a function of certain Forces not having equipped to meet their national commitment, or, where they were so equipped, an unwillingness to despatch those vehicles to another Force area in case they should be needed at hone. A further problem was the sheer duration of the dispute and the havoc this played with maintenance, servicing and replacement schedules. The image of the Police Service was certainly not enhanced by pol ice officers arriving at scenes of considerable public disorder and de-mounting Co?op van hire transits. On more than one occasion confusion arose because both the police and the NUM were hiring vehicles the same ccmpany. Hired vehicles were, of course, unprotected and therefore placed severe restrictions on the ability of operational Commanders to deploy them in riot, or near riot, situations. ELIE: COINOYS AND Convoys 14.7.1 Considerable public comment was passed and there was much criticism of the manner in which mutual aid convoys travelled fran the aiding to the aided Forces, particularly in respect of motorways. Whilst security is important, the deliberate blocking of the overtaking lane, thereby restricting general traffic flows to the speed of the convoy, is unacceptable. Training in this respect should be examined. Escorts 14.7.2 The draining of aided Forces, both in manpower and vehicle terms was quite considerable when escorts/guides had to be provided for use by mutual aid. Previous canments on the size of a PSU vehicle are relevant if the solution is to attach a member of the host Scanned by CamScanner Scanned by CamScanner 0 l-J h. ?1 P4 91:hk marge 31is: x1313; 31:02 52:31it}! :2 I- scram-1 -. 1? 2.37.5. 107 108 109 110 REVIEH (F THE KLICIKE 13mm (F THE NATIONAL UNIGI 0F HINEHORKEIB DISPUTE 1984/85 GRGIP - TRANSPORT RECOIHENDATIUB RECOHENDATIONS museums: A common policy should be established on the type of vehicle required for PSU duties. It is recommended a fifteen seat personnel carrier is the most practical type. A detailed operational requirement should be drawn up including levels of protection to be afforded and taking into account the equipment needed to be carried to enable a unit to be completely self-contained. All Chief Officers should be urged to meet their national cannibnent in respect of vehicles for PSU's. Tne use of hired vehicles for operational work is not recommended. Hired vehicles should be restricted to coaches for the transporting of officers to and from their hcme Forces. Motomaxactivitv (1) Tactical plans should be drawn up for dealing with incidents on motorways connected with public order disputes; (ii) All such activities on motorways should be supervised by trained motorway officers to minimise danger to the general public. Mariam (1) Coaches travelling to and aided Forces do not generally require to be in convoy; (ii) Empty personnel carriers travelling to and aided Forces should travel in convoy so that they arrive together and are ready for deployment; Operational deployment of units may be required to travel in convoy but dependant upon circunstances should not impede the normal free flow of traffic particularly on motorways. Scanned by CamScanner PARA ?lul1 et seq et seq ?-301 et seq 11.7.1 et seq ?0701 et seq 11.7.1 et seq 14.7.1 et seq 111 112 WW (1) Aided Forces should assune total responsibility for arranging sufficient fuelling points for units deployed by then; (ii) It should be the reoponsibility of the aiding Forces to make arrangenents for fuel on journeys to and from aided Forces. A standard re?charge formula covering all classes of vehicles should be drawn up and agreed between Forces. [4.8-1 et seq 4.8.1 et seq 40801 Scanned by CamScanner COMMUNICATIONS Scanned by CamScanner - - - - - - mam name-BIB (I we NATIONAL UNION OF madame bism'm 1984/85 WHICLTIDNS 0F 131E STUDY GRCIJP Esq., QPM, DL, LLB, Chief Constable, Staffordshire Police (Chairman) Johnson Esq., QPM, Chief Constable, Lancashire Constabulary Nobes Esq., LLB, Chief Constable, North Yorkshire Police A Esq., QPM, 05w, Chief Constable, Gloucestershire Constabulary Whiteley Esq., CBE, QPM, Cnief Constable, Suffolk Constabulary Wilmot Esq.?, Deputy Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police A A Vickers Esq., QPM, LLB, Deputy Cl'lief Constable, South Wales Constabulary Drew Esq., NBA, FBIM, Assistant Chief Constable, West Mercia Constabulary Mitchell Esq., Commander, Metropolitan Police TERPB OF REFERENCE To assess the adequacy of current equipment available to Forces responding to widespread disorder and the ccmpatibility of such equipment when used on mutual aid. IN TRON CT ION 5.1.1 report deals with communications for situations involving actual or potential. serious public disorder or for major incidents. 5.1.2 Generally", despite their limitations, Police communication systems coped reasonably well during the N014 dispute, with appropriate modifications being made where necessary. 5.1.3 In addition, the communications section of the ACPO Public Order "General Guidance for Senior Police Officers" booklet gave adequate guidance to Forces. 5.1.11 During the dispute, the Directorate of Telecommunications provided on temporary loan to Forces, in excess of 1000 personal radios, 50 base stations, 80 mobile radiosand a full range of ancillary equipment, as well as installing a number of temporary control systems. 5.1.5 This equipment was made available in a variety of ways, diverting stocks due to be issued, refurbishing old equipment and taking into use spares holdings. The diversion of stocks meant that some gogces had to retain older equipment longer than originally inten . Scanned by CamScanner 5.1.6 5.1.7 Additionally, a large quantity of equipment was prov idea from Forces? own holdings of rented equipment involving extenSive re- and retuning of radios for PSU Operations' required a significant maintenance effort and the Directorate of Telecommunications are to be corgratulated for the way in which they coped with the additional demands placed upon them. Nevertheless, certain problems were highlighted during the dispute and they fall under the following general headings:- Problans experienced by the Directorate of Telecanmunications? VHF Radio - adequacy of channels etc. UHF Radio adequacy of channels etc. Difficulties of reception plus theneed for PUblicaddress equipment. PSU and other Convoys - intercanmunication radio equipment. Incident Control. Security of Radio Transmissions. Equipment - Loss/Danage/Indury. Details of the various problems are set out below, with 011? reccnmendations. ENGINEERED BY DIRECIORAIE (F MEWHIJNICATIONS 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 The Directorate has brought to notice certain problems which they encountered during the dispute. there was tne lack of early intelligence of Police requirements and a lack of co-ordination in supplying it, although the needs of Forces were met. Information about their requirements reached the Directorate in a nunber of ways. Uncertainty about needs and about the correct avenue of approach led to requests being sent either to local depots, direct to Directorate Headquarters, or through the Police Liaison Office, and it would have been much more efficient if early advice of a general coummications requirement could have been provided to the Directorate from one central point. Indeed, we consider that this is essential for effective planning to support a potential major operation. At the beginning of the dispute, senior management at the Directorate made contact with staff of the National Reporting Centre who were unable to provide any indication of the communications facilities required but were able to give helpful guidance on how various situations might develop and give rise to the need for additional cannunications. 'lhere can be little doubt that it would have been more efficient had there been one central organisation charged with responsibility for the co-ordination of demands for radio equipment. We RECOMMEND, for consideration, that the NRC should undertake this task in the same way as they co?ordinate demands for manpower. The second problem arose over the planning of emergency communications. Whilst in some areas this was quite adequate, there was a feeling that some Forces did not fully appreciate that the expertise of the Directorate was available to them and accordingly mistakes were made because of lack of consultation Scanned by CamScanner at an early stage. As a result of this, Directorate senior management instructed depot line managers to take the initiative by visiting Forces providing on-site-gtIidance where necessary. 5.2.5 We RECOMMEND that whenever Forces are planning emergean communications the Directorate-should be asked for adVICe an guidance the outset. VHF RADIO Incompatibility a: VHF Radios 5.3.1 One of the most common problems during the dispute was 1112):: incompatibility of VHF radio between the aiding Force and the . Force brought about by insufficient channel capacity on the radio equipment, the widespread nature of operations and often insufficient time to arrange for" the of sets. 5.3.2 Sane forces considered that a Vii-F channel, nationally canpatible, might be of advantage in the dehloyment of inter-force mutual aid units. . . 3 5-3-3 This suggestion could cause-problem of interference, for example where several persons wereconnunicating at the sane'time in close proximity, albeit in different Farce-areas. Moreover, eacn Force would have to the national channel frequency both in its Control Roan and on its hillatop sites, 'which would raise problems of expense and of accanmodat-ibn to install a radio channel wnich might be used only infrequently. 5.3.14 We do not feel that a national VHF channel would be justified or that it would fully solve the problems that have arisen. Use of the ART177 set would- provide an interim solution but the problem will only be when the WARC programme (1985-1990) is fully implemented because the post NARC multi channel . set will have a 250 channel capacity and will be capable 01 use anywhere in England and Wales. In the meantime, we RECOMMEND that the problem of incompatibility-refVHF radios be looked at by the Directorate of Telecommunications as a matter of urgency to ascertain whether sane other interim solution'is possible. Insufficient VHF (kennels 5.4.1 It became clear during the dispute that most Forces had insufficient VHF channels to meet their operational re'quiranents adequately. 5.4.2 This led to severe congestion of radio?systems whenever all 'donestic' cannunications were transferred to the limited nunber of remaining channels so. that one or more channels could be solely dedicated to the control of the NUM dispute operations. 5.4.3 There can be no doubt that there is a need for more VHF channels to be made available to Forces. It seas essential that, AS A MINIMUM, each Force should have one VHFichannel, which can be dedicated totally to an emergency or major incident without affecting the efficiency of those channels available for nemal 'dcmestic' use and Scanned by CamScanner Lack of 5.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.3 5.5.4 5.5.5 we REIDMIEID accordingly. Communications to Hire Vehicles Many Forces were able to meet their calmitznent to mutual aid only by hiring vehicles from commercial sources. Quite clearly such vehicles were not equipped with Police radio and whilst sane effort was made to utilise hand-held VHF or board-mounted equipment, supplies of such equipnent were limited. It seems improbable that Forces will, in the foreseeable future, possess sufficient transport of their own to fully meet mutual aid calmitments on the scale seen during the NUM dispute. It follows, therefore, that temporary radio arrangements will continue to be necessary. The Directorate of Telecommunications has empna51sed that the dispute highlighted the need for a centralised pool of radio equipment for emergency use. Although most of the. requests for equipnent were met, this was at the expense of diverting other needs or by providing refurbished equipment which could not be expected to work to the same efficiency as current issue. In addition, the Directorate also had to provide assistance for other emergencies during the period of the Miners' dispute the docks strike, in addition to the normal routine servicing of Force equipment and systans planning. We REGJMMEND that the Directorate of Telecanmunications should give consideration to the provision of emergency holdings of VHF radio equipment to be held either centrally or on a regional basis, and should also consider the funding of such anergency holdings. We also RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Telecommunications should pursue the concept of the post-NARC multi channel portable VHF set, if this has not already been done. Insufficient 5.6.1 5.6.2 One factor which exacerbated the position regarding incompatibility of VHF radio during the dispute was the apparent shortage of at local or regional level to sets at short notice. As indicated earlier, the post?NARC VHF radios will resol ve this problem. The Directorate of Telecanmunica tions has stated that specific difficulties arose in obtaining sufficient plus the large amount of effort expended in actually sets. However, we RECOMMEND that, as an interim solution, the Directorate makes available adequate supplies of covering all frequencies, at regional or local depot level. UHF RADIO Insufficient UHF Ehmrgency Channels 5.7.1 During the dispute, it became manifestly clear that, overall, there were insufficient UHF channels for Police use and, in particular, Scanned by CamScanner that the national provision of four emergency frequencies was totally inadequate. 