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9592!; 39159; .QEELCERS

FIRST RBPOR



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FIRST REPORT

95; THE

 

OPERATIQEQL INTEELIGENCE

 



 

The original concept of this Working Party envisaged the
production of a report recommending solutions to the
twin problems of day to day intelligence and the
particular demands created during times of wideSpread,
major disorders. Initial research established that a
long term solution was required to restructure the
intelligence system and that a more immediate answer had
to be recommended in dealing with crime and associated
matters which arise during large scale disorder.

It is to the credit of the Working Party members listed
on the following page that they were able to adjust
their lines of research at a late stage and formulate
the recommendations contained in this report. I place
on record my thanks for their unstinting efforts,
willingly given additional to their considerable in
force responsibilities.

 

 



A. Ratcliffe
Assistant Chief Constable 14th March, 1986

 

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ASSOCIATION OF







 





To review the increasing demands on Forces for
the collation and evaluation of operational
intelligence together with existing

commitments and to consider how best these

demands may be met.

 

 

Further to consider the integration of all
intelligence aspects presently being required
of R.C.I.O.'s and in the light of this to make
recommendations on organisation, resources and
training implications.

Report as a matter of urgency.

 

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As. 5221.5391222

qggicERs

ELEM
mg
WORKING 913511

9!



MEMBERS

A.B. Ratcliffe Esq., Chairman
Assistant Chief Constable,
Cambridgeshire Constabulary.

Detective Superintendent R.J. Manning, Secretary
No. 4 Regional Criminal Intelligence
Office, Birmingham.

Superintendent J. McLaughlan,
Northumbria Police.

Detective Chief Inspector H. Turner,
No. 3 Regional Criminal Intelligence
Office, Wakefield.

Detective Chief Inspector T. Dickinson,
C11 (South East Unit),
New Scotland Yard.

Co-opted to the Working Party in November, 1985 having
replaced 

Detective Superintendent T. Thorpe,
C11 (South East Unit),
New Scotland Yard.

Who was co-opted to the Working Party in September, 1985
but returned to his Force in December, 1985.

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The Terms of Reference governing the
deliberations of the Working Party which was
constituted ha July. 1985, required van in-
depth study of the use of
information/intelligence throughout the
Police Service. Two factors have strongly
influenced the approach which the Working
Party has adOpted:e

i. the requirement to produce a system
capable of providing immediate support
during major socially disruptive
activity and associated crime and

ii. the constitution of the Home Office
Police Technical Services Department,
Criminal Information Systems Strategy
Study (C.I.S.S.S.), lead by Doctor H.

Goldman.

As a result of these considerations the
Working Party decided to produce a report in
two stages. This, the First Report, deals
with the immediate measures it is possible to
take to provide intelligence support during
major outbreaks of civil or industrial
disorder. The Second Report will deal with

 

long-term considerations and strategy for
intelligence within the Police Service and
will reflect the close co-operation which has
existed between the Working Party and the
Home Office C.I.S.S.S.

In dealing with the subject matter of this
Report and determining the available options
account was not taken of the causes of such

 

ll, 

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activity, it being considered irrelevant
whether public disorder results from
industrial or any other cause. The crucial
requirement was to produce a viable easily
recognisable intelligence system capable of
immediate enhancement at appropriate times to

cope with increased demand and work load.

The Working Party's research included in
depth studies of a number of intelligence
systems. There emerged a clear common thread
in all systems of ea tiered structure which
provides an overview at different levels.
This approach permits information entering a
system to be subjected to processes of
filtering at each level, passed to other
levels, if appropriate, and at each level to
be considered in the context of that which is
already known. Overview developed this way
through tiered management guards against
parochial interests restricting the flow of
information across divisional, force, or
regional boundaries, where such circulation

is necessary.

These principles are accepted as the corner
stone of a viable intelligence system. They
were clearly embodied in the Association of
Chief Police Officers Sub-Committee Report on
Criminal Intelligence published in July 1975
and the Fourth Report of a Working Party
which considered standards and procedures for
Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices
published in .December, 1978. The former
report is generally referred to as the

 

 

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Baumber Report and the. latter, the Pearce
Report. These Reports resulted in the
establishment of an intelligence system
within the police service. In suggesting a
number of Options capable of satisfying the
increasing needs of all aspects of
operational intelligence and not purely crime
orientated matters, the Working Party is
pleased to endorse the recommendations of
Baumber and Pearce. It believes that the
established intelligence structure provides a
viable system with automatic growth potential
according to perceived need and deprecates
the increasing tendency to design isolated
intelligence units dealing specifically with
individual problems as they reach sufficient
prominence to deserve special attention.
This results in different intelligence
systems. holding information on the same
subject which, without compatibility, is not
linked. This prevents the full import of the

total information available being realised.

Baumber and Pearce recommendations have,
where properly implemented, proved their
merit. Criticism of their format has
frequently resulted from the fact that the
system has not been properly implemented and
basic flaws which have been identified have
been incorrectly linked with the system
design.

In recommending from the outset that the
existing intelligence system can provide all

that is required in this area of operations

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the Working ?arty acknowledge that efficiency
of an acceptable standard will only be
achieved through improvements in training
methods and techniques.

Acknowlegge-ents
During the research phase Working Party

 

Members entered discussions within many
Police Forces, related organisations and
specific officers who were able to
contribute. Appendix 1 details the main
visits and meetings which were undertaken.
This does not, however, represent the total
picture of interaction with officers and
organisations who were able and only too
willing to provide assistance.

It would be most remiss of the Working Party.
if it did not pay tribute to those who have
unselfishly and without partisan
considerations added a great deal to the
deliberations. The Working Party was greatly
encouraged by the response of those from whom
it sought advice. They are too numerous to
detail but many have in their own way made a

significant contribution.

 

 

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5 
CHAPTER 1
1 - TEE -EEKLSELEE 
WHICH MUST BE LEARNED
1.1 The aim of the Working Party is to outline

the options available within the existing
National Intelligence System capable of
responding to major disruptive activity. It
is prudent, however, to first consider
certain aspects of the system and more
generally the progress which has been made
since its inception. The philosophy of
intelligence has not been grasped by many
within the service and some background
comment is necessary at this stage to enable
the report to be viewed in perspective.

1.2 The Distinctio_r_1__ between Information? and
Intelligence
The distinction between information and
intelligence is understood by only a small
section of the service. This contributes more
than any other single factor to the confusion
which results in an unrealistically high

expectation being placed on the intelligence

 

system. This expectation produces a state
where many believe that evaluation and
a analytical techniques applied to raw and
possibly low grade information should provide
a constant supply of 'target' material.

1.3 During the research the Working Party
undertook it became clear that there is a
body of opinion which places a high

expectation on the intelligence system.

 

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Those who hold this opinion are far from
satisfied with that which the system
currently achieves. Superficial comment
about analysis and prediction creates the
impression that, regardless of the quality of
information available, an almost magical
process will distil a logic which will
suggest the need for development of the

information or specific operational action.

This stereotype of an intelligence system
must be dispelled, it is a and must be
recognised as such before the National
Intelligence System can progress to that

which it is possible to achieve.

The National Intelligence System developed
with a definite bias to crime orientated
matters and operational problems of other
types have only recently intruded into the
intelligence area. It may now be prudent to
link the growing use of 'operational' as
distinct from 'criminal' with the expression

'information' instead of 'intelligence'.

The military intelligence system has been
researched and it has been found that it
tends 'towards the management of factual
information. That is, of course, the main
of the intelligence in the
Police Service. The tiered overview provides
a communciations network for factual
information on crime and criminals, and this

is where its basic strength lies. It ensures

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1.7

that problems stretching beyond boundaries
are recognised and that those with an
interest are informed. It co-ordinates the
collation of factual information and where a
predictive element occasionally emerges it is

a valuable bonus.

Some specialist officers are reputed to
depend on intelligence. The truth is that the
majority of 'target' arrest situations
develop from factual surveillance information
or (direct requests from forces. There- is a
strong contribution from informants but in
this area quite often the information which
leads to a success would be graded rather low
on a set evaluation scale. There remains also
the purely fortuitous arrest which sets off a
chain reaction, culminating :h1 many arrests
of quality criminals. Many criminals are
'taken out' as a result of a combination of
these factors. It is, therefore, necessary
for those who believe that they Operate
substantially as a result of intelligence, to
avoid this delusion. They, in fact, operate
as a result of information correctly managed
and developed where appropriate. This is the
proven side of the system which exists and
which .could be improved. Standard training
and an awareness of the principles of
intelligence can lead to an educated guess
(prediction, the art of) but this will not
provide the degree of success of which many

believe it to be capable.

 

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1.8

1.9



The search for' an analytical process which
can be applied to all information entering
the intelligence system, which can
subsequently provide prediction and
operational direction, is rapidly becoming a
philosophical concept. It has been likened
to a rainbow, although remaining constantly
in sight the search for the rainbow is
frustrated because it constantly recedes. To
search too frantically fails to acknowledge
that eventually it disappears altogether.

The implementation of the Data Protection Act
will create additional difficulties in that
sensitive information, particularly of a
Speculative nature, will be more difficult to
process and retain. It will lead to the
information/intelligence system in the future
being principally directed to the correct and
efficient management of factual material.
This has been the real situation for many
years but has not been realised by those who
lack a proper understanding of the system.

Thus the expectation, set at a high
unrealistic level, has spawned the concept of
analysis of information as virtually a
scientific process. In general day-to-day
operational matters this is not the
case and never will be. Analysis will
principally remain an intellectual process
aided by experience and that which is already

known.

A more realistic approach which accepts these
limitations would enable that which it is
possible to achieve to develop rapidly and

strengthen the system. It would certainly

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1.11

1.12

uu- 

not be to its detriment to take
'intelligence' from time philosophical plan

and produce a situation where it is
understood at all levels.

The Metropolitan Police have pioneered in
this country the Anacapa system of analysis.
It has been viewed by a section of the
service as a potential answer to all analysis
deficiences. This has added to the
misconception of what analysis is capable of
achieving in day-to-day intelligence work.
Anacapa establishes principles on which it is
possible to graphically display complex
information, thereby leading to the

development of particular and relevant areas.

The Anacapa system could not be applied to
day-to-day information managed by the
majority of Intelligence Operatives. It is
suited to major inquiries and the occasional
involved target type operation. It is a time
consuming process which, through a chain of
development, has a specific goal. Although
not recommending the Anacapa system for use
throughout the intelligence system it is
essential that a number of trained operatives
are available for use in appropriate
circumstances. Anacapa principles will
provide assistance in major disruptive and
criminal activity where complex situations
are involved.

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CHAPTER II 3

2 THE OPERATIQNAL REQUIREHENT 
2.1 Prior to discussing intelligence system 

options it is necessary to state the

operational requirement for planned cohesive

 

intelligence support during major disruptive
activity, its associated crime and the

benefits which can be derived.

2.2 The Hiners Dispute Central Intelligence Unit
The Miners Dispute of 1984/85 saw an intense
period of co-ordinated mass picketing, acts
of violence and other criminal activity which
was clearly orchestrated. It stretched police
resources and confounded Operational

commanders.

2.3 Some months into the dispute a Central
Intelligence Unit (C.I.U.) was established at
Leicester to collate, analyse and disseminate
various aspects of tiispute activity and to
work in close liaison with the National
Reporting Centre (N.R.C.). Having been
introduced at such a late stage the C.I.U.
coped well in dealing with a: retrospective
flow of information but some months elapsed
before back record conversion was completed
and an accurate computerised data base
esablished. The problems were compounded by
the different approaches taken by individual

forces involved in the dispute.

 

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 11 

254 Some forces placed_ a high priority on
intelligence gathering. others were less
enthusiastic. The manner in which information
was collated and reduced to record varied
significantly. Different computer and manual
systems operated in different forces. This
produced a somewhat haphazard approach which,
in a matter of such national significance
involving many forces both operationally and
through information gathering processes, must
have been to the detriment of overall

objectives.

