. 1 THE IMPLEMENTATION nun"! .i HE A.C.P.O. WORKING: . IN THE REPORT MAJOR PUBLIC DISORDER I a A HE RECOMMENDATIONS - 2JNTELLIG .ul" . Scanned by CamScanner .11- seam?e" ImmwmIm I. REVIEW OF ARRANGEMENTS TO DEAL WITH OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN FORCES MINIMUM INDICES REQUIREMENT THECQMPUTER REQUIREMENT THE COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENT EINRNQIALIMPLICATIQNS STAFFING REQUIREMENTS QEEICE ADDITIONAL SUWYOF REWATIWS (Scanned by CamScanner 1.1 1.2 1.3 mm . The ACPO Working Party on Operational Intelligence recoIrmended inter alia that a permanent National Intelligence Office be established as the best means of dealing with the manifold and various problems inherent in the management of the intelligence system in its entirety. The Working Party envisaged that such a National Office, as part of its permanent function, would embrace a responsibility for monitoring public order problems which might take on a national dimension. A National Office would be dedicated to the provision of proper intelligence support at all levels of the system; and this would include support for the Mutual Aid Co?ordination Centre (formerly the National Reporting Centre). . .1 It is submitted that there is an urgent and prima facie need to enhance public order intelligence arrangements; pending the eventual introduction of an acceptable integrated system based on the second generation Police National Computer. The interim solution necessary to achieve this enhancement recognises the need for a central co-ordination point. There are compelling arguments which militate against the establishment of a National Office other than on a permanent basis. Information should be collected continually so that a proper analysis and ongoing evaluation of historical data can occur. If the process is permitted to function correctly, the intelligence which is disseminated will provide reliable indicators about the intentions, capabilities and vulnerability of those who engage in organising and initiating disorder. Intelligence produced inthis way will aid operational commanders to make more accurate decisions about the way in which manpower and other resources should be Scanned by CamScanner . - 1.4 1.5 allocated and deployed to take preventative action and assist in the detection of offences. If there is no continuity in the process of information gathering, it has to be accepted that the intelligence which is disseminated at the outset of a national incident will be less meaningful and less reliable. It is appreciated, however, that there are long term problems to overcome before a permanent National Intelligence Office can be created. Accordingly, the option which is to be taken forward at the present time relates to the establishment of an 'ad hoc' National Intelligence Office capable of receiving, analysing and disseminating information generated during periods of widespread public disorder transcending regional police boundaries. A failure to create a National Office would result, it is suggested, in the service being no better prepared than in 1984 to deal with the next national problem which arises. It is inperative that the functions and status of a National Intelligence Office should be understood fully. Such an office will not 'act as an arm of government', neither will it direct police operations in particular police areas; nor will it seek to infiltrate organisations of whatever persuasion. It will, however, undertake a quite legitimate information and evidence gathering role in sumort of all police forces and the Mutual Aid Co?ordination Centre, so that the police service is better able to deliver a properly co?ordinated response to national problems. The ?suggested terms of reference and functions of a National Office will be described in detail in a later report. Scanned by CamScanner The terms of reference for the post of Superintendent (National Intelligence) have been agreed with the Home Office to the extent that approval has been given for the post-holder to take forward over a six month period the detailed planning which is necessary in order to develop intelligence arrangements along the lines envisaged (see para 1.4 above). Questions as to the possible location and functions of a National Intelligence Office in this context do not fall within the terms of reference currently. 'Ihis Interim Report - submitted as required within three months - treats the following areas specificallythe state of 'in?force' arrangements to deal with operational intelligence; the minimum indices requirement and the camuter system which would be needed to support and maintain those indices in an 'ad hoc' National Office; other oonmunications equipment which would be required; orders of cost for and above: staffing requirements; size of office accatmodation required. Scanned by CamScanner 1.8 'Ihe final section of the Report details mat further work is required to omplete the planning phase, so that the recomnendations contained in the First Report can be translated into policy and acknowledged practice. x. Scanned by CamScanner In 1985 the Working Party conducted