5.7.2 The close proximity of a number 0: radio schemes operating on the four emergency LHF frequencies led to unacceptable cross talk and interference. Additionally, many convoys utilised the anergency channels for inter-vehicle cunnunications and added to the problem by interfering with local energency schemes 5.7.3 'lhe requirenent for additional UHF frequencies had already been identified by the ACPO Ccmmications Cannittee in February, 198?, before the NUH strike began, and had been communicated to the Directorate of Telecommunications so that action could be taken whenever additional UHF spectrun became available. Btperience of Forces during the dispute has served to anphasise the urgency of this requirement. He consider that more UHF frequenc1es should be made available, both for normal and emergency use, and that one of these extra channels should be dedicated solely for use by PSU convoys. He RECOHHEID that the Directorate of Telecamunications should pursue this issue as a matter of priority. Inmubum or us annals and Limited Capacity on our Radio Sets 5.8.1 The limited channel capacity of the UHF sets available for Police use proved inadequate for operational purposes during the dispute. 5.8.2 ?lhe majority of Forces utilise UHF radio sets which are limited to 3 channel settings and are, therefore, unable to accommodate all four available emergency UHF frequencies. Many logistical problems were experienced throughout the dispute in attempting to equip aiding detachnents with canpatible communications and this, in turn, imposed severe restrictions on operational flexibility. 5.8.3 Virtually all Forces have identified a need for the multi-channel sets, of the types currently being manufacnured and distributed, to overcane the problems indicated above. 5.8.44 He RECOMMEND the general introduction, as soon as possible, 01 a multi channel UHF radio (capable of up to 99 channels). The need for a multi-channel set is recognised by the Directorate. Provision of maiment to Aiding Detactnent 5.9.1 Throughout the dispute problems arose because of demands at snort notice for the provision of additional UHF equipment. Through the good offices of the Directorate of Teleoanmmications these demands were met but it is felt that clear guidance should be given as to whether the responsibility for the provision of compatible UHF equipment should rest with:- The aiding Force, or (ii) The host Force. 5.9.2 Adoption of a multi-channel UHF set, as indicated above, will solve this problem but we RECOMMEND that, in the interim period, the host Force should, in consultation with the Directorate of Scanned by CamScanner Telecommunications, be responsible for the supply of compatible UHF radios. ISSUE (F T0 SUIERVIBORY OFFICERS 5.10.1 The ACPO manual "Public Order General Guidance for Senior Pol ice OfficerS". at paragraph 18.12 of the Communications Section, recommends that personal radios should ordinarily be issued only to Inspectors and above, although it is recognised that this may vary according to operational necessity. 5.10.2 During the NUM dispute, it became common practice to issue personal radios to the Inspector and to each of the Sergeants in a PSU because it was frequently necessary to sub-divide the PSU into independent sections during the course of operations. This has also proved to be the case in other public order operations and we RECOMMEND that the General Guidance should be amended to provide for the issue of personal radios to PSU Sergeants and above subjeCt ?30 operational necessity. DIFFIQILTJIB (F RECEPTION PLUS THE NEED FOR PUBLIC ADDRESS EDUIPHENT Difficulties of Reception During Disorder 5.11.1 The tremendous noise generated in disorderly situations during the dispute made reception of radio transmissions extremely difficult. 5.11.2 This problem had already been recognised and a Working Party has been set up by ACPO Carmunications Ccmnittee in conjunction with the General Purposes Committee. Experiments were carried out during the dispute to provide "hands off" ccnmunication facilities for the NATO helmet. This research has now been broadened to provide similar facilities for the standard Police helmet. The report of the Working party is awaited. Public Address Systems 5.12.1 The problem of noise levels during disorderly situations also showed a requirement for mobile public address systems, (both hand held and vehicle mounted) with a very high decibel output. This would aid communication both with the crowd and, in some cases, with front line Pol ice Officers. 5.12.2 We RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Telecommunications undertake research to meet this need. PSU AND OTHER (DNVOYS INTERCOMNICATION RADIO Requirement for Suitable Roof Aerial for Convoy Cannunications or Small Radio Sd'lanes 5.13.1 Problems of interoommunications en?route between vehicles forming PSU and other convoys arose from- Interference from other local schemes encountered during the 9 Scanned by CamScanner journey; (ii) The length of the convoy, which in some cases coke lorry convoys, was considerable; Large convoy vehicles, such as coaches, screening transnission. 5-132 In addition, some difficulty was experienced in operating portable UHF base stations in vehicles because of the inadequate height (and consequently in some cases positioning) of serials on command vehicles which gave insufficient range of trananission. 5.13.3 As indicated earlier, more emergency UHF frequencies would alienate the problem of interference and would allow a national UHF channel (which because of its limited range would not give rise to the same problems as a national VHF channel) to be dedicated for PSH convoy use. We further RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Tel should carry out research into the adequacy and 0f aerials for UHF mobile base stations with a view to extending the range of transmissions. 5-13-13 A radio telephone (referred to in Paragraphs 5.20.1 and 5.20.2) would provide an alternative means of canmunication between the convoy and relevant Forces. 5.11M In order to provide a ccmnunications link with convoys, host Force motor-cyclists were often employed as escorts but problems arose when motor-cycl ists found difficulty in operating standard UHF radio sets while steering their vehicles. 5.14.2 It is clearly desirable that there should be a communications facility between the escort and the convoy. We RECOMMEND that the Directorate of Telecommunications should investigate the possibility of providing a "hands free" method of operating UHF personal radios suitable for use by Police motor-cycl ists. INCIDDJT CONTROL Dedicated Incident Control Centre 5.15.1 We have already dealt with the need for a minimun of one VHF channel to be available for dedication to incident control at 5.11.3. 5.15.2 Experience during the dispute clearly indicated the need for a dedicated incident control room, which was usually located at Force Headquarters. It was also found that greater effectiveness was achieved where a unit at each of the scenes of operations was dedicated solely to the task of reporting the current situation to central control by VHF radio. This accords with the scheme of communications set out in the chart, "Incident Radio Communications Network" contained in the curmunications section of the ACPO "Public Order General Guidance for Senior Police Officers" booklet and is Scanned by CamScanner 5.15.3 Those Forces with "Command and Control" computers, particularly those having a major incident log facility, found it even more efficient to dedicate one or more VDU's to the control of the incident. By this means, the officer in overall carmand could keep himself completely in touch with developments and take informed decisions as to the supply, deployment and of personnel and equipment. 11113 was particularly effective where it was Possible to transfer VDU entries onto a centralised monitor. We commend this practice and understand that the Working concerned with "logistics" are looking into the ccmposition of the "ideal" control roan. STANDARD CALL 8113!! 5.16.1 Some PSU's operating during the dispute had as many as three different call signs during the course of the day. Such situations caused confusion and there is a clear need for an efficient National Mutual Aid call sign structure which recognises that there may be separate deployments of individual sections of PSU's. 5.16.2 He RECOMMEND that there should be a national mutual aid call sign structure and we understand this aspect is being pursued by the ACPO General Purposes Ccmnittee, Public Order Sub Committee TENCDDE 5.17.1 Experience has shown that the "Ten Code" meant different things to different Forces and this gave rise to confusion. 5.17.2 This problem was recognised by ACPO Communications Committee and a Working Party on the subject will shortly present their report for consideration. SECURITY (F RADIO TRAIBHISSINS Security of Radio Sites 5.18.1 The Directorate of Telecammications has pointed out the fact that attacks were made on sane radio installations, during the period of the dispute. He RECOMMEND, therefore, that the Directorate should approach Forces with a V163 to taking such steps as may be necessary to ensure maximun security of hill?top radio sites and Directorate pro per ty . Transission Security 5.19.1 It was apparent throughout the dispute that pol ice radio broadcasts were monitored by outside agencies, including the aim, and this gave rise to occasional problems of security and operational efficiency. 5.19.2 Whilst it would be desirable to have total security of radio communications we are aware of the probl ems involved, not least those of cost and effectiveness. We RECOMMEND that the Directorate of should look again at this problem and issue Scanned by CamScanner guidance to orceS. KBJLE RADIO TELEPHONE 5.20.1 Some Forces equipped their PSU's with mobile radio telephones as a means of communication and were generally well pleased with the facility. The radio telephone provided a more 'secure' means of communication and could be utilised when VHF radio was not compatible with local schemes or when radio communications were faulty. Whilst some congestion of the radio telephone schemewas occasionally experienced, developments in the cellular radio field may offer even more attractive options for the future. 5.20.2 We RECOMMEND that each Force should possess portable radio telephones sufficient for issue to:- The officer in command at each location of operations. (ii) Any convoy sent away the Force. USE OF (B RADIO 5.21.1 The Directorate of advises that CB radios should not be used as a substitute for a telephone, due to CB radio being a very insecure mode of communication. We agree and RECOMMEND accordingly. 5.22.1 During situations of disorder there were instances of loss and damage to radio equipment and, in some cases, of injury to Police Officers wearing it. 5.22.2 It is felt that methods of wear and of use of radio equipment should be investigated by a Working Party of ACPO Camunications Committee. We RECOMMEND accordingly and feel that the Staff Associations should be represented on the Working Party. Scanned by CahiStanneh N0. 113 1111 115 116 117 118 119 120 REVIE (F 111E muons ?mm 111E NATIGIAL OF ?Dim DBNTE - MNICATIONS WTIONS The National Reporting Centre should undertake thetask of co?ordinating demands for radio equ1pment. In similar situations, whenever Forces are planning emergency cannunications, the Directorate should be asked for advice and guidance from the outset. The problem of incompatibility of VHF radios should be looked at by the Directorate as a matter of urgency to ascertain whether an interim solution is possible during the WARC progranme. Each Force should have AS A MINIMJM one VHF channel which can be dedicated totally to an emergency or major incident without affecting the danestic use. The Directorate of Telecommunications should give consideration to the provision of emergency holdings of VHF radio equipnent to be held either centrally or on a regional basis, and also consider the funding of such anergency holdings. The Directorate of Telecommunications should pursue the concept of the post. NARC multi channel portable VHF set if this has not already been done. During the NARC change-over period the Directorate of Teleccmnunications should make available at regional or local depot level adequate supplies of covering all frequencies. More UHF frequencies should be made available, both for normal and emergency use. One of these extra channels should be dedicated solely for use by PSU convoys. The Directorate of Telecommunications should pursue this issue as a matter or priority. PARA 5.2.3 5.2.5 5.3.4 5.4.3 5.5.5 5.6.2 5.7.11 Scanned by CamScanner 121 122 123 1214 126 127 128 129 A multi channel UHF radio (capable of up to 99 channels) should be introduced generally as soon as possible. When mutual aid is provided and until a multi channel UHF set is adopted, the host Force should be responsible for the supply of canpatible UHF radios. The ACPO manual "Public Order General Guidance for Senior Police Officers" at paragraph 18-12 of the Cannmications section should be anended to provide for the issue of personal radios to PSU Sergeants and above, subject to operational necessity. The Directorate of Teleccummications Smould undertake research into public address systems (both hand-held and vehicle mounted) with a very high decibel output. 