2.5 Leicester C.I.U. gecommendations
There resulted from the C.I.U. a number of

recommendations for future strategy which

included:?

i. The existing intelligence system in
general use should be utilised to deal
with such problems and that separate
isolated special units should not be

created for a particular purpose.

ii. Contingency planning above force level
should enable support at such times to
be available from the intelligence
systan at the earliest indication that

regional or inter regional activity has

begun.

2.6 gompatibility and Standardisation of

lyformatigg Systems
Acceptance of intelligence support above

force level imposes an absolute need for

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2.7?

-12-

compatibility and standardisation of technical
equipment and administrative procedures.
These matters are addressed in Chapter VI.



There is a clear and proven need for an
intelligence system capable of responding
urgently to wholly abnormal activity or
disruption which affects a number of forces
or regions. The benefits to.be derived are,-
-to an extent, proportional.to the resources
allocated to achieve the aim. The aftermath
of the N.U.M. Dispute spelt out this message
in incontrovertible terms and the Working
Party fully supports this approach.

 

 

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-13?

 

CHAPTER 
3 magma FORCE s_uppon'r
3.1 In a letter dated 13th June, 1985, Appendix 2

the President of A.C.P.O. in his role as
Chairman of a Study Group on 'Intelligence
and the Media' recommended to all Chief
Constables in England and Wales:-

i. There should be established in each
Force an Operational Intelligence Unit
of a size dependant upon the size of the
Force and the current situation.

ii. The Unit to be part of the 'Operations
Department' which already exists in one

form or another within Forces.
The Assistant Chief Constable
responsible for 'Operations' to have

overall control of the Unit.

3.2 The objectives of the Unit set out in the
letter were:-

i. To provide Operational Intelligence for

resource allocation purposes.

ii. To provide evidential intelligence for

prosecution purposes.

3.3 Individual Force Needs

 

In making recommendations it was appreciated
that the need would differ from Force to
Force. In some Forces, because of the
constant high incidence of industrial action,
racial unrest or public disorder, there would
be the need for a permanent Unit with
staffing to meet the need. In other Forces,
because of the relatively low activity,

 

 

 

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 14 

arrangements for implementing a Unit would be
on an ad hoc basis.

3.4 I Force Arrangements_for Intelligence as at
September 1985 
In a survey conducted by the Working Party in
September, 1985, it was found that of the 43
Forces in England and Wales, 12 had formed
Stand Alone Force Intelligence Units; 17 had
introduced operational intelligence into
their Crime Intelligence Sections keeping the
indices separate; 2 Forces had made Special
Branch responsible for Operational
Intelligence and 12 Forces had drawn up
contingency plans to form Operational
Intelligence Units on an ad hoc basis.

3.5- Information Systems in Force Qperatignal.
Intelligence Units
Experience has shown that in the past major
industrial disruption and public disorder
situations have on a number of occasionS'
resulted in the commission of serious
offences which have required the setting up
of Major Incident Rooms. It follows
therefore that any recording and retrieval
system used in Force Intelligence Units must
logically' be compatible with those used in

major crime enquiries.

3.6 The A.C.P.O. Crime Committee Working Group in
its Report published in 1981 introduced Major
Investigation Incident Room Standardised
Administrative Procedures which have been

 

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3.7



adopted nationwide. This system has proved

to be effective in major'investigations, and

is ideally suited to the management of

?intelligence. Its adoption for use in Force
Operational Intelligence Units would enable

intelligence/information collated in the

early stages of disputes, up to the

commission of major crime. to be accessed by
the enquiry team en bloc. It is thought that
in many cases this would provide the Senior
Investigating Officer with information which
would enable enquiries to commence
immediately. The standardised administrative
system is more fully discussed in Chapter VI

at paragraph 6.18.

?1753 

The size of Stand Alone Units varies from
Force to Force and depends on a number of
considerations, i.e. the size of the Force,
the current industrial, race and public order

?situation and the number? and nature of the

indices to be maintained.

NoerLAEEivitx

?In times of normality, most Force Units could

operate effectively with a staff of 1
Sergeant and Constable. This assumes that
the development of information required to be

lundertaken on tmhalf of the Unit, would be

carried by divisional, uniform or C.I.D.

officers.

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3.9

5192;221:123:

In times of high activity Force Operational
Intelligence Units will require seconded
pre-selected trained staff dedicated to the
Specific task. A typical team will
comprise:-

1. Officer in charge of the Unit.

ii. Field Intelligence Officers.

Special Branch Officer(s).

iv. Community Services Department Officer(s)
v. Clerks.

vi. Computer Operators.

Unit Commanders Responsiblitiee

This position should only be filled by an
officer of proven investigative ability and
of sufficiently high rank to ensure the
effective management of the Unit. Detective
Inspector or Detective Chief Inspector is

thought to be the appropriate command level.
His duties would include:?

1. Identifying indices to be maintained.

ii. Analysing information with a view to
predicting future sequences of events.

Briefing command on the current
situation. 

iv. Briefing the Unit's staff on their
responsibilities and the aims

objectives of the Unit.

and

v. Identifying information requiring

development by the Investigation Teams.

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~.511

. 
. A- . 
n: .955? . 

44-

 

17 

 

 

3.11 Field 
Field Intelligence ?Officers should be
seconded to the Force Operational

Intelligence Unit to? carry ?out the duties
listed below. They Vshould be formed in a
number of teams each consisting of two
officers all. of whom are of proven
investigative ability. The number of teams
will depend on the level of disorder,
intimidation, and crime associated With the
dispute/incident.

3.12 The composition of Investigation Teams must
be left to the discretion of individual Chief
Officers. It is. recommended' that licensing
departments and other specialist squads could
provide suitable manpower to supplement

C.I.D. personnel.

3.13 The duties of the Field Intelligence Officers
will include:-

i. Obtaining Intelligence/Information
relative to the dispute/incident.

ii. Developing information on the directions
of the Officer in Charge of the Unit to
enable him 'to make a more accurate
evaluation and detailed analysis.

Cultivation of informants with a view to
obtaining high quality relevant
information.

iv. Constantly feeding into the system all
'the relevant information which has been

obtained.



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3.14

3-15



v. Visiting persons who have been subjected
to offences of personal injury, criminal
damage or intimidation and to maintain
contact with those persons as directed
by the Officer in Charge of the Unit.

vi. Undertaking intelligence surveillance
duties as required by the Officer in
Charge and subject to the directions of
the Assistant Chief Constable.

?pecia1 Branch

The value of Special Branch involvement in
Force Intelligence Units cannot be
overstated. Their lines of communications
with other forces and agencies, makes the
Branch indispensable in times of major
disputes. The Working Party considers it
essential that at times of high activity, a
Special Branch officer, preferably of
supervisory rank, be seconded to the Force
Operational Intelligence Unit for the
duration of the operation.

This officer's duties would include:-

i. Maintaining a constant liaison link
between the Intelligence Unit and Force
Special Branch.

ii. Conducting enquiries on behalf of the
Unit with Special Branch Departments in
other forces and other agencies.

Constantly updating the Units
information data bank with relevant

information.

 

_i

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-19-

Chapter discusses _the Special Branch

involvement in more detail.

3.16 I ggmmunity Services Department

 

In the recent past major public disorder has

 

involved identifiable communities. During
and after such disorders concern has been
expressed about the effect of police
community relationships. For this reason it
may be advantageous to have seconded to the
Unit an officer from the Force Community

Services Department.

3.17 His responsibilities would include:?

1. Monitoring the effect (M1 the community
of police actions.

ii. Identifying areas creating antipathy
between the police and the community.

action to minimise the
effect of the conflict.

iv. Maintaining a close liaison with
community intervenors.

v. Updating on a regular basis the Officer
in Charge of the Unit on the current
atmosphere obtaining in the community.

3.18 ?taffing of Force 

 

[latte
When considering staffing levels for Force

Units it must be borne in mind that reserve

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a'



20 


staff must be available to cover for annual
leave, sickness, and courses etc. It must be
remembered that staff from Force Units may be
required to man regional and national units
if a major dispute or incident occurs. Such gr
commitments are discussed in detail in
Chapter IV. It is, therefore, essential to 0
have a pool of trained reserve officers, .3
capable of providing the back-up which would 
be required, at such times.

3.19 Civilians in Force Operational In_telligeng_e
Civilianisation in Force Operational
Intelligence Units could be extended.
Civilians with special skills such as
computer operators and those with general j?
skills, such as clerks, can be of great value
and assistance. In those forces operating
ad hoc systems, contingency plans should
allow for training of reserve civilian staff
in addition to police staff. - .

3.20 
The duties of clerks will include:?
i. Maintaining records.
ii. Receiving and recording information.
Assisting in the evaluation and weeding
of information.
iv. Assisting in disseminating processes.

3.21 Computer Operators
With the inexorable move towards

computerisation in all fields of police work

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3.22

3.23

3.24

properly trained compute; opt.u.u.c 
indispensible. The inixouuc..u. .
computerisation in major inucstiguibuw
HOLMES, is well progressed and bhvulg .n
completed by 1989. If the recommendation
this Working Party is taken up will be
used in Force Operational intelligence 
It is necessary to aneure within tblucb Lto'
sufficient computer Operators are [ralhcc .
cater for a major protracted mousing; ..:

public order situation.



Units
Those Units established within Operations

Departments should be situated in ar

adequately sized room close to the
Incident/Resource Room and DiviSiona;
Command.

H)

Experience in the Di pets

showed that those Forces which operatec 
this way found the system to be effective an:
efficient in quickly identifying resource
requirements and maintaining a comprehens1ve

overview of the local and national scenario.

Where Units are formed within 
Intelligence Sections provision Shoulo we
made for an adequately sized room or area

which the Unit can operate without impinci?
upon other functions of the Section. Ad not
Units require t1) have identified for the?
use specific accommodation which will more 
be pre-fitted with the requisite electiwpm.

and communications wiring to enable the ?nv'

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 secome -pereticnal almost immediately. A

surgeries: as: be drawn between the
erre:;eme::e which need to be made for an ad
so: as: a Eajer Investigation Incident
Roan. I: nest be borne in mind when

coating accommodation for both the above
ne::ione? trite the possible eventual size of
teen seconded to the Unit as detailed in

geragregc 3.9.

[Esp-tes within a region

3: re 'till. undoubtedly' arise in the future
incidents of industrial unrest or public
disorder anion transcend force boundaries but
3: c: are not likely to escalate to the
degree there they will become regional
slams. For example, two forces within a
Region may experience problems associated
with the same dispute but find that they can
cope with their resources. In such a case
there would be no benefit in involving an
R.C.I.G. or Rational Intelligence Office in
the nanagenent of infornation relative to the

inc cent.



diSputes or incidents which transcend
force boundaries but do not require regional
involvement the decision as to which force
unit is to be the lead unit will be made by
the Chief Constables of the forces concerned.
the Operational Intelligence Unit should be
located within the Force mainly affected by
the dispute. Considerations affecting the

decision will include:-

i. Centrality of the Unit.
ii. Co-puter capacity and availability.

 

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 23 

Availability of suitable accommodation.
iv. Scale of problems in the affected force.

 

3.27 Management of Units

Where an Operational Intelligence Unit is
established with a Force as the Lead
Intelligence Unit for 23 particular problem,
it should be separate from the Force
Operational Intelligence Unit. For practical
purposes and general efficiency the
information systems may be 'merged but the
management systems must be clearly defined
and separate. Flexibility will be necessary
to achieve this aim within minimum staff and
resource constraints.

3.28 The staffing of a Unit must be the
responsibility of the constituent forces.
Trained staff should be made available from
the affected forces to meet the needs of what
would amount to an .Area Intelligence Unit.
This is one stage down from the intelligence
structural options in Chapter IV.

3.29 It is recommended that the officer-in-charge
of the Unit be from the host force and of
sufficient rank and experience to ensure the
credibility and authority of the Unit.