a survey of all forces in England and Wales to establish what action had been taken in relation to the letter dated 13th June 1985, sent to all Chief Officers by Sir Stanley Bailey in his role as Chairman of the Study Group on Intelligence and the Media. letter sets out recommendations made by the Study Group. The reocmnendations concerning individual forces are the following: a) there should be established within each force an Operational Intelligence Unit of a size dependent upon the size of the force and the current situation; b) this Unit would be part of the 'Operations Department' which already exists in one form or another within forces; and c) the Assistant Chief Constable reSponsible for 'Operations' would have overall control of the Unit. Details concerning the letter and the outcome of the survey in 1985 are to be found in Chapter of the First Report at paragraphs 3.1 - 3.4. The national survey was repeated in ?March 1937 to ascertain how forces deal currently with the issue of operational intelligence. The results do ?not differ substantially from those obtained in 1985. Of the forty-three forces in England and Wales, the current position is that ten forces have 'stand alone' operational intelligence units, eighteen have tasked their criminal intelligence sections with! the additional responsibility of operational intelligence, three have made Special Branch responsible, and i Scanned by CamScanner twelve forces have made contingency plans to form terrporary units should the need arise. It is clear from the most recent survey that each force has taken steps to develop a system oonmensurate with its own requirements, and which accords with the overall scheme of things ?as described in the 1985 letter. However, it is equally clear that a lacuna remains in the structure, which would be eliminated by the formation of a permanent central unit taking a oo-ordinating overview at national level. Scanned by CamScanner ?qw The First Report stated clearly that it is not possible to specify all the indices which a National Intelligence Office would need to maintain, due to the infinite number of variables which may become relevant during peariods of major public disorder. However, a minimum requirement was described as follows:? a) details of all persons arrested, their associates and associations with particular groups or organisations; f? b) details of persons who come to notice who have not been arrested but whose activities give rise to the suspicion of criminal offences; c) vehicle details of those persons at and above, and additional vehicles of interest which cannot be connected to named persons; d) details of relevant associations or representative groups and persons known to be involved in their organisational structure; e) information about incidents of mass picketing and categories of crime and incidents relevant to the circumstances; f) telephone numbers and part numbers; f? g) nicknames and radio call signs. The indioes described above are broadly similar to those which were kept . Scanned by CamScanner 3? iy?the ?entral Intelligence Unit at Leicester during the Miners'.Dispute. Egually, the indices set out in paragraph 3.2 are representative of those kept in other police indexing systems enincluding HOLMES - which have been examinai The reSults of informal soundings taken with personnel working in the intelligence system indicate that this general specification is yalid and is the essential requirement for which one should aim. Accordingly, it is recommended that the specification set out in paragraph 3i2 should be adopted as the minimum indices requirement for a National intelligence Office to satisfy needs in the short term. This recommendation is postulated subject to the caveat that the computer system which is used in a National Office should be flexible enough to take account of other matters which may become relevant and therefore deserving of indexing and research resources. Scanned by CamScanner .2 the question of dedicated computer support for a National Intelligence (ffioe has been debated at length by members of the Working Party. There ha been also a good deal of consultation with other interested parties and agencies who have had valuable contributions to make. It is pertinent so publish some of the issues and suggestions on which the debate has foamed. A card iuhx It has been azggested in one quarter that it would be possible to maintain a national index using a card system, based on standardised administrative procedures. This suggestion is to be disregarded immediately. The notion fails to gate mount of the limitations of a manual system. It is sutmitted that a card index would not fulfil the operational intelligence requirement in the context of a temporary National? Office monitoring major public disorder. The task of maintaining a card system is a laborious one. A clear limitation is that only one person is able to properly research the index at any one time. Furthermore, it is in the process of the analysis and evaluation of information that a card based system proves most unwieldy, particularly if the data?Base becomes very large. It is