'lhe Directorate of Telecommunications should carry out research into the adequacy and positioning of aerials for UHF mobile base stations with a View to extending the range of transmission. The Directorate of Telecammications should investigate the possibility of providing a "hands free" method of operating UHF personal radios suitable for use by Police motor- cyclists. He amend the practice of dedicating a unit at each scene of operations solely to the task of reporting the current situation to central control by VHF radio. This accords with the scheme of cannmications set out in the chart, "Incident Radio Cmmunimtions Network". We comend the practice of dedicating one or more of caunand and control canputers to the control of incidents. He also cannend the practice of transferring VDU entries on to a centralised monitor so that the officer in overall command may laeep himself in touch with developnents and take informed decisions as to the supply, deployment and re-deployment of personnel and equipment. 'Ihere Should be a national mutml aid call sign structlre and we understand this aspect is being pm-sued by the ACPO General Purposes Cunnitee, Public Order Sub Cannittee. 5.9.2 5.10.2 5.12.2 5.13.3 5.14.2 5.15.2 5.15.3 5.16.2 Scanned by CamScanner 130 131 132 133 134 The Directorate of Teleccmnunications should approach Forces with a View to taking such steps as may be necessary to ensure maximun security of hill-top sites and Directorate property. The Directorate of Telecommunications should look again at the problan of radio trananission security and issue guidance to Forces. Forces should possess portable radio telephones sufficient for issue to: The officer in connand at each location of operations. (ii) Any convoys sent away fron the Force. Citizens Band Radio should not be used as a substitute for a telephone due to it being a very insecure mode of communication. ACPO Connunications Cannittee should set up a Working Party to investigate methods of wear and of use of radio equipment. The Staff Associations should be represented on the .wOrking Party. 5.15. TU 5.195.21.1 5.22Scanned by CamScanner TACTICS Scanned by CamScanner I REVIH (F mm THE NATIONM. UNION OF mm DISPUTE 1934/85 OPTIONS OF THE Payne ESQ-. 0PM, DL, Chief Constable, Cleveland Constabulary (Chainnan) Rostron Esq., QPM, Deputy Chief Constable, Gwent Constabulary Donaille Esq., Assistant,Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police Dovaston Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Constabulary A 4 Morritt Esq., FBIM, Assistant Chief Constable, North Yorkshire Police Weselby Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Nottinghanshire Police 1 Jackson Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, South YorkshirePolice Evans Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, West Midlands Police TERMS CF REFERENCE To examine the current guidance available to the service and its application to industrial disputes, including the dissemination of the Tactical Options Manual. 6.1.1 Our Group was tasked with the following:- Assessing the principal tactical and equipment problems arising the policing of the NUM dispute; Making reccmmendations to improve the Tactical Options Manual. 6.1.2 The Group, which comprised one chief constable, one deputy and six assistant chief constables, all from forces who had experience of policing the NUM dispute selected the following topics for detailed examination:- (1) Tactical options; (ii) Briefing and Debriefing; Command, Control and Communications; (iv) Protective Equipment including the Identification of IntimidatiOn and the role of CID in public disorder. 6.1.3 A canphrensive report detailing our findings and I?eCCIrmendations in respect of the above is attached at Appendix Because that report embraces a wide range of technical detail, which will require evaluation by the ACPO Public Order Sub Committee, this report has been prepared as a synopsis of our principal findings. In all cases where we have made recommendations in this paper it CSCanned by CamScanner should be linked to Appendix for detailed explanation. BROAD STRATEGY 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 It is important to stress that this Group is of the view that the strategy for policing normal industrial disputes is not comparable with that which, on occasions, was required to respond effectively to many incidents which occurred during the NUM dispute. The potential for disorder, which was a feature of the NUM dispute, required, on occasions, more than the passive presence of police, traditionally clothed and equipped, to ensure that disorder was either prevented or brought under control. Amongst other things, the Study Group observed that force strategy for responding to some of the implications of the NUM dispute needed to take account of measures for:- The defusing of potentially violent situations and a return to peaceful picketing; The control and dispersal of mass demonstrations; The protection of non?striking miners travelling to and fran work; The protection of property, including that of the National Coal Board; and The preservation of the peace and the protection of life and property in thelnining villages and towns In referring to these issues, the(3roup bore in mind that there were often marked differences in the attitude, temper and behaviour of those taking part in the dispute in one area compared with another and, indeed, at different times in the dispute. Not surprisingly therefore, policing strategies varied from one police area to another in order to reflect local circumstances and disorder potential. We have made no attempt to compare such different strategies. Not only would it require conparisons to be drawn, which is quite outside the scope of this Review, but it would be misleading. We would, however, comment that it was the clearly expressed desire of the service to maintain so far as possible, a traditional police image, to depart fran it only when absolutely necessary, and to exercise the concept of the minimun use of force to achieve objectives. The Study Group concluded that strategy is a matter for individual chief constables to assess in the light of prevailing circunstances. In so doing thought must be given to the wider effects of strategy, particularly insofar as it may effect neighbouring forces and, to, what may be termed, service or global thinking on strategy. TACTICAL OPTIONS 6.3.1 The Study Group looked at two aspectsScanned by CamScanner - - How did the options contained in the Tactical Options Manual work out in practice? What situations arose for which guidance was not available? 6.3.2 The disorder experienced in the dispute differed from the 1981 street disorders in that it usually occurred at predetermined places, at reasonably predictable times, thereby enabl1n8 a degree of pre-planning albeit perhaps often hurriedly. However. when serious disorder occurred, the pattern of crowd behaviour was of ten similar to that of the 1981 street disorders, although the envirorment was often relatively open space rather than confined streets. 5-3.3 With few exceptions the Tactical Options Manual was thought to have provided well founded tactics which were successful on the majority of occasions. Sane lessons were learnt, for example the use of verbal warning messages identifying individual trouble makers and, that officers with long shields should not normally be deployed without short shield support. 6.3.4 Such matters have been considered by our Group and new guidance has been prepared. It is RECOMMENDED that the guidance drawn up by the Group, which is of a detailed nature, in relation to tactical options, warning messages, the use of combinations of officers equipped with long and short shields be evaluated by the ACPO Public Order Sub Committee and, if accepted, put forward for inclusion into the Tactical Options Manual. SPECIAL 6.11.1 1140 tactics which emerged during the NUM dispute are not precisely covered in the Tactical Options Manual. Tne first of these related to the blockading of roads and motorways. The second concerned the anbushing of vehicles driven by persons intending to lawfully enter industrial premises. Both tactics revealed a need for a positive police response anbracing the following:? Regular reconnaissance by pol ice along the routes concerned; Effective preventive measures, including control of strategic points, for example, access roads and key junctions; Adequate protection for escorts; and Equipped PSU's in a position to respond quickly. 6.11.2 The Study Group has prepared guidance to deal with the blockading of roads and motorways, the associated tactic of using slow moving convoys to inconvenience other road-users and thereby draw attention, and the anbushing of vehicles. It is RECOMMENDED that this guidance be considered by the ACPO Public Order Sub Committee for inclusion in the Tactical Options Manual. Scanned by CamScanner A 1(3 6.5.1 6.5.2 6.5.3 6.5.5 The use of intercept tactics by various forces during the course of the MJM dispute produced considerable public carment. Although the use of this tactic by the pol ice was not new, its legality was tested by the courts, both civil and criminal. The court-'3 held that it was perfectly legitimate for the pol ice to use such tactics in the interests of preventing disorder. There is no doubt that intercept tactics proved effective in preventing excessive nunbers of pickets/demonstrators reaching designated locations. Thus, much potential disorder was avoided without recourse to the police having to take stronger measures to deal with actual disorder. To be effective the Group concluded that intercept tactics require the following:- Good intelligence and a high degree of liaison between forces; Flexible planning and the ability to redeploy [30110e resources rapidly. The Tactical Options Manual gives some guidance under the heading 'Checkpoints? but this requires enlarging in the light of experience during the NUM dispute. The Group has prepared specific guidance on intercept and turn- back tactics and we RECOMMEND that such guidance be considered by the Public Order Sub-Committee for inclusion in the Tactical Options Manual. It is essential that this guidance is seen to cover all aspects of safety for officers both undertaking intercept and turn-back operations or when on stand-by. Our Group has also considered the implications of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, in relation to intercept tactics. The power to turn?back vehicles is at cannon law and reflects the duty on the pol ice to preserve the peace. Nothing in the Act alters this cannon law duty and accordingly it does not modify the power and responsibilities of the police in this regard. Where, in order to prevent a breach of the peace, road checks are set up to stop and turn?back persons intending to go to a specific site, the authority under the Act is not required. DISPUTES 6.6.1 As previously stated, whilst the tactical guidance contained in the Tactical Options Manual was found to be suitable for responding to a great many of the incidents which occurred during the NUM dispute, it is the Groups view that further specific guidance in relation to industrial and trades disputes could usefully be contained in the Manual. Our Group has gathered a wide-range of potential guidance for the service relating to industrial and trades disputes and we RECOMMEND that the Public Order Sub-Canmittee should consider our findings for the purpose of inclusion within the Manual. Scanned by CamScanncr summon-3mm 6.7.1 6.7.2 6.7.3 6.7.1! 6.7.5 It is evident to our Group that throughout dispute there were occasions when briefing and debriefing did not adequately cover all that was required for operational ply-poses. Advice is already available to the service through the Tactical Options Manual but it is our view that further spec1f1c emdance is required in this regard, particularly at the Mutual Ald RecePtion Point. We have, therefore, given consideration to the range of guidance that Siould be provided at such reception points for briefing and debriefing and have concluded as fol lows:- Force policy in relation to all aspects of policing stratey; The tactical approach to be adopted in relation to particular types of incidents; Current information about the dispute eg, mood of pickets, potential targets and tactics used by demonstrators. This range of briefing information should be supported by a standard written briefing package. Briefing and debriefing should be viewed as an integral part of information management. There is al so need to set up Briefing Teams at an early stage of an incident. These teams should ideally include training personnel who have experience in the use of visual aids and other teaching techniques. The teen should also handle debriefing. Again, the Group has given consideration to the present guidance available to the service on briefing and debriefing and are of the View that it should be canplanented by further and more detailed guidance being available in the Tactical Options Manual. Our conclusions are dram up and it is RECOMMENDED that they should be passed to the Public Order Sub Committee to be considered for inclusion in the Tactical Options Manual. 