3.30 The responsibilities of this officer would
include:-

i. the co-ordination of intelligence;

 

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if: miw?rll?l?i?

11'? 

 

3.31

3.32

24 

ii. analysing information with a view to

predicting future sequences of events;

ensuring that information requiring
development was carried out by Force

Operational Intelligence Units;
iv. briefing Command.

The expense of the Unit should be borne by
the host force, except that the salaries,
subsistence, refreshment, accommodation, and
travelling expenses of the seconded officers,

should be borne by their own force.

System of reporting

The A.C.P.O. Sub?Committee on Criminal
Intelligence which reported in July, 1975,
recommended Local, Field and Force
Intelligence Officers. This system, where
properly implemented, has worked successfully

for several years.

There should be provision for Local
Intelligence Officers to receive information
from any source in relation to all
operational matters. This could take the form
of simply providing a suitably marked file
tray into which information reports, message
switch messages and telephone messages could

be deposited.

It would be the responsibility of the Local
Intelligence Officer to forward relevant
information to the Force Operational
Intelligence Unit and to Divisional/Sub-

Divisional Command.

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mu.

1


?7
1

.r

I

 



_25_

3.35 Supervision of the system would depend on the

structure adopted within individual forces.

3.36 Standardised Information Report
Standardised administrative procedures which
are commented on in detail in Chapter VI and
IX are essential if a cohesive intelligence

system capable of providing inter force or

 

inter regional support is to be developed.

3.37 The Working Party recommends that a Standard
Information Report in the style shown at
Appendix. 3 should be introduced nationally
without exception and without individual
force variation. The proposed introduction
of standard evaluation procedures referred to
in Chapter 8 requires that those involved in
intelligence work should use a common source
document which will be recognised across
force and regional boundaries. By the general

use of such a document officers will be made

 

aware of the requirements when information is
to be fed into the intelligence system. The
passage of information between different
units at whatever level of the system will be
greatly facilitated. The composition of
manual files will also be brought closer to a
standard system recognisable across force
boundaries.

 

3.38 Technical Requirements
The general requirement for the use of secure

telephones and telex machines is discussed at
Chapter 

   
   

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CHAPTER IV
4

25 

INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE ABOVE FORCE LEVEL -

THE 

4.1

4.3

The Working Party identified three options
for developing intelligence support above
force level. Each option will be clearly
defined and the advantages and disadvantages

discussed.

OPTION 1 - The Concept of a National
Intelligence Office and National
Co-ordinatg;

Heads of Regional Criminal Intelligence
Offices identified during 1985 the need for a
greater degree of compatibility within their
organisation. They made a strong
recommendation to A.C.P.O. Crime Committee
that this could be achieved by the
appointment of as National Co?ordinator with
powers to direct the various offices in a
way which would give a greater sense of
purpose and cohesion throughout the system.
This recommendation commended itself to the
Working Party particularly when viewed in the
light of the requirements of a National
Intelligence Office during times of major

public-disorder.

The concept of a National Intelligence Office
(N.I.0.) was postulated by Baumber and this
Working Party, in the light of its research,
finds itself in accord with the proposal. In
dealing with this Option it is not possible
to isolate the everyday activity of RCIOs and
the intelligence system as a whole from the
extraordinary requirements which the Working
Party considered for the purposes of the

report.

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-27-

Initially it will be necessary to discuss the
benefits which would constantly be
experienced from the introduction of a N.I.O.
The role of such an office in major Outbreaks
of disruptive and criminal activity will be
seen as a natural extension of its function
which, to a degree, should encompass a
permanent facility for monitoring such

matters.

The development of the N.I.O. concept wOUld
enable the intelligence support system to

 

cope more effectively with operational
problems than has hitherto been possible.
The existing spontaneous reaction of RCIOs in
establishing records in respect of national
crime problems which require central
collation and analysis would be mere
i efficiently controlled and Supervised. This
measure would improve a poorly defined area
of RCIO activity. National problems should
be identified at an earlier stage and

duplication of effort avoided.

..

4.6 Functions of a National Intelligeng?_9??19?

The following 'functions are considered

appropriate to a 

i. criminals of national significance;

ii. National crime problems
where serious offences link a
number of regions, e.g. The Fox

Inquiry;

a a 4.
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iv.

vi.

vii.



23 

such as bogus official offences
which currently are recorded by a
single force on a national basis.
Such information should be
maintained by a N.I.O. equipped
and staffed to provide a complete
service. A single force extending
such facilities on a national

basis is inevitably using valuable

resources which could be devoted.

to local issues;
organised syndicated crime;

animal rights activities, product
contamination and food extortion;

counterfeit currency - the functions
currently carried out by the National
Office for the Suppression of

Counterfeit Currency;

drugs activity of the type currently
registered by the National Drugs
Intelligence Unit;

State Security Information, e.g.
Anarchist Groups. Brief details which
may influence operational policy. It is
accepted that Special Branch will remain
privy to the detailed and sensitive
information;

football hooliganism the monitoring of
trends on a national basisScanned by CamScanner

 

 

ix.

xi.

xii.

'Peacy Convoy' and other similar group
activity;

publication of national intelligence
circulations;

monitoring of information on matters
concerning social and industrial
disorder;

provision of a National Reference Bureau
in respect of large scale operational
matters such as Party Political
Conferences, Pop Concerts, etc. The
detailed planning for such events
requires a very sound understanding of
the techniques involved and the agencies
capable of providing specialist
assistance. Currently forces involved
are required to research that which is,
to some extent, known and available in
various forces around the Country.
Without a formal central repository of
such information those responsible for
organising events are required to visit
other forces which have undergone a
similar experience and duplicate much of
the painstaking research which has
previously been done. A central
repository which would include copies of
operational orders and debriefing notes
would significantly reduce the initial
problems which have to be resolved

during the planning phase.

.1

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 30 

The Introduction of Unrelated and
Incompatible Systems

 

A number of the matters outlined at paragraph
4.6 have recently been reviewed and systems
produced to ensure correct collation and
analysis of the available information. It is
unfortunate that some of these solutions have
treated the individual subject in isolation
and have not considered it in the context of
all that is available within the intelligence
system as a whole. This has produced a
series of intelligence systems which lack
compatibility and fail to derive benefit from
other systems which could, if connected,
prove beneficial. Put simply, each
separately developed system encourages an
isolationist approach and leads to poor
communications between operational units
charged with separate responsibilities. This
basic flaw must result in the less than

efficient harnessing of resources.

A N.I.0 would produce a structure capable of
influencing the whole of the intelligence
system down to the Local Intelligence
Officer. It is the anking Party's belief
that the system has been debilitated by a
lack of commitment and direction and a N.I.O
would provide a watershed which could nourish
all component parts and instil a- greater

sense of purpose.

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 31 

4.9 Overall? Management of- Intelligence__: The
Ideal
The?gorking Party does not advocate a single
massive information bank but stresses the
need for compatibility of all intelligence
systems so that a multiple interest in a

 

g? . common subject can be indicated. This will
require secure levels of information
retrieval but that presents no problems
within a computerised system. This 'coming
a; together' would be (If major benefit. It
would assist in the identification of
problems or areas of interest at an earlier
stage and enable the National Co?ordinator to

seek solutions according to his terms of
reference, within the context of the complete
3 system. Intelligence and operational units
31 . could then be drawn towards an increased

degree of mutual empathy which should result
in greater efficiency.

4.10 An Integrated Intelligence System

The Working Party is convinced that the time
is overdue for a strategy from which an
integrated and compatible intelligence system
can emerge. .A change in emphasis from the
present grime orientated approach is required
to achieve a balanced system. The Working
Party does not advocate the merging of all
information/intelligence systems but believes
that the intelligence network available must
be sufficiently flexible to cater for .all

operational requirements. The network is
designed _to provide a system of

communications through which information is
passed, .evaluated and analysed at certain
levels. The governing principles are equally

 

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_32_

relevant to all operational policing problems

and not just crime. Why, therefore, should

totally different systems evolve which are 
incompatible and fail to recognise that they
are but a part of the overall operational
information requirement. The Intelligence
System, must be capable of immediate
enhancement, through planned measures, to
provide support to any future major
operational contingency, whatever the nature
of the problem. This includes outbreaks of

public/industrial disruption.

4.11 The problems associated with achieving these
objectives remain long term and are addressed
in the separate Part II report. Our . 5;
recommendations which follow recognise the 
necessity of an interim solution to the 1

 

intelligence problems posed during widespread 
disorder. 
4.12 Basic Needs of an Intelliggnqe System if

The ideal Intelligence Support System Inust
constantly monitor that which it either now
or at some future stage will be expected to
analyse. An intelligence system cannot start 
from scratch during a critical period and be ST
expected to achieve effective results. This 
means that a N.I.O. would be required to 5i
receive, evaluate, record and analyse all I if
information appropriate to its level of ?w
operation. To avoid a repetition of the
failings of the Miners Dispute Central
Intelligence Unit there must be consideration

of two major points:?

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R.
v.

4.13

-33..

i. an intelligence unit dealing with such
matters must be operating, even at low
key, constantly so that information
indicators can be received and
processed. This provides a system of
communication which is readily

recognisable.

ii. information passed to a central unit
must be considered in the context of
that which is already on record. This
more than any other single factor

distinguishes intelligence from
information. Without the ability to
function thus, the efficiency of an
intelligence unit is reduced. It is

more prone to inaccuracy and historical
comment and is less able to analyse
information and predict future

possiblities.

A N.I.O must, therefore, constantly monitor
indicators apprOpriate to its level of
operation. The existing intelligence
structure requires RCIOs to monitor certain
types of crime and criminality but in what is
the more rarefied atmosphere of major
industrial and public disruption, for the
purposes of the immediate solution, the
involvment of RCIOs in the communications and
monitoring network would unnecessarily
complicate the system. The same opinion is
held in respect of the other matters thought
appropriate to the operation of a N.I.O which
are set out at paragraph 4.6. A.L.F. and
counterfeit-currency intelligence have been





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developed with a national overvzew. However,
if the recognised intelligence system is to
be fully implemented in the future all
operational aspects must be administered
according to the tiered structure.

4.14 The Benefits a ?pational _?g?glliggnce



 

The Working Party strongly recommends the
implementation of a N.I.0. which c0uld
readily accept as an essential part of its
function the monitoring of information
indicative of increasing social and
industrial tension and associated criminal
activity. The Working Party much favours the
siting of a National Intelligence Office in
London. which would enable a close working
relationship with the N.R.C.

4.15 Many of the central services are provided
from London based units and, in particUlar.
those aspects of intelligence which have been
developed recently on a national basis are so
located. However, other possiblities exist
in provincial RCIO accommodation, should this
be considered a better' option. The model
N.I.O described would also provide the
following additional advantages:-

i. as a permanent feature it would provide
the final tier' of the Baumber concept
which has, with experience, been shown

necessary;

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 35 -

ii. it would provide -an automatic focal
point to which all officers could

relate;

the benefits of permanent accommodation.
trained staff, communications and other
facilities ablev to. support immediately
its enhanced role during phases of
intense inter regional disruptive
activity would be far more efficient
than the activation procedures necessary
to establish an ad hoc unit. Speed of
operation is of the essence as in the
implementation of an Incident Room for
major crime. Time lost during the
implementation of contingency plans can
be detrimental. It should also be
acknowledged that the N.R.C. may only be
activated some time after the full

intelligence requirement, if at all.

4.16 Con-and anq_?taffing_of a National

Intelligence Office

A permanent N.I.0. should be commanded by an
Assistant Chief Constable who at times of
inter regional crisis would liaise directly
with the Deputy Chief Constable in charge of
the N.R.C. The exact staffing requirement
of a N.I.O. is not commented upon; to arrive
at an organisational and management structure
would require in-depth research. However, if
the N.I.O. became overloaded, because of

intense activity of the type with which

 

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-35-

the Working Party has been tasked to
consider, additional trained personnel would
need to be seconded from forces adjacent to
the N.I.0. or from those forces most
concerned hi the operational problems. The
latter measure would encourage good liaison
with the forces involved. Such problems
should not affect the role of? a permanent
N.I.O. as it would be called upon to extend
its activity to cope on a priority basis.
There would be a pool of staff familiar with
the type of work and with the nature of the
problem which had escalated to major
proportions. if it had in fact developed in
discernable phases. If that were not the
case at least staff would be in post and able
to provide an immediate response.