of interest that certain other national indices such as the Animal Rights Intimal Irudex and the National Bureau for the Suppression of Counterfeit agency do not make use of manual systems when recording information and distilling that information to produce tintelligence. Scanned by CamScanner 521-9; Auto-Index as a mans of cocputeriaing the indexing function of the standard Ianial has been advocated as an intern solution for use in a may National intelligence Office. A wile the system facilitates the rapid retrieval of information and is less labour intensive than the traditional card index. it is not accepted that it is the best solution to satisfy the short ter- needa for moved public order intelligence arrangements. It is recognised that certain forces have made use of the package very successfully for their own requirements. However, as the predecessor of the was mecification, the suggested use of Auto-Index lust be regarded as sosething of a retrograde step, especially as it is known that potential for expansion on an 'upvards growth path' via the Police Rational Ccnputer is to be discontinued on a date yet to be fixed. A decision to adopt Auto-Index for use in a temporary National Office sight be regarded as short-sighted in the extreme, in that it might be seen as advancing the came of public order intelligence in isolation and :1th (he regard for other planned .: i u. Mined Intelligence aust- Accuputerised system has been introduced by the Suffolk Constabulary ithich. when complete, will see fully computerised data-bases in Local Intelligence Offices throughout the county. The system is based on mull-Douglas hardware and Isis software and would wear to satisfy the operational intelligence requirmnt for a talporary Rational Officesyste- in fact is a wstanised version of the qwecification and 10 Scanned by CamScanner has similar indexing capabilities, except for the 'sequence' index which . l: . Ii? been deleted. There are other differences, notably in those fields "?J?nd'facilities which take full account of the recommendations made by the 4 ACPO Working Party on Data Protection. The system is sized currently to host up to sixteen terminals, which . . w-number might be required to support the sustained operation of a National 5f? Intelligence Office given the worst conceivable public disorder scenario. 'Although the system is based on the HOLMES specification, it is not in a: ?If-r fact compatible with HOLMES. The compatibility issue is discussed when 1 7 . . . the HOLMES option is considered. .10 The Suffolk Computerised Intelligence System is an attractive one, and an approximate order of cost is included later in the report. However, for L?raome of the reasons adduced when considering Auto?Index, the adoption of the Suffolk system to satisfy the short term needs might act to the 14 w. disadvantage eventually of public order intelligence arrangements. These jg) . arrangements might be so compartmentalised that it would not prove fru'ssible to reap the benefits later on of a properly integrated system. Wu. _BanaOfficeLareHaor i tern I P?i?ha Working Party recommended that a National Intelligence Office should krb. HOLMES to satisfy the recording and processing requirements of II I aft-national intelligence in the short term. This recorrmendation took full of the following factors:- 11 Scanned by CamScanner ;5 BS is the only computerised system currently which is standard . oughout the country, so that there is 'commonality' or compatibility een data-bases. Thus, if HOLMES were used for the operational i lligence requirement, the national data-base would be readily m-l Wilable for a major crime enquiry team from a particular area or areas access if the need arose. It is submitted that the argument regarding {(votibility outweighs any disadvantages which might be advanced against 9 use of mil-ES. 11" 1? large number of police personnel have received/are to receive training -. t3: Kin I - - .1Hrces, and the course is based on a standard content devised at national 3 ?ts evel. It follows that, in the event that a National Intelligence Office 3- activated, a large pool of trained staff will be available throughout the use of HOLMES. The training is being administered locally in 1? .the country, and it will be possible to draw on this reserve to Operate tr- 9. MES in a National Office. .r r! fact that trained personnel will be readily available to staff a National Office will result in training implications at national level u? -. _;being much reduced. This area is addressed later in the report when ?0 -: mp fing requirements are identified. (See paragraph 7.14). I .2, thermore, it is understood that, at some stage in 1987, a central ?ility will become available 'via the Police National Computer which will CW an upwards growth path for a HOLMES data-base if it grows too large, it becomes necessary to link different data-bases. .1. ?:veral points have been made against the use of HOLMES for the 12 Scanned by i i It - -perational intelligence requirement. It is stated quite that . HOLMES is the official functional specification that all police incident room systems should