6.8.1 6.8.2 6.8.3 Our Group is aware that detailed consideration to incident canmand and control has been given by the Group reviewing Logistics who have made a nunber of recannendations. Nonetheless, we are of the view that it does warrant some examination by our Group as effective command and control is a prerequisite for tactical success. As was recognised by the Logistics Study Group, we have concluded that dedicated incident control and co-ordination were vital at force level and that the task could not be handled in the normal way through force Operations mans. The Study Group has prepared a paper detailing our findings on operational structm'es, incident cannand, sector cmmand, incident control and PSU amend. He that our findings should be passed to the Public Order Sub Committee to be considered for inclusion in the Tactical Options Manual. Scanned by CamScanner 6.8.11 EQUIPMENT 6.9.1 6.9.2 6.9.3 6.9.11 6.9.5 PROTECTED 6.10.1 6.10.2 It will be noted that our paper (Appendix RP) makes specific reference to the use by forces of different terminology and different nomenclature. These factors were frequently the cause c??significant control problems in operations employing mutual aid. Our Group is finnly of the view that the terminology used in respect of command designations and communications codes, contained in the Tactical Options Manual, should be followed by forces to ensure commonality and consistency throughout the service. Much work has already been done by forces to achieve standardisation of equipnent. An implication of the NUM Dispute was to emphasise this need in relation to equipment for PSU's, particularly protective equipment. In view of the very large nunbers of officers deployed through mutual aid, it is not surprising that scme PSU's were not capable of being fully equipped. As a result such PSU's were, on occasions, at some risk when in front line operations where violence was at its worst. Operational commanders need to know that equipment is available for all trained officers when considering deployment and the range of duties to be undertaken. This Study Group is of the view that wherever PSU's form mutual aid, such units should be self contained and the personnel capable of being fully equipped. We are aware of the recommendations of the Study Groups examining mutual aid and training and agree their respective findings, which we see as complementary, in regard to both protective equipment and training, for all mutual aid PSU officers. We RECOMMEND that the Public Order Forward Planning Unit be taswed with establishing common minimum levels of personal protective equipment for all PSU's when on mutual aid. PILICE VEHICLES The report of the Public Order Forward Planning Unit of October 1981! commented that there was much diversity in the types of vehicles used to transport PSU's during the NUM dispute. Furthermore, there were variations in the amount of. protection afforded to pol ice owned PSU vehicles. It is considered that such diversity arises from a number of factors, none of which can be resolved by the service alone and reflects the following:- Chief officers' policy prior to the dispute; Police Carmittees' policy prior and during the disputeScanned by CamScanner (0) Cost, both of vehicles and protection measures; Demand for transport during the dispute outstripped force fleet resources, resulting in the hiring of inadequate transport; The fact that there is currently no nationally accepted 'ideal' vehicle for use by PSU's 6.10.3 It was also recorded that on many occasions the axle weights of PSU vehicles, particularly the four wheeled Transit, were exceeded. Same forces overcame this by having vehicles converted, some attached trailers to carry equipment, and others used separate vehicles. 6.10.? This Group is aware that the Study Group on Transport has made recommendations which may lead to the adoption of a specific vehicle(s) for use by PSU's. Our Group acknowledges that those reccmmendations would, if implemented, make the task of detailing protective equipment for PSU vehicles more feasible. IDENTIFICATIGI 0F KLICE SJPPORT UNITS 6.11.1 Despite the existence of guidelines on the identification of both PSU vehicles and their personnel, ananolies came to light during the NUM dispute. For example, some forces sent PSU's without the force number being displayed on either the vehicle or police personnel. As a result supervisory officers lost contact with their men and men lost contact with their vehicles. 6.11.2 Similar problems were experienced in respect of the use of PSU call?signs. An early report showed that every force receiving mutual aid operated a different system of command/control and call-signs. This resulted in same PSU's being allocated several different call-signs in one day, depending on deployment. 6.11.3 The Group were unanimous that a combined identification and call- sign system should be introduced for use by mutual aid PSU's. However, the call-signs should be of an alpha-numeric type and designed to give a clear identification of the donor force, as well as the particular unit. The Group accordingly RECOMMEND that the Forward Planning Unit be tasked to produce such a cal l-sign structure for evaluation by the Public Order Sub Committee. AND THE RILE OF THE CID IN PUBLIC DISORIER 6.12.1 The mining dispute of 1984/85 produced many forms of intimidation including mass picketing, assaults, criminal damage and threats. These may be summarised as follows:- HASS 6.13.1 on many occasions. the weight of numbers and mood of pickets were, in themselves, intimidatory. Appropriate police tactics recommended to deal with intimidation stemming mass picketing Scanned by CamScanner ASSAULTS 6.14.1 DAHKJE 6.15.1 6.16.1 GJFBATIVE 6.17.1 have been prepared by our Group. Of particular concern were the hostile gatherings of female and juvenile demonstrators. Where serials of pol ice wanen were deployed it is worth noting that they were ill at ease in the face of such hostile groups and needed the reassurance of ample support from male colleagues. Leaflet campaigns were introduced by the police in an attempt to defuse such situations. These leaflets contained information on the relevant law and were distributed to picket leaders to ensure their awareness to the consequences of their actions. This was found to be an effective tactical option. In addition to attacks on workers en route to and from worikr it was noted that assaults were prevalent throughout the communities, and often of an opportunist nature. Victims were sometimes found to be reluctant to canplain for fear of reprisal. In some communities the homes, cars and even the domestic pets of working miners were considered legitimate targets for attack, especially during the night hours. Equally sinister were the attacks on the property belonging to those dispensing justice. Many instances of damage occurred to property owned by the National Coal Board and conpanies servicing the coal industry or consumers of its product. A particularly insidious form of intimidation was that taking the form of threats of physical violence to the wives and children of working miners. It was often extremely difficult to prevent or detect offenders as they usually preserved their anonymity by use of telephones. Links with colliery management were found effective to voice police concern at such activities, to provide feed-back of offences where the victim was reluctant to contact the police direct and to provide facilities for rehousing those worst affected. MRI-ZS Intensified Patrols Despite the often intensive pol ice operations necessary in some mining cannunities, local police officers were generally left to pol ice normally. Such officers were able to identify community tensions and recommend appropriate responses. Where necessary additional pol ice presence was also emphasised by intensified use of liveried police vehicles. Vulnerable property similarly received additional police attention fran uniformed personnel. 1 ll]! Scanned by CamScanner 6.17.2 6.17.3 6.17.4 6.17.5 6.17.6 6.17.7 Ct-mity Interveners There is ample advice available in the Tactical Options Manual detailing curmunity interveners. Where the prinCiPal industry of a community was coal mining it was found that useful contact could be made by the police with NCB officials who could often act as effective community interveners. The importance of hav1ng contacts well established and known to local 901199 officers was emphasised. 'lhe Courts Sane areas experienced difficulty convening adequate nunbers of courts to deal with the many offenders arrested. In sane areas, Justices disqual ified themsel ves, declaring an interest in the coal industry. A considerable backlog of cases built up. Consequently the Lord Chancellor appointed a number of Stipendiary Magistrates on a temporary basis, which successfully resolved the Problem. Resetting Where appropriate, the offence of besetting was charged. Although the use of this offence was, until the dispute, relatively rare, it was found to meet particular incidents. This fact has been identified to the Group examining legislation in relation to the Public Order Act on behalf of ACPO. Dedicated Telemones A confidential telephone line for the use of victims of intimidation was installed in one force area. Abusive and hoax calls were received but they did not detract from the overall value of such a telephone system. Auto Index In certain areas an auto index was maintained which assisted in the identification of vehicles owned by those strikers bail ed by the courts with conditions, curfews, to keep away from NCB property, etc. Such an index should be computerised as immediate retrieval is frequently an operational necessity. The role of the CID in Public Disorder Surveillance and intelligence gathering are, in the main a proper CID function in public disorder situations. Although our Group has considered the range of guidance that should be available to the service, it is considered that any input on these matters should await the findings and recommendations of the Group examining intelligence. However, the NUM diSpute drew attention to the value of having CID officers used in a supporting role in public disorder, particularly where major crime enquiries are required, follow?up enquiries are needed, or preparation of complicated file papers is necessary. Many of the options available in Section 3 of the Tactical Options Manual are equally applicable to trade disputes as they are to other forms of Scanned by CamScanner crininal disorder. Anti-inti?chtim 311.63 Hhere employed, these squads were effective Datum-3?? in relation to serious crile. Though, conversely, many 0f the? investigations were into an offence of a relatively rumor nature, the intimidation factor elevated their status, It was The erperiam of those forces who established such squads that- 1?an an have severe manpower implications, and in a protracted dispnoe consideration may need to be given to detective officers being supplied forms!"- mutual aid. I 1 . Scanned by CamScanner 135 136 137 138 139 1?40 1111 11-12 mm! arms mam mama-ms (r nu: uncut. or 913m 1984/85 TACTICAL 0mm mm That the guidance prepared by the Study Group examining Tactics, in relation to tactical options, warning messages, the use of canbinations of long and short mield tactics be evaluated by the Public Order Sub Ccmnittee. Tactical options in relation to blockading of motorways and anbushing of vehicles prepared by the Study Group be evaluated for inclusion in the Tactical Options Panual. That the tactics relating to intercept points be evaluated for inclusion in the Tactical Options Hamnl. That the guidance gathered by the Study Group examining tactics dealing with industrial and trades disputes be evalmted for inclusion in the Tactical Options Panual. That further and more detailed guidance be prepared in relation to briefing and debrieting and be included in the Tactical Options Mnual. That the Study Group's findings in relation to operational structures, incident canmand, sector earmand, incident control and PSU cannand be incorporated into the Tactical Options Hamel. That the Public Order Forward Planning Unit be tasked with establishing canmon minimum levels of personal protective equipment for all mutual aid PSU's. That the Forward Planning Unit be tasked to prepare a national standard call-sign structure linked with personnel and vehicle identification. 0 Ch En 6.5.1. 6.6.1 6-7.5 6.8.3 6.9.5 6.11.3 Scanned by CamScanner Appendix REVIEW OF THE POLICING ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL UNION CF HINEHORKERS DISPUTE 19811/35 TACTICAL OPTIONS STUDY GROUP This appendix, which deals with the detailed implications of the Tactical Options Review is prepared but awaits approval by the Study GroupScanned by CamScanner FINANCE Scanned by CamScanner HATICNAL UHIGI 0? mm DISPUTE 1984/85 mum PEHBERS-IIP OF THE STUDY GRQIP Mr A Goodson OBE, QPH, LLB, Chief Constable of Leicestershire was Chairman Of the Group for its first twomeetings but due to other comm1tments was replaced by Mr Robes LLB, Chief Constable of North Yorkshire. The other members of the Group were:- Burke Esq., BA, Deputy thief Constable, Warwickshire Constabulary (Secretary) Young Esq., Carmander, A.8 Branch, Metropolitan Police Watson Esq. BA, Assistant Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police Placke Esq., DHA, FCIH, Ackninistrative Officer, Nottinghanshire Constabulary Supt. Caple, BA, Leicestershire Constabulary in) . TERIB OF REFERENCE The initial terms of reference for the Study Group were to develop a Service view as to the content of any future circular advice dealing with major/large scale aid. Also, to formulate a cannon policy for the payment of hours of duty performed, expenses and other borrowed services arising through mutual aid. At the first meeting of the group when the fact that the Home Office were also in the process of producing a new draft circular became known, the working group's terms of reference were amended as follows:? To review the financial aspects of existing Hane Office circulars, or any proposed changes in these circulars, dealing with mutual aid; to identify such financial problems as emerged from the recent industrial dispute in the ruining industry and to make recommendations about the principles to be embodied in any future circular; and to identify the problems that may arise in forming common policy for the payment of hours of duty performed, expenses and other operating services arising through mutual aid. These amended terms of reference were agreed by the President of ACPO. Scanned by CamScanner 7.1.1 7.1.2 The Chairman of the working group attended a meeting at the Home Office on 10th May 1985 when a new draft paper was examined. LThe Chairman pointed out the activity being undertaken by ACPO on this SUbJect and suggested that those discussions would be very rel event to the contents of a new circular. 