4.17 Staffing_of Special Unit dealing

with Major Disruptive Activity

Although this report has indicated that an
in?depth study of the functions of a N.I.O.
would be required to determine staffing
levels it is necessary to deal more
specifically with the staffing requirement
for a unit within a N.I.O dedicated to the
processing of information concerning major
public. or industrial disruption during
periods of intense activity.

 

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mix-n1.? 3.5111.

4.18

4.19

4.20

ru?r

37 

It is necessary that the National Co?
ordinator, an Assistant Chief Constable,
would take overall command to ensure adequate
liaison with the N.R.C. and Special Branch.
The unit would then be split into two basic
functions of:?

i. Force Liaison, Evaluation_ and Analysis

of information and Special Branch input.

ii. Information Systems Maintenance and
Computing Teams.

Diagrammatically this can be represented as:-

NRC Assistant Chief Special
Liaison Constable . Branch
(Unit Commander) Liaison

Detective Superintendent

 

Jo 
.l 1.
Detective Inspector Detective Inspector
(Office Manager)
Computing Teams Force, Regional

Liaison Evaluation
and Analysis of
Information
Information Systems
Maintenance Special Branch Input

Precise staffing levels are not possible to
predict because this will vary according to
the extent of the problem. During the Miners
Dispute the Central Intelligence Unit had a
staff of six in total but there is no doubt
that future incidents of this nature will be
more labour intensive if the functions
perceived by the Working Party, such as
analysis of information and Special Branch
input, are in) be properly introduced. The
office would be required to function

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-38-

throughout the 24 hours durlnq periods of

intense activtty.

- 2  5 amour-u .-. 199999?- gates?-
The whole Option has explored Hi depth the
requirement for a permanent National

Intelligence Office located in London.
Unless this recommendation were tc; be acted
upon with speed and urgency. its
implementation would, of necessity. be long
term. An alternative, short term solution
would be to establish the N.l.0. when the
need arose from major public disorder. The
Working Party has not attempted to identity
suitable London office accommodation 
would almost certainly have to be located at
New Scotland Yard. The computer support
required to sustain this alternative Option

is commented upon in Chapter VI.

- 21 ?Noise; fewest

Chapters VI and deal with the technical
support which eculd be necessary. A major
advantage of a permanent N.I.U. is that the
permanent use of eQuipment vauld be far more
cost efteCtive than options spread
eQuipment ardund variOus centres and create a

complex network.

 

7 Scanned by CamScanner




 

 

39 

OPTION 2 Begipnal Criminal Intelligence
Offices (RCIOs) 

This option explores the possibility of an
individual RCIO taking the lead during
disorders which are likely to assume national
significance. In the event of disruption
breaking out in a particular region the RCIO
servicing that region would form an
intelligence unit which would, if the
disruption spread to other regions, take the
lead as the National Intelligence Unit for
that specific purpose.

Force and RCIO Monitoring Role

All RCIOs would be required to assume a
constant monitoring role within their region
of tension indicators and trends or patterns
of behaviour which are of relevance. Each
force would be required to maintain similar
information on a routine basis, as is
currently the case, and pass information of
significance to RCIOs. This would be in
keeping with the existing relationship
between forces and RCIOs in matters of
traditional crime and criminality. The
effect of the tiered system would filter
information ofaa purely local character. The
essential element being that when RCIOs are
required to take a prominent role the basis
of an intelligence system would exist thereby
facilitating the analytical function.

The RCIO Information System
The nature of the additional files to be
added to the RCIO information system would

depend on circumstances prevailing at any one

time.

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-40?

The intention would be for Heads of RCIOs,
through self-initiation or close liaison with
contributing forces, to have available
information prior to any major outbreak of a
socially ijisruptive nature. It is through
this measure that analysis and subsequent

prediction can occur.

4.26 Chapter VI deals in detail with the

information system requirement.
4.27 Accalnodation Reguirenents

This option depends on each RCIO having
sufficient space to organise what amounts to
the equivalent of a restricted major incident
room. With\ one exception this is not the
case. Space generally is at a premium in
RCIOs and the additional facilities which
would be required to store the necessary
files and provide working areas for staff are
not available. In the event of RCIO taking
the lead as a N.I.O. there simply would not
be sufficient space for all but No. 4 Region
(Birmingham) to cope. This is a prohibitive
factor unless the commitment to the ideal is
such that space at least close to each RCIO
can be made immediately available, as soon as
the need arises.

4.28 To detail the alterations of a structural or
organisational nature necessary at each RCIO,
to provide the necessary accommodation would
require a detailed survey.

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-41-

Agreement in principle for such projects
would be essential from various Chief
Officers and management committees before the
departments concerned could develop and cost
such proposals. Without such agreement this

option is virtually precluded.

 

4-29 

Existing R.C.I.O personnel should COpe
f. adequately with the additional workload
I during normal periods of activity. However,
. during phases of increased activity although
11 R.C.I.O. staff could cope with the initial
j? stages it would be necessary to second
1? trained officers from forces contributing to

individual R.C.I.0's to provide assistance.

4.30 grgaqisation_of Unit
The system of management and organisation

detailed at paragraph 4.19 should be adopted.
4.31 Technical SUpport

The technical support requirement is dealt
with at Chapters VI and 

4.32 152.213.11.411? 
This structural option does not have the
confidence of the Working Party. Although it
provides the most viable alternative to a
N.I.O. and would enable a proper intelligence
systenl to develop with information and

intelligence flowing constantly whilst

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4.33



- 42 

subjected to the processes of evaluation and
analysis there are three disadvantages which

cannot readily be overcome.

To summarise. the problem of
accommodating the additional reguirement
within all RCIOs particularly at a time when
they would be required to act as a lead N.I.0
cannot be solved without building alterations

or relocation of most offices.

Secondly, the back up from forces which would
be required constantly would create a complex
communications matrix which would not, with a
particular RCIO in a national 'lead'
situation. be easily recognisable to the
service as a whole. would be required
to act within their own regions throughout
crisis periods to filter information from the
forces which they represent to the lead
office. When dealing with a developing
problem which spreads widely and Quickly,
because of mobility of those involved. the
object of intelligence can be thwarted if
inevitable time delays are built into the

communications syStem.

Thirdly. the prQViSion of technical support
cannOL be dChl?Vcd withOut difficulty. To
equip all RCIOs would be exorbitantly
expensive and to equip just one lead at
the appropriate time w0uld reSult in delays
and the whole service needing to come quickly

to terms with an unfamiliar system.

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4.36 OPTIONS 3A 5 3B -

I


These final Options are compromise. and
recognise both the resistance which might be
engendered to Option 1 and the impractability
of Option 2 as a short term solution. These
Options are formed on the basis of pro
selected R.C.I.O.'s to be activated as a
National Office but to operate only when the
need for such an office is anticipated.

4.37 02:1.ng
For the purpose of Option 3A it is
recommended that the following be

pro-determined:-
No. 1 - Manchester No. 3 - Wakefield
No. 4 - Birmingham No. 7 - Bristol
4.38 The R.C.I.O. nearest to the initial outbreak

of disorder would take on the 
functions as soon as considered necessary.
This Option would reduce to four the number
of R.C.I.O.'s for which contingency plans
would have u: be drawn to ensure efficient
activation, staffing and provision of
technical resources. It would also support,
in part, the original concept of the load
R.C.I.O. being established in the region in
which disorder first occurred.

 

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4.39 The disadvantages of this Option are the cost
and staffing implications in duplicating the
arrangements necessary to create an embryonic

N.I.O. at each of four R.C.I.O.'s

4-40 Queue
Option 38 follows the concept of the pre-
determined single location outlined in Option
1 put located at No. 4 R.C.I.O. in
Birmingham. This office would assume
national responsioility for intelligence as
and when the prevailing situation dictates.
The advantages stemming from this
recommendation are directly opposite to the
disadvantages associated with Option cost
and staffing implications would be minimal in

comparison.

4 . 41 MEEGLMQAHQQ 
The proposed staffing outlined at paragraph
4.29 is considered suitable for this Option
and the organisational chain should be the
same as that envisaged in paragraph 4.19
Technical Support is dealt with in Chapters
VI and 

4-42 ?awietejeseite?ss
Whilst detailing the inherent weaknesses of
Options 2 and 3 the Working Party is
cognisant of the requirement to provide a
system capable of alleviating the existing
weaknesses in the intelligence system which
are apparent when wide spread industrial or

social disruption are considered.

 

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4.43 Option 38 is the most. viable in the short
term but it must be viewed as no more than a
stop gap measure which should be replaced at
the earliest Opportunity by an integrated and
planned intelligence strategy able to
adequately support all aspects of operational.
policing. This Option can, however, function
if it receives the support and unreserved co-
operation of all forces. Commitment and
resolve can overcome the difficulties which
are inherent in this model, the major problem
being the need to make computer capacity
available when called upon. This aspect is
considered in detail at Chapter VI. 

4.44 Command of a National Intelligegg?_ Office



 

within the Terms of Options g_gnd 3

 

The management structure of a N.I.O. is
discussed at paragraph 4.19 where it .is
recommended that an Assistant Chief Constable
should take command.

4.45 In respect of Option 2, it is recommended
that at least three Assistant Chief
Constables from the forces contributing to
each RCIO should be pre?selected so that one
can moVe into the command position at the
earliest opportunity with a full working
knowledge of what is required. I

 

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?46_

l.d6 Option 3A, requires three Assistant Chief
Constables from the constituent forces of
the 4 R.C.I.0's concerned to be similarly

pre-selected.

4.47 In respect of Option 38, the Birmingham 4
Office would assume national
responsibilities. It is, therefore,

considered that 3 Assistant Chief Constables
from any of the 43 forces should be pre-

 

selected to take command as and when the

office is activated.
4-48 

It is considered that potential N.I.O.
commanders should be designated from forces
which are less likely to experience serious
public disorder but it is realised that this
is a speculative area. Pre-designation
should ensure that commanders move into post
smoothly and with a complete understanding of
what is required of the National Intelligence

 

Office.
4-49 Ias.eaema10us 
Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices

providing facilities for Regions 5,6 and 9
are based at New Scotland Yard. They do not
operate in the same way as provincial RCIOs
and provide a different service to
such an extent that they could not assume the
role of a N.I.0. for the purposes which this

report addresses.

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4.50 This is a major hurdle to overcome because if
significant social/industrial disruption
begins within the Metropolitan Police area
and spreads to the provinces it would be
necessary for a Metropolitan based

 

operational intelligence unit to extend cover
as a N.I.0. Similarly. if such activity
having started in the provinces spread to the
Metropolitan area there would be an
eXpectation placed on the Metropolitan Police
for it to contribute to a N.I.O. sited within
the provinces. It is. therefore. necessary
to seek a solution outside the RCIO structure
in respect of these Regions.

4-51 An alternatire 

Responsibility for monitoring public order
within the Metropolitan Police rests with A8
Department - Central Information Unit -
which is located at New Scotland Yard. The
Unit is manned between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. each
weekday and in addition to matters of public
order the Department deals with political
security, football hooliganism, trade
disputes, public processions and ceremonial

events .

4.52 Departmental staff assist in the manning of
the New Scotland Yard Special Operations Room
when it is activated for major public order
events within the Metropolitan police area.
Additionally. staff have manned a Special
Information Unit for the Notting Hill
Carnival, responsible for the analysis of
information by the hour throughout the event.