now met, and is designed to assist in the management ,4 to! major crime enquiries. It is further stated that it was not envisaged 4' that it would be employed to record and process information for l' intel igence purposes. Additionally, it is suggested that the system is too comprehensive and too 1 Iophisticated for the operational intelligence requirement, to the extent . i that its use would be an 'overkill'. As the system is sophisticated, it . if is claimed that adaptation of the 'system would be necessary to suit ff- intelligence requirements, and that fields would be misused. This would ?e result, it is said, in a movement away from the rules and conventions - . . - dictated for HOLMES. Furthermore, HOLMES trained staff would suffer if they were instructed to use the system in a different way than that in which they had been trained. '3 I it?. . Despite the objections Which have been raised, the recomendation that a g\ HOLMES system should be used to satisfy the Operational intelligence A i3 reguircnent of a National Office in the short term remains utterly valid. I'i?he fact that the system was not designed primarily with an intelligence It): epplioation in mind must not prohibit its use for that application if it I II Lproves to be a suitable tool for the purpose. One has to recognise that personnel do make use of the system to satisfy certain intelligence . qfunctions in police incident rooms. It is accepted that the full ?a -ilities of the system may be under?used in a National Intelligence A. 112$, but that should not render its use impracticable, particularly 13 Scanned by CamScanner me considers the highly responsive nature of the data-base and the that it is fully transferable. is appreciated that the system is labour intensive, but so are other Indexing systems used by the police. The point which is readily and Briously acknowledged is that relating to the rules and conventions 'v?-licable to HOLMES. If HOLMES is to be used, standards must be adhered so that the integrity of the system is not corrupted. This matter is .-L bf paramount importance if it is envisaged that there will be a need to link incidents via the central facility. ere are, of course, implications regarding the use of HOLMES for intelligence purposes in a National Office. There will be a need to draft a registration for the application'pursuant to the Data Protection Act .1984. It is submitted that the Data Protection legislation does not - esent such insurmountable difficulties as would preclude the use of a .50! 1 system along the lines envisaged, subject to proper observance of .A the data protection principles. ?further implication concerns the envisaged use of the central facility the need were to arise. Specific areas of difficulty in this context ,1 or those tasked with the management of the central facility will need to I resolved at a later stage. .arproximate cost of procuring a HOLMES system to support the indices would be maintained in a temporary National Intelligence Office is iled later in this report. 14 Scanned by CamScanner the longer term, a strategy for the development of a system to satisfy . ?requirements of a temporary National Intelligence Office will need to I: advanced in line with the strategy governing the develqnent of police #li infomtim system as a whole. Irdeed, the Crininal Information tems Strategy Study conducted by the Police Technical Services 3" urtment recognised that much of the content of intelligence records .atblicates the information held in criminal records and concluded that: . of intelligence with records intonation and utilisation of the same information technology infrastructure would represent the lost I ?it-effective use of the total resources invested.? 'r 15 Scanned by CamScanner nu? MIMICNS '30 function efficiently and effectively a temporary National Intelligence would require a range of communications facilities. The exact . 1AM tent of these facilities would depend very much on the scale of the nc?ident for which the Office had been activated. t. .33. it is not a viable proposition at this stage to consider a networked ., puterised information system, so that it is anticipated that Ch . .n-ormation would be transmitted to the National Office from all parts of i he country via conventional channels of communication, i.e. via *1 2 telephone, telex and facsimile equipment. Li 1 r't is suggested that six exchange lines should be provided for a National 1 1r. 2' ice, of which one should be secure. 0 {is further suggested that the lines might be handled by a small switch 1.x: F. the Office, capable of supporting up to ten extensions. r. ?4 .13 hoped that incoming calls might be put on a 'hunting' facility for 1? 