'lhe representatives DI the Arm and ACC ?ho were P?esent also indicated the need to consult their members before agreeing such a paper. It was agreed to discuss the issues further at a later date. It was accepted by the group that with the time scale available to them it would be impossible to deal in detail with what are very controversial issues and they would essentially be the problems and bringing them to the notice of ACPO with, where appropriate, recommendations which were considered suitable to reselve these probl ens The members sat on three occasions and wish to express their appreciation to Mr I Pickwell and Mr Chatrath of the Commission and all Forces for the detailed information and help supplied to them on the financial implications arising from the large scale deployment of mutual aid. 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2-3 It was identified that finance played a considerable part in the question of the accountability of Chief Constables and has significant implications so far as his operational independence was concerned. The group were conscious of the fact that the question of the Chief Constable's accountability was being examined by another group but felt the two were inextricable. It was felt the present position imposed an unreasonable constraint upon a Chief Constable's operational decisions at a time when his thoughts should be wholly directed towards operational problems. A new circular needs to identify in unequivocal terms the principles for funding incidents of such major proportions as to take them outside normal policing activity. The circular needs to encompass both payment for mutual aid and escalating costs within the force. A model for achieving this might be by defining a procedure or regulation under the general prov 15mm of Section 31 of the Police Act 196?. When a policing operation of major proportions and outside normal pol icing activity occurs where expenditure in excess of an agreed percentage of the appropriate authority's rates has been incurred the Police Authority or the Chief Constable (if they are in dispute) can approach the Hone Secretary for a declaration of central funding. Ideally there is a further need in the event of the Home Secretary refusing this funding in circunstances where the Chief Consnable considered that there existed a considerable threat to the maintenance of law and order, for provision for recourse to the Courts to resolve the impasse. It is that provision be made under Section 31 of the Police Act 198R that when a pol icing operation of such proportions i r?lg! Scanned by CamScanner occurs, and expenditure on that Operation amounts to agrees percentage of the appropriate authority's rates, for the Police Authority or the Chief Constable to approach the Home Secretary tor a declaration that costs be met from central funding. 7-3.1 Home Office circular 1311/73 identifies three categories of 31C small scale aid, large scale aid and major aid, indicating the financial implications of each. It had been considered that these three categories were mutually exclusive and one or other was intended to cover every eventuality. However recent events and decisions by the Home Secretary as promulgated in Perl ianentary answers and Home Office circular 5/85 indicate a considerable blurring between the forms of aid until then clearly defined. 7.3.2 In the light of this recent experience it is RECOMMENDED that mutual aid be categorised as follows:- Small Scale Aid For which no charge is generally levied and relating to casual assistance from relatively small nunbers of of: mere on a quit. pro quo basis. Specialist Aid Where officers are provided by one Force to another normally to undertake a specialist task in circumstances where, because of the particular skills, the recurring basis of the provision of aid, or because of the duration of the period of aid, no reciprocity is possible. In such circumstances the full econcmic cost of the aid should be met by the aided force. Large Scale Aid Where mutual aid is provided otherwise than as defined in small scale or specialist aid then that aid will be recompensed by payment on the scale 01 a standard charge for a Police Support Unit devised a mathematical model which canprises the notional cost of an average PSU together with an element for consequential costs. STANDARD CHINE EUR mum. AID ELIE SIPPORT UNITS 7 .u.1 It is accepted that due to a nunber of variables such as length of service, rest day, etc, the actual costs can vary between one Egg and another. However, the administrative tasks necessary to identify and collate the particular costs of each PSU is very great and raises the question of identifying a standard charge for a Poll. approach could obviously create anqnolies of over and underpayment in relation to the actual oosns incurred by the aiding authority. These are, however, likely to balance out Over time. 7.14.2 A mathematical model identifying the average service, the proportion on average on rest day, etc., of the notional is i Scanned by CamScanner 7.14.3 7.u.4 7.11.5 7.4.6 seen to have considerable advantages both in reiucugethe administrative burden and providing an early .Uld roman? assessment of the costs of policing operations. has navel: which it is considered should be based upon the additional railing upon the aiding force and including an element 101? costs, would need two scales in order to take account oi the differing rates of pay between Metropolitan and officers. The limit Comission have been consulted and in principle the concept whilst. identifying the fact that. it. is essent 1?3171.? matter for the Home Of: ice and Local Authorities. 'lhere is sees. for sane expert advice as to formulating the notional model anc it may well be that the Society of County Treasurers or LIPFA Mm sane. input fran the Receiver's Office could provide that expertise. The cost of vehicles used for transporting PSU's also needs examining as a wide variety of costs per mile for similar venicies is evident. Standard Charges, based upon vehicle type and engine size, for police owned vehicles is seen as desirable. It is accepted that the actual costs for hired vehicles will have to be met by the aided forces. It is therefore that a mathematical model be devised to identify a notional standard charge for a Police Support Unit based upon the additional costs incurred together with an element for consequential costs. It is further RECOMMENDED that standard mileage charges be devised for police vehicles used by PSU's based upon vehicle type and engine size. MUTATION 7.5.1 7.5.2 Tne recent dispute has highlighted significant administration problems for both aiding and aided Forces in the accurate recording and checking of the very detailed records which were considered necessary by some Treasurers and Auditors in order to provide adequate information upon which a proper level of scrutiny could be undertaken. An agreed standard charge for a PSU will obvioiusiy obviate some of this work but there is still a need for standard and simple forms which record sufficient information to support a claim for payment without imposing unreasonable demands upon either authority in the preparation or checking of the documents. It is worth mentioning that recent experience has shown it is virtually impossible for an aided Force to check properly the accuracy of claims submitted other than where obvious errors on the forms themselves occur. Standard charges and standard docunentation will do much to alleviate this problan. It is that standard docunentation agreed as suitable by the Audit Coumission be used when claims for mutual aid are made. . . - - . Scanned by CamScanner 31W mans 7.6.1 Hhen PSU's are deployed on mutual aid, it has become the graft?? with sane Forces to deploy additional Civilian staff to service the mutual aid be support ranges from one senior officer responsible :or 55-19:: liaison etc., to large achinistrative units, uf'l - - etc 0 ing :rovzaes. .ra; 7.6.2 The presence of large number of additional considerable logistic burdens on the aided Force. 95990-9- 11" ?fr? overnight accomnooation is being provided and in most instance? they merely duplicate the aided Force's 10815035 and provisions. 7.6.3 It is That no additional officers or civilian personnel mutual aid PSU's other than in accordance with an a scale, and; moan pa ri- green That where additional supporting staff is required that 1: ac requested by tne aided Force. nil-2m 7.7.1 Ihe great disparity between deiinitions of the working day adoptec by different Forces causes confusion and inequity w'nen officers from different Forces are working together. In many Forces time working day cannenoes at midnight, in other: Eat an: yet other 7'33. Again, when providing mutual aid, some Forces identify their working day as starting at the time the officers leave their hope Force with all subsequent days canencing on the daily anniversary of that time. Instances occur of disparity in payment being made to officers working identical periods of duty due to the different starting and finishing times of their particular day. In addition, such variations add considerably to the acninistrative lcac'. 7.7.2 The recent experience does indicate a need for a cannon definitiOn oi' the working day but it is accepted that any definition coal; raise problems depending upon the particular shift system worse; so far as the interpretation and Regulation is concerned. Shou;c? a cannon working day be agreed, the opportunity to provide standard interpretations of Police Regulations so far as the tours of duty which continue beyond the completion of the standard working day, overtime, the start time of a rest day, etc, became possible. 7.7.3 me inadequacy of existing regulations and circulars to deal with long term and major operations outside the compass of normal policing operations is self evident. Therefore these Garments and recommendations are suitable only for the routine use of mutual aid. In section ten we cment upon the desirability of hav 1ng special regulations to deal with wholly exceptional circumstances. Scanned by CamScanner 707'? It is That the P01 ice Negotiating Board define a standard working day, and; That the Police Negotiating Board agree interpretations 0f the Regulations appertaining to the working day. 1115. NEED FOR SPECIAL REBULATIONS 7.8.1 "Lona 708-3 7.5.4 The unforeseen circunstances of the recent dispute identified1 the fact that Police Regulations, Home Office Circulars and Police Negotiating Board Circulars were totally inadequate to 53931 ?in: the situations which arise when a significant threat 139 the maintenance of law and order occurs of such a scale and duration as to demand the deployment of very large nunbers of 0139?? on munual aid for long periods of time. In PartiCUJ-a?" 13119.13? CI. authoritative interpretation of Hone Office and PNB Circulars and the fact that they are not supported by 16815181310?, created difficulties which have not yet been resolved. After examination of many alternatives the group have come to the conclusion that circulars, whilst valuable in normal circunstances, are unsuitable for dealing with emergencies on the scale recently experienced. The police service is the principal emergency service and thus it is arguable that the Regulations governing its conditions of service and adninistration must take account of all the situations they may face. It follows, therefore, that special regulations should be drafted to deal with the most serious of circumstances. The effect of these Special regulations would of necessity have to replace normal existing regulations when invoked. A possible procedure for invoking such regulations is for the Chief Constable(s) who are requesting mutual aid, to decide after consultation with those Chief Constables providing the aid to bring special regulations formally into effect. Special regulations would need to define simply and clearly the conditiions of service of officers deployed on mutual aid, in particular in respect of payment and living conditions. The group are aware of representations being made to the PNB in respect of special allowances for officers living away from home on muzual ad but it is felt that a simpler approach is desirable. Experience has shown that even in the most serious of incidents officers rarely worked for 16 hours and when on duty spend a sigrificant part of their time on stand-by where it is posible to rest and relax. Therefore it does seen equitable for some degree of give- and-take to prevail. In the light of this the following considerations should be examined when drafting special regulations:- (3) Officers should normal ly have 8 hours rest during each period of 24 hours. They should be awarded 16 hours pay for perioos or actual duty not greater than that nunber of hours. On the very rare occasior when duty periods exceed 16 hours, an additional 11Scanned by CamScanner hours payment be made but where duty exceeds 20 hours, payment for 211 hours be met. These regulations, when invoxea, should apply whether officers travel daily or are billetted. In sucn exceptional circumstances it must be accepted that sleeping may not be of normal standards out the reasonably generous rate of pay does take account of this. In view of the generous rate of pay for officers below the rank of Superintendent no additional allowances are conSIdered necessary. Of: icers above the rank of Chief Inspector living away from home who do not receive any additional salary should be provided with an allowance to cover incidental expenses. (3) That these costs be included in the mathematical model for the notional cost of a PSU. 7.8.5 It is RECOMMENDED that where a threat to the maintenance of law and order is of such scale or likely duration that existing regulations, HO Circulars and PNB Circulars are inadequate to govern conditions of service and administration, that Special Regulations are invoked superceding normal regulations and making such special provisions for pay, allowances and conditions of service as are necessary to police the situation. SIBSISTEICE (LABS AID WINGS 7.9.1 Where the aided Force makes full provision to provide all meals for mutual aid, then subsistence allavances cannot be justified. There may be a need, nowev er, to pay subsistence to cover the period of travel to and from the aided Force if meals are not prov ided and where police regulations apply. 