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clearly Ad Department is deeply involved in
operational intelligence and its role eQuates
loosely with hat which is envisaged for
Operational Intelligence Unit: forces.
as described at Chapter 111. At the present
time. however. the Metropolitan Police are
examining all aspects of public order
including the intelligence process and the
functions of A8 Department thrOugh a
specially constituted committee titled 'The

Metropolitan Police ?uolic Order Review
Committee'.

d.54 There are many prOposals and recommendations
before the committee including devolVing the
functions of A8 Department to eight Areas
with or without the Central Unit.

4.55 There are obviOus difficulties but withOut

the full co-oPeration of the Hetropolitan

Police it will not be possible to introduce

adequate national cover for all aspects of

operational intelligence. The final.
recommendations of the Public Order Review

Committee are. therefore, awaited with

interest. There has been consultation

between the Review Committee and the Working

Party. It is highly desirable that the

recommendations of both bodies
compatible.

are

4.56 It is recommended that consideration also be
given to utilising the services of 
(Forward Planning Unit) if the Metropolitan
Police were required to act as the National
Intelligence Office. The Unit is properly
funded and staffed by a number
and Provincial

of
officers

 

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and has good knowledge (3f public- order
matters. The suitability of the staff to
perform an intelligence role and whether
their normal duties would permit their
diversion to such duties would need to he
further examined.

0.51 

The long term strategy for the develOpment of
Intelligence in support of all operational
aspects must include a permanent National
Intelligence Office. The immediate problems
posed by social and industrial disruption
demand enhancement of the existing system to
provide an intelligence capability now and
this can best be achieved by the
implementathmm of Option 38. 0f paramount
importance in considering the viability of
this and other options is finance and a
trigger mechanism to ensure early activation
of the N.I.O. without such a mechanism there
would be almost insurmountable difficulties
in recording relevant information already
assimilated by affected forces. These
aspects are commented upon in Chapter VII.

4.58 The Working Party considers that the existing
tiered Intelligence System should continue
but that a greater degree of understanding of
the principles and the service commitment to
it are required. This short term option moat
not be allowed to cloud the ultimate aim, a
permanent National Intelligence Office. The
options to provide a National intelligence
Office during periods of major disorder are
limited by the existing intelligence
structure. This is nor a disadvantage
because the structure provides strict
parameters within which all future aspects of

intelligence should be developed.

 

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4.59 This would encourage an integrated and
wholly compatible system to develop. There
could emerge a system where

information/intelligence held by individual
systems would be considered not only in the
context of that previously recorded in
individual systems but in the context of all
information/intelligence which could be
relevant and capable of influencing

judgement.

 

4.60 A National Intelligence Office would provide
a natural focal point from where cohesive
development of the system could be encouraged
and monitored. It would provide the answer
to many of the problems which exist currently
and are being countered with disparate
measures.

4.61 The Working Party is concerned that the
implementation of further measures outside
the principles of a cohesive and integrated
system could destroy rather than build
confidence in the system at a time when it is
necessary to elevate the intelligence
requirement to a higher level of competence
and professionalism.

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CHAPTER 

swag LIAISQQ 0133151331051?
SYSTEM

The Working Party considers the importance of

5.1
involvement in

establishing Special Branch
the operational intelligence system to be of

such a priority as to be deserving of a

dedicated chapter in this report.

5.2 Home Office Guidelines on the Work of a

Special Branch produced 1984 Appendix 4
state that not only State subversion
industrial means are
must be

clearly
through political or
matters with which the Branch
concerned but also Public Order matters and
in particular briefing Chief Officers as to

the likely number and mood of demonstrators
anticipated at a Public Order event. This
requires Special Branch to have a recognised

in an intelligence unit processing

place
into these

information which may well fall

categories. Special Branch should,

therefore, maintain a constant monitoring

role even at periods of low key activity.

5.3 Special Branch involvement is essential to
ensure proper analysis of information within
the context of Special Branch records and

adequate liaison with the Security Service.

 

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5.5

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Special Branch - The Issqg of Sensitigity

The more open involvement of Special Branch
in operational intelligence units dealing
with major public and industrial unrest is a
very sensitive matter. It is recognised that
in the eyes of the public at large Special
Branch has appeared as 'cloaked in secrecy'
and this has to an extent added to the
allegations that the Branch is involved in
insiduous intrusions into normal and lawful
activity. The low profile of Special Branch
has, no doubt, given some degree of unmerited
substance to the allegations. The fact
exists that Special Branch and its sources of
information are essential to an operational
intelligence unit endeavouring to provide an
adequate support service to ground commanders
at times of major disorder and its role must
be properly defined - and regularly

acknowledged.

In order to resiSt attacks on Special Branch
integrity some forces are openly using
Special Branch Officers working in small
numbers alongside Divisional colleagues.
Special Branch Officers in these
circumstances continue to concentrate on
matters within their terms of reference.
This has had the effect of removing some of
the which has surrounded the function of
Special Branch. It has provided a more
public face countering the spurious
allegations which have been aimed at its

motives.

 

 

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5.6' Some forces have developed this concept
further by establishing Operational
Intelligence Units 
monitoring, particularly, public disorder and
tension indicators. Records are maintained
separate to traditional Special Branch
registry material but areas of overlap do
occur_during the gathering of information and
in such cases Special Branch registry
benefits by the inclusion of relevant
material.

5.7 ?erce Operational_1ntellig?nge Units

The Working Party considers that every force
should designate a Supervisory Special Branch
Officer as the liaison officer with the force
Operational Intelligence Unit. During
periods of low key activity this officer
would have regular contact with the officer-
in-charge of the Operational Intelligence
Unit, but at times of intense activity he
should, according to the requirements of the
officer?in-charge of the unit, be exclusively

 

committed to the force unit.

 

5.8 Operational Intelligence Unit?_?bove Forge
level

The introduction of Regional and National
Offices at times of major disorders requires
that a Senior Special Branch Officer be
designated as a liaison officer responsible
to the Assistant Chief Constable in charge of
the Office. Contingency planning should take

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account of this necessity. Whether the
liaison function is a full-time commitment
depends on the circumstances and the
requirements of the Commander. A permanent
National Intelligence Office would greatly
facilitate this liaison and the necessary

arrangements.

- Suggagy of the Reguirenent
A proper working relationship between
Operational Intelligence Offices and Special
Branch is seen as an important principle
underpinning the success of future
intelligence operations. If this essential
element of liaison is not present at the
levels which have been indicated the
operational intelligence system would, in a
very important area of information, be
operating in a partial vacuum. The
effectiveness of the intelligence system

would suffer considerably.

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-55-
CHAPTER VI

6 - CONTENT, 



6.1 This Chapter details the essential system
requirements, be they manual or computer
based, within force, regional and national

Intelligence Offices.

6.2 ggntegt Systems
It is not possible to specify the exact
information system content because of the
infinite variables which may occur but it is

suggested that the minimum requirement would
be:-

1. personal details of all persons
arrested, their personal associates and
associations with particular groups or
organisations;

ii. persons who come to notice who have not
been arrested but whose activities give
rise to the suspicion of criminal
offences.

vehicle details of those at i. and ii.
and additional vehicles of interest
which cannot be connected to named

persons;

iv. details of relevant associations or
representative groups and persons known
to be involved in their organisational
structure;

 

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v. intormation on incidents of mass
picketing and categories of crime and
incidents relevant to the
circumstances.

vi. telephone numbers and part numbers:

vii. nick names and radio call signs.

The information would be used at force,
regional or National Intelligence Office
level, whichever is appropriate to the scale
of activity being monitored, to arrive at
predictions on the movement of pickets or the
development of crime patterns or other
trends. the aim being to better equip
operational commanders to more effectively
commit resources. This would assist in the
targeting of individuals suspected of
criminal activity, including those at the
conspiracy stage. and the concentration of
resources on certain geographical areas or
crime types. Those individuals organising
activity over a wide area which is outside
the law should be more effectively
identified. The service provided would
partially remove the information shortfall
which creates uncertainty and difficulty in
devising operational strategies.

To avoid possible embarrassment it is of
vital importance that information recorded
must be relevant and evaluated, particularly
in view of the provisions of the Data

Protection Act.





Recommendations in respect of any system

which has force, regional or, indeed,

 

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-. L) 7 .-

national implications must, of necessity,
include a detailed standard npnolilcntion.
Through this means, and no other, can
compatibility he assured. Any degree tn
incompatibility would seriously hinder the
aim to provide an hiteliigence norvlou
capable of dealing with a national problem.

The publication of Standards Manuals by the
Central Conference Committee on Criminal
Information Systems Standards Working Group
and the A-C-P-O- Crime Committee Working
Group on Major Crime investigation
Standardised Administrative Procedures have
provided a: detailed specification which can
be used with confidence in the development of
a national facility. This approach must be
exploited to the full, there is no other way
of achieving national compatibility. A far
healthier climate now prevails throughout the
Police Service towards standardisation and it
is only by emphasising and continuing this
pedantic requirement that the Working Party
proposals can he realised, particularly in
the short-term

The increasing use of computer systems in
major investigations stretching across force
boundaries and the drive for standardisation
merges the two essential considerations of
compatibility and computerisation to such an
extent that they are dealt with in this
report simultaneously.

Any system for processing operational
intelligence either in force or on a regional
or national basis must be standard throughout

 

 

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_58_

England and Wales and, therefore, wholly

compatible. This applies particularly to
computerised systems because of the
complications of access, retrieval and
transmission of information. It. must also

apply to any manual system if a recognised
standard system capable of producing the best

results is to be developed throughout the
country.

6.9 At the present time there is no
standardisation of intelligence systems
throughout the country. Although most forces
use the recognised tiered system of
information/intelligence gathering from Local
Intelligence Officer to Force Intelligence
Office and onto RCIO, a variety of manual and
computerised systems are used and there is no

standardisation of documentation.

6-10 
gtangardised 
The only standard system used by all forces
in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland is that provided by the Major
Investigation Incident Room Standardised

Administrative Procedures for the

 

investigation of serious crime. These
manual procedures incorporate the functions
and management of an incident office with a
defined system of recording information on
standardised documentation. These procedures
also form the basis of the

 

approved
computerised system, the Home Office

 

 

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_59_

Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) which

will be available to most forces throughout

the country by late 1987.,

6.11 The advantages of using standardised

procedures for manual and computerised
systems in the investigation of serious crime
have already been well argued and accepted.
Most of the advantages would equally apply to

any systems used for the gathering of

intelligence.

6.12 Working Party __realises_ that _their
easieii??cal ?22-91E2ilei?iie?thg
_9f u?ipg the"_ Standardised

importance

Administrative PrgceduresL__ manual or
computerised_jm1 the routine of

Eorce Operational IntelligencgJUnits.

6.13 The inevitability of nmjor disorder" giving
rise to serious crime renders the manner in
which intelligence is regarded of paramount
importance. When a major crime is committed
the retrieval of existing information becomes

very significant.

6.14 At the initial stage of the particular
problem information will be collected into
the system, analysed and disseminated and be
totally under the control of the in-force
operational unit. However, if the problem
spreads across force boundaries and escalates
into large scale public disorder and serious
crime, that same information will be
essential to the subsequent major

investigation. It is, therefore, imperative

 


- 

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that the initial information gathering system
is capable of being used, accessed and even
taken over by the subsequent major

investigation.

6.15 It would be reckless to consider any other
system, manual or computer assisted. for the
operational intelligence requirement without
giving due consideration to the subsequent
use to which that information may be put.

6.16 The implications of the Data Protection Act
must be borne in mind when using HOLMES
facilities for intelligence purposes.
Registration of HOLMES facilities for
investigation of major crime may possibly
include the purposes for which the computer
would be used in respect of an intelligence
function but designated Data Protection
Officers would need to consider this in
detail. on. behalf of their' respective Chief
Officers. Guidance would need to be sought
on common registration from A.C.P.0. Computer
Development Committee.