7 . . sake of convenience. Eli as the secure telephone is concerned, the Directorate of Tele- J-mr'hications, and Networks Branch in particular, have been anxious to ?rstheir poor opinion of the normal British Telecom speech inverters has Privacy No. 8 sets. Interception of communications via this ,6 minis achievable by unskilled persons. The reconmendation of Networks 1 A I is that the installation of Plessey 'Voicelok' equipment should be l6 1 Scanned by ?amScanner Isidered. The system is classified as less than fully secureperfectly adequate for police privacy purposes. Use of this ipment would involve a departure rfrom established police practice but certainly improve greatly the security of police communications. gm ible equipment would be needed nationally to realise this option, is'one telephone in each Force (located in Headquarters Special '??anch Office), one in the National Office, and one in the Mutual Aid Co- jdfdination Centre. If approval in principle is given to an exploration of . *?option, the Communications Electronic Security Group at Cheltenham I?I'mprovide a analysis of the equipment. (See paragraphs 13.12; and 6.13 also which explains why the installation of Privacy No. equipment is likely to be the preferred option). '31; e: provision of a teleprinter machine is considered essential to support {the operation of a National Office. During periods of most intense activity, there may be a requirement to instal two machines. The r'n?vision of 'Leopard' equipment has been investigatedsecure telephone line being available, it is not considered {-ssary at this stage to investigate for the National Office the option l?alii'secure telex facilities. It, is expected that there would be a staffing jjuitment to the National Office by Special Branch during periods of public disorder. It would be feasible for personnel from Special i?i?nch to make use of their secure?telex facilities located elsewhere 1 fully in the same building as the National Office) should the need ?fto ccmunicate information of a high classification, and for those 17 (H Scanned by CamScanner icers themselves to convey relevant information transmitted by these p\ to the National Office. imile :HCsimile machines are now used by most police forces and many other ncies. There is a demonstrable need for such equipment in a National 3 i ice. when it may be necessary to relay information in exact form. so at it can be acted on authoritatively and without delay. Any machine ich is installed in a National Office should be Group 2 or Group 3 i i mtible. 18 Scanned by CamScanner A 'lhe orders of cost which are set out in this section of the report should be viewed with some caution, as it would have been entirely inappropriate .. approach suppliers at this stage for precise figures. Accordingly, figures which are included are based on those from various Computer ?velopment Departments in forces, and on figures quoted by Networks . Branch. ?i?ices quoted in this section relating to communications equipment . xcluding computer systems) are based on tariffs applicable for April 1987. A demonstration of any of the equipment and systems discussed in . this report can be arranged. - - Omterised Intelligence System 3 total figure for the hardware necessary to support the Suffolk r- terised Intelligence System would be in the order of ?150,000 ?lusive of delivery and installation). I 3? - emphasised that the figure quoted above is based on the supply of a Mlemegabyte processor with sixteen ports, and the figure includes the shame of sixteen terminals and two printers. ?aintenance contract for the hardware would amount to about 12% of the 32. tal cost per annum. . a above must be added the annual rental of the Isis software which _?-amount to approximately ?6,000. . Scanned by CamScanner HOLMES ?The cost of supplying a HOLMES system to support the indices of a temporary National Intelligence Office would be in the region of ?60,000 - ?75 000 . - This figure is based on the supply of a Honeywell DPS 6/52 processor capable of supporting fourteen terminals and two printers. 5 The connection charges for six exchange lines would be ?630, and the at": ?annual rental for the lines ?541.20. ?5 (a 1 The cost of a small switch to handle up to ten extensions would be in the 7; region of ?1,000. [The rental cost of one telephone per annum would be approximately 515? I - The purchase price of fifty Plessey 'Voicelok' telephones would be .5 ??60,000. This would ensure high level voice security for police 33-- . ications nationally, and the option is supported by Networks Branch. . if f. je . "course, Special Branch would use the system daily regardless of whether the National Intelligence Office and the Mutual Aid (Io?ordination Centre [were Operating . ?ftc rd 11:1" gfthe? level of expenditure urged in paragraph 6.12 does not receive .1 approval, one would have to make do with the ordinary Privacy No. 8 set. 1m"? v? ?r-?The connection charge for this would be ?15, and the rental per quarter 160. It is probable that installation of the ordinary speech inversion I 20 x; Scanned by CamScanner device would be the preferred option, due to the cost implications in respect of the Pleasey equipment which may be considered prohibitive. In any event, before the Plessey option could be viewed favourably, one would ll.