7.9.2 It is recognised that officers living away from hone do incur some additional expenditure but the overall level of payment being recorrmended, we believe, compensates for this. 7.9.3 No evidence has been elicited to subatantiate the need for entertairment allowances to be paid to liaison officers attached to mutual aid units. 'Iherefore, the group consider no provision need be made for such allowances 7.9.1! It is Iii-2mm:? That where all meals are prov idea, no subsistence claims be met, and; When meals are not available, subsistence/refreshment allowance be paid in accordance with regulations. Scanned by CamScanner 7.7.14 THE NEED 7.8.1 7.8.3 7.6.4 It is That the Police Negotiating Board define a standard working day, and; That the Police Negotiating Board agree interpretations of the Regulations appertaining to the working FOR SPECIAL REGULATIONS The unforeseen circunstances of the recent dispute identif la?: the fact that Police Regulations, Home Office Circulars and Roi-ice Negotiating Board Circulars were totally inadequate to seal wltr. the Situations which arise when a significant threat to the maintenance of law and order occurs of such a scale and duration 85 to demand the deployment of very large nunbers of police ozficers on aid for long periods of time. In particular the 180K or authoritative interpretation of Hone Office and PNB CirCUlars am: the fact that they are not supported by legislation, created difficulties which have not yet been resolved. After examination of many alternatives the group have come to the conclusion that circulars, whilst valuable in normal circunstances; are unsuitable for dealing with anergencies on the scale recently experienced. The police service is the principal emergency service and thus it is arguable that the Regulations governing its conditions of service and adninistration must take account of all the situations they may face. It follows, therefore, that special regulations should be drafted to deal with the most serious of circumstances. The effect of these special regulations would of necessity have to replace normal existing regulations when invoked. A possible procedure for invoking such regulations is for the Chief Constable(s) who are requesting mutual aid, to decide after consultation with those Chief Constables providing the aid to bring specialregulations formally into effect. Special regulations would need to define simply ans cl early the conditiions of service of officers deployed on mutual aid, in particular in respect of payment and living conditions. The group are aware of representations being made to the PNB in reSpect of special allowances for officers living away fran home on mutual ad but it is felt that a simpler approach is desirable. Experience has shown that even in the most serious of incidents officers rarely worked for 16 hours and when on duty spend a significant part of their time on stand-by where it is posible to rest and relax. Therefore it does seem equitable for some degree of give- and?take to prevail. In the light of this the following considerations should be examined when drafting Special regulations:- Officers should normally have 8 hours rest during each period of 24 hours. They should be awarded 16 hours pay for periocs or actual duty not greater than that number of hours. On the very rare occasion when duty periods exceed 16 hours, an additional 1: 1 - . .- Scanned by CamScanner hours payment be made but where duty exceeds 20 hours, payment for 218 hours he met. These regulations, when invoxec, snould apply whether officers travel daily or are billetted. In sucn exceptional circunstances it must be accepted that sleeping accommodation may not be of normal standards but the reasonably generous rate of pay does take account 01 this. In view of the generous rate of pay for officers below the rank of Superintendent no additional allowances are considered necessary. Of: icers above the rank of Chief Inspector living away from home who do not receive any additional salary should be provided with an allowance to cover incidental expenses. (8) That these costs be included in the mathematical model for the notional cost of a PSU. It is RECOMMENDED that where a threat to the maintenance of law and order is of such scale or likely duration that existing regulations, H0 Circulars and PNB Circulars are inadequate to govern conditions of service and administration, that Special Regulations are invoked superceding normal regulations and making such special provisions for pay, allowances and conditions of service as are necessary to police the situation. (1.1116 MD INTERIM mums 7.9.1 Where the aided Force makes full provision to provide all meals for mutual aid, then subsistence allowances cannot be justified. There may be a need, however, to pay subsistence to cover the period of travel to and from the aided Force if meals are not prov ided and where police regulations apply. 7.9.2 It is recognised that officers living away fran hcme do incur some additional expenditure but the overall level of payment being recoumended, we believe, canpensates for this. 7.9.3 No evidence has been elicited to subs entertairment allowances to be paid to lie mutual aid units. Therefore, be made for such allowances. tantiate the need for ison officers attached to the group consider no provision need 7.9.4 It is That where all meals are prov idea, no subsistence claims be met, and; When meals are not available, sub51stence/refreshment allowance be paid in accordance with regulations. Scanned by CamScanner STAND-BY 7.10.1 7.10.2 Where the Force is requested to make provision for mutual aid and that aid is held on stand-by in the home Force but is wholly committed to another Force and, therefore, cannot be operationally deployed within its home Force, then it does seem reasonable to require the aided Force to meet the costs incurred in accordance with the standard PSU charges envisaged. It is RECOMMENDED that wnere officers are wholly committed to stand-by duty for another Force, that Force be respon31ble for the costs incurred. COBEJUENTIAL AND DIRECT 7.11.1 7.11.2 The concept of recompensing costs incurred by the home Force as a consequence of providing mutual aid is a new concept which is not particularly clearly defined. Hcme Office circular 5/85 relates only to the miners dispute and the principles of consequential costs need to be identified in any future circular or regulations and those indicated in H0 Circular 5/85 expanded to take account of all costs properly incurred by any Forces as a result of the abnormal activities. For exanple, non-police personnel, such as traffic wardens and control roan staff, may be required to perform duties on overtime which would otherwise have been undertaken by regular oxficers. Not only personnel but equipment, clothing and vehicles are also subject to additional use, increasing the rate of wear and tear and depreciation, thus shortening the normal replacement time. These consequential costs should form part of the mathematical model to be added to the cost of the PSU for the aiding force. In the case of the aided force similar considerations need to be examined when central funding is invoked and the actual cost of extra'wear and tear identified and reimbursed. It is RECOHENIED: That any new Home Office circular or regulations on Motual Aid includes. an element for consequential costs as a part of mathematical model of notional costs of a That consequential costs take account of all those items for wnich claims can properly be made against the aided force, and; That when Central funding is invoked the actual cost of wear and tear, etc., on the host force's resources be reimbursed. TRANSFERRED IIJTUAL AID 7.12.1 When a serious breakdown of law and order is threatened there arises the need, on occasions, to transfer mutual aid from one aided force to another, creating difficulties in apportioning costs. When central funding on the scale of the miners dispute occurs these difficulties are ameliorated but when police authorities are responsible for funding there is a need to identify Scanned by CamScanner an equitable method for apportioning those costs. 7.12.2 A possible solution is for the initial host Force retaining liability for accommodation and thereafter the costs be pro rate between the various Forces benefiting from that aid. 7.12.3 It is RECOMMENDED that there is need for an equitable methmi nl' apportioning the costs of mutual aid transferred fran one receiving Force to another. Note - Both the Superintendents? Association and the Police Federation reserve cement on this section pending discussions with the PNB. Scanned by CamScanner 1?43 144 145 NE ?1161'; mm (F 11-18 NATIGML UNIGI 0F mm DISPUTE 198M353 mud; STUDY PARA 'I'nat provision be made under Section 31 of the 72-? Police Act 196?, that when a policing operation of such proportions occurs and expenditure on that operation amounts to an agreed percentage of the appropriate authority's rates, for the Police Authority or the Chief Constable to approach the Hone Secretary for a declaration that further costs be met from central funding. 'lhat mutual aid be categorised as follows:- 7.3.2 Small Scale Aid for which no charge is generally levied and relating to casual assistance from relatively small nunbers of officers on a quid pro quo basis. Specialist Aid Where officers are provided by one Force to another normally to undertake a specialist task in circunstances where, because of the particular skills, or the recurring basis of the provision of aid, or because of the duration of the period of aid, no reciprocity is possible. In such circun- stances the full economic cost of the aid should be met by the aided force. Large Scale Aid Where mutwal aid is provided otherwise than as defined in small scale or specialist aid then that aid will be recompensed by payment on the scale of a standard charge for a Police Support Unit devised from a mathe- matical model which the notional cost of an average PSU together with an element for consequential costs. That a mathenatical model be devised to identity 7.4.5 a notional standard charge for a Police Support Unit based upon the additional costs incurred together with an elanent for consequential costs. saga-ll Scanned by CamScanner 1M8 153 15? 156 15? That standard mileage charges be devised for police vehicles used by Police Support Units based upon vehicle type and engine Size. That standard docunentation agreed as suitable by the Auoit Commission be used when claims for mutual aid are made. That no additional Officers or civilian personnel acconpany mutual aid PSU's other than in accord- ance with an agreed scale. That where additional supporting staff is required that it be requested by the aided Force. That the POlice Negotiating Board define a standard working day. That the Police Negotiating Board agree inter- pretations of the Regulations appertaining to the working day. That where a threat to the maintenance of law and order is of such scale or likely duration that existing regulations, H0 Circular and PNB Circulars are inadequate to govern conditions of service and administration, that Special Regulations are invoked superceding nonnal regulations and making such special provisions for pay, allowances and conditions of service as are necessary to police the si tua tion. That where all meals are provided, no subSistence claims be met. That when meals are not available, subsistence/ refreshment allowance be paid in accordance with Regulations. That wnere oificers are wholly committed to stand- by outy for another Force, that Force be responsible for the costs incurred. That any new Home Office Circular or Regulations on Mutual Aid include an element for consequential costs as part of the mathenatical model of notional costs or a PSU. That consequential costs take account of all those itens for which claims can properly be made against the aided force. That when central funding is invoked, the actual cost of wear and tear, etc., on the host force's resources be reimbursed. Scanned by CamScanner 7.5.2 7.6.3 7.7.u 7.9.1; 159 That there is need for an equitable method of apportioning the costs of mutual aid transferred fron one receiving force to another. .3 Li Scanned by CamScanner TRAINING Scannedby CamSca?ner REVIEH OF POLICING ARRANGEPENHS FOR THE NATIONAL UNION OF HENEHORKERS DISPUTE TRAINING PAPER PREPARED BY 3 Bunyard Esq., QPM, Chief Constable, Essex Police TERMS OF REFERENCE To assess whether the Dispute has revealed significant gaps in the current extent and quality of training at all levels within the Service. Tc identify if the Service requires minimun specified standards for Tactical Band public order training. INTRODUCTION 8.1.1 The NUM Dispute tested Public Order Training and Mutual Aid organisation to the full. It gave a tremendous opportunity for an exchange of ideas and it lasted