6.17 ?gailability Systems
There are. of course. other systems
available, manual and computer assisted,
which could adequately perform the functions
required of force operational intelligence
units and facilitate linkage to regional and
national units. However, as already stated
they are not common throughout the country
and are not capable of making the step from
an intelligence system to a major
investigation system in accordance with those

 

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procedures already common to the whole of the

country.

6.18 The Advantages of 



Accepting that the standard manual system and

the computerised version, HOLMES, are the

only complete readily available systems

throughout the country, there are other major
advantages which would accrue by adopting

these systems. The standardised manual
system is (nurently used by all forces and
has been so for five years. The
documentation used is specified in the

Appendix of the Report of the A.C.P.O. Crime
Committee Working Group for Standardised
Administrative Procedures and all forces are
using the standard documentation. In
adopting such procedures for gathering and
processing operational intelligence there
would be no training requirement as all
forces have already trained sufficient staff
and the procedures are in current daily use.
There would be no additional costs to forces
in using the manual system as supplies of
documentation are already available for major
investigations. Indices should be maintained
as required by the Standardised
Administrative Procedures utilizing the
documentation for an intelligence gathering
purpose. The only additional document
recommended by the Working Party to be
incorporated into the system being a
Standardised Information Report to which

reference is made at Chapter paragraph

3.36.

 

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-52..

6.19 In adopting HOLMES for the processing of
operational intelligence the advantages are
more significant. Any computerised
application specially purchased for this
purpose would be expensive. All forces intend
purchasing the HOLMES system from one of the
approved suppliers and it is envisaged that 17
forces will be live by June 1986 and a further

21 forces live by early 1987.

(I

HOLMES is a sophisticated three module system:+
i. Indexing;

ii. Action/Document Management;

Free Text Word Processing.

It is ideally suited to meet the
administrative procedures required of an
operational intelligence unit.

6.21 Forces which only purchase module 1, Indexing,
would have the capability to complete the
functions required of an operational
intelligence unit, although I current
indications from the Police Research Services
Unit (PRSU) are that most forces intend to
purchase all three modules. No additional
costs would be incurred across the country in
recommending the use of HOLMES as all 43
forces intend by 1989 to have taken delivery
of this facility. All forces would then have
the facility to be compatible at an

information /intelligence gathering level.

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6.22 There would be no special training requirement
for HOLMES as all forces are training
sufficient staff to use .HOLMES for major
investigations as and when they take delivery.
PRSU have already assisted with a national
training programme for each of the four
approved suppliers. The particular advantage
of using HOLMES for this additional function.
so far as those forces which have an ongoing
operational intelligence unit are concerned,
is that trained staff would be constantly
using the system and would not require
refresher training. The expertise gained from
using HOLMES on a daily basis as an indexing
facility for' operational intelligence during
low level activity would be invaluable to
those using all three modules of the system
during a full major investigation.

6-23 

Most forces are committed to HOLMES systems
capable of simultaneously running two to four
major incidents. The data base capable of
running 2 major incidents would sustain 6.000
nominals. Whilst accepting that the C.I.U. at
Leicester' during the Miners Dispute may not
have produced. a data base (1.600 nominals)
indicative of a true N.I.O. potential data
base, there is no doubt that HOLMES does have
the capacity to c0pe with the indices which
would be required by in-force Operational
Intelligence Units.

 

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6.24 It must be noted, of course, that when
individual forces examined their requirements
in relaticnl to HOLMES. no consideration was
given to the additional suggested function of
operational intelligence. If major
investigations demand the use of HOLMES, will
there still be sufficient capacity for the

3 envisaged operational intelligence

9 requirement? The Working Party recognises

the constraints which might, therefore, be

3 placed on the use of HOLMES by individual

Force Operational Intelligence Units but

recommend that forces explore the possibility.

 

. . . A
a. 

The U?e_of HQLHES - Assggiated_?rob1ems

The present arrangements for the
implementation of HOLMES systems in all forces
will take until 1989. At that stage all
forces will be compatible but there are two
problem areas, the second of which will
persist after 1989 

1. until all forces have HOLMES available
there will be several computerised
systems in use which forces will wish to
use during the transitionary period;

 

ii. there will be no similar arrangements in
relation to the computerisation of
RCIOS.

These problems and suggested solutions are
discussed at paragraphs 6.27 and 6.39 et
seqq respectively.

 

 

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_65_

The standard manual system and HOLMES are the
best methods which can be nationally applied
to documenting? operational intelligence.
These are the only systems available to all
forces. However, as HOLMES is currently in
use only by a few forces due regard must be
given to other computerised systems which have
been and will be used by forces conducting
major crime investigations over the next 3
years pending full implementation ref HOLMES.
Such forces would, no doubt, wish to extend
the use of their existing systems to the
operational intelligence requirement, should
the necessity arise. To suggest to these
forces that the recommended system for an
operational intelligence unit should either be
the standard manual system or HOLMES would not
be acceptable and an examination of these
systems and their compatibility to HOLMES is.
therefore, necessary.

6 - 28 .stesEsLEst

 

Approximately 18 forces are currently using
the Auto-Index package as a means of
computerising the indexing function of the
.. standard manual system. The system based on
3' micro?computers enhances retrieval facilities
and is less manpower intensive than the
traditional card index.

6.29 Auto?Index was introduced as an interim

measure prior to the implementation of HOLMES
and because of the limited capacity of the

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 66 

system the need for an upwards growth path was
foreseen at an early stage and facilitated via
the Police National Computer. Although the
Auto-Index package has been installed by
forces on different hardware, provision has
been made to ensure data can be extracted in a
pre?determined format so that the data from
all systems can be transferred to the Auto?
Index upwards growth path. It is acknowledged
that at some date yet. to be determined the
provison of upward growth path for Auto-Index

must be discontinued.

6.30 Auto-Index and HOLMES - Compatibility



Systems using the Auto-Index package can
transfer data to a card index but cannot
transfer data direct to ea HOLMES system. A
commercial computer bureau, SIA, are currently
contracted to produce a program which will
permit data created by Auto?Index to be
transferred into a HOLMES format. It is
understood (March 1986) that this work is near.
completion and hopefully, will be the key to
linking data stored on both systems. SIA have
also been contracted to produce a program
which will permit data created by HOLMES to be
transferred to the Auto-Index format. 'This
work has not been completed (March 1986).

6.31 Auto?Index Upwards .Growth Bath on Police



Software has been written for the Police
National Computer which in effect gives the
appearance of simulating Auto-Index and
permits indexers to use the system with a
'minimum of training if familiar with the Auto?

 

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 57 

Index package. It is used to give increased
capacity to forces using the Auto?Index
package and data previously created by the
auto-Index package can be transferred to the
system. Considerable resources in terms of
equipment and manpower have been made
,available by PNCU to forces using this

facility.

6.32 gut011ndex _ppwards Growth and
Compatibility

The PNC facility cannot accept data direct
from HOLMES systems nor can it produce a card
system. However, paragraph 6.41 deals with an
upwards growth path on PNC for HOLMES.

6.33 gureau

The commercial computer Bureau SIA has created
a simulation of Auto-Index which has the
compatibility to act as the upwards growth
path for Auto-Index users in a similar manner
to PNC. The cost of the system is related to

its use and can be expensive.

6.34 Auto?Index Simulation Bgregg_and


The SIA system cannot accept data direct from
HOLMES and cannot produce a card system.

6.35 System

The MICA system is used by five forces and is
currently being used on enquiries in the
Metropolitan Police District and West
Yorkshire. The MICA system can be transferred

 

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6.36

6.37

6.38

53 

to Auto?Index subject to restricted indexing
conversions and, therefore. can access PNC

upwards growth path.
m?lg??rs?ise 31121 -EQLHES - Campatibilitx

MICA can produce a card index and it is
designed to transfer data created on MICA to
HOLMES, although this has not yet been tested.



The different computer systems in use in
forces throughout the country have produced a
complicated situation. This should, however,
become greatly simplified in the longer term
with the increasing introduction of HOLMES
systems. The lowest form of common system
will remain manual and card based, whiCh can
always be back record converted. Auto-Index
will continue to be used but it will be able
to be converted to HOLMES by the BIA Bureau

conversion program.

In the interim period there remains three
other systems, SIA Bureau, PNC Upward Growth
Path and MICA. The SIA Bureau conversion
program in the short term will facilitate the
transfer of data from those systems to HOLMES
thereby 7 giving compatibility during the
interim period. The position may appear over
complicated by envisaging that all current
systems could be used at the same time. The
reality is that within months MICA will be put
to one side by the five forces currently using
it, as they take delivery of HOLMES systems.
It should' be possible to successfully link
all systems by the use of the expertise
available at PRSU and PNCU.

 



 

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_69_

6-39 


1.29.2.1} igeass 

6.40 Optign_l
gatiogal Intelligence 

 

gg_elsewhere.

To have the capacity to cope with a National
Operational Intelligence crisis the 
system would have to include all three modules
with the largest possible data base. The
current cost of such a system would be
approximately ?1 million. Even if sufficient
funds were readily available to purchase the
system, from the date of purchase to final
installation many months would elapse. This,
added to the fact that the National
Intelligence Office does not yet exist. makes
this option a long term consideration and not
an immediate answer.

6.41 The Home Office and Police Service are
currently discussing provision of a HOLMES
'Central Facility' to give forces increased
capacity for their in force HOLMES systems as
and when required by the demands of serious
crime. When the decisions for the location,
staffing. financing etc., of the 'Central
Facility' are made, an answer may be
forthcoming to the long term proposal of a
National Intelligence Office.

6.42 A possible alternative to the establishment of
a permanent National Intelligence Office with
all the responsibilities previously listed,

 

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?70?

may in the short term be an office centrally
located which could be triggered in the same
way as the National Reporting Centre to set up
as and when required purely to deal with an
operational intelligence problen1 of national
proportions. This could be arranged in the
short term providing the Home Office will use
the funds known 13) be immediately available
to purchase the HOLMES 'central facility'.
Urgent arrangements should then be made to
locate and staff the central facility which
could then be linked to the pre-located site
chosen as the N.I.O.

to monitor Operational



gaggesiomnal one
to bg_gqminateq_a?_lgaq R.C.I.0.

For this option the HOLMES facility would need
to be made available on a regional basis to
each R.C.I.O. from local forces. When a
particular region is nominated the 'lead'
R.C.I.O. that_ facility would need to be
continued and enhanced as necessary.

6.44 For this option to work seven R.C.I.O.'s would
need to have available staff trained for
HOLMES and suitable hardware would also need
to be made available to each office. Although
this option would appear to be far cheaper in
that it makes use of the in force HOLMES
systems as opposed to purchasing an additional
system as per Option 1 it does mean that the
Same arrangements for staff and equipment are
unnecessarily duplicated in all '7 R.C.I.O.s.
Although in times of crisis the Police Service

 

 

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is always able to respond the reality is that
only one of the seven R.C.I.0.'s has any
capacity for locating such a facility without

increasing existing accommodation.

6.45 For the suggested availablity of in Force
HOLMES systems to be a viable proposition,
there would have to be considerable agreement
by Chief Officers within regions for the use
of their systems and the supplying of suitably
trained staff. Even if this agreement were
forthcoming there would inevitably be some
problems on the availablity of a given system
at a given time. An alternative would be to
equip each R.C.I.O. with their own HOLMES
system. The cost would be prohibitive and in

 

any case computerisation of R.C.I.0.'s is the

subject of further research.

 

 

 

6-46 Mew
gaminated waggfield,
Birmingham and to begqqeihg_ 'lead'


This option reduces from seven to four the
R.C.I.0.'s required to take the 'lead'. It
mirrors the inherent difficulties of Option 2
namely. lack of accommodation at all but the
Birmingham Office, duplication of arrangements
and available hardware for four? offices and
the possibility of finding the HOLMES systems
of the constituent forces unavailable when
needed. Furthermore no force within no. 1
region has currently (March 1986) taken
delivery of HOLMES and they are not,
therefore, in a position to support the

Manchester R.C.I.O.