- . . need some firm evidence which indicated that persons engaged in public disorder were capable of or intent on intercepting police canuunications. I Telex The cost of a 'Leopard' teleprinter machine would be ?1,650 inclusive of connection charge. The line rental is in the order of ?88 per quarter. . HS There would be a maintenance charge'of around ?50 per quarter. SA rental scheme is available, which is based normally on a two year . contract. Facsimile .IThe cost of a Group 2/Group 3 compatible facsimile machine would be between ?1,500 and ?2,000. Overall costs -- BMith all due regard for the note of caution sounded in paragraph 6.1, and assuming that the suggested provision of a HOLMES system, ordinary telephones, a secure telephone based on Privacy No. 8 equipment and ordinary telex and facsimile equipment meets with approval, the total .A expenditure involved would be approximately ?80,000. (excluding annual ,rental charges for lines and certain eguipnent). in, 21 Scanned by CamScanner mm . lI?he staffing levels of a temporary National Intelligence Office would . depend verylnuch on the extent of the incident for which the Office had been activated, and on the amount of information being fed to the Office. A relatively small staff might run the National Office very efficiently . (and effectively at certain times, but the contingency plans for staffing Vlmust allow the Office to operate on a twenty-four hour basis when activity nationally is intense. The First Report set out in diagrammatic form the staffing requirements sufficient to cater for this eventuality: ASSISTANT CHIEF SPECIAL BRANCH LIAISON CONSTABLE LIAISON (Office Commander) SUPT DET INSP DEI INSP (Office Manager) OOMPUTING TEAMS LIAISON AND . EVALUATION AND - ANALYSIS OF -. - INFORMATION INFORMATION . SYSTEM SPECIAL BRANCH r? INPUT Although it is likely that the President of A.C.P.O. would retain overall responsibility for a temporary National Intelligence Office, in the same way as he does for the Mutual Aid Co-ordination Centre, it would be impossible for him due to his many and varied commitments to be present on 22 Scanned by CamScanneI a day to day basis. Accordingly, the Working Party considered that it would be appropriate for an Assistant Chief Constable to have command of a National Office. This would ensure proper co?ordination of the functions of that Office. Indeed, the Assistant Chief Constable might be called the National Intelligence Co-ordinator. The rank of Assistant Chief Constable is considered to be the correct rank for this command role, as appropriate reporting practice would be ensured from the National Office to the Deputy Chief Constable in charge of the Mutual Aid Co-ordination Centre. The 'level of operation of a National Office would determine whether an Assistant Chief Constable needed to be present at all times. A Detective Superintendent should be seconded to act as deputy to the National Intelligence Coordinator. The Superintendent would, of course, {run?the Office in the absence of the Assistant Chief Constable. It would seen eminently sensible if one of the senior supervisory staff in a National Office came from the area in which that National Office was located. This suggestion is made with a view to ensuring a fast and efficient response to a conmand for activation of the Office. It is envisaged that one Detective Inspector would act as office manager and that another would supervise the processing of all information- .- . entering the Office. It is suggested that the Special Branch staffing comitment to the Office would be at the level of Detective Sergeant. This commitment would facilitate communications generally, and with Special Branch personnel elsewhere . 23. Scanned by CamScanner 4' Npq?L" 9 It is possible to parallel to some extent the staffing and training requirements for potential attachment to a temporary National Office with those set out for the Mutual Aid Co-brdination Centre. The figures which follow are intended to establish a nucleus of trained staff who could provide twenty-four hour cover in an Office working at full capacity: .10 6 Assistant Chief Constables - Intelligence Co?ordinators 10 Det. Superintendents - Deputy Co-ordinators 20 Det. Inspectors 20 Sergeants 64 Constables .11 It would be the responsibility of the Assistant Chief Constable or 'Detective Superintendent concerned to determine the exact staffing levels he required for each tour of duty. .12 The figure of ?1 Constables, which may seem somewhat exorbitant at first ?sight, is established so as to allow operation of up to sixteen terminals l'on a twenty-four hour basis. It is hoped that this level of operation would cater adequately for all indexing and research work on the HOLMES system. It is accepted that this number of personnel would be required only when public disorder was most intense. .13 It is anticipated that staff would be identified and drawn from the regions on which Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices are based. 