long enough to allow a good deal of 'on the job'training for all ranks There were failings and those failings highlighted problems in relation to the training of all ranks in Public Order techniques. Following the riots of 1981 great efforts were made to ensure that the police were better equipped and trained to handle such situations in the future, and this resulted generally in an over?emphasis on riOt?type disorder. Having concentrated public order training predominantly on the control of serious and violent disorder for two or three years the problems of Greenham Common, the NUH Dispute and latterly Molesworth have highlighted the need for a tremendous range of skills and flexibility of approach from those in command on the ground when deciding upon police action. From the extremely interesting comments and recommendations received from various forces there is clearly a need to look closely at the likely role of each rank in a public disorder situation, examine the problems they are likely to face and then design a training package which covers the full spectrum of their training needs. UONSTABLES AND SERGEANTS 8.2.1 It is apparent that all constables and sergeants may be called upon to deal with Public Order problems. It is equally'apparent that these problems range from the minor incident which can be dealt with in a very low key fashion up to and including a full-scalezriot. Given this diversity it is apparent that all officers must receive familiarisation training to a common national standard. This training will be mainly to ensure that each and every constable and Scanned by CamScanner 8.2.2 8.2.3 8.2.14 8.2.5 8.2.6 8.2.7 sergeant Lmows the basics of our response to Public Order problems. There should be no exceptions to this principle and it therefore follows that CID officers and women police officers should be included in the programme irrespective of their deployment ?lthm forces. This first level of training can be given once and then repeated every other year. Initially the main effort will have to be made by individual forces but then it should also be included in the progranme for recruits which will ensure a steady lessening 0f force input. The programme presently being constructed by the central Planning Unit and the Forward Planning Unit A38) should prov1?ie for this most basic level of training and should be instituted without any amendation. It is only when this situation has been achieved that we can genuinely talk of the Police Service being trained to a cannon minimum standard. We accordingly RECOMMEND- Such training will need to provide an element of theory as well as practice. It is essential that officers understand the law in relation to Public Order and have some awareness of crowd and the role of the media at Public Order incidents. Equally 1?9 15 important that pol icing methods in relation to particular events such as Royal visits, football matches, marches and demonstrations are explained and discussed so that a flexible response becomes part of the mental armoury of the Service as well as part of its capacity. Although the common minimum standard will ensure a level of awareness throughout the Service it will not be sufficient for uniformed constables deployed on normal pol ice duty who will necessarily form the major proportion of our response to wide-scale public disorder. These officers will need to be trained to a higher level and more often than those receiving basic training. Again the programme should be devised in the same fashion and communicated to forces by the Central Planning Unit. It is envisaged that this type of training should be given every six months. Officers to receive it must be selected with due regard to their physical fitness and age. A channel should be open to any officer to apply for exemption from such duties on the grounds of health. A further safety net should be available wherby an oficer, irrespective of age, should have the channel open to him of applying for exemption from PSU duties on the grounds of health. Such applications should be viewed sympathetically. We accordingly RECOMMEND. Second tier training will be the reSponsibil ity of individual forces although, in addition to local input, regional training involving the collection and deployment of resources should occur- on an annual basis. However, the scale of these exercises does not have to be especially large and can be effective if only two or three forces are involved at any one time. We RECOMMEND accordingly. The third and final tier of training should include those units which provide an initial emergency response. These are generally centrally based reinforcement units retained on a permanent basis and they require the highest level of training. The personnel so employed should be trained every three months and should participate in regional exercises as frequently as opportunities allow. We RECDHHEHD accordingly. Although the problem of Public Order is predominant uniformed officers there is also a role for the more stiolngfigat departments of the Service. It is essential that CID officers are Scanned by CamScanner pronerly trained in evidence gatherinS technique-? tr". ?rri'l dog units receive training designed nationally and ad?cres ?luff: forces and regions. It is equally important that the deployment and use of baton rounds and CS agent receives the same type of conSideration. We RECOMMEND accordingly. INSPECTORS 8.3.1 8.3.2 This rank attracts special consideration since the recent of the Service points to the fact that Inspectors face note teat-.ca- and command problems and training needs to be geared to cater those needs. In so far as tactical training is concerned they I135- be trained as an integral part of the tactical training alyen 1'3" constables and sergeants and should receive training at the same intervals dependent upon their individual deployment within 101?935- We accordingly. In so far as command training is concerned it is apparent that this needs to be given immediately before every session of tactical training. Cmmand training has clearly been lacking for Inspectors in the past and therefore calls for early theoretical and practical input, Theoretical training should be classroom based, covering such subjects as briefing, legislation, and contingency planning. This training will need to be on a nationally agreed and produced package in the same way as the practical training must be agreed and preduced nationally. Ideally, the Inspectors should pass the theoretical training administered in the classroom to practical based training with sergeants and constables where they can begir to utilise their ocmmand skills. Practical training can be catered for at force level by exercises and scenarios during the tactical training of all uniformed ranks. CHIEF INSPECTORS AND ABOIE (DEMAND BAND 8.14.1 5-04.11] p.14.? Very few officers required to fulfil a command role in the NUM Dispute felt fully prepared to undertake the task. Again the identified areas of training broke down into strategic, cannand and tactical needs. Officers of these ranks should receive training at a regional level based on a nationally produced syllabus covering a wide range of topics related to public disorder. The regional training presently given is subject to review by the Central Planning Unit and it is likely that the revised course will shortly be available. In addition those selected officers who attend the Police College should have their regional training reinforced by further practical and theoretical inputs. Officers should attend a regional training course every other year and should attend tactical training within their own forces on an annual basis. We RECOMMEND accordingly. It is essential that they know the capabilities of their officers and equipment and this can only be achieved if they partimpate in the training received at constable and sergeant level. At the present time little or no practical command training exists. A remedy for this is seen in the in-force and regionally based Scanned by CamScanner tactical exercises already referred to. These exercises cm?: Lt: d?ES'iSrled to test many aSpects of earmand in "real" situations. ACPO RANKS 5.5.1 The present training for Assistant and Deputy Chief Constable: at- the Police Staff College should continue, with approwiatc attending a course every other year. This should ensure that 951% officers retain a level of knowledge comensurate with their reaponsibilities. We accordingly. ACPO PUBLIC ORDER HANML OF TACTICAL AND RELATED MATTERS 8.6.1 The Manual is considered to be an excellent reference book and there is no doubt that practical training in most forces is based on its contents. There is a problem in relation to its sheer 512? am?ht fact that the contents of the Manual have not been disseminated to those likely to perform a command role. This is not an acceptapie situation and there is a real need for the mini-Manual presentiy being produced. This should be circulated to those officers llKely to perform a command role and provide them with a more viable and easily absorbed work of best practice. We REGJHHEND accordingly. li?l 1 i Ii i Scanned by CamScanner N0. 180 151 162 163 169 THE FOLICING ARRANGEIENHS OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF HINEHORKERS DISPUTE wan/85 TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS All police constables and sergeants should be given biennial familiarisation training; locally but to an agreed national standard. Such training should be incorporated into the Initial Training Course for Probationary Constables. periods or second?tier training should be given to those unifonn constables who are physically fit to undertake duty at wide-scale public disorder. Second and third tier training should be carried out locally according to a nationally agreed syllabus. Regular multi?force exercises should be held. periods of third-tier training Should be given to those units which provide an initial emergency response as a regular part of their duties. Specialist training should be given to CID officers, dog and horse units to agreed national standards. Inspectors should receive command and tactical training alongside sergeants and constables. Chief Inspectors and above should receive biennial strategic, camnand and tactical training on a regional basis. They should participate in practical training sessions for inspectors, sergeants and constables. Every force should ensure that it has an appropriate nunber of ACPO ranks who attend biennial training at the Police Staff College. A pr80t1cal manual of guidance should be made available to all inspectors and above who are likely to be tasked with public order duties. Scanned by CamScanner PARA 8.2.2 8.2.14 8.2.4 8.2.5 8.2.6 8.2.7 8.3.1 8.5.1 8.6.1 CONSTITUTION Scanned by CamScanner rDISPUTE 1984/35 00mm RBITIOI THE CONSTABLE PEPBERS-IIP 0F 630.]? Wright Esq. OBE, Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police A 0 Sm1th Esq., Acting Chief Constable, Constabulary DP Griffith Esq., HALLB, Deputy Chief Constable, Leicestershire Constabulary Cranpton Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police Crawford Esq., Assistant Chief Constable, Mrseyside Police TERMS OF REFERENCE To consider the constitutional position of the Chief Constable in the light of the mining dispute, and the problems which have been faced by some of our members. INTROIIJ Cl? ION 9.1.1 9.1.2 9.1.3 The Study Group's approach to this issue has been basedon a nunber of questions. For instance, had the differences of opinion between chief constables and their police authorities on how, or even if, the picket lines should be policed revealed any anomalies in the respective responsibilities of the Home Secretary, Police Authority, and Chief Constable, as they were understood by the police? Was a Chief Constable's understanding of his operational autonony as unequivocal after the dispute as it was before? What would be the effect on pol ice authority/chief constable relationships following recognition of the police authority's apparent inability to control a chief constable's spending on operational actions with which it disagreed. In pursuing these questions we acknowledged that we were not the first to review the constitutional position and operational autonomy of chief constables as a result of policing the dispute. At the ACPO Council meeting on 5 July 1984, A Goodson Esq., was asked to examine the legal position of chief constables when exercising operational autonoungainst the wishes of their police authority. - His subsequent paper concluded that a Chief Constable could not be curtailed in ,his operational decisions by his Police Authority, or indeed by Central Governnent. The paper contended that it was clear from case law and the Police Act, 1961! that the operational decisions of a Chief Constable was unfettered, and that the Pol ice Authority's responsibility was confined to the maintenance of an adequate and efficient Force. The paper maintained that Central Scanned by CamScanner 9.1.11 9.1.5 9.1.6 9.1.7 9.1.8 9.1.9 Government was unable in law to control the Chief other constable in his operational deciSions and the such position required fresh legislation. Our Group started by questioning Mr Goodson's agdofnt?g doing took account of a number of publications ariSing ou ctions. dispute, particularly those which were critical of POllCe 'ters who In the publication 'Pol iCing the Miners' Strike' those address the Question of a Chief Constable's operationaltatuggtlo? express concern that it should be so bUt do not sugges does not exist. Sarah Spencer, Director of the Cobden Trust, and now Secretarytoi" NCCL, in her article entitled 'Eclipse of the Police hy states inter alia, "This dispute has exposed the weakness 0 