I


 

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- 72 -
6-47 ensign 3J2
aimless 

off ce.

 

This option centres the National Operational
Intelligence role to one office when triggered
by the appropriate authority. Birmingham
R.C.I.O has the capacity to expand when
required and could accommodate overnight the
hardware to facilitate linking into a HOLMES
system. Two forces within 4 Region, namely
Leicestershire and Staffordshire, are current
users of HOLMES and local arrangements could
be made to link the Birmingham Office into one
of those systems. Of the remaining forces
Warwickshire will go live in April 1986, West
Mercia in December, 1986 and Northamptonshire
February, 1987. Alternatively, if the Home
Office were able to provide the 'Central
Facility' in the short term, as previously
discussed, the Birmingham Office could be
linked into that 'Central Facility'
irrespective of where it was located.

6.48 The major advantage of this option over the
National Office in Option 1 is that Birmingham
functions daily as an R.C.I.O. The staff are
trained intelligence operatives and could
instantly respond to a developing national
problem.' The part time National Office,
suggested in Option 1 does not yet exist and
accommodation would have to be earmarked for
that purpose. Staff would have to be nominated
to man the office at times of crisis and as
with the C.I.U. at Leicester they would be
starting cold and would inevitably waste time
setting up and going live.

 

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 73 

6-49 ELL-lees:
Guidelines on the content of the Information
System have been included but much will depend
on the circumstances of particular problems.

6.50 There is only one standardised manual system
for recording information used by all forces
in England and Wales and that has now been
fully incorporated into the HOLMES
computerised system. HOLMES. although only
available to eleven forces, as at March 1986.
will become increasingly available to forces
over the period until 1989. Both of these
systems are far? in excess of that which is
required for an intelligence system. The
overall advantage of the use of these systems
is that the record of information/intelligence
during the early days of an operational
problem will be capable of being used for the
investigation of any serious crime that may
result from it. It is therefore essential for
all Force Operational Intelligence Units to
record all information in accordance with the
standard administrative procedures on a daily

routine basis.

6.51 Those forces currently using HOLMES or any
other compatible computerised system are
recommended to record all operational
intelligence on that system. This will enable
all forces throughout England/Wales to record
operational intelligence ixi a compatible way
with standardised indices. either manual or

computer based.

 

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7.2



- 74 

-

 

31.29.1192

The Working Party recognised the sensitivity
of this issue and the difficulties which would
face Chief Constables particulary as Chairmen
of R.C.I.O..Management Committees, in seeking
additional monies to finance extra computer

facilities for use in intelligence work.

If there is an incontrovertible assumption in
the report it is that computer support must be
available at short notice to record, analyse
and disseminate information. Such computer
support must be identified_and ideally, pre?

located as a matter of urgency.

In the long term, creation of a National
Intelligence Office could prObably be financed
as ea Common Service. This would mirror the
regional arrangements which apply to
R.C.I.O.'s. The Working Party recommends an
immediate, interim solution and that an
alternative system of financing is required.

All the recommended options to create an
Intelligence Office capable of assuming
national responsibilities depend on the use of
a HOLMES computer. Although it is anticipated
that all Forces will have HOLMES facilities by
1989 there is no guarantee that the respective
data bases would be sufficient to cope with
the demands placed upon a National
Intelligence Office. Enhancement would be
required and the options of achieving this

have been explained in Chapter VI.

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75 

Whichever method of enhancement is finally
chosen there should have requirement made of
Home Office to finance the requisite
equipment. The simplest method would be to
use the proposed HOLMES Central Facility,
(previously termed Upwards Growth Path) the
provision of which is currently under
discussion. This solution would have the
advantages of using a system already financed
and abhe to be put into any suitable office
space. If this recommendation is accepted it
is vital that Home Office be advised of the
Police Service requirement as soon as

possible.

Other than drawing attention to the obvious
advantages of using a HOLMES Central Facility
and recommending that Home Office finance any
of the other possible enhancements to HOLMES
the Working Party feel constrained from
advising on any financial considerations
which would impact directly on affected Chief
Constables

National ?fties - 

 

Easememnt <21: P-O-

The main problem faded by the Leicester C.I.U.
during the N.U.M. Dispute was back record
conversion caused by the late activation of
the Unit. No criticism is implied; not many
people in the Police Service, or elsewhere,
expected the dispute to be so prolonged.

If the Service is to learn from that
experience it must be recognised that early
activation is essential. The situation is

 

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7.10

analagous to any crime which .an' become a
major enquiry. Investigating Officers would
not hesitate to use the HOLMES facility in the
early stages of the enquiry whether or not it

was known that computer assistance was

confirmed as necessary.

The vast majority of disorders, whatever their
causes, can be dealt with in force insofar as
the intelligence requirements are concerned.
It is when such disorders cross force borders.
but still retain a common origin, that a
national overview is required. No hard and
fast rules can be laid down on the timing of
activation of a National Operational
Intelligence Office. Each case would be .a
matter of judgement. The best person to judge
whether disorder was spreading across force
boundaries would be the Chief Constable of the
force initially affected. Even at this stage

the situation may well remain manageable by

that force.

When disorder is seen to be spreading to
several force areas the Working Party
recommend that affected Chief Constables
consult with A.C.P.O. President on the
necessity of activating the N.I.O. The
President of A.C.P.O. should then be the
officer responsible for authorising activation
similar to his responsibilities in connection
with the N.R.C. Decisions on necessary levels
of staffing could then be delegated to the
Assistant Chief Constable designated to
command the office. In the early stages of
disorder there may only be a requirement for
minimal staff to maintain indices. Any

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.- 

- - -

 

7.11

77 

necessary build up would need to be

recommended by the designated Assistant Chief

Constable. It. is worth re?emphasising that

circumstances will almost invariably dictate
that the Intelligence Office would be
activated before a decision on activation of
the National Reporting Centre is taken.

If these recommendations are accepted it would

be necessary for them in) be incorporated in

the A.C.P.O. Public Order Manual of Tactical

Options and Related Matters.

 

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- 73 -

CHAPTER 

8.2





Force Regional or National Operational
Intelligence Units will require technical
equipment other than computerised information

systems according to their level of
operations. The distribution of equipment
will depend on the scale of disruptive
activity which individual units are

monitoring. For example, a force Operational
Intelligence Unit may, during normality,
require no more than telephone and telex
communications. During periods of intense
disorder a force unit may need access to all
of the technical equipment which is
identified.



The following equipment should be generally
available and installed according to the
operational requirement.



A secure telephone should be available.
Immediate communication will be necessary with
other forces and agencies which should be
protected by, at least, British Telecom
scrambler devices. These are known as Privacy
Sets. The cost (March 1986) is ?34 per
quarter.

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This type 0E GEL lui itrter"nl?crl n/ 3L:
USE (3f Similar E'jLJip?lenf, i: ff?f
daily conununicatiorm which are uni tr:

critically sensitive.

Telex



l"

Telex machines are an JmpurLanl reane or
communication within Intelligence Unsta. Macs
of the routine information exchange will he 3/
means <3f telex. Where .1 need h; identified
for transmission caf classified internation a
device can be introduced into the British
Telecom telephone line U) ensure secire
transmission of the information. 330413
information of a higher classified natxre be
required to be communicated Special Branch
Departments nationwide have access to secure
telex facilities with which it is possible to
communicate with all U.K. Police Forces and

Security Services.

Kassie ile?tiqteg

Such devices are necessary to relay in exact
form detailed operational information
emanating from monitoring a public disorder
situation. They ensure an immediate
authoritative source of information on which

it is possible to act decisively.
Summary

Technical demands are not great but must be
met quickly and without reluctance if a proper
relationship is to be immediately forged

during periods of crisis between Operational

 

 



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-33-

Intelligence Units and their various sources
of information. Delays in establishing such
contact will inevitably result in sack record

conversion problems and the inability to

predict events.

8.7 Information Systems require current and
accurate information and if this is not passed
speedily the system can become an historical
account of events rather than a dynamic and

useful tool which can influence resource

allocation.

8.8 The requirement for Special Branch to play a
full part in Operational Intelligence Units is
discussed in Chapter V. Without adequate and 
secure communications the involvement of the 

Branch will be restricted.

 



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CHAPTER IX

9.1

THEE .3599 I. BEHFNT -

A national integrated intelligence system will
require a high degree of compatibility
throughout all of the tiers and processes
associated with it. A degree of success,
which has rum: yet been realised, depends on
the philosophy of intelligence being
understood by those involved, the effective
use of standard administrative procedures and
a common approach to the grading and analysis
of information. It is a pre-requisite that
sufficient numbers of trained staff are
available to meet the possible simultaneous
demands of coping with an inforce major
incident and an operational intelligence unit

during a period of intense activity.

As a specialism within the Police Service,
Intelligence has, to a great extent, stood
alone. The selection of staff has too often
been based on dubious criteria, and job
descriptions and general direction of staff
have been inadequate. Coupled with the fact
that little has been done to train staff, a
situation has been produced where a
considerable proportion of intelligence
operatives have been carrying out their duties
with only the slightest comprehension of what
is required of them and how that requirement

can most effectively be satisfied.

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-82?

9.3 The Working Party is convinced of the need to
apply a standard form of training to all
intelligence operatives regardless of the
particular aspect of an integrated system with
which an individual 'may be involved. This
principle applies to both police officers and

civilian intelligence officers.

9.4 It is recognised that civilian intelligence
operatives play an important part in many
Intelligence Departments and the future will,

no doubt, see expansion in this area of
civilianisation.

9.5 Intelligence Operatives Training Course

The Working Party will include details of an
Intelligence Officers training course ix: the
Second Report which will deal with long term
strategy. The course will include a standard
system of processing and evaluating
intelligence which must be operated at all
levels of the system but particularly by local
intelligence officers and in the day to day

activity of Force Operational Intelligence
Units.

9.6 A system of evaluation of intelligence used by
the Metropolitan Police has proved effective.
The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis
recommended to A.C.P.O. Crime Committee its
universal adoption throughout the United
Kingdom. The Working Party fully endorses
that recommendation and will comment in more

detail in its second report.

 

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_83-

meaz?isemd Ad-ieisgatizgzaogeqlgee

All Forces have an ongoing commitment to
training in the standardised administrative
procedures which are necessary for major
incident investigations. An increased pool of
trained and experienced officers will be
necessary in each Force to take account of
potential operational intelligence

requirements.

 

i

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 A

-84-



WORKING PARTY MEETINGS AND
OFFICIAL VISITS

LETTER TO ALL CHIEF CONSTABLES
FROM CHAIRMAN OF A.C.P.O. STUDY
GROUP

STANDARDISED INFORMATION REPORT

HOME OFFICE GUIDELINES ON THE
WORK OF A SPECIAL BRANCH

SUMMARY OF OPTIONS TO ESTABLISH
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

SUMMARY OF MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

 

PAGE

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max 1 no 31531!



   
   
   
 
   

The Working Party undertook a great deal of roaoarqh
which involved many meetings and visit: to policq
orientated establishments.



8th July. 1985 West Yorkshire Police
Headquarters
The meeting was addroulud,g 
by C. Samson Baq., Q. P. 
Chief Constable, Woam,L4?
Yorkshire Police and the [it
Working Party was formallyb 
constituted. 



30th December. 1985 Cambridgoshiro Constabulary 9
Headquarters

18th February. 1986 New Scotland Yard

lath/14th and Northumbria Police

17th/215t March Headquarters

1986

The two reports of the
Working Party were
prepared.

INFORIIAL HEBTINGS - NOT 

11th September, 1985 Constabulary
Headquarters

12th/13th

September, 1985 Northumbrio Police
Headquarters

23rd September. 1985 Hertfordshire Constabulary
Headquarters

 

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_86_

APPENDIX 1 (Cont.)