24 Scanned by CamScanner '14 While the training implications for selected staff do not fall within the purview of this Interim Report specifically, there would be an obvious requirement for personnel up to the rank of Inspector to be HOLMES trained, and for the Superintendents and.Assistant.Chief Constables to have a good appreciation of the capabilities of the systent In addition, all personnel up to the rank of Inspector should have attended the new national course which is being developed for those working in the intelligence system. There would also be a requirement for some personnel to have received training in 'Anacapa' techniques. .15 As previously stated in paragraphs 4.13 and 4.14, the availability of HOLMES trained personnel would greatly reduce the burden of the training implications in respect of staff selected to man a National Office. .16'A1'l of the issues which surround the need for training will be considered in detail in a later report. 25 Scanned by CamScanner mm The terms of reference for the Superintendent (National Intelligence) do not allow at this stage for any feasibility study regarding the possible location(s) of a temporary National Intelligence Office. Whilst accepting that a detailed survey would be necessary to locate suitable for a National Office, it is possible to outline the size of the accommodation which might be required. In arriving at a specification in outline, it has been necessary to take account of staffing levels, the number of indices and associated records which would need to be kept, and the size of the computer system which would be required to support the indices. It is suggested that office accommodation measuring not less than 800 square feet should be made available for a temporary National Intelligence Office. Within this area a double office module should be available for the Assistant Chief Constable and Detective Superintendent in charge of the National Office . .r'Ihe remainder of the accormodation would be taken up by other personnel, ?the'computer and its terminals, and other communications equipment. Adequate arrangements would needto be made to house and ventilate the processor . 26 Scanned by CamScanner Clearly, there remains a great deal of further work to be done to achieve the implementation of the reconmendations contained in the First Report of the ACPO Working Party on Operational Intelligence. The staff of the National Public Order Forward Planning Unit (1021) at New Scotland Yard is fully calmitted, and it is evident that no support staff is readily available to assist in taking the next steps. It is sutmitted that, even given some support staff, the task cannot be completed within a time-scale of six months. The following represents a suIrmary of what further work is required:- a) Locate and designate accommdation for a National Intelligence Office (in London or elsewhere); b) Arrange for and supervise the installation of the necessary comnunications wires and points in the designated c) Procure computer system in liaison with d) Arrange for staff to be nominated and supervise the training programme for that staff; and devise administrative procedures to ensure that sufficient trained personnel are readily available to staff an 'ad hoc' National Intelligence Office; e) Specify procedures to activate a National Intelligence Office; 27 Scanned by CamScanner f) Define the suggested terms o?.reference and functions of a National Office: 9) Consider the implications of Data Protection legislation and associated Codes of Practice in relation to the proposed use Of HOLMES in a National Office; 11) Take account of recmmendations contained in the Second Report of the ACPO Working Party which may impinge on those contained in the First Report. 28 .yi Scanned by CamScanner 10,1 10.2 The police service is expected by Gwermnt and pill in slim to respond speedily and effectively to incidents of public disorder was?? emanating from industrial disputes! racial conflict, hooligtmm or War social discord. However, unless greater priority is given to the my in which 1?!me? is handled during periods of major public disorder, the palms reg/m 14111 never measure up to those expectations. A glotation from true ??g/gt on the Brixton Disorders 1985' expressed the sentiment in the foil/?int; manner "We believe that the management of information is the m: critical aspect to the success of the policing operation daring - public disorder.? It is recomended that the period of secondment for the Smerintersdest (National Intelligence) should be extended to allow the minim of further work specified in this mport, which is my it public order intelligence arrangements are to be developed along the line: winged. There is a very real danger that {the not Widerable rmxcu already devoted in forces to public order intelligence will be wasted than: a - failure to invest that little extra at national level. 29 Scanned by CamScanner . a i) ii) . .1112 iv) V) vii) ?xJ Minimum indices requirement Use of RIMES in a National Intelligence Offiw Provision of telephone lines Provision of teleprinter machine .. Provision of facsimile machine . Installation of secure telephone (Privacy No. 8 set) .. Assistant Chief Constable town-1000 Det. Supt to act as deputy to ACCOC. Special Branch staffing mimttoN-IIOU Staffirlg levels Office . xii) Additional work implications Extension of period of secondment for Superintendent . (National Intelligence) 3d 3.4 4.18 5.3 5.7 5.9 a 6.13 7.4 7.5 7.8 7.10 8.3 - 8.5 9.3 10.3 Scanned by CamScanner