authorities in the tripartite . They (Chief Constables) have made operational decisions will? EXEGHSIVG financial implications over which the Authorities have no control but have to pay the They have shown ?that _the accountability of the police to local police authori ties exists more in theory than in reality and undermine the faint optimism that authorities could exert some influence over the operational methods of their force through their control of the budget". Other ccnmentators, albeit reluctantly, come to the same general conclusion, and press the case for the necessary legal reform to enable police authorities to exercise local democratic control over operational policing. To summarise our findings, we confirmed Mr Goodson's conclusion that a Chief Constable's autonomy in deploying his existing resources is unfettered. But he can be called to account for his actions in the courts and our Group was extremely concerned at the lack of support and advice available to a chief constable if he was called upon to justify and explain his operational decision to a court. As a result of recent events a number of people in Local Government, both elected members and officers, are likely to address their minds to find ways within the current legislation and within the systen to establish control over Chief Constables and redress the imbalance that they feel has been created. Our Group has identified a number of areas where we feel trends can already be observed which should give members of this Association cause for concern they are as follows. FINANCIAL AND coma. 9.2.1 We believe it is true to say that prior to the dispute most Pol ice Authorities and many Chief Constables were content to accept that financial control was theirs and operational control was ours. However, in the final analysis the ability of the Police Authority to control the supply of money was a clear brake over unfettered operational autonomy, just as the Home Secretary may consider his control of the Home Office Grant as a last resort means of control over dilatory or indisciplined Police Authorities. Scanned by CamScanner 9.2.2 9.2.3 9.2.4 9.2.5 9.2.6 222635;: oVg'llch fostered this belief is provided by the refusal rounds and . fence authorities to approve the purchase of baton disorder lar equipment for the control of extreme public concerned th 13 refusal was accepted by the Chief Conspables co 1 U8 confirming 1n the mind of the Police Authority its ro over certain aspects of police operations. 2:613? ACPO Autumn Conference of 1981! the Chairman of our ?ined the Court action against his Police Ccmnittee arising frun their refusal to pay the costs of. pol icing the dispute. In the event the matter was not pursued to a final conclusion which allows doubt to remain. It could be argued that irrespective of who won or lost the Court action it would have given a sound base for amending legislation, if it were declared necessaril- It may well be that Counsel's advice to the Committee suggested that it was a matter that should be pursued but that the miners dlspute introduced an additional controversy and was not suitable for a test case. Our Group have noted examples since the dispute Of severe pruning in police budgets on vehicles, overtime, and other areas. In pursuing this theme we wonder what the outcome would be if a Chief Constable, either by miscalculation or by dint of circunstances, or by lack of support services, overspent one of those particular budget heads and the relevant Police Authority, seeking to reimpose its financial control, refused to find the money. We would not like to speculate on the outcome. The question should be asked, what would be the position of the Chief Constable? Could he be suspended, could he be disciplined, could he be surcharged? Taking this further, our Group thought disquiet should be expressed about the possible effect of Council's Standing Orders and Financial Regulations being adopted on the Chief Constable's constitutional position. Implicit in the adoption of such Standing Orders is that it creates the status of principal and agent between the Committee and the Chief Constable. It can be argued that Standing Orders and Financial Regulations are subject to the overriding provisions of the Police Act 1964, but we feel that the safety net prov1ded by the Police Act is limited and could leave a Chief Constable exposed. The service should be clear about these matters. One practical issue which arose fran such considerations was the question of legal advice. If a Chief Conscable finds himself in the centre? of financial controversy arising from disputes over finance, to when does he turn for such advice? During the dispute at least one Police Authority sought Counsel's advice not only in connection with financial issues but also on the constitutional position of the National Reporting Centre, on the implications of disbanding Mounted and Dog Sections against the wishes of the Home secretary, and on whether they could press for access to a copy of the Manual on Tactical Options. If the controversy arises out of national issues, there is a chance, and indeed it was demonstrated, that the Heme Office may find the required support, but what about the more mundane and local issues? The Chief Constable could not turn to the County Solicitor, nor any member of his staff, because they would be acting for the Police Authority. 'Ihe matter is less stark whilst County Prosecuting Solicitors remain in a Scanned by CamScanAner' cl ient/sol icitor relationship with the Chief Constabl e. but the implicationsc??the Crown Prosecuting Service will change this position. If Police Authorities seek aggressively to the actions of Chief Constables in order to restore their apparently diminished authority, the need may well occur for a Chief Constable to have access to impartial legal advice but there are no facilities for this. DISCIPLINE 9.3.1 9.3.2 9.3.3 9.3.14 Our Group expressed some disquiet at the way a Police Authority acting in its capacity of disciplinary authority, 00U1d_1f 5? minded use the Police (Discipline) (Senior Officers) Regulations to question operational decisions and to apply pressure on senior officers which could inhibit operational activity. We are aware of one Assistant Chief Constable who was made the subjeCt 0f two disciplinary enquiries, despite advice fran both the Chief Executive and the Chief Constable that even if the 'complaintS' were substantiated they could not provide the grounds for a discipline charge. One such complaint was based on an operational decision to prevent menbers of the National Front fran entering a city where they were the subject of a ban under the Public Order Act. The other was based on a comment that the Assistant Chief Constable had allegedly made to a newspaper about incidents WhiCh occurred during the dispute. In both cases an investigating officer was appointed and it appears that once the Police Authority decided on an investigation and referred the matter to the Inspectorate, they had no option but to appoint an investigating officer. In addition to a disciplinary enquiry, a Police Authority at odds with a senior officer has other options. It can for instance initiate an internal audit enquiry, or apply for a local enquiry to be held under the provisions of Section 32 of the Police Act 1964. Should the Secretary of State decline this request the Police Authority may initiate its own enquiry with or without a legally qual ified chairman. It may over a period of time record a number of critical committee resolutions which, when considered cunulatively, are perceived by the Authority to totally discredit the chief officer to such an extent that he cannot be relied upon to efficiently manage the Force. A chief officer seeking to defend his position in any of these instances would face very substantial costs which he may have to find from his own resources This Group are aware that at a Divisional Court hearing in May 1985, one chief officer had costs of ?3,500 awarded against him and these costs simply represented the expense of one day's hearing before that Court CONDITIONS OF SERVICE 9.4.1 Another area considered by our Group was conditions of service for chief officers. Our consideration of this aSpect amounts to little more than speculation, but nevertheless we consider it worthy of Scanned by CamScanner mention. we have seen in some areas disputes abOUt th: absence of chief officers their force area andfwe lare conscious of the controversy that surrounded the despatch 0 potlct resources from one force area to another. We are aware t2: in least one Force has applied conditions to a Chief Const'clixat inis respect of his absence the Force area. and believe at dd trend needs to be closely monitored. A Police Authority a 0 4: With the Chief Constable over certain issues may try '09 prevenf similar disputes with his successor by imposms service on his appointment. Although 8110?} a change is specu a?tlhva it does not require a great deal of imagination to come up ?1k 3 list of conditions which, entered to in contract. ma Chief Constable's constitutional position less clear than we currently imagine it to be. THE ASSOCIATION (F CHIEF MICE OFFICERS 9.5.1 9.5.2 9.5.3 9.5.4 9.5.5 Finally we have considered matters connected with ACPO. The P01 itical perception of ACPO's role in the National Reporting Centre, coupled with the furore likely to accompany any reference to the Tactical Options Manual, has put the Assoc1ation and its members in the limelight as perhaps never before. Martin Kettle in his chapter on the National Reporting Centre in the book 'Policing the Miners' Strike' questions the influence of the Association over actual pol icing policies. He does not consider the Association poses the possible threat to local pol icing policy which some critics imagine. However, he goes on to say "Nevertheless the ACPO remains important, not least because of its largely autonomous character. Unlike the P01 ice Federation and the Superintendents' Association the ACPO is not a statutory body. No publicly elected person is accountable for its actions. It is constitutionally autonomous from the formal structure of accountability. As a result, it is a lad unto itself. It has been able to develop its own, sanetimes influential but sanetimes not, pol icing policies without any public scrutiny or overt constraint". The Association of Metropolitan Authorities, in its draft 'Revised Policies for the Police Serv ice' dated 18 June 1985, comments on representative bodies saying that there is no justification for them seeking to trespass into 'pol itics' thereby exceeding their representative role. Relations between police authorities and such bodies, says AMA calls for further examination. Such interest caused our Group to pose a number of questions to which, as yet, we have not been able to find satisfactory answers. For instance, by what authority do we arrange our meetings, our committees, our working parties, and our study groups? By what authority do we absent ourselves from our Force areas to attend such meetings, and recharge our expenses to the local authority? By what authority do we attend conferences? If one of us is injured on the wayto an ACPO forum,is he on duty? Prior to 1951: Home Office approval was sou chief officers, in terms that "sub could be recognised for grant?. question of the authority for a ch for every meeting of Ject to audit claims for expenses This of course left the prime ief officer to meet and discuss Scanned by CamScanner 9.5.6 9.5.7 9.5.8 police business with his peers completely unanswered, since it implied that only if the police authority tacitly approved the activity and accepted the claim for expenses would grant be payable. It also completely ignored the question of a chief officer's absence from what his Police Authority may consider to be his normal place of duty. The development of ACPO appears to have been based upon under standings and pragmatic arrangements which have evolved, rather than on any formal agreements. The Edmund-Davies Report stated that it was incumbent upon the Home Office to "ensure the Association did not suffer any disadvantage either in praCtlcal terms of time off for Association business or in status from th: absence of statutory recognition". In addition the Report Observed that at force level problems do not arise regarding time Off an facilities for ACPO representatives. These are granted readily by police authorities. There is no definition of the meaning of 'time off' in the contexit used by Lord Ednund-Davies and we beg leave to doubt that 31_1 Chle officers have been granted facilities in the sense impl led 1? these statements. The findings of our Group so far are that as individuals and as an Association we are vulnerable to those who wish to exercise 'greater control over our actions, and who do so by questionlng the decisions of Chief Constables. We also believe that Chief Constables are not sufficiently equipped, legally, financial ly, and to some extent constitutionally, to meet the challenge which could face members of this Association in the future. Our Group believe that rather than make a number of separate recommendations attenpting to'address each issue, the general implications of our findings should be considered by the Association and that it should remain on the table until it is satisfied that all possible action has been taken to protect the interests of its members. Our Study Group 35mm accordingly. Scanned by CamScanner 1115 KLICIE means THE NATIWAL URIUI 0F HEW DISPUTE 1984/85 HBITIDH (F THE CHIEF (DUSTELE NO. Rammumlou PM 171 That the report of the Study Group be Whole report considered by the President, Chairman of ACPO Council Canmittees and HHCIC. Scanned by CamScanner