24th September, 1985 The Home Office
Horseferry House
London

9th/lOth October, Kent Constabulary

1985 Headquarters

28th October/let Northumbria Police

November, 1985 Headquarters

29th November, 1985 Merseyside Police
Headquarters

17th January, 1986 New Scotland Yard

30th January, 1986 New Scotland Yard

3rd February, 1986 Cambridgeshire Constabulary
Headquarters

25th February, 1986 New Scotland Yard

QEELQLAE $51.15. :30. 0. 

24th July, 1985 C11 Branch
London Metropolitan Police

28th/29th August, 1985 Royal Ulster Constabulary
Belfast

2nd/6th September, 1985 Federal Republic of
Germany

The National Police
College and various
Police Departments at
Munster and Dusseldorf

16th September, 1985 The Services School of
Intelligence
Ashford, Kent

11th October, 1985 The Services School of i
Intelligence 
Ashford, Kent

3rd/5th December, 1985 Royal Ulster Constabulary
Belfast

 

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 1

87 APPENDIX 2

From: The Chief Constable
S. E. BAILEY, C.B.E.. Q.P.M.

FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PONTELAND
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE
NEZO OBL

 
   
   
 
   
  
   
 
    
 
  

LAND 72555

- June ISBS

-.I ALL CHIEF CONSTABLES, ENGLAND Er WALES
THE COMMISSIONERS, METROPOLITAN AND CITY OF LONDON

ear Col league,

you are aware, I am currently chairing a Study Group on Intelligence

id the Media which, whilst it is an integral part of the Review
the NUM Dispute, the Group has been charged with developing an
"going structured System to deal with Intelligence Collation, Analysis
at Dissemination within the Police Service in the future, partiCuIarly
'regard to major public. order demands and offences.

,c Study Group was tasked with this additional role at a meeting
tween Home Office, the President, immediate Past President and myself
the Inner Cities Group of Chief Constables on March I985.

which makes the

Study Group has produced an interim report

lowing recommend a ions 

t) FORCE LEVEL

wu? 

There should be established within each Force an Operational


Intelligence Unit of a size dependent upon the size of
the Force and the current situation.

This Unit would be part of the 'operations department'
which already exists in one form or another within Forces, and

The Assistant Chief Constable responsible for 'operations'

would have overall control of the Unit.



If the public order situation extends beyond a Force boundary
then one or the other or? possibly one of three Forces would
take on the role of the lead Force with the Operational

Intelligence Unit of that Force being the lead Unit.
to) Regional ACPO meetings would provide a forum to iron out
administrative problems.

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u-v;

4? -

..- .



 

88 ?41'le 2 ?1th

(3t l.

If (1r lhff?a?jl I?y lf?flf?r'l f,r/r,r I: ?(11(l,flgp infr-et.
then :1 recommended that ttu- ?Hunt?! (runnial ."frll'Q'JU"

Officeu would m?nvult' at! 

a Regional Centre tn tr, lino-ir- roll-
(bl 'xlt?r) to move to rr-qmrinl Irv/rt would m: 'nve'
{that Car seen 

Without lirtwiron lt.r- 

and the Presulent ol ACPO.

The Assistant Chief Constable ?Ormrutiormi s' 
where the RCIO is; situated who it. rir-tlir..irIi-/ l'
overseeing the RCIO would lillvic (in tl.t-. rUI-mll'l

nihifzty.

(4) $1933th LEVEL
(5) If the situation developed beyond one region ther- one of

the RCIO's w0uld become the lead office and this the National

Intelligence Office.

(bl When such in situation arose, the President of I-CPO need
to be consulted before this step was taken.

has been accepted by thr- Steering Committee .rmJer
well (tr, Home Olfir,?,

atone ir. rein mr

This arrangement
Mr. D. Hall to which the Study Group works,
Whilst there is a considerable mitounl ol whr'ld it; 
implicutions, specialist training, iletnilr-rt system rte/elapmr:rt

to rescurce
the President of I-CPO QSPS that

and formal lines of communication,
you take the first steps in developing a sy'zicm within your Force
which will fit into the overall system. 


enclose a copy of the interim report under 'Confidential' cavcr for

your information and i will keep you informed. of the Study Grmm',
progress in quantifying and developing the interim skeletal ".yuterr
set out above. Bearing in mind other developments currently on-going

in connection with intelligence handling and analysis i would expeCt
that further development will highlight the need for considerable training
in the intelligence field which will be of benefit to all our intelligence

needs.

  

sincerely,

 

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INFORMATION REPORT

. REPORTING

Name: Stn:

URCE (Include ref. to value in the past)

Source Eval
A




Info Eval 1 4

EVALUATED BY

Date
FORWARDED TO

By
On

 

 

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90 APPENDIX 4

   
  
    

?313 OFFICE GUIDELINES ON THE WORK OF A SPECIAL BRANCH

\Status and organisation

'LEach of the police forces in England and Wales has its own Special Branch.
rjExcept for the Metropolitan Police Special Branch which has responsibilities

Bin relation to Irish Republican extreniaa and terrorism throughout Great Britain,
;fthe responsibility of each Special Branch relates only to the area of the

.force of which it is a part.

.2. All members of a Special Branch are responsible to the chief officer of
'the force through the head of the Branch and any intervening supervisory ranks

_;in the force structure.

Specific functions

3. The Specific functions listed below comprise those tasks which will cost
commonly fall to be undertaken by the force Special Branch. However. in some
force areas1 it may be necessary or desirable for some of these functions to
be undertaken by other parts of the force CID or a specialist unit. It will
be an operational matter for each chief officer to decide how best to utilise

his resources within the force Special Branch.

h. The work of a Special Branch arises from the chief officer's responsibility
for the preservation of the Queen's Peace. Its work is to assist the chief

officer in discharging this responsibility.

5. A Special Branch gathers information about threats to public order. Such
information will enable the Branch to provide assessments of whether marches.
1? meetings. demonstrations and pickets pose any threat to public order and help

the chief officer to determine an appropriate level of policing.

6. A Special Branch assists the Security Service?in carrying out its tasks of
defending the Realm against attempts at espionage and sabotage or from the
actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without

the country which may be judged to be subversive to the State. A large part

of this effort is devoted to the study and investigation of terrorism, including

the activities of international terrorists and terrorist organisations.

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II

 

Innuluna yuan?? mudhnw um MonluWan unamw. .o?du?wl. um (.3--. 

 

momssoa 3N OmBmomssoH

Co 
92 APPENDIX 4 (Cont

    
   
 
  
  
    

?=ch Special Branch, under the direction of its chief officer, help: the

 

gktropolitan Police Special Branch in discharging this function.

'1e. Thelictropolitan Police has certain national reaponsihilities for the
provision of personal protection to members of the Royal Family, Minister: of
.the Crown, former Ministers, diplomats and other_people at risk. Where a
Special Branch has protection duties which are connected with he matters
which are the reaponsibility of the Iietropolitan Police, the local Special
_Branch and the lietropolitan Police Special Branch or Royalty and Ziplo: tic

,.Protection Department work in close liaison with each other.

.15. The National Joint Unit at New Scotland Yard, which is staffed by 055:: rs
'rfroslietropolitan and provincial Special Branches, co-ordinates enquiries

and applications from police forces in Great Britain concerning people held
under prevention of terrorism legislation. The Unit processes, for onward
transmission to the Home Office or the Scottish Home and Health Depart.. nt as
.the case may be, applications for extension of detention and exclusion orders
under the legislation and co?ordinates the preparation of up-to?date 
in connection with the review of exclusion cases. The National Ports Office,
Lbased at Heathrow Airport, provides a liaison and advisory service for parts

gunits in other force areas.

Records

16. Records should be maintained in order to discharge effectively the function
listed in paragraphs 3? 12 above. It is important, however, because of the
particular sensitivity of the information concerned, that only information

I relevant to those functions should be recorded. Close attention should therefore
I be paid to paragraphs 3? 12, and to the definitions given in paragraph 20, in
deciding what information should be recorded or not recorded. Data on individuals
or organisations should not under any circumstances be collected or held solely

on the basis that such a person or organisation supports unpopular causes or

on the basis of race or creed.

it is also important to ensure that, wherever possible, information recorded
about an individual is authenticated and does not give a false or misleading
impression. Care should be taken to ensure that only necessary and relevant

information is recorded and retained. Bach Special Branch should therefore

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93 APPENDIX 4 (Cont)

maintain an effective system both for updating information where necessarv

and for weeding out and destroying information which can no longer be clearlv

related to the discharge of its functions.

18. Access to information held by Special Branch should be strictly limited
to those who have a particular need to know. Under no circumstances should

information be passed to commercial firms or to employers' organisations.

19- The security of records maintained by Special Branch is of paramount
importance. Because of the sensitivity of the information concerned and

because of the damage to individuals which might result if unauthorised persons
were to gain access to it. or if improper use were made of the information,
Special Branches must ensure that the most stringent and appropriate precautions
are taken to safeguard the information and tO?prOtect it against both unauthorised

access or disclosure and accidental loss.

Definitions

20. Espionage - Covert or illegal attempts to sequire information or materials

in order to assist a foreign power.

Sabotage - An act falling short of a military operation. or an omission,
intended to cause physical damage in order to assist a hostile

foreign power, or to further a subversive political aim.

Terrorism - The use of violence for political ends, including any use of
violence for the purpose of putting.the public or any section
of the public in fear.

Subversion - Subversive activities are those which threaten the safety or
well being of the State, and which are intended to undencine
or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial

or violent means.

Home Office
December 1984

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4.

94 
APPENDIX 5

SUMMARY OF OPTIONS TO.ESTABLISH A

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

PAGE

PERMANENT LONDON 26

Responsibilities outlined.
unirement for National
Co?ordinator.

Suggested organisation during
periods of major disorder.
Recommended as long term solution.

TEMPORARY OFFICE IN LONDON 38
(VARIATION OF OPTION 1) (Para. 4.21)

Activate when need arises.
Premises not identified.
Proximity to N.R.C. an advantage.

LEAD OFFICE FROM ANY OF THE 7 39

(OPTION 2)

Considerable problems with office
space.

Computer support difficult and
expensive.

Staffing very complicated not
considered a viable option.

LEAD OFFICE FROM ONE OF FOUR 43
RICIIOO. Is
(OPTION 3A)

Use Birmingham, Manchester, Wakefield
or Bristol.
Lessens problems associated with Option

Inherent staffing and computerisation
problems remain and not considered
a viable option.

 

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5.

- 95 -
APPENDIX 5 (Cont.)

wig
44
At! .1115 Ma .13! .9 .mu

 

Suitablc accommodation readily


Starting and computer support less
problematical.

Easy for police service to identify
with pro-selected location.


not! 911-



 

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- 96 -

APPENDIX 6



.2
Creation of Force Operational 3.1
Intelligence Units.
Suggested composition of Force 3.7
Operational Intelligence
Units.
During normal activity. 3.8
At times of high activity. 3.9
Appointment of a National 4.2
Intelligence Co-ordinator.
Establishment of a permanent 4.3
National Intelligence Office
(N.I.O.) in London.
Suggested functions of Permanent 4.6
N.I.O.
Recommended staffing of N.I.O. 4.19
during periods of major disorder.
Alternative options for creation
of temporary N.I.O.
London location. 4.21
All Regional Criminal 4.23

Intelligence Offices
(Option 2).

Four Regional Criminal 4.37
Intelligence Offices
(Option 3A).

Birmingham R.C.I.O. 4.40
(Option 3B).

Recommendations in respect of 4.49
5.6, 9 Regions.

Role of Special Branch. 5.2

Recommended Information System 6.2
content for Force, Regional or
National Intelligence Offices.

Adoption of Standardised 6.10
Administrative Procedures

in Operational Intelligence

Units.

 

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 w?HOLMES computer in
National Intelligence Office.

Proposed method of financing
HOLMES requirement.

Recommended procedure for
activating N.I.O.

Recommendation to standardise

_information evaluation.

APPENDIX 6 (Cont.)

PARAGRAPH



6.39 6.48
7.5
7.7

9.6

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